

The Impact of the Irish Revolution on the
Irish Community in Scotland, 1916-23

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CONTENTS

- Abstract - i-ii
- Preface - iii-x
- Chapter 1: The Irish in Scotland c1840-1914: The Development of a Separate Community, pp 1-52.
- Chapter 2: The Rise of Sinn Fein, 1916-18: Attitudes in Flux, pp 53-104. •
- Chapter 3: The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21: A Community at War, pp 105-144. •
- Chapter 4: Physical Force Irish Republicanism in Scotland, c1912-21, pp 145-194. •
- Chapter 5: The Irish Civil War: Apathy and Revulsion, pp 195-240.
- Chapter 6: The Attraction of Labour, 1918-22, pp 241-292.
- Chapter 7: The Effect of the Irish Question on Communal Relations in Scotland, c1912-22, pp 295-354.
- Conclusions - pp 355-361.
- Bibliography - pp 362-370

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Abstract

The aim of this thesis is to examine how those who were accorded, and accepted, the status of being Irish but who resided in Scotland responded to, and influenced the course of, the events that occurred in Ireland between 1916-23. The major insight into the activities of the Irish community in Scotland has been provided by the *Glasgow Observer*, the paper which was designed primarily to serve, and reflect the wishes of, this community. In addition, whenever possible, reference has been made to the archives of the political organisations that were active in this community during the period under examination.

Chapter 1 examines the growth and development of a distinct community in Scotland between the 1840s, when Irish first arrived in considerable numbers, and the onset of the Great War. It also records how the growth of this community on the margins of society affected mainstream Scottish society. Chapters 2, 3 & 4 examine the political developments that occurred in Ireland between 1916-21, when a section of that country sought to change its constitutional position within the United Kingdom by force of arms, and attempt to assess the response of the immigrant community in Scotland to the rise of republicanism in Ireland. The impact of the subsequent civil war in Ireland, 1922-3, on the Irish community in Scotland is discussed in chapter 5.

Chapters 6 & 7 discuss how far the events in Ireland

affected the position of the immigrant community in their adopted land. both politically and socially. vis a vis mainstream Scottish society.

PREFACE

Possibly no subject excites the Scottish popular mind as much as the issue of the Irish community in Scotland. Virtually everybody in the west central belt could voice an opinion on this topic. Indeed, many would claim to be experts on the subject. Paradoxically, despite engendering such interest amongst the general public, little has been written about this distinct community by professional historians.

The aim of this thesis is to examine what effect the events that occurred in Ireland between 1916-23, a period popularly known as the Irish Revolution, had on the political and social life of a section of the population who were accorded, and accepted, the status of being Irish although they and their immediate forefathers, resided in Scotland. Early historical work, particularly that by J.E. Handley, has shown that links between the parent community in Ireland and the immigrants in Scotland remained strong throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century. The 'Irishness' of the immigrants was reinforced by that community's failure to integrate into the mainstream of Scottish society, partly as result of elements within this community who sought to ensure that such a development did not occur, but also because of the hostile attitude adopted by many within the 'native' population to the immigrants. In political terms the effect of this process, as many historians have shown, was that this community saw its role primarily in Irish rather than Scottish terms. It sought to use its

power not to change Scottish society but Ireland's constitutional position within the United Kingdom.

Considering the position adopted by the Irish community in Scotland during the nineteenth century it might be expected the events of, and the issues raised by, the Irish Revolution would exert a powerful, if not overwhelming, influence on the politics of the community under examination. The two main studies of this period, by Handley and Gallagher, have suggested that, while the Irish in Scotland were slow to endorse the politics of Irish Republicanism in the immediate post 1916 period, once it became apparent that Sinn Fein had become the predominant force in Irish nationalism the immigrant community not only transferred its allegiance to the Republican ideal but played an important, if not crucial, role in backing the military campaign of the IRA during the Anglo-Irish war.

Although the period 1919-21 is held to represent the zenith of the immigrant community's influence on Irish politics, paradoxically historians have accorded the community an important role in altering the political landscape in Scotland. Prior to the Great War the political allegiance of the Irish in Scotland was almost solely determined by external, Irish, factors. While an Irish dimension is not totally absent from Scottish politics in the post war era historians have tended to stress the internal factors which helped to produce the

realignment of the Irish vote. It has been suggested that 1922 represents the year when domestic influences eclipsed external factors in moulding the political consciousness of the immigrant community. Indifferent to the civil war that was raging in southern Ireland the immigrants are portrayed as marching, almost as one, behind Labour's red banner and playing a vital part in that Party's electoral breakthrough of that year. The thesis will attempt to examine the interplay of domestic and external factors that resulted in the realignment of the Irish vote in the post war era and attempt to evaluate the strength of these forces in producing this change.

Finally, the thesis will examine the impact of the Irish Question on communal relations within Scottish society. Many people in Scottish life tend to assume that sectarian friction in Scotland is an extension of the conflict that existed in Ireland; not all the immigrants were of Catholic extraction, a sizeable proportion were of the Protestant faith. The immigrants, it is believed, imported their quarrels and introduced the bacillus of sectarianism into a stable society. The Thesis will examine how far sectarianism in Scotland had an internal or external dynamic.

One reason which goes far to explain the reluctance of historians to tackle this subject, despite its hold on the popular imagination, is the paucity of reliable

source material. C.A. Oakley attributes this to the reluctance of the native population to acknowledge or discuss the existence of the immigrant community. Certainly, the lack of coverage is noticeable in the papers that composed the national press, *The Scotsman*, *Glasgow Herald* and the *Daily Record*. The position is no better at local level. Selective examination of newspapers such as the *Motherwell Times*, *The Greenock Telegraph*, *Partick and Marryhill Press*, and *The Govan Press* (all areas with sizeable Irish communities) indicated that the coverage of Irish activities was minute.

If the 'native' as Scots preferred to ignore the Irish experience in Scotland the same can be said of the nation to which this community pledged its allegiance. While it might be expected that comment would be light in national papers such as *The Freeman's Journal* and the *Irish Independent* it was hoped that the more specialised political press, such as *Nationality* and *The Irish Volunteer* would have been more generous in acknowledging the part played by this community in contributing to the causes which these papers championed.

The source most consulted was the *Glasgow Observer*. The paper is undoubtedly the richest source of material concerning the political activities of the immigrant community. The paper reported on the meeting held by prominent Irish politicians in Scotland which were

ignored by the mainstream Scottish press. Many of the organisations that were very active amongst the immigrant community were given the opportunity to put forward their ideas. Moreover, all Irish political bodies submitted reports of organisational meetings at local level, which admittedly tended to concentrate on the social aspects of the evening but, nevertheless, did give some fleeting glances of the issues in which they were interested and fortunes of the respective organisations.

When examining the pages of the *Glasgow Observer* the historian has to be aware of this source's shortcomings. Firstly, it would not, in today's terms, be classified as a 'quality' paper. Its main selling point was the close relationship it enjoyed with Glasgow Celtic, the paper considered itself to be a 'popular football medium'. This should be borne in mind when assessing its political statements. That the *Glasgow Observer* has become essential reading for those who wish to study the immigrant community is testimony more to the lack of source material than to its quality as a newspaper. It should also be noted, that as time progressed, at least between 1912-23, the paper existed less as a medium to reflect a cross section of opinion within the community, but rather to serve as a mouthpiece for its autocratic proprietor, Charles Diamond. If Diamond could be classified as a typical representative of the immigrant community in Scotland this shortcoming would, to a

certain extent be negated. Obviously, his position as a newspaper magnate ensured that this was not the case. Moreover, the fact that he last resided in Scotland in the 1880s and visited infrequently, suggests that his articles were meant to tell the immigrant community what to think rather than articulate their feelings.

With these reservations in mind, an attempt has been made to place the views of the *Glasgow Observer* alongside those espoused by Catholic Socialist Notes column which appeared in *Forward*. Obviously, this column cannot be assumed to represent the immigrant community at large. It was the literary arm of the Catholic Socialist Society, an organisation which never numbered more than 500 members, and was more interested in converting the Irish community to the socialist cause than in absolute historical accuracy. Nevertheless, by examining the issues on which it concentrated one can identify which topics were relevant to the immigrant community. The credibility of the column is increased by the fact that many of those who became prominent in the Labour movement, such as John Wheatley, were prominent members of the CSS. Moreover, as the vast majority of the community which this column sought to reach were voting Labour at the end of the period under examination, it could be held to represent the political destiny of the Irish in Scotland.

The community under examination produced a number of men who achieved prominence in Scottish political life.

However, the thesis has generally eschewed the temptation to write a history of a community through biographies of individuals. Inevitably, biographies are written about exceptional individuals and it is activists who leave biographical material rather than those who compose the mass of the largely inert body politic. Moreover, autobiographical works tend to be very localised studies and degenerate into exercises in self justification where history is perverted to suit ideology. However, this does not mean that the large collection of papers left by prominent individuals such as T.P. O'Connor and John Devlin were ignored. Their experiences in Scotland will be referred to during this thesis in the hope of shedding more light on the subject under examination.

An analyst of present day mass political opinion can divine the mood of the people by examining ⁱⁿ opinion polls or election results. Unfortunately, the former are not available to the historian and political contests in Scotland did not reflect the conflicts between the varieties of Irish nationalism on offer. In order to assess the view taken by the immigrant community towards the various Irish political philosophies that fought for ascendancy during this period stress, will be laid on the fortunes of the organisations which represented these strands of thought, and by this means it is hoped to ascertain the mood of the community under examination. Thus, whenever possible reference will be made to the records of organisations such as the Ancient Order of

Hibernians, the United Irish League of Great Britain.
Sinn Fein and the IRA.

Chapter 1

The Irish in Scotland c1840-1914: The Development of a
Separate Community

On a clear day an observer standing on top of Cave Hill, north Belfast, can see the coastline of Scotland. Considering the proximity of the two countries it is not surprising that each has played a part in shaping the destiny of the other.

As the coastlines of Scotland and Ulster are separated by less than twelve miles at the closest point, transferences of population across the North Channel must have started as soon as man first mastered the open sea.' Although this process was an ongoing one throughout human history, two particular waves of migration have attracted the attention of modern historians because of their relevance to present day political issues. In the case of Ulster this was the mass emigration of Scots in the seventeenth century; so extensive was this that some have called Ulster Scotland's 'invisible colony'.² Distinguishable by their Protestant faith from the bulk of the population of the island and those who had previously crossed the North Channel, these 'planters' evolved into a community, whose politico/religious beliefs were to prove an insurmountable barrier to the attainment of the political desires of the majority of the Irish population between 1886 and 1921. In the opposite direction immigration peaked in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Once again the religious faith of the immigrants was different to that of the host community. Although the Irish in Scotland did not enjoy the success of the Ulster-Scots

in determining the political destiny of their adopted homeland, they retained their own identity and pursued their own political goals.

The bulk of the immigrant Irish settled in the urban centres of Scotland. This is illustrated by the 1841 census. Nationally only 4.8% of the population had been born in Ireland. However, in the counties of Renfrewshire, Lanarkshire, and Dumbartonshire the figures were 13.2%, 13.1%, and 11.0% respectively. In Glasgow and its suburbs 16.2% of the population were Irish born, in Greenock 11.7%, Paisley 10.8%, Airdrie and New Monklands 10.1% and 9.0% in Dundee³. The pace of Irish immigration slowed as the century ebbed away. The proportion of Irish born in Glasgow declined from 13.1% in 1881 to 10.5% in 1891.⁴ In Dundee the number of Irish born residents had been eclipsed by those born in England by 1911.⁵ The bald statistics, however, hide two important facts, which coloured socio/political issues in Scotland during this period. The figures record only first generation Irish immigrants. According to J.E.Handley "immigration into industrial areas had persisted long enough to establish a second and even third generation" Irish community by 1840. He estimated that about 10% of Scotland's population were either Irish or of recent Irish descent by 1840.⁶ Many who proclaimed themselves to Irish had little physical contact with the motherland, their identity was forged by factors other than birth.

The second point, not revealed by the census figures, was the deep divisions that existed amongst those classified as Irish born. Although many equated, and some still do, Irishness with Roman Catholicism a large proportion of immigrants were in fact Protestants whose cultural, economic and political interests had led them to develop a quasi-nationalist philosophy, which was diametrically opposed to that of most Irishmen. The conflict that existed between the two groups did not disappear once they emigrated to Scotland and was a complicating factor in relations between the immigrants and hosts. Unfortunately, there is no way of discerning the religious composition of the immigrants. However, it is likely that a good proportion were Protestants. E.G. Ravenstein has shown that the majority of Irish emigrants came from Ulster and the majority of these came from the four counties, which had the greatest number of Protestants.⁷

There is much evidence, which suggests that Irish Catholic emigrants formed a homogenous community that existed on the margins of Scottish society. John Denvir, for example, described Duntocher of the 1890s as being:

a really thriving Irish community - a model community in fact. The good priest who is like a ruler - or, perhaps, one should say father - among his people, will tell you that this is "Ireland" with all its domestic values, with infinitely more domestic comfort and none of its wretchedness.⁸

This statement could have been applied to a large number of communities at this time.

The "Irishness" of the immigrants was expressed through the whole spectrum of community life - politics, papers, sport and religion. The question arises as to why this happened? It was probably to be expected that distinctive "Irish" communities would develop simply because the most recent arrivals would seek out those of a similar background, who had preceded them in order to help them come to terms with the new environment. However, it is arguable that the rate of assimilation, in respect of the Irish, was slower than other groups which arrived in Scotland. Writing in 1947 Handley stated that it was "doubtful if it can be said that the process (of assimilation) is in being today."⁷ As late as the 1960s, according to Bill Murray, 90% of Celtic fans, a club which flaunts its Irish origins, did not support the Scotland international football team, arguably the most potent symbol of Scottish nationhood.¹⁰ If "Scottishness" is defined as support for a politically independent Scotland then those with an Irish background, albeit some generations removed, have shown little enthusiasm.¹¹ Although it should be borne in mind that in the latter case that the "average" Scot has not been over zealous in pursuing that goal.

It has been argued that anti Catholicism on the part of the indigenous population was the major factor in slowing

the assimilation of the Irish into Scottish society. Handley compares the experience of the Catholic Irish in Scotland with that of the continental Jew:

like the Goldsteins and the Cohens, the Bradys, the Dochertys and the O'Tooles are names that thunder their nationality in the ears of the Presbyterian Scot and stir the recollection of his grandfather's sentiments towards 'the low Irish.' One result of that isolation was... that the immigrants were thrown back on one another for social intercourse in their moments of leisure.¹²

This process was, in effect, self perpetuating. Rejected because of their Catholicism the immigrants were forced back into a community which was centred around the Catholic parish. Handley describes the self reliant nature of immigrant society and how it revolved around the church:

The church had been built with their hard earned money their pastors were usually Irish like themselves, the school alongside depended on their contributions for its upkeep, and even the humble parish hall hallowed in their sight by the fact that it had been their temporary chapel until they were able to undertake the erection of a stone edifice. The hall provided recreation for them in the evenings of the week and was the meeting place on Sundays after Mass for the formulation of plans for financing the school and clearing off debts, determining policy in the schoolboard and municipal elections. In addition, it housed such confraternities as the Young Men's Society or the local branch of the benevolent institution known as the Irish National Order of Foresters.¹³

While anti-Catholicism on the part of the host community played a part in slowing the process of assimilation it was by no means the only factor. William Walker has

argued that the 'separate development' of the Irish community was at least partly due to the immigrants choosing this path. For example, the paper most associated with the Irish community in 1864, the *Glasgow Free Press*, warned of the dangers of associating with 'those who differ so much from us in morals, manners, habits, customs and religion.' The paper stated that: 'so sure as we associate with them, so sure we will be defiled; their very breath is enough to do it...If we do not gather ourselves from them, they will corrupt the hearts of even the wise and good among us.'¹⁴ Walker states that:

This conviction, common among the Irish Catholic laity and one endorsed by their priests, was the foundation of the community within a community erected by the Irish wherever they congregated. Within their enclaves the Irish imbued values, conformed to codes of conduct, and submitted to patterns of subordination which, if essential to cultural survival and perhaps, just plain survival, acted none the less to cut them off from the mainstream of working class aspiration.¹⁵

Ironically, Handley records how assimilation flourished as descendants of the eighteenth century in Galloway lost their Catholic faith in the absence of priests.¹⁶ Consequently, intermarriage with members of the host community was a frequent occurrence and gradually the Irish emblems of the immigrants took on a different hue. For example, Irish names changed. McMahon became McMeechin, Dwyer changed to Dyer, McDade to Davidson, McDevitt to McDavid, O'Neil to McNeil and Devine to

Devon. Although Handley explicitly attributes the slow pace of assimilation to Scottish bigotry his evidence supports Walker's contentions that pressures within the immigrant community played a greater role in retarding the process.

The bulk of the Irish who settled in Scotland in the nineteenth century were wretchedly poor; indeed many of those who came to Scotland only remained because they could not afford to travel to the U.S.A. Their relationship with the majority of the Scottish working class, possibly not surprisingly, was similar to that with Scottish society in general. Many commentators have ascribed much anti-Catholic feeling amongst the indigenous working class to economic rather than religious factors.¹⁷ Arguably sectarian friction was sharpest in the mining areas of Scotland. Handley identifies the Motherwell-Coatbridge area as the cockpit of Catholic-Protestant rivalry and A.B.Campbell comments that tension was highest in the mining industry.¹⁸ The fact that many Irish were used as strikebreakers and were prepared to work for lower rates of pay than their Scottish counterparts created ill feeling between the two groups.¹⁹ That the economic basis of the conflict between the two groups could be expressed in religious terms can be seen in the poem "Scenes Underground". Set in a Lanarkshire coalfield in 1819 the initial economic attack on the Irish soon develops a religious thrust:

(Voices) Aff, aff wi' the Irish.

(Shovel) They take our bread and make us to perish!...

(Tammy) Treach'ry's in their religion and their creed. An I Trust Romans, then say Tammy's dead.

(Voices) Aff wi' ignorant beasts o' Bab'lon.

(Tammy) Ay, lang syne they boiled guid folk in cauldrons, And roasted our forefather's t'death in fire, Twaden e'en the patience o' a McGavin tire, To tell o' their ways that nae guid furthers! Their curs'd inquisitions, plots and murthers!²⁰

H. Hechter has portrayed working class anti-Catholicism as an example of "natives" displaying aristocratic modes of thought, apeing the attitudes of their 'betters', when they should have allied themselves with their fellow exploited in a class alliance in order to ameliorate their social conditions.²¹ It is arguable that Hechter, like Handley, has wrongly attributed the exclusion of the Irish from mainstream working class society to nativist bigotry and failed to take into account the forces within the immigrant community that prohibited the formation of working class unity. Campbell is unable to state categorically that the Roman Catholic Church attempted to dissuade its flock from joining Trades Unions in nineteenth century Lanarkshire. However, J. H. Treble's research into the position in the north of England has concluded that the hostility of the local priests to Trades Unions significantly reduced immigrant participation in such organisations.²² In addition the high mobility of the Irish militated against their unionisation, or attaining any position of responsibility

if any did join.²³

Although economic factors have been ascribed the role of dynamic in creating sectarian divisions within the working class this view has been challenged by the work of I. Budge and C. O'Leary, who have argued convincingly that the paucity of riots in Belfast during the nineteenth century bore little relation to the prevailing economic climate.²⁴ While it could be argued that economic competition was the origin of sectarian friction the absence of an apparent relationship between the riots and the economic fortunes of Belfast diminish this thesis.

That sectarian conflict in Belfast was mostly the result of non-economic factors does not necessarily mean that Catholic-Protestant rivalry in Scotland originated from the same sources as those which reeked such havoc across the North Channel. Religious identification, as expressed by church attendance, was higher in Ireland than in Scotland. Politics and religion were more closely entwined in Ireland. However, intercommunal tension in Scotland could be heightened by non-economic factors. For example, Catholic emancipation in 1829 provoked a hostile response from many in Scotland. Commenting on this reaction the Rev. I. A. Muirhead notes that the Protestant agitators of the period appealed "not to the economic results of immigration" but in religious terms.²⁵

Although many working class people had little contact with organised religion this does not mean that they were indifferent to the subject. E. R. Norman characterises the second half of the nineteenth century as "a religious age, not in the sense that people went to church-for the religious census of 1851 showed many did not-but in the amounts of public discussion on religious questions, devotional and ecclesiastical writing and of church building at home and expansion overseas."²⁶ An example of this is provided by the left wing journal *Forward*. Looking through its issues between 1912-22 one is struck at how often religious figures are invoked as early socialists and religious teachings are used to support socialist dogma. While specifically Protestant political parties enjoyed most electoral success in the depressed decades of the 1920s and 1930s they did so at a time when the economic climate was improving in both Edinburgh and Glasgow.²⁷ The most visible manifestation of sectarianism in present day Scotland is found when Rangers play Celtic (a slightly toned down version of this phenomenon can be found at Hearts-Hibs matches). This rivalry would appear to be best explained as a clash of cultures, because the fans who bay for, and sometimes spill, the blood of opposition supporters live in similar areas, work in similar jobs, are in the same Trades Unions and generally have the same political allegiances, they vote Labour, as there counterparts.

Although the majority of the Irish, who emigrated, were of the Catholic faith, many were Protestants and it would appear that the latter were more successful in entering the mainstream of Scottish society. In his history of Kilysth the Rev. R. Anderson, born in 1825, records the "bitter ill will of the natives...towards the Irish." Yet when he was a boy and there were only two Irish families in the town such bitterness was absent: "as they were Protestants they lived unmolested."²⁸ In his study of nineteenth century Greenock R. Lobban has shown that marriages between Irish Protestants and Scots were significantly more numerous than marriages between Scots and Irish Catholics. The respective percentages for Irish intra group marriages were 79.6 for Catholics and only 60.0 in the case of the Protestants.²⁹ It has also been pointed out that Irish-Scottish marriages were more common in Larkhall, where the majority of immigrants were Protestants, than in Coatbridge, where the bulk of the Irish were Catholic.³⁰ While such evidence may suggest a degree of religious bigotry on the part of the native population it should be remembered that there were no forces within the immigrant Protestant community that sought to retard the process of assimilation. Moreover, the incoming Protestants possessed cultural and educational attributes, which made their absorption into mainstream Scottish society much easier than that of their Catholic counterparts. For example, Robert Smillie, a Belfast Protestant, who emigrated to Larkhall, stated

that he had read Burns as a boy and that his grandmother had recited ballads in Scots Doric even though she had never visited Scotland.³¹ Furthermore, it is likely that many of those Ulster Protestants who crossed the North Channel had some family ties with Scotland. Thus, on arriving in their new home they could immediately enter the mainstream of Scottish society and did not have to construct their own community on the margins as had the Irish Catholics.

Although the Ulster Protestants were better equipped to enter Scottish society than the Irish Catholics they too suffered some resentment from the native population.

Denvir stated:

The province of Ulster [sends to Lanarkshire]..a certain proportion of those wretched creatures called Orangemen...and as a rule the Scotch despise them as the only people on earth who have no nationality.³²

Denvir's Irish nationalist sympathies make him a slightly unreliable witness when discussing Orangeism in Scotland. However, the thrust of his observations were endorsed by a historian of the Orange movement; R. M. Sibbett records how an Orange parade in Edinburgh was attacked by a large body of Irish Catholics. Although a local newspaper, the *Caledonian Mercury*, was compelled to admit that attacks on the Orange inhabitants of the Cowgate were a commonplace occurrence "the journal had not a friendly word to say for the Orangemen."³³ A columnist writing in *The Fartick and Maryhill Press* in 1912, both areas with

large Orange communities, claimed that 50 years previously the Scots regarded both Catholic and Protestant immigrants as Irish and that there was friction between the native population and the latter group because of its Orangeism and the trouble that accompanied Orange parades.³⁴ In his study of 'ethnic' marriages in nineteenth century Greenock Lobban finds that the inter-group marriage rate of Ulster Protestants in the town was almost identical to that of another 'immigrant' community, the highlanders.³⁵ Of the highlanders it has been stated that some had to endure the prejudices of the lowland Scot on account of the former's stricter religious attitudes on sabbatarianism and temperance.³⁶ As many Ulster Protestants would have similar attitudes as the highlanders on such religious questions presumably they encountered the same reaction.

It has been argued by many that the hostility of the native population to the Catholic Irish was exacerbated, if not initiated, by the simultaneous arrival of many Ulster Protestants. The result being the importation of the conflict that had existed in Ireland. In the words of Steve Bruce the influx of Irish created "a situation primed for ethnic conflict. The fuse..provided from the same source as the dynamite."³⁷ The organisation most associated with Ulster Protestantism was, and still is, the Orange Order. Its initial development in Scotland, however, was not as a result of Protestant emigration

from Ulster. Orangeism first took root in Britain with the return of British regiments which had been sent to Ireland in 1796; the Argyle Fencibles are credited with introducing the Order into Scotland.³⁸ A similar process occurred in the late 1850s in the Partick area. Clydeside shipworkers, who had hired by William Harland to go to Belfast to teach the skills involved in iron ship construction in his yards, set up lodges when they returned to Glasgow.³⁹

For most of the nineteenth century the Orange Order could not be considered as a mass movement. In Airdrie the two local lodges could boast a combined membership of less than sixty.⁴⁰ As late as 1868 the annual 12th of July parade in Glasgow could only attract a crowd of 600.⁴¹ However, a decade later there were about a hundred active lodges in the city with an estimated membership of between 14-15,000.⁴² One factor in this rapid expansion was the influx of Ulster Protestants that occurred between 1876-81. In that period "83.2% of all Irish immigrants to Scotland came from the province of Ulster, with the four most Protestant counties providing 58.7% of the total inflow."⁴³ The evidence available suggest that Ulstermen provided the bulk of the organisation's numerical strength throughout the nineteenth century.⁴⁴ It should be noted, however, that it was not until the early 1880s that membership of the Order began to grow rapidly in Ireland.⁴⁵ In all probability popular Protestant organisations in Scotland would have

experienced an upturn in fortunes at this time even without the influx of Ulster Protestants. The 1860s and 1870s were in the eyes of some a period of Catholic triumphalism. The doctrine of Papal Infallibility and the promulgation of the Syllabus of Errors suggested to some that Protestantism would be forced on the defensive by a more confident Catholic Church. The restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in 1878 in Scotland was evidence that even the land of John Knox was not safe from the Vatican's tentacles. The history of popular Protestant societies in Scotland long pre-dates the arrival of the Irish, both Protestant and Catholic. According to the historian Senex there were 43 such organisations in Glasgow at a time in the seventeenth century when there was only 39 Catholics in the city.⁴⁴

If anti-Catholicism on the part of the native population was the major factor in creating the tensions that existed between the two communities, it might be assumed that the immigrants would have been warmly welcomed by their Scottish co-religionists. The reality was in fact very different and there was much conflict between the Scottish and Irish wings of the Catholic church during the nineteenth century. This conflict can partly be explained as a clash of cultures:

The Irish were exuberant and lively...whereas the Scots were somewhat dour, possessing a distaste for the Irish passion for display, for the emotional. Much of the Presbyterian influence had penetrated into Scottish Catholicism, and this

manifested itself in a dislike of Continental devotions, of excessive ecclesiastical decoration and statues and elaborate ceremonial. All these the Irish cherished.⁴⁷

Politics and nationality further inflamed relations between the two groups. Handley compares the political philosophies of both:

The Irish emigrants of the early nineteenth century came to Scotland with the recollection of the '98 Rising and the Act of Union fresh in his mind. Possibly he had been a member of the United Irishmen. Certainly.....he was a sympathiser with their ideals.' (in contrast) the Catholic Scot...was a loyal member of the British Empire and looked askance on the political views of the Irish immigrant. The Scottish hierarchy in particular had little sympathy with his intransigence.⁴⁸

There are many examples of the Scottish Church establishment condemning instances of the immigrants supporting Irish nationalist causes and organisations. Following its support for the Fenians and the 1867 Rebellion the organ of the immigrants, the *Glasgow Free Press*, was denounced from the altars of every Catholic Church in Scotland in February 1868. As a direct consequence of the leadership's action the paper closed: its final issue was published the week following its condemnation.⁴⁹

Irish resentment towards his Scottish co-religionist was fuelled by the attitude of the priesthood towards their newly arrived flock. Many priests viewed the immigrants as a transient phenomenon and consequently paid little attention to their spiritual or temporal needs.⁵⁰ Unlike

the previous generations of Irish, who had quickly returned to their native land, the vast majority of the newcomers stayed and helped to swell and expand the Church's parish organisation. While the Irish wished to be served by priests of the same nationality the highland dominated leadership retained control of the major posts within the Church and actively blocked Irish participation on many occasions. In the early 1860s the *Glasgow Free Press* complained that there was only one parish priest in all eight Glasgow parishes and that "every first class mission out of Glasgow, except Coatbridge is held by a Scotchman".⁵¹ The Irish had built up the Church but enjoyed little control of the movement. Resentment was summed up in the phrase "Paddy pays, Sandy owns."⁵²

The conflict between the two groups resulted in the Holy See appointing Archbishop Manning to enquire into the political and religious tension that existed in the Western District. Manning visited Scotland in October 1867 and after observing the situation advocated a bold initiative:

I remain completely convinced that the only adequate remedy for the very serious troubles of the present and the great dangers of the future is to be found in the division of Scotland into diocese and the restoration of the Hierarchy.⁵³

Manning's suggestions were accepted by the Vatican but internal disputes delayed the restoration of the

Hierarchy until 1878. The subsequent growth in the number of clergy enabled the immigrants to play a substantial part in this expansion.⁹⁴

Religious bigotry on the part of the native population is the usual reason cited as the cause of the communal friction in nineteenth century Scotland. However, the history of nations is littered with examples of nativist resentment to immigrants and it might more proper to portray the tension that existed as tribal in origin; while remembering to take into account the part religion has played in defining national/tribal identity. It has been pointed out that Catholic-Protestant conflict is different than other religious disputes because the original impetus behind Protestantism was anti-Catholicism, however, one wonders if the situation in nineteenth century Scotland would have been much different if the natives had been Catholic and the Irish emigrants Jewish? The examples of Poland and Germany suggest that the situation might have been a lot worse.

Conflict between immigrant and host communities operated at a variety of levels and varied from the spectacular to the almost imperceptible. On occasions the two groups fought running battles in the streets. While this represented the zenith of community conflict, to some even the drinking of a pint of beer was seen as a victory in the cultural battle between the natives and the immigrants.

The nineteenth century witnessed numerous sectarian riots in Scotland, the origins of which were as varied as the issues, which divided the protagonists. Handley identifies the 1850s as the period in which communal violence peaked and cites examples of rioting occurring throughout the central industrial belt. He argues that the Maynooth Grant and the restoration of the Catholic Hierarchy in England contributed to a rise in religious friction.⁵⁵ Such examples of Papal Aggression resulted in the formation of ultra-Protestant organisations such as the Scottish Reformation Society. Some zealous defenders of the faith took their messages to the street corners and whipped up the mob to such an extent that anti-Catholic riots ensued. The most notable of these mob orators was John Sayers Orr, who preferred to style himself as the "Angel Gabriel." Throughout the first half of this decade many of his meetings ended with his followers going off to attack Catholics. In 1851 he led a mob to attack a chapel in Bearhope Street, Greenock. This incident sparked off a week of intermitent rioting in the town. On returning to Greenock in 1855, after lecturing on the evils of Popery in the U.S.A., he quickly resumed his previous activities. On one occasion he was arrested for breach of the peace. A mob of 2000 assembled to protest but, after hearing that Orr had been transferred to nearby Paisley, they started to attack chapels in Greenock; on the second day of the attacks the militia was brought into control the situation. Sermons by the

"Angel Gabriel" were blamed for the outbreak of indiscriminate assaults against Catholics and breaking of chapel windows that occurred in Dumbarton in October 1855. In some respects these riots mirrored the "sermons in stones" that occurred in Belfast in the nineteenth century.⁵⁶

Many conflicts were ritualist in nature, the time of the battle known well in advance. Two early socialist activists, Thomas Johnston and William Haddow, record examples of this:

There was.. the annual Orange turnout on 12th July, when Swanky Semple would put on his pit buits 'to fight for an unchained bible' and a band would march through the town playing 'Kick the Pope' and 'Boyne Water', while the local priest strove manfully to shepherd his fighting men into bye-ways.⁵⁷

St.Patrick's day was another great event Bands of boys from the Catholic Schools and the near by Board (Protestant) Schools met in battle array after lessons were over and many a broken head and torn clothes testified to the fight. The fights had little to do with either St.Patrick or with religion; it was simply considered to be a question of use and wont with which to celebrate the day.⁵⁸

The feuds, which erupted on the set days, became self perpetuating. For example, on 12th July 1872 the Catholics succeeded in killing a Protestant in Wishaw. The was not forgotten, or forgiven, and the following year Orangemen attacked some Irish Home Rulers in the hope of avenging the events of the previous year.⁵⁹ This ritual/tribal violence was usually sparked when one of

the groups attempted to "invade" the territory of the other. Most of the sectarian riots in Belfast and Liverpool appear to have originated when one "tribe" attempted to march through areas heavily populated by the other.⁶⁰ In an attempt to eradicate violence of this nature Orange parades were banned on many occasions.⁶¹

Although there are examples of the strike weapon being used for sectarian aims conflict between the protagonists in the economic sphere usually expressed itself in a less visible manner. There are many examples of industries, which exhibited a high level of ethnic segregation. Harry McShane paints the following picture of the engineering industry in Glasgow in the early years of the twentieth century:

Howden's attracted young Tories of that sort (i.e. bigoted) because it was dominated by the freemasons: even one of the shop stewards was up to his neck in freemasonry. Many engineering places had a strong freemason element in them, particularly among the foremen and managers. They were a closed clique with their own code of honour and their own secret meetings; they were all Tories and anti-Catholic. Freemasonry was probably stronger in Glasgow than the Orange Order. The Orange Order attracted Protestants of Northern Irish extraction, specially in the shipyards; freemasonry was more common among skilled engineers. All the Freemasons were Tories because they believed in their right to be privileged workers and had great disdain for the Irish and labourers.⁶²

Ethnic segregation could be found elsewhere. In both Coatbridge and Larkhall the Irish formed a significantly higher proportion of those employed as ironstone miners than of those working as coalminers.⁶³ While native

workforce attitudes meant that some forms of employment were closed to the immigrants once entrenched in an industry they were adept in defending their own interests. In Greenock it was a relatively easy process for a new arrival to secure employment in the Irish dominated sugar refining industry.⁶⁴ It has been argued that employers deliberately discriminated against the Irish. There are some examples of employers proudly boasting of the fact, for example, the firm of John Spencer, shippers, informed the readership of *The Orange Standard* of the absence of Catholics in their employ.⁶⁵ While some employers were anti-Catholic in principle others are charged with creating sectarian friction within their workforce in order to frustrate the growth of working class solidarity. The great iron and coalmining concern, the Bairds of Gartsherrie, allegedly encouraged its workforce to join the Orange Order and when standing as a Conservative candidate in 1851 James Baird included anti-Catholic remarks in his manifesto. However, when the employees of Bairds went on strike the company imported Irish Catholic labour to break the strike.⁶⁶

Communal antagonism found expression in even the most minor of actions. In *Boyhood of a Priest*, written by a Dundee born Catholic priest, even drinking could be viewed as a political act of defiance. Many immigrants "got drunk just to spite their neighbours, the

Presbyterians, who were nearly all Rechabites: Intemperance assumed a sort of apologetical significance in a locality where Total Abstinence was apt to be exalted as embodying the sum total of the law of the prophets."⁶⁷

As has been cited earlier in this chapter Handley compared the position of the Irish in Scotland with that of the Jews in continental Europe.⁶⁸ While the nature of the conflict between the natives and the immigrants may have been the same the extent to which each suffered at the hands of the indigenous population bear no comparison. Sectarian riots in Scotland were relatively minor; eclipsed in intensity by those in Belfast and Liverpool. The Irish may not have been made welcome by the majority of the Scottish people but they were not the victims of organised pogroms, (and when rioting did occur they could give as good as they got,) or at the receiving end of a 'Final Solution' type policy.

Handley has portrayed the Irish immigrants as being highly politicised when they first arrived in Scotland in the early 1800s.⁶⁹ Writing in the 1890s John Denvir stated: "Ireland has no more patriotic children than those who have made their homes in Scotland."⁷⁰ T.P. O'Connor, the man most associated with Irish nationalism in Britain from 1886-1918, concurred with Denvir's opinion.⁷¹ Thus, it is not surprising to note that the various nationalist organisations which emerged in Ireland through the

nineteenth century can also be found within the Irish community in Scotland.

Within Irish nationalism there has always existed a strand of thought, which believed that the Act of Union could only be broken by the use of physical force. In 1848 the Young Irelanders failed in their attempt to attain Ireland's nationhood by force of arms. Allegedly there were several hundred well armed men in Scotland, who were poised to aid the insurgents though in the event the rebellion did not last long enough for them to be summoned to fight.⁷² In subsequent years the *Glasgow Free Press* was vocal in its support for those who wished to fight for Irish independence, much to the annoyance of the leadership of the Catholic Church in Scotland at the time.

While proponents of physical force nationalism still existed after the failed Fenian rebellion of 1867 they became increasingly marginalised as the century progressed. In both Ireland and in the immigrant centres of Scotland constitutional nationalism became the prevalent philosophy. The man credited with the formation of the Home Rule movement, as this form of constitutional nationalism was styled, was Issac Butt. An early disciple of Butt was John Ferguson, a publisher of Irish descent, who resided in Lenzie, near Glasgow. It was he, who conceived the idea of organising the Irish in Scotland into a body that would support Ireland's cause. Ferguson

persuaded Butt to address a meeting in Glasgow on the subject of Home Rule in December 1871. This resulted in the formation of the first branch in Great Britain of the Home Government League.⁷⁵ The movement spread rapidly throughout Great Britain and was to survive, albeit under a variety of titles such as the Home Government Confederation, the Irish Land League, the National Irish League and the United Irish League of Great Britain (UILGB), until the 1920s.

Such organisations had a variety of purposes. Prior to 1885 the main function of such bodies was to gather funds for the Irish Party. These funds would help the Irish Party defray the cost of fighting elections, pay the salaries of any M.P.s who were elected and finance general political propaganda. These bodies also provided a platform for prominent visiting Irish nationalists to disseminate their political creed. Highlight of the year would be St. Patrick's Day when they would arrange parades and large meetings. With the extension of the franchise such bodies sought to mobilise the immigrants in support of the candidate of the party most sympathetic to Irish Home Rule. Although politics was the primary reason for the existence of the UILGB and its ilk, they also served as a focus for the immigrants to engage in social activities, thereby reinforcing the ghetto mentality and butterising traditional loyalties.

The organisation, which carried out the above functions

during the period discussed in this thesis was the UILGE. It had been founded in 1898, the result of the reunification of the pro and anti Farnell factions. Unfortunately, there are no records available, which allow the historian to chart the progress of the movement in its infancy. However, it is possible to give an estimate of its numerical strength from 1905/6 to 1913/14. From an estimated membership of 6200 in 1905/6 numbers declined to only 1050 in 1911/12. The introduction of the third Home Rule Bill, coupled with the improving economic position, boosted the organisation's fortunes and by May 1914 the hundred branches in Scotland had about 12,500 members, out of a total of 47,900 throughout Great Britain.⁷⁴

Geographically the bulk of the organisation's branches were located in the west of Scotland. In 1908 there were 22 branches in Glasgow compared with only two in Edinburgh.⁷⁵ In 1914 48 of Scotland's 100 UILGE branches could be found in and Lanarkshire and Falkirk Burghs.⁷⁶ As there was no minimum number stipulated as being necessary for the formation of a branch this meant that virtually everywhere the Irish gathered there was a branch. It also meant that there was a wide variation in the numbers attending branches in the same city. For example, in Glasgow in 1906 the "Home Government" branch boasted a "paying membership" of 1200 whereas the "Wolfe Tone" branch could attract thirty enthusiasts.⁷⁷

Although membership of the UILGB was open to all it was not permissible for a member to join any other political organisation. Thus members of the Liberal or Labour Parties, who wished to join the UILGB had to resign from their party. Consequently Scots, who supported the principle of Irish Home-Rule did not join; they remained as members of which ever British political party they supported. The bar on dual membership also ensured that relatively few Irishmen joined any of the major parties. The organisation did boast some Irish Protestant members. John Ferguson was an example, however they were very rare. Ian Wood has detected some sign of anti-Protestant bias within the UILGB. Whether this was the result of intentional sectarianism or due to the organisation merely reflecting the characteristics of the bulk of its membership is unclear.⁷⁸

Although the vast majority of the Irish in Scotland were located at the lower end of the socio-economic scale a variety of sources have claimed that the UILGB was middle class in character. McShane stated: "The membership of the UIL was mostly middle class Irishmen: publicans, grocers, iron merchants and such like-men who were making their way. I knew them by repute only; none of my grandfather's friends were in it."⁷⁹ The supposed dominance of the middle class is not surprising considering the restricted franchise that was then in operation. However, it should not be overstated and it did not pay to stress an aura of exclusivity amongst the

immigrant community. When a branch of the UILGB was formed in Tradeston with the intention of attracting businessmen and retailers, charging 5/- per member to ensure a middle class ethos, the move was attacked by many within the UILGB and the branch only continued in existence for a short period.⁸⁰

The numerical strength of the UILGB varied in unison with the prevailing economic climate, which suggests that the bulk of the membership was working class. The organisation's annual report of 1909 illustrates the point:

Some idea of how seriously the organisation is affected by the existing bad trade may be formed from the following comparison of receipts this year and last from 115 Branches principally in Scotland and the North of England. Total receipts from the same 115 branches, 1908-09 £500, 1907-08 £1209 7/4.⁸¹

The UILGB suffered another sharp downswing in its fortunes between 1910-11 and 1911-12. T. P. O'Connor, the leader of the organisation, attributed this to the miners' strike and the resultant financial hardship experienced in the immigrant communities.⁸² While the introduction of the third Home Rule Bill would have stimulated membership irrespective of the prevailing economic climate the fact that the Bill was introduced in a period of relative prosperity was a welcome bonus. In 1913 the largest branch in Britain was "Allen, Larkin and O'Brien" of Coatdyke, which had a paid up membership of over 1000.⁸³ Had the Home Rule crisis occurred at a time

of economic dislocation it is unlikely that a branch in this area would have had such a large membership.

With the extension of the franchise in 1884 the opportunity arose for the first time whereby the Irish in Scotland could play a significant role in shaping the political destiny of both their adopted and spiritual homelands. It was the policy of the UILGB and its forebears that the Irish vote "should not be committed to any British party...but directed where the interests of Ireland demanded such action".⁸⁴ Ironically, the first beneficiaries of the greatly enlarged Irish vote were the Conservatives. Fearing a large Liberal victory in the General Election of 1885 Farnell urged his supporters in Britain to vote Tory in order to lessen the magnitude of the expected Liberal majority. The plan succeeded brilliantly in this respect because the combined Parliamentary strength of the Irish Nationalists and the Conservatives exactly matched that of the Liberals. Although there is some evidence to suggest that some Irish voters in Scotland so despised the Conservatives that they ignored Farnell's order and voted Liberal the vast bulk of the immigrant community voted in line with his pronouncements.⁸⁵ It was claimed that this example of tactical voting provided the Tory margin of victory in four of the ten seats that they won in Scotland.⁸⁶

Whether Farnell's strategy was directly responsible for Gladstone's conversion to the cause of Irish Home Rule,

or merely served to create the conditions necessary whereby he could push a reluctant Liberal party down on course which he wished it to embark, is a question which has occupied the minds of many historians. Whatever the reasoning behind his endorsement of Irish Home Rule the effect of his actions was to align the Irish vote with the Liberals until the onset of the First World War. There was occasions when the relationship broke down; possibly the the most notable example of this occurred in the General Election of 1900. The local branch of the UILGB deemed that the sitting Liberal M.P. for the constituency of Glasgow Blackfriars, possibly the division with the largest Irish vote in Scotland, was unsound on the issue of Home Rule. It was resolved to teach him a lesson and it was agreed to support his Tory rival on this occasion. The strength of the Irish vote ensured the triumph of the Conservative candidate. Thus, the parliamentary career of Andrew Bonar Law, a future Tory leader and P.M., was launched. Ironically, the Irish voters had supported a man, who would devote all the powers at his disposal to thwart their aims at the very time they seemed on the point of realisation.²⁷

Although the Irish vote was bound to the Liberals because of support for Home Rule the religious and socio-economic composition of the community sometimes strained the relationship. The Irish nationalist vote was also a Catholic vote. On the issue of Church schools the

Unionists were more sympathetic to the wishes of the Catholic Church than the Liberals. The Unionist Education Act of 1902 made provision for Church of England schools to be financially supported out of the rates. Nonconformists, disgusted at being forced to subsidise denominational schools, campaigned vigorously for the return of a Liberal Government in the 1906 election. When attempting to legislate for nonconformist grievances the Government was criticised by the Catholic Church because the proposed 1906 and 1908 Education Bills would have affected Catholic schools. Thus, at this point in time, the immigrant voter was faced with a clash of interests: his nationality pushed him into the Liberal camp while his religion attracted him towards the Unionists. John Redmond, leader of the Irish party, was in no doubt which cause should have priority. At the 1908 Convention of the UILGB he stated that the campaign to achieve Home Rule had first call on the loyalties of the immigrant community.⁸⁶ It would appear that his request was heeded by the Irish community in Scotland when faced with the dilemma in the General Elections of 1910. Although *The Scotsman* claimed that the education issue was attracting some Catholics to the Unionist cause there is little evidence to support this assertion.⁸⁷ When the *Glasgow Observer* carried an advert from the Unionist Publicity Association, which alleged that the return of a "Radical" Government would mean the destruction of Catholic schools, the paper was deluged by letters from indignant

readers, who attacked the decision to afford space to a traditionally hostile source.'°

While Unionists appealed to the Irish vote on matters of denominational schooling Labour stressed the issue of class solidarity when attempting to entice the immigrant community away from the grip of the Liberals. The vast majority of the Irish in Scotland were located at the lower end of the social scale, arguably at the lowest point, yet they proved to be almost immune to Labours' appeals. When *Forward* analysed the party's chances in a by-election in South Lanarkshire in 1913 it was relieved to note that there was "no Irish vote to be organised by the Whig capitalists against us."°1

In April 1914, at the height of Ulster crisis and after the Irish vote had gone solidly Liberal at a number of by elections, James Connolly discussed the effect of the Irish Question on the electoral fortunes of the Labour party. He stated:

Socialists and Labour people generally in Great Britain have good reason to deplore the existence of the Irish question and to realize how disastrous upon the chances of their candidates has been the fact of the existence in the constituencies of a large mass of organised voters whose political activities were not influenced solely or even largely by the domestic issues before the electors. Our British comrades have had long and sore experience of contests in which all the arguments and all the local feeling were on the side of the Socialist or Labour candidate, and yet that local candidate was ignominiously defeated because there existed in the constituency a large Irish vote - a large mass of voters who supported the Liberal, not because they were opposed to Labour, but because they

wanted Ireland to have Home Rule.

Our British comrades have learned that the existence of that Irish vote and the knowledge that it would be cast for the Home Rule official candidate, irrespective of his record on or his stand upon Labour matters, caused hundreds of thousands who otherwise would have voted Labour to vote Liberal in dread of that the Irish defection would 'let the Tory in'. For a generation now the Labour movement in Great Britain has been paralysed politically by this fear, and all hands have looked forward eagerly to the time when the granting of Home Rule would remove their fear and allow free expression to all the forces that make for a political Labour movement in that country.'²

Irish leaders in Britain were, as Connolly states, particularly anxious that the Unionists should not benefit as a result of splits within the Irish vote. T. P. O'Connor declared that "to the Irish mind it would as bad to vote for a Home Rule candidate who would not succeed, and thereby let in a Unionist, as to vote for a Unionist himself".³ In 1894 even Michael Davitt succumbed to this fear. Although he had supported Keir Hardie in the Mid Lanark election in 1888 Davitt refused to campaign for Robert Smillie in a subsequent by election in that constituency as Labour's intervention "would only let the Tory in."⁴

Irish Nationalists expected Labour not only to support Home Rule but to subordinate all of its other demands until this was achieved. When Labour attacked the Liberal Government of 1910-14 for imprisoning suffragettes and using the military in labour disputes the *Glasgow Observer* warned that:

if in their tilt against the Liberal Government

they should succeed in displacing the Home Rule Ministry, which is on the point of crowning its efforts for Irish freedom, then the Labour party would surely succeed in securing probably for all time and certainly as long as the present generation survives, the active and indignant enmity of every Irish voter in Great Britain who cherishes any shred of sentiment for Irish liberty, or possessed the least scintilla of filial devotion towards his struggling motherland.⁷⁵

Irish support for Labour was in most cases only forthcoming when the Liberal candidate was unsound on Home Rule or when Labour was the largest anti-Unionist force in the division. An example of the latter point was George Barnes, victor in Glasgow Blackfriars in 1906, who enjoyed good relations with his Irish constituents and contributed occasional articles to the *Glasgow Observer*.⁷⁶ The man most associated with the Labour cause in Irish circles, and founder of the Catholic Socialist Society, was John Wheatley. His initial support for Labour was borne of tactical considerations rather than shared philosophy. Wheatly, then prominent in the UILGB, first supported the Labour party at a by election in North East Lanarkshire in 1901 because the Liberal candidate was unsympathetic to the Irish cause. In the 1906 General Election he worked for Labour in the North West Lanarkshire constituency for similar tactical reasons. A biographer considers these experiences to have radicalised him for in October 1906 he openly adopted the socialist cause.⁷⁷ However, in the majority of cases the Irish only loaned their vote to the Labour candidate until a more sympathetic Liberal was selected to stand.

This infuriated the ILP journal *Forward*. After the party's poor performance in the 1910 elections, which the paper attributed in part to the Irish reverting to their traditional allegiance in seats such as North East Lanarkshire where they had voted Labour in the past, the paper called for any informal alliances between the party and the Irish to be terminated.'*

The view that the absence of the Irish Question would have resulted in the Irish vote aligning itself with Labour is supported by the fact that as early as 1892 the *Glasgow Observer* predicted that the Irish vote would gravitate towards Labour once the question of Home Rule was settled.'* One way of ascertaining the political views of the Irish in a political environment devoid of the national question is to examine local elections.

With the absence of the Irish Question in local politics it might be assumed that the immigrants would be more supportive of the Labour cause than at national level. While in general this was the case tension between the two groups was by no means absent. In Glasgow prior to 1906 they were joined together in a loose coalition called "The Stalwarts" under the leadership of John Ferguson. It was Ferguson who effectively held them together but with his death the strains in the relationship finally told and the alliance was abandoned. Many within the I.L.P. disliked the arrangement because they considered the UILGB to be a non socialist

organisation and disliked the prominence of publicans within the movement. In 1911 Patrick Dollan considered that it would be better "for the Labour movements' prospects electorally to be set back twenty years than to make any tactical arrangements with UIL branches which had publican ties."¹⁰⁰ The question of temperance was to sour relations into the 1920s.

After 1906 all candidates had to be members of the I.L.P. or another affiliated Labour organisation to receive the "official" Labour ticket. As UILGB members were prohibited for joining other British political organisations this meant that Irish candidates would no longer receive Labour support. This infuriated Irish organisations because it virtually meant the exclusion of Irish representatives on the city council. Prior to the Municipal elections of 1912 the *Glasgow Observer* launched a scathing attack on Labour:

Catholics , Be Gulled NO Longer! Read This, Then Act Like MEN! Hitherto our counsel to Irish electors has almost invariably been to support the candidates of the Labour Party in every constituency. That counsel we are no longer able to extend...[because] the Labour Party, while making the most profuse professions of sympathy with the Irish sentiment, will not give the least help to any candidate standing who is an Irish Nationalist.¹⁰¹

The conflict over Irish candidates recurred in the municipal elections of 1913 and 1914. The paper claimed that in these contests the Irish vote was "a solid and decisive factor" in retarding Labour's advance. The

Glasgow Observer gleefully pointed out that, in 1914, all seven of its nominated candidates were triumphant at the polls.¹⁰² Whether this dispute antagonised the Irish community as a whole or merely the 'machine' is debateable. On many occasions *Forward* claimed that many Irish voters supported candidates other than those mandated by either the local branches of the UILGB or the *Glasgow Observer*.¹⁰³

Possibly the greatest impediment in the path of any emergent Irish - Labour alliance was the latter's association with socialism. The question of whether a Catholic could also be a socialist was answered in the negative by Pope Leo XIII in the Encyclical "Rerum Novarum" (On the conditions of the working Classes) which was issued in 1891. Although sympathetic to the plight of the working classes and critical of the worst excesses of capitalism it rejected the socialist solution:

To remedy these wrongs the Socialists, working on the poor man's envy of the rich, are striving to do away with private property, and contend that individual possessions should become the common property of all, to be administered by the State or by the municipal bodies. They hold that by thus transferring property from private individuals to the community, the present mischievous state of things will be set to right, in as much as each citizen will then get his fair share of whatever there is to enjoy. But their contentions are so clearly powerless to end the controversy that were they carried into effect the workingman himself would be among the first to suffer. They are moreover emphatically unjust, for they would rob the lawful possessor, distort the functions of the State, and create utter confusion.¹⁰⁴

As well as having theoretical differences with socialism the fact that many of its adherents were strident atheists was enough to condemn the movement in the eyes of many Catholics. Some commentators have argued that there were many varieties of socialism and that Pope Leo's views were formed with continental rather than British socialism in mind. The *Glasgow Observer* was well aware that British socialism was less antagonistic to organised religion than its continental counterparts but, nevertheless, the presence of some militant atheists in the Labour party still caused the paper some apprehension:

It is true that the Socialist in Great Britain rarely reveals...the virulent antipathy to the Catholic faith and Church which the Socialist in Continental countries so strongly manifest and exercises. We think the Labour movement in Parliament and in Great Britain generally is quite independent of extraneous control and in no way bound to follow the anticlericalism of Continental Socialism. Still British Socialists never cease proclaiming the international identity of all Socialism. Liberals in Great Britain never seek to establish political identity with the anticlerical Liberals of the Continent. But British Socialists are forever claiming their kin-ship with the priest baitors, the church-spoilers, the nun hunters of the Continent. And yet British Socialists do not in Great Britain seek to persecute and rob the Church as their brethren in France do, nor to attack and attempt to cripple the Church as their brethren in Italy do, nor to exile or imprison Catholic clergy...as the atheists in Portugal do: but then in Great Britain they are a minority, and the bulk of Catholics are never sure that if the Socialists came to the top in Britain he would be any better than Combes, or Nathan or Podrecca. The insensate action of such men as Blatchford and Will Thorne has done a great deal to foster this fear, and though Thorne has been overcome in his attempt to invest Socialism in Great Britain with an active anti religious

character the effect of their actions endures.¹⁰⁵

The *Glasgow Observer* carried many articles which criticised socialism, some of which argued for the formation of a Christian Labour party. If the Labour party or the T.U.C. endorsed policies such as secular education, as the latter did until 1912, then co-operation, so the argument went was impossible.¹⁰⁶

The man around whom the debate about the compatibility of Catholicism and socialism focused was John Wheatley. From orthodox immigrant politics he gravitated to the Labour cause. At first his support for Labour was based on pragmatism; however, this was followed by a philosophical conversion. The formation of the Catholic Socialist Society, which was open to only practising Catholics, was an attempt to resolve the conflict between community and class. Wheatley's clashes with clerical authority were to pass into folklore. In 1908 he was engaged in a lengthy and bitter debate, which most commentators consider he came out on top, with a Father Puissant, a Belgian Jesuit, on the question of the compatibility of Catholicism and socialism. A future legend in Clydeside socialist circles, Harry McShane, claimed that his drift to the cause originated as result of this debate.¹⁰⁷ Possibly Wheatley's most dramatic clash with authority came in the summer of 1912. Using the columns of *Forward* and boosting that edition's sales by 2000 in Shettleston, he attacked the weekly anti socialist diatribes of a

Father O'Brien of St. Marks, Carntyne. After the following week's service a mob of "hundreds or thousands" burnt an effigy outside Wheatly's house.¹⁰⁸ This episode appears to have boosted his credibility. Despite the opposition of the UILGB and the *Glasgow Observer* he was elected to the council in the following municipal elections.¹⁰⁹

If the Irish Question had never existed then it is quite likely that the Irish would have supported the Labour party in greater numbers than they did. At local level the problems posed by temperance and socialism do not appear, even in the immediate pre-war period to have swayed many of the Irish away from Labour's standard. If *Forward's* analysis of the municipal election results of 1912-14 are accepted in favour of those postulated by the *Glasgow Observer*. However, if the Irish remained culturally separate their support could never have been taken for granted by the Labour leadership, and had Labour advanced far enough to pose a significant threat to the other parties then they could have offered the Irish powerful inducements to detach them from Labour's camp. If on the other hand the Irish attempted to integrate their entry may have been resented by many socialists, who viewed the immigrants as social conservatives and the subsequent infighting would have retarded the advance of Labour.

Once Home Rule had entered British political life there was no guarantee that the alliance between the Liberals

and the Irish would terminate immediately the Irish Question had been "solved". The *Glasgow Observer* claimed that "on the passing of Home Rule the working class Irish in Great Britain would pass automatically and as a landslide into the Labour ranks".¹¹⁰ In actual fact had the Irish Question been settled in the favour of the Irish Nationalists it is likely that the Liberals would have reaped the benefits of the Irish vote in Britain long after the issue had been erased from the political agenda. The Liberals would have become enmeshed in Irish mythology and fathers would urge sons to vote for the party that gave Ireland her freedom. This outpouring of gratitude could have lasted a long time. In the U.S.A. the majority of negroes voted Republican, the party of Lincoln, in Presidential elections until 1936; a full fifty years after the ending of slavery.¹¹¹ Moreover, the provisions of the Third Home Rule Bill did not terminate the presence of Irish M.P.s at Westminster. If the Irish in Britain remained a distinct entity within working class society and had the Irish Nationalists continued to ask them to vote Liberal, especially if they were the largest party on the left, would they not have continued to do so ?

When stating that the Irish Question retarded the growth of Labour in Scotland one has to be careful not to overemphasise the effect the Irish vote could have had on the fortunes of the party. McCaffrey's analysis of the 1888 Mid Lanark by election suggests that had all the

Irish voted for Hardie his poll would have jumped from 617 votes to 1,517, the Liberal poll would have fallen to 2,947 from while the Tory vote would have remained static at 2,917. While the Irish vote would have substantially boosted Hardie's poll it would not have altered his position at the bottom of the poll.¹¹²

Blewitt has calculated that if all the Irish in Scotland voted Labour in the first General Election of 1910 the party would have gained only another two seats.¹¹³ If the Irish had voted Labour in the Midlothian and Leith by elections of 1912 and 1914 the party would still have finished a poor third in the former although it would have gained a second place in the latter. However, the main effect of such an occurrence would have been increased majorities for the successful Unionist candidates.¹¹⁴ Thus, Labour would not have been able to "break the mould of Scottish politics" had the Irish Question not existed. Many contemporary socialists believed that the Irish Question was a massive barrier to Labour's advance. In actual fact its main purpose was to provide such people an easy excuse for some poor performances.

While the Irish vote could not propel the Labour party to the top of the poll, this does not mean that it was unimportant. In 1913 *The Scotsman* claimed that there were 13 Liberals, who owed their parliamentary career to its existence.¹¹⁵ This illustrates the real potency of the Irish vote; it could play a crucial role in the fight

between the two major political forces. Though even then as the elections of 1886 and 1900 show it could not save the Liberals from suffering heavy defeats. Had the Irish vote been powerful enough to be the sole determining factor in many Scottish seats it would have been used as it was in the constituency of Liverpool Scotland, not to elect a representative of a British political party, but to return a member of the immigrant community to Westminster.¹¹⁶

Labour activists considered that the Irish Question not only deprived the Party of the "Green" Irish vote but also the support of many working class Protestants. The view that the issue hurt Labour was expounded by Robert Smillie. Smillie, an Ulster Protestant who supported Irish Home Rule, recounted his experience as a Labour candidate in the North East Lanarkshire by election of 1904: an area where many were Ulster Protestants by birth of descent. After Smillie had elucidated his views on Home Rule an

old heckler again turned to his audience and said 'Now, is not that a nice man to come here and ask ye to send him as your representative to Parliament? Ye heard...what he said about Home Rule for Ireland? As a miners' agent Bob is a'right but as a politeecian he is not worth a d--: I don't know whether he should be hanged or drowned, but I think the best thing we can do is just to walk out and leave him'.

Suiting the action to the word, he made his way towards the door, and the meeting followed him, leaving my chairman and myself and my solitary supporter in possession of the hall.¹¹⁷

Commenting on the Midlothian by election of 1912 *Forward* stated:

A large Orange vote, probably extending into hundreds, reluctantly voted Tory, rather than Labour, for fear of letting the Liberal in. That is to say, the orange workman was divided between his traditional faith and the knowledge forced on him by capitalism of Fumpherston Oil type.¹¹⁸

Undoubtedly the stance of the Labour Party on the Irish Question did not endear it to many working class Protestants, especially those with links with Ulster. However, it would appear that other factors helped to sour the "relationship" because there is little evidence to suggest that Orangemen were voting Labour at local level and that they proved more resistant to "socialism" than their Catholic counterparts. John Paton stated: "So tight was the hold of toryism on these men . that no Orangemen could be found in the Socialist movement. Roman Catholics, however, were frequent in spite of the opposition of the priests."¹¹⁹ This view is to some extent confirmed by the experiences of the "*Forward Vanner*". On many occasions he could assure the Catholic Socialist Notes columnist that Catholic Socialist Society material had sold very well in many Catholic areas.¹²⁰ However, he reported nothing but failure in noted Orange areas such as Armadale, Cleland and Kilwinning. Of the latter the *Forward Vanner* stated: "Kilwinning is that sort of ignorant Brisbyan (Brisby was a noted contemporary Orange leader) place, where folk hate one another for the love of God, and sit on dykes pouring over the betting

columns of the Evening News."¹²¹ Orangemen also participated in attacks against Labour candidates in Municipal Elections, especially in Partick.¹²² Moreover, prominent high ranking Orangemen addressed meetings in which they criticised socialism as either being atheistic or tainted with Catholicism; they were even accorded space in *Forward* in which to air their views.¹²³

Nevertheless, there must have been some working class Protestants who voted Labour at local level. Larkhall was returning Labour councillors in the pre war era. *Forward* recorded instances of Orangemen being thrown out of the Order because of their ILP sympathies. Such instances usually provoked a vigorous debate in the correspondence columns in *Forward* and some contributors would claim that many Orangemen were socialists.¹²⁴ There is also some evidence which suggests that there was an electoral backlash against the Labour party when it fielded Catholic candidates. In 1900 the ILP endorsed a Catholic candidate in the Mile End ward where they had polled well in the past. On this occasion the Labour vote slumped dramatically. The Irish press was in no doubt as to the reason: "a Catholic come into the field on any ticket and at once, like mercury plunged into boiling water, up leaps the poll of his opponent."¹²⁵ It is also noticeable that the Labour Party polled better in certain wards such as Mile End and Maryhill in 1912, Dalmarnock, Cowlairs, Townhead and Maryhill in 1913 when they were not supported by the UILGB than in previous contests when

they received the "Irish ticket".¹²⁶

While Orangeism played a part in boosting support for the Tories amongst the working class J.T. Ward considers that its influence has been over rated. His analysis of working class Toryism in Lancashire has found that social reform played an important role in gaining the Party popular support.¹²⁷ Certainly during the period 1912-14 the unionists in Scotland attempted to court working class support and their appeals were not based exclusively on religion or Irish Home Rule. In the 1912 by election in Midlothian the Insurance Act was criticised with telling effect.¹²⁸

Even had the Irish Question been absent from the political agenda it is by no means clear that the Labour Party would have inherited working class votes that went to the Tories. This is not surprising when it is remembered that Labour did not receive the majority of non Irish working class votes at the time. Possibly the Catholic Irish would have provided a more fertile ground for the Labour Party than the Ulster Protestants because the former composed a group which enjoyed at least some independence from the mainstream of Scottish society and therefore would not be subjected to the pro Liberal influences that permeated Scottish working class society. Being more integrated Ulster Protestants, in the absence of the Irish Question, might have inclined towards the Liberals. The more so because of the Liberal tradition

that existed in Ulster Presbyterianism prior to Gladstone's conversion to Home Rule. The swing that occurred in the West Lothian by election in 1913 suggests that many of those who supported the Unionists when the contest was fought mainly on the Irish Question had happily voted Liberal in 1910 when the prevailing political agenda was set by other issues.¹²⁹ Even when the Home Rule dominated the political firmament there were at least some Orangemen, such as those at Campbellton, who supported the Liberals.¹³⁰

Footnotes

1. For a discussion of the waves of migration see Ian Adamson *The Identity of Ulster* pp. 1-16
2. C. Smyth *Ian Paisley: Voice of Protestant Ulster* p.116.
3. Census figures quoted from S. Bruce *No Pope of Rome* pp. 26-27.
4. J. McCaffrey 'The Irish Vote in Glasgow in the later Nineteenth Century: A Preliminary survey', *The Innes Review* Vol 21, p.30.
5. W.M. Walker *Jutopolis: Dundee and its Textile Workers 1885-1925* p.115.
6. Quotation taken from S. Bruce *op cit* p.27.
7. Figures quoted from I.G.C. Hutchison *Politics and Society in Mid Victorian Glasgow 1846-86* p395. (Unpublished Ph. D.) That immigration came from predominantly Protestant counties does not mean that the bulk of the immigrants were Protestants. Various sources estimate that c20% of the early Irish immigrants were Protestant. For a discussion of this issue see A.B. Campbell *The Lanarkshire Miners* p.182.
8. J. Denvir *The Irish in Britain* p.450.
9. J.E. Handley *The Irish in Modern Scotland* p.282.
10. Bill Murray *The Old Firm* pp. 230-1.
11. T. Gallagher *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace* pp. 234-8.
12. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.282.
13. J.E. Handley *ibid* p.282.
14. W.M. Walker (2) 'Irish Immigrants in Scotland: Their Preists, Politics and Parochial Life', *Historical Journal* Vol 14. Issue 4. p.651.
15. W.M. Walker (2) *ibid* p.651.
16. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.282.
17. For example. Tom Gallagher argues that one reason why sectarian friction was greater in Liverpool and Glasgow was that job competition between the two blocs was greater in the former.
18. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.118.; A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.181.
19. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.181.; Tom Johnston *The History of the Working Class in Scotland* p.331.
20. A.B. Campbell *op cit* pp. 181-2
21. M. Hecter *Internal Colonialism* p.259.
22. Quoted in A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.197.
23. A.B. Campbell *ibid* p.197 & p.200.
24. I. Budge and C. O'Leary *Belfast approach to Crisis* pp. 91-5.
25. Rev I.A. Muirhead 'Catholic Emancipation: Scottish Reactions in 1929', *Innes Review* Spring 1973 p.32.
26. E.R. Norman *Anti Catholicism in Victorian England* p.19.
27. For a discussion of the two local Protestant Parties see Tom Gallagher *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace* pp. 150-168.
28. Quoted in J.E. Handley (2) *The Navy in Scotland* p.269.

29. R.D. Lobban 'The Irish Community in Greenock', *Irish Geography* p.279.
30. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.191.
31. A.B. Campbell *ibid* p.191.
32. John Denvir *op cit* p.447.
33. R.M. Sibbett *Orangeism in Ireland and throughout the Empire* Vol 2 p.294.
34. *Partick and Maryhill Press* 12 July 1912.
35. Robban Lobban *op cit* p.279.
36. Andrew L. Drummond and James Bulloch *The Church in late Victorian Scotland* p.88.
37. S. Bruce *op cit* p.28.
38. H. Senior *Orangeism in Ireland and Great Britain, 1795-1836* p.153.
39. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.395.
40. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.182.
41. I.G.C. Hutchison (2) 'Working Class Politics' in *The Working Class in Glasgow, 1750-1914* p.127.
42. I.G.C. Hutchison (2) *ibid* p.128.
43. I.G.C. Hutchison (2) *ibid* p.129.
44. Graham Walker made this point in a paper which examined the experience of Irish Protestants in Scotland in the nineteenth century which was given to the Senior Staff History Seminar of Strathclyde University in February 1990.
45. A.T.Q. Stewart *The Narrow Ground* p.166.
46. Bill Murray *op cit* p.93.
47. V.A. McClelland 'The Irish Clergy and Archbishop Manning's apostolic visitation of the western district of Scotland', Part 1, *Catholic Historical Review* 1967-8, pp. 2-3.
48. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.51.
49. For an account of the demise of the *Glasgow Free Press* see J.E. Handley *ibid* pp. 84-88. For a history of the friction between Scottish and Irish Catholics see J.E. Handley *ibid* pp.47-91.
50. Quoted by Tom Gallagher *op cit* p.44.
51. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.70.
52. J.E. Handley *ibid* p.62 & p.64.
53. V.A. McClelland 'The Irish Clergy and Archbishop Manning's Apostolic Visitation of the Western District of Scotland', *Catholic historical Review* 1967-8, pp.245.
54. For a history of Irish involvement in the development of the Catholic Church in Scotland see B.J. Canning *Irish Priests in Scotland 1829-1979*.
55. This paragraph is heavily based on the chapter entitled 'Religious and Racial Discord', in J.E. Handley *op cit* pp. 93-121.
56. A.T.Q. Stewart *The Narrow Ground* pp. 145-154.
57. Tom Johnston (2) *Memories* p.16.
58. W. Haddow *My Seventy Years* p.11.
59. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.236.
60. For an account of sectarian riots in Belfast see I. Budge and C. O'Leary *op cit* pp. 73-95. See also P.J. Waller *Democracy and Sectarianism* pp. 237-241 for an analysis of the 1909 riots in Liverpool.

61. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.184.
62. H. McShane and J. Smith *No Mean Fighter* p.19.
63. A.B. Campbell *op cit* p.178.
64. Robbin Lobban *op cit* p.274.
65. *The Orange Standard* Oct 1926.
66. A.B. Campbell *op cit* pp. 223-4.
67. W.M. Walker (2) *op cit* p.662.
68. See p4 of thesis. 69. See pp. 15-16.
70. J. Denvir *op cit* p.143.
71. T.P. O'Connor *The Parnell Movement* p.282.
72. J. Denvir *op cit* pp. 143-6.
73. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.269.
74. In the National Library of Ireland there is a bound volume which contains report of the UILGB annual conventions between 1906-09. Each report lists every active branch in Great Britain. Although it does not give details of the organisation's numerical strength it is possible to give an estimate of the UILGB's membership. The rules for the guidance of branches which were passed by the annual convention of 1905 state that although the individual membership fee was to be fixed by each local branch a sum of 1/- per member had to be forwarded to the Executive per annum. Although each branch could set whatever membership fee it wished it is likely that the minimum fee of 1/- would become the standard rate. It is using this basis that I have attempted to calculate the numbers in the Scottish branches of the UILGB, using the reports of the annual conventions between 1906-9. for the years 1905/6 to 1908/9. For subsequent years see *Freeman's Journal* 13 May 1912, 12 May 1913, 20 May 1914; *Glasgow Observer* 17 May 1913, 23 May 1914; *Irish Independent* 16 May 1914.
75. Report of UILGB Convention of 1908.
76. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Aug 1914. Falkirk Burghs was a parliamentary constituency which was composed of Falkirk, Airdrie, Hamilton, Lanark and Linlithgow.
77. Report of UILGB Convention of 1906.
78. Ian Wood 'Irish Immigrants and Scottish Radicalism. 1880-1906', in I. MacDougall (Ed) *Essays in Scottish Labour History* pp. 73-4.
79. Harry McShane and Joan Smith *op cit* p.11.
80. Ian Wood *op cit* p.77.
81. Report of UILGB Convention of 1909.
82. *Freeman's Journal* 13 & 27 May 1913.
83. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Apr & 31 May 1913.
84. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.290.
85. Ian Wood *op cit* pp. 74-5.
86. Claim made by T.P. O'Connor. Quoted by D.C. Savage 'Scottish politics, 1865-6', *Scottish Historical Review*, 40, 1961, p.128.
87. Ian Wood *op cit* p.81.
88. Report of UILGB convention of 1908; *Freeman's Journal* 6 June 1908.
89. *The Scotsman* 18 Nov 1909. Quoted in John F. McCaffrey 'Politics and the Catholic Community since 1878', in D. MacRoberts (Ed) *Modern Scottish Catholicism* p.147.
90. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.294.

91. *Forward* 15 Nov 1913.
92. *Forward* 11 Apr 1914 Quoted in M. Tobin *The Irish Question and the Emergence and Development of the Labour Party, 1900-24* pp. 5-6.
93. J. E. Handley *op cit* p.290.
94. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.182.
95. *Glasgow Observer* 15 Nov 1913.
96. *Glasgow Observer* 16 May & 27 June 1914.
97. David Howell *A Lost Left* pp. 231-2.
98. *Forward* 29 Jan 1910. Quoted in I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p260.
99. Ian Wood *op cit* p.78.
100. W. Knox *Scottish Labour Leaders, 1918-39* p.23. See also J.E. Handley *op cit* pp. 284-6.
101. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Nov 1913.
102. *Glasgow Observer* 7 Nov 1913.
103. *Forward* 9 Nov 1912; 15 Nov 1913; 14 Nov 1914.
104. Quoted in M. Tobin *op cit* pp. 9-10.
105. *Glasgow Observer* 4 July 1914; See also *Glasgow Observer* 26 Oct 1912.
106. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Nov, 7 & 14 Dec 1912; 1 May & 19 July 1913; 7, 14, 21 Feb 1914.
107. H. McShane and Joan Smith *op cit* pp. 17-18. David Howell *op cit* pp. 232-3.
108. *Forward* 29 June & 6 July 1912.
109. *Forward* 9 Nov 1912; 15 Nov 1913.
110. *Glasgow Observer* 4 July 1914.
111. W.E. Leuchtenburg *Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-40* pp.185-7 (New York 1963).
112. J. McCaffrey *op cit* p.150.
113. Quoted in J. McCaffrey *ibid* p.150.
114. In the Midlothian by election the actual result was Conservatives 6,021, Liberals 5,989, Labour 2,413. There was an estimated Irish vote of 650. If they are transferred from Liberal to Labour the revised result would be Conservatives 6,021, Liberals 5,339 and Labour 3,083. In Leith the Conservatives polled 5,159 votes, the Liberals 5,143 and Labour 3,346. The Irish vote was estimated as between 1,200 and 1,880. If it assumed that the Irish vote numbered 1,200 and this number is transferred from liberal to Labour the revised totals are Conservatives 5,159, Labour 4,546 and the Liberals 3,943.
115. *The Scotsman* 10 Nov 1913.
116. T.P. O'Connor represented the constituency from 1885 until his death in 1929. 117. R. Smillie *My Life for Labour* pp. 111-2.
118. *Forward* 21 Sept 1912.
119. J. Paton *Proletarian Pilgrimage* p.186.
120. *Forward* 16 May 1912.
121. *Forward* 28 June 1913. See also *Forward* 31 Aug 1912; 12 July 1913; 13 June 1914.
122. J. Paton *op cit* p.172.
123. *Forward* 21 Sept 1912; 25 Jan; 1, 8 & 15 Feb; 26 Apr; 10 & 17 May; 5 July 1913. On 26 July 1913 an appeal went out for someone to write a book or pamphlet designed to win over Orangemen to socialism. There is no evidence to

suggest that anybody accepted the challenge.

124. *Forward* 6,13 & 20 Nov, 4 Dec 1909.

125. Ian Wood *op cit* p.85.

126. *Forward* 9 Nov 1912: 8 & 15 Nov 1913.

127. J.T. Ward 'Some Aspects of Working-Class Coservatism in the Nineteenth Century', in J. Butt and J.T. Ward (Eds) *Scottish Themes* p.156.

128. *Glasgow Herald* 4 & 10 Sept 1912; *The Scotsman* 14,21 & 22 Aug 1912: 3,6 & 10 Sept 1912.

129. In the Dec 1910 General Election the Liberals polled 5,835 to the Conservatives 3,765. In Nov 1913 the Liberals polled 5,615 to the Unionists 5,094.

130. *Glasgow Observer* 22 Nov 1913.

Chapter 2

The Rise of Sinn Fein, 1916-18: Attitudes in Flux

On 15th September 1914 an Irish Home Rule Bill was finally placed on the statute book by a British Parliament. Although it would not come into operation until an unspecified date in the future dependent on the termination of the war and was still subject to an Amending Bill, which would legislate for some form of partition, the Irish cause appeared triumphant. Redmond received the plaudits of the vast majority of the Irish at home and abroad. However, the mood amongst the nationalist people of Ireland was to change abruptly.

The catalyst which transformed the Irish political arena was the Easter Rising of 1916 when a small number of IRB and ICA insurgents attempted to assert Ireland's nationhood by force of arms. Crushed militarily and disowned by the overwhelming majority of those whom they sought to liberate the Rising initially appeared to be a total failure. However, the perceived harsh treatment of the insurgents by the British authorities coupled with the Irish Party's failure to transform its parliamentary victory into political reality, caused the party to suffer a number of by election reverses. In 1917 the Irish Party lost four by elections in a row. Although the Irish Party, in exceptionally favourable circumstances, won the first three by elections of 1918 the British Government's announcement that it intended to apply conscription to Ireland caused it to lose whatever momentum it had acquired. In the General Election of 1918 it only won 6 out of 103 Irish seats. In nationalist

Ireland it had been eclipsed by Sinn Fein.

It is one of the ironies of history that the organisation most associated with the rebirth of Irish Republicanism, Sinn Fein, was throughout a large proportion of its existence not a republican organisation far less one which wished to establish an Irish Republic by force of arms. In the latter part of the nineteenth century Ireland witnessed a literary and culture revival from which developed a "New Nationalism". In effect this was a manifestation of cultural nationalism. For many Irish nationalism was meaningless unless the population knew what it was to be Irish. Political freedom from England/Britain had to be accompanied by a rejection of the invaders values and attitudes. D. P. Moran outlined the failings of Irish political nationalism:

We are proud of Grattan, Flood, Tone, Emmet, and all who dreamt and worked for an independent country, even though they had no conception of an Irish nation; but it is necessary that they should be put in their place and that place is not on top...The foundation of Ireland is the Gael and the Gael must be the element that absorbs.¹

Many organisations were formed with the intention of promoting Irish culture as epitomised by the language, native literature and gaelic games. In the words of Moran's seminal essay it was *The Battle of Two Civilisations*.² Sinn Fein was founded by Arthur Griffith in 1905. In its early years it propounded not republicanism but a system of dual monarchy modelled on

that in operation in Austro-Hungary. Under such a system it was proposed that the two islands within the British Isles would enjoy equal status.³

Sinn Fein soon incorporated a variety of other bodies within its organisational structure- the Dungannon Clubs. Cumann na nGaedhael and the National Council.⁴ Its first electoral test came in 1908 when the then Irish Party M.P. for the North Leitrim, C. J. Dolan, defected to Sinn Fein due partly to his disillusionment with the then Liberal Governments' policy on Home Rule but, also, because of the views expounded by Griffith in his *Resurrection of Hungary*. At the subsequent by election Dolan, standing on a platform which advocated abstention from Westminster, polled a creditable 1,157 votes against a poll of 3,103 for the Irish Party candidate.⁵ However, the votes received by Dolan represented less an endorsement of Sinn Fein but rather an expression of frustration at the failure of the Irish Party to get significant concessions from their erstwhile Liberal allies. With the hung parliament and the subsequent introduction of the third Home Rule Bill Sinn Fein once again returned to the political margins of Irish society.

There were echoes of the "New Nationalism" within the Irish Community in Scotland. A branch of the Gaelic League was established in Glasgow in 1889.⁶ This movement encouraged the emigrants to retain their native Irish culture: language classes were run, Gaelic games set up

on a league basis and speakers from Ireland given a platform to air their views. In June 1902 Patrick Pearse addressed the Glasgow branch on the subject "No Language - no nation" and compared the position of the Gaelic League then with what he had found when he last visited the city in 1898: "Then there was only one branch of the League in the city - the Glasgow branch - which was in its infancy. Now there are a dozen branches and outside London with its vast population, there was no centre where the language had made such progress as in Glasgow." The movement continued to expand and at the 1907 Ard Fheis in Dublin 24 branches in Scotland were represented.⁶ This probably represented the zenith of the movement in Scotland. Although zealous in the defence of the Irish language within the immigrant community it was fighting a losing battle. In 1913, a time when political nationalist organisations such as the UILGB and AOH were enjoying a resurgence in fortunes, it was reported that the Catholic community was apathetic to Irish gaelic.⁷

The overtly political manifestations of the "New Nationalism", after a widespread debate, also failed to gainsay over the minds of the immigrants. In March 1906 the *Glasgow Observer* adopted a dismissive tone towards Sinn Fein and its founder:

It is hardly necessary to say that we dissent entirely from the cardinal proposals of the new movement, that we very little trust for the National sentiments of its main promoter, and that we think its contentions and methods are

inadmissible and calculated only to excite contemptuous dissent.¹⁰

Despite such skepticism those, who attempted to transplant the Sinn Fein doctrine did achieve some success. When Griffith visited Glasgow in 1908 the *Glasgow Observer* adopted a more respectful tone: "On rising to speak, Mr Arthur Griffith, who is a good-looking, modest-looking, clever-looking man, had an enthusiastic reception. He is not an orator...but he has something to say, and it is worthy of attention".¹¹ The debate ignited by Dolan's defection to Sinn Fein dominated the correspondence columns of the *Glasgow Observer* for most of the year.¹² However, the victory of the Irish Party in the North Leitrim by election and the subsequent re-emergence of the Irish Question at Parliamentary level blunted any advances made by Sinn Fein in Scotland.

The marginalisation of Sinn Fein within the Irish community in Scotland was most apparent in the years 1912-14. An examination of the columns of the *Glasgow Observer* suggests that there was only one Sinn Fein cumann active in Glasgow, possibly Scotland. As to its numerical strength little can be ascertained. When Bulmer Hobson addressed a Sinn Fein sponsored rally in Glasgow in 1912 "about 500 were present": in contrast an estimated 50,000 heard Joseph Devlin speak at Kilmarnock in 1913.¹³ Commenting on the meeting attended by Hobson the *Glasgow Observer* stated: "Even the very name of Sinn

Fein has fallen into obscurity of late, and the term now counts for so little in Irish politics as to leave it almost needless to make any reference to it."¹⁴ It would appear as if Sinn Fein in Glasgow was dominated by IRB men. Present at the aforementioned Hobson rally, himself an IRB man, was Charles Carrigan, Dan Braniff and Tom White (Tomas O'Ban), who can all be identified as members of the IRB.¹⁵ It may also have been the case that Sinn Fein in Glasgow was more left wing than the bulk of the immigrant community. Carrigan and White were both members of the Catholic Socialist Society and the Glasgow branch of Sinn Fein attacked Arthur Griffith for siding with the management during the 1913 Dublin transport strike.¹⁶ However, when a motion was put before the membership that the club would only advertise its functions in the socialist press the move was defeated.¹⁷ The political strength of the Irish Party in the aftermath of the suspended enactment of the third Home Rule Bill was graphically illustrated by the fate of the Irish Volunteers. The crisis, which resulted in the split of the movement was initiated by John Redmond. He declared that those, who had joined the IV should not merely remain in Ireland in readiness to repulse any attempted German invasion, but should volunteer to fight "wherever the firing line extends".¹⁸ The bulk of the organisation's original executive repudiated Redmond's stance and argued against giving military aid to Ireland's traditional enemy. Consequently, the movement

split into two opposing camps. The vast majority of the membership, possibly as many as 170,000, supported Redmond and left to form the National Volunteers while the minority, estimates of their strength range from 2-13,000, formed a rival organisation, which retained the original title of Irish Volunteers.¹⁹

These events evoked much comment amongst the Irish community in Scotland and it would appear that the bulk of the immigrants endorsed Redmond's stance. The *Glasgow Observer* commented that the enactment of the Home Rule Bill had totally transformed the relationship that existed between Ireland and Britain. Whereas, previously, the Irish people had been involved in a constitutional arrangement to which they had not consented, with the enactment of Home Rule their aspirations had been fulfilled. Ireland, like Australia, Canada and New Zealand, was now a voluntary member of the British Empire and, consequently, its battles were Ireland's battles. The paper contended that "the real line of defence of Irish freedom now is the line of Allied armies holding back the Germans from Belgium and France".²⁰

Possibly the only other voice, which spoke from within the immigrant community and had access to both that community and the wider Scottish community could be found within the columns of *Forward*. Most weeks a member of the Catholic Socialist Society contributed a column headed Catholic Socialist Notes(CSN). According to this

columnist the Home Rule Act was not worth the paper it was printed on: "England's debt to Ireland has been paid by an undated cheque, payment of which has been stopped at the bank until the figures are altered".²¹ While it is likely that this contributor honestly believed that Redmond had failed to secure the significant triumph with which many Irishmen credited him it should be noted that other considerations might have influenced his view. *Forward* and the CSS, sought to persuade as many as possible not to fight in the Imperialist war. One way those within the CSS could increase such sentiments within the community, in which they operated was to suggest that the Liberal Government would not honour the "cheque" it had issued. The columnist sought to illustrate this by reminding potential recruits that Redmond was now acting as a recruiting sergeant for the same administration that had been "prepared to shed the blood of the...[Irish] Volunteers...at Howth." He sarcastically urged those Irish in Scotland, who felt inclined to follow Redmond's advice to join the King's Own Scottish Borderers: the regiment that had inflicted the fatalities at Howth.²² Although critical of Redmond the contributor did not endorse the breakaway Irish Volunteers. When a correspondent had argued that, just as Belgium had the right to form military alliances in order to safeguard its freedom, then Ireland had the right to form an army and seek aid from any quarter to further its quest for independence the columnist observed that

"Bloodthirsty people are fearfully logical".²³ As a pacifist all forms of militarism were abhorrent.

The evidence available would suggest that very few within the immigrant community dissented from Redmond's opinion. When the 'Home Government' branch of the UILGB discussed the Volunteer split "hundreds" of those present backed Redmond while only four favoured the separatists.²⁴ Furthermore, at a subsequent meeting organised by the UILGB, which was addressed by the national president T. P. O'Connor, an estimated crowd of 5,000 endorsed a motion, which expressed confidence in the Irish Party and its policy of supporting "the just war of the Allies against Prussian militarism".²⁵

It was unlikely that those, who supported the McNeillite position, entertained much hope that organs such as the *Glasgow Observer*, or organisations such as the UILGB would reject Redmond's stance. However, they might have expected more support from within the ranks of the original Irish Volunteers. Moderate organisations such as the AOH and the UILGB had been wary of becoming associated with the movement, because of the extremist elements within the ranks. However, even within the Irish Volunteers the vast majority supported Redmond.²⁶ The failure of the McNeillite view to command much support within any section of the immigrant community coupled with the rush of recruits to the British Army suggests that the bulk of the Irish community in Scotland either

regarded Home Rule as a battle already won or, if its success was in doubt, then the best way to secure an Irish Parliament was to fight for the rights of small nations on the battlefields of Europe.

In the period between the split in the Irish Volunteers and the Easter Rising there is little evidence to suggest that the Irish Party was losing the support of many within the immigrant community. The only source of friction appears to have concerned the future role of the UILGB. The *Glasgow Observer* carried a number of articles which questioned the need for the continued existence of such an organisation once Home Rule had been achieved. However, the paper was not critical of the organisation's links with the Irish Party, even though both Redmond and Dillon had attacked those calling for the disbandment of the UILGB. The *Glasgow Observer* argued for the termination of the UILGB, because it believed that it had fulfilled its task and that if it continued in existence after the Irish Question had been settled then it would reinforce the political and social ghettoisation of the Irish in Britain and retard the progress of the very people it sought to represent.²⁷

The aspect of policy, which caused the *Glasgow Observer* to criticize the Irish Party centred upon its role in the breakup of the then Liberal Government and the subsequent formation of a Coalition administration in May 1915. The paper contended that the lack of support displayed by the

Irish Party towards the Asquith Government had substantially weakened its position and therefore its ability to resist the Unionist onslaught, which developed once the military situation began to deteriorate. The *Glasgow Observer* cited the opposition of the Irish Party to the Liberal Governments' proposals to tax alcoholic drinks as an example of the Irish Party's indifference to the plight of their erstwhile political allies.²⁹ In actual fact most historians consider that a coalition was inevitable irrespective of the actions of the Irish Party given the worsening military situation and the determination of the Unionists to use the issue as a political weapon.²⁷ That the *Glasgow Observer* sought to criticise the Irish Party for its role in stopping the introduction of a drink tax possibly tells us more about the pro-temperance views of its editor and proprietor than anything else.

With the inclusion of Unionists such as Andrew Bonar Law and Edward Carson in the new Coalition Government the *Glasgow Observer* wondered "whether the cause of Irish Self Government has encountered so great a setback since the days of the Parnell split".³⁰ The position that the Irish Party should adopt in the face of this development, particularly if it should accept the offer of a post in the Cabinet, was discussed in the light of what effect this would have on the fortunes of Home Rule. At this point in time the traditional policy of the Irish Party

was not to accept any positions of authority in Government until Home Rule had been achieved. However, some voices called into question this policy and argued that the best way to counter the increased influence of the Unionists was for Redmond to fight the Home Rule cause from within the Cabinet.

The *Glasgow Star* strongly advised Redmond to adopt this course of action. It argued that "the Irish leader would surely have more knowledge, power and influence regarding the Amending Bill if inside the Cabinet than if he remained out of it". Moreover, should he be in a position whereby he could exercise some power over the affairs of Ulster and "by doing so wisely and fairly he would show the world the hollowness of Unionist fears that they would suffer under a future Nationalist administration". His acceptance of Office would also illustrate Ireland's continued loyalty to the Empire and the war effort.³¹ This view commanded the support of the majority of those prominent Irish community leaders whose opinions were canvassed by, and printed in, the *Glasgow Observer*.³² In the event Redmond declined the invitation to join the Cabinet. Initially, the *Glasgow Observer* regretted Redmond's decision and bemoaned the lack of consultation between the Irish Party and the wider nationalist community, especially those in Britain, over the issue.³³ However, once it had become public knowledge that Redmond had been offered a minor position within the Government the paper retrospectively endorsed his decision.³⁴

Although the *Glasgow Observer* was critical of the tactics employed by the Irish Party in the spring of 1915 it still exhibited support for the institution. In July the paper stated that "the clear duty of Irish Nationalists concerned for Home Rule is not to allow themselves to be chilled into inactivity or provoked, manoeuvred, or enter into conflict with the Party because of what has happened...Nobody wants to replace them by any other party".³⁵ The latter point was reinforced in both editorials and articles supplied by prominent Irish politicians, which criticised the anti-recruiting activities of Sinn Fein.³⁶

If the *Glasgow Observer* did not use the Cabinet Question to berate the Irish Party the same could not be said in relation to the UILGB. Once Redmond's decision became known many of those, who previously advocated that he should have joined the Cabinet did an immediate volte face. A campaign was mounted by ADH and UILGB officials to gather support for Redmond's stance. To the paper this confirmed its view that the UILGB was staffed by "Yes men" who did not deserve the support of the immigrant community.³⁷

The columnist, who acted as the mouthpiece of the CSS was indifferent to these issues, which were preoccupying the *Glasgow Observer*. In his opinion a one party war mongering capitalist Government had been replaced by a

multi party war mongering capitalist Government-in effect, no change. As for the change in Government personnel endangering the future prospects of Home Rule, this particular scribe had always assumed that the Act would never come into operation. As for Redmond's refusal to join the Cabinet on the grounds that he wished to preserve political independence of the Irish Party the columnist merely observed that the Irish Party had previously subordinated its fortunes to those of the Liberals and wondered why the party was now concerned about being independent.³⁹

This period witnessed the decline of many Irish nationalist organisations within Scotland. This, however, was not due to any expansion of Republican groups, but rather the result of many rank and file nationalists taking Redmond's advice to join the armed forces. Consequently, organisations such as the National Volunteers and the UILGB suffered a large drop in membership.⁴⁰ In the case of the UILGB it has already been pointed out that many of its branches were transient phenomena: their existence linked to the prevailing level of political activity. With the effective suspension of adversarial electoral politics it is not surprising that the number of active branches declined.⁴¹ The organisation least afflicted by a drop in membership was the AOH.⁴² The campaign of the *Glasgow Observer* to promote the AOH in favour of the UILGB may have contributed to the relative buoyancy of the former.

However, it is more likely that this was due to the fact that the AOH performed an economic service on behalf of its members: thus, the society was still relevant to the needs of its membership despite the decline in political activity. In the case of Sinn Fein there still appears to be only one active club in Glasgow. While it is not possible to estimate its active membership the fact that it was estimated that there were only 70 members of the IV in the city would suggest that not much more than a hundred Sinn Feiners were present in Glasgow prior to the Rising.⁴²

The Easter Rising of 1916 represented a challenge not only to the statehood of the United Kingdom, but also to the concept of Home Rule and the predominant position of the Irish Party in Irish politics. Although the aims of the insurgents were achieved within five years, the initial response of the Irish both at home and abroad was one of almost uniform hostility.

In its first post Rising editorial the *Glasgow Observer* was highly critical of those, who had planned and participated in the event. However, the main purpose of the editor appears to have been to show that the Rising was the result of forces, which existed outside of mainstream Irish nationalism. The paper argued that the activities of the pre-war UVF had militarised Irish politics and had set a precedent, which those who had taken part in the Rising had merely followed: "Larne was

the fount and origin of Monday's outbreak in Dublin, and had there been no Larne outbreak, Sinn Fein would have had no excuse even to its own votaries and victims".⁴³ The editor subsequently claimed that German intrigue played an important role in the planning of the Rising. The leaders of the revolt "were simply dupes...of Germany and they played the German game".⁴⁴ The presence of the noted socialist James Connolly in the Rising afforded the paper another opportunity to point out how unrepresentative the rebels were of Irish society.⁴⁵ That the *Glasgow Observer* sought to portray the Rising as the result of an interplay of forces, Ulster, German and socialist, outwith the traditional nationalist movement was in no doubt in part due to a desire to reassure pro Home Rule elements within British society of Ireland's continued loyalty to the British Empire and that Ireland still deserved their support in its quest for self determination. Moreover, by doing so the paper might also have been trying to deflect any backlash away from the immigrant community and to contribute to continued social harmony in Scotland.

The hostile response of the *Glasgow Observer* to the Easter Rising coupled with the paper's sympathetic tribute to Augustine Birrell on the occasion of his resignation from the post of Irish Chief Secretary has led one historian to claim that this period represented the paper's nadir in pro British sentimentality.⁴⁶ In

actual fact the coverage of the *Glasgow Observer* appears to have been representative of the opinions held by the vast majority of the community, which it served. The paper carried full pages of Irish community leaders from around Scotland denouncing the Rising. The following two extracts are typical of the views stated:

The Sinn Fein revolt must be deplored by every Irishman who is anxious for the future welfare of his country. Readers of Irish history know very well the reasons for '98, '48 and '67, but the Ireland of to-day is totally different, and there is no defence for these misguided Irishmen.

I do not believe that the leaders [of the Rebellion] have been responsible for this unfortunate upheaval. I have always looked upon them as impracticable theorists and dreamers. their organisation has been captured by Larkinite Socialists and led to destruction. The trouble had its origin when Ulster Unionists flouted law and order - when officers of the Army refused to obey orders a couple of years ago at the Curragh.⁴⁷

The branches of the various community organisations such as the AOH, INF and the UILGB convened with the express purpose of deriding the Rising.⁴⁸ The reaction to the Rising managed to rejuvenate the flagging fortunes of the UILGB. Many previously dormant branches were reactivated and sent protestations of loyalty to Redmond while the members of the "Home Government" branch, Glasgow, donated £132 to the funds of the Irish Party to be used in the political fight against Sinn Fein.⁴⁹ In contrast the only example of public support for the Rising was one letter printed in the *Glasgow Observer* to which the editor replied in critical terms.⁵⁰

Readers of the Catholic Socialist Notes column in *Forward* would have been unaware of the events in Dublin if they were wholly dependent on this source for their information concerning Irish affairs. The columnist contented himself with ridiculing Edward Carson: "Sir Edward Carson's concern for the peace of Ireland is very touching. Surely he must think that the public forget that it was he who began the arming of the Irish people that has had such tragic consequences."⁵¹ Although this view was similar to that expressed by the *Glasgow Observer* in that it identified physical force Ulster Unionism as the catalyst of the Dublin rebellion the columnist nowhere commented on the legitimacy, or otherwise, on the actions of the insurgents. He even went so far as to ignore the circumstances that surrounded the death of a CSS member, Charles Carrigan. On May 20th 1916 the readership of *Forward* were no doubt saddened to read that Carrigan had "died suddenly". It was not until October that the readers of the paper found out that this particular CSS member's sudden demise occurred in the GPO building in Dublin while he was taking part in an armed rebellion.⁵² Why the columnist chose to ignore the Rising is perplexing. Possibly he thought Tom Johnston's critical editorial, in which he expressed amazement at Connolly's participation in a nationalist rebellion that had no chance of success, was comment enough.⁵³ On the other hand, there could have been a reasonable amount of support for the Rising within the CSS. According to Harry

McShane the labour movement in Scotland was deeply divided over as to how the Easter Rising should be viewed.³⁴ Possibly the deepest divisions were in the CSS. As has been commented on elsewhere some CSS members were also supporters of the IRB and the ICA. Unfortunately it is impossible to quantify the level of support these military organisations enjoyed within the CSS, but if an explicit condemnation would split the movement possibly the columnist thought that he would employ the maxim "least said soonest mended".

In the aftermath of the Rising ninety republican prisoners were sentenced to death. The executions commenced on May 3rd when three signatories of the Declaration of the Irish Republic, which was read out on the steps of the Dublin GPO immediately before the commencement of the rebellion, Patrick Pearse, Tom Clarke and Thomas McDonagh were executed. The following day there were four more executions. One of those to die was Joseph Plunkett another signatory of the Declaration of the Republic. On 5th May another execution took place. No more executions occurred until the 8th when four more men died, including another signatory of the Declaration of the Republic, Eamonn Ceannt. The following day there was an execution in Cork. On 12th May the last two signatories of the Declaration of the Declaration of the Irish Republic, James Connolly and Sean MacDermott became the final prisoners to die. In all fifteen men were

executed.

The initial response of the *Glasgow Observer* to the execution of the leaders of the Rising was favourable. While acknowledging that many Irishmen would experience "a feeling of pensive pity" over the executions the paper pointed out that those being executed "got or will get no worse than they gave". It further justified its stance by stressing that the rebels had committed a crime not only against English law, but also against the Irish people. The rebels "shed blood and took recklessly- not merely the lives of British [soldiers] but also of Irish citizens who dared to walk the streets of Dublin without the permission of 'Commandant' Connolly or 'President' Pearse".⁵⁵

A similar reaction swept through Irish society. However, this mood was soon to change. In the House of Commons the leaders of the Irish Party appealed that leniency should be shown towards the captives. Redmond pointed out that when a rebellion had occurred at the outset of the war in South Africa the Government of that country had not embarked on a policy of retaliation towards the defeated rebels. Moreover, the Irish leader argued that by executing some of the rebels the Government ran the risk of transforming them from criminals into martyrs in the eyes of the Irish people. John Wheatley concurred: "It appeared as if in the most miraculous manner the Irish heart had been completely captured by the British Empire.

I firmly believe that had the Government at that moment treated the Irish rebels as they did the Boers, that the Irish problem was solved for ever. But no, they insisted on their pound of flesh."⁵⁶ This view was also expressed by the *Glasgow Observer* and every other manifestation of Irish opinion in Scotland, such as the UILGB, the AOH and the CSS.⁵⁷

After the failed Rising various Irish "political" prisoners were transferred to jails on the British mainland, of which two, Perth and Barlinnie, were in Scotland. Although still critical of the actions of the prisoners the *Glasgow Observer* was prepared to highlight the allegedly harsh conditions, in which the prisoners were kept.⁵⁸ The paper's description of the prisoners' plight evoked a sympathetic response from the wider immigrant community and as a result a new organisation, the Irish Prisoners Aid Committee, was founded. The intention of the IPAC was to raise funds which would be used to provide "comforts" for those prisoners residing in Scottish jails. The Gaelic League was the main impetus behind the formation of the IPAC. Although it was somewhat "greener" in its nationalism than either the AOH or the UILGB it was careful to stress that its support for the prisoners was motivated by a sense of charity rather than an expression of political sympathy.⁵⁹ A columnist in the *Glasgow Observer* was insistent that supporting the prisoners 'did not imply the least approval of Sinn Fein politics or action'.⁶⁰ The fact

that the bulk of those on the executive of the IPAC are identifiable as members of either the AOH or the UILGB would seem to confirm the view that charity rather than politics was the prime motive of those, who supported the organisation.⁶¹ The initial success of the IPAC, it raised £160 19s 4d between June 10th and August 5th, showed that within a short period of time the feeling of the immigrant community towards the rebels had changed from outright hostility to one of sympathy, or even respect.⁶² However, it should be noted that public interest does seem to have waned fairly quickly. By September 16th the total had only risen to £184 0/- 2d.⁶³

In Ireland the political tide was beginning to ebb away from the Irish Party. British policy in the aftermath of the Rising had, as Redmond feared, helped to turn public opinion towards the cause of the rebels. Moreover, the continued failure of the Irish Party to transform the provisions of the Home Rule Act into a political reality whereby Ireland could be seen as having some control over its own destiny further diminished its standing in the eyes of the Irish public. In a desperate attempt to achieve an agreement that would allow the Home Rule process to begin, the Irish Party conceded the temporary exclusion of six Ulster counties in return for immediate setting up of a Parliament that would have jurisdiction over the rest of Ireland. The decision to acquiesce to partition attracted widespread criticism from the

supporters of the Party in the excluded area and the Catholic Church. Although Redmond managed to get the Party to back this compromise his efforts were in vain. While the Ulster Unionists accepted the scheme, they believed partition to be permanent. Opposition from southern Irish Unionists and their Conservative allies in the Cabinet proved strong enough to ensure the collapse of the scheme. Thus, the sacrifices of the Nationalists proved to be in vain. The process also graphically illustrated their political impotence.

The subterranean changes that were taking place in Irish politics were commented upon by both the *Glasgow Observer* and in the Catholic Socialist Notes column of *Forward*. However, it was the latter that was first to discuss the Sinn Fein challenge. As early as November 1916 Sinn Fein and its policies were being criticised by the columnist. While in favour of Ireland being in control of all purely domestic affairs he still wished it to be represented at Westminster and playing a full part in Imperial concerns. It was feared that, if a fully independent Ireland was created, the result would be an outbreak of nationalist friction between the two former partners: "However, regrettable may have been the means by which the British Isles were brought together, it is better for the inhabitants that they should remain united than that they should again be sundered into rival powers in perpetual conflict".⁵⁴ However, the columnists' main charge against Sinn Fein was its lack of a socialist programme: "Sinn

Fein does nothing and proposes to do nothing to protect the Irish working class from Capitalist parasites, provided they [the capitalists] are Irish".⁶⁵ This view was to be expressed on numerous occasions in the future as was the columnists' conclusion that "the Sinn Fein movement deserves no sympathy from Irish socialists".⁶⁶

Until late 1917 Sinn Fein was a loose ad hoc coalition of disparate anti Party elements without a coherent political programme. Its motive power was emotion rather than philosophy.⁶⁷ Nevertheless, this new brand of politics was to prove a potent electoral force and in 1917 candidates associated with Sinn Fein successfully contested four consecutive by elections.

In February Count Plunkett, technically an independent candidate, won a famous victory in North Roscommon. Plunkett's victory marked the zenith of his political career but, before he was to return to obscurity, he was to introduce an ideological innovation that was to become a central part of Sinn Fein policy. Against the wishes of some in the party Count Plunkett announced that he would not take his seat at Westminster: the policy of abstensionism was born. The *Glasgow Observer* had expected Plunkett to win. The paper even chided the Irish Party for opposing him. Its initial reaction to his success was one of indifference. It regarded his victory, correctedly, as being primarily due to personal factors such as the involvement of three of his sons in the

Easter Rising, rather than a portent of the impending doom that was to befall the Irish Party.⁶⁶ However, once it became clear that Fiunkett was not going to attend Parliament the paper adopted a more critical tone. Not only did the editor adversely compare the abstensionist policy with constitutional nationalism but also with physical force republicanism. Although the latter did not command the support of the *Glasgow Observer* it did at least evoke its respect.⁶⁷

The advance of Sinn Fein continued when it won the contest in South Longford. Once again the *Glasgow Observer* considered this to be a victory for the candidate rather than for the party claiming that a prisoner candidate "always had a strong appeal to any Irish constituency"⁷⁰ Undoubtedly the prisoner status of the Sinn Fein candidate, Joseph Maguinnis, played an important role in the campaign. The major slogan used by Sinn Fein was "Put him in to get him out". While the desire to further the release of a "political" prisoner may have been the primary reason for the election of Maguinnis the by election was also notable for the eve of poll intervention by Dr. W. J. Walsh, the Catholic Archbishop of Dublin. In a letter to the press he denounced partition "whether in its naked deformity or under the transparent mask of county option" before concluding that the country had been "practically sold."⁷¹ As the Irish Party had accepted the principle of

partition, albeit as a temporary measure. Walsh's letter was widely interpreted a gesture of support for Sinn Fein. Given the small margin of Sinn Fein's success, the first count gave the victory to the Irish Party, it is conceivable that this was the factor, which tipped the contest in favour of Maguinnis. The *Glasgow Star* vehemently attacked Walsh though its sister paper remained silent on this issue.⁷²

In its analysis of the result the *Glasgow Observer* exhibited a measure of confusion. While it argued that the result represented "a rally on the part of the constitutionalists...as...compared with...North Roscommon" the paper went on to state that:

The polling was really a warning to the Government that any further delay in the settlement of the Irish question will be a real danger. Patience with the constitutional movement is growing rapidly less in Ireland. It would be an infinite pity if the interminable tardiness of the Government in tackling the Irish question should alienate the majority of Irish voters from constitutional methods and discredit the effectiveness of the Irish Parliamentary Party. On the whole, South Longford shows that such a contingency is not impossible, and indeed it is anything but remote.⁷³

The editorial effectively states that the fate of the Irish Party is in the hands of an outside agency, the British Government. This was the first occasion that the *Glasgow Observer* conceded that the success of Sinn Fein was based on something more substantial than the personal qualities of its candidates.

The response of the *Glasgow Observer* to the triumph of Eamonn De Valera in East Clare was in marked contrast to its reaction to the previous two Sinn Fein victories. In this case the paper was convinced that issues rather than personalities had decided the contest. The electorate had voted, not for the traditional Home Rule policy as advocated by the Irish Party, but for the establishment of an Irish Republic. In contrast to Plunkett's initial triumph when the paper had chided the Irish Party for contesting the by election, the *Glasgow Observer* attacked the "ineptitude" displayed by the Irish Party during the East Clare campaign. The paper concluded that the East Clare contest represented "a further and more significant blow at the Irish Parliamentary Party" and warned that "The Irish Party must either now accept the Sinn Fein challenge in earnest or perish".⁷⁴ Thus, Sinn Fein was now viewed as representing a potent, possibly lethal, threat to the predominant position of the Irish Party.

It would seem that the magnitude of the victory achieved by De Valera panicked the *Glasgow Observer* for it was soon to revert back to its original view that Sinn Fein would prove to be a transitory phenomenon. Although Sinn Fein won the next by election contest in Kilkenny the paper expressed some optimism that the tide was beginning to turn: "the empty sterility of the Sinn Fein programme of abstention from Westminster, already apparent to over one third of the Kilkenny electorate, will speedily become apparent to the majority of electors when the

futility of the 'wishbone' policy is decried".⁷⁵

In the lull between by-elections that occurred after the contest in Kilkenny there was an opportunity for those connected with the *Glasgow Observer* to take stock of the changed political situation in Ireland. This period witnessed a subtle shift of opinion on the part of both the editor and the proprietor of the paper. The former assessed the various means by which Ireland could use to advance her claims to nationhood. To those, who advocated physical force, the paper argued that "Britain would have to sink her last ship and lose her last man before allowing Ireland to become a jumping off ground for future invaders or assailants of England". In a military contest, concluded the paper, Ireland was just not strong enough to win. The editorial also dismissed passive resistance as impossibly altruistic. The only method, which offered the possibility of success was constitutional action. However, the *Glasgow Observer* now no longer considered support for constitutional nationalism to be synonymous with support for the Irish Party: "The issue is not whether the present Irish party deserves the confidence of the Irish electorate... the issue is whether the constitutional method is the right method".⁷⁶

Charles Diamond, the proprietor, penned his thoughts on the rise of Sinn Fein in a series of articles, which appeared in late 1917. He rebutted charges that the

Irish Party was wrong to have acquiesced to the temporary partition of Ireland and that it should not have supported Britain's war policy. Diamond contended that Redmond's support of recruiting "did more to break down the power of Ireland's foes, and make sure inevitable triumph, than anything that had gone before".⁷⁷ Moreover, he dismissed republicanism as being detrimental to the material interests of the majority of Irishmen and denounced the futility of fighting for a free Ireland by military means. Nevertheless, he too was critical of the Irish Party. While acknowledging the role played by the policy pursued by the British Government policy Diamond considered that it was the vacillation and lack of fight displayed by the Irish Party that was the root cause of its failure to defeat Sinn Fein. He too went on to differentiate between supporting the present Irish Party and supporting constitutional methods.⁷⁸

Although critical of the Irish Party Diamond had not attacked it with any great venom. However, less than six weeks after the final article in the series was published he adopted a much more hostile stance. Diamond stated:

The Irish Party had a good cause. It threw it away. It got satisfied, sleek and content. Its members had salaries that made them easy and all was couleur de rose. What did it matter if 'the fight' which was no longer a fight but a 'guzzle' should last another ten years or more? Were not the McFuds and the Dooleys, the gombeen men and the job hunters, quite safe in any event?... It is all gain for Ireland and for Freedom that such a party has not entered into possession of Irish administration and control of Irish affairs,

imbued as it has been, and is, with a narrow selfish conceited, and intolerant view of its own virtues, and a grotesque sense of what it considered due to itself and its members. The new Government of Ireland will be a bigger better, more virile, more competent and patriotic thing than could ever have been evolved from Mr Redmond's leadership and following.⁷⁹

Though critical of the Irish Party Diamond reserved his strongest comments for the British Government:

I must put on record the fact that to me all Ireland's troubles, the social, economic and political difficulties of her case are the result of British misgovernment, of a rule of a foreign Power, of government infamy, brutality and callousness, and stupidity without parallel in the world.⁸⁰

Why Diamond chose to attack the Irish Party so vehemently at this particular time is difficult to understand. He attacks the Irish Party for its lack of fight, but subsequently acknowledges that it is unable to force the British Government to grant a measure of Home Rule: Diamond is clear that Home Rule is preferable to the establishment of an Irish Republic. He expresses the hope that Home Rule could be achieved and the advance of Sinn Fein blunted if the Irish Convention, which was a round table meeting attended by all Irish parties except Sinn Fein, was successful.⁸¹ However, it was not within the power of the Irish Party to engineer a successful conclusion to the forum. To have done so the Irish Party would have had to accede to the demand of the Ulster Unionists for the *permanent* exclusion of six Ulster counties. Such a concession was politically impossible at that point in time without further stimulating the

growth of Sinn Fein within nationalist society.' The criticisms levelled by Diamond against the Irish Party were remarkably similar to those he directed against the the UILGB in 1915. That this was the case is not surprising, because both organisations were composed of members drawn from similar socio-economic backgrounds. Perhaps Diamond wished that a new party based on the lines of the British Labour Party would emerge to carry the constitutional colours in Ireland, but if he did harbour such thoughts he kept them to himself.

The response to the rise of Sinn Fein from the columnist, who contributed Catholic Socialist Notes was muted. While applauding the Irish for supporting prisoner candidates and contrasting this with the experience of John MacLean in Scotland. Sinn Fein was constantly being attacked for being "nation conscious not class conscious".⁸² As with the *Glasgow Observer* the columnist turned to the question of how Ireland could achieve a measure of Home Rule when faced with a hostile British Government. Unlike Diamond, however, an answer was forthcoming. The columnist argued that "Capitalist Britain" would remain in Ireland to ensure that no other capitalist power could use Ireland as a base from which to threaten Britain. Dismissing Sinn Fein's abstensionist policy and physical force methods as futile the writer supplied the answer:

Destroy Capitalism throughout the world; end the trade jealousies and commercial competition that keep the world soaked in inflammable paraffin; establish the International, and then the

integrity of small communities will be a measure of practical politics.⁹³

Thus, only an international socialist revolution would create the conditions necessary, which would enable Ireland to achieve her political aspirations. Possibly the Soviet revolution, which had occurred three weeks previously had convinced the columnist that a change in the world order was imminent, however, it is unlikely that his philosophy would have appealed to an impatient Irish electorate.

The extent to which Sinn Fein advanced in Scotland during this period is difficult to gauge. It would, however, seem that the bulk of the immigrant community, if not actually hostile to the organisation, were at best indifferent to the fortunes that it enjoyed. In mid 1917 it is possible to identify, from the pages of the official Sinn Fein organ, *Nationality*, two active clubs in Glasgow.⁹⁴ In July 1917 the paper recorded the formation of another club in the city but it did not state the name or location of the new club.⁹⁵ The *Govan Press* in late 1917 records that a club existed in that locality; possibly this is the club referred to in *Nationality*.⁹⁶ By December clubs had also been founded in Motherwell and Clydebank.⁹⁷ It is also possible that another club existed in Dunbarton.⁹⁸ In addition to these "visible" advances there were allegations that pro Sinn Feiners had infiltrated and captured branches in other organisations.⁹⁹ It might have been the case that

the IPAC suffered this fate. However, if this was the case, it did not much avail the republican cause. The IPAC did manage to build up an organisation and by mid 1916 there were branches in Glasgow, Blantyre, Clydebank and Coatbridge.⁷⁰ Although these branches were to develop a scheme whereby they linked with similar organisations in Liverpool and Cork it was not enough to revive its fortunes in Scotland.⁷¹ In July 1918 it was announced that the IPAC had raised £223 16/- 6d while in existence, of which £160 19/- 4d had been raised by August 1916.⁷² Of the sum raised £155 3/- 2d went to a recognisable pro-republican body, the Irish National Aid and Volunteer Fund.⁷³ While the slowdown in fundraising activities may be explained by the fact that all those imprisoned as a result of the Easter Rising were released in December 1916 it could also have been the case that as the IPAC drifted towards republicanism the flow of donations dried up. If this was the case then the Irish in Scotland still did not support the politics of republicanism. Thus, *The Glasgow Observer* appears to have been correct when it claimed that, whereas Sinn Fein was rampant in Ireland, this was not the position in the Irish communities of Great Britain. Nevertheless, the fact that it subsequently called on the AOH to mount a campaign in Britain with the express purpose of denouncing physical force nationalism suggests that it feared that the position could change rapidly.⁷⁴

The early months of 1916 witnessed an apparent revival in

the fortunes of the Irish Party when it successfully defended the constituencies of South Armagh, East Tyrone and Waterford in a series of by-elections. However, as Robert Kee points out, none of these constituencies could be regarded as being representative of nationalist Ireland at that point in time.¹⁵ Prior to 1914 the Irish Party were the only party to stand in many constituencies. The absence of a creditable opponent meant that the Party only needed to build up a basic organisational structure in many areas. However, in Ulster, where the Unionists could mount an effective challenge, the need to maintain an effective electoral organisation was paramount. Thus, in the two Ulster by elections the Irish Party were much better placed to resist the Sinn Fein challenge than they were in the nationalist dominated south and west of Ireland. Moreover, the Unionists did not contest these two by-elections and it has been assumed that the Irish Party rather than Sinn Fein received the considerable unionist vote in the constituencies.¹⁶ In Waterford the Irish Party won by 478 votes in a total poll of just over 2000. As their candidate could be expected to poll the bulk of the not inconsiderable personal vote of the late John Redmond and the estimated 3-400 unionist votes in the constituency, the result could be classified as disappointing for the Party.¹⁷ These results appeared good for the Irish Party only because the previous four had been so bad. Nor could the Party view these victories as a portent of a bright new dawn: the by

elections were fought on a limited franchise and not on the universal male suffrage that was to operate in the General Election of 1918. Thus, many of Sinn Fein's most vociferous supporters, who had been unable to vote in these by-elections would be able to vote in future contests. The hold of the Irish Party on these constituencies, even at this period of apparent triumph, was at best tenuous.

The *Glasgow Observer* welcomed the victory of the Irish Party in South Armagh. However, while extending its congratulations to the victor it also, possibly inadvertently, highlighted the special factors that were at work in the constituency, which favoured the Irish Party, but could not be relied upon to aid the party in many other constituencies where it faced the Sinn Fein challenge. The paper stated:

For once fortune favoured the Irish Party. The constituency is pervaded by the political influence of Canon Charles Quinn of Camlough, the Nestor of the Ulster priesthood and a staunch supporter of the Constitutional movement. The candidate was an able local politician, well known to the electorate, and had been in the running at a previous election. The AOH is strong in the Division and finally the deceased member took the trouble to keep in touch with his constituency by frequent visits and assiduous attention to local affairs.'⁶

How far this victory was applauded in the immigrant community is unclear. The AOH certainly made known their positive reaction via their official column in the *Glasgow Observer*.⁷ The only other example of public reaction was

the resumption of a vigorous debate carried on by letter in the pages of the *Glasgow Observer* between James Duffy and Tomas O'Ean as to whether the Irish Party, or Sinn Fein had the dubious privilege of polling the unionist vote.¹⁰⁰

The second by election of 1918 was caused by the demise of John Redmond, leader of the Irish Party. Despite the fact that it had been increasingly critical of the Irish Party, the *Glasgow Observer* was generous in its praise of Redmond's life work:

his career and labours will shine effulgently in the years to come as those of one of the greatest and most gifted of Irishmen and the Irish leader who brought the cause of Ireland's liberty to the very threshold of realisation... He had many great gifts of leadership- political experience, wide prolonged and profound: personal disinterestness: a Parliamentary eloquence unsurpassed since the close of Gladstone's day: tolerance, shrewdness, foresight, persuasiveness, dignity, and the withal of personal charm which attracts and retains the loyalty of friends. If he lacked anything it was the touch of despotism which Parnell possessed, and which in Irish politics often proves indispensable... The Sinn Fein eclipse cannot justly be debited to Mr Redmond. Until Easter Week his leadership was acclaimed. Even after Easter Week it would have suffered slight setback had it not been for the incursion of Sir John Maxwell and the cold blooded executions perpetrated at his command.¹⁰¹

This affectionate view of Redmond seems to have been shared by the bulk of the immigrant community at the time. Throughout Scotland Requiem Masses were held in Redmond's honour.¹⁰²

The appointment of John Dillon as the leader of the Irish

Party was welcomed by both the proprietor and editor of the *Glasgow Observer* and was even applauded in the Catholic Socialist Notes column.¹⁰³ Diamond hoped that the change in leadership would result in the party adopting a more militant stance when pressing Ireland's demands.¹⁰⁴ If the Irish Party was to survive as the premier force in Irish nationalism then it was indeed the tactic to adopt. Dillon's speech in front of a hostile House of Commons, in which he expressed his admiration of those who had taken part in the Easter Rising, helped to stem the flow of public sympathy for the rebels in the immediate aftermath of the Rising and illustrated that the Irish Party could have survived had it become more intransigent and vigorous. However, the Irish Party did not follow this path and by the time Dillon became leader its fate, at least in the opinion of F.S.L. Lyons, had already been decided.¹⁰⁵ Nevertheless, Dillon was able to lead his party to success in the by election in Waterford and East Tyrone. Surprisingly, the *Glasgow Observer* failed to comment on these victories and they were only hailed as triumphs by the writer of the AOH column, which the paper carried.¹⁰⁶

Whatever recovery the Irish Party managed to effect in the early months of 1918 was nullified by the announcement of the British Government that it intended to apply conscription to Ireland. At a stroke nationalist Ireland united against the measure. This was graphically illustrated when a conference attended by

representatives of Sinn Fein, the Irish Party, assorted Labour leaders and dissident nationalists unanimously passed. after consultation with the Catholic hierarchy, a declaration which stated: "The attempt to enforce conscription be unwarrantable aggression which we call upon all true Irishmen to resist by the most effective means at their disposal".¹⁰⁷ Moreover, the conscription crisis resulted in all nationalist sentiment becoming blurred in the Sinn Fein image. This was most apparent when the Irish Party adopted the Sinn Fein policy of abstentionism and boycotted the House of Commons immediately the Conscription Bill was passed.

The first test of Irish opinion in the aftermath of this new development came when a by-election was called in East Cavan. According to Kee, even in this heightened atmosphere a Sinn Fein success was by no means guaranteed. The Irish Party was well organised in the constituency and could have counted upon the support of the 1-1500 unionists voters in the 9000 electorate.¹⁰⁸ During the campaign, however, the Sinn Fein candidate, Arthur Griffith, along with 72 other noted Republicans, was arrested after the "discovery" of a "German Plot", in which it was alleged that Sinn Fein had entered into treasonable communication with Germany. Evidence of such activity was scant, but the the arrest of Grifith ensured his electoral success. That Sinn Fein was now able to triumph in such seemingly barren terrain illustrated the

perilous state of the fortunes of the Irish Party.'

Reaction to the Government's conscription proposal amongst the Irish community in Scotland was one of almost total hostility. The subject dominated the correspondence columns of the *Glasgow Observer* from late April to mid June. In this period there was only one letter in favour of applying conscription to Ireland.¹⁰⁷ The paper itself argued that Westminster did not possess the authority to make the decision. Only Ireland could decide to conscript Irishmen.¹⁰⁸ Were Ireland to gain a measure of Home Rule then it might transpire that a Dublin Parliament would accede to conscription, but the *Glasgow Observer* was adamant that Home Rule would have to precede such a development.¹⁰⁹ The paper believed that the conscription proposals had less to do with augmenting the strength of the British forces in France, but were more concerned with destroying the future prospects of Home Rule. If the Government was able to portray the Irish as shirkers and traitors then support for Home Rule in Britain would diminish and the goodwill that existed between the two peoples would be replaced by conflict.¹¹⁰ There was, of course, no support for the extension of conscription to Ireland in the Catholic Socialist Notes column. However, the writer derived much pleasure when pointing out that many of those, and the *Glasgow Observer* has to be counted amongst them, who were vehemently opposed to the introduction of conscription in Ireland

had acquiesced, even campaigned for its application in Great Britain; a move which had affected many of Irish birth or descent.¹¹³

The conscription crisis and the "German Plot" allegations caused Charles Diamond to reassess his view of Sinn Fein. No longer would they be portrayed as the wild men of Irish nationalism:

We have yet to see if the Sinn Fein movement apart from what may be the claims of a handful of irreconcilables is not just as "lawful", as "constitutional" as "peaceful" as the Parliamentary movement itself... If Sinn Fein has Ireland at its back, it is the duty of those who have been discarded to make way for the new man and the new forces. Anything else is pure factionalism.¹¹⁴

D.J. Mitchell Quin, the editor of the *Glasgow Observer*, used the correspondent columns of the paper to attack this view.¹¹⁵ Quin disputed the assertion that Sinn Fein represented the views of the majority of Irishmen and cited the victories of the Irish Party in the Waterford and East Tyrone by elections as evidence. Moreover, argued Quin, the fact that a view commanded the support of a majority did not in itself prove the correctness of that view. Even if Sinn Fein did espouse the views of the majority of Irish nationalists this did not mean that it was entitled to the uncritical support of the Irish in Britain. Quin concluded by stating that the policies of Sinn Fein had no chance of success given the nature of the Anglo-Irish relationship, therefore, those interested

in the fate of Ireland should remain loyal to the Irish Party. While it "may have its faults... so long as it remains the sole embodiment of constitutional (and therefore commonsense) politics in Ireland our duty may be to reform but it is paramountly to support it".¹¹⁶

This conflict was discussed in the editorial columns of the paper. While wishing that the Irish Party and Sinn Fein should seek to narrow their differences in order to help unify Ireland, the paper was subsequently to state that there was little difference between the two bodies, it appears to have sided with Diamond: "It is hard work putting 'new wine into old bottles'. We cannot live with a dead past. Ireland needs new men and a great modification of recent methods".¹¹⁷ Although both Diamond and the *Glasgow Observer* were no longer prepared to resist the new order in Ireland it should be noted that neither were they willing to positively endorse Sinn Fein.

Throughout the period, which marked the rise of Sinn Fein Diamond remained silent as to how Ireland could achieve self government, whether on a Home Rule, or Republican model. In the autumn of 1918 he finally outlined a positive policy to achieve the goal of Irish self determination. Ironically it had little to do with events in Ireland, the catalyst for change was to be found in British society. With the Labour Party becoming more sympathetic to Irish demands, coupled with Liberal

inactivity on this subject, Diamond advocated the Irish in Britain to work for the return of a Labour Government at the earliest opportunity.¹¹³ Once this was achieved then the Irish at home would automatically benefit. Essentially, this was the pre war strategy with the Labour Party playing - the role once occupied by the Liberals. Not only did this policy "solve" Diamond's dilemma of being anti-Party, but not pro Sinn Fein it also enabled him to urge the immigrant community to support Labour on grounds of both class and nation.

Not surprisingly a similar strategy found favour in the Catholic Socialist Notes column. The writer agreed with the view that Ireland alone could not free itself by its own actions. A capitalist Britain would never give Ireland a measure of independence whether Ireland voted or fought for such a scheme. Britain remained in Ireland to satisfy her own needs, remove those needs and the British presence would disappear:"the only hope for Ireland and other oppressed people was to end the rule of Capitalists, which everywhere was based on theft and tyranny. A Labour Government would have no economic or imperialist reason to keep Ireland in subjection".¹¹⁴ A Labour Government was proposed as the answer to Ireland's prayers.

Sinn Fein won a stunning triumph in the General Election of 1918. They won seventy three seats compared with the six held by the Irish Party and the twenty six won by the

Unionists. While this victory had been predicted in both the pages of the *Glasgow Observer* and the Catholic Socialist Notes column neither were to exhibit any great enthusiasm over the result. The former merely reiterated its view that the Irish in Scotland, or elsewhere for that matter, had no right to organise against the views expressed by Ireland in a democratic election no matter how intensely they disagreed with Sinn Fein and its policies. Sinn Fein had won, therefore, it had the right to pursue its goals by its own methods.¹²⁰ The latter, while regretting the defeat of John Dillon, shed no tears for the demise of the Irish Party, but it also thought that Sinn Fein's policies and methods were impractical. Although the columnist could see no way through the existing impasse he was at least correct when he predicted that Anglo-Irish relations were about to enter an "interesting" phase.¹²¹

Within the immigrant community in Scotland it would appear that Sinn Fein made some headway in 1918. For example, by June there were seven Sinn Fein clubs in Glasgow.¹²² While no figures concerning the numerical strength of each club are available, their popularity can be illustrated by the fact that crowds of 6-700 attended the concerts and lectures sponsored by the "Thomas MacDonagh" club in Partick.¹²³ Yet, despite such advances, it would appear that the Irish Party retained a large groundswell of support within the immigrant community in Scotland. For example, the two largest

donations, of £645 12s 6d and £105 respectively, to the "Irish National Fund", which had been set up to finance the campaign of the Irish Party in the 1918 election came from Scotland.¹²⁴ In contrast Sinn Fein received only £111 from its supporters in Scotland when attempting to raise cash for the same purpose.¹²⁵

While the difference in the size of donations received by the two groups could be explained by the fact that those, who supported the Irish Party were more likely to be middle class than those of Sinn Fein and, therefore, were in a position to give more. Of the donation of £645 12s 6d, £634 3s 6d was contributed by only 171 people. However, there is other evidence, which supports the view that the Irish Party had retained a large proportion of its pre war support in Scotland.¹²⁶ The membership of the AOH in Scotland had actually increased in 1917-18, though it did not reach its pre war peak.¹²⁷ Nor did the AOH in Scotland fear that they would lose members to Sinn Fein. Rather they feared that the rising Labour movement provided a greater threat in this respect.¹²⁸

The question arises as to why support for Sinn Fein was so relatively low amongst the immigrant community at this point in time. The most obvious reason is that the Irish in Scotland had not suffered the ravages of Maxwellism. Though it should be borne in mind that, in many cases, militancy increases with distance, the phenomena of armchair generals leading from the rear safe in the

knowledge that they would not figure in the casualties. It would appear that there was a greater level of support for Sinn Fein in the Irish communities in the U.S.A. than in Great Britain in 1918.

Possibly one major factor which explains the relative weakness of Sinn Fein in Scotland was the lack of support for the organisation displayed by the sections of the press most likely to be read by the Irish community in Scotland. As has been seen Sinn Fein only began to command the lukewarm support of the *Glasgow Observer* from the summer months of 1918. Moreover, it would appear that the paper barred local Sinn Fein clubs advertising the holding of meetings and other activities from Easter 1916 until May 1918.¹²¹ This dearth of information regarding Sinn Fein activities in Scotland was even replicated in pro Sinn Fein journals. The official organ of the organisation, *Nationality*, only carried acknowledgements of financial donations received from clubs in Scotland. Commenting on the results of the 1918 General Election the relatively poor showing of Sinn Fein in Ulster was attributed to the strength of the pro party *Irish News* and *Irish Weekly* in the area. L. J. Walsh stated that "We shall never be in a good position in Ulster until we have a decent weekly at least in Belfast".¹²²

The fact that Sinn Fein failed to make the same dramatic advances in the nationalist areas of Ulster as they had

in the other provinces also helps to explain the lack of progress in Scotland. The province, with which the Irish in Scotland were most likely to have some contact with was Ulster. Therefore, it is possibly not surprising that the political behaviour of the immigrant community mirrored that of the nationalist community of Ulster. An example of this phenomenon can be found when examining the fortunes of the AOH. Between 1917-18 its membership had risen in Scotland and Ulster, but had declined dramatically in Leinster, Munster and Connaught.¹³¹

In December 1918 T.F. O'Connor confided in his diary that "we here in England are so absorbed in our own struggle that few of us pay the least attention to Ireland."¹³² It is likely that the war and its attendant effects lessened the ties that existed between Ireland and Scotland. One suspects that those in the Irish community, who had sons at the front were more obsessed by the course of the war and the fate of their offsprings, than the rise of Sinn Fein. Moreover, one wonders how long Sinn Fein was associated with pro-Germanism in the mind of the immigrant community, after all even the *Glasgow Observer* equated the two in 1916 and the British Government alleged the links remained in 1918. Even though they might have sympathised with the aims of Sinn Fein it is difficult to imagine many of those, who were either members of, or had relatives in, the armed forces fighting in France supporting an

organisation tainted with such allegations. The pages of the *Glasgow Observer* in 1917-18 make somewhat incongruous reading. While the paper highlighted and praised the sacrifices of those from the immigrant community who were fighting and dying in France in Belgium it was also highly critical of the Government for which they were fighting and dying.¹³³

The fact that sectarian friction in Scotland appears to have gained a new lease of life during the war years may well have caused many immigrants to concentrate on domestic rather than Irish issues. More positively, the expansion of the workforce and the resultant increase in unionisation that occurred during this period may well have loosened communal bonds of the Irish community in Scotland. Finally, it may have been the case that interest in Irish politics declined because those likely to play an active role in politics, the men, would have been conscripted and, therefore, were probably ignorant or indifferent to the fate of the land of their ancestors at that particular point in time. In any case they were unlikely to be in Scotland for any length of time before returning to the Front and it is probable that they spent their leave concerned with other activities than politics.

Footnotes

1. F.S.L. Lyons *Ireland since the Famine* p.232.
2. F.S.L. Lyons *ibid* p.232 gives details of this work.
3. Calton Younger *Arthur Griffith* pp. 22-27.
4. F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p.256.
5. F.S.L. Lyons *ibid* p.257.
6. J.E. Handley *The Irish in Modern Scotland* p.232.
7. Rev B.J. Canning *Padraig H. Pearse and Scotland* p.5.
8. Rev B.J. Canning *ibid* p.8.
9. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Oct 1913.
10. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.291.
11. J.E. Handley *ibid* p.292.
12. J.E. Handley *ibid* p.292.
13. For an account of the Hobson meeting see the *Glasgow Observer* St. Patrick's Day Supplement 16 Mar 1912. For the Devlin meeting see the *Glasgow Observer* 6 Sept 1913.
14. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Mar 1912.
15. For the military connections of those named see the chapter on the activities of the IRB in Scotland.
16. Most notably Carrigan and White were members of the CSS. *Glasgow Observer* 1 Nov 1913.
17. *Glasgow Observer* 1 May 1915.
18. D.G. Boyce *Nationalism in Ireland* p.284.
19. F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p.330; C. Townshend *Political Violence in Ireland* p.279; R. Kee *The Bold Fenian Men* p.224 give varying estimates of the various factions.
20. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Sept 1914.
21. *Forward* 10 Oct 1914.
22. *Forward* 3 Oct 1914.
23. *Forward* 9 Jan 1915.
24. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Oct 1914.
25. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Nov 1915.
26. The issues raised in this paragraph are discussed in greater detail in another chapter.
27. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Nov 1914; 6 & 22 Feb 1915: This aspect of the viws of the *Glasgow Observer* is also discussed in the chapter dealing with domestic politics in Scotland.
28. *Glasgow Observer* 29 May 1915.
29. R. Jenkins *Asquith* pp. 396-410; S. Koss *Asquith* pp. 181-190; T. Wilson *The Downfall of the Liberal Party* pp. 51-61; R. Blake *The Unknown Prime Minister* pp. 241-7.
30. *Glasgow Observer* 29 May 1915.
31. *Glasgow Star* 21 May 1915.
32. *Glasgow Observer* 22 May 1915.
33. *Glasgow Observer* 12 June 1915.
34. *Glasgow Observer* 26 June 1915.
35. *Glasgow Observer* 24 July 1915.
36. *Glasgow Observer* 3 & 24 July 1915.
37. *Glasgow Observer* 5 June 1915.
38. *Forward* 5 June 1915.
39. *Glasgow Observer* 8 & 22 May 1915.
40. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Oct 1915.
041. See Secretary's Reports Aug 1915 & 15 June 1917. AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925. B.R.S. Lou 12/1/2.

42. An advert placed by the Glasgow branch of the Sinn Fein club appeared regularly in the columns of the *Glasgow Observer*. This usually gave details of forthcoming lectures and dances held by the club.
43. *Glasgow Observer* 29 Apr 1916.
44. *Glasgow Observer* 6 May 1916.
45. *Glasgow Observer* 6 May 1916.
46. Rev B.J. Canning *F.H. Fearse and Scotland* p.10.
47. *Glasgow Observer* 6 May 1916. For further opinions see *Glasgow Observer* 13 May 1916.
48. *Glasgow Observer* 6 May 1916; *Glasgow Herald* 27 & 28 Apr 1916; *Daily Record* 1 May 1916.
49. *Glasgow Observer* 6 & 13 May; 10 June; 22 July 1916.
50. *Glasgow Observer* 13 May 1916.
51. *Forward* 6 May 1916.
52. *Forward* 20 May & 14 Oct 1916.
53. *Forward* 6 May 1916.
54. H. McShane & Joan Smith *No Mean Fighter* p.83.
55. *Glasgow Observer* 6 May 1916.
56. *Forward* 20 May 1916.
57. *Glasgow Observer* 13 & 20 May 1916; *Forward* 20 May 1916.
58. *Glasgow Observer* 10 June 1916.
59. *Glasgow Observer* 10 & 17 June 1916.
60. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Aug 1916. *Forward* did not mention the IFAC until 3 Dec 1916.
61. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Aug 1916.
62. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Aug 1916.
63. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Sept 1916.
64. *Forward* 4 Nov 1916.
65. *Forward* 4 Nov 1916.
66. *Forward* 4 Nov & 2 Dec 1916. William Regan also disseminated anti Sinn Fein sentiments at public meetings in Glasgow and Belfast. He even put forward his views at meetings held in Sinn Fein clubs. See *Forward* 25 Nov & 30 Dec 1916; 13 Jan 1917.
67. For the diversity of views that existed within Sinn Fein at this point in time see M. Laffin 'The Unification of Sinn Fein'. *Irish Historical Studies* Vol 17. 1971. pp. 353-379.
68. *Glasgow Observer* 10 & 17 Feb 1917.
69. *Glasgow Observer* 17 & 24 Feb 1917.
70. *Glasgow Observer* 12 May 1917.
71. M. Laffin (2) *The Partition of Ireland, 1911-25* p.57.
72. *Glasgow Star* 25 May 1917.
73. *Glasgow Observer* 12 May 1917.
74. *Glasgow Observer* 21 July 1917.
75. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Aug 1917.
76. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Aug 1917.
77. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Sept 1917.
78. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Sept 1917. A prominent Sinn Fein supporter, Louis Walsh, was allowed to put forward the party's views in the *Glasgow Observer* of 6th October. The following week the editor of the *Glasgow Observer* replied to Walsh's arguments in similar terms to those used by Diamond, little more than a month earlier. See *Glasgow*

- Observer* 8 Sept & 6 Oct 1917.
79. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Nov 1917.
80. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Nov 1917.
81. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Nov 1917.
82. *Forward* 19 May 1917. He attacked Sinn Fein's abstentionist policy the preceding week. *Forward* 12 May 1917.
83. *Forward* 1 Dec 1917.
84. The two clubs were the "James Connolly", which would seem to be the club that was in existence in the pre war period, and the "Tom Clarke" club. *Nationality* 23 June: 21 July 1917.
85. *Nationality* 29 Sept 1917.
86. *Govan Press* 16 Nov 1917.
87. *Nationality* 17 Nov & 22 Dec 1917.
88. The paper recorded that a telegram of congratulation was sent to De Valera on the occasion of his by election victory. Unfortunately it is not clear if this was sent by an individual or on behalf of a club in the vicinity. *Nationality* 21 July 1917.
89. There were claims that the executive of one branch of the UILGB was dominated by Sinn Fein supporters. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Dec 1917.
90. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Sept 1916: A further branch was founded in Motherwell. *Glasgow Observer* 2 June 1917.
91. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Sept 1916.
92. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Aug 1916; 6 July 1918.
93. *Glasgow Observer* 6 July 1918.
94. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Dec 1917.
95. R. Kee *Ourselves Alone* pp. 41-3.
96. R. Kee *ibid* pp. 42-3.
97. R. Kee *ibid* pp. 42-3.
98. *Glasgow Observer* 9 Feb 1918.
99. *Glasgow Observer* 9 Feb 1918.
100. *Glasgow Observer* 2 & 23 Feb; 12 & 19 May; 21 July 1918.
101. *Glasgow Observer* 9 Mar 1918.
102. *Glasgow Observer* 16 & 23 Mar 1918.
103. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Mar 1918; *Forward* 6 Apr 1918.
104. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Mar 1918.
105. F.L.S. Lyons *op cit* pp. 378-380.
106. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Mar & 13 Apr 1918.
107. R. Kee *op cit* p.45.
108. R. Kee *ibid* pp. 46-7.
109. *Glasgow Observer* 11 May 1918 printed a letter from Olim Miles which urged Irishmen to enlist rather than wait to be conscripted. For replies to this letter see *Glasgow Observer* 18 & 25 May 1918. For reports of the hostility which this proposal aroused see *Glasgow Observer* 27 Apr: 4 & 18 May; 8 June 1918.
110. *Glasgow Observer* 15 & 20 Apr 1918.
111. *Glasgow Observer* 13 Apr & 6 May 1918.
112. *Glasgow Observer* 25 May; 15 June; 13 & 27 July 1918.
113. *Forward* 13 Apr 1918.
114. *Glasgow Observer* 1 June 1918.
115. There is no indication that this D.J.

- Mitchell Quin was the editor of the *Glasgow Observer*. However, it would seem probable that this was the case. The writer of the letter gives his address in Pomeroy, Co. Tyrone. *Glasgow Observer* 15 June 1915.
116. *Glasgow Observer* 15 June 1918.
117. *Glasgow Observer* 15 June 1918.
118. *Glasgow Observer* 6 July; 3 Aug 1918.
119. *Forward* 24 Aug 1918.
120. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Dec 1918.
121. *Forward* 21 Dec 1918; 11 Jan 1919.
122. *Glasgow Herald* 13 June 1918. In addition there were active clubs in Cotbridge and Greenock. See *Glasgow Observer* 28 Sept 1918.
123. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Oct 1918; 25 Jan 1919.
124. The smaller amount was raised at a St. Patrick's Day meeting organised by the AOH in Glasgow. The larger amount was raised by public subscription. It is not clear whether this collection was organised by the UILGB or AOH. Full details of the sources of donations, the majority of which appear to have been remitted by nationalists in Ulster, especially Belfast, who contributed the £2960 13/- 6d which was raised for the Irish Party by means of the Irish National Fund see *Glasgow Observer* 16 Nov 1918. For more details of the funds raised in Scotland see *Glasgow Observer* 20 Apr: 1, 8, 15 & 19 June; 6 July 1918.
125. *Glasgow Observer* 25 Jan 1919.
126. A list of those who gave donations to the fund can be found in the *Glasgow Observer* 19 Oct 1918.
127. Between 1917 and 1918 membership of the AOH in Scotland rose from 10,993 to 14,489. This was less than its pre war peak of 17,792. See Secretary's Reports of 22 Jan 1914; 4 Mar 1919. AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925 B.R.S. Lou 12/1/2.
128. Secretary's Report 4 Mar 1919. AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925 B.R.S. Lou 12/1/2.
129. In the aftermath of the Easter Rising the usual notice concerning forthcoming attractions at the Glasgow Sinn Fein Club, which previously appeared at least twice a month in the prepaid advert section on p2 or p3 of the paper, failed to appear. The issue of the *Glasgow Observer* dated 11 May 1918 and advertised a debate between a Sinn Fein activist T. O'Ban and a prominent supporter of the Irish Party, James Duffy.
130. L.J. Walsh-H. Boland n.d. Flunkett MSS 11,405.
131. Between 1917 and 1918 membership of the AOH in Scotland rose from 10,993 to 14,489. Between 1917 and 1918 AOH membership in Ulster rose from 16,849 to 16,656. In the same period AOH membership in the other three provinces of Ireland declined from 19,744 to 12,905. See Secretary's Reports of 22 Jan 1914; 4 Mar 1919. AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925 B.R.S. Lou 12/1/2.
132. L.W. Brady T.F. *O'Connor and the Liverpool Irish* p.245.
133. The *Glasgow Observer* carried a regular column entitled "This Country's Heroes" which featured members

of the Irish community in Scotland who died fighting in Europe. This column existed well into 1919.

Chapter 3

The Anglo-Irish War, 1919-21: A Community at War

Although Sinn Fein had won a victory of stunning magnitude in the General Election of 1918, winning 73 of the 105 Irish seats, the question remained as to how it could attain its political goals when the levers of power in Ireland were controlled by an unsympathetic Government in Westminster. Initially, Sinn Fein had planned to press for Irish independence through the medium of the Paris Peace Conference where it was hoped that President Wilson of the U. S. A. would force Lloyd George to apply the principle of self determination to Ireland. Sinn Fein, however, met with disappointment so far as this plan was concerned and the quest for Irish independence was to depend on future events in Ireland.

As Sinn Fein did not recognise the right of the Westminster Parliament to have jurisdiction over Irish affairs it attempted to constitute a separate Irish Parliament, the Dail Eireann. Although invitations to attend this body were sent to all of those who were entitled to represent Irish constituencies at Westminster both the Unionists and the Irish Party declined to accept the summons. The inaugural session of the new body occurred on the 21st of January 1919 and was attended by only twenty seven Sinn Fein M.P.s. Those present approved a series of articles which asserted the nature of Irish sovereignty. Most importantly they drafted a Declaration of Independence, which stated that "the Irish Republic was proclaimed on Easter Monday, 1916, by the Irish Republican Army, acting on behalf of the Irish people".¹

This day was to mark the zenith of Sinn Fein for while the Dail was proclaiming the above sentiments events were occurring which would ensure that physical-force Republicanism would become the prevailing philosophy. In Soloheadbeg, Co. Tipperary a group of nine armed Republicans, acting on their own initiative, attempted to capture a cartload of explosive. During the ensuing skirmish two R.I.C. (Royal Irish Constabulary) men were killed. The Anglo-Irish war had begun.

At first the Anglo-Irish war was a small scale conflict, 'only' eighteen policemen were killed between May and December 1919. Although civilians suffered a degree of discomfort, both from the actions of the British Government, which designated specific limited areas as military districts, and the IRA which resorted to intimidation if it could not achieve its objectives by persuasion, the fighting was restricted to the combatants, the RIC and the IRA. Nevertheless, this period settled the question of how Republican Ireland would pursue its political goals and posed the question of how far those who had supported Sinn Fein in 1918 would support the IRA in subsequent struggle.

While the *Glasgow Observer* hailed Sinn Fein's massive victory in the General Election the paper recognised that this triumph did not alter the position of Ireland within the United Kingdom; therefore the paper believed that any change in Ireland's constitutional position had to occur

through that mechanism. Though Sinn Fein sought to enlist the support of the Paris Peace Conference, the *Glasgow Observer* believed that only if there was a sympathetic Labour Government in Westminster could Ireland expect her wishes to be granted. The paper continuously expressed this view throughout 1919: many editorials devoted solely to events in Ireland ended with the instruction-'Vote Labour'.²

For much of 1919 the *Glasgow Observer* did not comment on specific issues or events that were subsequently to exercise the minds of historians. The paper preferred to highlight the supposed illegitimacy of British rule in Ireland and the ills which originated from this source. It was argued that British rule in Ireland was simply an example of 'successful piracy' and would remain so while the majority of the Irish opposed the prevailing arrangement.³ Charles Diamond argued that the division between Protestant and Catholic was a direct product of English policy in Ireland:

Only the cessation... of the support given by the English Tories and Huns to the Orange minority, can produce peace and goodwill between the Irishmen of North East Ulster and the rest of the country. England has steadily promoted this inter-cine feud by favouring the minority and hounding down the majority. And then the feud has been put forward as an excuse for England's 'impartial' presence in the land.⁴

In essence this is the Republican analysis of the position in Ulster today. It ignores the fact that

Protestant/Unionist-Catholic/Nationalist conflict has been stimulated by internal as well as external factors and denies the former their distinctive culture.

Editorial comment on IRA violence during this phase of the war was sparse. The *Glasgow Observer* tended to see the campaign of the IRA as a response to British provocation. The paper argued that it was British policy to provoke a violent response from the IRA in order to poison relations between the people of Britain and Ireland. If this could be achieved, claimed the *Glasgow Observer*, any British political party, which wished to satisfy Ireland's demands, would be destined to electoral failure, and, consequently, the Act of Union would remain triumphant on the statute book.⁵ In actual fact it was the IRA which was acting offensively, though Republicans would argue that it was the British presence in Ireland that was the fundamental cause of the violence.⁶

It was Charles Diamond, who first discussed the IRA campaign in any detail. Although unwilling to condemn the actions of individual IRA activists, he did not endorse their activities and, indeed, seemed to dispute the right of the IRA to pursue such methods. Diamond stated:

As to the moral aspect of individual resistance, or attack, I cannot judge for others, whose consciences may acquit or justify them. But plainly, it is not the proper function of one man here, or a dozen men there, to levy war as being done in Ireland today... without reference to the views, the advice or the orders of the only organised Government representing Ireland in possession of any moral authority, as

representing the Irish people, I mean Dáil Eireann.⁷

Diamond had focused upon one of the major sources of friction that existed within the broad Republican movement, which body had the right to determine policy. Although the Dail claimed to be the legitimate Government of Ireland it did not assume public responsibility for the military campaign until April 1921. It should also be noted that those in the IRB had sworn an oath, which recognised that organisation's Supreme Council as the true Government of Ireland and therefore saw no need to respect the wishes of the Dail. Many physical-force men feared that the political wing of the movement would become dominant if the militarists remained dormant. Indeed, Dan Breen, one of those who took part in the initial action of the Anglo-Irish war, the ambush at Soloheadbeg, was to subsequently portray this event not only as a blow struck for Irish freedom but also as a bid to ensure that the IRA did not become subordinate to Sinn Fein.⁸

In December 1919 the IRA unsuccessfully attempted to kill Lord French, the Viceroy of Ireland. This incident brought forth a wave of indignation from many sections of British society. This reaction caused Diamond to make his most famous, or infamous, comments regarding the use of violence by the IRA. In an article entitled "Killing, No Murder" Diamond pointed out that many of whom were most bitter in their denunciations of the activities of the

IRA had endorsed the use and effects of violence on other occasions:

The very same newspapers that justify and applaud or excuse the shooting of thousands of unarmed Indian peasants by the English military authorities and who declare that this horrible outrage 'saved India' are the very same people who scream their denunciations of the attack on the Irish viceroy... If Lord French was Field Marshall von der Goltz, if he were representing Germany in occupation of England and doing here what Lord French is doing in Ireland, would there not be patriotic Englishmen ready to shoot him down, and millions more ready to applaud the deed.'

Diamond had penned similar sentiments a few weeks prior to the attempt on French's life, which caused no comment, however, the "Killing, No Murder" article resulted in him being charged with and convicted of incitement to murder.¹⁰ While Diamond probably approved of the attempt by the IRA to kill French he did not explicitly express this sentiment in print. In fact his article merely pointed out that, in many cases, 'one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'.

The *Glasgow Observer* used the furore caused by the "Killing, No Murder" article to reiterate the view that the prime cause of the violence then occurring was the British presence in Ireland:

We are against assassination and violence, war and outrage in principle. We condemn them wherever they show their heads. But we agree with the witty Frenchman, who replied to the arguments in favour of the abolition of capital punishment: Let Messieurs the Assassins begin. So long as the English Government insists upon holding Ireland

by the throat. so long will Irishmen be found to resist.'¹

This would appear to suggest that the paper conferred a degree of legitimacy to the IRA's campaign. At this point in time it might be argued that the *Glasgow Observer* was adopting a more militant stance than many both in Ireland and Scotland.

A more critical attitude towards the IRA was exhibited by the Catholic Socialist Notes columnist. Although he might be assumed to have been a pacifist his comments on the prevailing situation in Ireland owed more to pragmatism than principle. As did the *Glasgow Observer* the columnist contended that IRA violence was a product of the British presence in Ireland, however, he went on to argue that the military campaign was counterproductive in political terms and unlikely to be effective. Of the general IRA campaign it was stated:

It may be admitted that any means would be justified in overthrowing the foreign Government in Ireland, but a knowledge of the conditions compels one to regard all proposals to accomplish this by force as extreme madness. Ireland has no more chance of success than a child would have against the militarist machine of Britain and all the enthusiasm so unselfishly devoted to such propaganda is a criminal waste of valuable effort.'²

In the aftermath of the attempted assassination of Lord French the columnist stated:

We may as well frankly admit that as a result of this the Irish cause is weakened. The cause of Ireland is so pure that one instinctively

shudders at it being stained by murder. There is no comparison between this and the brave and noble sacrifice made by the men who openly faced death in Dublin during Easter Week of 1916. A policy of assassination would reduce Ireland in the world's eyes from its present pinnacle to the moral level of a Balkan State. And it is such an ugly, illogical and ineffective policy that we are confident it does not appeal to any considerable section of the Irish people.¹³

There were indeed many within the Republican/Nationalist community in Ireland, who rejected the methods employed by the IRA. Throughout 1919 IRA killings of RIC men provoked a hostile response amongst the community the IRA were seeking to liberate. The term murder was used by many to describe such actions ranging from the Lord Mayor of Dublin to local authorities and representatives of the Catholic Church.¹⁴ As the victims tended to be devout Catholics well known and liked by the community they policed, and sometimes unarmed, this reaction might not be considered surprising. However, the attempted assassination of Lord French, the personification of the 'occupying' regime, also attracted widespread criticism. The Archbishop of Dublin described it "as an appalling attempt at murder". His sentiments were endorsed by the normally pro Sinn Fein *Irish Independent*; a stance, which resulted in the IRA destroying the paper's printing press and issuing a death threat to its editor.¹⁵ As evidence of the Irish public's antipathy towards the IRA's campaign Robert Kee cites the result of the municipal elections of January 1920. In the 28 most nationalist counties Sinn Fein won only 527 seats compared with the

872 won by the other parties. While votes cast for Labour were also votes cast for Irish self determination they must also be considered as votes against the use of physical force tactics by the IRA.¹⁶

In 1919 the British Government adopted both political and military measures in an attempt to 'solve' the Irish Question. The Government responded to increasing IRA attacks by designating the area in which they occurred as a military district. In the specified area restrictions were placed on the movement of the local populace, the holding of markets and fairs. Such restrictions tended to produce a backlash effect. When Limerick was declared a military district a general strike developed: a move which was fully endorsed by the *Glasgow Observer*.¹⁷ As the violence continued the Government reacted by banning Sinn Fein and other non violent nationalist organisations.

The Government's attempt to find a political solution was unveiled three days before the attempt on the life of Lord French. It was proposed that parliaments would be set up in both Dublin and Belfast; the latter having jurisdiction over the six counties of Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone. In an attempt to preserve the unity of Ireland both parliaments were to send twenty representatives to a Council of Ireland. This body would have the power, without having to refer the matter to Westminster, to unite the two parliaments if a

majority of both sets of representatives agreed. Although devolving some power to the respective parliaments certain aspects of government, most notably finance, were to be retained by Westminster. Throughout the parliamentary passage of the Government of Ireland Act the *Glasgow Observer* portrayed the measure as a further attempt to maintain British supremacy in Ireland. It argued that the very act of passing this piece of legislation was proof of Britain's dominant position in the prevailing relationship:

Irish Nationalists will not trouble to discuss the Lloyd George Bill. Ireland's national demand is for Self Determination, which means that Ireland shall be governed by a form of government according to the Irish people. The Lloyd George Bill is simply a variant of British rule in Ireland, framed without reference to the interests, sentiments, or desires of the Irish people, and which is proposed should be imposed on Ireland willy nilly.¹⁶

As the paper did not recognise the right of the British Government to pass legislation concerning the affairs of Ireland it failed to discuss in any detail individual proposals contained within the Government of Ireland Bill/Act.¹⁷ When it did so it the paper usually concentrated its fire upon partition. Although it highlighted the position of nationalist majorities in specific regions of the proposed excluded area the *Glasgow Observer* was not attempting to redraw the boundaries over which the future parliaments in Belfast and Dublin were to have jurisdiction and thereby eliminate these discrepancies. Even if everybody in the

excluded area was a unionist the paper would not accede to partition.²⁰ Ireland was indivisible, its borders were the sea, attachment to the land outweighed the wishes of the people, at least of those in the north.

The arguments that dominated the editorial columns of the *Glasgow Observer* could also be found in the Catholic Socialist Notes column. However, partition was not only portrayed as a crime against Ireland but also as a device to accentuate religious division within the excluded area. Divisions within the working class would remain, which would permit the continued exploitation of the workforce by the British ruling class. Moreover, such conditions would ensure the continued marginalisation of Labour as an electoral force.²¹

With the absence of an agreed political solution the security position deteriorated. The IRA was able to kill 176 RIC men and 54 soldiers in 1920. Always in the frontline there were signs that the RIC was in a precarious position in the early months of 1920. Recruitment to the force within Ireland had declined. In order to counter this the RIC began to recruit in Britain. So successful was this policy the RIC experienced difficulty in supplying the new recruits with the traditional uniform and ultimately some of the newcomers had to be clothed in a distinctive black and khaki outfit from which the term black and tan was derived. In addition the RIC was further strengthened in

July when an Auxiliary Division, composed of ex British army officers, was formed. These forces were to become notorious in Irish Republican mythology. Historians have mostly tended to dismiss much of the legend that surrounds these forces. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that there were many breeches of discipline: the O/C of the Auxiliaries ultimately resigned his post rather than continue leading what he described as a drunken and insubordinate body of men. In purely military terms it could be argued that the 'brutality' associated with these new forces proved to be a relatively successful policy. However, whatever their military prowess, they proved to be a public relations disaster and a powerful propaganda weapon in the hands of Republican publicists. Their indiscriminate reprisals affected many in Irish society who had been at best ambivalent towards the IRA. These consequently became more supportive of the IRA as a result of their treatment at the hands of the British security forces. The former were at least Irish. Moreover, many liberals in Great Britain were scandalised by the actions of the Black and Tans and as a result became more critical of British policy in Ireland.

Comment by the *Glasgow Observer* on the conduct of the Black and Tans was surprisingly scarce. For the most part the paper tended to reprint articles which had previously been published in the columns of British liberal papers, such as the *Manchester Guardian*, and had attacked the

conduct of the British forces in Ireland.²³ The editor presumably chose this form of 'reporting' because atrocity stories are more believable when coming, not from those who are allegedly suffering but, from those in whose name they are being committed. Such criticism might also be cited as evidence that British opinion was changing and that Britain would leave Ireland if its own volition if a sympathetic Government was in power; the only way that Ireland could get self determination according to the paper.

The *Glasgow Observer* contended that continuing repression, citing as examples the conduct of the Black and Tans and the legislative powers granted by the Restoration of Order in Ireland Act (not all of which were enforced), would not break the republican spirit in Ireland but merely intensify the desire to break the union.²⁴ Far from reinstating British authority in Ireland the policy of coercion illustrated to the world the moral bankruptcy of British rule; rejected by the people the British writ had to be enforced by the gun.²⁵ At this point in time, whatever doubts the paper had harboured towards the action of the IRA had vanished. It presented a romantic view of the republican struggle. In its pages the IRA never attacked non combatants and was non sectarian. Sinn Fein courts, which enforced de facto law in many areas of Ireland, dispensed justice without fear or favour to both unionist and nationalist alike.²⁶ There would be many in Ireland who would disagree with

this picture. However, the nature of the *Glasgow Observer* makes such discrepancies understandable. In war it is the other side, which is fighting for an immoral cause while you and the forces that you support that have a monopoly of righteousness. Whereas in 1914 the paper portrayed the Germans as sadists while the British were fighting a just cause, in 1920 it was the British, who were accorded the role of barbarian aggressors, on many occasions the paper called the British the Huns, while it was the IRA who played the role of freedom fighters in this conflict.²⁷

Comment on Irish affairs was surprisingly sparse in the Catholic Socialist Notes column during 1920 though this might be explained by the increased prominence of the issue in the main body of *Forward* than had been the case in previous years. The columnist continued to regard IRA violence as being marginal to the bulk of the republican movement and reiterated his view that such violence was counter productive in terms of furthering support for the political aims of Irish republicanism. However, in a manner reminiscent of Diamond's "Killing, No Murder" article, CSN pointed out that many of those who criticised the IRA had been quite prepared to endorse violence in the recent past. The correspondent pointed out that the blood spilt by Republicans in Ireland was "only a 'small' red blot compared with the river of blood which the British Capitalist class shed for the ostensible object of liberating poor little Belgium from

the prospect of a similar thralldom."²⁸ He too, viewed the British as the Huns in this conflict.

November 1920 was the bloodiest month in the whole of the Anglo-Irish war and the bloodiest day of that month was Sunday the 21st. 'Bloody Sunday' as it has become known. In the morning of the 21st the IRA killed eleven people, whom it considered to be British agents. In addition they killed two Auxiliaries, who attempted to intervene and another victim shot by mistake. In the afternoon twelve people died while attending a Gaelic football at Croke Park as the RIC attempted to capture some IRA suspects. In the evening the British security forces killed three more, two of which were IRA men shot while trying to escape. On that Dublin Sunday twenty nine people were killed. Historical accounts vary as to how many of those killed were 'legitimate targets'. Charles Townsend states that some of those killed by the IRA on the assumption that the target was a British agent were the victims of mistaken identity.²⁹ He also disputes the view that the events at Croke Park can be classified as a direct reprisal provoked by the events of the morning; the raid had been planned sometime before the 21st. Townsend believes that the official British explanation for the conduct of the security forces, they reacted to warning shots fired by the IRA, is far from being implausible. Moreover, not all those who died did so as a result of gunshot wounds: some were killed in the resultant stampede.³⁰ Of the three killings in the evening Kee

points out that one of those who died was entirely innocent of IRA connections and considers the term 'killed while trying to escape' with suspicion.³¹ On the other hand, argues Lyons, two of the victims had been sentenced to death by the courts and therefore had every incentive to escape and thus it was quite possible that the description in which they met their deaths was an accurate statement of the facts.³²

While historians have cast doubt upon the version of 'Bloody Sunday' as portrayed in republican mythology it is no surprise to find that this view was faithfully disseminated by the *Glasgow Observer*. The 'intelligence agents' were legitimate targets, although the paper regretted the manner in which some of them died, in their bedrooms in front of their wives though it went on to allege that some republicans had died in similar circumstances.³³ The paper considered all violent deaths in Ireland to be regrettable but if the British Government wished the bloodletting to cease all they had to do was accede to the demands of the Irish people. In the Catholic Socialist Notes column the response to the events of 'Bloody Sunday' was one of despair rather than anger. Nevertheless the correspondent was more critical of the RIC Auxiliaries than the IRA:

Every healthy minded person must have read with the utmost horror of Sunday's events in Dublin. War on the Continent even with its poison gas, was noble compared to the war in Ireland. No one can feel admiration for men who went to a house

and murdered a man in the presence of his family, and we feel perfectly satisfied that such actions must be secretly deplored by the religious people of Ireland. But what are we to say of men paid, drilled and uniformed by the Government of the country, presumably to protect its citizens, who march to a football field and having deliberately erected machine guns at certain vantage points, proceed to mow down the innocent youths engaged in harmless recreation. Surely Lloyd George's phrase 'subsidised murderers', is the only accurate description of these brutes. This, at least, may be said for the men who murdered the British officers that they accepted the risk of being arrested and hanged by the Government, but the uniformed murderers acted with complete assurance that their crimes would be condoned, if indeed they did not win promotion.³⁴

Until the summer of 1920 the North of Ireland had been spared much of the political violence that was occurring else where in the island. However, this relative calm was shattered when a series of politico-religious riots erupted throughout the Province of Ulster. The worst conflict was centred on Belfast and between June 1920 and June 1922 428 people met violent deaths, the majority of whom were Catholics. This strife inflicted considerably more fatalities than any other series of riots in the city's history.³⁵ The riots can be viewed as a unionist response to the activities of the IRA. When the IRA killed a prominent policeman in Lisburn anti Catholic riots erupted in many urban centres in Ulster. One contemporary source links this incident with the subsequent expulsion of Catholics and socialists from Harland and Wolff.³⁶ The Unionist leadership had responded to the IRA's campaign, and heightened community tension in Ulster, by threatening to revive the UVF. It

was hoped by some that the creation of the Ulster Special Constabulary would help to stem the violence, however, this proved not to be the case. In response to the riots in Belfast republicans attempted to organise an economic boycott of products manufactured in the city. The IRA might also have embarked on a sectarian murder campaign. Kee notes that the number of Protestants killed by the IRA on the grounds that they were supposedly spies or undesirables increased markedly during 1921 and comments that this could be interpreted as a sectarian response.³⁷ Thus, the two communities became even more polarised.

Events in Ulster dominated the editorial columns of the *Glasgow Observer* throughout the latter part of 1920. The paper was in no doubt that the riots were orchestrated by the unionist establishment with the twin purposes of providing the British Government with a pretext to remain in Ireland and intimidating the republican/nationalist community in Ulster.³⁸ It contended that the riots were blatantly sectarian in nature and urged Sinn Féin to become the defender of Catholic areas.³⁹ Predictably, the paper argued that those Catholics who died were innocent of any IRA connections; murdered because of their religion, whereas the Protestants killed were either murdered as a result of being mistaken for Catholics by their co-religionists, or that the IRA killed them while engaging in the legitimate defence of Catholic areas against rampaging Protestant mobs.⁴⁰ As a response to the riots the republican leadership in Ireland urged there

supporters not to buy northern produce. The *Glasgow Observer* wholly endorsed the Belfast Boycott and claimed that it weakened the hold of unionism on the upper classes by illustrating that the continued economic prosperity of the city was dependent on it maintaining its links with the south of Ireland.⁴¹ The thrust of the *Glasgow Observer*, during this period, was to illustrate that partition was unworkable. If partition became a reality then the minority in Ulster would be left defenceless at the mercy of their hereditary enemy; 'The Orange Wolf and the Catholic Lamb' as one editorial put it.⁴² However, the Catholics would not be the only losers. Partition would cut Belfast off from its markets in the South and, consequently, would suffer economically. Unfortunately for the paper, Belfast was economically interdependent with the west of Scotland and the north of England rather than with the south and west of Ireland and the bulk of the unionists were well aware of this fact.

Readers of the Catholic Socialist Notes column were also treated to a conspiracy theory. However, in this case, it was alleged that the riots had been orchestrated with the sole purpose of maintaining religious divisions within the working class in order to frustrate the advance of Labour.⁴³ Interestingly enough an article appeared in *Forward*, reproduced from the pages of the Irish socialist paper *The Watchword of Labour*, which contradicted the

usual ideological message to be found in the paper'. Of the rioting in Londonderry the latter stated:

Unless 'Derry has changed very much in heart and in head-and we have seen no great evidence of the change- we shall be surprised if there is not nearly as much bigotry, ignorant and stupid but essentially mischeavous bigotry, in what would call itself the Green camp in 'Derry as there is in the Oranges.⁴⁴

The fact this article was printed suggests some form of endorsement of the sentiments expressed by the editorial staff of *Forward*. Whether the 'plague on both your houses' sentiments represented more awareness of the complexities of the Irish issue or was merely a cry of exasperation at the prevailing state of affairs is not clear.

Militarily the Anglo-Irish war entered its final phase at the end of 1920. Although the tactics of the protagonists changed and the level of violence increased the events in this period posed no new moral issues to occupy the thoughts of the fourth estate. Thus, both the *Glasgow Observer* and the Catholic Socialist Notes column had a stock response to any incident that occurred in Ireland.⁴⁵

However, if the nature of the conflict had acquired a rigidity in Ireland, the IRA did have one innovation left: the extention of the campaign to Britain. In the latter part of 1920 reports that this development was imminent were treated with skepticism by the *Glasgow Observer*.

Nevertheless, the paper was not slow to state that it was opposed to such a development:

We note that there have been allegations made that in one or two places in Great Britain Sinn Feiners have been 'drilling'. In one case we are told that they made an attack on the police. Now to begin with, we do not believe it... For the Irish in Great Britain to aid Ireland at home by all the moral and material support they can give is a bounden duty. But the secret or open advocacy of violence would be a crime and a blunder. Ireland at home does not expect it, does not ask it. The Irish in Great Britain from a great body of organised and active opinion that can contribute to Ireland's Freedom while acting as good citizens of the country where they live.⁴⁶

It was soon to become apparent that the IRA was indeed active on the mainland. During 1921 there was a series of trials and convictions of IRA men who had been active for the cause in Scotland.⁴⁷ While the paper professed its admiration and the courage of those involved, it continued to reject the means by which those involved exhibited such characteristics.⁴⁸ That the *Glasgow Observer* could support the actions of the IRA in Ireland, but condemn those who sought in Scotland to aid the IRA in its campaign seems somewhat hypocritical. It would appear that the paper adopted this stance because it feared that IRA actions on the mainland would ensure the continued marginalisation of the Irish community in Britain. The paper argued that military action would strain relations between the host and immigrant communities and was not prepared to sanction any action, or even word, that would contribute to such a state of

affairs.⁴⁹ The *Glasgow Observer* bitterly criticized Kevin Boland when he sought to portray the conflict as being racial, Irish versus English, in origin.⁵⁰ The paper was at pains to differentiate between the British Government and the British people and sought to ensure that the latter did not suffer because of the policies pursued by the former. The *Glasgow Observer* ignored the fact that the Government was in power because it had the support of the people.⁵¹ The paper, since 1918, believed that the Irish in Britain could best help those at 'home' by supporting the party most sympathetic to the republican cause, the Labour Party. One wonders if it had it been 'proved' that the best way to achieve an Irish Republic was by undertaking military operations on the mainland if the paper would have endorsed such tactics. If not, and the tone of the editorials suggests not, then it could be argued that the *Glasgow Observer* considered the successful integration of the immigrant community into mainstream society as being more important than the quest for Irish self determination; a reversal of the position that prevailed in the pre war period.

Unfortunately the frequency of the Catholic Socialist Notes column declined dramatically post mid 1920, arguably a sign of the successful integration of the Irish into the Labour movement. However, *Forward* endorsed the view expressed in the *Glasgow Observer* that IRA activities on the mainland poisoned host-immigrant relations and failed to advance the cause the activists

sought to promote. In the aftermath of an IRA killing in Glasgow *Forward* stated that the result was:

The immediate irruption again of that cursed anti-Irish, or rather anti-Catholic prejudice, which has for a hundred years kept the working class split into sections and which only in the last decade have we got partially smothered. And not only that, but the growing sympathies of the Protestant and other non Catholic workers for the Irish people under the vicious Greenwood George terror have suddenly withered. You can hear the anti Sinn Fein rumble on every hand; and, as in England, the burning of farmstacks, warehouses, and hotel bedrooms by alleged Sinn Feiners, has resulted in the strengthening of the reactionary forces there, so, too will it be in Scotland.⁵²

The continuing troubles in Belfast coupled with the run up to the elections for the proposed new legislature at Stormont ensured that events in Ulster were the dominant issues in the comment columns of the *Glasgow Observer* during the first half of 1921. In the run up to the election the paper expressed optimism regarding the likely fortunes of the anti-partition parties at the polls. It derived much satisfaction at the display of nationalist unity that was in evidence, the Irish Party and Sinn Fein agreed an electoral pact, and went so far as to predict that this would deny the Unionists an overall majority in the proposed Parliament.⁵³ As the partitioned area had been so constructed as to ensure the survival of unionism one wonders how the paper arrived at the conclusion. One suspects wish fulfillment was the primary reason. This was exemplified in a series of articles which grossly exaggerated the 'natural'

nationalist vote. For example, one article claimed that there was a nationalist majority if Belfast was excluded from the calculations.⁵⁴ The paper also trotted out the standard republican/nationalist analysis that Ulster unionism was the result of external factors, which if removed, would collapse immediately. If one accepted this view then the signs were indeed good. Irish Unionists were opposed to partition and some of those, who had espoused the Ulster cause in the pre war period, no longer did so. The *Glasgow Observer* gleefully highlighted editorials that appeared in *The Times*, to illustrate this point.⁵⁵

As it transpired reports of the demise of Ulster Unionism was to prove somewhat exaggerated. Every one of the forty unionist candidates were elected while only twelve nationalist/republicans were successful. The *Glasgow Observer* explained the poor performance of the anti-partitionists by claiming that their supporters were prevented from recording their vote as a result of intimidation.⁵⁶ While it is no doubt true that incidents of intimidation did occur and also that both sides practised impersonation on a large scale, the main reason why the nationalist poll did not reach the levels predicted by the paper was that it grossly overestimated the strength of the anti partitionists within the partitioned area. In the aftermath of the election the *Glasgow Observer* reverted to its original stance that Ireland could not be partitioned no matter the wishes of

the electorate in that area: the most the Unionists could aspire to was that Ulster would be accorded a degree of local autonomy within a united Ireland system.⁵⁷

King George V opened the new Belfast Parliament on 22 June 1921. He used the occasion to issue an eloquent appeal for peace and reconciliation in Ireland. Although historians consider this to have been the catalyst which led to a truce being called between the opposing factions the following month, the *Glasgow Observer* and its proprietor considered both the visit and the speech provocative to nationalists. He was viewed as a symbol of the oppressor and by opening the Northern Parliament he was allegedly endorsing the actions of the Orange mobs in Belfast.⁵⁸ While the paper was to welcome the cessation of hostilities it warned Irishmen that Britain was going to the negotiating table with the intention of securing a settlement that would be to the advantage of the Empire. Ireland still had to beware perfidious albiion.⁵⁹

The fact that Sinn Fein had won an impressive triumph in 1918 dictated the stance of the *Glasgow Observer* during the years of the Anglo-Irish War. Ireland had voted for an independent 32 county republic and only the Irish people had the right to revoke this decision. The paper contented that anybody, who considered themselves to be an Irish patriot could not oppose the expressed will of the Irish people; though it did not expect everybody to totally endorse every activity undertaken with the aim of

advancing the cause of Irish Republicanism. Despite certain caveats concerning IRA activities it would not be an exaggeration to state that the *Glasgow Observer* operated not as a genuine newspaper but as a purveyor of republican propaganda during the period of the Anglo-Irish war. Although the correspondent, who penned the Catholic Socialist Notes column shared many of the objectives espoused by Sinn Fein, he attacked the party for pursuing nationalist goals at the expense of socialist aims. He also adopted a more critical attitude to the IRA's use of violence than the *Glasgow Observer*. Unfortunately, neither the *Glasgow Observer* or *Forward* was in the habit of printing many letters on the Irish Question so the historian has to examine other sources in order to attain the views of immigrant population on the issues raised by the Anglo-Irish War.

Support for the Republican cause may be gauged by the fortunes of the Sinn Fein movement in Scotland. According to Handley there were about twenty Sinn Fein clubs in 1918. The following year witnessed a dramatic expansion of the organisation. Allegedly, the number of clubs increased to eighty, income increased forty times while membership rose eightyfold compared with the previous year.⁴⁰ It would appear that Handley has grossly overestimated the strength of the Sinn Fein movement in Scotland. By the end of 1918 it is likely that the number of active clubs did not reach double figures. An

examination of the columns of the *Glasgow Observer* during 1919 reveal the existence of 29 Sinn Fein clubs.⁶¹ Official Sinn Fein sources claim that there were 40 clubs active by August 1920 and 65 by August 1921.⁶² Early in 1922 a club which had previously been expelled was re admitted and the organisation reached its peak strength of 66 clubs.⁶³

Regretfully there are no official figures concerning the numerical strength of Sinn Fein in Scotland. However, the historian is better served with information concerning Sinn Fein's sister organisation in England and Wales, the Irish Self Determination League (ISDL) and an examination of its fortunes may be able to shed some light on those of Sinn Fein in Scotland. During the whole of 1920 and for the period 1 January to 18 October 1921 the ISDL remitted to the parent organisation in Dublin the sums of £1523 5s 10d and £4839 3s 10d respectively. In contrast Sinn Fein in Scotland remitted £2544 4s 3d and £4240 for each respective period.⁶⁴ Thus it would seem likely that both organisations would have a similar number of members. The peak strength of the ISDL was 27,000 so it not unreasonable to estimate the peak strength of Sinn Fein in Scotland to be about 30,000.⁶⁵ This estimate is considerably smaller than some of those ventured by the Scottish press and the security forces.⁶⁶ However, as these sources grossly overestimated the strength of the IRA it is not unlikely that their estimates contained similar margins of error when discussing Sinn Fein. If

30,000 is accepted as being the peak numerical strength of Sinn Fein it should be noted that this was almost three times the number the UILGB achieved when it was at its peak.⁶⁷

Considering the probable numerical strength of Sinn Fein in Scotland it is obvious that many, the majority, of those who swelled its ranks had never before participated in nationalist politics. It would also appear that Sinn Fein was more of a working class organisation than the pre war UILGB.⁶⁸ The fact that on two occasions the Scottish Sinn Fein Executive had to urge supporters of Glasgow Celtic not to display Sinn Fein colours at matches illustrates the strength of republican feeling, irrespective of whether the offending fans were actually members of Sinn Fein, amongst the working class Irish of Glasgow and the west of Scotland.⁶⁹ A further indication of Irish working class support can be gauged by the frequency of contemporary reports commenting on the number of Sinn Fein flags present at purely labour demonstrations, which were unconcerned with Irish affairs.⁷⁰

Throughout the period between 1918-21 the *Glasgow Observer* claimed that the UILGB was a moribund organisation in Scotland.⁷¹ There were even instances of ex UILGB officials defecting to Sinn Fein.⁷² Yet it would appear that the UILGB was in better shape than its enemies believed. In May 1919 it was recorded that the

revenue of the UILGB raised in the past seven months was £2,434 11/- 9d compared with the £1,544 15s 7d that had reached the organisation's coffers in the 15 months prior to October 1918.⁷³ Throughout 1920 T. P. O'Connor informed John Dillon, in private correspondence, that the organisation in Scotland was holding up far better than in most areas of Great Britain.⁷⁴ When T. P. O'Connor went on a fund raising tour of Scotland he was delighted by the response:

The tour was a triumphant success. The interruptions which were only serious at the great meeting in St. Andrews Halls (in Glasgow)-a somewhat risky experiment-only came at the end, and were largely due to the local unpopularity and the indiscreet speech of Neil Doherty and were confined to a very small quota of the audience. There were scarcely any interruptions at the meetings in Greenock, and none in Dundee where Joe (Devlin) spoke, or Cowdenbeath where we spoke together.

I think there is no doubt that the Irish in Scotland are standing firm and that the Sinn Feiners have not made any serious progress in that country.

We shall get at least £100 out of the meeting (in Glasgow) and I expect that Arthur Murphy and his friends will raise some hundreds of pounds for us. You will understand that the only reason that I am resorting to these visits is that our organisation is bankrupt, and unless I am able to raise some money in this way we shall have to shut up shop.⁷⁵

O'Connor was obviously mistaken in his assessment of Sinn Fein's lack of progress in Scotland. However, the fact that he could make such an error would suggest the advance of Sinn Fein was not made at the expense of the UILGB. Ironically, the Labour Party proved to be a greater temptation to disillusioned members of the UILGB

than Sinn Fein. At the 1919 UILGB Convention Glasgow delegate J. Neill Doherty pointed out that the organisation was decaying in some urban areas and stated that many of those who had previously been members of the UILGB were now "holding aloof, not because they had thrown over constitutionalism, or because they had gone over to Sinn Fein, but because they wanted to stand for human progress everywhere...They should stand for the workers in every part of Great Britain."⁷⁶ As will be seen in the chapter concerning the relationship between the Labour Party and the Irish community in the post war era it was the attraction posed by Labour that was ultimately to ensure the demise of the UILGB.

Denuded of its domestic role by the advance of Labour amongst the immigrant community the UILGB was also losing its influence within the Irish Party because of the changing nature of the party. Post 1918 the main area, in which the Irish Party could claim any degree of popular support was Ulster where it was closely associated with the AOH. Although O'Connor sought to increase the levels of co-operation between the UILGB and the AOH Devlin, presumably because he did not want to cede any of the power that remained in his hands, ensured that such efforts came to nothing.⁷⁷ Thus, with no political role the UILGB only purpose was to serve as a focus of social activity for its remaining members. The UILGB remained strong in Yorkshire. O'Connor ascribed this to the fact

that many branches in that area were twinned with 'social clubs.'⁹ It is possible that the relative strength of the UILGB in Scotland was due to the recreational facilities provided by the organisation. Regrettably O'Connor does not comment on the fortunes the UILGB north of the border between 1921-23. However, in January 1924 he states that the organisation had collapsed sometime previously after one of the leading officials had retired.'⁹ This would suggest that while the UILGB may have survived in numerical terms, the quality of its membership declined. Without a political role it could no longer attract enough of the younger generation to ensure its future survival. It died a 'natural' death of old age rather than being killed by Sinn Fein.

Unlike Ireland where the IRA had attacked AOH property there appears to have been little friction between the republicans and the AOH in Scotland. It was possible to be a member of both Sinn Fein and the AOH although officials of the latter had to renounce their position if they wished to hold an official post in Sinn Fein.'⁹ While this restriction caused some AOH officials to reconsider their positions once again it was the Labour Party, and the subsequent opportunities to achieve electoral office, that proved the more attractive to those within the AOH, who sought new pastures. Although AOH membership declined slightly between 1919-21 it could still mount large demonstrations. For example, when Joe Devlin addressed a meeting in the St. Andrews Halls,

Glasgow in 1919 it was reported that the venue was "incapable of accomodating the large crowd seeking admission, many having to be turned away".⁹¹ The AOH also held a large demonstration the following year.⁹² However, this was about all it could do. Members were generally apathetic and could only be mobilized to attend set piece demonstrations.⁹³ In some ways the AOH then is like the Orange Order today. Although the latter has a claimed membership of 80,000 they are politically dormant, members more interested in social activities for most of the time.

The question arises as to the relationship between Sinn Fein and the Roman Catholic Church during the Anglo-Irish War. The most visible manifestation of clerical support for the republican cause came at meetings addressed by Archbishop Mannix of Melbourne. Priests were admitted free to these demonstrations and many accepted this offer of hospitality.⁹⁴ At his meeting at Whifflet there were 250 priests on the platform.⁹⁵ It may have been the case that some clerics attended more out of curiosity rather than as an expression of solidarity with the republican cause. Many were identified as having been "jingoists" during the war.⁹⁶

It would appear that the strength of clerical involvement in political activities was dependent on the attitude of the local priest rather than at the direction of the hierarchy. Indeed it may have been that those in the

upper reaches of the Church considered the Irish Question to have been an embarrassment. When a Requiem Mass was held in honour of Terence MacSwiney a report which appeared in the *Glasgow Observer* was to remark that the Catholic Hierarchy was notable by their absence.⁶⁷ There were only two occasions when the leadership took a positive stance on Irish issues during the Anglo-Irish war. The hierarchy and the membership of the Archdiocese of Glasgow submitted petitions urging the release of Charles Diamond.⁶⁸ It also sanctioned the collections to be taken after Mass in aid of the Belfast Expelled Workers' Fund.⁶⁹ The latter could be categorised as a humanitarian action rather than an endorsement of republicanism. Although it was alleged that the Hierarchy arranged the recall to Ireland of one noted pro Sinn Fein priest, a Father Fahy who preached in Dundee before his transfer, it would appear that the Hierarchy in Scotland did not vent any public condemnation of the actions of the IRA.⁷⁰ This was in sharp contrast to the hostile stance adopted by their English counterparts, much to the disgust of the *Glasgow Observer*.⁷¹

The most famous incident involving a priest came when Patrick McRory was arrested in the aftermath of an IRA killing in Glasgow. There were riots in the east end of the city when he was arrested and when he was released from police custody, without being charged, thousands rejoiced in the streets.⁷² It would appear that McRory

held no important post in Sinn Fein and had he not been arrested would have remained in obscurity. The Rev. Patrick Torley of Kirkintilloch, would seem to have been much more important. He was the President of the Scottish Sinn Fein Executive in July 1922.⁹³ Unfortunately, he also appears to have adopted a low profile and little is known of his republican activities. A Dean Ryan was a prominent official charged with managing the Irish Prisoner's (Scotland) Fund which was designed to raise funds for IRA prisoners in Scottish jails.⁹⁴ Many priests were quite prepared to hold Requiem Masses for those who had died furthering the republican cause in Ireland.⁹⁵ While there are some examples of Sinn Fein clubs being allowed to take Church Door collections it was also reported that in some instances the organisation was refused the use of Church premises.⁹⁶

Sinn Fein in Scotland had a variety of functions which it sought to fulfil. Its primary aim was to publicise the cause. One way of achieving this aim was to hold mass meetings which would be addressed by prominent republican politicians and sympathisers such as Eoin MacNeil and Arthur Griffith.⁹⁷ Possibly the most successful meeting was that addressed by Archbishop Mannix of Melbourne. It was estimated that 50,000 heard him speak at Whifflet near Glasgow.⁹⁸ In addition many republican propaganda sheets such as *Dark Rosaleen*, *Old Ireland*, *New Ireland* and *Eire* were printed in Scotland both for distribution in Ireland and abroad.⁹⁹ This ensured that the republican

view could be put forward despite the suppression of such titles in Ireland.

In order to promote the republican cause Sinn Fein made contact with various purely Scottish organisations. Although the vast majority of the immigrant population were in the process of becoming Labour supporters during the Anglo-Irish war, except for arranging a series of 'Hands Off Ireland' demonstrations, there was little organisational contact between Sinn Fein and the various bodies that composed the Scottish Labour movement; indeed there were many instances of friction between the two groups.¹⁰⁰ Much stronger links existed between Sinn Fein and the Scottish National League (SNL). Sinn Fein money helped to finance the SNL's paper *Liberty*. There were even plans to launch a pan Celtic daily paper though in the event this did not materialise. It could be argued that this attempted link up did little to advance the Irish cause in Scotland. Scottish nationalism at this point in time was at most a marginal political force. The money provided by republican sources could have been better invested on more relevant materials such as arms; indeed, Collins expressed such sentiments.¹⁰¹

Scotland was a great source of financial support for the republican cause. The extent of this contribution to Sinn Fein in Ireland has been outlined earlier in this chapter. It is likely, however, that this does not represent the total amount of cash raised by Sinn Fein in

Scotland. For example, money collected by Sinn Fein and subsequently donated to non-republican causes such as the Belfast Expelled Workers' would not be included in the quoted totals.¹⁰² It has been claimed that more subscriptions to the republican cause during the war of independence came from the immigrant community in Scotland than from any other body of Irishmen, exceeding that raised by those still living in the 'old country'.¹⁰³

While there can be no doubt that substantial amounts of cash were donated to the Republican cause it would appear that such claims cannot be substantiated. Michael Collins, admittedly early in the conflict, was disappointed at the response of the Irish in Britain to the Irish National loan.¹⁰⁴ It has been pointed out earlier in this chapter the financial report to the Sinn Fein Ard Comhairle of 1921 records that donations from England exceeded those from Scotland.¹⁰⁵ Despite the magnitude of funds flowing from Scotland to Ireland it would appear that demand was beginning to outstrip supply by mid 1921. A fund which was set in order to finance the expenses of both Sinn Fein and the Irish Party candidates seeking election to the new Northern Irish Parliament, raised only £4,160 11s when the target was £10,000.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, as the year progressed the IRA in Scotland had to beg for funds from GHQ in Dublin in order to pay mounting legal fees: the result of the police capturing some of its members.¹⁰⁷

Footnotes

1. F.S.L. Lyons *Ireland since the Famine* p.400.
2. *Glasgow Observer* 22 Feb 1919 sets the tone that prevailed throughout the Anglo-Irish war.
3. *Glasgow Observer* 7 June 1919.
4. *Glasgow Observer* 11 Oct 1919. The paper expressed similar sentiments on 6 Sept 1919.
5. *Glasgow Observer* 7 June & 30 Aug 1919.
6. R. Kee *op cit* pp. 61-2.
7. *Glasgow Observer* 25 Oct 1919.
8. Breen's comments are quoted in C. Townshend *The British Campaign in Ireland 1919-1921* pp. 16-7.
9. *Glasgow Observer* 27 Dec 1919.
10. See Diamond's article printed in the *Glasgow Observer* of 1 Nov 1919. For reports of his subsequent trial see *The Scotsman* 9 & 10 Mar 1920.
11. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Jan 1920.
12. *Forward* 11 Oct 1919. See also *Forward* 13 Sept 1919.
13. *Forward* 27 Dec 1919.
14. For more detail see R. Kee *op cit* pp. 67-91.
15. R. Kee *ibid* p.85.
16. R. Kee *ibid* pp. 92-3.
17. *Glasgow Observer* 26 Apr 1919.
18. *Glasgow Observer* 27 Dec 1919.
19. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Feb; 13 Mar; 3 Apr; 29 May; 25 Dec 1920.
20. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Mar & 22 May 1920.
21. *Forward* 27 Dec 1919; 27 Mar & 15 May 1920.
22. F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* pp. 415-6; R. Kee *op cit* pp. 97-8.
23. This technique is used when discussing the death of the Lord Mayor of Cork and the "sack" of Balbriggan. *Glasgow Observer* 25 Sept; 2 & 9 Oct 1920.
24. *Glasgow Observer* 7 Aug; Oct 2 1920.
25. *Glasgow Observer* 7 June; 6 Sept 1919.
26. *Glasgow Observer* 10 July; 28 Aug 1920.
27. *Glasgow Observer* 10 May; 2 Aug 1919.
28. *Forward* 15 May 1920.
29. C. Townshend (2) *Political Violence in Ireland* p.338.
30. C. Townshend *op cit* p.130.
31. R. Kee *op cit* p.120.
32. F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p.419.
33. *Glasgow Observer* 27 Nov; 4 Dec 1920.
34. *Forward* 27 Nov 1920.
35. A.T.Q. Stewart *The Narrow Ground* p.153.
36. Quoted in C. Townshend (2) *op cit* pp. 340-3.
37. R. Kee *op cit* p.130.
38. *Glasgow Observer* 3 & 17 July 1920.
39. *Glasgow Observer* 31 July 1920.
40. *Glasgow Observer* 31 July 1920; Also see *Glasgow Observer* 25 June 1920.
41. *Glasgow Observer* 22 Jan; 9 July 1921.
42. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Aug 1920.
43. *Forward* 3 July 1920.

44. *Forward* 10 July 1920.
45. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Jan 1921; For the paper's views on the introduction of 'official reprisals', see editions dated 19 Feb & 30 Apr 1921.
46. *Glasgow Observer* 20 Nov 1920.
47. See Chapter
48. *Glasgow Observer* 29 Jan; Mar 26; Apr 9 1921.
49. *Glasgow Observer* 29 Jan; Mar 26; Apr 9 1921.
50. *Glasgow Observer* 15 Jan 1921.
51. *Glasgow Observer* 15 Jan 1921.
52. *Forward* 14 May 1921.
53. *Glasgow Observer* 22 Jan; 2 Apr; 21 May 1921.
54. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Dec 1920.
55. *Glasgow Observer* 26 Jan 1921.
56. *Glasgow Observer* 4 June 1921.
57. *Glasgow Observer* 2 July 1921.
58. *Glasgow Observer* 25 June 1921. For the verdict of a historian on King George's speech see F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p426.
59. *Glasgow Observer* 23 July 1921.
60. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.298.
61. There was an official Sinn Fein column in the Paper. In addition the clubs placed adverts giving details of their activities in the paper's classified column. Glasgow Geanings and the page devoted to local news also give information concerning the Sinn Fein clubs in the west of Scotland.
62. Hon Secretaries Report to Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1921. Affiliation Fees and Monies Received up to 18 Oct 1921. A copy of this document can be found in Count Plunkett MS 11,405 Folder 2; Another copy can be found in A O'Brien MS 8431.
63. *Glasgow Observer* 21 Jan 1922.
64. Figures taken from Hon Secretaries Report to Sinn Fein Ard Fheis 1921. Affiliation Fees and Monies Received up to 18 Oct 1921.
65. A report on the numerical strength of the ISDL can be found in Art O'Brien MS8425.
66. It was claimed that in April 1920 there were 90,000 Sinn Feiners in Scotland in April. A Survey of Revolutionary movements in Great Britain in the year 1920, p15. CP2455 CAB 24/118.
67. See p
68. W. Walker 'Dundee's Disenchantment with Churchill', *Scottish Historical Review* Vol 49, 1970, p98.
69. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Oct 1920; 6 May 1922.
70. *Glasgow Observer* 8 May 1920.
71. *Glasgow Observer* 31 Jan 1920.
72. *Glasgow Observer* 15 Feb 1919; 8 Nov 1919; 3 Apr 1920.
73. *Freeman's Journal* 24 May 1919.
74. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 10/3/1920; 13/5/1920; 29/6/1920; Dillon MSS 6743/744; 6743/766; 6743/785.
75. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 10/3/1920 See also letter of 19/3/1920. Dillon MSS 6743/744; 6743/748. Joe Devlin confirms the success of the tour. Joe Devlin-J. Dillon 5/3/1920 Dillon MSS 6730/254.

76. *Irish Independent* 9 June 1919.
77. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 17/6/1921; Dillon MSS 6744/845.
78. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 13/5/1920, 29/6/1920, 26/4/1921 Dillon MSS 6743/766, 6743/785, 6744/903.
79. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 30/6/1924 Dillon MSS 6774/956. Derrick may have retired in early 1922. The *Glasgow Observer* of 4 Mar 1922 comments on the resignation of a prominent, but unnamed UILGB official.
80. There were some claims that Sinn Feiners within the AOH were discriminated against and there were examples of AOH demonstrations attracting small numbers of republicans who heckled the speaker. However, it would appear that there was little antagonism between the two bodies in Scotland. *Glasgow Observer* 19 July; 6 & 20 Sept 1919; 6 Mar 1920. AOH Minutes, 10 Sept 1920, BRS 12/1/2.
81. Private Section membership of AOH in Scotland was 11,736 in June 1919; 12,811 in June 1920, 8,166 in December 1922. See Secretaries Report 9 June 1920; Convention Report 1922. AOH Minute Book B.R.S. Lou 12/1/12. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Sept 1919.
82. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Mar 1920.
83. The membership was criticized for being apathetic in *Glasgow Observer* 1 Feb 1919.
84. See the advert for the meeting in the *Glasgow Observer* 19 Feb 1921. A similar offer was made prior to the Mannix meeting in Dunbarton. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Mar 1921.
85. For a report of the meeting see the *Glasgow Observer* 5 Mar 1921.
86. *Forward* 5 Mar 1921.
87. *Glasgow Observer* 20 Nov 1920.
88. *Glasgow Observer* 17 May & 26 June 1920.
89. The Glasgow Archdiocese acknowledged two sums raised. £1178 14/- 4d and £560 3/- 10d respectively. It was hoped to raise over £3,000. *Glasgow Observer* 4, 11, 18, 25 Sept 1921.
90. W. Walker *op cit* p98 (see footnote). For some of his activities see *Glasgow Observer* 21 Aug & 11 Sept 1920; 18 June 1921. For a biography see B.J. Canning *Irish Born Secular Priests in Scotland, 1829-1979* p96.
91. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Aug 1919; 24 July & 25 Dec 1920; 15 Jan, 19 Feb, 9 Apr, 11 June 1921.
92. *Glasgow Observer* 7 & 14 May, 4 June, 30 July, 27 Aug 1921; B.J. Canning *op cit* pp. 273-5.
93. For his position on the Sinn Fein Executive see Sinn Fein Executive-Erskine Childers 20/7/1921. Erskine Childers MSS 7790/8/48. Torley is named as the Hon. Pres. of the John Mitchell Sinn Fein Club, Kirkintilloch. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Feb 1920.
94. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Feb 1921. Intelligence sources claimed that Catholic clergy helped organise a public fair; the proceeds of which went to Irish Political Prisoners. Report on the activities of Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom. CP 3055 16 June 1921; CP 3074 23 June 1921. Cab 24/125.

95. Masses for the dead of the Easter Rising were held on the anniversary of the event in 1919 and 1920. *Glasgow Observer* 5 & 19 April 1919; 27 Mar, 3, 10 & 24 Apr 1920; Requiem Masses were also held for both Terence McSwiney and Kevin Barry. *Glasgow Observer* 6.13, 20 & 27 Nov 1920.
96. The proceeds of a concert organised by Sinn Fein were given to the Belfast Relief Fund in the name of All Saints, Coatdyke. *Glasgow Observer* 9 Oct 1920; The Pierce McCann Cumann Falkirk was allowed to take a Church door collection for the Devasted Areas of Ireland Fund. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Mar 1921. There is no evidence of the Church allowing Sinn Fein to collect for a party political cause outside the Church Door. That some Sinn Fein clubs were allowed to take Church door collections does not necessarily mean that the local priest was a republican supporter. In Ireland, at least, prominent Catholics were prepared to associate themselves with Michael Collins for charitable purposes, The Irish White Cross Appeal, while critical of the IRA. R. Kee *op cit* p127. For examples of Sinn Fein being refused access to Church property in Scotland see *Glasgow Observer* 13 Dec 1919; 18 Dec 1920.
97. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Apr 1920.
98. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Mar 1921.
99. J.E. Handley *op cit* pp. 298-9.
100. See chapter detailing the domestic politics of the immigrant community in the post war era.
101. Details of this relationship can be found in file DE 2/435 State Paper Office Dublin. See also the correspondence between Art O'Brien and Erskine of Mar which can be found in the A O'Brien papers. A O'Brien MS 8427.
102. For example, of the £111 'spent' by the Sinn Fein club of Anderton only £15 was forwarded to the Sinn Fein Executive in Scotland and then, presumably, to the parent organisation in Ireland. *Glasgow Observer* 17 July 1920.
103. *Daily Record* 21 Nov 1921; J.E. Handley *op cit* p297.
104. Memo to M-Loan 9/4/1920 Mulcahy MSS 7/A/10
105. See p
106. *Glasgow Observer* 23 & 30 Apr; 21 & 28 May; 25 June; 2, 9 & 16 July 1921.
107. See p 181 of thesis.

Chapter 4

Physical Force Irish Republicanism in Scotland c1912-21

The formation of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, founded on St. Patrick's Day 1856, is usually considered to be the first manifestation of modern physical force republicanism. Its philosophy enjoyed much support within Ireland until the unsuccessful rebellion of 1867 thereafter the constitutional Home Rule movement gained the ascendancy, which it did not surrender until 1919. The fortunes of physical force republicanism within the Irish community in Scotland fluctuated in time with the success such organisations as the IRB enjoyed in Ireland.

On joining the IRB in 1899 future Scottish representative on the Supreme Council, Patrick McCormick, found that most of his fellow members were men aged about 60; men who had joined the IRB prior to the failed 1867 rebellion.¹ What had once been a fighting force was now a group of old men reminiscing about military defeats. During the first decade of McCormick's involvement the organisation declined even further. The nadir of the IRB's fortunes came in 1912 and it was no coincidence that this coincided with the introduction of the third Irish Home Rule Bill, when the IRB only had a "paying membership" of 200 and 1660 in Scotland and Ireland respectively.² With Home Rule only a formality, or so it must have seemed at the time, the future of physical force republicanism must have seemed bleak. However, the emergence of physical force unionism in the form of the Ulster Volunteer Force created the conditions necessary whereby supporters of the IRB could re enter the mainstream of Irish politics.

On 1st November 1913 an article entitled 'The North Began' appeared in the Gaelic League paper *An Claidheamh Soluis*. It was written by Eoin McNeil, a professor at University College Dublin, and he argued that the activities of the UVF should provide a model to nationalist Ireland. On seeing this article veteran IRB men made their acquaintance with McNeil in the hope that he would put his ideas into action. This indeed did happen and on 25th November McNeil addressed a meeting, which witnessed the emergence of a new organisation, the Irish Volunteers. The IRB did not play a prominent public role in the formation of the IV. However, in the period between the publication of McNeil's article and the emergence of the IV the IRB had moved to ensure that they had control over the new organisation, which was far in excess of their numerical strength or political importance at that point in time.³

The IV spread like wildfire across nationalist Ireland and was soon transplanted across into the immigrant community of Scotland. In early January 1914 the *Glasgow Observer* reported that a meeting was being called under the auspices of the Gaelic Athletic Association to discuss the possibility of forming a corps of IV in the city.⁴ The meeting was held on 11th January and from the outset the development was opposed by some of the most powerful groups in the immigrant community. Local branches of both the Ancient Order of Hibernians, and the

Irish National Foresters were invited to attend but "the heads of these societies...[gave] a lead to their divisions by declining to have anything to do with the new movement meantime." Those Hibernians who attended what turned out to be the inaugural meeting of the IV did so as individuals and attempted to ensure that the new movement was stillborn.⁶

The reluctance of such organisations to endorse the formation of the IV in Scotland merely reflected the stance taken at this point in time by the Irish Nationalist leadership to the IV in Ireland. It was not until the original leadership of the IV ceded control of the movement to John Redmond in June 1914 that the leadership of mainstream Nationalist movements recommended their members to join.⁷ However, in Scotland the AOH leadership did not endorse the IV even after Redmond had assumed control of the parent body in Ireland. As late as July 18 the official AOH columnist in the *Glasgow Observer* reminded his readers that their "first duty as members of the order is to raise subscriptions...and to forward these subscriptions to either Messrs John Redmond MP, or Joseph Devlin MP, or to Mr Crilly, General Secretary U.I.L...Do not take any notice of any organisers in connection with the Volunteers."⁸ While many Hibernians did join the IV there can be little doubt that the reservations expressed by the AOH leadership led many to distance themselves from the organisation preferring to set up their own version of

the IV which acted independently of the main body in Scotland and was not affiliated to the parent organisation in Dublin.' The reticence of mainstream Irish nationalist organisations and organs in Scotland to identify themselves with the IV was explained by the Secretary of the "First Glasgow and West of Scotland Regiment" to the fact that those within the movement were not "afraid to associate...with the wild men of our nation."¹⁰

While the IRB was a major factor in the formation of the IV in Ireland it is difficult to prove that they played as similar role in the inception of the organisation in Glasgow. There is evidence that would support such a contention. Sean MacDermott, who played a significant role in the creation of the IV in Ireland, alerted the IRB in Glasgow to the possibilities of using the IV as a front organisation.¹¹ The proposer of the motion in favour of setting up a corps of the IV in Glasgow may have been a republican.¹² The motion was endorsed by at least one speaker, who was an accredited Sinn Feiner.¹³ However, if the main impetus behind this development did come from the "extremists" they were soon swamped by the representatives of mainstream nationalism. The organisation's Provisional Committee was composed in part, as the secretary of the IV was keen to point out, of members of such bodies as the UILGB, the AOH and the INF.¹⁴ Of the subsequent Permanent Committee only two of

the nine members are identifiable as IRB men.¹⁰

British intelligence sources estimated that there were a total of 3,000 IV in Glasgow¹¹. This would appear to be an overestimate. Regrettably although the activities of the IV were well documented in the organisation's regular column in the *Glasgow Observer* the correspondent rarely quoted figures preferring to use terms such as "good" or "healthy" when referring to the number of members participating in a specific event. The only definite figure quoted was that the Glasgow County Board, the body which controlled the IV in not only Glasgow but the rest of Lanarkshire and the counties of Stirlingshire, Ayrshire and Renfrewshire, was composed of 24 commanders who represented "over 2000 men".¹² As this figure was quoted in October 1914 it was probably the peak numerical strength of the IV in these areas.

While the Irish of Glasgow were the first to form a corps of the IV on the mainland they were by no means the largest.¹³ Even if the bulk of the 2000 members did hail from the city this total was exceeded by Liverpool where over 3000 joined.¹⁴ A similar number enrolled in Glamorgan while Manchester and South East Lancashire provided 2500 recruits to the cause.¹⁵ Although no figures exist to confirm this it is likely the largest number of IV were to be found in London. When it is remembered about the claims made about the loyalty of the immigrants in Scotland to the Irish cause it might be

considered surprising that that the IV were better represented in other areas. Although most of the evidence available is of a circumstantial nature it would appear that the IV in other parts of Britain enjoyed a better relationship with mainstream Nationalist bodies than existed in the West of Scotland.²¹ This would explain why the numbers were larger in other the areas. For example, the IV in Coatbridge could only attract 100 members in its first two weeks of activity and this was in a town where one branch of the UILGB was over 1000 strong.²²

Although the purpose of the IV was to act as a military counterweight to the UVF there was no comparison between the two organisations. The UVF was far in advance of the former as a fighting machine. D.G. Boyce states of the IV "that the enthusiasm for the military life was easier to arouse than sustain" and that the recruits "perhaps found the experience similar to that of their eighteenth century counterparts whose 'cloud cap't grenadiers and...gorgeous infantry' dissolved 'a pace as the summer approaches.'²³ It would appear that a similar attitude existed within the IV in Scotland and that those who enlisted did so to express solidarity with their comrades in Ireland rather than to fight in the expected civil war. The first decision taken by the IV in Edinburgh was to 'start both a fife and bugle band.'²⁴ An example of the IV dissolving "a pace as the summer approaches" occurred in Glasgow where the drill hall was closed for three weeks in July in order to let the recruits take

their holidays.²⁶ Although there was much talk of acquiring a firing range there is no evidence that any volunteer ever fired a practice shot in Scotland: it would appear that drilling was the only form of military activity undertaken.²⁷

The IRB sought to penetrate the IV so that they could acquire arms for their own purposes. However, there is no evidence that they succeeded in this aim. What arms came into the possession of the IRB were acquired by their own members.²⁸ Ironically, the IRB could have been acquiring arms for another organisation. There is some evidence that in Glasgow Sinn Fein and the IRB had overlapping memberships and that both organisations were more socialist in orientation than their parent bodies in Ireland. For example, Charles Corrigan and Tomas O'Ban (Tom White) were members of the IRB, Sinn Fein and the CSS.²⁹ During the Dublin transport strike of 1913 the Glasgow branch of Sinn Fein criticised the organisation's leader, Arthur Griffiths, for not supporting the strikers.³⁰ One outcome of this dispute was the formation of the Irish Citizen Army (ICA). This was led by James Connolly, who had been born in Edinburgh and retained strong links with labour organisations in Scotland. His daughter records how the ICA received a consignment of smuggled arms from a Joseph Robinson in 1914.³¹ Unfortunately it is not possible to confirm that this was the man of that name who occupied a high position in the

Glasgow IRB. However, as will be discussed later in this chapter, the IRB in Scotland retained strong links with the ICA in the period after 1916, even when the ICA was almost dormant, so it is not impossible it was being used as a cover by some of its members when it was supposed to be doing the same within the IV.

The expected civil war in Ireland never occurred; this conflict was averted because of the outbreak of the First World War. Redmond's decision to pledge the IV to the British war effort split the organisation. The vast bulk of the membership followed Redmond's lead and about 170,000 joined a new movement called the Irish National volunteers (INV). While 3-5,000 remained with McNeill in an organisation which retained the name of the IV.³¹

The split in the parent body in Ireland was replicated in Scotland. As in Ireland the majority backed Redmond. Unfortunately there are no estimates as to how the rank and file split but only four of the twenty four commanders in the Glasgow County Board backed McNeill.³² Of the nine man Permanent Committee four backed Redmond, two supported McNeill while the political allegiances of the other three cannot be traced.³³ Although there are no figures which would prove, in its initial stages at least, that the number in INV was greater than organisation from which it sprung, there is strong circumstantial evidence to this effect. For example, a new corps was founded in Shieldmuir and the Hamilton

corps had to drill in Cadzow because their former drill hall could no longer accommodate the numbers who wished to drill.³⁴ As late as December 1914 the Bridgeton corps was claiming a "steady increase in membership."³⁵ The fact that the AOH and UILGB endorsed the INV explains why it could attract those who had been indifferent to the original IV.³⁶ It could also be noted that those volunteer corps which had operated independently of the original IV were incorporated in the new organisation.³⁷

Although some Volunteer corps had rifle ranges, and probably for the first time rifles, and all could engage in drilling the military pretensions of the INV were soon superseded by social functions.³⁸ These took the form of dances and concerts and while some of the funds raised by such activities were sent to the parent organisation in Dublin the main beneficiaries appear to have been local charities.³⁹ The ultimate demise of the movement was preordained by the manner of its birth. The INV had been formed in response to Redmond's call that Irish nationalists should fight "wherever the firing line exists." Obviously if those who joined the INV heeded this call the organisation would soon dissolve. This is indeed what happened in Scotland. In early 1915 the Bridgeton Corps which "had been considerably thinned through enlistments to the Army" suffered the loss of one of their instructors to that cause. The organisation's regular columnist in the *Glasgow Observer* "while recognising the noble principles which prompted his

action. deplored the loss of such a capable instructor."⁴⁰ The organisation survived until May 1915 when a meeting of the Glasgow County Board decided to "discontinue operations until after termination of the present great war." This decision was taken in response to the movement's "loss of membership...through members joining the army-fully fifty percent having enlisted."⁴¹ Although the County Board had sought to ensure the future resurrection of the organisation by developing and expanding the Irish National Boy Scout movement, the junior branch of the INV, events in Ireland which resulted in the eclipse of the Irish Party ensured that this proved to be a meaningless gesture.⁴²

The evidence available suggests that the IRB had been unable to control the original IV in Scotland. However, in the aftermath of the split the IRB men such as Joseph Robinson and Tomas O'Ban (Tom White) were able to attain prominent positions in the new IV.⁴³ The reason why the IRB could now control the IV was the latter's small size. It was estimated, by intelligence sources, that the two companies in Glasgow boasted a membership of only seventy in 1915.⁴⁴ It is quite possible, especially when it must be assumed that many IV recruits owed their first loyalty to the IRB, that the IRB was numerically stronger than the IV.⁴⁵ Unfortunately it is impossible to ascertain the numerical strength of the IRB at this time. In any case it is likely that there was a rapid turnover in

membership because of the practice of sending Scottish members to Ireland in order to avoid their being registered under the Military Service Act. One such example was the then Scottish representative on the IRB Supreme Council Charles Corrigan, who left in 1915.⁴⁶

It is probable that any loss of manpower as a result of this practice was replaced from two sources. At this point in time many Irishmen were drawn across the North Channel by the employment opportunities offered by the burgeoning munitions industry on Clydeside. It is more than likely that some were recruited by the IRB in Scotland. Probably the best source for new recruits was from the families of those already active. It has been estimated that "about eighty per cent of current membership [of the Provisional IRA] have fathers, uncles or brothers in the movement."⁴⁷ It is impossible to estimate the proportion of those in the IRB in Scotland in 1915 had had relatives in the movement. However, there is evidence that republicanism was a hereditary tradition that dominated certain families. The leader of the IV in 1915 was a part of such a tradition. Originally from the Falls area of Belfast Joseph Robinson joined the cadet wing of the IRB, the Fianna, in 1902; he was following the tradition of his grandfather. This family provided another recruit. Seamus Robinson took the IRB oath in Glasgow in 1915 and was destined to acquire much status when fighting for the IRA in the Anglo-Irish war.⁴⁸ John McGalloughy was recruited by his brother James: "He was

eight years my senior. and it was no difficult task for him to bring me to his way of thinking. He...made me a member of the I.R.B."47

Although the IV must be classified as an extremist organisation this was not the image they sought to portray. An officially sanctioned report carried in the *Glasgow Observer* stated: "there is no harm in a further repetition, that our organisation is non political, non sectarian and non party, and all Irishman who love the old country are warmly welcome in the ranks."50 Readers of the paper would see that the IV offered its members a fine and varied social calendar. For example, there was the monthly Ceilidh, various rambles and readings of Irish culture.51

Anyone reading the organisation's semi regular column in the *Glasgow Observer* who was unaware of the real nature of the IV would have thought it little different to the plethora of mainstream nationalist bodies that existed at that time. Such a profile may have been adopted so that curious immigrants who might be attracted by the social opportunities offered by the movement would not put off from attending such functions. Once they did attend attempts would be made to convert them to the cause. This tactic has been used in the present "troubles" in Ulster. Paramilitaries have sponsored many flute bands, membership of which was open to anybody who wished to join: once in the band and the "blood was up" they

usually joined the parent organisation.⁸² Such subterfuge appears to have little benefited the IV because, as has been noted, it had only seventy members in Glasgow in 1915. Nevertheless, it may have attracted some who otherwise would not have attended the social functions and the funds raised on such occasions would no doubt be put to good use either in Scotland or in Ireland.

Despite the social and cultural window dressing the IV did engage in military activities. The hall in which the IV drilled was registered as being the premises of the Celtic Miniature Rifle Club.⁸³ This would suggest that the IV had access to firearms though British intelligence reports tended to doubt this.⁸⁴ Possibly the most common activity engaged in by the IRB and the IV was raiding premises to acquire arms and explosives, which were subsequently transferred to Ireland. A favourite target would be colliery armouries. A group of seven or eight volunteers would raid a colliery. In some cases one of the participants would have worked there and would provide the necessary intelligence on the location of the armoury. They were usually able to steal large amounts of explosives, detonators, fuse wire and other materials useful in bomb making.⁸⁵ After being stored in a "safe" house the material would be taken, usually by young Fianna boys, to Ireland.⁸⁶ The route most commonly used was that between Ardrossan and Belfast. Some of the smuggled explosives would be distributed amongst

sympathisers in Belfast, but the bulk would be taken to Dublin. In addition the IV Glasgow played an important role in taking arms supplied by Irish-Americans and transferring the weapons to Ireland.⁸⁷ Many members of IV were employed in war related industries and they used their position to sabotage the British war effort. Seamus Robinson claimed that they were responsible for the fact that "several submarines never came up on their first trial."⁸⁸ The IV also provided a network of "safe houses" in which Republicans attempting to evade the attentions of the RIC could stay. In a celebrated case a priest in Crosshill used his position to ensure that Liam Mellows could return to Ireland unhindered; Mellows went in a coffin escorted by the priest.⁸⁹

The most significant military event to take place in Ireland during the war years was the Easter Rising of 1916. The highest ranks of the IRB in Scotland were informed that a rising was planned in January of that year.⁹⁰ This resulted in an upsurge in explosive gathering raids and smuggling operations on the part of the IRB.⁹¹ However, this was not done without some cost. When raiding a colliery Joseph Robinson dropped his Trade Society card which was subsequently recovered by the Lanarkshire police. After consulting the RIC in Glasgow the police arrested Robinson and searched his house and the IV drill hall. During these searches the police found a cache of small arms, a quantity of explosives, some of which had been stolen in the particular raid being

investigated by the police, and a list of names and addresses in the Dublin area. Although a subsequent search by the by the relevant authorities in Dublin recovered some more explosives this did not include any from colliery raid which sparked of the initial police activity. Most of the material stolen had indeed been smuggled to Dublin. The colliery had been raided in the afternoon of the 15th of January. Seamus Reader and six volunteers took part of the haul to Ireland on that nights Ardrossan-Belfast ferry. They successsfully smuggled their cargo to Dublin. Reader informed Robinson of that fact by telegram. Unfortunately for Reader he had put his own name on the telegram and when the police raided Robinson's house they found the telegram and were able to arrest Reader on his return to Glasgow.*2

Scotland not only provided some of the arms used in the Easter Rising, but also some of the participants. Immediately the decision to stage a Rising was known to the IRB in Scotland those who possessed specialist knowledge in explosives left for Ireland. They joined up with some of there comrades, who were stationed in the Kimmage camp in order to prepare the rebel armoury for the event.*3 The majority of the IV in Scotland were only informed of the plans for the Rising about a week in advance. About fifty IV from Glasgow took part in the event.*4 They were joined by some women of the Cumman na mBan. The latter did sterling work in nursing the

republican casualties during the fighting.** The only accredited member of the Scottish contingent to die in the fighting was Charles Carrigan though it should be noted that he went to Ireland initially to avoid registering under the Military Service Act than to specifically fight in the Rising.** Prison was the fate of most of those who did cross over specially for the event. In the event their loss of liberty was short term. Once captured they were transferred to jails in Britain, to be released by the end of 1916.**

In the aftermath of the Rising the physical force republican movement in Glasgow was wracked by internal division, which was to continue within some sections until the end of the 1921. On his return to Glasgow sometime "towards the end of 1917" one participant found that:

A split had developed in the ranks of the IRB there and, as a consequence in the other organisations too. Joe Robinson was at the head of one party composed mostly of those who had been in the rising. Seamus Reader was with, but not at that time at the head of those who had not taken part. Some of them were in the IRB beforehand and had been informed of its coming. One of them was alleged to have been in Dublin during Easter Week without turning out and to have given a false account afterwards in Glasgow.**

Seamus Robinson was a member of the IRB contingent that came from Glasgow and he has stated that the onset of his disillusionment with the IRB was attributable to the fact that many IRB men had shirked the Rising.** Unfortunately, he does not state if he is referring

solely to the performance of the IRB from Glasgow or if his criticism is aimed at the organisation in general. Future investigations of this subject by men sent from Dublin could not ascertain the truth or otherwise of these allegations.⁷⁰

With the release of the republican prisoners in December 1916 the IRB in Glasgow was able to regroup and resume its previous activities of raiding for arms and transporting the material to Ireland. However, in the period before the end of the first world war they were to suffer a series of setbacks. In November 1917 two Fianna boys were arrested in Belfast after crossing on the Ardrossan ferry. They were caught carrying 230 two ounce sticks of gellignite and "a considerable amount of blasting powder".⁷¹ When captured they were found to be carrying material which incriminated Joseph Robinson. The charges against the two Fainna were dropped, but Robinson was to receive a ten year prison sentence.⁷² This was by far the heaviest sentence passed for arms smuggling in the period 1916-21.⁷³ It was alleged by some elements within the IRB that an informer had betrayed Robinson. However, these allegations were not proved and the man suspected remained in the volunteers.⁷⁴ In May 1918 Bernard Friel was found in possession of gunpowder when attempting to board the Ardrossan ferry. He was subsequently sentenced to three years penal servitude.⁷⁵ The third blow came when a group of eight men and women

were arrested, again at Ardrossan Harbour, while carrying a quantity of explosives. Of the eight three women were subsequently found not guilty of any offence but two of those arrested received a three month prison sentences; two of their accomplices were jailed for six months while the leader, Michael Callaghan, was sentenced to three years imprisonment.⁸⁸ According to one source Callaghan was acting on his own initiative in undertaking this venture.⁸⁹ A note he had in his possession when he was caught might explain why Callaghan was operating in this manner. The captured letter was headed "Liberty Hall, Dublin". the headquarters of the ICA.⁹⁰ This strengthens the suspicion that an element within the IRB owed their first loyalty to a rival organisation.

These blows necessitated the reorganisation of the movement and the man who was put in charge of this process was Joe Vize.⁹¹ He arrived in early 1919. His initial report on the conditions of the IRA in Glasgow must have depressed his superiors in Dublin.⁹² There were two companies of volunteers active at the time:

A(Co) which claim to be the Headquarters is composed of a good number of undesirables and citizen army & vols, trying to run the whole movement here but making no progress beyond their own company, because the majority of the men won't work under them, so that A.Co is an obstacle in the way of further developments of vol. movement here at present. B.Co. I found practically disorganised on this account, also little differences between themselves.⁹³

Although Vize viewed the prevailing situation as

"lamentable" he was optimistic that expansion was possible. In this he proved to be justified. The first new company to be formed was in Govan and by April it had a membership of fifty.²² By late May the IRA had established companies in Motherwell and Paisley.²³ At this point it is likely that the new units were reactivated sections of dormant IRB and IV cells in these areas.

It might be assumed that the expansion of the Sinn Fein movement which occurred in Scotland during the early months of 1919 would have proved a fertile recruiting ground for the IRA. Initially, however, this does not seem to have been the case. Vize was dismayed to find that many Sinn Feiners were opposed to the activities of the IRA. Vize wrote to Michael Collins to ask if he could help rectify the situation.²⁴ Collins replied that friction between the two bodies existed in Ireland and admitted there was little he could do about it; "Of course it is no good taking official action against such lack of spirit...It is worse than useless making a rule when the rule is not obeyed."²⁵ In June, shortly before Collins was due to meet a delegation from Sinn Fein in Scotland, Vize returned to the subject. He urged Collins to criticise their attitude to the IRA: "rub it as strong as possible they are no good only for singing and dancing".²⁶ Shortly after this meeting there is evidence which suggests that the Sinn Fein members adopted a more positive attitude to the IRA. In September Vize sought to

expand the IRA in Glasgow and planned to do this through the city's Sinn Fein Clubs:

We are starting a big recruiting move in the city forming sections of companies or half companies in the different SF halls, they will drill in their own halls once a week, and attend company drill once a month at headquarters, for example, if we had four SF Clubs only able to make up one section each, these four sections would form four sections would form a company but drill as sections once a week under their section leaders in their own hall, and the whole four attend H'Quarters once a month for company drill...We find something like this must be done to meet the demand for admission & desire to use their (SF)halls for drills.'*

Whether this change in attitude was the result of Collins' strictures, or the response of the rank and file to the increase in conflict in Ireland is not clear. However, the last sentence of the quote would suggest the latter.

In May 1919 there were five companies of the IRA active in Scotland. By September additional companies had been or were in the process of being formed in Glasgow, Greenock and Clydebank.** At least another six companies had been formed by January 1920 and Vize was optimistic that there were enough potential volunteers for another nine or ten companies.'* Although Vize had effected a dramatic transformation in the fortunes of the IRA in the year in which he had control, it would appear that progress had been limited to the west of Scotland. Despite promptings by Collins to extend the organisation

into the east of the country, it was not until late February 1920 that Vize was able to set up a company of IRA and Cumann na mBan personnel in Edinburgh.⁹⁰ By the middle of the year the IRA started to recruit members in the Dundee area.⁹¹ Thus, by mid 1920 the IRA had essentially completed its organisation in geographic terms.

Unfortunately the correspondence between Vize and Collins does not provide the historian with an exact picture of the structure of the IRA or its numerical strength in Scotland in the period before the former was recalled to Ireland in July 1920. However, Eamonn Mooney outlined the order of battle of the IRA in Scotland between January and July 1921.⁹² The Scottish Brigade was composed of five battalions which, in turn, were composed of thirty one active companies. The first Battalion, and the largest, was centred on Glasgow and had nine constituent companies. The second Battalion had eight companies which were organised in the industrial areas on Lanarkshire such as Motherwell, Wishaw, Hamilton and Blantyre. The third was active in the east of Scotland and was organised from Edinburgh. It consisted of five companies with a further one in the process of formation in early July. The fourth Battalion had a total of four companies located in Dundee and the mining areas of Fife. The fifth Battalion had companies in Paisley, Greenock, Port Glasgow and Kilmarnock. According to Mooney the average strength of each company was about eighty men. The total strength

of the Scottish Brigade was put at between 2000 and 2500 men. This total is considerably smaller than contemporary estimates. A report in the *Daily Record*, which has been cited by many secondary sources such as Handley, claimed that there were 4000 IRA members in Glasgow alone in 1920.⁷³ The fact that a company was in the process of formation in July 1921 suggests that there was no ceiling put on recruiting levels and that Mooney's estimate represents the peak strength of the IRA in Scotland with the exception of the womens section. Unfortunately, there is no document, which outlines the numerical strength or organisational structure of the Cumann na mBan. All that can be ascertained with certainty is that fourteen branches of the organisation were active in 1920.⁷⁴

Although the organisation of the IRA improved dramatically as the Anglo-Irish war progressed some of the problems that the beset movement at the start of this period were never satisfactorily resolved. Immediately Vize took control he complained of the negative effect the Glasgow A. Company had on the rest of organisation and he consequently tried to marginalise it from the main body of the Scottish Brigade. Nevertheless A.Co continued to survive and indeed attempted to organise the formation of two new companies in the Edinburgh area before the "official" movement had established a foothold in that region.⁷⁵ In order to ensure that the development of the IRA in the east of Scotland was under his control Vize

convinced Collins to let the leaders of the Irish community in that region know that he totally disowned the renegade company.⁹⁶ Consequently the threat posed by A.Co to create an organisation within an organisation evaporated. However, despite being officially suspended by Collins in February 1920, it was not until April 1921 that the Scottish Sinn Fein executive informed the readers of the *Glasgow Observer* that "the institution advertising under the name of Cumann Thomas Uí Cléirigh (the Tom Clarke Club)...whose address is Banba Hall, 251 New City Road, St. George's Cross Glasgow [where A. Co was based] is Not a Sinn Fein Club."⁹⁷ While it was not until early 1922 that the press reported that club was been readmitted to the Sinn Fein movement Eamonn Mooney's inclusion of A.Co in the Scottish Brigade's order of battle as of July 1921 suggests that some elements within the Brigade never considered A.Co to be suspended.⁹⁸

There are other examples of the Glasgow Battalion coming into conflict with the representatives of the parent body in Ireland. Tom Gillespie was elected Captain but Vize refused to sanction his appointment.⁹⁹ It is not known whether the views of the Battalion or Vize prevailed. Possibly the situation was only resolved with Gillespie's imprisonment in March 1921.¹⁰⁰ According to Mooney, Seamus Reader was the O/C of the Scottish Brigade as at July 1921, but other evidence available suggests that he had previously been dismissed from the IRA by Vize.¹⁰¹ If Mooney is correct then it is likely that local feeling

counted for more than orders from Dublin when selecting the leaders of the movement in Scotland.

As has been previously noted a dispute arose within the ranks of republicans in Scotland as to whether certain volunteers had evaded fighting in the Easter Rising. This was according to Vize "the root of all the trouble here".¹⁰² Attention focused on a veteran republican, indeed the *Glasgow Observer* was to call him the father of Sinn Fein in Scotland, Tom McDonnell.¹⁰³ Vize was able to ascertain that McDonnell had indeed claimed exemption from participating in the Easter Rising however, despite a vigorous enquiry it was not discovered if the accused had or had not the right to claim an exemption. The peculiarly Scottish legal verdict of Not Proven was returned. McDonnell remained in the movement despite the suspicions of some of his "comrades". Although Vize initially considered McDonnell to be inefficient he had cause to favourably revise his opinion of the man in coming months.¹⁰⁴ Other volunteers, such as two Breslin brothers, were also investigated about their activities in Easter 1916, but once again no conclusive evidence was found that would warrant their dismissal.¹⁰⁵ Thus, the suspicions and rancor remained throughout the period of the Anglo-Irish war.

The prime objective of the IRA in Scotland was to acquire arms and munitions and transport them to Ireland. The IRA employed a number of methods to achieve its goals.

Traditionally, raiding colliery armouries was a favourite way of getting explosives and detonators. This activity continued through the Anglo-Irish war, but most of the materials secured from this type of source were acquired by more subtle means. One method was to get a sympathetic engineer to overestimate the amount of material needed to complete a specific job. He would use the minimum amount necessary to complete his task and then hand over the surplus to the IRA. This method has been used by the paramilitaries during the present Ulster "Troubles". For example, J. Bowyer Bell states that the construction of the New York City Water Tunnel, built between 1970-75, required about 10% more dynamite than a careful engineer would have used. He implies that the surplus found its way to the IRA.¹⁰⁶ It has also been claimed that the bulk of the explosives used by the UVF in the early seventies had been smuggled out of Scottish pits by Loyalist sympathisers.¹⁰⁷ While this method was obviously less risky than raiding a colliery it was also not as productive and once the authorities became aware of the problem security was stepped up and the flow of material slowed to a trickle. After a visit to Motherwell Vize informed Collins that he had returned with about a hundred detonators. However, they had to be acquired "in ones and twos, the watch is so keen".¹⁰⁸ Raids on premises, which held rifles, explosives or other military equipment while less common than before the war did continue. In the Vize-Collins correspondence there is a

press cutting, undated, that refers to a raid on Robroyston colliery.¹⁰⁹ British Intelligence reports state that arms, ammunition and money had been stolen from the Orange Hall in Cowcaddens, Glasgow. Before leaving the raiders had scrawled the words "Commandeered for the Irish Republican Army" on the walls.¹¹⁰

The bulk of the material acquired by the IRA in Scotland seems to have been purchased rather than stolen. Vize purchased munitions from a variety of "entrepreneurs". One of his major sources of material was a Mr J. Corbett of Parkhead, Glasgow.¹¹¹ Corbett was a contractor, who employed his own men. Thus, he had easy access to gelignite and detonators. Furthermore, he was in a position to hire IRA members and train them in the use of explosives.¹¹² Once the employee had mastered the requisite skills he would return to Ireland to use them to further the cause. Vize also used cash to line the pockets of those who had access to munitions and were prepared to steal whatever weaponry they could and pass the materials to the IRA. A favorite ploy was to bribe men who worked in military barracks. He informed Collins as to the extent which he had penetrated this source:

In Maryhill we are in direct touch with the sergeant in the machine gun stores...he is only waiting now to get his right man on sentry for to start working for us...We are getting rifles from Hamilton Barracks, this place is just developing, up to now we have ten out of it, expecting many more, Houston & Sterling is giving us some Webleys (new), the latter place is newly

opened up to us, anticipate a good many from there, we are also waiting for the wire to lift two machine guns from Dunfermline, another new opening.¹¹³

Not only did Vize scour Scotland to find arms sources he paid members of boat crews travelling to Germany, Hamburg in particular, to acquire munitions there and smuggle them back to Scotland.¹¹⁴ There was an attempt to set up an arms network between New York and Glasgow, however, Collins vetoed this scheme because he already had agents active in the USA.¹¹⁵

Many sources suggest that the bulk of the arms smuggled to Ireland had been acquired in Scotland.¹¹⁶ However, it is difficult to accurately quantify the extent of this trade. Although Vize left a set of documents which gave a very detailed picture of IRA activities in Scotland between February 1919 and July 1920 they do not cover every event that occurred in that period. Moreover, these documents only relate to the attempts by Vize to acquire munitions. They do not shed any light on the attempts by individual IRA units, acting without the authority of the leadership in Ireland, to secure additional weaponry.¹¹⁷ Nevertheless, it is possible to construct at least a partial picture of what transpired. Between June 11th 1919 and 23rd June 1920 Collins sent at least £2150 to his representative in Scotland. Of this sum £1600 was sent between 20th January and 23rd June 1920.¹¹⁸ This was a greater amount than was sent to either Liverpool and London during this period.¹¹⁹ Vize itemised two specific

accounts, one of £300 and one of £500. The former amount bought 12 rifles, 43 revolvers of assorted manufacture, 234 lbs of gelignite, 1800 detonators, a hundred rounds of .303 ammunition and miscellaneous sundries such as field glasses and batteries.¹²⁰ For an outlay of £500 Vize purchased 25 rifles, 68 revolvers 1600 rounds of assorted calibre ammunition, 2300 detonators, 28 lbs of soft explosive and some sundries such as telescopes and field glasses.¹²¹

Success in acquiring weapons posed certain logistical problems for the Scottish Brigade. The major problem was transporting the material to Ireland. Initially the main route for arms shipment was by a ferry across the North Channel to Belfast from where it would be transported to Dublin where IRA GHQ would distribute the weaponry to individual units in the field. This was augmented whenever the opportunity arose. For example, a link was established between Glasgow and Tyrone when a man on the Glasgow-Londonderry ferry offered to smuggle arms to his associates in the 3rd Battalion, Tyrone.¹²² At this point arms were generally smuggled across in the luggage of an individual and was small scale in nature. On one occasion Tom McDonnell carried a consignment of only four revolvers and less than 200 rounds of ammunition.¹²³

The ability to transport munitions to Ireland was soon eclipsed by the ability to acquire armaments. In May 1919 the IRA in Glasgow had a stock of four revolvers and two

rifles.¹²⁴ In September ten revolvers and three rifles awaited shipment to Ireland.¹²⁵ By 7th February 1920 the stock in Glasgow had risen to eighty .45 revolvers and "about twenty rifles".¹²⁶ This backlog forced a new route to be brought into operation. Henceforth the vast majority of arms shipments from Glasgow would arrive at Dublin via Liverpool.¹²⁷ Liverpool served as a marshalling yard for arms acquired throughout Great Britain. The city's small force of IRA men, only 120 strong, played a vital role in supplying the needs of the organisation in Ireland.¹²⁸ How far this development alleviated the problems of the IRA in Glasgow is debatable. In July 1920 Vize reported that they now had seventy rifles on hand; an increase of fifty on the February figure.¹²⁹ He did not state if there were any revolvers awaiting transportation at this time. If indeed the stock of revolvers had been shipped to Ireland then the number of weapons in Glasgow fell from a hundred to seventy between February and July 1920. If not then it is possible that despite increased efforts to ensure the rapid turnover of weapons the number in stock in Glasgow actually increased during this period. It is doubtful if the problem of transporting the arms acquired in Scotland to Ireland was ever satisfactorily solved. As late as December 1921, six months after the cease fire had come into operation, frantic efforts were still being made to clear the arms depots that existed in the west of Scotland.¹³⁰

Fervently trying to secure arms for the use of the IRA Vize was prepared to speculate to accumulate. The people who were prepared to supply arms were doing so for financial gain and not because of a shared ideology. Had Vize put any great emphasis on the the good character of his contacts it is likely he would have made few deals. On occasions Vize made small financial losses on various deals. Collins accepted such reverses as being inevitable.¹³¹ However, it would appear that Vize lost a considerable amount of money on a transaction which occurred about June or July 1920.¹³² He was recalled to Dublin and an investigation was set up to examine the affairs of the Scottish Brigade. Ostensibly the enquiry was supposed to be concerned with the finances of IRA operations in Scotland the enquiry soon became sidetracked by personality clashes and questions about the role of the IRB within the IRA.

Cathal Brugha was the prime mover in raising the issue. Prior to the Rising in 1916 Brugha had been an active member of the IRB. However, with the failure of many rural IRB circles to join the Rising he became disillusioned. Brugha was not alone in this, as we have observed Seamus Robinson was to tread the same path. With the emergence of the IRA people such as Brugha resented the existence of an organisation within an organisation and sought to weaken the hold of the IRB on its members. On joining the IRB the new recruit swore an oath

recognising the Supreme Council of the IRB as the *dé jure* Government of Ireland. In an attempt to lessen the force of this oath elements who shared Brugha's sentiments persuaded the Dail to legislate that every member of the IRA should swear the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic. The Dail not the Supreme Council of the IRB was seen to be the legitimate source of power within Ireland. Vize was a member of the IRB and during his stay in Scotland had introduced some IRA members into the IRB. With the alleged discovery of financial irregularities in the Scottish accounts Brugha appears to have viewed this as an opportunity to lessen the power of Collins and the IRB within the republican movement.¹³³

The subsequent investigation, which was led by Liam Mellows, cleared Vize of any suspicion of misconduct. However, it did reveal that some elements within the Glasgow IRA were consigning too much material to the ICA. It also found that the Cork, Mayo and Sligo brigades were, on their own initiative, attempting to purchase arms in Scotland. This meant that sections of the IRA were bidding against themselves and pushing the price of illicit munitions higher than they would otherwise have been.¹³⁴

It would appear that the months of mid summer 1920 represented the high water mark of the IRA in Scotland after which they suffered a series of reverses. The first was a self inflicted wound. The enquiry into the finances

of the Scottish Brigade disrupted activities. For example, the IRA failed to secure a deal involving 9000 rounds of ammunition because Mellows did not want to further muddle the accounts by authorising fresh disbursements.¹³⁵ In addition, the IRA was to suffer many arrests after December 1920. Previously arrests and arms finds by the police had been rare. Admittedly the authorities had located some of the boats which had transported munitions from the Continent and had been able to prevent the arms reaching their intended destination in Ireland.¹³⁶ They also arrested four IRA members, who had attacked some policemen in George Square, Glasgow, but by any yardstick the authorities had been outmanoeuvred by the IRA.¹³⁷

The first wave of arrests to hit the IRA in Scotland came in December 1920 when twenty of their number were picked up. It would appear that the activities of the IRA in Liverpool, where they had succeeded in torching many of the city's docks, forced the authorities to act in an attempt to forestall similar activity north of the border. This "trawling exercise" appears to have netted mostly small fry. The bulk of those caught had either been found in possession of small quantities of arms and/or ammunition, one man who was caught had only seven rounds of ammunition in his possession when arrested, or had been attempting to purchase arms from serving soldiers.¹³⁸

The first major success achieved by the police against the IRA came on December 5th when the police captured Henry Coyle and Charles McGinn in Alloa as they were transporting a quantity of munitions, which had been stolen from mines in the Fife coalfields, from Cowdenbeath to Glasgow. The police recovered 3cwt of explosives, 300 detonators, strum, two rifles, three revolvers and two bayonets.¹³⁹ At the subsequent trial it was revealed that Coyle was found in possession of receipts for large amounts of cash which had been issued by IRA GHQ in Dublin.¹⁴⁰ This incident has been portrayed as a greater blow to the IRA than was possibly the case. Handley states that Coyle was the O/C of the Scottish Brigade of the IRA at the time of his capture.¹⁴¹ This would appear not to have been the case. Eamonn Mooney fails to accredit Coyle with such a high ranking position.¹⁴² In the correspondence between Vize and Collins Coyle is only mentioned twice. On neither occasion was his rank mentioned. Admittedly before the recall of Vize to Ireland, in the summer of 1920, Collins stated that "C" would take over Vize's former position.¹⁴³ This would appear to have referred to John Carney rather than Coyle. At a trial in August 1921 documents which had been captured in Dublin in December 1920 were produced that referred to Carney as O/C S.B.¹⁴⁴

It may have been the case that subsequent arrests were the result of the police being able to infiltrate the Scottish Brigade of the IRA; this was the view of at least one

source.¹⁴³ If the police did manage to plant an informant in the IRA it is likely that happened towards the end of 1920, or in early 1921. Certainly the picture of IRA activities in Glasgow before that period as portrayed in the Reports on Revolutionary Organisations, which were submitted to the Cabinet, bore little resemblance to that painted in the Vize-Collins correspondence. That the intelligence of the authorities had improved is illustrated by the fact that on the next occasion when mass arrests occurred, in May 1921, the police captured John Carney, James Fullerton, Eamonn Mooney and Michael Carroll; each of whom held prominent positions in the Glasgow Battalion.¹⁴⁶ In addition, the O/C and the Q/M of the Scottish Brigade were also captured.¹⁴⁷ Thus, by the summer of 1921, the Intelligence Services seem to have known who the leading IRA personnel in the west of Scotland were. Whether this meant that an informer was at work is unclear.

The arms links that existed, after February 1920, between Glasgow, Liverpool and Dublin meant that if the police made a breakthrough in one area it might be possible to use this information to achieve a similar result in the other two. For example, papers en route to Glasgow were seized in Liverpool.¹⁴⁸ Papers captured in Dublin were used as incriminating evidence at the trial of John Carney.¹⁴⁹ Therefore, the IRA in Glasgow had been weakened by security lapses that were not of their

making. Moreover, each arrest in Scotland gave the police a better insight into the organisation of the local IRA. Coyle was caught in possession of documents relating to IRA activities when arrested. Thus, it is possible that the improved intelligence available to the authorities was not due to the activities of a "mole" within the IRA, but simply the cumulative effects of a series of lucky breaks and good follow up work by the police.

A further example of the increased effectiveness of the police came in December 1921 when thirteen IRA men were arrested in Tollcross, caught in the act of attempting to clear the backlog of arms that existed in Glasgow.¹⁵⁰ The frequent location of arms dumps and the arrest of key IRA men was testimony to fact that by 1921 the IRA was under severe pressure from the authorities. It had lost the cloak of invisibility that it had once possessed.

The increased number of arrests affected the IRA in a variety of ways. Firstly, the arrest and/or imprisonment of the leaders resulted, in the short term at least, in a certain amount of dislocation and confusion within the IRA while new leaders came to the fore. The more successful the police were in capturing IRA activists the more likely those on the fringes of republicanism would be deterred from aiding and abetting the organisation. The most significant result of the increase in arrests was the drain on the financial resources of the republican movement occasioned by the subsequent trials,

irrespective of whether defendants were found guilty or innocent. The defence of Coyle and his co-accused cost £1,339.¹⁵¹ In December 1921 one solicitor claimed that he was owed over £2,000 for defending IRA men.¹⁵² It is not clear if these legal expenses were met out of central IRA funds controlled by Dublin, or were supposed to be raised by local activists in Scotland. In Scotland there were certainly specific appeals issued by the republicans for the sole purpose of paying the legal fees of accused IRA men.¹⁵³ However, it would appear that whatever cash they raised was not enough. The Free State Government had to allot £4,000 to cover outstanding legal costs which had been incurred by the Scottish Brigade during the war of independence.¹⁵⁴

The prime function of the British Brigades of the IRA was to acquire arms and munitions and transport such materials to Ireland. However, there were those within the IRA GHQ who wished to use these units as a means to strike militarily at the heart of the Empire. Chief proponent of this school of thought was Cathal Brugha, however, his views were not endorsed by the majority of the GHQ staff.¹⁵⁵ Although there was no co-ordinated IRA campaign in Britain certain military operations did occur, albeit on an ad hoc basis. The IRA in Liverpool destroyed warehouses in the city's docks area and engaged in a campaign of arson as a reprisal for the death of the Mayor of Cork.¹⁵⁶ In London a local unit killed a suspected informer.¹⁵⁷ More grandiose and gruesome plans

such as the poisoning of reservoirs were contemplated, but never materialised.¹⁵⁶

Sections of the IRA in Scotland also engaged in acts of violence. In most cases property was the target. However, there were occasions when casualties did result from IRA operations. The most serious incident occurred on 4th May 1921 and represented the culmination of a series of events, which originated in Londonderry three months previously. It was common practice for wanted men in Ireland to go to Scotland and stay in a "safe" house until it was deemed safe for them to return to the fray.¹⁵⁷ In February Frank Carty, a leading figure in the IRB, escaped from goal in Londonderry. He was smuggled across the North Channel in a coffin. On arriving in Glasgow he became involved with the local units of the IRA. He was subsequently recaptured by the Glasgow police on 28th April. Immediately local IRA and IRB members resolved to try and secure his release. Liam Mellows, who was in the city at the time, vehemently opposed such a course of action.¹⁵⁸ His advice was ignored and a party of IRA members ambushed the prison van transporting Carty as it was going through Glasgow. The ambushers attempted to shoot the lock open. However, they only succeeded in killing an Inspector Johnstone and wounding a Detective Sergeant Stirton.¹⁵⁹ The only other recorded incident where the IRA used firearms occurred in Bothwell in October 1920 when an attempt to raid a drill hall

resulted in the wounding of a policeman.¹⁴²

The formation of rifle clubs, one section even succeeded in gaining membership of the Scottish Rifle Association, the holding of military exercises in the Campsie hills should not convey the impression of the Scottish Brigade as being a fighting force.¹⁴³ There is little evidence to suggest that more than a handful of IRA members ever fired a shot in anger during the Irish War of Independence. There appears to have been only two shooting incidents in Scotland throughout this period (recounted above) and on neither occasion was it planned to open fire on the forces of law and order. According to Peter Beresford Ellis "a number of Scots, such as Ian MacKenzie Kennedy, fell fighting for the IRA."¹⁴⁴ There is little evidence to support the view that members of the Scottish Brigade went to fight in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish war. In the case of the aforementioned Kennedy he went to Ireland "rather than fight for England"; this suggests that he dodged conscription and thus left Scotland c1915. It should also be noted that the agency of his death was the Free State forces and not the British Army.¹⁴⁵ For the Scottish Brigade to have encouraged its members to go to Ireland en masse would be an exercise in futility. At the outset of the truce in July 1921 it has been estimated that the IRA had a membership of 112,650.¹⁴⁶ However, shortage of arms meant that only about 5,000 could be classified as activists.¹⁴⁷ While it is possible that some members of

the Scottish Brigade, who had special skills, explosive experts for example, did participate in military action in Ireland any attempt to encourage the rank and file to return to Ireland would only have exacerbated the shortage of arms that the parent organisation experienced.

It has been suggested, by many sources, that the aid rendered by the Irish in Scotland during the Irish War of Independence was central to the success enjoyed by the republican movement.¹⁶⁵ However, it would appear that such claims were exaggerations. While a major source of arms, the amount smuggled between Scotland and Ireland between 1918-1921 was exceeded many times by the quantity landed by the UVF in one night at Larne in 1914. In any case by early 1921 such links that existed between Scotland and Ireland were becoming increasingly tenuous. The IRA in Scotland was coming under severe pressure from the police, who were winning the intelligence war. Arms dumps were being found and many leading IRA members were being arrested. The amount of cash raised by Sinn Fein in Scotland was less than the amount needed to cover the legal fees involved in defending IRA men in the courts.

It is also unlikely that arms smuggled from Scotland played any significant role during the Irish War of Independence. In many areas of Ireland a war did not exist. Arms were sent to IRA units who promptly dumped them in the countryside and rarely attacked the British.

This represented a waste of the resources and effort on the part of the IRA in Scotland. As has been pointed out previously a proportion of munitions acquired in Scotland were sent to the ICA. But as one of its prominent members stated the ICA failed "to play a worthwhile role in the fight against the British forces during the period 1918-21".¹⁶⁹

The largest and most active IRA division during the Anglo-Irish war was the 1st Southern. One of its component Brigades, the 2nd Cork, allegedly received only "six or seven rifles from GHQ during the whole of the Tan War".¹⁷⁰ Tom Barry makes clear that majority of arms used by the 3rd Cork Brigade were acquired directly from the enemy. They were either captured by raiding arms depots, or removed from dead soliders at the scene of an ambush.¹⁷¹ Ernie O'Malley, the O/C of the 2nd Southern Division, concurred: "We get little from the Quartermaster General. Our main source of supply is the enemy".¹⁷²

That arms sent from Scotland appear to have played little part in the conflict is, of course, no reflection on the activity of the Scottish Brigade. However, it does illustrate that any successes achieved by the IRA, whether military or political, was dependent on the will of their members or supporters in Ireland. While stressing the marginality of the IRA in Scotland to the events that occurred in Ireland between 1918-21 it should be noted "Green Clydeside", in supporting and supplying

the IRA, posed more of a threat to the unity of the United Kingdom than "Red Clydeside " ever did.

Footnotes

1. Patrick McCormick Statement to Beureau of Military History p4. Photocopy of Statement can be found in the National Library of Ireland, MS 15,337.
2. IRB.Report c1912 McGarrity Papers MS 17,705.
3. F.S.L. Lyons *ireiland since the Famine* pp. 320-22 give details of the origins of the IV.
4. *Glasgow Observer* 10 Jan 1914.
5. *Glasgow Observer* 10 Jan 1914.
6. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Jan 1914.
7. *Glasgow Observer* 18 July 1914.
8. *Glasgow Observer* 18 July 1914.
9. *Glasgow Observer* 29 Aug; 5 & 12 Sept 1914.
10. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Aug 1914.
11. Precis of Information received by Special Branch RIC Nov 1913. CO 904/119/191.
12. The motion in favour of setting up a corps of the IV was forwarded by a Dan MacGlynchey One wonders if this was a mis spelling of his name because the first secretary of the IV had a similar name, Daniel McGlinchey, and he we on to join the McNeilite IV after the movement split. *Giasgow Observer* 17 Jan & 14 Feb 1914; *Irish Volunteer* 24 Oct 1914.
13. *Giasgow Observer* 17 Jan 1914.
14. *Glasgow Obsrver* 2 May 1914.
15. The members of the full Permanent Committee are listed in the *Giasgow Observer* 15 Aug 1914; The two IRB members were Joseph Robinson, (See Transcript copy of account of Seamus Robinson of his part in the War of independence pp. 59-60. Frank Gallagher papers MS 21,265 acc 3237) and Thomas White (Tomas O'Ban) (See Patrick McCormick p8 MS 15,337).
16. Precis of Information and reports relating to Dublin Metropolitan District July 1914. CO 904/14/2/107.
17. *Giasgow Observer* 17 Oct 1914.
18. Glasgow was the first city to be mantioned in the organisation's official paper in which plans were afoot to create a corps. *Irish Volunteer* 14 Feb 1914.
19. *Irish Volunteer* 15 Aug 1914.
20. *Irish Volunteer* 15 Aug 1914; *Glasgow Observer* 1 Aug 1914.
21. *Irish Volunteer* 7 Mar; 9, 16 May; 20 June 1914.
22. *Giasgow Observer* 13 June 1914; 19 Aug 1913.
23. D.G. Boyce *Nationalism in Ireland* p.283.
24. *Glasgow Observer* 25 July 1914.
25. *Glasgow Observer*, 1 Aug 1914. In this issue the Secretary of the movement states that the IV had just resumed activity after the holiday period. No adverts for the IV were placed in the *Giasgow Observer* on 11.18 & 25 July. They were only resumed in the 1 Aug 1914 issue.
26. *Irish Volunteer* 21 Feb 11 July 1914.
27. Precis of Information and reports relating to the Dublin Metropolitan District May 1914. CO 904/14/2/56 & 75.

28. *Forward* 9 Oct 1915; 20 May & 14 Oct 1916; *Glasgow Observer* 16 Mar 1912 St. Patrick's Day Supplement.
29. *Glasgow Observer* 1 Nov 1913.
30. Nora Connolly-O'Brien *Portrait of a Rebel Father* p.183.
31. F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p.330; C. Townshend *Political Violence in Ireland* p.279; R. Kee *The Bold Fenian Men* p.224 give varying estimates of the respective factions after the split.
32. *Glasgow Observer* 24 Oct 1914.
33. The nine members of the Permanent Committee are listed in the *Glasgow Observer* 15 Aug 1914. Of these John Cryan, Maryhill, Glasgow; John Clyne; J. Alexander; C.B. Fox can be positively identified as supporters of the INV. See *National Volunteer* 27 Feb 1915. Joseph Robinson and Thomas White (Tomas O'Ban) were members of the IRB and went with the McNeillite faction. See footnote 15. The affiliations of Thomas McMonagle, Paisley; J. Bradley, Partick; and Bernard Gibney, Clydebank cannot be traced. However, it is likely that Gibney did not support the McNeillite wing. The split in Clydebank was discussed in the *Irish Volunteer* and it is noticeable that Gibney's name does not appear as an officebearer in the new organisation. *Irish Volunteer* 24 Oct 1914.
34. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Oct, 7 Nov & 12 Dec 1914.
35. *Glasgow Observer* 12 Dec 1914.
36. For the attitude of the AOH in Scotland to the INV see *Glasgow Observer* 10 Oct 1914. The Anderston Corps, Glasgow, was inspected by J. O'Donnell Derrick, the chief organiser of the UILGB in Scotland. *National Volunteer* 31 Oct 1914.
37. For example, the previously independent Hamilton Corps joined the INV. *Glasgow Observer* 24 Oct 1914.
38. A report of the activities of the Anderston Corps states that the members engaged in 'firing exercises'. *National Volunteer* 31 Oct 1914; The Bridgeton Corps engaged in rifle practice with miniature rifles on their own range. *National Volunteer* 30 Jan 1915; *Glasgow Observer* 30 Jan 1915.
39. *National Volunteer* 14 Nov 1914; 2 Jan & 27 Feb 1915; *Glasgow Observer* 26 Dec 1914; 2 Jan & 13 Feb 1915.
40. *National Volunteer* 20 Feb 1915; *Glasgow Observer* 20 Feb 1915.
41. *Glasgow Observer* 8 May 1915. According to press reports the following corps were still in existence in February 1915: 2nd Battalion Govan; Maryhill; 'G' Co. Greenock; 'B' Co. Ballieston; 'A' & 'B' Cos, Sword St. Glasgow; Bridgeton; 'A' & 'B' Cos, 2nd Battalion Paisley. *Glasgow Observer* 27 Feb 1915; *National Volunteer* 27 Feb 1915.
42. *Glasgow Observer* 8 May 1915. The Bridgeton Corps had a Boy Scout wing at least as early as February 1915. They indulged in drill and rifle practice along with semaphore and morse signalling. By September 1915 the Bridgeton Irish National Boy Scouts had imitators in Anderston, Partick, Maryhill, Townhead, Dennieston, Parkhead, South

- side Glasgow and Greenock. Unfortunately, apart from publicly denying any connection with Sinn Fein, the INBS did not place any statements in the *Glasgow Observer* so the historian is unable to chart the organisation's progress, or lack of it, post September 1915. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Jan; 13 Feb; 20 Mar; 17 Apr; 8 & 15 May; 3 July; 7 Aug; 18 Sept; 16 Oct 1915.
43. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Oct & 20 Nov 1915; *Irish Volunteer* 24 Oct 1914.
44. Precis of Information received by Special Branch R.I.C. Oct 1915. CO 904/120/8/174.
45. Not every member of the IV would be selected by the IRB to join "the organisation", conversely many IRB members would not attempt to penetrate other bodies.
46. Patrick McCormick *op cit* pp. 1-2; Margaret Skinnider *Doing my bit for Ireland* pp.64-5; N.Connolly-O'Brien *op cit* p.275.
47. P. Bishop & E. Mallie *The Provisional IRA* pp. 14-5.
48. Seamus Robinson *op cit* pp. 58-60; For a biography of Seamus Robinson's later career see P. O'Farrell *Who's Who in the Irish War of Independence, 1916-21* pp. 139-140.
49. John McGalloghly Statement to Bureau of Military History UCD Archives P60, p.1.
50. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Apr 1915. The Fianna h-Eirann (the youth wing of the IV) tried to portray a similar innocuous air. According to one advert placed in the press the boys engaged in many forms of physical activity and were taught a version Irish history which excluded "modern politics and personalities". However, the fact that the boys were "to pray and work for the sovereign independence of the Irish nation" revealed the organisation's political orientation to the politically aware reader. *Glasgow Observer* 10 July 1915.
51. *Glasgow Observer* 4 & 25 Sept; 2 & 9 Oct; 13 & 20 Nov; 4 Dec 1915.
52. *Forthnight*, 224, 9-22 Sept 1985.
53. *Glasgow Observer* 5 Apr 1915. The IV had access to a hall at 34 Ann St., Glasgow. In the Glasgow Post Office Directory 1915 the building was listed as the premises in the name of the Celtic Miniature Rifle Club.
54. Precis of Information Crime Special Branch. CO904/120/7/156. CO904/120/8/174.
55. John McGalloghly gives a vivid account of raids on colliery armouries. McGalloghly *op cit* pp. 2-3.
56. Seamus Reader, who took part in both the raids described by McGalloghly, recounts his smuggling activities in *An-t-ogiac* St.Patrick's Day Issue 1962; Easter 1963.
57. Report Dublin Metropolitan Police CO904/28/4/650.
58. Seamus Robinson *op cit* p.61.
59. N. Connolly O'Brien *op cit* p.277; For details of the Mellows incident see P. McCormick *op cit* pp. 5-6; C. Desmond Greaves *Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution* pp. 81-2.
60. McGalloghly *op cit* p.2; S. Reader *An-t-ogiac* St. Patrick's Day Issue 1962.

61. S. Reader *ibid* St. Patrick's Day Issue 1962.
62. This episode is probably the most documented incident concerning Republican activities in Scotland during this period. S. Reader *op cit* Summer 1964. Easter 1965; Police Report Jan 1916 CO 904/99/11. Brendan MacGiolla Chaille (Ed) *Intelligence Notes* pp. 161-2, 225.
63. S. Reader *op cit* St. Patrick's Day Issue, 1962.
64. F. McCormick *op cit* p.8; Seamus Robinson *op cit* Appendix 4. Unpublished letter from K. Kincaid to Editor, *Sunday Tribune* 17/3/1954.
65. The activities of Margaret Skinnider are highlighted by a member of the ICA. Frank Robbins *Under the Starry Plough* pp. 96-7, 115-117.
66. McCormick *op cit* p.1; *Forward* 14 Oct 1916.
67. Seamus Robinson describes the lot of prisoners in Reading jail. Seamus Robinson *op cit* pp. 17, 65-66; Joseph Robinson and Seamus Reader were released between 23rd Jan 1916 and 6 Jan 1917. J. Kelly-? 6/1/1917 Art O'Brien MS 8443.
68. J. McCalloghy *op cit* p.18. It would appear that Reader did take part in the Easter Rising.
69. Seamus Robinson *op cit* p.18.
70. See p of thesis.
71. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Dec 1917; *Glasgow Herald* 4 & 6 Dec 1917; *Daily Record* 11 Dec 1917. One of those apprehended, Michael O'Carroll was subsequently to acquire the rank of Intelligence Officer in the Glasgow Brigade of the IRA.
72. *Glasgow Observer* 9 Feb 1918; *The Scotsman* 2 Feb 1918.
73. There were 8-10 year sentences passed against IRA men during the Anglo-Irish war, however, in each case these involved the discharge of a fire arm. it is unclear why Robinson received such a lengthy sentence.
74. J. McGalloghy *op cit* p.19.
75. *Glasgow Herald* 1 May 1918.
76. For details of this episode see *Glasgow Observer* 12 July, Sept 14 1918. *Daily Record* July 13 & 16; Sept 11 1918; *Glasgow Herald* July 15; Aug 10; Sept 10 1918.
77. J. McGalloghy *op cit* p.19.
78. *Glasgow Observer* Sept 14 1918.
79. For a biography of Vize see P. O'Farrell *op cit* p.153. It is difficult to ascertain what rank Vize held within the IRA in Scotland. If Eamonn Mooney is correct Vize was never officially the O/C. Despite this it seems clear that he was the de facto leader of the movement while he was in Scotland. It should be noted that although Vize was an IRB man his correspondence with Collins makes clear that his authority was not limited to that secret society but extended to the IRA. Eamonn Mooney-Seamus Robinson File S1745 Army Archives, Dublin. Vize-Collins 22/4/1919 Mulcahy Papers P7/A/11.
80. The correspondence between Vize and Collins is contained in the Mulcahy Papers P7/A/11. Usually only first names or initials were used when corresponding. However, in these footnotes I shall use full names when indicating the author of the particular letter. This correspondence lasts from February 1919 to July

1910. There are also a few references to events in Scotland to be found in the correspondence between Collins and his associates in England, especially those in Liverpool. This can also be found in the Mulcahy Papers. P7/A/2-10. Henceforth references to the Mulcahy papers will only give the number of the relevant file.

It is a matter of conjecture as to when the term IRA replaced IV in popular usage. Vize refers to the Irish Volunteers of the Irish Republican Army throughout much of his correspondence. I have replaced the term IV with IRA from the beginning of the Anglo-Irish war which is usually stated to have originated with the attack on Soloheadbeg on 21 Jan 1919.

81. Vize-Collins n.d. Date Stamped Read (by Collins) 5/2/1919 P7/A/11.
82. John Carney-? 12/4/1919 P7/A/11.
83. Vize-Collins 28/5/1919 P7/A/11.
84. Vize-Collins 28/5/1919 P7/A/11.
85. Collins-Vize 11/6/1919 P7/A/11. For similar sentiments regarding the reluctance of many within Sinn Fein to endorse IRA violence in the early part of the Anglo-Irish war see Dan Ereen *My fight for Irish Freedom* pp. 38-57; C. Townshend *The British Campaign in Ireland* pp. 16-17.
86. Vize-Collins 6/6/1919 P7/A/11.
87. Vize-Collins 27/9/1919 P7/A/11.
88. Vize-Collins 27/9/1919 P7/A/11.
89. Vize-Collins 24/10/1919; n.d. Received by Collins 20/1/1920 P7/A/11.
90. Vize-Collins 27/9/1919; 7/2/1920; 15/2/1920; 26/3/1920; Collins-Vize 1/10/1919; 14/2/1920. P7/A/11.
91. Vize-Collins 11/6/1920 P7/A/11.
92. This paragraph is based on the recollections of Eamonn Mooney. E. Mooney-Seamus Robinson 17/8/1951. I was given a photocopy of this document by Commandant Peter Young of the Irish Army Archives in 1987. Officially this department did not exist at the time. The relevant file would appear to be S1745. There is, however, no catalogue and anybody who wishes to get this document, and others given to me by Comdt. Young, will have to rely on good offices of whoever is in charge of the Dept. when they apply to see it.
93. *Daily Record* Sept 11 1920. J.E. Handley *The Irish in Modern Scotland* p.299; T. Gallagher 'Scotland, Britain and Conflict in Ireland', in Y. Alexander & A. O'Day (Ed) *Terrorism in Ireland* p.55.
94. Commandant Peter Young supplied me with a photocopy which stated that the following sections of the Cumann na mBan were active in 1920: Broxburn, Govan, Mothrwel, Clydebank, Hamilton, Edinburgh, Mossend, Glasgow B & G Cos, Townhead, Uddingston, Parkhead, Cambuslang and Wishaw. There was no identification number on the file.
95. Vize-Collins 24/10/1919; 7/2/1920; 15/2/1920; 26/3/1920. P7/A/11.
96. Collins-Vize 29/10/1919; 14/2/20. P7/A/11.
97. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Apr 1921.

98. *Glasgow Observer* 21 Jan 1922. E. Mooney-Seamus Robinson 17/8/1951. Army Archive File S1745.
99. Vize-Collins 19/6/1920 P7/A/11.
100. *Daily Record* 21 Mar 1921.
101. Comdt. Gen Dir of Int-Sean Golden 16 Dec (1922) Ernie O'Malley Papers P17a/182.
102. Vize-Collins 20/2/1920 P7/A/11.
103. Vize-Collins 20/2/1920 P7/A/11; *Glasgow Observer* 24 Dec 1921.
104. Vize-Collins 22/11/1919; 15/2/1920; 20/2/1920; 11/6/1920 P7/A/11.
105. Vize-Collins 3/10/1919; 16/11/1919; Collins-Vize 23/10/1919. P7/A/11.
106. J. Bowyer Bell *The IRA: The Secret Army* p.458.
107. D. Boulton *The UVF* p.102.
108. Vize-Collins 22/6/1919 P7/A/11.
109. See also *Glasgow Herald* 26 Dec 1920; *Daily Record* 30 Nov 1920.
110. Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 80, 11/11/1920, CP 2089, Cab 24/114.
111. Vize-Collins 6/6/1919; 5/9/1919; 16/11/1919; Collins-Vize 29/5/1919; 11/6/1919; 19/6/1919; 8/7/1919; 11/9/1919; 22/11/1919. P7/A/11.
112. Vize-Collins 5/6/1919 P7/A/11.
113. Vize-Collins 7/2/1920 P7/A/11.
114. Vize-Collins 26/3/1920; 15/5/1920 P7/A/11.
115. Vize-Collins 7/2/1920; Collins-Vize 14/2/1920. P7/A/11
116. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p224-5; J.E. Handley *op cit* p.297.
117. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p.231. Vize and Collins were aware that they faced competition in the arms market from both the ICA and individual IRA units acting independently. Neither were unduly concerned about this. Vize-Collins 5 & 6/9/1919; 16/11/1919; Collins-Vize 22/11/19. P7/A/11.
118. Collins-Vize 11/6/1919; 29/10/1919; 20/1/1920; 21/2/1920; 24/3/1920; 23/6/1920. P7/A/11.
119. For details of IRA activities in England See P7/A/1-10
120. This is the account for the £300 sent by Collins 29/10/1919. Vize sent an itemised account 26/3/1920. P7/A/11.
121. This is the account for the £500 sent by Collins 20/1/1920. Collins refers to this as "organisation money" and requested a separate account to be kept. It would appear that this was IRB rather than IRA money. Vize sent an itemised account 11/6/1920. P7/A/11.
122. Vize-Collins 6/6/1919; Collins-Vize 19/6/19. P7/A/11.
123. Collins-Vize 15/5/1919. P7/A/11.
124. Vize-Collins 10/5/1919 P7/A/11.
125. Vize-Collins 27/9/1919 P7/A/11.
126. Vize-Collins 7/2/1920 P7/A/11.
127. Collins-Vize Memo 14/2/1920; Vize-Collins 15/2/1920; Collins-Vize 3/3/1920. P7/A/11. There is information

- concerning the frequency, though not the quantity, of munitions moved from Glasgow to Liverpool in the Mulcahy Papers F7/A/2.
128. An IRA commander in Liverpool has written his autobiography. See Edward Brady *Ireland's Secret Service in England*. The activities of the IRA in the city are discussed in *An-t-ogiac* Autumn 1966.
129. Vize-Collins n.d. Stamped Received 7 Jul 1920. F7/A/11.
130. S. Fullerton-Military Secretary, Commander in Chief 15/11/22 File A 13942. Army Archives.
131. Vize-Collins 27/9/1919; Collins-Vize 1/10/1919. F7/A/11.
132. F. O'Connor *The Big Fellow* pp. 139-141; C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* pp. 224-31; No dates are given in these accounts. However, it would appear that Vize was recalled to Dublin in July although he was to return to Glasgow. Collins-Vize 10/7/1920 F7/A/11. Collins-N(eil) K(ern) (Liverpool) 20/9/1920 F7/A/2.
133. For details of the relationship between the IRB and the IRA and the personalities involved See F. O'Donoghue *No Other Law* pp. 186-195; F. O'Connor *op cit* pp. 139-141. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p.224.
134. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p.231.
135. F. O'connor *op cit* p.141.
136. *Daily Record* 12 April 1920.
137. Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 52, 29/4/1920, CP 1197, Cab 24/104.
138. *Daily Record* 3,7,9,10,13,15,30 Dec 1920.
139. Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 84, 9/12/1920 CP 2273, Cab 24/116. *Daily Record* 6 Dec 1920; *Glasgow Herald* 6 Dec 1920.
140. Coyle's trial, along with fifteen others, received extensive coverage in all sections of the Scottish daily press between 15-21 March 1921.
141. J.E. Handley *op cit* p.299.
142. E. Mooney-S.Robinson *op cit* S1745.
143. Memo to Glasgow 10/7/1920 F7/A/11.
144. *Daily Record* 20 Aug 1920.
145. This allegation is made in a "Test Talk" given by Lieut. S. Collins when taking the Infantry Officer's Course in the Army Archives. Unfortunately he does not give a source for this information. A photocopy of this document was given to me by Commdt. Peter Young.
146. Fullerton and Mooney at one held the position of O/C. Carroll was the battalion's Intelligence Officer. Cearney was not credited with any rank by Mooney but he was the captain of "C" (Govan) Company in 1919. At his trial it was alleged that he was a onetime O/C of the Scottish brigade. Mooney-Robinson *op cit*; Vize-Collins 12/5/1919 F7/A/11. *Glasgow Herald* 22 Aug & 20 Oct 1921. *Daily Record* 20 Aug 1921.
147. Andrew Fagan was the Quartermater. He was arrested in May 1921 but was released without being charged. However, on 30th November 1921 he was arrested and charged with aiding and abetting James Kearney (also

arrested) in smuggling detonators to Ireland. *Daily Record* 28 May 1921; Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 134, 8/12/1921, CP 3538, CAB 24/131. For an account of Fagan's activities see I. MacDougall (Ed) *Militant Miners* pp. 35-6, 172. Mooney states that a Kearney was the O/C of the Scottish Brigade. Unfortunately he does not provide a first name so they may not be the same person. Mooney-Robinson *op cit*.

148. N(eil) K(err)-Collins 18/10/1920 P7/A/2.

149. *Daily Record* 20 Aug-1920.

150. S. Fullerton-Military Secretary, Commander in Chief. 15/11/1922. File A13942. Army Archives.

151. S. O'Dubhagin (S. Duggan)-? File A13942 Army Archives. The Bernard McCabe referred to is probably the one who was tried alongside Coyle. See *Glasgow Herald* 15 Mar 1921. See also Collins-? 9/4/1922 DE 2/435, State Paper Office Dublin.

152. J.N. Docherty-J.H. MacDonnell 30/12/1921 Art O'Brien Papers Ms 8442. S. Duggan-A. O'Brien 21/5/1921; 11/6/1922; A.O'Brien-S.Duggan 30/5/1922; 17/6/1922 Art O'Brien MS 8444.

153. *Glasgow Observer* 19 Feb 1921. Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 110, 16/5/1921 CP 3055. CAB 24/125.

154. ROH/NG-? 26/10/1922 File A13942 Army Archives.

155. F. O'Connor *op cit* p.119; E. Brady *op cit* p.24.

156. F. O'Connor *ibid* p.128; E. Brady *ibid* p.26 & 38; D. McCardle *The Irish Republic* pp.370-1.

157. E. Brady *ibid* pp.12 & 64.

158. D. McCardle *op cit* pp.370-1.

159. Vize-Collins 11/6/1920 P7/A/11; J.E. Handley *op cit* pp. 298-9.

160. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p.232.

161. C. Desmond Greaves *ibid* p.232; Statement of Military Activities of Frank Carty late O/C 4th Brigade 3rd Western Division, Frank Carty-J.J. O'Donnell. 2/5/1935 I was given a photocopy of this document by Commdt. Peter Young Army Archives. *Glasgow Herald* 5/5/1921 for an account of the raid. The trial of the suspects took place in August and September 1921. P. O'Farrell *op cit* p.25.

162. The event occurred on 28th Oct 1920. The trial took place 8-9th Feb 1921. *Glasgow Herald* 9 Feb 1921.

163. Vize-Collins 5/9/1919; J.E. Handley *op cit* p299; *Daily Record* 8 Sept; 8 & 15 Oct 1920; 5 May 1921.

164. Peter Beresford Ellis *A History of the Irish Working Class* p.256.

165. For an obituary of Kennedy see *Poblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish Edition) 21 Oct 1922.

166. F. O'Donoghue *op cit* pp. 219 & 334.

167. C. Townshend *op cit* p.179.

168. J.E. Handley *op cit* pp. 298-9; R.J. Ross 'Scotland and the Easter Rising', *Radical Scotland*, 21, Jun/July 1986, p.26.

169. Frank Robbins *op cit* p.206.

170. F. O'Donoghue *op cit* p.42.

171. Tom Barry *Guerilla Days in Ireland* pp. 9, 62, 207.
172. Ernie O'Malley *The Singing Flame* p.24. For comments on IRA arms supplies from outside Ireland, and their relative unimportance to the struggle see C. Townshend *op cit* pp. 61-2 & 214; J. Bowyer Bell *op cit* p.24.

Chapter 5

The Irish Civil War: Apathy and Revulsion

On 6th December 1921 the evening papers heralded an agreement between British and Irish delegations, which it was hoped would settle the constitutional position of Ireland and usher in an era of peace between the two antagonistic nations. From the outset it was clear that the proposals contained in the "Articles of Agreement for a Treaty between Great Britain and Ireland" fell far short of the traditional aspirations of Irish Republicanism. The proposed Treaty reaffirmed the partition of Ireland, the British military presence throughout the island and the position of Ireland with the British Empire.

Although many commentators had identified the future constitutional position of Ulster as being the rock on which the negotiations would flounder, in actual fact, this was by no means the prime consideration of either of the rival delegations. The question was 'solved' by a typical piece of Lloyd George chicanery. It was proposed that, initially, a Parliament would be set up in Dublin which, if the northern Government agreed, would have jurisdiction over the whole of the island. If, as was almost certain, the Stormont regime exercised its right not to join the new body then a Boundary Commission, composed of a neutral chairman and representatives of the Dublin, Belfast and London Governments, would be set up. This would be charged with the responsibility of redrawing the Irish border in accordance with the wishes of the local people. Many on the Irish side concluded that this

arrangement would result in the transfer of Tyrone, Fermanagh, and parts of Armagh, Down and Londonderry from the North to the South. This would effectively ensure the destruction of the northern state as a viable entity. With those thoughts in their minds the Irish delegation moved on to other subjects. In private, however, Lloyd George was reassuring the Ulster Unionists that once partition was established the frontiers created would harden into permanent structures.

The British military presence would be maintained in the shape of the British Navy, which had the right to keep bases in certain designated ports, usually known as the Treaty ports, in which, during time of war, they would be allowed certain rights of access. Ireland would also inherit a part of the U.K. national debt; calculated in proportion to her population. The most contentious aspect of the negotiations centred upon Ireland's future links with the British Crown and Empire. It was finally agreed that Ireland would be accorded the same constitutional status as that enjoyed by the 'white' dominions of Australia, Canada, South Africa and New Zealand. A Governor General, to be called the "Representative of the Crown in Ireland", would be appointed to safeguard British interests as defined by the Treaty. Most controversially, members of the proposed new Irish legislature were to swear an oath pledging those elected to "be faithful to H.M. King George V, his heirs and

successors by law, in virtue of the common citizenship of Ireland with Great Britain and her adherence to and membership of the group of nations forming the British Commonwealth of Nations".¹

On the day the Treaty was signed Collins penned his thoughts to a friend:

Think-what have I got for Ireland? Something which she has wanted these past seven hundred years. Will anyone be satisfied at the bargain? I tell you this- early this morning I signed my death warrent. I thought at the time how odd, how ridiculous-a bullet may just as well have done the job five years ago.²

The divisions that were ultimately to lead to civil war and the death of Collins had been apparent within the Irish negotiating delegation. Their decision to accept the Treaty was carried by the most slender margins, three votes to two, and this narrow margin of the victory was replicated when the Irish cabinet voted by four votes to three to accept the proposals outlined in the document. Those, who urged acceptance of the Treaty, did not believe that it was perfect but rather that it represented the best deal that to be secured at the time. Collins regarded the Treaty as a first step rather than a final settlement; it did not give Ireland total freedom but it did give her the freedom to achieve freedom.³ The pro-treatyites realised that they had not won the Anglo-Irish war and thus could not insist on a British declaration of unconditional surrender. To those who thought that the IRA had defeated the might of a world

power Richard Mulcahy pointed out that they had' been unable to expel the British from any part of Ireland but only some "fairly good sized police barracks".⁴

The man most associated in the public mind with the anti-treaty forces was Eamonn De Valera. Ironically, he was no doctrinaire republican. In his so called 'Document No. 2' he accepted the provisions of the Treaty in so far as they related to Northern Ireland, did not mention the word 'Republic', preferring to use the term "Sovereign Irish Nation", associated Ireland "for the purpose of common concern" with the British Commonwealth, and acknowledged "for the purposes of the Association...his Britannic Majesty as head of the Association."⁵ De Valera's attempt to secure a compromise was destined to fail. The British had already rejected this form of words as had the anti-treatyites. Unable to unite the two parts of the Republican movement De Valera threw his weight behind those, who were opposed to the treaty.

The provisions of the Treaty were exhaustively discussed by Dail Eireann during late December 1921 and early January 1922. As was the case during the negotiations the question of Ireland's future relationship with the British Crown and Empire eclipsed partition as the major focus of the debate. Those in favour of the Treaty such as Griffith and Collins articulated the practical benefits conferred by the settlement. Opponents argued that as Ireland had voted to establish a republic in 1918

then this was the only acceptable solution. While points of principle guided many of those in the Dail some of those present allowed their judgement to be coloured by other factors. Cathal Brugha, in particular, allowed his dislike of Collins to dominate his contribution to the debate. Others supported the Treaty only because Collins endorsed it. In the event, the pro Treatyites triumphed by 64 votes to 57. This victory was confirmed, albeit by a lesser margin, when Griffith defeated De Valera in the election for the post of President.⁶

During the six month period between the commencement of the truce between the opposing forces in Ireland and the publication of the proposed Treaty the *Glasgow Observer* stridently articulated the demand for the establishment of an Irish Republic as being only basis for a just settlement between the two nations. Ireland had voted for an independent united Irish Republic and this is what she should get. The *Glasgow Observer* outlined what it saw as the two positions of the respection groups:

The English position is as if England should say to Ireland-"You want Home Rule, very good. We shall give you Home rule-of a kind we think best fitted for our interests and military security. if you do not accept that, we shall impose it on you by force, or failing that we shall dispense with all parliamentary formality in Ireland and govern Ireland from the drum-head."

The Irish attitude, on the other hand, is that Ireland is a nation and is therefore entitled to frame and form her own Government in her own way. She declines to accept any dictation or dispensation from England in the matter, and in effect replies to England by saying-"Being an ancient, integral and independent nation, we are

going to form our own Government in our own way."7

Although the *Glasgow Observer* consistently articulated the traditional demands of Irish Republicanism its proprietor made clear that the paper would accept whatever settlement the Irish Government and people would accept. Diamond outlined his position:

If Ireland wants a Republic and says so clearly, we are prepared to stand or fall with it, if need be.

If Ireland accepts the status of a dominion in a British Empire, we shall abide by the decision of the Irish people.

For ourselves, we are Republicans in principle.

But it is not our business to dictate to Ireland.8

From the moment the the terms of the proposed Treaty became known pragmatism rather than principle was the dominant force in the editorials and articles published by the *Glasgow Observer*. In his initial response Diamond adopted an forward looking stance commenting that it was now up to the Irish Government and people to create "a new and great Ireland-sober, progressive, patient, resolved." Whereas, previously, the paper had viciously attacked partition and demanded that what the British Government had created it should dismantle now Diamond was prepared to wait for the "natural" demise of the nothern state:"It is now for Ireland's rulers and people to bring in the recalcitrant North Eastern minority. not be force but by moral suasion."9 The generosity of the Irish people and future Government would be the only

weapon used to secure Irish unity. By showing the Unionists that their fears were unjustified the Irish Government could win the hearts and minds of the Unionist people and unity would be achieved by consent.

Throughout the period between the unveiling of the Treaty and the vital votes -in the Dail *Glasgow Observer* editorials backed up the pro-treaty view. Although the paper had articulated the traditional Irish republican demands during the period when the British and Irish delegations were at the negotiating table it would appear that the editor viewed these demands as bargaining chips rather than cardinal points of principle. It was stated that terms achieved by the Irish delegation were better than the editor initially thought that they would be able to achieve. He considered that the very act of accepting the offer of a truce implied a willingness to barter and by extension accept a settlement, which did not fully meet the war aims of the IRA.¹⁰ However, the primary argument advanced by the paper as to why the Dail should endorse the terms of the Treaty was based on the perceived sovereignty of the Irish people in deciding their fate. In response to those, who argued that as Ireland had voted for a united Republic and, therefore, should accept nothing less, the *Glasgow Observer* contended that if the mood of the Irish people had changed their opinions between 1918 and 1922 then the politicians had to take account of this fact. Thus, once the Dail had accepted the provisions of the Treaty, any

attempt to thwart its implementation would represent a usurpation of power by a minority. If the anti-Treaty elements attempted to force their opinions on a reluctant majority then they would be acting akin to the British beforehand when they governed Ireland without the consent of the people:

It is one thing to argue that alien government in Ireland has no title to the obedience or allegiance of the Irish people-and to act accordingly. It is quite another thing to argue that the minority in a popularly and properly elected Irish legislature has the same title to refuse obedience to a Government representing the majority of the Irish people...

It would appear that obedience to the Provisional Government in Ireland which is at once *de jure* and *de facto* is something which all patriotic Irishmen should unhesitatingly yield.¹¹

The *Glasgow Observer* claimed that the stance of the Irish people, or at that point in time their elected representatives, was the major factor in determining its attitude to the Treaty. However, it is possible that the paper's desire to see the pro-Treaty forces triumph in Ireland was accentuated by domestic considerations. If the Irish question was finally settled then the barriers to the political integration of the immigrant community would be irrevocably breached. Instead of devoting their energies to external Irish causes the immigrants would be free to pursue goals that would improve their social and economic well being in their adopted land.¹² It is noticeable that, when a new pro-Republican organisation was formed in Great Britain during the civil war, Charles

Diamond chose to attack it not only on the grounds that the majority of the Irish people rejected the philosophy of the respective body but also that it threatened the future welfare of Irish immigrants in Britain: "Irish agitation in Great Britain is not only needless-it is worse than needless. -It will divert the attention of citizens of the country who are of Irish blood or sympathies from their own needs-social, economic, political or moral-and keep them in the old groove as strangers and pariahs. This would be a disaster."¹³

After the Dail had endorsed the Treaty the *Glasgow Observer* switched its attention to other topics, most noticeably the position of IRA prisoners in Scottish jails and events in Northern Ireland. In the case of the former, Diamond argued that, unlike their comrades in Ireland they had committed their crimes in a land where they did not enjoy the support of the community at large, therefore they could not be expected to be released as of right. Their release would obviously help future relations between the United Kingdom and the emergent Irish Free State, but the Irish could only ask for this as a favour and not demand it.¹⁴ In the event the prisoners were released. Once this occurred the *Glasgow Observer* stressed the role of the Irish Provisional Government in securing their release.¹⁵ This was done, presumably, with the intention of promoting the image of the Free State amongst the immigrant community in

general and those, who had been members of the IRA in Scotland in particular.

In Northern Ireland the violence, which had erupted in the summer of 1920 continued unabated throughout this period. In Belfast a de facto civil war was taking place. In the months of February and March 1922 103 people, the majority Catholics, were killed. The IRA launched a series of cross border raids; at one point British artillery had to be used to repel the invaders. In an attempt to end this cycle of violence a series of meetings were held between representatives of the three Governments. At inter governmental level an agreement was reached. The Craig-Collins Pact pledged both Governments to take steps to end the violence, which stemmed from their respective sectors. In addition, it was proposed that a police force composed equally of Catholics and Protestants would be created to patrol in mixed areas. Furthermore, the two leaders expressed the hope that it would be possible to work out an internal settlement on the border thereby obviating the need to refer the issue to the proposed Border Commission. Whatever the hopes and intentions of the two leaders the conflict had acquired a momentum of its own. Sectarian violence continued in Belfast while border units of the IRA stepped up the frequency and intensity of their incursions into Northern Ireland. Consequently, relations between the two Governments degenerated into a series of public recriminations, which were no more than exchanges of

abuse. When Collins and De Valera announced that the pro and anti Treaty elements within Sinn Fein would not fight each other in the 1922 Free State election Craig responded by stating that his Government would "not have any Boundary Commission under any circumstances whatever." Thus, traditional suspicions and attitudes prevailed at the highest levels of society and the violence continued unabated.

Not surprisingly the *Glasgow Observer* highlighted the plight of the Catholics in Belfast and condemned the Unionist Government's security policy as being antagonistic towards the minority community. The paper was especially critical of the decision to appoint Sir Henry Wilson, an arch unionist who had played a significant role in Ulster's resistance to Home Rule between 1912-14, as the military advisor to the Belfast government.¹⁶ Although the *Glasgow Observer* was prepared to concede, on occasion, that the Government had not sponsored attacks on the nationalist areas of Belfast and that the loyalist mobs were acting on their own volition, the paper, for the most part, sought to give the impression that the Government condoned the violence. According to the *Glasgow Observer* if a 'Special' was caught in the act of killing a Catholic and then sentenced to death the violence in the city would come to a halt.¹⁷ According to the paper the Northern Ireland Government tolerated, if not initiated, these attacks in

the hope that the killing of Catholics would provoke a military response from the Free State forces. This would then allow the British Government to restart the Anglo-Irish war on the pretext of defending Ulster from a Free State invasion: the Treaty would then be destroyed.¹⁶ In its zeal to pillory the unionist cause in Ulster some of the paper's correspondents showed excessive enthusiasm. When discussing the somewhat uncomfortable fact that many Protestants had been murdered in Belfast it was ingeniously claimed that these murders were not the result of IRA actions, but rather the work of Protestant extremists wishing to provide themselves with a reason for launching retaliatory attacks on Catholics.¹⁷

Although the *Glasgow Observer* used the violence in the North to criticise the Ulster Unionists and partition, the paper also used the events in Belfast to attack the anti-treaty forces in the South. It argued that had the unionists in Belfast not observed the split that had developed in Republican ranks over the Treaty they would not have felt confident enough to attack the nationalist population in Belfast.²⁰ Moreover, alleged the paper, cross border raids by anti-Treaty forces had given Craig the opportunity to claim that the violence in Belfast had been provoked by external factors.²¹ The *Glasgow Observer* equated the intentions of the anti-treaty forces with that of the Ulster unionists. The paper claimed that the aim of those involved in launching cross border incursions was to provoke a civil war in the North and

force the British to intervene and thus restart the Anglo-Irish war. Consequently, the Treaty would become invalid and the Republicans would have subverted the will of the Dail and the Irish people.²² In actual fact, the IRA in Northern Ireland was receiving aid from both pro and anti-treaty elements in the South and there was no plot by the anti-treaty forces to restart the Anglo-Irish war as imagined by the paper.

One of the effects of the violence in the North was to put pressure on the rival factions within the Free State to settle their differences. The initial signs were not promising as one crisis rapidly followed another. In late February and early March 1922 pro and anti Treaty elements within the IRA sought to take over the military barracks in Limerick. In March the anti-Treaty faction of the IRA organised itself into a separate national organisation and, in the following month, set up its headquarters in the Four Courts, Dublin. This development led to calls from both the Ulster Unionists and the British Government urging the Free State Government to take military action against the dissident elements. However, the desire to avoid a conflict with former colleagues in arms, the exposed position of the Northern Catholics, and the view expressed by the Chief of Staff during the Limerick crisis, in which he doubted the ability of the Free State forces to win a military contest led Collins to seek an electoral pact with De

Valera to contest the forthcoming elections.²³

The agreement to resuscitate the old Sinn Fein party stipulated that its candidates would be selected so as to reflect the relative strengths of the pro and anti Treaty forces in the Dail. It appeared as if the Irish electorate was to be denied the opportunity to pass its verdict on the Treaty and that the situation in Ireland would remain tense and unresolved. Although the *Glasgow Observer* was highly critical of the military activities of the anti-treatyites the paper expressed relief when the electoral pact was announced. Though it considered that Collins may have erred on the side of generosity in agreeing to the pact, the *Glasgow Observer* was confident that the pro-treaty forces would win any election fought on the constitutional question. The paper contended that it was better to give "a little too much" than risk plunging the country into a state of civil war. The editor believed that Collins, by effectively bringing De Valera into the national Government, had moved to neutralise the latter's anti-treaty views.²⁴

Although there was no direct electoral clash between the pro and anti-Treaty factions within Sinn Fein the presence of pro-treaty independents enabled the Irish electorate to express their views on this issue. In the event, of the 128 seats available, the anti-treaty Sinn Fein candidates were returned in only 38 cases. Pro-treaty Sinn Fein candidates won 58 seats, Labour 17,

Independents won seven, a total matched by the Farmers Party, while four Unionists were returned for the constituency of Dublin University. Of the 620,283 votes cast, pro-Treaty Sinn Fein panel candidates won 239,193, anti-treaty panel candidates were endorsed by 133,864 votes while the Independents polled 247,226 votes, the largest of the three groups.²⁵ Thus, the electorate had decisively endorsed the Treaty. Not surprisingly the *Glasgow Observer* enthusiastically endorsed the views of the Irish people, not only because the electorate had endorsed the Treaty, but also because of the promising performance of the Labour Party in the contest. Although delighted by the verdict of the people the paper was magnanimous in victory. It regretted the defeat "of the Republican candidates of outstanding eminence such as Madame Markievicz, Mrs Clarke and Liam Mellows and above all Mrs Pearse."²⁶ The events of the following week were to ensure that such generosity to ones opponent's in Irish politics was a rarity in subsequent generations.

On 22nd June 1922 Field Marshall Sir Henry Wilson was murdered in London by two members of the IRA. While historians have put forward a number of conflicting theories as to who actually ordered the killing contemporary British opinion was in no doubt that, despite denials from this source, anti-treaty Republicans were responsible. The Irish Provisional Governmnet initially resisted British pressure to take military action against the anti-treaty forces then occupying the

Four Courts building in Dublin. However, when the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army was kidnapped by Republican forces the Government felt obliged to respond. On the morning of the 28th pro-Treaty forces attacked the Four Courts. Within two days they had secured this objective. Defeated in Dublin the republicans consolidated their position in the south of the country. At the outset of the civil war the anti-treaty forces were numerically stronger than their opponents. However, the Free State forces controlled the apparatus of the state, which enabled them to build up their military capabilities and they also enjoyed the support of the bulk of the Irish people. These factors were to prove decisive. By the end of August all the major towns and cities were controlled by the Free State, this forced the republicans to resort to guerilla war tactics. While such methods proved relatively successful during the Anglo-Irish war, the fact that the insurgents no longer retained the support of the mass of the people meant that the republicans could not merge in with the surrounding population as had been the case in the previous conflict. Although the anti-Treaty forces continued to fight until May 1923 their defeat appeared inevitable many months before the reality of the situation was acknowledged by the republican leadership.

From the outset of the civil war the *Glasgow Observer* strongly endorsed the actions of the Free State regime.

Throughout the conflict a variety of themes recurred in the paper's editorial column. Primarily the *Glasgow Observer* sought to stress the legitimacy of the Free State cause. Sovereignty lay not in abstract ideals, but with the Irish people. As the electorate had endorsed the provisions of the Treaty, argued the paper, the anti-treaty forces, by taking up arms against the state, were acting in a similar manner to the British in the period before 1921, attempting to impose their will on a hostile population. While those on the anti-treaty side might contend that they were fighting to attain the principles which the IRA had fought for between 1919-21. Charles Diamond stated that, whereas in the conflict against the British, these principles were endorsed by the majority of the Irish people this was not the case during the civil war. Thus, the Free State forces, according to this view, were the true inheritors of the Irish Revolution.²⁷

Many *Glasgow Observer* editorials highlighted the alleged futility of the anti-Treaty cause. For the Republicans to achieve their war aims they had not only to defeat the Free State forces, but then restart and win the Anglo-Irish war. The *Glasgow Observer* argued that even avowed Republicans had implicitly admitted that they could not inflict a military defeat on the British when they endorsed the decision to open negotiations with the British in the summer of 1921 without first setting the precondition that they recognise the establishment of an Irish Republic before negotiations commenced.²⁸ If there

was a resumption of this conflict the paper was in no doubt that this time, unlike during the 1919-21 period, the British would use the full scale of its military power against those, who sought to establish an Irish Republic by force of arms.²⁹ If the IRA, between 1919-21, had been unable to win the Anglo-Irish war when the British had not used every means at their disposal, how could the anti-Treaty forces hope to achieve their goals if the enemy was prepared to fight a total war?

In the aftermath of the Easter Rising, which initially the *Glasgow Observer* condemned, the paper was at pains to stress that the insurgents were unrepresentative of Irish nationalist society as a whole. This tactic was used against the anti-Treaty forces. Editorials highlighted the fact that Erskine Childers was an Englishman, while they described De Valera as a "hybrid Spaniard of alleged Jewish extraction."³⁰ Subsequently, the paper concentrated on 'exposing' the alleged communist and athiest sympathies of some of the Republicans. It attributed the conversion of the widow of the late Terence MacSwiney from Catholicism to agnosticism to excessive patriotism; in worshipping her country she had neglected to worship God.³¹ The paper stated of the Republicans in general:

Love of country is indeed next to love of God, but it must be in harmony with god's laws. This is where the zealots of the Irish movement like the religious revolutionists of the 16th century, have fallen into terrible and destroying heresy.

They have made an idol of 'patriotism' and offer to it daily bloody sacrifices, as even few savage tribes who never heard of God.³²

Not content with calling the Republicans Bolsheviks and comparing them with early Protestant reformers, possibly the ultimate insult, the paper went one step further and claimed that criminality rather than political philosophy was the prime motivation of the rebels: "nine tenths of those 'at war with the Free State' are just out for loot and a good time."³³

Although it was probably true that most of those on the left of the pre-Treaty Republican movement opposed the Treaty there can be no doubt that the bulk of those, who took this standpoint were devout Catholics; De Valera being a prime example.³⁴ There is some evidence, which supports the paper's contention that many within the anti-treaty forces were no better than common criminals. For example, many of the guns, which were used in the first post civil war crime wave had previously been in the hands of the Republicans.³⁵ However, it could be argued that subsequent criminal activity on the part of those, who opposed the Treaty can be explained by the situation in which they found themselves after the end of the conflict. On the margins of society facing discrimination in the job market possibly the only way to survive, other than emigrate, was to steal. One doubts if the *Glasgow Observer*, in attacking the calibre of the men of the Republican forces, was indulging in anything more sophisticated than directing general abuse at their

political opponents. After all when many of these men were fighting the British the paper had not been slow to praise them as men who were inspired, not by thoughts of self advancement, but by the most noble of motives. That the paper now viewed these men as terrorists rather than freedom fighters was purely due to the fact that they were no longer fighting for a cause which it endorsed. In essence, the *Glasgow Observer* was displaying the traits of the British establishment attacked by Diamond in his article "Killing, no murder."

While critical of the Republicans the *Glasgow Observer* would brook no criticism about the prevailing state of affairs in Ireland from British, or Ulster Unionist sources. On many occasions the paper argued that the root cause of the conflict was British rule in Ireland. Had Britain acceded to the demands of John Redmond between 1912-14 an era of peace between the two nations would have ensued. However, Britain decide not to implement Home Rule. Thus, it was the British who bore the the ultimate responsibility for the Irish civil war.³⁶

Throughout the civil war the *Glasgow Observer* was in no doubt that the forces of the Free State would prevail. Possibly the darkest hour for the fledging State came in August 1922 when, a week after Arthur Griffith had died from natural causes, Michael Collins was killed in an ambush. In a black edged editorial the paper accorded Collins the status of a martyr. His personal qualities

were highlighted:

He was a born fighter, a great soldier, a skilful tactician, and a magnetic leader, a man of quick mental mobility, of endless resource, of rapid decision, of unhesitant action, and, above all, of resolute and unfaltering purpose. these gifts he gave unsparingly to the service of his country, and they achieved great things. To Michael Collins more than any other man is the credit due of defeating the last effort which Britain made to encompass the subjugation of Ireland by force and violence.³⁷

While the Republicans could kill the man they would not kill his achievement:

Irish leaders and Irish heroes may fall, and may still have to fall, at the hands of fratricidal executioners, but the national spirit of Ireland will not quail or flicker in the face of such dastardly blows.

The murder of Collins cannot murder the Irish nation, and their murder of Collins will simply have the effect of steeling to firmer and more indomitable purpose his comrades who remain to realise and establish the liberty of the country and bring it to the blessings of native government and national peace.³⁸

In many respects the *GLasgow Observer* portrayed Collins' death as a 'blood sacrifice' in the tradition of those who died in the Easter Rising of 1916.

The Irish civil war was notable for the number of high ranking leaders, on both sides, who did not survive the conflict. The most controversial aspect of the war was the measures taken by the Free State against its Republican captives. The Government granted itself exceptional powers including the right to try before a military court, and if necessary execute persons found in unauthorised possession of arms, irrespective of whether

these arms had been used against the Free state forces. One of the first to die as a result of this law was Erskine Childers. While the *Glasgow Observer* regretted his death it considered that he had brought his fate upon himself:

Quite certainly the majority of Irishmen have no desire to see any unnecessary blood spilt and while strongly supporting the Treaty and the Provisional Government, would be glad if some way could be found to avoid executing such combatants as Erskine Childers. At the same time, if that should be impossible there can be no manner of doubt that Childers has only himself to thank for the plight in he has landed. We should all like to see an end of shooting in Ireland, but it is really up to Messieurs the Irregulars to begin its abolition.³⁹

The editor had frequently used the last sentence in the above quote against the British during the Anglo-Irish war.⁴⁰

The Free State was to expand the scope of its execution policy a month after Childers had been killed. On 7th December 1922 the anti-treaty forces killed Sean Hales, a deputy in the Dail. In retaliation the Government subsequently executed four republican prisoners. In the next few months 77 prisoners were executed by the State in reprisal for 'outrages' (such as murder, attempted murder and arson) committed by the Republican forces. The *Glasgow Observer* was a silent witness to this aspect of the war. Previously, Diamond had stated that "to kill prisoners in a war is murder. No national sanctions. no order of a general can make it anything else."⁴¹

Evidently, Diamond would not condemn 'murder' if it was committed in the name of a cause he endorsed; "Killing, no murder?" In military terms the Free State's execution policy was an unqualified success and gives the lie to the frequent assertion that such a policy automatically creates martyrs and aids the cause against which it is aimed. The bulk of the Irish people supported the Free State and were prepared to tolerate any action, which would ensure its survival and ultimate triumph.

In March 1923, shortly before the close of the civil war, the British authorities arrested almost 100 alleged Republican activists, of which 38 were captured in Scotland. Those arrested were subsequently deported to the Free State. The *Glasgow Observer* fully supported the actions taken by the British and Free State Governments against the Republicans, though it was more concerned about the welfare of these 'British' prisoners than their Irish counterparts:

In many cases (but by no means all) there can be little doubt that many of those arrested firmly believed themselves, however wrongly, to be sincerely patriotic in sentiment, attitude and action. For that reason those of their fellow countrymen who -with us- differed from them and considered it a duty to support the Irish Free State will cherish the hope that no unnecessarily drastic punishment may overtake their misguided compatriots who so long as they are interned in Ireland will find themselves placed beyond possibility of any illegal activities.⁴²

Was this generous tone due to the realisation that the Free State would win the civil war or made out of a fear that if the Free State did execute any of these prisoners

there would be an outcry in Britain? Many in Britain, primarily those in the labour movement, were to question the legality of these deportations. In Scotland Jimmy Maxton described the Free State Government as an 'enemy Government' while his fellow Clydeside M.P., Roslyn Mitchell, was to act as the deportees' legal advisor. This led the *Glasgow Observer* to direct a rare barrage of criticism at those elements within the Labour Party, though this did not threaten the emerging Labour-Irish 'alliance' in Scotland.⁴³ In the event, those who disputed the legal basis of the deportations were proved correct as the House of Lords found in favour of the deportees when the issue came before them. The deportees were awarded large amounts of compensation; £17,000 was awarded to the Scottish defendants.⁴⁴ However, in order to gain this favourable verdict, the deportees had to establish that they were British rather than Irish citizens and thus could not be deported. The *Glasgow Observer* could, therefore, enjoy the spectacle of supposed 'Irish super patriots' claiming to be British in order to save their own hides.⁴⁵

As it became increasingly evident to all, but the most fanatical Republican, that the Free State would win the civil war the *Glasgow Observer* started to discuss what terms the victors should impose on the vanquished. The paper urged the Free State to display magnanimity in its hour of triumph:

If the efforts for peace by negotiation mean that its (the republican forces) leaders just wish to save their faces and their dignity by a show of securing something to obviate the appearance of unconditional surrender, then the Free State might act wisely in putting the soft pedal on the unrelaxed and vigorous assertion of logic and right.⁴⁶

The only condition that the paper was adamant that should be enforced was that the rebels be made to hand over their weapons.⁴⁷ The Free State Government was of a like mind on this issue but, in the event, the Republican forces refused to accede to this demand and the negotiations broke down. There was to be no agreed settlement between the protagonists. The hostilities ended on 24th May 1923 when the O/C of the military wing of the anti-Treaty forces declared a unilateral ceasefire and ordered his men to "dump arms". De Valera then issued a political message to the "Legion of the Rearguard" in which he admitted that the republic could no longer be established by force of arms. He went on to state that by their efforts and sacrifices the men of the republican forces had "saved the nations' honour." The *Glasgow Observer* failed to comment on the end of hostilities but, during the following months, it was to allege, on many occasions, that the anti-Treaty forces were intent in recovering the hidden weapons and restarting the civil war.⁴⁸ While many would in the future take up the gun in order to achieve the proclaimed aims of the anti-Treaty forces, the conflict would take place in Northern Ireland rather than in the Free State.

During the civil war period, as had been the case in the Anglo-Irish war, the *Glasgow Observer* was essentially a propaganda sheet rather than a genuine newspaper. It was unquestioning in its adherence to the Free State cause. The question arises whether it reflected the feelings of the wider Irish immigrant community in Scotland during this conflict.

The debate that occurred in Ireland in the aftermath of the unveiling of the proposed Treaty was mirrored within both the Sinn Fein organisation and the wider immigrant community in Scotland. Indeed, the respective protagonists in Ireland sent their representatives to tour Scotland and espouse the rival philosophies. It would appear, however, that the bulk of the immigrant community remained indifferent to the views expressed by both sides. The pre-Treaty Sinn Fein organisation collapsed as a result of the conflicting pressures that it was exposed to in the early months of 1922 and the rival pro and anti-Treaty organisations, that emerged out of its ashes, failed to attract even a sizeable proportion of those who had previously been active within the pre-Treaty republican movement in Scotland. The most successful Irish political organisation, in this period, was concerned not with the events in the Free State but with alleviating the plight of Catholics in Belfast. Indeed, it could be argued, that the civil war provoked such a feeling of revulsion amongst the immigrant

community that it acted as a catalyst, which helped integrate that community into the mainstream of Scottish political and social life.

Unfortunately there is little evidence available to the historian concerning the developments that took place within the Sinn Fein organisation in Scotland in the period after the signing of the Anglo Irish Treaty of 7th December 1921. By the time the Treaty was signed it is likely that its membership had declined from its peak. Certainly this process occurred in similar organisations in America and England; presumably, this happened because many members thought that Ireland would gain its independence at the negotiating table and, consequently, believing the fight largely won their interest waned.⁴⁹ Within the Scottish Executive of Sinn Fein there appears to have been an anti-Treaty majority but the fact that the organisation seems to have been dissolved by the latter part of 1922 and a totally new Republican organisation had to be created from nothing suggests that either the bulk of the original Sinn Fein movement supported the Free State or that they were strong enough to block the 'capture' of the movement by anti-Treaty activists.⁵⁰ In England the National Executive and the Standing Committee of the Irish Self Determination League opposed the Treaty and despite allegations that the bulk of the ISDL's membership did not share these views, the anti-Treaty forces managed to retain control of the organisation. It would appear that, whereas in England

the pro Free State elements simply left an organisation with which they no longer supported, similar elements in Scotland stayed long enough to ensure that anti Treaty elements could not remain in control of the original body.

The first signs that a new anti-Treaty organisation was beginning to evolve in the immigrant centres in Scotland came as early as April 1922 when the O'Donovan Rossa Republican club was founded. According to the *Glasgow Observer* the founders of the club had embarked upon this course because they had found themselves to be in the minority within an existing Sinn Fein club.⁵¹ However, other sources suggest that this was an attempt by Joseph Robinson, a noted physical force activist recently released from prison, to force a split within the existing Sinn Fein movement and ensure that he would be in a position to control any emergent Republican organisation.⁵² Certainly, subsequent events lend credence to this theory.⁵³ Other individual Republican clubs came into existence in later months but, they acted as independent units until November when they combined to form the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban.⁵⁴

The records available show that the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban expanded slowly. In December 1922 there were 26 affiliated clubs, there were 30 the following month and by May the total had risen to 34.⁵⁵ While a numerical comparison based on the number of affiliated

clubs with the pre Treaty Sinn Fein movement in Scotland, 66 to 34, is not unflattering to the Republican organisation it is likely that the latter's membership was only a fraction of that which the pre-Treaty Sinn Fein could command. According to one source the average numerical strength of each republican club in May 1923 was only fifty, thereby giving a national total of c1700.⁵⁶ Whether this was the maximum strength achieved by the movement is unclear. While the number of affiliated clubs peaked in this month this hides the fact that the number of active clubs in Glasgow fell from 13 in January to 9 in May: this decline was offset by gains in the East.⁵⁷ That the number of clubs in the East expanded at a time when it was becoming increasingly apparent that the Free State forces would emerge triumphant illustrates the time lag that existed from converting diffuse support into an organizational structure. Possibly, while the movement was expanding in the East, it was experiencing a dramatic fall off in support in the West of the country as a result of the military reverses suffered by the anti-Treaty forces after the turn of the year. Nevertheless, it would appear that the Cumann Foblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban easily eclipsed its Free State rival in attracting support. Formed in December 1922 the Irish Exile's League of Great Britain does not seem to have expanded beyond the Airdrie-Coatbridge area.⁵⁸

It would appear that of those high ranking pre Treaty Sinn Fein and IRA officials in Scotland, who remained active, the majority backed the anti-treaty cause. Of the five men who composed the Sinn Fein Executive when the Anglo-Irish war ended two, the Treasurer Warren Hutchison and Secretary Seamus Duggan, were to subsequently serve on the Executive of the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban. one other. Vice President Maurice Frieze, was to serve on the National Committee of that body while another. the President Rev Patrick Torley, became a rank and file anti treaty activist.* Of the Executive of the Irish Exile's League of Great Britain only one had previously served on the pre-Treaty Sinn Fein Executive and he did not hold a post on that body at the time of the Truce.* Of the seven officials of the pre-Treaty IRA, whose subsequent political allegiance can be ascertained, five, Joseph Robinson, Seamus Reader, Eamonn Mooney, Michael O'Carroll and Patrick Hyland, supported the anti treaty cause. Only Michael Callaghan and James Fullerton joined the pro-treaty forces.* However, it should be noted that the anti-Treaty cause failed to capitalise on the level of support that it possessed in these quarters in the immediate aftermath of the signing of the Treaty. On 19th December 1921 at a meeting of Sinn Fein officials the vote was 99-16 against the accepting the proposed terms. Although republican sentiment was to remain in the ascendancy when the topic was broached once again at a meeting held in July the margin of victory,

although still comfortable had fallen to 51-17 with many abstaining.⁶² Thus, it can be seen that about half of those who opposed the Treaty in December were not prepared to support the anti treaty cause once it had been rejected by the Irish electorate or, if to do so meant fighting fellow Irish nationalists. Possibly the most illuminating statistic concerning the attitude of pre-Treaty Sinn Fein, even activists, to the two rival causes is the fact that of the 65 club secretaries only one can be identified as an activist during the civil war.⁶³ Even amongst pre-Treaty IRA officials the majority apparently took no active part in subsequent pro and anti Treaty organisations. It would appear that the anti treaty cause was most attractive to those pre-Treaty activists, who were on the left wing of the movement. Both British and Irish Intelligence reports suggest that the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban and its military counterpart had strong links with the Communists on Clydeside and that their respective memberships were more left wing than than the wider Irish immigrant population taken as a whole. For example, Liam Travers attacked his 'co-religionists' for not supporting William Gallagher, the Communist candidate, who challenged Churchill in Dundee at the General Election of 1922.⁶⁴

The fact that the republican cause attracted a relatively high proportion of those, who attained high ranking positions within the pre Treaty Sinn Fein and IRA organisations, might suggest that the anti-treaty cause

drew 'the best' elements of those respective bodies. However, according to Free State Intelligence files, many of those, who embraced the republican cause were tinged with criminality. Of 22 identified active republicans, four had alleged swindled cash from the coffers of the pre-treaty Sinn Fein organisation while a further five had been expelled from the pre-Treaty IRA. Five of those named had originally sided with the Free State only to subsequently defect and in three cases it was alleged that their conversion was occasioned not by a change in political philosophy, but by financial motivations. Only one of those named is accredited with carrying out works of note for the Volunteers during the Anglo-Irish war.⁶⁵ It is of course possible that the Free State document overstates the case against those named. For example, one of those named was Seamus Reader. According to Mooney he was O/C of the Scottish Brigade of the IRA at the time of the Truce. He had a long history of involvement in IRB and IRA activities. Reader apparently reached the "top rank" in the IRB while still in his teens. Seamus Robinson, who was on the anti-Treaty side, described Reader as "the most effective Officer in Scotland - especially when the older officers were in goal".⁶⁶ In the available correspondence between Vize and Collins there is no evidence of the former considering him unsuitable; indeed, Vize was to appoint him to a senior position.⁶⁷ Yet it appears that Vize subsequently chose to dismiss Raeder for reasons not disclosed in the Free

State file. It is possible that this occurred as a result of a personality clash over the aims and methods of the movement, or the result of the friction that existed between the IRB and the IRA. His dismissal does not necessarily mean that Reader was guilty of any disciplinary offences. Nevertheless, it would appear, at least in Scotland, that the republican movement attracted many of those, who were more interested in self advancement rather than fighting for a dearly held cause.

It is possible that the military activities of the anti Treatyites were dislocated by the internal friction that existed in the relevant organisation. It would appear that the controversy revolved around the person of Joseph Robinson. After his release from prison in 1922, he had been sentenced to ten years imprisonment for arms smuggling offences in 1917, he immediately attempted to set up an anti-Treaty organisation before sanctioned to do so by republican elements in Dublin. He subsequently attempted to attain the leading position in both the political and military organisations that came into being after the commencement of the civil war. In the event he was only given control of military matters.⁶⁸ Ironically, his deputy was Seamus Reader, who had been on the opposing side when the IRB in Glasgow split into rival factions in the aftermath of the Easter Rising.⁶⁹ It is not clear if this feud continued during the civil war, or whether their mutual hatred of the Free State effected a

reconciliation.

The major object of both the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban and its military wing was to aid the anti Treaty cause in Ireland. The former organisation arranged for prominent republicans, most notably the Countess Markievicz, to tour Scotland.⁷⁰ It was hoped that such meetings would raise enough money to fund the political wing of the movement, enable the military wing to buy weaponry and provide financial support to the families of republican prisoners. Unfortunately, the only figures available concerning the financial records of Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban relate to a six week period in early 1923, 13th March to 30th April.⁷¹ During that time £174 was raised, annualised this would equate to c£1450. This represents about a quarter of that raised during 1921 by Sinn Fein. While this is not an unflattering comparison for those involved in raising finances for the anti Treaty cause, and when it is remembered that unemployment was higher in this period it is reasonably impressive. It should be noted, however, that in the period that it raised £174 it spent £186. Possibly the round up of republican activists that occurred in March and subsequent legal expenses artificially inflated the organisation's expenses in this period. Whatever the cause, it would appear that the organisation's future was in peril even before hostilities ceased in Ireland.

A major function of the Cumann Poblacht Na h-Eireann N-Alban was to disseminate republican propaganda. This task was fulfilled not only by sponsoring prominent republicans to give lecture tours in Scotland, but also by the publication of 'newspapers'. Despite initially experiencing difficulties in getting some printers to handle republican material a variety of journals, for consumption both at home and abroad, were published in Scotland. At first the relevant 'newspaper' was *Poblact na h Eireann* (Scottish edition). This publication lasted from 26th August 1922 until 23rd January 1923 when it was superseded by *Eire*. The former publication took the form of an eight page broadsheet. Its columns gave details of club activities and public meetings, carried many appeals for donations, outlined the successes and difficulties encountered by republicans when attempting to further the cause amongst the immigrant community and printed many articles alleging Free State atrocities.⁷² Most articles were anonymous. There were, however, examples of priests writing in the paper's columns despite the fact that many Catholic clerics in Scotland banned church door sales of republican literature.⁷³ It would appear that these publications enjoyed a reasonable degree of success. It was reported that *Poblact na h Eireann* (Scottish Edition) had a large readership amongst the London Irish and subscribers from as far away as Barcelona.⁷⁴

Although there was one instance of republican forces using fire arms, in a failed attempt to murder a Free

State agent in Glasgow there was no intention to try and replicate the conflict that was occurring in Ireland on the streets of Scotland.⁷⁵ For the military wing of the movement the main task was to acquire as much weaponry as possible and smuggle it to the anti Treaty forces in Ireland. The sources of supply were the same as those used during the Anglo-Irish war. Continental Europe was scoured for arms and a link was established with sympathisers in Hamburg.⁷⁶ In Scotland colliery armouries and rifle ranges were raided by anti-treaty forces.⁷⁷ Once again the majority of arms acquired in Scotland were smuggled to Ireland via Liverpool though, on one occasion, a steamer travelling to Sligo from Glasgow was found to be carrying arms destined for republican forces.⁷⁸ It is likely that the magnitude of arms smuggled from Scotland to Ireland was considerably less than that which occurred during the Anglo-Irish war. It is noticeable that no major arms dumps were located in Scotland during the civil war. While it may be suggested that this was due to the efficiency of the anti-Treaty forces in hiding and, subsequently, moving its arms caches, it should be noted the the conditions in which they worked were less conducive to such operations than the pre-Treaty IRA. Firstly, they did not possess the support of the bulk of the Irish in Scotland and, as a result, were unable to merge into the background provided by the immigrant community. As has been shown previously, by the end of 1921 police in Scotland knew who was in the

IRA.⁷⁹ Any remaining gaps were plugged when the Free State authorities started to work in tandem with their British counterparts. The fact that most of the anti-Treatyites were known, as were the routes and methods used to smuggle arms to the IRA in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish war, meant that the anti-Treatyites, who had less resources than the pre Treaty IRA, had to rebuild from scratch an arms smuggling network.

There is evidence that some republicans from Scotland fought against the Free State forces in Ireland. For example, three Scottish volunteers were arrested in the storming of the Four Courts.⁸⁰ The pages of *Poblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish Edition) record the death of at least one Scottish volunteer.⁸¹ However, it is not clear if these men were sent as part of a force from Scotland, or were acting in an individual capacity. The only 'firm' evidence that an organised body of men went to the aid of the anti-Treaty forces in Ireland is a notice printed in *Poblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish edition), which announced that a Comfords Fund Committee had been formed with the intention of aiding the Glasgow IRA Expeditionary Force in Ireland.⁸² If there was a organised attempt to send a 'fighting force' from Scotland it would seem that not many high ranking republicans in Scotland availed themselves of the opportunity provided.

Throughout the conflict sources such as the *Glasgow Observer* consistently claimed that the bulk of the

immigrant community supported the Free State. The apparent paradox of the republicans enjoying less popular support amongst the general public, but being able to form organisations, which were numerically stronger than those founded by Free State supporters can be explained by the limited role available to the latter. Unlike the republicans there was no need to raise cash or smuggle arms for the parent body in Ireland; the Free State could fulfill its needs in those spheres by using the apparatus of the state. Nor did pro Free Staters need to establish a paper to counter republican propaganda; the *Glasgow Observer* willingly performed such a function. The major function of the Irish Exile's League was to provide a focus for social activity rather than to counter the activities of the anti-Treatyites. For those, who joined Free State IRA in Scotland there was the opportunity to fight for the cause by joining the official Irish Army (and be paid for doing so). In the early part of the conflict the *Glasgow Observer* criticized the Free State Government for restricting entry into the Irish Army to those, who had joined the IRA before the Truce came into operation.⁸³ This implied that many in Scotland were barred from joining the Irish Army because of the aforementioned rule. In actual fact, there is little evidence to suggest that even amongst those who were qualified to join the Free State Army that many did so. One source estimates that the Free State IRA in Scotland was only 900 strong.⁸⁴ Yet a 'census' of the Free State

Army's 'Scottish unit' reveals that only 32 of its 92 serving members, as at midnight on 12th November 1923, had home addresses in Scotland.³⁵ While this total was augmented by Scottish volunteers, who served in other units of the Free State army, none of the three Scots known to have died while fighting with the Free State forces appear to have served with the Scottish unit. It seems likely that the number who joined the Free State Army could be counted in tens rather than hundreds.³⁶

Some members of the Free State IRA served the cause not by joining the fight in Ireland but by working as intelligence officers in Scotland monitoring the activities of their republican counterparts. This was the course chosen by Michael O'Callaghan one time O/C of the Scottish Brigade of the pre-Treaty IRA.³⁷ Some commentators have claimed that the activities of the Free State agents enabled the British police and intelligence services to have a much clearer picture of paramilitary affairs than they had during the Anglo-Irish war.³⁸ In actual fact, in Glasgow and the West of Scotland at least, the security forces knew most of the top IRA men in Scotland and enjoyed considerable success in arresting them. The major problem at that time was securing enough evidence against those arrested to secure a conviction.³⁹ This problem continued to plague the security forces during the civil war period. On two occasions the police raided the Banba Hall in Glasgow and

found arms and munitions. The first raid resulted in six people being arrested. At the subsequent trial all received "Not Provan" verdicts.⁷⁰ On the second occasion over twenty arrests were made including high ranking members such as Robinson and Reader, O/C and Deputy O/C respectively. However, most were subsequently released without charge.⁷¹ This problem was finally 'solved' when, in March 1933, almost 100 republicans (38 of which were in Scotland) were arrested and deported to the Free State without trial.⁷² Although this action was subsequently declared illegal and many of the deportees won substantial awards of compensation, it effectively smashed both the political and military wings of the anti-treaty movement in Scotland; of the republicans of any note, only Seamus Reader evaded capture.⁷³

It has been argued in another chapter that aid from Scotland was of relatively little importance to both Sinn Fein and the IRA in Ireland during the Anglo-Irish war. The quantities of both cash raised and arms transported for and to the republican forces during the civil war must have been considerably less. The question arise as to why there was so little reaction in the immigrant community to the fratricidal events in Ireland. One of the reasons can be found in the composition of the Irish in Scotland. As has been pointed out the politics of the immigrant community most resembled that of nationalists in Ulster. Considering the fact that the civil war largely by-passed Ulster Catholics it is possibly not

surprising that it elicited little response from the Irish in Scotland. It could also be argued that the relative indifference displayed by the immigrant community was the result of it becoming more politically integrated into Scottish and British society. Certainly, once the Free State became established, the Irish in Scotland were free to fight for their own causes rather than those of their ancestral home.

Footnotes

1. R. Kee *Ourseives Alone* p. 152.
2. F.S.L. Lyons *Ireland since the Famine* p. 439.
3. R. Kee *op cit* p. 154.
4. R. Kee *ibid* p. 145.
5. R. Kee *ibid* p. 156.
6. F.S.L Lyons *op cit* pp.444-9. 7. *Glasgow Observer* 9 July 1921.
8. *Glasgow Observer* 9 July 1921.
9. *Glasgow Observer* 10 Dec 1921.
10. *Glasgow Observer* 11-Feb 1922.
11. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Jan 1922.
12. This reared itself again in the editorial column of the *Glasgow Observer* as early as 24 Dec 1921.
13. *Glasgow Observer* 7 Oct 1922.
14. *Glasgow Observer* 21 Jan 1922.
15. This theme recurred in a variety of editorials. See *Glasgow Observer* 18 Feb; 29 Apr; 6 May 1922.
16. *Glasgow Observer* 18 & 25 Feb; 25 Mar; 29 Apr; 13 May 1922.
17. *Glasgow Observer* 27 May 1922.
18. *Glasgow Observer* 10 June 1922.
19. *Glasgow Observer* 10 June 1922.
20. *Glasgow Observer* 11 Mar 1922.
21. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Feb 1922.
22. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Apr & 10 June 1922.
23. F.L.S. Lyons *op cit* pp. 453, 456-9; R. Kee *op cit* pp. 162-3.
24. *Glasgow Observer* 27 May 1922.
25. F.L.S. Lyons *op cit* p. 459.
26. *Glasgow Observer* 24 June 1922.
27. This theme was repeated in many articles and editorials throughout the war. *Glasgow Observer* 8 July; 23 Sept; 9 Dec 1922.
28. *Glasgow Observer* 8 July; 25 Nov 1922; 24 Feb 1923.
29. *Glasgow Observer* 8 July; 7 Oct 1922.
30. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Sept; 25 Nov 1922.
31. *Glasgow Observer* 21 Oct 1922.
32. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Jan 1923.
33. *Glasgow Observer* 3 Feb 1923. 34. For an account of the religious aspect of the civil war see Eoin Neeson *The civil war in Ireland* pp. 191-5.
35. The extent of the post civil war crime wave see T.P. Coogan *Ireland since the Rising* p.47. Also F.S.L. Lyons *op cit* p.487.
36. *Glasgow Observer* 1 July; 12 Aug 1922; 3 Mar 1923.
37. *Glasgow Observer* 26 Aug 1922.
38. *Glasgow Observer* 26 Aug 1922.
39. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Nov 1922.
40. For an example of the papers prior use of the French proverb see *Glasgow Observer* 20 Dec 1919.
41. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Sept 1922.
42. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Mar 1923.
43. *Glasgow Observer* 24 Mar 1923.
44. For details of the compensation awarded see *Glasgow*

- Observer 6 Oct 1923.
45. *Glasgow Observer* 12 May; 14 July 1923.
46. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Apr 1923.
47. *Glasgow Observer* 5 May 1923.
48. This sentiment was expressed as early as June 1923. *Glasgow Observer* 26 June 1923.
49. F.M. Carroll *American Opinion and the Irish Question, 1910-23* pp. 176-7. For the extent of the decline in the ISDL see Report of the General Secretary to 3rd Annual Conference of the ISDL, 1/4/1922. Report contained in Art O'Brien MSS 8433.
50. Reports on the dissolution of some individual Sinn Fein clubs can be found in the *Glasgow Observer* 14 & 28 Oct 1922. The Sean MacDiarmida club transferred its assets to the Republican Dependents Fund while the Kilysth club donated its fund to the Belfast Refuge Fund. Regrettably the paper does not give enough information to allow the historian to analyse the position within Sinn Fein nationally in Scotland.
51. *Glasgow Observer* 15 Apr 1922.
52. S. Duggan - J. Robinson 5/5/1922; J. Robinson - S. Duggan 10/5/1922. 1094/15/2 & 2b Sinn Fein Collection. 1919-23, IFR0.
53. See p
54. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Nov 1922. Reports on the activities of Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom. 171. 7/7/1922, CP 4183, Cab 24/138; 181. 10/11/1922, CP 4307, Cab 24/139.
55. S. Duggan - ?, 10/12/1922, 1094/15/5; Document listing clubs represented at Ard Fheis, 20/1/1923, 1094/17/1; Memorandum headed "Cumann Poblacht na h Eireann N Albain - Secy. Pdraig O'Carrigan 16/5/1923, Sinn Fein MSS 1094/16/4.
56. Memo 16/5/1923, Sinn Fein MSS 1094/16/4.
57. List of clubs at Ard Fheis, 20/1/1923, Sinn Fein MSS 1094/17/1. See also document which lists 33 clubs in Scotland. n.d. (post Jan 1923) Sinn Fein MSS 1094/17/7.
58. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Dec 1922. There are no recorded instances of clubs being active outside this area.
59. The the composition of the Scottish Sinn Fein Executive at the time of the Truce see the telegram they sent to Ershine Childers. SF Executive - Childers 20/7/1921. Childers MSS 7790/8/48. The positions of Hutchison, Duggan and Frieze within the Cumann Foblacht Na h Eireann Albain see Document concerning "National Executive Council elections at the Ard Fheis, 1923". 29/1/1923. Sinn Fein MSS 1094/17/2. Torley's activities as a Republican were noted in the "Reports on the Activities of Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom", 172. 14/7/1922, CP 4190, Cab 24/138.
60. This was an M. Regan. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Aug 1919; 23 Dec 1922.
61. See Mooney - Robinson. 17/8/1951 File S1745. Irish Army Archives. M. Callaghan - ?, 26/10/1924 File A13306 Irish Army Archives; *Glasgow Observer* 8 July 1922, 20 Jan & 17 Mar 1923; O'Malley MSS P17/a/182. " Reports on the

- Activities of Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom". 189. 18/1/1922. CP26(23). Cab 24/158.
62. "Reports on the Activities of Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom", (Henceforth known as British Intelligence Reports), 136. 22/12/1921. CP 3579. Cab 24/131: 137. 5/1/1922. CP 3600. Cab 24/131: 163. 13/7/1922. CP 4102. Cab 24/138.
63. He was James Sexton, secreatey of Shettleson branch. See Sinn Fein MSS 1094/14/1 & 1094/17/2.
64. British Intelligence Reports 160. 6/4/1922. CP 3934. Cab 24/135: 171. 7/7/1922. CP 4183. Cab 24/138: 191. 1/2/1923. CP 74(23). Cab 24/158. Margaret Skinnider, friend of James Connolly, joined the republican forces. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Apr 1923.
65. Comdt. General. Director of Intelligence. - Sean Golden. 16 Dec ? (1922). Ernie O'Malley MSS P17/a/182.
66. E. Hooney - Seamus Robinson *op cit*: Statement by Seamus Robinson p66. Frank Gallagher MSS 21.265 Acc 3237. Reader provides some autobiographical material in some editions of *An t-ogiac*. *An t-ogiac* St. Patrick's Day 1962; Easter 1963; Summer 1964; Easter 1965.
67. Vize - Collins 25/5/1919 P7/A/11. Mulcahy MSS
68. British Intelligence Reports 174. 26/9/1922. CP 4242. Cab 24/139: 176. 12/10/1922. CP 4282. Cab 24/139: 183. 30/11/ 1922; Patrick Holland Notes n.d. (Possibly c23/5/1922) Sinn Fein MSS 1094/14/6b: S. Duggan - J. Robinson 5/5/1922; J. Robinson - S. Duggan 10/5/1922; Sinn Fein MSS 1094/15/2 & 2b.
69. McGalloghy MSS P60 p.18.
70. It was planned that she would address 16 meetings between 21st Jan & 6 Feb 1923. Programme for Countess Markievicz n.d. Sinn Fein MSS 1094/16/9. See also British Intelligence Reports 191. 1/2/1923. CP 74(23). Cab 24/158: 192. 6/2/1923. CP 91(23). Cab 24/158: 193. 15/2/1923/ CP 105(23). Cab 24/158.
71. Financial Statement of Cumann Poblacht Na H-Eireann Na-Albain n.d. Sinn Fein MSS 1094/17/4.
72. A microfilm copy of editions of *Foblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish Edition) can be found in British Library, Colindale. I was unable to find any copies of *Eire*. The intial difficulties of getting people to print this type of material are referred to by Charles Diamond (Not the propreitor of the *Glasgow Observer*). C. Diamond - 7 2/9/1922. O'Malley MSS P17/a/159
73. For examples of clerical involvement the adverse response of some priests to *Foblacht na h-Eireann* (Scottish Edition) see the editions dated 26 Aug: 2 Sept & 30 Sept. 1922. For names of some priests involved in Republican activities during this period see British Intelligence Reports 170. 31/8/1922 CP 4773. Cab 24/138: 175. 5/10/1922. CP 4262. Cab 24/139. 203. 26/4/1923. CP 219(23). Cab 24/160. S. Duggan - E Donnelly, 18 Dec 1922 Sinn Fein MSS 1094/2/1. List of Republican activist in Glasgow n.d. O'Malley MSS P17/a/182.
74. British Intelligence Reports 172. 26/10/1922. CP 4292. Cab 24/24/139: 180. 9/11/1922. CP 4302. Cab 24/140:

187. 4/1/1923 CP 4(23), Cab 24/158.
75. British Intelligence Report 188, 11/1/1923. CP 15(23), Cab 24/158. *Irish Independent* 13 Jan 1923. These are possibly accounts of the same incident.
76. British Intelligence Reports 189, 18/1/1923, CP 26(23), Cab 24/158; 196, 8/3/1923, CP 144(23), Cab 24/159.
77. British Intelligence Reports 176, 12/10/1922, CP 4282, Cab 24/159; 185, 14/12/1922, CP 4365, Cab 24/140; *Irish Independent* 13 Jan 1923.
78. *Irish Independent* 7 Oct 1922.
79. See p
80. Tomas MacAonia - Director of Intelligence 15/6/1923 O'Malley MSS P17/a/18.
81. A volunteer Seaghan Mooney died while in the custody of Free State sources. Republican sources claimed that he had been tortured before his death. *Foblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish edition) 14 Oct 1922. An Iain Bain MacKenzie was killed by the Free State forces, but he had lived in Ireland since 1916. *Foblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish Edition) 21 Oct 1922.
82. A similar fund was set up for a supposed IRA Liverpool Expeditionary force in Ireland. *Foblacht na h Eireann* (Scottish edition) 23 & 30 Dec 1922.
83. *Glasgow Observer* 29 July 1922.
84. *Glasgow Observer* 29 July & 26 Aug 1922.
85. The totals quoted were taken from "Returns of Officers, NCOs and men serving at Portobello Barracks, Dublin, and also Government Buildings at Midnight, 12-13 November 1922." This document was acquired by Comdt. Peter Young of the Irish Army Archives, Dublin. Unnumbered file.
86. The three who died were Sean Adair, for details of death see *Glasgow Observer* 29 July 1922, William Williamson, see *Glasgow Observer* 9 Dec 1922, and John Lynn, his details are contained in File A 13.306. Irish Army Archives. None appear to have served in the Scottish unit. A Scot was serving as Michael Collins' when Collins was assassinated. His subsequent defection to the Republican cause has given rise to much speculation concerning the manner of Collins' death. Marjory Forester *Michael Collins, the lost leader* p.338. Quoted in T. Gallagher *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace* pp. 95 & 129.
87. His name appears as an Intelligence Officer in File A 13.306. Irish Army Archives.
88. T. Gallagher *op cit* p.95.
89. See p
90. *Glasgow Observer* 4 & 25 Nov 1922.
91. *Glasgow Observer* 20 Jan 1923. British Intelligence Report 189, 128/1/1923, CP 26(23), Cab 24/158.
92. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Mar 1923; British Intelligence Reports 197, 15/3/1923, CP 151(23), Cab 24/159; 196, 22/3/1923, CP 166(23), Cab 24/159; 199, 28/3/1923, CP 77(23), Cab 24/159; 201, 12/4/1923, CP 194(23), Cab 24/159.
93. For the effect the deportations had on the republican

organisation in Britain see M.A. Hopkinson *Green against Green: The Irish Civil War* p.255. For the legal ramifications of the deportations see the *Glasgow Herald* 2 Oct 1923: *Glasgow Observer* 6 Oct 1923. For the full list of those captured in the raid see the *Glasgow Observer* 17 Mar 1923.

Chapter 6

The Attraction of Labour, 1918-22

The rise of the Labour Party in the period after the first world war has been the subject which has most exercised the minds and pens of historians of modern Scottish politics. Most of these historians have stressed the role and importance of the immigrant Irish Catholic population in facilitating this transformation in electoral politics. In the pre war period the vast bulk of the Irish vote aligned itself with the Liberals. This was because the Liberals were the Party most sympathetic to the political aspirations of the Irish Nationalists. The question arises as to how far the realignment of the Irish vote was in response to the Irish policy of the Labour Party or whether other domestic factors were the major influences which transformed the political allegiances of the immigrant community.

According to the historian F. D. Schneider, Labour's attitude to the Irish Question in the latter months of 1918 was "cautious and tentative. The most that could be said for it was that it stood firmly in the radical tradition".¹ At the Party Conference in June a resolution was passed, which urged "self determination in all exclusively Irish affairs" and "a wide and generous measure of Home Rule". Any attempt to frame a more specific policy would have led to friction over details, thus no attempt was made.² Although Schneider may not be impressed by the attitude of the Labour Party to Ireland at this point in time the *Glasgow Observer* was more charitable. It stated:

The Labour Conference has passed a resolution affirming the necessity of Great Britain's agreeing immediately to such measures as may secure the self determination of Ireland in all purely Irish affairs. That is equal to a declaration that Dominion Home Rule should be without delay set up in Ireland. A more far reaching proposal, which was defeated, declared for self determination without any limit whatever. That spoke the spirit of real democracy which recognises no right to the exercise of government unless derived from the consent of the governed. Such a spirit would agree to the inauguration of an Irish republic if the Irish people so desired. Theoretically Dominion Home Rule will suffice...Such an attitude and declaration should lend greatly to dispose the Irish vote in the direction of Labour at the next General Election, especially if the official Liberal attitude in face of current events should continue to be one of tactiturn supineness and 'masterly inactivity.'

In subsequent weeks the paper's support for Labour was expressed in more explicit terms as was its attacks on its onetime allies the Liberal Party. Charles Diamond contributed a series of articles, in which he compared the attitude of the Labour Party to the Irish Question with that of the Liberals. In his view the latter were tainted by the then Government's handling of the Ulster crisis between 1912-14. Their strategy was fatally flawed in that they would refuse to coerce Ulster into an all Ireland settlement, thus, they had not advanced from their position in 1914. Until the Liberals proclaimed their intention to "tackle Carsonism" they had no claim to the Irish vote.⁴

Since November 1914 Charles Diamond had expressed the wish that the immigrant Irish should become fully

integrated into the mainstream of British social and political life.⁵ However, it is noticeable that while these two strands, aiding Ireland and integrating into British society, are evident in the following quote taken from an article written by Diamond the second is subordinate to the former:

We hold firmly and steadily that the duty of Irishmen and women, of Nationalists and Catholics, is to join hands with Labour, to sustain it, to participate in its work, its organisation, its policy, its leadership, as the best way to help Ireland.

Inside the Labour ranks the Irish and Catholic electors will be powerful and effective. They can gain influence and weight.

Outside they will be mere pariahs, flies on the wheel, working in the darkness, fighting not their own battles, but those of others like the Irish Brigades from Dunkirk to Belgrade.⁶

In the pre war period the *Glasgow Observer* highlighted the existence of many secularists in the Labour movement and contended that their existence threatened future Labour-Irish relations.⁷ However, now the paper argued that, while the Labour Party had its faults, it was the best available and that if the Irish and Catholic vote integrated itself into the movement they would tend to side with the trade union wing of the movement and, thereby, negate the socialist wing of the movement.⁸ It would appear that the *Glasgow Observer* was prepared to support any Labour candidate irrespective of his ideological position for during the 1918 General Election campaign it urged its readership to vote for every Labour candidate in Glasgow, Lanarkshire and Ayrshire, including

the marxist John MacLean.⁷

In the pre war period it was the UILGB, which organised and directed the Irish vote at election time. Its future political role was discussed at its National Convention of 1918. John Dillon informed the delegates present that the traditional alliance with the Liberals had been terminated in 1916. Despite pressure from the grassroots, notably led by some members of branches in Scotland who wished that the organisation would pledge itself only to work for the return of Labour candidates, the Conference decided to let T.P.O'Connor and his executive choose which candidate to support.¹⁰ At a subsequent meeting comprised of delegates representing branches of the UILGB in Scotland chaired by O'Connor, it was unanimously adopted that the Irish voters in Scotland should give "their general support to the Labour Party except in cases where long and loyal services compelled them to continue their adhesion to member of other parties".¹¹ The decision as to who, outside the Labour Party was to receive the support of the local branches of the UILGB, was to "be left to the Standing Committee after consultation with the branches".¹²

In the event the Standing Committee selected 47 candidates whom it urged local branches of the UILGB to support; of these 47 only 17 were not Labour candidates or in alliance with the Party. Of the 17 non Labour nominees eleven were opposed by Labour candidates while

another, Asquith, was faced with opposition from an Independent Progressive.¹³ In constituencies where the Standing Committee had advocated that the Irish vote should support a Liberal rather than his Labour opponent there were many examples of dissension. For example, the Standing Committee urged the Irish in Dunbartonshire to support the sitting Liberal M. P. despite the fact that the Alexandria branch of the UILGB had passed a resolution, which called upon the parent body to endorse the Labour candidate. After the Standing Committees' mandate was known the Alexandria and Vale of Leven branches repudiated the choice and advised the local Irish to vote Labour.¹⁴ In St. Rollox the local UILGB branch voted to support the Labour candidate "wholeheartedly" despite the fact Standing Committee's endorsement of Mackinnon Wood, the Liberal M. P., who had represented the constituency since 1910.¹⁵ In Leith the local UILGB initially supported Labour while the Standing Committee preferred the Liberal, Wedgwood Benn.¹⁶ There were further instances of dissension in Springburn, Maryhill, Paisley and Motherwell where sections of the local UILGB, not necessarily the majority, announced that they intended to support Labour and not the "official" choice.¹⁷ Ironically, there are at least two examples of the local branch of the UILGB disassociating themselves from the Standing Committee's advice to support the respective Labour candidate. In Dundee T.P.O'Connor's "ticket" was not awarded to the sitting Labour M.P. It

was stated that the the national UILGB would not support any coalition candidate in general and Brown in particular "in spite of past services".¹⁸ Nevertheless, Brown was to appear on UILGB platforms during the campaign.¹⁷ In Greenock the Standing Committee endorsed the official Labour candidate. However, the local UILGB preferred to support Neal Haughey, a prominent local Irishman, who was standing as an Independent. The failure of the Standing Committee not to support Haughey caused general surprise and not a little resentment amongst the immigrant community in Greenock.²⁰

Richard McGhee, an Irish Nationalist M. P., spent most of the campaign in Scotland attempting to organise the Irish vote. Of his activities he wrote:

I found great difficulty in securing the Irish vote for the few Liberals that were recommended by the Standing Committee. The issuing of the mandate was shockingly belated, and our people in many cases had got out of hand before it reached them. In many cases decisions had been made to support the Labour candidate, and I had some work cut out to get the matter undone. In every case but one I succeeded and that was the case of Allen of Dunbartonshire, a very worthy man. I was unable to visit Alexandria where the Irish had passed a resolution to support Allen's opponent. In all other constituencies I carried Irish support for the mandate of T. P.²¹

While the *Freeman's Journal* recorded that McGhee had indeed managed to reverse the original pro Labour stance of the organised Irish vote in some Scottish constituencies, the *Glasgow Observer* was dismissive of such claims.²² It would appear as if T.P.O'Connor shared

the view of the latter. He stated that: "in nearly every case that I asked our people to support the Liberals they went against me; except in the case of Wedgewood Benn, and there I had to send Dick McGhee to fight for him and practically to over bear the branch".²³ The inability of the UILGB to influence the election result in many Scottish constituencies was gleefully highlighted both in *Forward* and the *Glasgow Observer*.²⁴ The latter stated:

Mr. Fringle in Springburn, who was declared to have received 'several thousand Irish votes' and who enjoyed the advantage of T. P.'s 'coupon' polled fewer than 1700 in all and falls to forfeit £150 as polling less than one eighth of the votes recorded. Mr McKinnon Wood, another of the Liberals who got T. P.'s mandate, is in the similar humiliating position. In Motherwell and Wishaw also where Mr Duncan Miller got T. P.'s coupon, it availed him nothing...but the shinning incident of all is the case of Hamilton, where Mr Whitehouse, having first received a letter from Mr Dillon, then received also T. P.'s mandate, and apparently achieved the distinction of polling the lowest number of votes recorded for any rejected ex member in Great Britain.²⁵

Although the *Glasgow Observer* hailed the demise of T.P.'s mandate it is debatable whether its attempts to influence the alignment of the Irish vote were more successful

The extension of the franchise had greatly increased the Irish vote in Scotland. In Glasgow sources claimed that it numbered between 80,000-140,000.²⁶ *The Scotsman* claimed that there were 53,500 Irish votes in the seven Lanarkshire seats.²⁷ The *Glasgow Herald* stated that there were 6-7,000 Irish votes in Paisley.²⁸ In Dundee various sources claimed that between 8-16,000 Irish votes were

available.²⁷ To the contemporary observer it must have appeared that Labour was poised to reap the benefit of this massive increase in the voting power of the immigrants. The acrimony between the *Glasgow Observer* and the Standing Committee of the UILGB has tended to obscure the fact that, in the vast majority of cases, they supported the same candidate, the Labour candidate. Although *Forward* claimed that the Irish were solidly behind Labour the Party only won in two seats where there was an immigrant community of any size, Govan and Hamilton.³⁰ To some extent it could be argued that external factors worked to negate the strength of the Irish vote and therefore, it did not possess the power necessary to help Labour achieve a major breakthrough. Iain Maclean states: "The Irish stood to gain proportionately, more than other groups from the electoral reform of 1918; by the same token they doubtless suffered worse from the defection compilation [of the voter's roll]".³¹ This contributed to the low poll whereby only 57.3% of those eligible voted in Glasgow and 54.9% in the whole of Scotland.³² However, even where the Irish did allegedly vote in numbers it appears that in not every constituency did they support the Labour candidate. Both the Standing Committee of the UILGB and the *Glasgow Observer* urged the Irish in Brigeton, Glasgow, to vote for James Maxton. In the event he was soundly defeated and the victorious MacCallum Scott claimed that he won "a substantial share of the

Irish Catholic vote".³³ In both Leith and Paisl y it would appear that the local Irish supported the Independent Liberals.³⁴ In Shettleston, Glasgow, John Wheatley was widely expected to win but as it transpired he failed by a narrow margin to fulfill these predictions and a report in the *Glasgow Observer* states that he failed to poll the full Irish vote in the constituency. The paper suggests that there was some opposition to his candidature amongst the Irish community in the constituency on personal grounds. This may imply that some had not forgiven him for his pre war disputes with the Catholic Church.³⁵ In Bridgeton the Labour Party selected Maxton as the candidate without conferring as to his suitability with the Irish community in the constituency. This may well have provoked a backlash within the immigrant community to the benefit of Mackinnon Wood. Even the *Glasgow Observer*, which described Maxton as an excellent choice, criticised the manner by which Labour selected their champion.³⁶ In the cases cited it may have been that local factors played an important role in denying Labour the Irish vote. However, it could have been the case that there more general reasons, which made the immigrants wary of positively endorsing the party at this juncture.

In the pre war era a factor, which militated against closer Irish-Labour relations was the latter's association with socialism. It would appear as if this question may have continued to exert a degree of

suspicion in the minds of some immigrants at the 1918 General Election. *Forward* records many instances of individual priests attacking socialism in the months prior to the election.³⁷ Although the *Glasgow Observer* urged its readership to vote Labour it was, at the same time, printing articles which attacked socialism.³⁸ While the paper may have been able to differentiate between Continental and British socialism its readership may not have been so discerning. Possibly "Erin Go Bragh" articulated the feelings of many within the immigrant community in a letter printed in the *Daily Record*:

With one or two exceptions, all the individuals who have received 'T. P.s' label and blessing are Labour candidates, and with very few exceptions all are Socialists.

We Irish Catholics are second to none in our allegiance to the Church, and as the Church condemns Socialism, then it is our duty to discountenance Socialism, and we are bound to do so.

Is it not absurd that we should be instructed by responsible Catholic men, like T.P.O'Connor to support the Socialist candidates? He has even the audacity to instruct the Irish Catholics in the Gorbals to vote for John MacLean. Surely this is the limit.³⁹

Certainly it would appear as if the writer of the above letter was more in tune with the immigrant population in the Gorbals than either the Standing Committee of the UILGB, or the editorial staff of the *Glasgow Observer* because MacLean was soundly beaten by the sitting Coalitionist Labour M. P., George Barnes. The paper was forced to admit that "notwithstanding official

soothsaying to the contrary, those on the spot declare that Mr Barnes polled quite a substantial Irish vote".⁴⁰

Although in some constituences it seems clear that the Irish voted for the Coalition candidate it is unlikely that there was a large undercurrent of support for the Coalition amongst the community as a whole. One suspects that in most cases where the Irish did vote for a Coalition candidate it was in appreciation for their stance over Home Rule in the pre war period. While one can accept that the Irish did vote for people such as Barnes or MacCallum Scott who had cultivated good relations with the local Irish it seems unlikely that many of the immigrant community would have voted for those Coalition candidates who had identified themselves with the cause of Ulster. It should also be noted that some elements within the Coalition seemed to have little desire to capture the Irish Vote. In Dundee the local paper, *The Advertiser*, commenting on the Standing Committee of the UILGB endorsement of Brown and Scrymeour stated that the "good Britishers of Churchill and Wilkie" were now faced with opposition from "all the Bolsheviks and pacifists of the city and as many of the Irish nationalists as care to follow the caucus orders".⁴¹

Possibly the 1915 General Election witnessed the least homogenous Irish vote in history. There was certainly a time lag between the conversion of the self appointed leaders of the immigrant community, whether the Standing

Committee of the UILGB or the *Glasgow Observer*, to the cause of the Labour Party and that of the mass of the Irish in Scotland. It would appear as if this divergence did not last long. Although the Irish vote was fragmented in 1918, by 1922 it had reformed into a coherent bloc massed behind the Labour Party when sources claimed that 90% of the immigrant community voted for the party.⁴²

Simultaneously as Labour was advancing rapidly within the Irish community in Scotland, Sinn Fein was enjoying similar good fortune. It is tempting to conclude that the growth of republicanism within the immigrant community acted as a catalyst, which changed the allegiance of that group in domestic politics. After all, in the pre war era, it was the stance of the respective British parties towards the aspirations of Irish nationalism that determined whether it would receive the Irish vote in elections. This linkage, as we have already seen, was evident in the editorials of the *Glasgow Observer* in the run up to the 1918 General Election when the paper urged its readers to vote Labour, because of its Irish policy. Indeed, in 1919 the *Glasgow Observer* argued that an Irish Republic would only be established when a Labour Government came to power and could not be achieved by the military actions of the IRA.⁴³ Moreover, there are many examples of Irish Republican bodies working in conjunction with local Labour organisations in order to demonstrate against the Government's Irish policy.⁴⁴ However, the evidence reveals a more complex reality.

While there were instances of cooperation between republican and socialist groups, there was also much friction between Sinn Fein and Labour in Scotland. The former accused the latter of being apathetic towards the demands of Ireland and contrasted the response of the Labour movement to the events in Eastern Europe with its relative inaction against British militarism in Ireland. Labour, on the other hand, had to balance the effect that its Irish policy would have in attracting the votes of the immigrants against alienating sections of the wider indigenous population. Furthermore, elements both within the party and amongst the wider movement disliked Sinn Fein's association with violence and its ideology which subordinated socialist goals to nationalist aspirations.

It is commonly stated that the Labour Party in particular and the labour movement in general is a broad church capable of encompassing many viewpoints. It is certainly the case that the various component parts of the movement advanced at varying paces towards accepting the idea of an Irish Republic. The leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) marched at the slowest pace. Throughout 1919 they maintained a policy of inaction over the question of Irish affairs. Galvanised into action by the deteriorating military situation in Ireland and the need to determine a policy in order to counter Lloyd George's Government of Ireland Bill, which was published in December 1919, a high ranking delegation, led by

William Adamson leader of the PLP and M. P. for West Fife, toured Ireland on a fact finding mission in January 1920. Their subsequent report rejected "simple solutions" such as 'partition' or a 'republic' and instead outlined two constitutional changes for consideration:

Firstly, a full measure of Dominion Self Government with provision for the protection of minorities, questions of defence and foreign relations being reserved to the Imperial Parliament...The second alternative...is that a form of self government to be established should be decided upon by an Irish constituent assembly representing the whole Irish people and elected on a system of proportional representation, which would be charged with the task of drafting the new constitution and making provision for the protection of minorities, questions of defence and foreign relations being reserved to the Imperial Parliament.⁴⁵

Thus, Labour succeeded in angering both Irish Republicans and Ulster Unionists.

Throughout the Parliamentary passage of the Government of Ireland Bill the Labour Party leadership reiterated their desire to see a united Ireland remaining within the British Empire. However, the escalating violence in Ireland coupled with pressure from the activists to endorse the principle of an independent Irish Republic forced the PLP to redefine its Irish policy. During the third reading of the Government of Ireland Bill Adamsom proposed that the British Army should be withdrawn from Ireland, the erection of an Irish constituent assembly, elected by proportional representation, and would devise a system of Government whereby any constitution would

embody articles which would provide for the protection of minorities and ensure that Ireland could not become a naval or military threat to Britain. Although these proposals did not recognise the legitimacy of the Dail as the authentic voice of the Irish people and still advocated limitations on Irish independence, they were welcomed by a special conference of Irish Labour and TUC delegates, and "for the first time since 1914, the British and Irish Labour Movement were in true alignment on the great issue of Irish Self Government".⁴⁶

In November and December 1920 a Commission of Enquiry, headed by Adamson and composed of high ranking Labour officials from both sides of the Irish Sea, toured Ireland to investigate the conduct of the British Army in Ireland. Their findings, very hostile to the Government, were discussed at a Special Conference held on the 29th December at which Arthur Henderson announced plans for a "great national campaign for peace" in Ireland. The campaign opened on 17th January 1921 at the Free Trade Hall in Manchester and climaxed four weeks later at the Albert Hall in London. In this campaign 500 meetings were held, more than 20,000 copies of the Commission's report were sold, and seven million leaflets distributed including the Irish Labour Party's "Who Burnt Cork City?" and a "Handbook for Rebels". However, all this activity did not mean that the PLP leadership had become fervent republicans; Schneider points out that Labour policy still did not go beyond "self determination".⁴⁷

Although the bulk of the leadership of the Labour Party did not adopt a radical posture on Ireland until the winter of 1920-21 other sections of the movement were not so reticent. At the Party Conference in 1920 the resolution adopted has been seen as a victory for the left and if it did not explicitly state "recognition of the Republic", one hardline pro-republican historian considers that it "came within an ace of it".⁴⁶ The adopted resolution stated:

The conference reaffirms the resolution passed by the Permanent Commission of the Internationale at Amsterdam in April 1919, demanding that the principle of the free and absolute self-determination shall be applied immediately in the case of Ireland, confirming the right of the Irish people to political independence and demanding that this self-determination shall rest upon a democratic decision expressed by the free equal and secret vote of the people without any military, political or economic pressure from outside, or any reservation or restriction imposed by any Government. The conference accordingly demands that the Government should at once provide for an election by Proportional Representation of an effectively open Constituent Assembly for all Ireland, and the withdrawal of the British Army of occupation.⁴⁷

At its 1919 Conference the Independent Labour Party (ILP) passed a motion demanding the withdrawal of British troops from Ireland and the recognition of that "form of Government which is desired by the Irish people".³⁰ A similar motion to this was put forward at the following years conference. An amendment was proposed whereby the initial call for Irish self determination was extended by a clause urging "the recognition of the Irish Republic".

If Irish self determination meant recognising the Irish Republic it might be assumed the both the original resolution and the amendment would have received similar levels of support. In the event the original resolution was carried by 366 votes to 66 whereas the amendment was carried by only 51 votes, 268 against 207.⁵¹ Nevertheless, the voting revealed that a majority were prepared to unequivocally endorse the concept of an Irish Republic.

The conflicting attitude of the Labour movement was further illustrated by the events of the 1920 TUC conference. In the immediate post war era there were signs that the unions were prepared to use their economic and industrial power for overtly political ends. The use of the strike weapon had been threatened as a response to British military intervention in the Russian civil war. This threat materialised in May 1920 when London dockers refused to coal a munitions ship bound for Poland, which at that point in time was at war with Russia. Subsequently, all supplies allegedly bound for forces fighting the Bolsheviks were officially 'blackened' and then a TUC Council of Action threatened to call a General Strike against British involvement in the war. However, with the curtailment of hostilities in October, the action threatened never materialised; the Labour movement claimed that this threat prevented direct British military involvement in the war. While the use of "Direct Action" did not occur on a large scale in Britain this

was not the case in Ireland. Almost simultaneously as the London dockers were refusing to load the *Jolly George*, Irish dockers and railwaymen declared they would not handle war materials destined for use by the British security forces against the IRA. In contrast with the Polish episode the National Union of Railwaymen (the parent organisation of the Irish workers) refused to pay the strikers and, after talks with the British Government, instructed its Irish members to move munitions until the question of "Direct Action" was fully discussed by the TUC.

In July 1920 the TUC turned its attention to the use of the strike weapon against the Government's Irish policy. A motion was submitted, which urged the TUC to call a General Strike if its proposals for a truce in Ireland were rejected by the Government but accepted by the Sinn Fein and the IRA.⁵² This proposal was decisively defeated. However, the conference passed, by a large majority of 1,124,000, a Miners' resolution, which demanded the cessation of the production of munitions of war destined for use in both Ireland and Russia.⁵³ The resolution advocated the use of "Direct Action" in the event of Government non co-operation: the tactic to be employed on a union by union basis with the proviso that its use had been endorsed by the membership.

It is difficult to ascertain the level of Scottish input into the various policies and actions of the British

labour movement. It might be assumed, given the strength of the ILP in the Scottish labour movement, that the Scottish rank and file were more sympathetic to Irish demands than their English and Welsh comrades. If this was the case, then it is not evident to those who read *Forward*. For the most part discussions on Irish affairs were confined to the Catholic Socialist Notes column. Apart from this section of the paper coverage of the issues raised by the Anglo-Irish war tended to take the form of reprinted articles, which had previously been published in the *Manchester Guardian*, or Irish labour organs. There were a few articles submitted by Scottish activists and they usually tended to reiterate the republican viewpoint that the British presence was the root cause of violence in Ireland.⁵⁴ *Forward* usually only commented on Irish affairs in the aftermath of an excessively violent incident. The paper adopted its most strident tone immediately after British forces had sacked the town of Balbriggan. It stated:

If the Labour Party in the House of Commons does not create a first class public row about Balbiggan and other atrocities of a like kind, if there isn't somebody thrown out of the House, if the Unions continue to manufacture and transport munitions to the Balbrigands, we may give up hope of civilisation altogether.

To condescend from the general to the particular. Are these munitions being sent to Ireland from the Clyde? If so, who is handling them and where are they manufactured?

Cannot the Glasgow Trades Council institute prompt action?⁵⁵

If the latter section of the quote was a plea for the

Clydeside unions to adopt the methods of "Direct Action" in order to disrupt the supply of munitions to Ireland then this mood of militancy did not last long. In December Tom Johnston ruled out such a course of action because of the prevailing economic climate: "Unemployment is with us on a big scale, and with it the chances of a strike for a political object is almost hopeless."⁵⁶

It should also be noted that even had the economic climate been more favourable there were many within the labour movement, who doubted that the workforce could be roused by the Irish Question. In response to Sinn Fein demands that a General Strike should be called the author of the Catholic Socialist Notes columnist was dismissive of such a suggestion: "The slightest acquaintance with British public opinion would tell them (Sinn Fein) that the feeling here in favour of a separate Irish Republic is not unanimous, and unanimity would be essential in a General Strike".⁵⁷ The only active response to the events in Ireland was Johnston's decision to set up an Irish Terror Fund, which was intended to aid the victims of the Black and Tans. The readers of *Forward* were asked the question: "How many shillings were the resolutions worth?". Between November 20th 1920 and 25th June 1921 £398 6/- 3d was raised.⁵⁸ This is not an impressive sum when it is realised that the Glasgow ILP fund for the miners raised "almost £700" between April 30th and June 4th 1921.⁵⁹

There were two major reasons why the resolutions of support were not backed up by more concrete expressions of solidarity. Possibly many of those, who supported the idea of an Irish Republic in abstract were not prepared to support the use of force to establish it. In the aftermath of Bloody Sunday *Forward* argued that the effect of the violence of the IRA was to undermine the moral standing of Sinn Fein:

Murder is murder, whoever be Cain, and the murders in Dublin last Sunday have done much for the moment to weaken the growing volume of resentment at the atrocities being committed by the Government, and the growing sympathy with the Irish in their afflictions.

Up to last Sunday the Government was on the run; public opinion was steadily rising against the brutal George-Greenwood hunnaries in Ireland, but the retaliatory murders last Sunday have given the Georges and Greenwoods a political defence which they have not been slow to use.⁴⁰

It could also have been the case that those who were vociferous in their support for an Irish republic were not particularly interested in Irish affairs but found the subject a convenient stick with which to beat the Government. Of the Labour Conference of 1920 the *Forward* columnist Rob Roy (Patrick Dollan) stated: "I should imagine some of the most ambitious Labour Leaders are not sorry that for the present the solution of the Irish Question is in other hands than theirs".⁴¹ Certainly if those who framed the militant resolutions were ardent supporters of an Irish Republic then their views were not representative of feeling amongst the grassroots of the movement.

The question of "Direct Action" was to tax the minds of those within the STUC. The issue was debated at a special one day conference held in Glasgow on 10th July 1920. A resolution was passed, which called upon "affiliated organisations to refuse to manufacture, handle and transport munitions; or to transport troops for the purpose of repression in Ireland".⁶² In some quarters such utterances were viewed with apprehension. The intelligence services considered the industrial power of the Irish in Scotland to be a much more potent threat to the state than the Scottish Brigade of the IRA.⁶³ The *Daily Record* promoted a similar view and highlighted instances where the Irish, allegedly, had taken over high ranking positions within the unions; it would appear that the paper was running a Red-Green scare campaign.⁶⁴ In the event there was no organised attempt to disrupt the supply of munitions from Scotland. The only example of workers striking against the policy of the British Government in Ireland occurred in Giffnock. The miners at the local colliery went on a 24 hour strike and at a mass meeting passed a resolution, which called upon the local Executive to declare a 48 hour strike throughout the whole of Lanarkshire in order to demonstrate sympathy with the Irish people "in this their day of tribulation".⁶⁵

The failure of the wider Labour movement to take industrial action against the Government's Irish policy

was attacked by a delegate at the annual conference of 1921. In reply to such criticism Councillor John Heenan stated that the reason why the Unions had been unable to do so little for Ireland "was that in the Trade Unions there were too many who did not yet understand the justice of the Irish claim for freedom".** There would appear to be only two instances where industrial action was taken on the Irish issue, that at Giffnock and the Liverpool dockers' strike of 1920; it is probable that the respective workforces were Irish dominated. The bulk of the "native" workforce was indifferent and in Scotland, there was a large minority, who were actively hostile to the idea of establishing an Irish Republic especially in the mining and shipbuilding industries.

There can be no doubt that the actions of the Labour movement with respect to Ireland did not match their words. For this they were attacked from many quarters. John Maclean's pamphlets and articles such as *The Irish Tragedy: Scotland's Disgrace* and *Scotsmen, stand by Ireland* are representative of the criticism from the left.*' From the Irish community similar demands and arguments were heard. The question arises as to whether Labour's prevarication over the issue of an Irish Republic retarded its advance within the immigrant community. In the event the answer appears to be negative.

Prior to the general election of 1918 the *Glasgow*

Observer urged its readership to vote Labour, because of its sympathetic stance on Irish affairs. It was an implicit assumption that, if this rather than other domestic factors were paramount in the paper's conversion to Labour, its continued support of the Party was conditional on its adopting an Irish policy, which met with the satisfaction of the proprietor and the editor. The conditional nature of the *Glasgow Observer's* support of Labour was apparent in early 1920 in an article by Charles Diamond occasioned by the proposed visit to Ireland by the labour Commission. After Diamond had commented on the apparent lack of enthusiasm displayed by the Labour movement over the Irish issue, especially when compared with its attitude to Russia, he went on to threaten that Labour's future electoral appeal to the Irish community would be in jeopardy should the Commission not endorse republicanism: "If Labour takes a wrong turn on the Irish Question, it will not matter very much, in the long run, to Ireland. But it will matter a great deal to Labour in Great Britain".⁹⁹ When the report of the Labour commission was the subject of press speculation the *Glasgow Observer* once again adopted a strident tone:

The Labour Delegation is credited with being prepared to recommend that Ireland should have the utmost concession of self-government within the Empire. That means that it should have a different kind of British rule from the present kind. But the new kind of British rule, will be just the same as the old kind and will have just as much moral right and authority attached to it-

and that is none at all....

Of course in the Labour Party there are a great many "wise men" and "prudent leaders," as also "moderate men" and "men of reason." All these appellations mean the one thing. They mean men who are afraid of the logical, consistent, and thorough application of principles which they profess but fear to apply. They mean men who while professing themselves willing to give self-determination to all civilised peoples, are not willing to do so in the case of Ireland- not that they object from any sentiment of their own but because they "think it wiser" not to alarm or arouse the latent fears or prejudices of the English voter- the non-party English voter-with regard to Ireland.

These people will have to make up their minds one way or the other. They either stand with Asquith and Lloyd George for the imposition of an imposed British rule in Ireland against the will of the Irish People or they take their stand with Commander Kenworthy and Tom Myers, of Spen Valley, and other Labour representatives and Labour candidates like Mr. Biggar in Paisley, who are not afraid of their own principles nor afraid of the fearless application of them.

It is too soon to discuss the report of the Labour Delegation until it is formally published, but the considerations just set out may serve to prepare the minds of those who read them for the proper reception of that report when it arrives.'*

When the report was published it rejected the option of an Irish Republic in favour of a scheme of Dominion Home Rule a columnist in the *Glasgow Observer* reiterated the main points of the editorial quoted above. The writer stated:

The delegates solemnly inform the world that Ireland should have self-determination, but "that matters of Imperial defence and foreign affairs should be reserved for the Imperial Parliament."

In other words Ireland is to have "the sort of" self-determination that individuals like Mr Arthur Henderson consider good enough for Ireland....

These Labour leaders will have to make way for men of higher character and principle who are less acquainted with the bye-ways of politics and

know how to run straight...

People who are neither hot or cold ought to be vomited out of the mouth. These Labour leaders have either got to toe the line or get down and out.

They are bringing Labour into disrepute.⁷⁰

Although Diamond had previously threatened the Labour Party with the loss of Irish support at the ballot box if the report did not satisfy Irish aspirations, it is noticeable that the columnist did not take this line. He believed that those who did not support the idea of an Irish Republic should be replaced by those who did. This could only be done if the Irish remained within the Party and supported those who agreed with their views. In subsequent months the *Glasgow Observer* gave vigorous support to those elements within the Labour movement that supported Irish Republicanism while attacking those who did not. The conduct of the paper may be likened to that of an audience at the pantomime who cheer the "goodies" and boo the "baddies". When the ILP declared for "the recognition of the Irish Republic" the *Glasgow Observer* stated:

It will be seen that the rank and file of the Labour movement are absolutely sound and sincere on the Irish question and a good deal ahead of their official leaders in that connection.

Mr Wilfred Blunt in his latest volume of "Reminiscences" quotes Cunninghame Graham as having said twenty years ago that when Labour members get elected to Parliament their utility ceases because they immediately imagine themselves statesmen and moderate their pace. That criticism still applies.⁷¹

When J.R. Clynes stated in print that a settlement of the

Irish question was "not possible only upon lines desired by the Irish people" and that it "must be in accordance with the what Britain thinks the terms of a settlement must be" the paper resorted to name calling. It called Clynes "one of the rottenist Labour 'oracles'", "a mere runt...out to 'pose' as a 'statesman,' and to 'run with the hare and hunt with the hounds,' all the time keeping his eye on a job, a 'future,' a salary".⁷²

Although critical of those within the Labour Party who did not support Irish Republicanism during the Anglo-Irish war and, subsequently, men such as James Maxton, who helped those who aided the anti-Treaty cause in the Irish civil war, the *Glasgow Observer* never wavered in its support for Labour at national elections. Editorials and articles by Diamond consistently attacked those who advocated the formation of specifically Irish or Catholic parties in Great Britain. If the Irish were dissatisfied with the commitment of Labour they had to work from within the Party to ensure that it reflected their opinions.⁷³

The attitudes and opinions expressed by the *Glasgow Observer* were mirrored in the Catholic Socialist notes column in *Forward*. On many occasions the columnist was critical of the British Labour Party's stance on Irish affairs, but it never swerved from loyalty to the Party. For example, when a Sinn Fein candidate was nominated to stand at a by election in Southport the columnist

vehemently denounced the step:

The working class must make its choice as a class or, leave every group to make their own separate selection. We support the class method ...Is there really any substantial difference between the new cry of Irishmen in Britain making the Irish question their sole public interest and the appeal formerly made to them to adopt the same course by the United Irish League? Should Irishmen allow British Capitalism to rule triumphant, and in doing so to keep them in their slums and ignorance and general destitution, for the joy of waving the green flag?...

It may be true that the Labour Party as at present constituted may not meet the wishes of the Irish people, but if so this is an argument for improving the Labour Party, not for destroying it. The duty of the Irish in Stockport was to have actively interested themselves in the Labour movement, and seen that the chosen candidate was acceptable to them. The policy of remaining outside to criticize what others do in a field where they should be active will always be ineffective.⁷⁴

Throughout the Anglo-Irish war letters appeared in *Forward*, which criticised both the Labour Party and the Catholic Socialist Notes Column for a perceived lack of militancy on the Irish issue. Criticism from Sinn Fein in Scotland climaxed with the impending death of hunger striker Mayor MacSwiney of Cork. Sean O'Sheehan, organiser of Sinn Fein in Scotland, released a letter to the press in which he was as critical of the Labour party as of the Government:

We have noted the failure of the great British Labour Party who claim to be strong enough to prevent war with Russia to take any effective action against the policy of murder, outrage and terrorism carried on in Ireland by the British Government through its officers and men of the working classes who constitute its voluntary armies.

Should Lord Mayor MacSwiney die...all the

abovementioned parties [the Government and the Labour Party] must participate equally in the guilt of his murder.⁷⁵

At a subsequent public meeting held under the auspices of the Gaelic League at the St. Andrews Halls in Glasgow one of the speakers, Sean MacFergus from Belfast, reiterated this theme:

Criticising the attitude of the trade unionists' of this country to Ireland, he said the men at the Portsmouth Congress had dug a chasm that would never be filled between the democracy of this country and the Irish people in Ireland. The Congress was asked to use its influence so that the British Government might be deterred from the policy of the assassination of the Lord Mayor of Cork and eleven others, and the answer was a resolution had been forwarded to Mr Lloyd George, and that he had ignored it. Many of the Labour movement say they had no power. If they had the power they lacked the backbone to assert it. There was no difference whatever between the democracy and autocracy of this country.⁷⁶

The organisation, which stood to gain the most from friction between the Labour Party and Sinn Fein in Scotland was the Irish Labour Party. Commenting on the conflict between the two blocs, which had been manifest in the letter columns of the *Glasgow Observer*, one Irish Labour Party supporter stated:

For the last few weeks there has been various letters in your paper in reference to the Irish people's outlook in politics here. The majority, while yet having no faith in the official British Labour Party owing to their position regarding the Irish Republic, seem to favour Labour as the party which they should vote for at election time. These Irishmen or women who, while Labourist in their outlook, will not join the British Labour Party, forget that there is an organisation in great Britain which they could and should join, which, while standing for the

principles of Labour, yet puts the national issue first.⁷⁷

From the reports and adverts placed by the Irish Labour Party it would appear that many within the immigrant community were attracted to its philosophy.⁷⁸ However, its appeal was dependent on the continuation of the Irish Question at the top of the political agenda. It is unlikely that the growth of the Irish Labour Party adversely affected the fortunes of the British Labour Party amongst the immigrant community, because the former did not embark on electoral politics preferring the role of a pressure group to that of a true political party. In any event it is likely that once the Irish civil war erupted any threat to the emerging Irish/Labour alliance from pro Republican elements disappeared.

It is difficult to assess how far Labour's prevarication over the issue of an Irish Republic affected the Party's fortunes within the Irish community, because no General Election occurred when the Irish debate raged fiercely. In both the Paisley and Kirkcaldy by-elections the Labour candidates, unlike the Party leadership, expressed no objection to the concept of an Irish Republic should the Irish people desire such a status.⁷⁹ The evidence that exists, and it is slight, suggests that the bulk of the immigrant community would have supported the Labour Party irrespective of its stance on Irish affairs. In a local election in 1919 the *Glasgow Observer* urged the Irish in Govan not to support the official Labour

candidate, J.N.Docherty, because he had stood as a representative of the Irish Party in East Down in the General Election of 1918. The paper alleged that his intervention cost Sinn Fein the seat. Nevertheless, Docherty triumphed at the polls.⁵⁰ It is also noticeable that many Labour candidates, who were associated with either the UILGB or the AOH did not suffer electorally despite the fact that they did not support Sinn Fein.⁵¹

Historically, it was Labour's association with socialism and by extension atheism that most threatened any emergent Labour/Catholic alliance. The suspicions that existed in the pre war era appear to have diminished during the period of the conflict. Throughout the period 1919-22 the Catholic Socialist Notes column recorded less resistance to the activities of the Catholic Socialist Society on the part of the Catholic Church than had been the case in previous years. For example, the columnist stated in early 1919:

It is an interesting study to watch the evolution of the clerical mind from its stonewall hostility to Socialism of a few years ago to its present timid flirtation with our policy. One has to travel into very remote hamlets to find the local priest declaring that Catholicism and Collectivism are as oil and water. The average ecclesiastic is at last taking his stand with Pope Leo in making substantial claims for Labour. This gradual improvement is probably due to the driving force of an intelligent laity that is every day becoming more aggressively class conscious.⁵²

An example of clerical endorsement of the Labour Party came in the elections to the Education Boards in 1919

when Catholics were recommended to support Labour after giving their first preference votes to clerical candidates.⁹³

It has been argued by Tom Gallagher that the Catholic Church encouraged its communicants to support Labour partly because it did not want to alienate and then lose those of its flock, who were determined to support the Party and also to act as purifying influence within the movement working to dilute its radicalism.⁹⁴ The view that, by entering the Labour Party, the immigrant community could ensure that its more objectionable policies, from a Catholic point of view, would not be implemented was not new. Prior to the war the Govanhill-Patrick Sarsfield-branch of the UILGB had debated a motion, which promoted this viewpoint.⁹⁵ In the post war period the *Glasgow Observer* also articulated the line that only by integrating themselves into the Labour movement could they ensure that it was responsive to their needs and aspirations. Its proprietor stated: "many Socialists are secularists, but in Scotland the loyalty and influence of the Catholic membership of trade unions and Labour organisations counteract any sinister influence with which secularism might seek to invest Labour".⁹⁶ This point was articulated in many editorials:

For some years the Trade Union Congress found on its agenda paper resolutions advocating secularism in schools. Eventually those resolutions disappeared and troubled the Trade Congress no longer. Why? Because Catholics through their membership of various Trade Unions

throughout the country were able to exert - from the inside - an influence and power which disposed of the secularist suggestion so far as the Traded Congress was concerned. By joining the Labour Party and by voting Labour, Catholics will place themselves in the best possible position to exercise the salutary and effectual influence when the Labour Government arrives.⁸⁷

Both Catholics and left_wingers testify to the success of this tactic. John Wheatley commented that, with the influx of Roman Catholics into the Labour movement attacks on the Catholic Church from that quarter "had practically ceased".⁸⁸ The view that Catholic participation in the Scottish Labour movement acted as a drag on its socialist credentials was endorsed by Harry McShane and Tom Bell.⁸⁹ Of Wheatley, Bell stated: "He was successful in gathering around him a large following of young Catholic workers and keeping them out of the mainstream of the militant workers' movement".⁹⁰

It could, however, be argued that, rather than Catholics embracing the Labour Party in order to "tone down its radicalism and frustrate red agitators", it was the fact that the movement itself had proved itself to be a moderate rather than an extremist body that resulted in Catholic massing en bloc behind its banner. Recent work by I.G.C.Hutchison and Iain MacLean has done much to puncture the myth that "Glasgow was a revolutionary storm centre". The former approvingly quotes an ILF official's assessment of the "Red Clydesiders":

The candidates were an exceedingly diverse selection, they had nothing whatever of the

homogeneity of outlook and action expressed by such picturesque titles as "the Clydesiders" or "the Scottish Rebels". The men from Clydeside, as from all other districts, were of the Right, the Centre and the Left, as their temperaments, experienciess and habits of thought dictated.'¹

Arthur Woodburn provides a damning epitaph on the legend of "Red Clydeside". According to him: "The most revolutionary thing that ever happened in Scotland at that time was when J.S. Clarkes' wife made Davy Kirkwood wash the dishes - which he'd never done before".² While Easil Thompson and John MacLean saw the spectre of revolution on the streets of Glasgow Catholic clerics were able to differentiate between the Bolsheviks in Russia and the Labour Party in Scotland. In late 1921 the Rev. Fr. MacQuillen was adamant that Catholics could not be socialists unless they were either ignorant of their religion, or place hunting. Subsequently he was to state that he would "not confuse Labour with Socialism": this was one cleric, who did not believe that Labour posed a secular threat, which could only be nullified by a Catholic presence within the movememt.³

Had Labour in Scotland been more militantly socialist it is possible that, the Irish community would have been more reticent in embracing, and more fickle in their adherence, to the Party. Hutchison has shown that where strident left wingers stood in constituencies with a large Catholic population the latter did not support the candidate. In Motherwell, for example, the Irish community was prepared to abstain and let an Orange and

Protestant Party candidate be elected rather than vote for his Communist opponent.⁷⁴ However, to those who would maintain that the infiltration of the Catholics thwarted the emergence of a socialist utopia, it has to be pointed out that without this group's electoral support the advance of Labour would not have occurred at such a rapid pace, if at all. It should also be noted that virtually every group within the Labour Party, be they Trade Unions, militant feminists or those wishing to set up black sections, have sought to further their own sectional interests.

According to Iain Maclean the catalyst that resulted in the integration of the immigrant community in the Labour movement was local rather than national in origin. He contends that the issue of prohibition was the major stumbling block between a closer relationship between the two groups.⁷⁵ Temperance Reform had for a long period of time been a central ideological platform of the Scottish left. This was reaffirmed in 1920 by both the Scottish Labour Party and the S.T.U.C. The issue came to the fore in 1920 when a local referendum was held in each municipal ward on the question of local licensing hours. The electors in each ward were given the chance to choose between 'No Change' in the number of licenses granted, in the respective ward, restrictions on the number of licenses granted or no license, which would mean that the area would become dry.

In the event those who advocated Temperance Reform or Prohibition were soundly defeated in the Veto poll. The fact that this poll was held simultaneously with Municipal elections in Glasgow and other Burghs caused the issue of temperance to spill over into these contests. Many Labour activists complained that this retarded the Party's performance in the local elections. Not only did the drink question eclipse issues such as housing, but Labour's association with the No License campaign caused many working class voters either to abstain or vote against the Party; this, argues MacLean, was especially true in wards with many Catholic Irish voters.¹⁶ The *Glasgow Observer*, which although both its editor and proprietor supported prohibition, didn't exhort its readership very strongly over the issue, indeed space was given to several independent working class Catholic candidates recorded their opposition to prohibition.¹⁷ Irish 'publican' candidates triumphed in Cowcaddens, Provan and Calton.¹⁸ McLean argues that the reassessment that occurred within the Labour movement over its stance on prohibition as a result of the parties relatively poor performance in the 1920 municipal election played an important role in integrating the Catholic Irish community into the labour movement.¹⁹ One wonders if McLean has possibly overestimated Catholic Irish indifference to prohibition, at least at national level. For example, in the General Election of 1922, the Irish in Dundee played a prominent role in the election

of the only candidate of the Scottish Prohibition Party, Edwin Scrymgeour, ever to enter Parliament.¹⁹⁰ It could be argued that the "wet" Irish in Dundee could vote for Scrymgeour safe in the knowledge that as the only representative of the SPP in the house of Commons he would be unable to implement his policies; anybody was better than the alternative Churchill. Although the STUC reversed its prohibitionist stance in 1921, William Knox makes clear the strength of temperance sentiment within the inter war Scottish labour leadership. In 1922 Edwin Scrymgeour introduced a private member's bill for Liquor Traffic Control, which was supported by many prominent Scottish Labour M.P.s such as James Maxton.¹⁹¹ However, the bill was defeated by 236 votes to 14. Temperance Reform had no chance of making headway at Parliamentary level thus the wettest immigrant could safely vote for the driest Labour candidate in the knowledge that the former could not influence his drinking habits, for example, James Maxton enjoyed close relations with the Irish Catholics in his constituency of Bridgeton.¹⁹² Even at local level one wonders if the effect of temperance reform has been exaggerated. For all the examples of the Irish not voting for ILP candidates in 1920 it should be noted that the vast majority of the Irish did in fact vote Labour. In many areas people did differentiate between the the local elections and the referendum on the drink question. For example, in Mile End three ILP candidates were successfully elected despite the fact

that in this ward the "No License" campaign was soundly defeated.¹⁰⁴

In the period after 1914 Charles Diamond used the columns of the *Glasgow Observer* to abuse the UILGB. Although sometimes Diamond attacked the organisation because of its association with the Irish Party the main thrust of his diatribes was that its continued existence ensured the isolation of the community it purported to represent. As has been seen earlier Diamond argued that the best way for the immigrant community to achieve its social, economic and political goals was to integrate themselves into the mainstream of British society and the Labour Party in particular. This was diametrically opposed by T.F. O'Connor, who believed that the best way to advance Irish/Catholic claims was to remain as a distinct and separate entity. He outlined the issues that faced this community:

We have two possibilities with the Irish in Great Britain; either to go bodily into the Labour movement; or that they have an organisation of their own friendly to Labour but independent and outside the Labour Party. I am in favour of the latter policy; it is not...from racial or religious prejudice...My main reason is, that, taking them in average, the Irish in Great Britain are just where they were in 1846. living in slums, doing the hardest, the most precarious and worst paid labour. It seems to me that if the problem is to be faced and in any way alleviated it will require an Irish organisation; the Irish like the Jews must really look after their own. Doubtless any social ameliorations which maybe brought in by the Labour Party would extend to them; but they have problems of their own, not all political, which require the concentration of their own upon them. Besides, I rather shrink

from being absolutely dependent on the Labour Party. We certainly could get better terms from them by being up to a certain point independent of them. Proportional representation is bound to come. I think, to come soon, and under that we may with such an organisation behind us get a considerable number of Irish members in the Imperial Parliament.¹⁰⁴

The decline of the UILGB in Scotland would seem to suggest that it was the rewards offered by political integration which attracted many middle class Irishmen to the Labour cause. The first step down this road came at the UILGB's annual conference in 1919. Previously, UILGB members could not remain in the movement while holding an official position in any other organisation. However, the delegates at the conference voted to remove this disability and it was clear from the debate that many wished to seek positions in the Trade Union and Labour movements.¹⁰⁵ Presumably, many accepted this new departure, because they assumed that this would arrest the drift of members to the Labour Party. Ironically, those who availed themselves of the opportunities of "dual membership" soon transferred their allegiances totally into the Labour movement. O'Connor observed: "Most of our fellows when they join the Labour movement become pure Labour men. Many of them cease to be Catholic as well - an indication of how they become denationalised."¹⁰⁶ According to O'Connor, the decline of the UILGB was, in part, stimulated by the removal of the Irish Question from the political agenda but also because it offered few opportunities to politically ambitious immigrants. In

early 1923 O'Connor illustrated how the UILGB could not compete with the rewards on offer to those who joined the Labour Party:

the Labour movement...has an immense advantage over any appeals of ours - that it offers the clever young Irishmen a career and offices ranging from the Secretaryship of the Trade Union to membership of Parliament. I was surprised to find that in the Glasgow band of Labour members which has come into the present Parliament...there are no fewer than four Irish Catholic members. Thus, if we pit an Irish organisation with no such opportunities, rather with the absence of them against the Labour party organisation we should be carrying on in Great Britain a struggle somewhat analogous to that of our old Party in Ireland between a self denying organisation and another with loaves and fishes to offer.¹⁰⁷

In January 1924 O'Connor wrote the obituary of the UILGB:

With regard to the Irish organisation in Great Britain I have come slowly and reluctantly...to the view that such an organisation is now impossible. The lure of Ireland has gone, and the Labour Party, which has so many things to give and has given very freely I must say to our people, is very strong on the other side. Scotland is dead...and with some of our people like Wheatley in a high position in the Govt. revival will be impossible.¹⁰⁸

The role of the Labour Party, as described by O'Connor, in the demise of the UILGB appears to have been replicated in the case of the AOH. In early 1919 the Secretary's Report discussed the future of the Order: "The only danger I anticipate in Scotland is that our members may be attracted to the Labour Socialistic Party and consequently be lost to the movement".¹⁰⁹ The attraction of the Labour Party to those within the AOH harbouring

political ambitions can be gauged by the number who were elected in local elections. Of the 13 Catholics elected to Glasgow Corporation in 1920 11 were members of the AOH.¹¹⁰ That the AOH survived while the UILGB perished is explained by the fact that the latter was primarily a political body whereas the former had a wider spread of functions, especially in the economic and cultural spheres. It is noticeable that when discussing the threat posed to the AOH by the Labour Party the leadership of the AOH sought to broaden the organisation's economic appeal to its members.¹¹¹

The question arises as to whether the political integration of the Irish was due to the community becoming a less distinctive entity within Scottish society. There were factors that must have worked to that end. It has been noted that "there was some correlation between high unionisation and Labour voting strength".¹¹² Between 1914 and 1920 membership of trade unions throughout Britain doubled. It is likely that many within the immigrant community became unionised during this period. Thus, it may be argued, that the issues, which won the Labour Party the votes of "native" Scots also attracted those within the Irish community. However, there is evidence, which suggests that the Anglo-Irish war resulted in the immigrant community stressing rather than repressing their Irish origins. For example, it would appear that Sinn Fein in Scotland attracted over three times the membership the UILGB ever attracted.¹¹³

Although at national level the Irish voted solidly for Labour it is noticeable that this was not the case in many areas in municipal, and School Board elections. In his analysis of the 1920 elections to Glasgow Corporation Iain MacLean has attributed the electoral success of various Irish candidates to their opposition to temperance reform.¹¹⁴ It could, however, be argued that the success of Irish publican candidates was primarily due to their ethnic origins. In the previous years contest CSN columnist complained that in in Calton an Irish publican candidate received 75% of the immigrant vote while the ILP candidate came third in a three man poll. This occurred when the question of prohibition was absent as an issue in the campaign.¹¹⁵ It is also noticeable that while the *Glasgow Observer* enthusiastically endorsed the concept of political integration and advised its readers to vote solidly for Labour candidates at national elections, it did not endorse every Labour candidate at local level and, in some cases, supported specifically Irish candidates, who were opposed official Labour representatives.¹¹⁶ Amongst the wider immigrant community it would seem that when given a choice between Catholic or Labour candidates, as at School Board Elections, they would vote for the former. In the 1919 elections the CSN columnist recorded "that the Catholics voted nearly unanimously for the Church candidate"; though it should be noted that they

gave their second preference votes to Labour.¹¹⁷ In 1922 Maxton observed that many, who fought "alongside us in Municipal and Parliamentary Elections, voted not as Labourists but as Catholics...in the Education Authority".¹¹⁸ A prime example of this phenomena was one time Labour Parliamentary candidate and editor of the *Glasgow Observer* D.J. Mitchell Quin, who stood as a Catholic candidate in Education elections.¹¹⁹

While many would like to explain the electoral breakthrough of the Labour Party in positive terms i.e. the growth of socialism within the Scottish working class, it is evident that many who voted Labour did so only because the Liberals had disappeared as an electoral force.¹²⁰ In the pre war period many immigrants voted Liberal only because Labour had no hope of winning. now the situation was reversed. In late 1920 the *Glasgow Observer* commented that the "Liberal Party has so far got ahead of Labour in its denunciations of Hunnism." However, the paper was quick to point out the futility of voting Liberal; they could not possibly win:"There is a big advance in the Liberal attitude as expressed by Mr Asquith. But alas! it comes last. The Liberal Party has been pretty well wiped out as a Parliamentary force. It is a handful. So it may have the will, but it has not the power."¹²¹ Thus, it advised the immigrant community to redouble their efforts to convert Labour to a more favourable position on the Irish Question.

Had the liberals, in the post war period, remained the largest anti-Tory Party it is likely that Irish support for Labour would have been less than was the case. Moreover, had there been in operation a single transferable voting system with multi membership constituencies it is likely that a separate Irish Labour Party would have received many first preference votes from the immigrant community. It should be remembered that T.P.O'Connor retained his seat in Parliament until 1929 and it was death rather than Irish defections to Labour that terminated his political career. Where the Irish were in a position to elect members from their own community they did so. One suspects that the major impetus in realigning the Irish vote between 1919-22 was the prevailing political system; certainly it is not difficult to imagine a number of scenarios, in which the immigrant vote is not a homogenous bloc cast in favour of the Labour Party.

With the development of an "alliance" between the Labour Party and the Irish community in Scotland the question arises as to whether this relationship compromised attempts by the Labour Party to gain the support of the Orange/Protestant working class. As Iain MacLean has pointed out contemporary sources were reluctant to estimate the size of the Orange vote in Scottish constituencies and thus it is difficult to plot the political allegiances of this bloc. However, the links which which had bound the Orange vote to the Tory Party

since the early 1880s, if not before, became more tenuous as the twentieth century progressed. The culmination of this process came when the Orange Order decided to withdraw its representatives from the party's Western District Council.¹²² The Order took this course of action to register its disapproval of the Irish settlement of 1921. The Order went further and founded its own political organisation, the Orange and Protestant Party. Although there appears to have been several branches of the OPP in Glasgow, its only foray into electoral politics came in Motherwell. In 1922 the OPP fielded a candidate, Hugh Ferguson, after the sitting Unionist M.P. had criticized the Orangemen for being intransigent over the Irish settlement.¹²³ Ferguson's intervention split the unionist vote and allowed T.W. Newbold, a Communist, to be returned. In the General Election of 1923 Ferguson was the sole candidate of the "right". It would appear that the Unionists decided not to field a candidate so not to split anti-Communist vote, and Ferguson was elected to Parliament only to be defeated in 1924.¹²⁴

While tension existed between the Orange Order and the Unionist Party during the General Election of 1922 it is questionable whether the Labour party benefited to any great extent. The *Orange Standard* consistently portrayed Orangeism and socialism as mutually incompatible entities, the latter having a strong association with Roman Catholicism. The journal alleged, that the

electoral success of the Labour Party was due to priestly guidance and to bribery and corruption in the form of the Rent Reducation Act.¹²⁵ However, the friction between the Orange Order and Unionist Party did affect the fortunes of the latter. The General Committee of the Glasgow Unionist Association was informed that: "The attitude of the Orangemen, who at the earlier stages did not enter into the contest with any degree of zest also had unravourable results".¹²⁶ This comment would seem to suggest that the Orange Order had played an important role in the Unionist party's organisation in the city but it does not preclude the possibility that the disenchanting Orangemen still voted for the Party although they no longer worked for it. There is some evidence that many Orangemen did vote Labour once the Irish Question disappeared from the political agenda. Tom Johnston portrayed Orangeism in Scotland in a sympathetic light at least compared with their brethren across the north Channel. Whereas in Ulster the Order was a tool of the ruling classes, in Scotland "it was not pledged to uphold the Capitalist cause but the Protestant faith".¹²⁷ *Forward* certainly claimed that many Orangemen voted Labour.¹²⁸ Moreover, Maryhill and Paisley Tories partly ascribed their defeats in 1922 and 1924 to the leakage, up to a third of their erstwhile supporters, of the Orange vote.¹²⁹ The fact that various columnists in the *Orange Standard* spent so much time attacking socialism would suggest that it proved more attractive to the

brethern than the leadership wished.

At local level a similar patchy picture prevails. In 1920 *Forward* complained that a Labour candidate in Maryhill attracted much hostility, because of his pro Sinn Fein views. Of Fartick and Whiteinch the paper stated that it was "a noted stronghold of Carsonism and at election times the primitive passions of the people are easily roused in violent opposition to Labour".¹³⁰ However, at least one "Carsonist" and one time UVF member, William Reid, was standing as a Labour candidate in Mile End.¹³¹ Furthermore, Labour, once again, won easily in Larkhall the "capital" of Orangeism in Scotland.¹³² In 1922 Maxton complained that many who had voted Labour at national and local level supported specifically Protestant candidates in the elections for the Educational authority.¹³³

The inter war period witnessed the zenith of specifically Protestant Parties at local election level in both Glasgow and Edinburgh. It would appear that, in Glasgow, the respective Protestant Party, the Scottish Protestant League, attained its successes mostly at the expense of the middle class Moderates, whereas in Edinburgh the Protestant Action Party was strongest in working class wards.¹³⁴ This paradox could possibly be explained by the strength of the Labour-Catholic "alliance" in the respective cities. In Glasgow this was strong and may, therefore, have inhibited some Protestants from voting Labour. In Edinburgh, in the absence of such a

relationship, Protestants might have been less reluctant to associate themselves with Labour whatever the strictures of the Orange leadership. This explanation could also account for the relative strength of the Conservative vote at the local level in the Coatbridge area.¹³⁵ This would seem to suggest that, in some areas, there was a Protestant backlash against the Labour-Catholic "alliance". However, it is possible to explain this phenomenon as a legacy, from an older political system. During the era in which Irish Home Rule predominated Unionists cultivated strong links with the Orange Order. It is possible to attribute residual Orange support for the Tories in areas such as Glasgow and Coatbridge to the fact that the Orange movement had, to some extent, been integrated into Conservative and Unionist Party. Even when the OPP was attempting to establish itself as an independent political entity many prominent Orangemen remained in the Unionist Party. Indeed, one time Grandmaster and OPP officebearer MacInnes Shaw stood for the Tories in Paisley in 1923.¹³⁶ In other areas such as Edinburgh where these links were weak, if they existed at all, the Tories were less likely to have as great a hold on the Orange vote.

If the close relationship between the Labour Party and the Catholic community did provoke an Orange backlash it might be expected that some Protestants would become alienated from the wider labour movement and that Catholic-Protestant rivalry would weaken the Trades

Unions. However, there seems to be many examples of the rival factions supporting each other when their interests coincided. In 1914 *Forward* remarked:

Cleland, like so many other mining villages, is split over the religious question...There is an Irish corner and a Scottish corner. Yet during the great coal strike [of 1911] these brother collier sunk religious differences: Orange and Green bands worked together in processions and demonstrations, and fought for the common end.¹³⁷

A similar process occurred during the 1915 Glasgow rent strikes:

Like Ibrox and parts of Govan, Partick was well known for its strong Masonic and Orange Order contingents, though this did not prevent their adaption of popular loyalist and patriotic slogans to attack the oppressive factors. One local woman who remained a life long Tory and Orange leader is reported to have played a prominent role in mobilising local tenants, borrowing a fishmongers bell as the alarm against the approach of the enemy.¹³⁸

Although the Orange leadership opposed the General Strike of 1926, and claimed that the bulk of the Order's membership shared their views, some Orange flute bands manned the picket lines.¹³⁹

While it is possible to identify some areas, in which the Protestant working class supported the Tories it should be remembered that had this been widespread then Labour would not have been able to achieve its predominant position in Scottish politics.¹⁴⁰

Footnotes

1. F.D. Schneider 'British Labour and Ireland, 1918-1921: The Retreat to Houndsditch', *Review of Politics* 40, (1978) p.373.
2. *Forward* 4 May 1918 Quoted in F.D. Schneider *ibid* p.373.
3. *Glasgow Observer* 6 July 1918.
4. *Glasgow Observer* 20 July; 3 Aug; 14 Sept; 5 & 26 Oct; 2 Nov 1918.
5. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Nov 1914; 6 & 13 Feb; 22 May 1915. In these articles Diamond merely articulated the need for the Irish to integrate into the mainstream of British political life. Diamond did not specify which party the Irish should support.
6. *Glasgow Observer* 24 Aug 1918.
7. See Introductory Chapter p
8. *Glasgow Observer* 6 July 1918.
9. *Glasgow Observer* 7 & 14 Dec 1918.
10. *Forward* 2 Nov 1918.
11. *Glasgow Herald* 18 Nov 1918.
12. *Glasgow Herald* 18 Nov 1918.
13. 44 of those who received the UILGB's official mandate are listed in the *Daily Record* 7 Dec 1918. Subsequently the UILGB advised its members to support Brown and Scrymgeour in Dundee and Wedgewood Benn in Leith. *The Scotsman* 9 Dec 1918.
14. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Nov; 14 Dec 1918; *Forward* 21 Dec 1918; *Daily Record* 10 Dec 1918; *Glasgow Herald* 10 Dec 1918; *The Scotsman* 11 Dec 1918.
15. *Glasgow Herald* 13 Dec 1918; *Forward* 21 Dec 1918.
16. *The Scotsman* 9 & 10 Dec 1918.
17. *Glasgow Herald* 12 & 13 Dec 1918; *Forward* 7 Dec 1918; *Glasgow Observer* 14 Dec 1918.
18. *The Scotsman* 11 Dec 1918.
19. *The Scotsman* 9 Dec 1918.
20. *Glasgow Herald* 9 Dec 1918.
21. R. McGhee-J. Dillon 15/12/1918 Dillon MSS 6757/1064.
22. *Glasgow Observer* 28 Dec 1918.
23. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 8/12/1919 Dillon MSS 6743/716.
24. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Jan 1919; *Forward* 4 Jan 1919.
25. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Jan 1919.
26. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Dec 1918; *The Scotsman* 9 Dec 1918. Give widely differing estimates of the size of the Irish electorate in the city.
27. *The Scotsman* 10 Dec 1918.
28. *Glasgow Herald* 12 Dec 1918.
29. *The Scotsman* 9 Dec 1918.
30. There was a large Irish contingent in Govan though it should be noted that Iain McLean considers it to have been somewhat unorganised. I. McLean *op cit* p.276. The Coalitionist candidate in Hamilton attributed his defeat to the Irish vote. *The Scotsman* 30 Dec 1918.
31. I. McLean *ibid* p.196.

32. For the Glasgow figure see I. McLean *ibid* p.155; Martin Pugh *Electoral Reform in War and Peace, 1906-18* p.196 gives the national poll.
33. Diary Entry 22 Dec 1918. MacCallum Scott MSS 1456/9.
34. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Jan 1919; *Forward* 31 Jan 1920.
35. *Glasgow Observer* 2 Nov 1918.
36. *Glasgow Observer* 30 June 1917.
37. *Forward* 27 Apr; 14 Sept 1918.
38. See articles by Hieronymous in *Glasgow Observer* 29 June; 13 July 1918.
39. *Daily Record* 12 Dec 1918.
40. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Jan 1918. Quoted in I. McLean *op cit* p197.
41. W.M. Walker 'Dundee's Disenchantment with Churchill', *Scottish Historical Review* 49, (1970), p.98.
42. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Nov 1922.
43. *Glasgow Observer* 7 June 1919.
44. For details of one specific rally see *Forward* 13 Sept 1919.
45. Labour Party, The P.L.P. Commission of Inquiry Into the Present Conditions in Ireland, pp. 11-2. Quoted in M. Tobin *The Irish Question and the Emergence and Development of the Labour Party* p.96.
46. Report of Labour Commission to Ireland p.58. Quoted by C. Desmond Greaves *Liam Mellows and the Irish Revolution* p.234.
47. F.D. Schneider *op cit* p.388.
48. C. Desmond Greaves *op cit* p.190.
49. C. Desmond Greaves *ibid* p.190.
50. Report of the 27th Annual Conference of the ILP. Huddersfield. 20-22nd April 1919 p.75.
51. Report of the 28th Annual Conference of the ILP. Glasgow. 4-6th April 1920 pp. 95-7; *Forward* 17 Apr 1920; *Glasgow Observer* 10 Apr 1920.
52. M. Tobin *op cit* p.102.
53. M. Tobin *ibid* p.102.
54. For example, see *Forward* 22 May 1920.
55. *Forward* 9 Oct 1920.
56. *Forward* 6 Nov 1920.
57. *Forward* 18 Sept 1920.
58. The final reference to the Fund is in *Forward* 25 June 1921.
59. *Forward* 4 June 1921.
60. *Forward* 27 Nov 1920.
61. *Forward* 3 July 1920.
62. Angela Tuckett *The Scottish Trades Union Congress: The First 50 Years 1897-1977* pp. 176-7.
63. Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 53, CP 1239, 6/5/1920, CAB 24/105.
64. *Daily Record* 20 Mar. 11 & 13 Sept, 8 Oct 1920.
65. *Forward* 29 Jan 1921.
66. Angela Tuckett *op cit* p.177.
67. The pamphlets are reproduced in Nan Milton *John Maclean: In the Rapids of Revolution* pp. 165-177.
68. *Glasgow Observer* 10 Jan 1920.
69. *Glasgow Observer* 7 Feb 1920.

70. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Mar 1920.
71. *Glasgow Observer* 10 Apr 1920.
72. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Oct 1920.
73. *Glasgow Observer* 31 Jan; 7 Feb; 28 Feb; 10 July; 28 Aug 1920.
74. *Forward* 3 Apr 1920.
75. *Glasgow Observer* 4 Sept 1920.
76. *Glasgow Observer* 18 Sept 1920.
77. *Glasgow Observer* 16 Oct 1920.
78. It was claimed that the membership of the Irish Labour Party in Glasgow expanded by 344 in the summer quarter of 1920. See *Glasgow Observer* 11 Sept 1920.
79. *Glasgow Observer* 31 Jan 1920; 1921
80. *Glasgow Observer* 1 Nov 1919; *Forward* 15 Nov 1919.
81. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Nov 1920.
82. *Forward* 10 May 1919.
83. *Forward* 12 Apr 1919.
84. T. Gallagher 'Catholics and Scottish politics', *Bulletin of Scottish Politics* 1, (1981) pp. 25 & 31.
85. W. Knox *Scottish Labour Leaders, 1918-39* p.33.
86. Article by Diamond reprinted in *Forward* 3 May 1920.
87. *Glasgow Observer* 29 Nov 1919.
88. *Glasgow Observer* 14 Feb 1914.
89. H. McShane & Joan Smith *No Mean Fighter* p.110.
90. T. Bell *Pioneering Days* p.79.
91. I.G.C. Hutchison *ibid* p.280.
92. I. McLean *op cit* p.239.
93. *Forward* 17 Dec 1921; 7 Jan 1922.
94. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.290.
95. I. McLean *op cit* pp. 181-4, 189-91.
96. I. Mclean *ibid* pp. 181-2.
97. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Oct 1920.
98. I. McLean *op cit* p.183.
99. I. McLean *ibid* p.182.
100. W.M. Walker *op cit* pp. 97-9. It has been stated that many of the supposed Prohibitionists were drunk during the campaign. J.T. Ward *The First Century: A History of the Scottish Tory Organisation* p.27.
101. W. Knox *op cit* pp. 23-25.
102. W. Knox (2) *James Maxton* pp. 35-7.
103. *Forward* 13 Nov 1920.
104. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 28/11/1922 Dillon MSS 6744/903.
105. *Freeman's Journal* 19 June 1919.
106. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 19/3/1920 Dillon MSS 6743/748.
107. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 7/2/1923 Dillon MSS 6774/914.
108. T.P. O'Connor-J. Dillon 28/1/1924 Dillon MSS 6774/947.
109. Secretary's Report 4/3/1919 AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925. B.R.S. 12/1/2.
110. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Nov 1920.
111. Secretary's Report 4/3/1919 AOH Minute Book 27/12/1912-21/7/1925. B.R.S. 12/1/2.

112. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* pp. 285-6.
113. See pp 131-2 of *thesis*
114. I. McLean *op cit* pp. 181-4, 189-91.
115. *Forward* 15 Nov 1919.
116. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Oct 1920.
117. *Forward* 12 Apr 1919.
118. *Forward* 1 Apr 1922.
119. Another example was P.J. O'Callaghan who unsuccessfully represented Labour in the Maryhill ward in the 1920 local elections. Both he and Mitchell Quin were accorded the status of purely Roman Catholic candidates by *Forward*. *Forward* 1 Apr 1922.
120. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.283.
121. *Glasgow Observer* 23 Oct 1920.
122. *Orange Standard* April 1922; Scottish Unionist Association Western Office Minute Book 1, Meeting of Western District Council 11 Jan 1922, p.280.
123. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.323.
124. I recall that when I was looking through the Scottish Unionist Minute books Ferguson was included in a list of Unionist candidates and not listed as a representative of the OPP.
125. *Orange Standard* Jan 1923. The question of whether an Orangeman could be a socialist was answered in the negative in the *Orange Standard* May, June & July 1923. The Scottish columnist admitted he was waging a campaign against "socialism and disloyalty." *Orange Standard* July 1923. An Orange manifesto highlighting the alleged relationship between the Labour Party and the Roman Catholic Church was issued in the run up to the local elections in 1921. *Glasgow Herald* 26 Oct 1921.
126. General Committee Glasgow Unionist Association Minute Book 6, 27 Nov 1922.
127. *Forward* 3 Feb 1923.
128. *Forward* 3 Feb 1923.
129. Maryhill Conservative Adssociation Minute Book. 20 Nov 1922. I.G.C. Hutchison *op cit* p.288.
130. *Forward* 13 Nov 1920.
131. *Belfast Telegraph* 19 Apr 1963.
132. Labour also won in noted Orange areas such as Irvine and Armadale. *Forward* 15 Nov 1919.
133. *Forward* 1 Apr 1922.
134. William Miller 'Politics in the Scottish City, 1832-1982', in G. Gordon *Perspectives of the Scottish City* pp. 201-2; I. McLean *op cit* p.220.
135. J.T. Ward states that this relationship continued until 1959 while J.G. Kellas & Peter Fotheringham believed that Orangeism inflated the Unionist vote in local elections as late as 1972. J.T. Ward *op cit* p22: J.G. Kellas & P. Fotheringham 'The Political Behaviour of the Working Class', in A. Allan MacLaren *Social Class in Scotland: Past and Present* p.146.
136. Other prominent Orangemen remained within the Unionist Party. For example, Sir Charles Cleland, a onetime Grandmaster, remained prominent in the Maryhill branch of the Party. It is doubtful if the OPP really

deserves to be classified as a genuine political party but rather than a pressure group. It is noticeable that Col Moore, Unionist MP for Ayr and an Orangeman, did not choose to fight in the colours of the OPP and face political oblivion.

137. *Forward* 13 June 1914.

138. J. Melling *Rent Strikes* pp. 70-1.

139. *Orange Standard* June 1926; C. Harvie *No Gods and Precious Few Heroes* p.94.

143. Evidence exists which suggest that many Protestants in Glasgow harboured doubts about the Labour Party's relationship with the Catholic community well into the second half of the twentieth century. However, despite such suspicions a large proportion of them Protestants did vote Labour. J.G. Kellas *The Scottish Political System* pp. 102-5.

Chapter 7

The Effect of the Irish Question on Communal Relations
in Scotland, c1912-22

Popular opinion would suggest that, in many respects, sectarian friction in Scotland was an extension of the conflict in Ireland. Evidence to support this view is not hard to find. The most visible manifestation of this phenomenon in modern Scotland is the 'Old Firm' football match between the two Glasgow teams, Rangers and Celtic. It is noticeable that the symbols, which the fans identify with are imported from across the North Channel. Supporters sing songs in praise of the UVF and the IRA, and take Ulster Red Hand and Irish tricolour flags to the match. In Bill Murray's book, *The Glasgow Giants*, one picture of fans at a match points out the virtual absence of purely Scottish emblems.' If it is believed that the motivating forces, which drive Scottish sectarianism are imported from Ireland and not natural indigenous factors within Scottish society, it might be expected that the heightened prominence of the Irish Question between 1912-21 would exert a baneful influence on community relations in Scotland.

At no other time did the Irish Question dominate British politics as much as it did between 1912-14. This period witnessed a bitter battle on behalf of the Ulster Unionists and Irish Nationalists to mobilize popular support amongst the Scottish people, more specifically its electorate, for their respective causes. The extent of this "invasion" can be gauged from the fact that the Unionist Associations of Ireland organised 3,843 public meetings and canvassed 205,654 "doubtful" voters in 50

constituencies between September 1911 and mid July 1914.² In addition, various branches of the Unionist Party in Ulster campaigned in Scotland independently of the UAI.³ Furthermore, prominent Irish Unionists such as Sir Edward Carson undertook many speaking engagements in Scotland.⁴ Although the Irish Nationalists were not as active in courting the Scottish public as their Unionist counterparts, they were by no means absent from the fray. By February 7th 1914 there had been approximately 4,000 Irish Nationalist meetings in Great Britain since the introduction of the Home Rule Bill.⁵ Irish Party M.P.s were active in the campaign. John Redmond and Joseph Devlin addressed large rallies in Glasgow.⁶ On many occasions lesser lights carried the message to the Scottish electorate. One example was J.J. Clanag, who addressed 10 meetings in 10 different constituencies between 20-30th October 1913.⁷ In addition, Irish Home Rule obsessed the editorials of every major Scottish newspaper during this period. It was the subject, which obsessed the minds of every person connected with politics, from prospective candidates to the leaders of the Liberal and Unionist parties.

There can be little doubt that the re-emergence of the Irish Question resulted in the topic of religion entering into the mainstream of political life. Since the first Home Rule crisis of 1886 Ulster Protestants had feared that any dilution of Ireland's position within the United

Kingdom would result in curtailment of their civil and religious liberties. because any Irish legislature would enact laws that would reflect the Catholicism practised by the majority of Irishmen. This was explicitly expressed in the Unionist slogan "Home Rule is Rome Rule". Protestant fears were by no means imaginary. Many Nationalists equated Catholicism with Irishness. John Dillon stated:

I assert, and it is the glory of our race, that we are today the right arm of the Catholic Church throughout the world...we stand today as we have stood throughout, without abating one jot or tittle of that faith, the most Catholic nation on the whole earth.⁶

This was no idle boast; words were backed by actions. In 1908 the Pope promulgated the *Ne Temere* decree, which declared that any marriage between a Protestant and Roman Catholic not solemnised by the rites of the Catholic Church was null and void. In 1910 a Belfast Catholic, Alexander McCann, instigated by his priest, left his Protestant wife taking with him their children. The Rt. Rev. C.F. D'Arcey, the Bishop of Down, complained that in Ireland "marriages which the law of the land declares to be valid are declared null and void, and the children of them pronounced illegitimate".⁷ The conduct of Irish Nationalist M.P.s such as Joseph Devlin, leader of the ADH, who defended his co-religionists actions in Parliament reinforced Protestant fears.¹⁰ If this type of event could occur when Ireland was subject to the jurisdiction of a Westminster Parliament what would it be

like if Home Rule were achieved? In an article by an Ulster Unionist M.P., Thomas Sinclair, it was pointed out that

during the Committee stage of the 1893 Home Rule Bill...Mr. Redmond, and his Irish Nationalist colleagues voted against, and defeated, an Ulster amendment which proposed to exempt marriage and other religious ceremonies from the legislative power of a Dublin Parliament.¹¹

Dismissive of Liberal claims to have inserted safeguards in the third Home Rule Bill that would protect the rights of the minority the implication of Sinclair's argument was that a Dublin Parliament would permit many more McCann style cases.

The recently published *Moto Proprio* Papal decree was also vehemently attacked as a threat to the religious liberties of Protestants in Ireland. Unionists contended that this placed Roman clergy above the law as it provided for the automatic excommunication of anybody who, without permission from the relevant ecclesiastical authority, summoned any cleric to a lay tribunal and compelled them publicly to attend such a court.¹² It was further alleged that it implied the excommunication of any Roman Catholic M.P. who took part in passing and by every executive officer of the government, who took part in promulgating a law, which was held to invade the liberty or rights of the Church of Rome.¹³

While the *Moto Proprio* decree threatened any member of a

Dublin Parliament with excommunication if he voted for or condoned any proposed legislation, which conflicted with Papal doctrine, many within the British Liberal Party did not believe that a Dublin Parliament would enshrine its laws with such a Catholic ethos. When the third Home Rule Bill was framed certain safeguards were inserted which, the authors supposed, would protect the religious liberties of the Protestants. Unionists contended that these provisions were not worth the paper they were written on because of the strength of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland. Ireland had more priests per head of population than virtually any other nation on earth.¹⁴ Moreover, whereas other nominally Catholic countries such as France and Italy had strong secularist traditions, this was absent in Irish society. When Garibaldi sought to unify Italy against the wishes of the Pope a brigade of Irishmen went to fight on the Pope's behalf. The ultramontane creed, which characterised Irish Catholicism would ensure that the "rights" of Irish citizens would be moulded in the image of Roman doctrine.

Unionists also highlighted instances of Protestants being oppressed by their Catholic neighbours on account of either their politics or religion. If Redmond or Dillon were respectable they shielded the darker forces, which infested Irish Nationalism. Should Home Rule become a reality the power behind the throne would be the AOH. On many occasions British electors were presented with what Unionists claimed was the oath taken by AOH members which

stated that the organisation sanctioned the violence against Protestants and Protestant church property.¹⁵ An attack by members of the AOH on a party of Protestant Sunday school children in Castledawson in 1912 was cited as evidence of an aggressive nationalism which would be given free reign in a post Home Rule Ireland.¹⁶

Despite the fact that 1912-14 marked the zenith of the Irish Question in political life evidence that the heightened prominence of the issue poisoned Catholic-Protestant relations in Scotland is difficult to find. If one looks through the Scottish press it is impossible to find any co-relation between the activities of Ulster Unionist campaigners and a rise in anti-catholic attitudes on the part of the indigenous population. There is some evidence which suggests a hardening of the divisions. It would appear that the attendance at Orange parades during this period was greater than in previous years.¹⁷ The same would seem to apply in the case of the AOH.¹⁸ It was noted that during the Leith by election of 1914 Catholics of a non Irish background voted for the Liberal candidate because of his support of Home Rule.¹⁹ However, in almost every instance where sectarian friction was evident, it would appear that domestic rather than external factors were responsible. In the political sphere sectarianism flourished not at national level but on the school boards. Various school boards discriminated against Catholics by refusing to give them

the free meals and books claimed by Protestant parents whose children attended school in the area controlled by Board.²⁰ Dalziel School Board was involved in legal action, which went to the Secretary of State for Scotland, when it dismissed a teacher, who had converted to Catholicism.²¹ There were very few examples of physical violence erupting between the two groups during this period. "Twelfth" parades occasionally ended with the "traditional" fracas.²² Catholics broke up meetings held by evangelical ministers.²³ The only example of large scale fighting erupted in Motherwell in 1914. This was occasioned by the visit of Celtic. According to a columnist in the *Motherwell Times* members of a Govan based Celtic brake club were intent on causing trouble and chose a deliberately provocative route to the match. The writer was of the opinion "that people going down County corner waving Green flags are asking for it".²⁴ Although it could be argued that the tensions of the period may have inflamed passions on both sides, it is likely that the catalyst that caused the fighting to erupt was an attempted incursion into Orange territory rather than politics. Thus, such a riot could have occurred at any time; indeed this riot was replicated when Celtic next visited the town in 1915.²⁵

It has been asserted that the most lasting impact on Scottish society of the pre war Ulster crisis was the emergence of Glasgow Rangers as an exclusively Protestant football club. The arrival of Harland and Wolff in Govan

in 1912 is alleged to have resulted in an influx of militant Protestant workers from Belfast, who attached themselves to the local club and endowed it with a Protestant ethos.²⁴ That transfers of population can imbue a football club with an identity it did not previously possess can be seen in relation to Cliftonville, a club based in North Belfast. Prior to the demise of Belfast Celtic, Cliftonville was associated with a tradition of amateurism. They were popularly known as the "Queens Park of Belfast". However, as the club was situated near the Catholic ghettos of the Ardoyne and New Lodge it became the natural focus for those who had previously supported the Falls based Belfast Celtic.²⁷

It would, however, appear unlikely that the emergence of Rangers as a Protestant club was the result of an influx of Protestant migrants in 1912. Firstly, Govan had a large organised Protestant population prior to that date and it is likely that those, who did have an interest in football supported Rangers. The fact that Rangers only fielded 11 Roman Catholics, many of whom played only a few games for the club, between 1873 and 1919 suggests Rangers may have preferred to sign Protestants long before 1912.²⁸ Certainly Bill Murray explains the emergence of a sectarian dimension of Scottish football was the result of domestic factors. The success of teams with a pronounced Irish Catholic ethos, Celtic and to a lesser extent Hibernian, with whom the vast bulk of the

Scottish public could not identify resulted in these supporters gravitating towards Rangers when it became apparent that they were the only club that could consistently challenge for honours. Murray states:

The real origin of sectarianism in Scottish football lay in the very formation of Celtic Football Club and their unprecedented success. The success of Celtic at the time coincided with a resurgence of catholic militancy both in local matters and Irish national affairs. Every country with a large immigrant population went through these same problems, but in Scotland there was a combination of features that made them more volatile than in any other country outside Ireland. It was from these factors, deep in the nature of Scottish society, that the Celtic Football Club sprang, and from it the rivalry we know as the Old Firm.²⁹

Murray believes that this phenomenon originated in the last decade of the nineteenth century:

In 1896 Celtic and Hibs were at the top of the Scottish League, prompting Scottish Sport to note the dominance in Scotland of two Irish teams and more or less asking where the Scottish team was that could challenge them.³⁰

The view that Rangers became associated in the minds of the public with protestantism because of internal pressures is to some extent confirmed by the existence of a sectarian dimension to the Hearts-Hibs rivalry. Nobody suggests that Hearts became the Protestant club in Edinburgh as a result of it pandering to the prejudices of Ulster immigrants, but rather acquired this image largely as a reaction to the overtly Irish and Catholic traditions of its premier local rivals. What differentiated Hearts from Rangers was the fact that the

latter, for much of its history, refused to sign Catholics. How did this come about? One writer speculates:

A deliberate, clearly-defined signing policy was in all probability never introduced by Rangers - natural progression and social divides were the real seeds in a divided city. When, decades later, Ibrox officials wanted to break the mould, they were held back in part by fear of the backlash which they believed would be unleashed, and in part by their own ingrained, partly-dormant, prejudices.³¹

The question arises as to why the Ulster crisis did not inflame sectarian tensions in Scotland. Historians such as Joan Smith and Tom Gallagher have argued that the the plight of the Ulster Unionists evoked little sympathy in their co-religionists in Scotland. In actual fact this was not the case. Those, who believe otherwise, seem to base their contentions on a comparison of the crowds who attended respective meetings addressed by Sir Edward Carson in Liverpool and Glasgow in the autumn of 1912. Gallagher states: "the response from Scotland for a Unionist *jihad* was distinctly feeble. In October 1912 only 8,000 turned out in Glasgow for Carson, the Ulster leader, compared with the 150,000 who at 7.00 a.m. on a Sunday morning had awaited his arrival at Liverpool pier head a few days earlier".³² Although the Glasgow meeting was not as impressive in numerical terms, it should be noted that Carson more than filled the St. Andrews Hall: an overflow meeting proved necessary.³³ There was no attempt to hold a mass meeting in Glasgow open to the

ordinary members of the public, rather it was a rally of the "great and the good" in West of Scotland Unionism. A writer in the *Glasgow Herald* commented that Carson appeared no less pleased with his reception in Glasgow than that which he received in Liverpool.³⁴ In actual fact it would seem that of the two meetings Carson was more impressed with the former. In private correspondence with Lady Londonderry Carson stated: "The Demonstration at Glasgow was the most magnificent & enthusiastic I have ever seen".³⁵ Even the pro-Liberal, and pro-Irish Home rule, *Greenock Telegraph* admitted that a "huge audience" had attended the meeting although it claimed that those who attended did so out of curiosity rather than as an expression of support for the Ulster leader.³⁶ When Carson toured Scotland the following year reports in the pro-Liberal *Daily Record* were testimony to the success of the meetings.³⁷ When Carson was forced, in the Autumn of 1913, to cancel meetings in Inverness and Aberdeen George Younger described the news as "most disastrous" because "the demand for tickets to those meetings have been enormous".³⁸ Finding that the disappointment amongst the Aberdonians was "so acute" Younger made a personal appeal, which in the event was successful, to Arthur Balfour to step in as a last minute replacement.³⁹

During the period, in which the third Home Rule Bill was before Parliament, there were five by-elections in Scotland, all in seats defended by the Liberals. The Unionists emerged triumphant in three of the contests,

sharply reduced the Liberal majority in another while the Liberals retained one seat with an increased majority. However, in each of the constituencies where the Tories won, they did so on a minority vote.⁴⁰ Thus, it could be argued, that the advance of the Unionists was primarily the result of Labour intervention which split the "left" vote and let in the Tory rather than an electorate voicing its disapproval of the Home Rule Bill.

While it must be conceded that the Irish issue did not play a significant role in the Unionists triumph in the Midlothian by-election of October 1912, what votes the Tories did gain from the Liberals was the result of reeling against the Insurance Act rather than Home Rule, there would seem to be little doubt that the re-emergence of the Irish issue aided the Unionist cause in Scotland.⁴¹ In October 1913 a by-election occurred in the constituency of West Lothian. While the Liberals retained the seat their majority fell dramatically.⁴² The contest witnessed many incursions by Irish Unionist and nationalist speakers and there can be little question that the Irish issue was the main topic, which exercised the mind of the electorate. Local unionists, including the unsuccessful candidate, were fulsome in their praise of the work done by the UAI during the campaign.⁴³

The next contest in Wick Burghs saw the Liberals retain the seat with an increased majority.⁴⁴ There were many Liberals, who claimed that the activities of the

Ulstermen produced a backlash on the part of the electorate.⁴⁵ However, it would appear that the by-election was decided by local factors. The contest was caused by the appointment of the sitting M.P., Robert Munro, to the position of Lord Advocate. Many in the constituency thought that the Unionists should not fight in the mandatory by election out of respect for Munro's achievement. If Munro was respected as a man by the electorate it was unlikely that his Unionist opponent was held in similar esteem. It was revealed, six days before polling day, that he was a director of the Gaiety Theatre in London, an establishment where the paying customer was assured of "catchy tunes, enchanting girls and adroit comedians".⁴⁶ Such a business connection was unfortunate in a constituency with a staunch Presbyterian ethos; it also rendered a campaign, which sought to highlight the religious objections to Irish Home Rule open to ridicule. One journal commented: "Imagine a political caucus running a director of the London Gaiety Theatre as a candidate and winding up its meetings by singing 'O God. Our help in ages past.'" ⁴⁷ Furthermore, many Unionists claimed that remarks made during the campaign by J.W.Gulland who implied that the Government would view with more sympathy Wick's application for a grant to improve its harbour if the Northern Burghs was represented by a Liberal than a Unionist proved a fatal wound to their campaign. The correspondence columns of the *Northern Ensign* show that many of the electorate were thinking along these lines

even before Gulland uttered the controversial remarks.⁴⁹ Although both Asquith and Gulland were to apologize to the House of Commons for the latter's remarks by then the damage had been done.⁴⁹

The disappointment of the Unionists at the Wick result was partly assuaged four days later when they won in South Lanarkshire, albeit on a minority vote. The UAI claimed that there was

not the slightest shadow of a doubt but that Home Rule was the most important factor in the conversion of a considerable number of Liberals, some of whom had never previously voted for [a] Unionist candidate before.⁵⁰

While the defeated Liberal candidate might have disagreed about the magnitude of those who defected over the Irish issue he did concede that it was an electoral asset for the Unionists:

I am very confident that by the time the next election comes round a considerable number of farmers who are at present opposed to Home Rule will support the Liberal after that question has been got out of the way.⁵¹

The Labour candidate also bemoaned the impact the Irish Question had upon his fortunes:

Labour cannot, and does not, choose to deny that Home Rule has played a not unimportant part in the contest. The great majority of the agricultural interests in South Lanark have been impressed by the fears of Catholic supremacy as depicted by the Tory.⁵²

The last contested by-election in Scotland before the

onset of the Great War occurred in Leith in February 1914. This result mirrored that of South Lanark in that the Unionist won on a minority vote. Leith had always returned a Liberal to Parliament since the constituency was formed in 1832 and a Unionist victory was totally unexpected. However, less surprising, was the fact that the rival candidates put forward different theories to explain the result. The Unionist victor George Currie said his slender triumph marked "a splendid victory for the cause of the Union" and was "a message to Ulster to cheer her in her distress".⁵³ The defeated Liberal pointed out that the Unionist vote was eclipsed by the combined vote of the Liberal and Labour Parties, both of which supported the principle of Irish Home Rule.⁵⁴

In order to ascertain the political trend indicated by the by-election result it is necessary to find the most relevant previous by-election or General election contest with which to compare the result. In the aftermath of the Unionist victory those with Liberal sentiments compared the Unionist vote in 1914 with the vote it gained in the General Election of December 1910. However, this is surely the wrong contest, with which to compare the 1914 result. The only previous three cornered contest in Leith occurred in the General Election of January 1910. The comparison between the results of the January 1910 and 1914 by-election reveal that the Unionist poll rose by 619 votes and that their share of the vote increased from

31.5% to 37.8%. In sharp contrast the Liberal poll plummeted by 1987 votes and its share of the poll declined from 57.2% to 37.7%. The performance of Labour closely mirrored that of the Unionists. Labour gained 622 votes and their share of the poll rose by 5.6%.⁵⁵

It would appear that, of those who voted Liberal in January 1910 but did not do so in 1914, one third defected to the Unionists, one third abstained while a third defected to Labour. Evidence which suggests that a reaction against Home Rule was a major factor in the decline of the Liberal vote is provided by the UAI. They quote the pro Liberal *Evening News* as stating that "the leakage in the Liberal Poll was due amongst other causes to the 'persistent Campaign against Home Rule pushed on for months.'"⁵⁶ In the same paper "Liberal Worker", whose comments were endorsed by J.M.Hogge Liberal M.P. for East Edinburgh, wrote:

Anti-Home Rule opinions did to some extent effect this election. It was discovered in the course of the contest that for a long time past large staffs or canvassers had been patiently working religious objections to Home Rule for all they are worth, and more, with the result that over and over again Home Rule canvassers came across Liberals, strong church people, who told them they had genuine scruples over the granting of Home Rule.⁵⁷

It is possible that the Liberal vote in Leith was more susceptible to an appeal based on anti Home Rule sentiment than in many other areas in Scotland. This was because the retiring M.P., Munro-Ferguson, had always

stressed his antipathy towards the Irish cause. Thus, in the past Munro-Ferguson may well have been able to count on the electoral support of some who were "Unionist" over the Irish Question, but "Liberal" on other questions such as Free Trade. However, with the departure of Munro-Ferguson, this type of voter would have to choose whether to continue supporting the Liberal Party. One example of a prominent Leith Liberal, who faced this dilemma was James Currie, the owner of the Currie shipping line. In November 1913 he refused to accept the position of honorary Vice President of Leith Liberal Club. In his open letter of refusal he stated:

I hold very strong opinions upon the Home Rule question, but in view of the attitude of Mr. Munro Ferguson towards the present Bill I have not felt it hitherto, incumbent upon me to take any step to emphasise my dissent on this question and still less to sever formally my connection with the Liberal Party in Leith...[However] If I find myself confronted with the alternative of abandoning either Liberalism or the Liberal Party I cannot hesitate to choose the later sacrifice.⁵⁶

In the event Currie supported his namesake in the subsequent by-election.

One noticeable fact about the Leith by election was that only 77.1% of the electorate voted. This was a much lower participation rate than those in the contests in West Lothian, Wick and South Lanarkshire, which registered turnouts of 87.8%, 91.8% and 89.4% respectively.⁵⁷ According to the UAI once Scottish radicals were confronted by the Ulster cause some would vote Unionist

"but the majority will do the next best thing, viz:- abstain from voting at all."¹⁰ Thus, the Unionists may have "gained" many Liberal abstentions as a result of the prominence of the Irish Question during the campaign in Leith.

There can be no doubt that the UAI were more than satisfied with their campaigning exploits in Scotland during the period 1912-14, more so than the response they elicited in their campaign in England. In July 1914 the UAI estimated that the Unionists would gain 14 seats in Scotland in a General Election if the Irish Question eclipsed the other political issues of the day.¹¹ If the issue had been confined to a referendum Unionists were confident that their cause would triumph at the polls. Commenting on the South Lanarkshire by-election the UAI stated that a "considerable number of Unionist working men [who were anti-Home Rule but] supported the Labour Candidate solely because he was a working man".¹² Obviously such temptations would be absent in a referendum.

The question arises as to why the heightened importance of the Irish issue did not produce a rise in sectarian friction in Scotland at this time. It would appear that a variety of factors ensured that the sectarian divisions in Ireland were not duplicated across the North Channel. The first point that should be noted was that every Irish organisation politically active in Scotland at this time

had no intention of stirring up sectarian hatred in Scotland. They were primarily concerned with gaining the sympathy of the Scottish electorate for their respective causes. When Unionists cited instances of Catholic intolerance the examples they chose were taken from Ireland. They wanted to show that, under a system of Home Rule, they would be discriminated against; it was little comfort to them if Catholic triumphalism in Ireland was matched by a Protestant ascendancy in Scotland. They wanted expressions of solidarity not pogroms. Writing in 1976 one journalist observed:

It seems clear that the Loyalist paramilitary activity around Glasgow, like its Republican counterpart, is geared towards intervention in Northern Ireland rather than bringing the conflict into Scottish seats.⁶²

A similar position prevailed in the period between 1912-21.

One factor which militated against any importation of sectarianism as a result of the heightened prominence of the Irish Question was that Scottish politics was not aligned on a religious basis, as was primarily the case in Ireland. This meant that a blanket condemnation of any religious sect would prove to be somewhat of a double edged sword. During the Midlothian by-election a Unionist activist outlined the difficulties posed by the introduction of religion into politics:

The religious question...may land us in

difficulties. Edmund Talbot is going to speak in the division I believe and as a Catholic he will doubtless make it clear that opposition to home rule does not arise from hostility to the Roman Catholic Church... if he disclaims anxiety as to the religious intolerance that might be shown by a Roman Catholic Government in Ireland we shall forfeit the support of some Radical Nonconformists. On the other hand I cannot help feeling that it would be wise that you [Bonar Law] personally should disassociate yourself from the Anti Roman Catholic attitude which will inevitably be assumed by a considerable number of your followers, and which I fear will alienate Conservative Roman Catholics.⁶⁴

He was not alone in his opinion.⁶⁵ Such attitudes ensured that overt sectarian appeals were generally eschewed by Unionists.

Religion was by no means absent from Scottish politics during this era, but unlike Ireland where the divisions sprang from the Reformation and the battlelines were drawn between Catholics and Protestants, in Scotland the major source was the Disruption and the conflict was primarily an inter Protestant dispute. The main political question, which separated the Protestant Churches in Scotland was whether the state should endow any particular church. Conservatives supported the idea of a state church, which should be accorded special privileges in areas such as education while Liberals, or at least a large proportion of them, wished to disestablish the national Churches in England and Scotland. Thus, the Liberals tended to gain the support of the vast majority of the adherents of the United Free Presbyterian Church, which espoused the idea of voluntarism.

Throughout the period of the Home Rule crisis the Ulster Presbyterians sought to gain support for their cause by petitioning the various Protestant Churches in Scotland. It is noticeable that, whereas many within the Church of Scotland were anxious to stress solidarity with their beleaguered sister church there is little evidence to suggest that the Ulster Presbyterians enjoyed much success in detaching many U.F. Presbyterians from their support of the Liberal Party by this appeal to their sense of Protestant solidarity. When Belfast Presbytery sent a letter outlining an attack by members of the AOH on a Protestant Sunday School outing at Castledawson and asking the recipients to condemn the incident and Home Rule it evoked a sympathetic response from many Church of Scotland Presbyteries. The members of the Glasgow Church of Scotland Presbytery unanimously passed a motion which stated:

The Presbytery desire to assure their brethern as they have done on former occasions, that they are in wholehearted sympathy with them in their struggle against Home Rule. They believe that the passing of such a measure would not only be grossly unjust to Ulster but also to the cause of civil and religious liberty. The Presbytery earnestly hope that the grave danger which is threatened by the introduction of Home Rule Bill may be averted and their prayer is that the struggle in which their brethern are now engaged may be with the blessing of God crowned with success.⁶⁴

Presbyteries in Greenock, Aberdeen, Edinburgh, Ayr, Oban, Irvine, Haddington and Dunfermline passed similar motions.⁶⁷

This sympathetic attitude was maintained throughout the crisis both at national and local levels within the Church of Scotland. In 1914 Glasgow Presbytery endorsed a motion, which re-affirmed "their heartfelt sympathy with their fellow Presbyterians in Ulster in their great struggle for civil and religious liberty" and appointed Sunday 29th March as a Day of Prayer on which the faithful could direct their supplications to this purpose.⁶⁹ While the Moderator of the General Assembly in that year, the Rev. Dr. Nicol, stated that they regarded as an outrage

that the intelligent, industrious, loyal, law abiding, and God fearing people of a great province of the Empire should be placed under a system of government which they declared they detested, and which they had good reason to believe would be dominated by a power hostile to Protestant ideals of civil and religious liberty, and should be placed under that system by the brute force of a political coalition in Parliament.⁶⁹

Although some secondary sources have claimed that there was little sympathy for the Ulster Unionist cause amongst established Presbyterians, this was not the case.⁷⁰ One minister stated that

he found that in the time of greatest trouble of the Irish Church the Church of Scotland was their truest friend. She had never failed them nor would she fail them again should the crisis which seemed imminent and threatening ever take place. Through her Presbyteries and the General Assembly she had already expressed her determination to stand by them and to make their quarrel her own.⁷¹

The Free Church also strongly supported the Unionist cause in Ireland from the outset. In May 1912 its Committee on Religion, Morals and Temperance attacked Home Rule as the thin end of a Nationalist wedge and left no doubt that it opposed the measure on religious grounds:

Very shortly the same parties would not be content with Home Rule. There is no appeasing of Roman Catholics, and it is folly of the most arrant kind for a Protestant nation to legislature to please them. The Government's first duty is to the Protestants of Ireland and it will be an outrage should this measure be granted.⁷²

Such sentiments were commonplace amongst the smaller conservative Presbyterian organisations. The Committee on Religion and Public Morals of the Original Session Church questioned "the moral right of a Christian Government to handover some of its subjects to the rule of unloyal and Romanish authorities".⁷³

In sharp contrast with its sister Presbyterian Churches was the stance of the United Free Church. When Belfast Presbytery presented its motion concerning the attack by the AOH at Castledawson it received a lukewarm response. When one time Unionist Parliamentary candidate J. Buyers Black submitted motion, which expressed sympathy with the plight of Irish Presbyterians, the members of Glasgow UF Presbytery passed, by "a large majority", a proposal not to discuss the motion.⁷⁴ UF Presbyteries in Aberdeen, Dalkeith and Galashiels also refused to discuss the

motion sent by Belfast Presbytery.⁷⁵ When the Irish Presbyterians sent a delegation to tour Scotland to put forward their views Aberdeen UF Presbytery refused to give them a hearing while it was only on the casting vote of the chairman that granted them the opportunity to address Glasgow UF Presbytery.⁷⁶ The response, which typified the stance of the UF Church throughout the crises was outlined by an editorial of the *Missionary Record* in late 1912:

Our friends in Ulster appear to be puzzled by the actions of Presbyterians on the Home Rule question. Some of these have passed motions sympathising with them; others have declined to discuss the matter. The 'truth' is that the majority of people in Scotland are watching the development of the question with the closest interest but are meantime holding their judgement in suspense until they see more clearly what effect the impending political changes will have on the position of their co religionists. There is no lack of sympathy with the latter and if it turns out that their religious freedom is menaced Scotland will act quickly enough.⁷⁷

Such an ambivalent attitude was opposed by some elements within the UF Church. In the summer of 1914 a petition critical of the Home Rule Bill was signed by over 170 UF Church office bearers was sent to Asquith.⁷⁸ It is not clear if this represented a sea change on the part of the Church over the issue. Unionist sources claimed that many Liberals had signed the petition, but this was denied by pro-Liberal elements.⁷⁹

No topic dominated the letter columns of the *Glasgow Herald* and *The Scotsman* as the stance of the UF Church on

the question of Home Rule.⁹⁰ Many criticised the UF Church for abandoning their co-religionists and alleged they were doing so in the hope that a Liberal Government would ultimately disestablish the national churches in Scotland and England.⁹¹ On the other hand, many UF Presbyterians were quick to point out that the Ulster Unionists had not displayed a sense of Protestant solidarity with the non conformists in England and Wales when the Unionist Government of the day passed the 1902 Education Act. One UF office bearer stated:

To me the civil and religious freedom of the Protestants of Ulster will be more assured under Home rule than that of our non-conformist brethren will be under a prelatial Tory Government, who, be it noted, are still suffering under the yoke of the legislation passed by the so called friends of religious liberty in Ulster.⁹²

This point was highlighted by Lloyd George in his message to the electors of Wick Burghs in December 1913. He stated:

It is rather sickening to see the upholders of sectarian privileges in England and Wales profess to be the champions of religious equality for Ireland. I wish English and Scottish Tories would concede to English and Welsh Non Conformists the same measure of religious equality and fair play as will be guaranteed to Ulster Episcopalians and Presbyterians under the Home Rule Bill.⁹³

The only example of violence erupting at a meeting concerned with the Irish Question between 1912-14 came during this by election campaign when local Liberals broke up a meeting in Dingwall, which was being addressed

by Ulster clergymen. It is ironic to note that the seeds of this disturbance were to be found in the Disruption and not at the Battle of the Boyne.⁵⁴

It would appear as if the Irish Nationalists sought to ensure that the Home Rule issue did not solely revolve around the question of religion. The two men most active in their campaign in Scotland, the MP Richard McGhee and the editor of the *Ulster Guardian* W.H.Davey, were both Protestants. Their presence must have helped those pro-Home rule Protestants resist the Ulster Unionist appeals for Protestant solidarity.

Although UF Presbyterians aligned themselves behind the Irish cause this did not mean that they had any particular love for the Catholic faith in Scotland.⁵⁵ While it is easy to portray Catholicism in Scotland as being as intransigent and aggressive as in Ireland the relative numerical strengths meant that they could never threaten the Protestant ethos of Scotland or the civil and religious liberties of its inhabitants. As Steve Bruce observes: "for all the waving of tricolours at Celtic football games, Scottish Catholics are not trying to move Scotland into a new political unit."⁵⁶ Had they been attempting to do so, and had any chance of succeeding, it was likely that the differences that existed between the various Protestant denominations in Scotland would have been submerged and a pan-Protestant defensive alliance would have developed. This had

happened in Ulster. In the latter part of the eighteenth century and the opening decades of the nineteenth there was much friction between Presbyterians and adherents of the Church of Ireland.⁹⁷ The Orange Order originally appealed largely to the latter but Presbyterians started to flock to its banners once the Home Rule issue began to dominate Irish politics.⁹⁸

It has been argued earlier in this chapter that the Unionists in Scotland benefitted electorally because of the heightened prominence of the Irish Question. However, this does not necessarily mean that those who switched to the Unionists were doing so either because they were anti Catholic (or pro Protestant for that matter) or because they were sympathetic to the appeals of the Ulster Protestants. Some Scots may have feared the economic implications of Irish Home Rule. Both Aberdeen and Glasgow Chambers of Commerce publicly opposed the Government's Irish proposals, but both made clear that their stance was dictated by economic considerations, that Home Rule would prove injurious to the British economy in general and the Scottish economy in particular, rather than the political and religious aspects of the issue.⁹⁹ One constituency which the Unionists hoped to win in an election dominated by Irish Home Rule was East Perthshire. *The Scotsman* pointed out that many of the small manufacturing towns in the constituency were linked to the Ulster economy through the linen industry and concluded that this would help the

Unionists capture the seat.⁹⁰

It has been alleged that the enthusiasm displayed by the Conservative Party on behalf of Ulster was motivated primarily by a concern to maintain the integrity of the United Kingdom and the Empire rather than any concern for the fate of the Ulster Unionists. Bonar Law outlined what Ulster represented in the eyes of many British Unionists in a speech delivered before a crowd of over 100,000 at Balmoral, a suburb of Belfast:

Once again you hold the pass for the Empire. You are a besieged city. The timid have left you; your Lundy's have betrayed you; but you have closed your gates. The Government have erected by their Parliament Act a boom against you to shut you off from the help of the British people. You will burst that boom. That help will come, and when the crisis is over men will say to you in words not unlike those used by Pitt - you have saved yourselves by your exertions, and you will save the Empire by your example.⁹¹

The re-emergence of the Irish Question gave a small impetus to the campaign for a Parliament in Edinburgh. It is noticeable that Scottish Unionists were advised to appeal to Imperial patriotism in order to counter any upsurge in Scottish nationalism because:

*The wider imperial patriotism...had proved of great benefit to the imperialist and Unionist Party at the time of the Boer War as the so called "khaki" election showed - when the Radical Party was for the first time in a minority in Scotland.*⁹²

While imperial objections to Irish Home Rule were put forward by all sections of Unionist opinion in Scotland

it must be stated that they preferred to stress Ulster's case against Home Rule. One wonders if it would have benefited the Unionist party more had it laid greater stress on this Imperial aspect of the Irish Question. From the correspondence columns of the papers it would appear that the Imperial objections to Home Rule did not concern the majority of those, who opposed Irish Home Rule. Nevertheless, it could have been the case that those who highlighted Ulster's cause did so because they had concluded that this way was the best means of maintaining the status quo. As one historian has stated "if the fight for the empire and for the integrity of the United Kingdom could be won on the streets of Belfast, then that was were it would be contested".'

In John Buchan's novel *Mr. Standfast* there is a passage, which is a vivid description of the anti-Irish feeling that existed in Glasgow and the West of Scotland during the First World War. In the novel a character by the name of Andrew Amos, a border radical, comments on the Irish:

Glasgow's stinkin' nowadays with two things, money and Irish. I mind the day when I rolled Mr Gladstone's Home Rule policy, and used to threep about the noble generous, warm hearted sister nation held in a foreign bondage. My Goad! I'm not speakin' about Ulster, which is a dour ill natured den but our own folk just the same. But the men that will not do a hand's turn to help the war and take the chance of our necessities to set up a bawbee rebellion are haterul to Goad and men. We treated them like pet lambs and that the thanks we get. They're coming over here in thousands to tak the jobs of the lads that are doing their duty. I was speakin' last week to a widow woman that keeps a wee dairy

down the Dalmarnock Road. She has two sons, and both are in the Army, one in the Cameronians and one a prisoner in Germany. She was telling me that she could not keep goin' any more, lacking the help of the boys. through she had worked her fingers to the bone. 'Surely its a crool job, Mr Amos,' she says, 'that the Government should take both my laddies, and I'll maybe never see them again, and let the Irish gang free and take the bread irae our mouth. At the gas works across the road they took on a hundred Irish last week, and every yin o them as young and well set up as you would ask to see. And my wee Davie, him thats in Germany, had aye a weak chest, and Jimmy was troupled wi' a bowel complaint. Thats surely no justice.'"⁴

There would appear to be little doubt that there was a rise in communal friction during the war years as compared with the preceding period. As indicated by the above passage this was not primarily due to the political events that occurred in Ireland, but a reaction to an influx of Irish immigrants and, probably more important, the fact that the Irish were not subject to the same military obligations as the Scots.

In August 1915 *The Scotsman* described the influx of Irishmen that occurred in Motherwell in the previous twelve months:

When the war broke out many hundreds of young men left their employment in the steel works and joined the Army. To fill their places there was a great influx of to the town of young Irishmen drawn nither by big wages that were to be made. In large numbers they have been arriving ever since and finding lucrative employment."⁵

Govan was also the destination of many immigrants. In March 1916 a columnist in the *Govan Press* wrote: "A good many young Irishmen, just over from the 'ould counthry'

are getting work to do about the docks, taking the place of others who have had to go and fight. This does not seem fair."'⁶ The influx of Irish immigrants was not limited to urban areas. There was much comment on Irish harvesters in Ayrshire in 1916 and 1917.⁷ Though it should be noted that this migration was a seasonal one, had a tradition extending long before the war and during that time was not subject of much hostile criticism, that it now engendered public comment was indicative of the decline that had occurred communal relations since the outbreak of the war.

Throughout history and in many locations any influx of immigrants has resulted in a hostile response from the native population. That community relations deteriorated at this time might not have been unexpected. However, it is unlikely that this would have occurred to such an extent had Irishmen been subjected to the same military decrees as the Scots. During 1915, indeed throughout the war, many letters appeared in the Scottish press, which alleged that Ireland, more specifically Catholic and Nationalist Ireland, had not proved a particularly successful recruiting ground for the British Army.⁸ Apparent proof that the Irish were "shirking" their military duties came in August 1915 when "many" of the immigrants returned "home" to avoid being registered under the provisions Military Service Act. In Motherwell it was reported that

Since the distribution of the registration forms this week these young [Irish]men seem to have taken sudden fright and are leaving the town in large numbers...It is thought that these young men believe that by spending the weekend in Ireland they will escape registration.⁷⁹

The Govan Press commented on the response of the Irish in its area to registration:

The nationality question provided some amusing answers from the Irish. With surprising unanimity the Irishmen in our midst refused to regard Irish and British as synonymous, and declared for their separate nationality.

'Irish means British, surely,' said one official. 'Oh, no it does not, sor' was the vehement answer. One wrote down 'Irish, and proud of it' and 'another said he was an Irishman born in Scotland.' A particularly touching feature was the fact that many Irishmen, though long resident in Govan, gave as their usual postal address some town or obscure village in Ireland.⁸⁰

When Ireland was exempted from the application or conscription a correspondent in the *Govan Press* was sarcastic in his observation:

And so conscription has come at last, has it? And the starred men are to escape, and Ireland has to escape. Why should the distressed Isle get off? Are the Government afraid of what might happen! And yet they are not afraid to grant Home Rule. But oh! beg pardon, that is politics, and we don't deal in them here. All the same, emigration to Ireland will become popular know.⁸¹

There can be little doubt that many Scots felt aggrieved that recruitment in Ireland failed to match expectations and that this stimulated sectarian friction between the two communities. On many occasions minor fracas developed in Scottish ports when locals attacked Irish boarding

ships destined either for Ireland or the USA.¹⁰² A columnist in the *Govan Press*, in March 1918, commented on the effect Irish immigration had on communal relations: "that so many young strong Irishmen are over here making good whilst so many Govan lads are about St. Quentin and the other danger zones, does not make for peace either amongst the engineers or anywhere else."¹⁰³

To those, who considered the Irish fundamentally disloyal, the Easter Rising must have seemed as the final confirmation of this fact. However, it is noticeable that in the response of the Scottish press to this event, even that element which had vehemently supported the Ulster Unionists in their fight against Home Rule, was not to use it as stick with which to beat the Irish but to stress, quite correctly, how marginalised the insurgents were in Irish society. For example, *The Scotsman* stated that the Sinn Feiners had "as little affinity to the Nationalists as to the Ulster Unionists. They have denounced the recruiting policy of Mr Redmond as they have declared against the fortitude of Ulster."¹⁰⁴ Both the *Glasgow Herald* and *The Scotsman* portrayed the Rising as being the inevitable result of Birrell's lenient policy which allowed Sinn Fein enough rope to hang themselves.¹⁰⁵ Even this attempt to score political points was soon eclipsed by the hope that the aftermath of the Rebellion would create the conditions necessary that would allow an agreed settlement between the rival Irish factions.¹⁰⁶

As to the position of the Irish in Scotland there appears to have been a concerted attempt by the press to ensure that the immigrants were not tarred with the same brush as the "Sinn Fein" rebels in Ireland. Papers, which had previously paid little attention to the experience of the Irish in Scotland, now devoted many column inches to reporting UILGB, AOH and INF meetings which were critical of the Easter Rising.¹⁰⁷ The only exception was the "Dreadnaught" columnist in the *Govan Press* who commented on the part played by men from Glasgow and Govan in the rebellion.¹⁰⁸ However, his views were by no means representative of the paper since another columnist commented that the local Irish, "in the opinion of all sensible men,...had as much to do with the trouble [in Ireland] as they had with the Armenian Massacres."¹⁰⁹

It would appear to have been the case that, throughout the war, the bulk of the Scottish press attempted to highlight positive aspects of Irish participation in the war. When, in 1915, there were many reports of Irishmen in Scotland attempting to evade the provisions of the Military Service Act the *Govan Press* pointed out the sacrifices made by the Irish of the parish on behalf of the allies: "Anyone who has studied the casualty lists published in columns will be forced to admit that the Govan Irish lads have done their full share of hard fighting."¹¹⁰ The *Greenock Telegraph* noted that "with some insignificant and contemptible exceptions Irishmen

are standing shoulder to shoulder with their fellow Britains".¹¹¹ In the summer of 1916 many papers reported the gallant actions of Irish Regiments and the following year they were fulsome in their praise of Willie Redmond, an Irish Nationalist M.P. who died at the front wearing a British Army uniform.¹¹² The insertion of such stories would suggest that the Scottish press did not deliberately seek to inflame Scottish passions against Irish immigrants. Presumably, this was to ensure that the Scottish war effort was not curtailed due to an outbreak of sectarian friction within the public at large.

The growth of anti-Irish sentiment was accompanied with a growth of anti-Catholicism. This was the result of a number of factors. The first was theological in origin. In December 1914 the recently appointed Special Envoy to the Vatican, Sir Henry Howard, presented his credentials and met the new Pope. The resumption of diplomatic relations between Britain and the Vatican evoked a hostile response from some sections of the Protestant Churches in Scotland. In the *Burgher*, organ of the Scottish Reformation Society, the move was roundly denounced in the name of the British people:

For the British Government to send congratulations to a Roman Priest on his assumption of an office the profanest on earth, and the titles and perogatives which by right belong to God alone, is not only to share the guilt of the assumption, but also to denigrate and compromise the British nation, the vast majority of whose people have no respect for the Pope of Rome and, if they were directly consulted

would refuse to have anything to do with him whether diplomatically or otherwise.¹¹³

When the Glasgow Knox Club predictably condemned Howard's appointment *The Buiwark* doubted whether the Government would accede to the demands of such marginal groups. If the Government was to reverse its policy a larger and broader campaign had to be mounted:

Will the Government be influenced by these [the hostile resolutions passed by the Knox Club] and similar resolutions from Protestant societies? We rear not. but if the great Churches of Scotland and the Non-conformists of England and Wales would only take up the subject in earnest and tell the Government in plain terms that the mission to the Pope is a policy they will not stand, the mission would certainly be recalled. These great communities of Protestants have now a precious opportunity of proving that their attachment to national Protestantism is sound, strong and reliable.¹¹⁴

Although this issue vexed the minds of some of the guardians of Protestantism in Scotland it would not appear to have been perceived as a threat by the mainstream Protestants. This question did not make the pages of the Church of Scotland's monthly magazine, *Life and Work*. In August 1915 the Scottish Reformation Society launched a public petition demanding the recall of the Papal Envoy. In January 1916 the petition, which was signed by 31,000, was presented to the House of Commons. Interestingly enough, in the absence, due to ill health, of C.E. Price it was his fellow Liberal Dundas White, who handed the petition to the mother of Parliament's. This illustrates the fact that many of those, who might be

classified as militant Protestants, did not oppose Home Rule on religious grounds.¹¹⁵

Another factor was the perception of some in Scottish society that the Pope favoured the Central powers at the expense of the Allies. Letters expressing such sentiments frequently appeared in the letter columns of the main newspapers such as the *Glasgow Herald* and *The Scotsman*, as well as in the popular Protestant publications, though it should be noted it was the editors of the newspapers, who usually curtailed discussion of the topic.¹¹⁶ *The Bulwark* thought that this was partly due "to the desire of the Press to preserve national unity at the present crisis, but to a great extent because of the Romanish influence at work in journalism".¹¹⁷ One suspects it was the former of the reasons cited rather than the latter, which ruled that such divisive issues were not allowed to dominate public debate during the war years.

In the spring of 1918 anti-Irish and anti-Catholic sentiment fused as a result of the Irish conscription crisis. When the Government announced, and subsequently passed into law but did not enforce, the extension of conscription to Ireland all sections of Irish nationalist opinion, the Irish Party, Sinn Fein and the Catholic Church, united in their opposition to the proposed measure. Whereas, previously, the Scottish press had been wary or criticising the role of the Vatican in the conflict, this was no longer the case. It was generally

perceived that, by opposing the British Government's proposals, the Catholic Church in Ireland had the backing of the vatican and this was considered the latest in a long line of instances where the Holy See frustrated the work of the Allies. The *Glasgow Herald* stated:

All the world took immediate note of his [Pope Benedict XV] failure to support the patriotic Belgian Cardinal Mercier. Since then, one ambiguous phrase has followed another...In Canada, in Australia, and in Italy the church has not helped the Allied cause. Now we have the Conclave Maynooth. It is idle for the Vatican to disclaim interference with the national hierarchies...Does Rome believe that Germany is now going to win the war? Do the secretly promised terms of peace include the dismemberment of Italy and the restoration of the temporal power? Is the hated rival Church in the east to be humbled permanently? Are these things to be the price of the prostitution of a great international institution to the ends of German materialism?''

The *Scotsman* also blamed the Vatican for the stance of the Church in Ireland toward conscription:

It is impossible to acquit the Vatican of responsibility for this great perversion of spiritual agencies. The ecclesiastical authorities of an important branch of the Roman Catholic Church would not dare to commit themselves to a policy which challenges the British Government to prove who is stronger and more authoritative - the Irish priest or the minister and Parliament of the King - without the direct sanction of the Pope.'''

There would appear to be little doubt that this resulted in further animosity towards the Irish. The *Glasgow Observer* commented :

Ireland is becoming more and more unpopular with the ordinary people of Great Britain. The Liberal

man in the street, who up till three months ago was a staunch Home Ruler, is wavering and coming to regard Ireland with a feeling of nausea as a hopeless, impossible country.¹²⁰

It is noticeable that the *Glasgow Observer* stated that the backlash was primarily directed against Irish political aspirations rather than Roman Catholics in general. Certainly, the *Glasgow Herald* could differentiate between the Vatican, and for that matter the Irish Hierarchy, and "Patriotic Catholics, Scottish and English" who had "fought as valiantly and wholeheartedly against the Germans as their Protestant countrymen."¹²¹ One wonders if the bulk of the Scottish population was so discerning? One suspects so. It is doubtful in a Catholic family, whose sons were fighting at the front, or who had suffered a bereavement as a result of the war were regarded with the same opprobrium as a recent young Irish immigrant, who had taken up employment in the Govan shipyards or the Motherwell steelworks. Nevertheless, some sources believed that this issue would continue to be a source of anti-Irish sentiment long after the war had ended. In 1920 an editorial in *Life and Work* stated: "While the generation lasts that suffered the anxieties of the Great War it will be burnt in the memory that at the solemn crisis of the Empire's faith it was the Roman Hierarchy in Ireland that opposed and made impossible the application of conscription there."¹²²

It is clear that sectarian tensions were high during the First World

War it might be expected that the Anglo-Irish war would have further stimulated communal friction in Scotland. In this period Irish Catholic disloyalty to the United Kingdom was manifest. In Ireland between 1919-21 the IRA killed hundreds of members of the British security forces, many of whom must have had links with Scotland. Scotland was not spared IRA violence, although it has to be noted that only one policeman died as a result of IRA activities. Throughout this period sources within mainstream Scottish society were not afraid to link the Catholic Church in Ireland with the IRA's campaign of terror. For example, in its editorial comment on the events of "Bloody Sunday", *The Scotsman* stated:

Cardinal Logue considers an act of defiance on the part of the military in the execution of their duty (This refers to the deaths at Croke Park. The paper contended that the army only returned fire once they had been attacked first by the IRA) a worse crime than assassination deliberately planned and executed with barbarous cruelty. Distasteful as it is to criticise the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Ireland, it must be said that his Advent Pastoral is at least equivocal. Lesser dignitaries and the parish priest may be justified in reading it as warranting a hate campaign against the British forces in Ireland...It is to be feared that under present circumstances the Government cannot look for much help from the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy in the suppression of crimes which ought to be anathema to the Church.¹²³

In the Church of Scotland's monthly magazine *Life and Work* the editor equated the Catholic Church with IRA terrorism:

And it must not be forgotten that the men who are

making Ireland a foul den of outrage and murder are members of a Church that requires them to go to 'Confession' and yet, so far as one sees or hears, does nothing to restrain their crimes...this magazine must repeat its testimony against the malign influence of a corrupt branch of the Church of Christ.¹²⁴

The question arises as to whether IRA activity provoked an anti-Irish (Catholic) backlash within Scottish society. Evidence of sectarianism is notoriously difficult to assemble. Primary sources, such as newspapers, did not dwell on this topic and unless sectarian friction was expressed in spectacular terms, riots, it remains invisible to the observer two generations removed from the period under examination. At best any attempt to measure sectarianism will resemble, not a graph but an impressionistic painting.

The upswing that occurred between 1919-21 in the fortunes of the Orange Order would suggest that there was an anti-Catholic backlash on the part of the Scottish people. According to the Scottish column in the *Orange Standard* membership increased steadily throughout the Anglo-Irish war; though the journal was careful not to quote exact figures of the organisation's numerical strength.¹²⁵ Thus, it could have been the case that the Order expanded primarily because of the cessation of the hostilities in Europe; membership rose as Orangemen returned from the trenches. However, it should be noted that the Order continued to expand long after the termination of the Anglo-Irish war. It was not until 1927 that it began to

suffer a numerical contraction; the reverse in fortunes being attributed to the deteriorating economic situation. Unlike other popular Protestant bodies, the Orange Order has been able to retain a mass membership over a considerable period of time. Its success in achieving this feat, not reproduced by more recognisably Scottish organisations such as the Scottish Reformation Society, the Protestant Action Party (PAS) or the Scottish Protestant League (SPL), may have been helped by immigration from Ulster and the importance of the Irish Question, but it has survived long after such factors ceased to play a significant role within Scottish society. Arguably, the primary explanation of the longevity of the Orange Order in Scotland may be the result of the social activities offered to the membership; social clubs, flute bands and parades.¹²⁶ A columnist in the *Govan Press* writing of his impressions of an Orange parade in 1913, commented that most of those present were more interested in having a picnic than listening to the speeches of the leaders present.¹²⁷ This situation seems to prevail today when it has been noted that "the numbers drinking cans of beer or eating ice-cream on the grass verges away from the rally exceeded those listening to speeches by top Unionist politicians from Ulster."¹²⁸ In many ways Orangeism, past and present, could be classified as an embedded cultural phenomenon, not dependent on transitory political or religious events for its continuing appeal.

There is little evidence to suggest that the intensity of sectarian conflict that erupted in Belfast in the summer of 1920 was duplicated on the Scottish side of the North Channel. This does not mean that sectarian violence did not occur. At a meeting in Motherwell, addressed by John MacLean, Orangemen and Sinn Feiners battled with each other.¹²⁹ However, such skirmishes were relatively rare and it may have been the case that Irish politics was the excuse rather than the reason for such violence. Commenting on the situation in the west of Scotland at the height of the marching season in 1920 the intelligence services reported:

Conflicts between the two factions of Irishmen are on the increase, and another of the weekly Saturday night brawls took place in Greenock on 26th June. Two policemen and several civilians were severely injured by stones and bottles, and 15 persons, mostly young Irishmen, were arrested. A peculiar innovation occurred in this fight, the rival factions chalked up notices on walls inviting their respective supporters to gather in the principal thoroughfare to take part in the affair.¹³⁰

Violence between the two communities during this period appears to have been limited to gangs indulging in Saturday night brawls rather than riots. In many respects the situation then is similar to the situation now. Marginalised elements within society fired by drink indulging in ritualised violence. While the gangs involved may have a specific religious/political ethos it could be argued that even if the Ulster conflict did not exist the same young men would still fight each other;

locality rather than religion would become the identifying badges of the conflicting tribes.¹³¹

In the aftermath of the murder of a policeman in Glasgow by the IRA *Forward* claimed that the event helped ignite an anti-catholic backlash.¹³² Evidence that this was the case is provided by the *Govan Press*, which stated that the "'Wearin' o' the Green' is not a popular ballad in Govan these days."¹³³ This, however, is about the only evidence available, which suggested there was an anti-catholic backlash. It is noticeable that *The Scotsman*, the *Glasgow Herald* and the *Daily Record* failed to comment on the incident in their editorial columns. The fact that these papers did not use the occasion to launch an attack on the IRA and its supporters in Scotland could have been an attempt to ensure that native sectarian tensions were not further inflamed. When specifically Protestant parties were at their electoral peak in the 'thirties the press played an important role in retarding their advance.¹³⁴ Thus, there appears to have been a desire within mainstream Scottish society, to ensure that the divisions in Ulster were not replicated in Scotland; admittedly there were occasions when the sectarian card was played, however, while the papers may have been prepared to keep sectarian fires burning they retained from pouring oil on the flames and if the conflagration appearing to be going out of control they tried to douse the flames.

To the historian it would appear that sectarian friction

in Scotland declined during the period of the Anglo-Irish war as compared with preceding four years. In many ways the impact on Scottish society of the "troubles" in Ireland between 1918-21 mirrors the response that has been evident since violence erupted in Ulster in 1968. This is not surprising because the position of the Ulster Question today in British political life is the same as that occupied by Ireland between 1918-21, viz, it is seen as an external issue. This is in total contrast to the position that existed between 1912-14, indeed, from 1886 when it was the issue around which the British political system revolved. The marginalisation/externalisation of the Irish Question appears to have originated with the development of the Irish Convention in 1917. The Convention first met in July 1917 and continued to meet until the following spring. Boycotted by Sinn Fein and organised labour the mutually exclusive political ambitions of the mainstream Unionist and Nationalist parties ensured that a negotiated settlement was not achieved. The Convention was portrayed by elements in the Scottish press as an attempt to find an Irish solution for an Irish problem.¹²⁵ If the two antagonistic Irish blocs could not agree between themselves it was no fault of the British Government. Thus, the blame for the continuing Irish crisis was located in Ireland and not Westminster.

Whereas between 1912-14 the Irish Question was the

primary source of political division within Britain and Scotland, in the post war era this was no longer the case. Many of the former protagonists were members of the same Government; thus it was imperative that divisions on the Irish issue did not split the Coalition. Possibly more important in negating the importance of the Irish Question was the development of a political system based on economic rather than constitutional issues. Although Labour was critical of the Government's Irish policy between 1918-21, unlike the Tories when they were in opposition between 1912-14, this issue was not central to its political philosophy. Moreover, whereas in the pre war period both the major British parties were closely aligned with the rival Irish parties this was not the case between 1918-21; the development of Sinn Fein resulted in the motive force of Irish politics being located in Ireland rather than Westminster. While grateful for any support from Britain they, unlike the pre-war Irish Party, were not prepared to wait until a Westminster Government was favourably disposed to their political aspirations. Sinn Fein means "Ourselves Alone" and they saw the solution of Ireland's ills as being located in Ireland and not Britain.

When comparing the impact of the Irish Question in Scottish politics between 1912-14 and 1919-21 one is struck by the virtual absence of the issue during the latter period. This can in part be explained by its decline in importance in "high politics"; without the

Westminster parties stressing the issue it was inevitable that it would not exert such an influence on the Scottish electorate. However, there appears to have been little pressure from the electorate on the politicians to take up the Irish Question with a little more vigor. In the pre-war period the Home Rule issue was debated at length in General Assemblies and individual Presbyteries of the Church of Scotland. Whereas, between 1912-14, the merits or otherwise of Home Rule was debated with passion and the protagonists were vehement in their opinions, between 1919-21 there was no desire to become involved in the issue. The Irish Question had bitterly divided the UF Church in the pre-war era; however, when the topic was raised at the 1921 General Assembly, a non-committal resolution was adopted:

The General Assembly, in view of the civil disorder and strife which unhappily prevail in Ireland...deplore and condemn all crime and outrage by whosoever committed, and whatever excuse be alleged in extenuation...They respectfully urge the Government, which already by its recent legislation given its pledges of its anxieties to meet Ireland's legitimate desire for self government, to undertake such further patient and resolute endeavours as shall seem best fitted to secure an agreed and lasting settlement.¹³⁶

On two occasions during this period the Glasgow Presbytery of the UF Church discussed motions both condemning IRA violence and British reprisals. On each occasion the majority of those present voted not to forward the motion to the General Assembly.¹³⁷ The Church of Scotland was

similarly indifferent. The Irish Question was discussed only once in *Life and Work* during the Anglo-Irish war. The Glasgow Presbytery, so vocal in its support for Ulster between 1912-14, ignored the issue post 1918. When the topic was raised at the 1921 General Assembly this body was content to merely utter pious words against the use of violence, rather than advance any political solutions.¹³⁰ It would appear that apathy was the emotion evoked in Scottish society with regard to the Irish Question between 1919-21. This must partly have been due to the fact that the issue had dominated British politics for so long. However, the World War had created a new political agenda wherein economic issues were now dominant: Ireland seemed to be a relic from another time. One reason why IRA violence in Scotland evoked apparently little hostility towards Catholics in general may have been the fact that socialism/communism was perceived as a greater threat to the prevailing order. On numerous occasions the *Daily Record* highlighted, as did the British Intelligence services, alleged Sinn Fein penetration of Trade Unions in Lanarkshire and the threat this posed to industrial relations:

Sinn Fein fights with more sinister and deadlier weapons than rifles and bombs. The real menace of the movement in the country lies in its political intrigue, still more insidious attack on industrialism.

The twin evil of Bolshevism and Sinn Fein's penetration into the counsels and activities of the Trade Union movement, is fraught with grave consequences to the workers of Scotland unless it be checked in time.

Sinn Fein and Bolshevism have nothing in common with Trade Unionism as such, and cannot be in it for other than ulterior ends.

To keep Trades Unionism not only clean, but safe, the workers must bolt the door against every Red, by whatever name he may chose to designate his particular tint of revolution.¹³⁷

In the aftermath of "Bloody Sunday" it is noticeable that the *Daily Record* equated the IRA with Bolshevism rather than Catholicism: "this Red Terror".¹⁴⁰ This source, which had the largest circulation of any paper in Scotland, indeed it claimed that more people read it than the four other Scottish morning newspapers, consistently portrayed the IRA and Sinn Fein as a revolutionary rather than a nationalist or religious organisation.¹⁴¹

It is ironic to record that just as the Irish Question was beginning to fade from the British political agenda, in 1922, many were expressing their fears of an aggressive Catholicism, which constituted a threat to the prevailing ethos in Scotland. In some respects these fears may have been stimulated by the settlement of the Irish Question. In December 1921 the chairman of the Glasgow Good Government League, George Black, feared that a wave of Irish immigration would wash across Scotland's shores as a result of the Treaty: "Already one quarter of the population of Glasgow is Irish, or Irish by origin, but with a badly governed 'Free State' in the saddle, there will be a greatly increased migration of Irish to Glasgow, partly for Safety (from the better class) & for employment from all classes. Do you want

more Irish in Glasgow?"¹⁴² In subsequent years there were many, who would allege that this indeed occurred, whether or not there was a mass migration of Catholic Irishmen to Scotland is a debateable point. What cannot be doubted is that many within Scottish society believed that such a movement of people had indeed occurred.

Many sources have claimed that sectarian friction in Scotland was primarily a result of the native workforce fearing the increased job competition that resulted in the aftermath of a wave of immigration. While it is not impossible to find examples of Scots claiming that Irish immigrants forced native workers out of their jobs in this period at least it appears to have been middle class fears that were most aroused by the supposed influx of Irish Catholics. The immigrant Irish were seen as harbinger of poverty and lawlessness. At the 1922 UF Church General Assembly various speakers claimed that the number of destitute Irishmen had become an "intolerable burden to the Scottish rate payers." The Rev J. MacLagan stated:

The Irish population in Glasgow was roughly 25 percent of the total. Of those who received assistance from the charitable funds of the Town Council it was roughly estimated that from 60 to 70 percent were Irish Roman Catholics, and so far as could be ascertained roughly 36 per cent of those in receipt of parochial relief were Irish Roman Catholics. Whenever the Irish emigrants landed at the Broomielaw one of the first questions they asked was - "Where is the road to the Parish Council offices?"¹⁴³

It was also feared that the influx of Irishmen would bring an increase in crime; partly this was ascribed to

the poverty of the immigrants, but primarily, as a result of the corrupt faith they practised. People were not slow to cite the continuing violence within Irish society and concluded that this phenomenon would be imported with the immigrants. The Moderator of the Free Church of Scotland stated:

Romanism was alien to the Scottish nation, a superstitious system chiefly from the neighbouring island, where we saw the fruits of it. Ireland was the most popish country in the world, and, with brutal crimes or lawlessness, it was today the darkest spot in Christendom.¹⁴⁴

Such sentiments were by no means limited to a marginal element in society. While citing other causes for the alleged crime wave that hit post war Scotland the *Glasgow Herald* argued that the very presence of a large Irish population in Glasgow was a major factor in aggravating the situation:

It is no reflection on the Irish people, but a statement of cold sociological fact, to say that Ireland has been responsible for more of our social trouble in Glasgow than the war and Bolshevik propaganda, combined. She had supplied us - along with many estimable citizens - with a most refractory element in our population; her agitators and desperadoes imprudently tried to include Glasgow in the scene of their domestic broils.¹⁴⁵

This editorial was written in the early stages of the Irish civil war. That, after fighting the British, Irishmen were fighting Irishmen in a bitter civil war, the reasons for which were largely unfathomable to the average Scot, was proof enough that the Irish loved

violence for its own sake.

The immediate post-war period witnessed the emergence of a more assertive Catholic Church at the very time the Protestant Churches were experiencing a crisis of confidence. The issue, which has caused the most communal friction in twentieth century Scotland was the 1918 Education Act. This legislation meant that religious authorities were absolved from maintaining and financing Catholic education; henceforth Catholic schools would receive a grant from the local authorities, "Rome on the Rates" according to the critics of the Education Act. In a speech delivered at a prize giving ceremony at St Aloysius Academy by John Phillimore, Professor of Greek at Glasgow University, education was pinpointed as the means by which the Catholic Church could reclaim Scotland to the true faith. In the first post war Educational Authority elections in 1919 there was little to suggest that there was a Protestant reaction to the Education Act. However, this was not the case in 1922, when the next election was held. The victory at the polls of Moderate and Protestant candidates in 1922 was due in part, according to the *Glasgow Herald*, to

a very natural resentment at the openly confessed attempt of the Roman Catholics to obtain a larger representation on public bodies than that which their actual numbers entitle them. Their protagonists have for some time been very busy on the whole education front. If the Roman Catholics complain that they are inadequately represented on the new Authority's they have mainly to thank the propaganda campaign carried on so

indiscreetly and, we may add, so impudently by Professor Phillimore and some of his co-religionists. What these gentlemen have done is to arouse the long quiescent spirit of self defence amongst Protestants... a vigorous assertion of the Presbyterian an element, which after all, is still the main force in Scottish life, was the natural riposte to Roman Catholic claims and aggressions.¹⁴⁶

Although the *Glasgow Herald* has identified Catholic aspirations as the major source of communal friction the root cause was the perception, on the part of Scottish Presbyterians, that Irish immigration could alter the ethos of the nation. The advance of Romanism was outlined at the Church of Scotland General Assembly in 1922 by the Rev. Duncan Cameron of Kilysth who painted a picture of Scottish Protestantism under siege:

In Glasgow at the present time between one fourth and one fifth of the entire population was Irish and if the suburban population in places like Pollockshields and Kelvinside were eliminated it was a reasonable and just computation that one third of the working class in Glasgow was Irish. He had official figures of the children under various authorities in industrial areas in Scotland. The increase in the Roman Catholic children in two years over the previous year was 1037 and the decrease in the number of Scottish children in the two corresponding years over the previous year was 1812. That is to say that the Irish children had increased in comparison with the Scottish children by nearly 3000. In Dundee the increase of the Roman Catholic children in the two years was 176 and the Protestant decrease 873—a Roman Catholic increase over Protestant children of 1049. In Edinburgh the Roman Catholic increase in the two years was 176 and the Protestant decrease 1389.

The Roman Catholic Church, believing in her vision, was using the Irish race, and she was justified in using the Irish race, for the conversion of Scotland to the Roman Catholic faith. Through the agency of what Professor Pillimore called the greatest missionary race in the world, the great Roman communion was seeking

to recover Scotland for herself.¹⁴⁷

Without Irish immigration Scottish Catholicism would have been destined to remain a marginal force in society. When studying the period 1912-22 it would appear that sectarian friction was greatest when the Irish Question was in abeyance as a political issue. This would suggest that Scottish sectarianism was precisely that; sectarian friction engendered by internal factors within Scottish society rather than an imported phenomenon from across the North Channel. This will obviously come as an unpalatable fact to those in Scottish society who would prefer to view sectarian friction in Scotland as something foreign to the fabric of the country. Those, who would support this view are, ironically, aligning themselves with nativists the world over. They too are blaming the immigrants for the problems in society. There is even some evidence to suggest that Scotland has exported her sectarianism to Ulster. In the present troubles it has been noted that many of the most aggressive bands in Loyalist and Republican parades are Scottish.¹⁴⁸ In the summer of 1935 Belfast suffered a series of major riots. The bitterest conflict occurred in the dock area of the city. Foremost in the fighting was the Bridgeton Billy Boys.¹⁴⁹ It could be the case that the Ulster conflict has served to reduce communal tensions in Scotland not only by allowing some of the wilder spirits in Scottish society to fight their battles across the North channel, but also by illustrating the fate that could await a community divided against itself.

Footnotes

1. Bill Murray *Glasgow's Giants* p.205.
2. P.J. Buckland *Irish Unionism* p.310.
3. One such body was Randalstown Unionist Association. See Unionist Association of Ireland Committee Minute Book, 16/6/1911. D1327/2/2. the activities of the Randalstown Association was predictably criticised by the *Glasgow Observer*, a sure sign of their effectiveness. *Glasgow Observer* 8 Nov 1913.
4. Carson addressed meetings in Scotland in Oct 1912, June and Nov 1913.
5. *Freeman's Journal* 7 Feb 1914.
6. Reports of these meetings can be found in the *Glasgow Herald* 5 Apr 1913 and *Glasgow Observer* 21 June 1913.
7. *Freeman's Journal* 7 Feb 1914.
8. Rev. Samuel Prenter "The Religious Difficulty under Home Rule: The Nonconformist View", *Against Home Rule* (Ed. Rosenbeum) p.215.
9. Rt. Rev. C.F. D'Arcy "The Religious Difficulty under Home Rule: The Church View". *ibid* p.207.
10. Thomas J. Sinclair "The Position of Ulster", *ibid* p.175.
11. Thomas J. Sinclair "The Position of Ulster", *ibid* p.175.
12. Rt. Rev. C.F. D'Arcy "The Religious Difficulty under Home Rule: The Church View", *ibid* pp.208-9.
13. Thomas J. Sinclair "The Position of Ulster", *ibid* p.175.
14. Rev. Samuel Prenter "The Religious Difficulty under Home Rule: The Nonconformist View", *ibid* pp.215-7.
15. *Glasgow Observer* 30 Nov 1912; 25 Jan, 1 Feb, 1 Nov 1913. When, in 1920, presented with an alleged Sinn Fein oath Steel Maitland stated:"It looks just like the various oaths which have been floating about for the last 20 years, which we have used often, and the genuineness of which, I am afraid, we have equally often doubted." ? - Steel Maitland 14/5/1921 Steel Maitland MSS GD 193/121/1.
16. A.T.Q. Stewart *The Ulster Crisis* pp.59-60
17. It was claimed that the re-emergence of Home Rule inflated the number of those present at Orange rallies in 1912. *Glasgow Herald* 8 July 1912.
18. It was claimed that over 50,000 were present at an AOH rally in Kilmarnock that was addressed by Joseph Devlin. *Glasgow Observer* 6 Sept 1913.
19. this claim was made by 'Liberal Worker', *Edinburgh Evening News* 27 Feb 1914.
20. Glasgow School Board was one such authority. *Glasgow Observer* 7 Feb 1914; see also 11 Jan 1913.
21. *Glasgow Observer* passim 1912-14. A question on the issue was asked in Parliament. See *Glasgow Herald* 20 Nov 1912.
22. On one occasion those who attacked an Orange parade were sentenced by an Irish nationalist MP, C. O'Neill who

- lived in Coatbridge. *Glasgow Observer* 17 Aug 1912.
23. *Glasgow Observer* 27 Apr 1912. Meetings held by Protestant lecturers often a source of friction. A Pastor McDonald, the Kilwinning Martyr, was active during this period. He was arrested in Hawick. *Glasgow Observer* 10 May; 12 Apr; 2 & 27 Sept; 4 Oct; 22 Nov 1912; 27 Dec 1913; 10 Jan; 23 May 1914.
24. *Motherwell Times* 13 Mar 1914.
25. *Glasgow Star* 30 Apr 1915.
26. Tom Gallagher "Protestant Militancy and the Scottish Working Class before 1914", *Radical Scotland* Aug/Sept 1984 p.25.
27. John Sugden & Alan Bairner 'Northern Ireland: Sport in a divided society', *The Politics of Sport* (Ed) Lincoln Allison, pp.111-2.
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33. *Glasgow Herald* 2 Oct 1912.
34. *Glasgow Herald* 2 Oct 1912.
35. Carson - Lady Londonderry 5 Oct 1912, Theresa, Lady Londonderry MSS D2846/1/1/91.
36. *Greenock Telegraph* 2 Oct 1912.
37. *Daily Record* 13 & 14 June 1913.
38. Younger - Law 27/10/1913 Bonar Law MSS 30/3/59.
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40. Unionist victories on a minority vote. Midlothian 10/9/1912; Hope 6,021 votes (41.8% of poll), Shaw (Lib) 5,989 votes (41.5), Brown (Lab) 2,413 (16.7). South Lanark 12/12/1913; Watson 4,257 (42.9), Morton (Lib) 4,006 (40.3), Gibb (Lab) 1,674 (16.8). Leith Burghs 26/2/1914; Currie 5,159 votes (37.8), Smith (Lib) 5,143 (37.7), Bell (Lab) 3,346 (24.5).
41. J.A. Hope - Bonar Law 5/9/1912 Bonar Law MSS BL 27/2/5.
42. By Election result: Pratt (Lib) 5,615 (52.4% of the vote), Kidd (Unionist) 5,094 (47.6%). In the General Election of December 1910 the Liberals, in the shape of the Rt. Hon A. Ure, gained 5,835 votes (60.8 of the vote) while Kidd polled 3,765 votes (39.2%).
43. Kidd - Dawson Bates 12/11/1913 UAI Joint Committee Minute Book. D 1327/2/1.
44. By election 8/12/1913: R.Munro 1,577 votes (56.2% of the vote), A.G.Hackenzie 1,134 (41.8%). In the General Election of December 1910 Munro gained 1,515 votes (53.7% of the poll) while his unionist opponent Sir A. Eignold won 1,304 votes (46.3%).
45. See editorial in the *Daily Record* 10 Dec 1913.
46. P.J. Buckland *op cit* p.323.
47. *Forward* 13 Dec 1913.
48. See letter by "Skipper" in the *Northern Ensign* 11 Nov 1913. A file in the Steel-Maitland collection contains

- many press cutting of letters which expressed similar sentiments. Steel-Maitland was collecting as much evidence as possible to show the Gulland's had indeed influenced the electorate. Steel-Maitland MSS GD 193/108/2/50,51,63x,100 & 104.
49. For a report of their apologies to the House of Commons see the *Glasgow Herald* 17 Feb 1914.
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 51. *Daily Record* 15 Dec 1913.
 52. *Forward* 20 Dec 1913.
 53. *The Scotsman* 27 Feb 1914.
 54. *The Scotsman* 27 Feb 1914.
 55. The result in Leith in the General Election of 1910 was Munro-Ferguson (Lib) 7,146 votes (49.6% of the vote), R. Cranston (Lib Unionist) 4,540 (31.5%), W. Walker (Lab) 2,724 (18.9). In the General Election of December 1910 Munro-Ferguson polled 7,069 votes (57.2%), F.A. Macquisten gained 5,264 votes (42.8%).
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 59. The figures are taken from F.W.S. Craig *British Parliamentary Election Results, 1885-1913* pp.515,531,532,551.
 60. Report on work in Scotland. n.d. UAI Joint committee Minute Book D 1327/2/2.
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 63. *The Observer* 16 Jan 1914.
 64. John Baird - Bonar Law 30/8/1912. Bonar Law MSS, 27/1/59.
 65. See letter by a "Wick Unionist". *Northern Ensign* 25 Nov 1913.
 66. *Glasgow Herald* 29 Aug 1912.
 67. *Glasgow Herald* 25 & 26 Sept; 3 Oct 1912; *Greenock Telegraph* 31 July; 2 Oct 1912.
 68. *Glasgow Herald* 26 Mar 1914.
 69. *Glasgow Herald* 5 June 1914.
 70. J.G. Kellas *Modern Scotland* pp.51-2.
 71. *Glasgow Herald* 4 June 1913.
 72. *Glasgow Herald* 15 May 1912.
 73. *Glasgow Herald* 14 May 1914.
 74. *Glasgow Herald* 2 Oct 1912.
 75. *The Scotsman* 18 Sept 1912; *Greenock Telegraph* 2 Oct 1912.
 76. *Glasgow Herald* 10 Sept 1913. *The Scotsman* 1,6 & 9 Sept 1913.
 77. Quoted from the *Glasgow Herald* 26 Oct 1912.
 78. *Glasgow Herald* 17 July 1914.
 79. A.G. Denholm Young - Bonar Law 17/7/1914. Bonar Law

- MSS 33/1/31. *Glasgow Herald* 20 July 1914.
80. See the letter columns of the two papers in May and June (when the General Assembly was usually held) 1912-14. It should be noted that the issue was discussed many times outwith this period, usually the correspondence dragged on for about two weeks.
81. This allegation was made many times. For one example see the letter by A. Noble in the *Glasgow Herald* 5 Oct 1912.
82. *Glasgow Herald* 9 Apr 1914.
83. *Glasgow Herald* 8 Dec 1913; *Daily Record* 8 Dec 1913.
84. *Daily Record* 3 Dec 1913; *Glasgow Herald* 6 Dec 1913.
85. See the comment by a Rev. Dr Reith to the northern UF summit. *Glasgow Herald* 31 Oct 1912. 86. S. Bruce *No Pope of Rome* p.244.
87. A.T.Q. Stewart *The Narrow Ground* pp.88-110.
88. R. McNeil *Ulster's Stand for Union* p.12.
89. *The Scotsman* 28 Aug; 15 Oct 1912. Kirkcaldy Chamber of Commerce also opposed the measure. *The Buiwark* 29 Apr 1914.
90. *The Scotsman* 30 Mar 1914.
91. A.T.Q. Stewart *op cit* p.55.
92. (Confidential Memorandum to Candidates). Scottish Home Rule. Enclosed in letter from George Younger - Bonar Law 15/5/1914. Bonar Law MSS 32/3/30.
93. D.G. Boyce "British conservative opinion, the Ulster question, and the partition of Ulster", *Irish Historical Studies*, Vol 19, 65, p.90.
94. John Buchan *Mr Standfast* pp.68-9.
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96. *Govan Press* 3 Mar 1915; See also *Greenock Telegraph* 13 Apr 1917.
97. *Daily Record* 11 Aug 1916; 10 Aug 1917.
98. *Glasgow Herald* 7, 12, Apr, 19 - 24 July 1915; 7, 12 Jan, 24 Apr 1916; *The Scotsman* 2 Feb, 12 June 1915.
99. *The Scotsman* 14 Aug 1915.
100. *Govan Press* 20 Aug 1915.
101. *Govan Press* 31 Dec 1915.
102. *The Scotsman* 14 Aug 1915; *Glasgow Observer* 28 Aug 1915; *Glasgow Herald* 8 Nov 1915; *Govan Press* 12 Nov 1915.
103. *Govan Press* 29 Mar 1918.
104. *The Scotsman* 28 Apr 1916; Similar sentiments about the "loyal" John Redmond were expressed by the *Daily Record*. *Daily Record* 26 Apr 1916.
105. *Glasgow Herald* 6 May 1916; *The Scotsman* 2 & 4 May 1916.
106. *The Scotsman* 26 May 1916.
107. *Glasgow Herald* 27 & 28 Apr, 1 May 1916; *Govan Press* 5 May 1916; *Daily Record* 1 May 1916.
108. *Govan Press* 5 May 1916.
109. *Govan Press* 5 May 1916.
110. *Govan Press* 22 Oct 1915.
111. *Greenock Telegraph* 17 Mar 1915.
112. *Daily Record* 1 May; 11 July 1916; 19 Mar 1917; *Govan Press* 31 Dec 1916. Many letters appeared in the press which testified to the gallantry of the Irish fighting

- man. for one example, see the *Govan Press* 12 May 1916.
113. *The Buiwark* Jan 1915.
 114. *The Buiwark* Feb 1915.
 115. *The Buiwark* Jan 1916.
 116. *Glasgow Herald* 13 & 14 Aug 1915; *The Buiwark* Nov 1914; Mar, May, Oct 1915; Feb 1918. There was a discussion of this subject in the letters column of *The Scotsman* passim Oct 1915. In an editorial the *Daily Record* the Pope was described as an "unconscious instrument of the political propaganda of the Teuton." *Daily Record* 13 Apr 1915.
 117. *The Buiwark* May 1915.
 118. *Glasgow Herald* 29 Apr 1918.
 119. *The Scotsman* 22 Apr 1918.
 120. *Glasgow Observer* 13 July 1918. This trend is noted in a letter to George Younger. G.P. Warren - Younger 29/4/1918 Bonar Law MSS 63/3/11.
 121. *Glasgow Herald* 29 Apr 1918.
 122. *Life and Work* May 1920
 123. *The Scotsman* 29 Nov 1920.
 124. *Life and Work* May 1920.
 125. The bulk of this paragraph is drawn from *The Orange Standard*. As, regrettably, I have lost the notes that I took from this source I am writing this paragraph from memory.
 126. The social activities offered by membership of the Orange Order are outlined in T. Gallagher *Glasgow: the Uneasy Peace* p.261.
 127. *Govan Press* 18 July 1913.
 128. T. Gallagher "Scotland, Britain, and Conflict in Ireland", in (Ed) Y. Alexander & A. O'Day *Terrorism in Ireland* p.59. This author attended the Orange parade in Glasgow 1985 and can confirm that only a small minority moved towards the platform to hear the address by the main speaker, the late Harold McCusker MP.
 129. H. McShane & J. Smith *No Mean Fighter* p.117. Gives details of this and other disturbances. For another account of the trouble at Motherwell see I. McDougall *Militant Miners* pp.145-6.
 130. Report in the Activities of Revolutionary organisations in the United Kingdom, 61, 1/7/1920, CP 1564 Cab 24/108.
 131. S. Bruce *op cit* pp 247-8.
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 136. *Glasgow Herald* 2 June 1921.
 137. Meetings of 9/11/1920 & 210/5/21, p.142,246-7, Minute Book of Presbytery of Glasgow, United Free Presbyterian Church, CH3 146/9. (Mitchell Library, Glasgow).
 138. *Glasgow Herald* 1 June 1921.
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 140. *Daily Record* 26 Nov 1920.
 141. This view was shared by some members of the

establishment. See the comments by a judge a IRA trial in Scotland. See report of trial and editorial. *Daily Record* 10 Feb 1921.

142. George Black - Boar Law 26/12/1921 Bonar Law MSS 107/1/109.

143. *Glasgow Herald* 25 May 1922.

144. *Glasgow Herald* 24 May 1922.

145. *Glasgow Herald* 23 Aug 1922.

146. *Glasgow Herald* 27 Mar 1922.

147. *Glasgow Herald* 29 May 1922.

148. T. Gallagher *Glasgow: The Uneasy Peace* p.292. A.T.Q. Stewart confirmed the reputation of the Scottish bands.

149. A.C. Hepburn 'The Belfast Riots of 1935', *Social History*, Vol 15, 1, pp. 80-2.

CONCLUSIONS

The years 1916-23 are arguably the most dramatic in Irish history, ancient and modern. This period shaped southern Irish society for the remainder of the twentieth century. In Irish politics today the two major parties trace their lineage back to the divisions of the civil war. The failure of organised Labour to emerge as a major force can in part be attributed to its inability to play a meaningful role during the Anglo-Irish war and in the development of a political system, which revolved around the passions engendered by the civil war, and not social and economic issues. The fact that Northern Ireland remained within the United Kingdom has led some to consider that the Irish Revolution is unfinished and that they have to rekindle the flame that burned in Dublin in Easter 1916. Not only did the events of this period influence the lives of those in Ireland, but also those who considered themselves to be Irish, irrespective of where they resided.

Although resident in Scotland the immigrants retained many of the institutions and social customs of their native land; a community within a community developed. That the Irish remained outwith the mainstream of Scottish society was in part due to nativist resentment. However, a contributory factor was the desire of some within the immigrant community who wished to retain their own cultural identity. Given the fact that the immigrant community resembled Irish rather than Scottish society it is not surprising that, once a significant proportion of

that body acquired the right to vote, they decided to use their new found political power to advance the cause of their "native" land rather than furthering their own position in the land in which they lived. Chapter 1 shows that throughout the nineteenth century and the pre-war period the evolution of nationalist politics in Ireland was mirrored in the immigrant community in Scotland.

An examination of the impact of the major political developments in Ireland between 1916-21 on the immigrant community confirms what most historians have suggested. While these events exerted a powerful influence on the immigrant community and the trend that developed within Irish nationalist society was replicated within Irish ghettos in Scotland, the tempo of change was different. While Sinn Fein became the dominant force in Irish politics in 1917 it was not until 1919 that the immigrant community endorsed Irish republicanism. It is likely that this time-lag reflected the fact that the war years had effected the partial integration of the immigrant community; those who either volunteered for the Front or were conscripted faced the same problems as their Scottish counterparts, whilst those, who remained at home were drawn into mainstream society by factors such as unionisation. Moreover, it is likely that some of the lines of communication that existed between the immigrant community and Ireland went into abeyance during this period and what links did remain were primarily with that

section of the Irish nationalist opinion that was most resistant to the attraction of Republicanism, the Catholics of Ulster.

The view has been put forward that Irish in Scotland were particularly militant in their support of the Republican cause during the Anglo-Irish war and that this community played a crucial role in ensuring whatever success the movement achieved in Ireland. While the thesis accepts that the political and military manifestations of Irish Republicanism did indeed advance to a considerable extent amongst the immigrant community in Scotland it argues this has been overestimated by secondary sources. The crucial role allocated the Scottish Brigade of the IRA bears little relation to the position that prevailed. It is also pointed out that the Irish in other parts of the world more than matched the contribution made by the Irish in Scotland to the Republican movement during this period. It has also been pointed out that such sources have also failed to grasp the resilience, albeit of a limited nature, of the constitutional nationalist movement in Scotland during 1919-21. The question arises as to why historians have inflated the role played by the Irish in Scotland during the Anglo-Irish war. History, it is commonly stated, is written from the winners' point of view. As there can be no doubt as to which philosophy triumphed in Ireland during this period it is possibly natural that this process occurred. Moreover, it is also noticeable that most of the historians who have examined

this topic, from Handley to Gallagher, have had close links with the immigrant community and have possibly been overconcerned with ensuring that the Irish in Scotland were associated with the triumphant ideology in what is arguably the historical zenith of Irish nationalism.

The thesis agrees with the view that the Irish civil war witnessed the final break between Irish politics and the mass of the immigrant community. Whereas in Ireland the civil war gave birth to a political system which remains to this day, the response evoked in Scotland was one of apathy. It would appear that the immigrant community considered the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 to be a just settlement of the Irish Question and were horrified that a fratricidal conflict could erupt over what they perceived as minor differences. This community's links with Ulster Catholics, who were largely bypassed by the events that were to mould southern society, also ensured that the civil war would not preoccupy the minds of the immigrants.

The gravitation of the Irish vote towards the Labour Party in the period between 1918-22 is examined. The thesis rejects the view that this process was either a positive development in that it reflected the community's conversion to socialism or a Machiavellian plot by the Catholic hierarchy to negate the Party's radicalism. It notes that the swing to Labour occurred first amongst middle class immigrants, the very elements of the

community who had lost their previous political role with the collapse of the Irish Party. Unwilling to embrace Irish Republicanism or fade away they preferred to enter domestic Scottish politics. Given the developing British two party political system in which there was no place for the Liberal Party, they had no other choice but to support Labour if they wished to play any role in Scottish politics.

It would appear as if there was a general desire amongst the immigrant community to advance their position in society. Whereas, in the pre war period, the Irish community was prepared to indulge in acts of self immolation, voting for Tory candidates such as Bonar Law when the Liberal candidate was not a whole hearted Home Ruler, this was no longer the case. While the Labour Party was not pro republican this did not inhibit the Irish from supporting it. The fact that Sinn Fein/IRA no longer saw the road to Irish independence as being routed through Westminster, but the actions of the Irish people must also have reduced the pressure on its supporters in Scotland to consider Irish issues when deciding which British political party to support. This gradual externalisation of Irish politics from the immigrant community was compounded by the Irish civil war. Once freed of such external influences it was inevitable that the immigrants would support Labour.

The thesis argues that the developing Irish-Labour

alliance did not provoke a general backlash amongst the Protestant community. There are many examples of Labour winning electoral contests in noted Orange areas, though in this case the picture tends to be localised. As with their Catholic counterparts the impetus that propelled them towards the Labour Party was primarily negative. The development of a class based political system in which Labour was the only credible opposition to the Tories ensured that Orange would join the Green and produce a pale Red.

Finally, the thesis rejects the view put forward by those who explain the existence of sectarian friction within Scottish society as being, primarily, an extension of the conflict that existed in Ireland. The thesis suggests that there was remarkably little correlation between the prominence of the Irish Question in the political firmament and communal friction in Scotland. It would appear that sectarian friction had an internal dynamic and primarily focused on questions of identity, rather than political issues.

Although the immigrant community was politically integrated by 1922 this did not mean that they ceased to be a distinct community. The pressures which worked to force their political integration did not operate at a social level. Through their distinctive institutions, the Irish community could enjoy a full social life without having to integrate into mainstream Scottish society.

Thus, it is no surprise that the social integration of the Irish community was preceded by its political integration.

The retention of their identity marked them as being apart from Scottish society; by integrating into society the Scots viewed the Irish as attempting to take over their society. This would explain the apparant paradox that occurred in the 1920s, when communal tension increased just as the Irish Question disappeared from the political agenda.

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Plan of Bibliography:

A. Manuscript Sources

1. Personal Papers
2. Records of Organisations

B. Printed Sources

1. Official Papers
2. Newspapers, Periodicals and Journals
3. Reports
4. Addresses, Manifestos
5. Biographical Works
6. Other Primary Works
7. Secondary Works

C. Unpublished Theses

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