

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY BASED
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN GLASGOW:
AN EXPERIMENT IN THE SOCIAL CONTROL OF HOUSING

Ann Rosengard

VOL I

Presented in fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Department of Administration, University of
Strathclyde, 1984.

ABSTRACT

Community based housing associations (CBHAs) are neighbourhood based and locally controlled housing associations, which became the predominant type of association in Glasgow between 1974 and 1984. The thesis examines the historical background to the development of associations, nationally and in Glasgow. It argues that, in contrast to the mainstream of the voluntary movement, with its philanthropic traditions, a distinctive feature of CBHAs has been their emphasis on resident involvement in housing production and allocation.

Central to this thesis is a study of various outcomes of the urban planning experiment of CBHAs. The study explores organisational, industrial relations, participatory and political aspects of their development in the light of pertinent theoretical debates in the social science literature and detailed empirical research. It demonstrates how CBHAs have evolved as small but complex organisations and suggests that this complexity reflects the multiple objectives of associations and their complex, changing and uncertain planning and economic environment. It shows that CBHAs, like many voluntary, professional and public sector organisations, have a tendency to certain types of organisational conflict. In terms of their neighbourhood role, the case studies demonstrate that associations are influenced by local conditions, by the dynamics of local accountability, by state agencies and by wider political and economic developments. Continuing the focus on participation and state planning, the thesis draws on theories about participation, power and control which throw light on the housing association experience. It points to organisational, cultural and

political influences on resident participation. It analyses the collective action through which associations have sought to modify external constraints and state controls and draws on theoretical debates on the state and social policy in examining different forms of state intervention and control. Finally it examines the role of CBHAs in Glasgow's tenement rehabilitation strategy and its consequences for people and housing in the city.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

At the point of completing a project like this thesis which has occupied such a significant 'space' in my life, I want to offer my thanks to those who have helped me to complete it. First, I want to thank those closest to me who have inevitably suffered during this project. As perhaps only those who have worked on a thesis may be aware, such projects can be dominating, oppressive, wearying, frustrating and sometimes destructive of self-confidence. Their completion requires a certain single-mindedness on the part of the researcher who in turn requires support, tolerance and understanding from others. I am especially grateful therefore to Lennie, my 'husband-friend', who has at times understandably wearied of me, but who has never failed to tolerate and be positively supportive of me in my project. Then there are my children. My youngest child, Sam, has grown up with the thesis and is now curious about whether I am doing a second one! Lisa and Adam, being older have been bemused by the longevity and intensity of my relationship with 'the thesis' and they have been curious throughout about its progress. Hopefully they may conclude that their projects can be completed also. Finally, on the home front, I must mention here the support I have received throughout from my mother, Dolly. Together with my friends, my family tolerated me, supported me and willed me towards completion.

On the academic side I am most of all indebted to Professor Lewis Gunn, my supervisor who took an active interest in the development of the research and the thesis and who was always ready to listen, comment and advise. Throughout my 'project' he assumed a painstakingly critical and supportive role, despite his early recognition of the scale and complexity of the research tasks I had chosen. The balance of criticism and support which he offered was invaluable. He encouraged me towards more constructive self-criticism, he was a key

influence on the structure of the thesis and he helped me to develop the confidence to complete it. I cannot do full justice here in stating my appreciation of his contribution to the development of the thesis. It was a difficult task that he assumed, of supervising a former lecturer in his department who as an SSRC student had embarked enthusiastically on a historical, multi-disciplinary and wide-ranging research project. Throughout the research and writing up phase he was open-minded and tolerant in spite of differences in our academic backgrounds and approach. It is to his credit that the thesis is so clearly my thesis at the end of the day. I also want to thank other members of the Department of Administration, like Professor Roy Wilkie, who took an interest in my research during the first year of my Social Science Research Council studentship.

I am also enormously grateful to Yvonne MacLeod for typing the manuscript and for coping so good-humouredly with any difficulties I set for her. Neither she nor I quite recognised at the start the length of our mutual project and I shall now miss working with her.

Next I want to thank all those people who donated their valuable time in interviews and discussions and in supplying information for the purpose of my research. I was helped in such ways by members of housing associations and their representative bodies and by individuals within state agencies (the Glasgow District Council, the Housing Corporation and the Scottish Development Department). Finally, I am grateful to certain individuals who commented on earlier drafts of various chapters of the thesis. On the academic side there was Colin Mair who lectures in Social Policy, John Jackson who lectures in Organisational Analysis and Mike Keating who lectures in Public Administration, all in the Department of Administration, Strathclyde Business School; Irene Kay who lectures in Sociology at Strathclyde University and Mary Wilson, currently at the

Scottish Council of Alcoholism and a long-standing friend and colleague, whose current professional services I hope I do not require in the future! As for those within the housing association network, I want to thank Dave Clarke and David Le Sage (former Research and Training Officers of the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations); Marian Jacobs (formerly of Govanhill Housing Association, now at Thenew Housing Association); Ann Scott, Committee member of Govanhill Housing Association; Malcolm Mathieson (Senior Officer, Reidvale Housing Association); John Butterley (Chairman of Reidvale Housing Association) and Gerry Gormal (Rutherglen Housing Association). All these individuals have had to cope with me in my role as researcher as well as in my various involvements as a housing association participant. The regularity of their questioning, along with that by other friends and colleagues, with regard to the progress of my research, served often as a distressing reminder of the tasks at hand, but was also a key factor in ensuring the completion of the thesis.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| <u>INTRODUCTION</u> | 1 |
| The research focus on Glasgow's housing associations | 2 |
| Personal influences, theoretical and substantive interests | 8 |
| Aspects of power and control | 12 |
| Research Methods | 17 |
| Notes and References to the Introduction to the Thesis | 26 |
| | |
| <u>PART ONE : THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND THE STATE</u> | 30 |
| | |
| <u>CHAPTER ONE : THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY HOUSING IN BRITAIN</u> | 31 |
| Section 1 The Voluntary Sector and the State | 32 |
| Section 2 Classifications of Housing Associations | 36 |
| Section 3 An Alternative Model of Housing Association Types | 42 |
| 3.a. The Social Service or Charitable Sector | 44 |
| 3.b. The Mutual Benefit Sector | 49 |
| 3.b.1. Influences on the development of Housing Co-operatives | 49 |
| 3.b.2. Types of Co-operatives | 53 |
| 3.b.3. A Note on the Membership of Co-operatives | 57 |
| Section 4 The Community-based Housing Association - A Hybrid of Service and Mutual-Benefit Types | 58 |
| Notes and References to Chapter 1 | 61 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| <u>CHAPTER TWO : GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF VOLUNTARY HOUSING</u> | 66 |
| Four Phases in the Development of Voluntary Housing | 67 |
| Phase One Capitalist philanthropy and state support (pre 1st World War) | 67 |
| Phase Two State housing and the voluntary sector (1st World War until 1960) | 69 |
| Synthesis | 72 |
| Phase Three Movement growth and new opportunities for expansion (1961-1974) | 72 |
| (a) The decline of private housing for rent | 72 |
| (b) The promotion of the voluntary sector through the HC | 73a |
| (c) Housing obsolescence and the role of the voluntary sector | 74 |
| (d) Urban variations | 78 |
| Synthesis | 79 |
| Phase Four Expansion, incorporation and a new politics (1974-1982) | 82 |
| (a) Housing obsolescence, housing policy and the 1974 Housing Acts | 83 |
| (b) A growing consensus over rehabilitation and the role of housing associations | 83 |
| (c) A more favourable funding environment for housing associations | 84 |
| (d) Centralised planning and the area approach to tackling obsolescence | 85 |
| (e) A planning emphasis on public participation and voluntarism | 86 |
| (f) Thatcherism and the revival of ideology, 1979-1983 | 87 |
| Synthesis | 88 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Two | 94 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| <u>CHAPTER THREE : HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AS THE THIRD ARM OF HOUSING</u> | 99 |
| Section 1 HAs and the Expansion of Public Participation | 99 |
| Section 2 Alternative Forms of Tenure | 105 |
| Section 3 Alternatives in Housing Provision | 107 |
| Section 4 Organisational Autonomy and the Contradiction of External Funding and Control | 110 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Three | 114 |
| <u>PART TWO : A HISTORY OF HOUSING AND HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN GLASGOW</u> | 116 |
| <u>CHAPTER FOUR : A HISTORY OF HOUSING AND POLITICS IN GLASGOW</u> | 117 |
| Section 1 Industry, Class and Housing in 19th Century Glasgow | 117 |
| 1.a. Commercial and industrial developments | 117 |
| 1.b. Industrialisation, urbanisation and housing | 118 |
| 1.c. Housing obsolescence, overcrowding and poverty | 120 |
| 1.d. Social class, social status and tenement housing | 121 |
| Section 2 Industry, Politics and Housing 1900 - 1939 | 123 |
| 2.a. Industry, employment and housing | 123 |
| 2.b. Politics, conflict and ideology | 125 |
| 2.c. Municipalisation and housing | 128 |
| Section 3 Post-War Developments in Housing and Planning | 130 |
| 3.a. Politics, industry and the inner areas | 130 |
| 3.b. Central-local dynamics in planning | 133 |
| 3.c. Changes in housing policy | 138 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| 3.c.1 Slum clearance and redevelopment | 138 |
| 2 Changing Tenures | 140 |
| 3 The critique of slum clearance | 141 |
| 4 A shift in policy | 146 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Four | 149 |
| <u>CHAPTER FIVE : THE ORIGINS OF A POLICY INITIATIVE</u> | 154 |
| Section 1 Housing Obsolescence and the Influence on Policy Change, 1969-1974 | 156 |
| 1.a. Social, financial and administrative con- siderations at the local authority | 157 |
| 1.b. The interest of 'traditional' associations in rehabilitation | 160 |
| 1.c. The local authority's early approach to rehabilitation and local reactions | 161 |
| 1.d. The role of officials | 165 |
| Section 2 An Alternative Model for Implementing Rehabilitation - Voluntary Improvement and the Community Based Housing Association (CBHA) | 166 |
| 2.a. The role of Assist | 166 |
| 2.b. The first community-based housing association | 170 |
| 2.c. From social experiment to housing policy: significant individuals and interconnections | 172 |
| 2.d. The urban politicians and the political context | 178 |
| Section 3 Implications of the Case Study | 183 |
| 3.a. Constraints and action | 183 |
| 3.b. Phases of development | 186 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Five | 191 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| <u>PART THREE : COMMUNITY BASED HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS:</u> <u>A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT IN PRACTICE</u> | 196 |
| <u>INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE</u> | 197 |
| A perspective on the development of CBHAs | 198 |
| Notes and References to Introduction to Part Three | 207 |
| <u>CHAPTER SIX : ACCOUNTABILITY, RESOURCES AND POLITICAL</u> <u>ACTION (1975-1979)</u> | 209 |
| Introduction | 209 |
| Section 1 The Planning Context of CBHA Rehabilitation | 212 |
| 1.a. Relations with the local authority | 212 |
| 1.b. The local authority-Housing Corporation Partnership | 217 |
| Section 2 Central Government Agencies, Accountability and Controls | 220 |
| 2.a. The significance of Project Area Approvals | 220 |
| 2.b. Cost limits and building standards | 223 |
| 2.c. Acquisition costs and cost limits | 226 |
| Section 3 Scheme Scrutiny and Delays | 230 |
| Section 4 Delays and the First Stages of Collective Action | 233 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Six | 237 |
| Appendix 1 Changes in Rehabilitation Cost Limits Compared to Changes in Building Costs | 240 |
| <u>CHAPTER SEVEN : CONSTRAINTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION.</u> <u>1978-1983</u> | 241 |
| Section 1 The Modification of Bureaucratic Controls | 241 |
| 1.a. Cost Limits | 242 |
| 1.b. Procedures of Scheme Approval | 248 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| Section 2 Cash Limits and Resource Allocation | 251 |
| 2.a. The System of Cash Control | 252 |
| 2.b. Resource Allocation and Campaigning | 253 |
| 2.c. Growing Resources, Growing Accountability | 266 |
| Section 3 Party Ideologies and the Housing Association Experience | 268 |
| Section 4 Current Issues | 271 |
| 4.1 The Outcomes of Tight Expenditure Control | 271 |
| 4.2 The Implications of Privatisation | 273 |
| 4.3 The Question of Rents | 277 |
| Summary and Conclusions | 282 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Seven | 284 |
| <u>CHAPTER EIGHT : CBHAs AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERESTS</u> | 288 |
| Section 1 The Urban Professionals | 289 |
| Section 2 Commercial Interests and CBHAs | 298 |
| 2.a. The building contractor | 298 |
| 2.b. Some influences on contract delays | 302 |
| 2.c. Two examples of contract delays | 304 |
| Section 3 The Owners of Sub-Tolerable Property | 310 |
| 3.a. Private landlords and property factors | 310 |
| 3.b. The property factors - Glasgow's private sector housing management specialists | 313 |
| 3.c. Shop owners and other owners of non-residential properties in CBHA areas | 318 |
| Section 4 The CBHA Employment Relationship and the Institutionalisation of Conflict | 325 |
| 4.a. An evolving system of industrial relations | 326 |
| 4.b. Aspects of conflict | 327 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| 4.c. Some influences on conflict in CBHAs | 333 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Eight | 337 |
| <u>CHAPTER NINE : A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS OF CBHAs</u> | 342 |
| Introduction | 342 |
| Section 1 Organisational Environment, Structure and Goals | 344 |
| 1.a. Organisational environment and organisational structure | 345 |
| 1.b. Contradictory aspects of organisational structure | 351 |
| 1.b.1. Bureaucracy and democracy | 352 |
| 1.b.2. Bureaucracy and professionalism | 354 |
| 1.c. Constraints and choice | 356 |
| 1.d. Power, Conflict and Organisational goals | 359 |
| 1.d.1. The complex evolution of organisational goals | 361 |
| 1.d.2. The multiplicity of goals in organisations | 363 |
| 1.d.3. Official and unofficial goals | 364 |
| 1.d.4. Goal displacement and succession | 367 |
| 1.e. Similarities and differences | 370 |
| Section 2 The Organisational Development of CBHAs | 372 |
| 2.a. Environmental uncertainties, complexities and choices affecting young CBHAs | 372 |
| 2.b. Contextual influences and structural tensions in CBHAs | 378 |
| 2.b.1. The tendency to bureaucracy in CBHAs | 379 |
| 2.b.2. Organisational learning and professionalisation | 383 |
| 2.c. CBHAs : Goals, ideology and strategic choice | 389 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| 2.c.1. A classification of the official goals of CBHAs | 389 |
| 2.c.2. CBHAs and operative goals | 392 |
| 2.c.3. The ideological distinctiveness of CBHAs | 396 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Nine | 399 |
| <u>PART FOUR : TWO NEIGHBOURHOODS AND THEIR HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS</u> | 409 |
| <u>CHAPTER TEN : THE TWO LOCALITIES AND THE ORIGINS OF THE HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS</u> | 410 |
| Section 1 Introduction | 410 |
| Section 2 Govanhill | 416 |
| 2.a. The locality | 416 |
| 2.b. History | 416 |
| 2.c. Planning intervention and local action | 418 |
| 2.d. Neighbourhood groups in Govanhill during the 1970s | 426 |
| 2.e. The Community Council and local perceptions of 'community' | 430 |
| Section 3 Reidvale | 435 |
| 3.a. The locality | 435 |
| 3.b. History | 436 |
| 3.c. Changes in housing and work | 440 |
| 3.d. The effects of planning | 444 |
| 3.e. The community worker as catalyst | 445 |
| 3.f. Perceptions of community: the case of Community Council formation | 451 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|---|-----------------|
| Section 4 A Note on Community and Community Control | 455 |
| 4.a. Community | 455 |
| 4.b. The ideology of community development and participation | 458 |
| 4.c. CBHAS, community and community control | 463 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Ten | 465 |
| | |
| <u>CHAPTER ELEVEN : A CASE STUDY OF GOVANHILL HOUSING ASSOCIATION LIMITED</u> | 472 |
| Section 1 GHA's Early Development, 1973 to 1976 | 472 |
| 1.a. Formation and the context of uncertainty | 472 |
| 1.b. Aims and early development, 1973-1976 | 475 |
| 1.b.1. Committee composition and aspects of local accountability | 476 |
| 1.b.2. Early assumptions regarding GHA's organisation and its approach | 480 |
| 1.b.3. Relations with external groups and organisations | 482 |
| Section 2 The Evolution of Goals at GHA | 486 |
| 2.a. The improvement of tenement housing in Govanhill, 1974-1977 | 488 |
| 2.a.1. Early influences and GHA's approach, 1974-1977 | 488 |
| 2.a.2. The experience of delays, 1974-1977 | 490 |
| 2.a.3. Local influences on policy development, 1974-1977 | 491 |
| 2.b. GHA's improvement programme, 1977-1983 | 495 |
| 2.b.1. The issue of ground conditions | 495 |
| 2.b.2. GHA and the private owners of tenement property | 504 |
| 2.b.3. The impact of GHA's improvement programme within Govanhill | 510 |

| | <u>page no.</u> | |
|-----------|---|-----|
| 2.c. | GHA as landlord | 518 |
| 2.c.1. | GHA's Allocations Policy | 519 |
| 2.c.2. | Allocations and accountability: the issue of Nomination Rights | 526 |
| 2.c.3. | GHA's approach to factoring | 528 |
| 2.c.4. | GHA's attempts to devolve and to increase tenant participation | 534 |
| 2.d. | Discussion | 538 |
| Section 3 | Organisational Change, Control and Conflict | 541 |
| 3.a. | Organisation structure and work relations, 1974-1977 | 541 |
| 3.a.1. | The issue of architectural services | 542 |
| 3.a.2. | Growth and changes in the organisational culture | 545 |
| 3.b. | Control and conflict | 551 |
| 3.b.1. | The issue of control and staff perceptions, 1977-1978 | 551 |
| 3.b.2. | Changes on GHA's Committee, 1978-1980 | 557 |
| 3.b.3. | The 1978 issue of hierarchy | 562 |
| 3.b.4. | The Committee's decision to appoint a Director, February 1979 | 569 |
| 3.b.5. | Staff reactions | 571 |
| 3.c. | Organisational developments, 1979-1983 | 575 |
| 3.c.1. | The new role of GHA's Director and its outcomes | 577 |
| | Notes and References to Chapter Eleven | 587 |
| | Appendix Govanhill Housing Association Limited | 599 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| <u>CHAPTER TWELVE : A CASE STUDY OF REIDVALE HOUSING ASSOCIATION, 1976-1984</u> | 600 |
| Section 1 Formation, early development and uncertainties, 1976-1977 | 601 |
| 1.a. RHA's Committee: early concerns and intentions | 602 |
| 1.b. The official as catalyst | 607 |
| 1.c. Public accountability and internal tensions | 610 |
| 1.d. RHA's early improvement programme, 1976-1977 | 613 |
| 1.d.1. The issue of standards | 614 |
| 1.d.2. RHA's approach to owner-occupiers | 617 |
| 1.e. Staff-Committee relations, 1976-1977 | 621 |
| 1.f. RHA and the dynamics of local accountability, 1976-1977 | 624 |
| 1.f.1. Local perceptions of RHA | 624 |
| 1.f.2. Two controversial decisions | 626 |
| 1.f.3. RHA's relations with other neighbourhood groups | 629 |
| Section 2 The evolution of RHA's goals, 1977-1983 | 635 |
| 2.a. The improvement of housing and the environment - RHA as a local housing developer | 638 |
| 2.a.1. The approach to resident consultation and planning | 638 |
| 2.a.2. RHA's approach in co-ordinating rehabilitation for private owners | 642 |
| (a) Owner-occupier improvements | 642 |
| (b) Commercial owners | 644 |
| 2.a.3. Uncertainties and delays | 648 |
| 2.a.4. Local accountability and the shape of the improvement programme | 661 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| 2.a.5. New building, planning and progress | 668 |
| 2.b. RHA's role as a local landlord, 1977-1984 | 672 |
| 2.b.1. RHA's approach to property factoring | 673 |
| 2.b.2. Social aspects of housing management | 676 |
| 2.b.3. Housing management and staff functions | 678 |
| 2.b.4. A policy on allocations | 679 |
| 2.c. Organisational growth, complexity, control and conflict, 1976-1983 | 691 |
| 2.c.1. Organisational growth and relations between officials, 1975-1977 | 693 |
| 2.c.2. RHA's Committee and industrial relations issues | 696 |
| 2.c.3. The issues of hierarchy and internal control | 702 |
| 2.c.4. Control and conflict, 1978-1979 | 704 |
| 2.c.5. Organisational outcomes, 1980-1983 | 714 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Twelve | 722 |
| Appendix Reidvale Housing Association Limited | 732 |
| <u>PART FIVE : THE HOUSING ASSOCIATION EXPERIENCE:</u> <u>A THEORETICAL ANALYSIS AND SOME CONCLUSIONS</u> | 733 |
| <u>INTRODUCTION TO PART FIVE</u> | 734 |
| Some Reflections on the Case Studies | 734 |
| Notes and References to Introduction to Part Five | 746 |

| | | |
|--|---|-----|
| <u>CHAPTER THIRTEEN : HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS, POWER AND CONTROL</u> | | 747 |
| 1.a. | Introduction: the theme of control | 747 |
| 1.b. | A multi-faceted case study | 752 |
| 2.a. | Perspectives on interorganisational relations | 760 |
| 2.b. | Perspectives on intergovernmental (central-local) relations | 765 |
| 2.b.1. | Conventional approaches | 765 |
| 2.b.2. | A shift in emphasis | 767 |
| 2.c. | Power, control and decision-making | 772 |
| 3. | Housing associations, interorganisational relations and control | 776 |
| 3.a. | Production issues: power and control | 777 |
| 3.b. | Aspects of negative decision-making | 783 |
| 3.c. | The routinisation of power | 787 |
| 3.d. | Bias and inaction | 791 |
| 3.d.1. | Choice and housing strategies | 791 |
| 3.d.2. | Funding and resource allocation | 794 |
| 3.d.3. | "Fair" rents | 798 |
| 4. | The Third Arm and the State | 804 |
| | Notes and References to Chapter Thirteen | 827 |
| <u>CHAPTER FOURTEEN : CBHAs AND THEIR PLANNING. PARTICIPATION AND HOUSING OUTCOMES</u> | | 839 |
| 1. | CBHAs and the urban planning system | 840 |
| 2. | CBHAs and participation | 853 |
| 2.a. | A Tale of Two Cities? | 854 |
| 2.b. | Control and accountability | 860 |

| | <u>page no.</u> |
|--|-----------------|
| 2.c. Representation and local accountability | 871 |
| 3. Housing outcomes: No mean improvement | 885 |
| Notes and References to Chapter Fourteen | 902 |
| <u>BIBLIOGRAPHY</u> | 907 |

THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMUNITY-BASED
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN GLASGOW:

AN EXPERIMENT IN THE SOCIAL
CONTROL OF HOUSING

INTRODUCTION

There are two main strands to this thesis. First of all, my aim is to provide a systematic account of various aspects of the development of community based housing associations (CBHAs). Secondly, my aim is to analyse the development of the planning initiative of CBHAs in the light of pertinent debates and questions which have originated within different social science disciplines. In this Introduction I shall therefore attempt to clarify the relations between my empirical focus on housing associations and the theoretical debates and issues which I have chosen to address in the thesis.

It will become evident to the reader that for my part CBHAs, and housing associations generally, are especially interesting organisations in terms of a variety of implications of their development. I shall acknowledge from the start that my personal and academic interests have significantly influenced the limits of my focus, the particular issues I have chosen to address, the perspectives which I have adopted and, unfortunately, the length of the thesis. In this Introduction I shall attempt to clarify key aspects of my approach both empirically and theoretically. The Introduction will also serve as a guide to the structure of the thesis.

The research focus on Glasgow's housing associations

A major aspect of the thesis is a study of the background, origins and development of an experiment in housing and planning in Glasgow, in which I was interested both academically and as a participant. My main concern is with community based housing associations (CBHAs), a neighbourhood based and controlled form of housing association which became the predominant form of housing association in Glasgow between 1974 and 1984. In contrast to the mainstream of the voluntary housing movement, with its philanthropic traditions, we shall see that a unique feature of CBHAs has been their goals of establishing local control through the involvement of neighbourhood residents in their management. A further important feature of Glasgow's CBHAs has been their central role in the tenement rehabilitation strategy which was adopted by the local authority during the 1970s with the support of central government agencies.

This planning strategy focused on the major planning problem of obsolescence of mainly privately-owned housing in several parts of Glasgow. These predominantly working class localities had been significantly affected by economic and industrial decline and, moreover, the vast majority of their tenement housing lacked basic amenities and was in a considerable state of disrepair. The problem of housing obsolescence was clearly significant, therefore, for the housing

conditions and opportunities of working class people who wanted to live in these mainly "inner" tenement areas of Glasgow. We shall see that the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy for tackling inner area housing obsolescence represented a major departure from established strategies for tackling housing obsolescence in the city.

The formation of two CBHAs by 1974 was therefore an atypical development in Glasgow's planning system and within the voluntary housing association movement. We shall see that this innovation was supported and influenced by state agencies (the local authority, the Housing Corporation and the Scottish Development Department), by professionals involved in housing provision and by local residents. We shall also see that the role of CBHAs was extended and routinised and that, by 1984, there were 27 neighbourhood associations in Glasgow.

For neighbourhood residents CBHAs represented a strategy for ameliorating social and physical aspects of their localities and they offered new opportunities of access to decent housing in favoured localities, nearer to shops, pubs and the city centre than the peripheral schemes. Moreover, they offered, for the first time, some scope for resident involvement in housing and planning issues affecting their neighbourhoods. However, we shall see that for those who became actively involved in developing their local associations, in formulating and modifying their objectives and in monitoring their progress, the experience of involvement was subject to extensive and complex controls and uncertainties.

The development of Glasgow's CBHAs has been notably interwoven, first, with the development of the voluntary housing movement and its political, economic and planning context; secondly, with housing and planning developments in Glasgow; and, thirdly, with neighbourhood characteristics and what I shall term specifically local influences. From the start I wanted to take systematic account of these different strands of influence on the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy adopted in Glasgow during the 1970s and on the development of local associations.

When I started the research, I conceived of a central role for two case studies of CBHAs. I aimed to document the local backgrounds, origins and development of these associations. I intended also to employ perspectives in organisational theory in order to illuminate and explain various aspects of their organisational development, such as the evolution of their goals, their internal and external relations and the key environmental influences on their growth and development. However I have indicated that I was also interested in questions relating to the wider planning context of CBHAs. Therefore, whilst I wanted to describe and explain the significant differences between CBHAs, I also wanted to explore their shared experience of political, economic and planning constraints and how this experience reflects that of other agencies involved in housing provision. Moreover, as the research progressed I could not fail to note that the developments I was documenting were taking place during a period of significant political and economic changes. I wanted therefore to examine how these wider influences interrelated with the influence of individual

and social action, local events, circumstances and neighbourhood characteristics. This approach was influenced by both Marxist and Weberian approaches to historical and sociological analysis.⁽¹⁾

It also reflects the influence of C. Wright Mills' approach to research in The Sociological Imagination, a work which has long impressed me.⁽²⁾

Mills states:

A-historical studies usually tend to be static or very short term studies of limited milieux. That is only to be expected, for we more readily become aware of larger structures when they are changing, and we are likely to become aware of such changes only when we broaden our view to include a suitable historical time span. Our chance to understand how smaller milieux and larger structures interact, and our chance to understand the larger causes at work in these limited milieux thus require us to deal with historical materials. (3)

Moreover, Giddens has recently suggested that the Sociological Imagination implies 'an historical, an anthropological, and a critical sensitivity'.⁽⁴⁾

In keeping with this historical perspective, Part One of the thesis will explore the historical development of the voluntary housing movement. It will highlight some of the key characteristics of the Third Arm, as well as changes in the goals of its participants. It will also illustrate how economic developments and changes in the policies, controls and interventions of state agencies have influenced housing provision by associations. In Part Two of the thesis I shall examine wider influences on housing and planning developments in Glasgow, and I shall against that background provide an account of the origins of the policy initiative of the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy in Glasgow.

From the start of the research I was interested in the ways in which the goals and structure of CBHAs implied a shift in established patterns of control over working class housing opportunities in the inner areas. I was aware that questions about control which were relevant to the CBHA experience have been addressed within a number of disciplines. I did not, however, aim to derive a central hypothesis from theoretical analysis, which would then be tested through the CBHA experience.⁽⁵⁾ I was more interested in exploring a number of questions about control which were at the same time a focus of debates in different social science disciplines and relevant to practical dimensions of participants' experience. I shall discuss this theme of control later in the Introduction and we shall see its relevance to different parts of the thesis. At this point, however, I shall stress my general interest in applying a variety of theoretical perspectives in the research, which have been selected by virtue of their relevance for focusing on, highlighting and explaining different dimensions and outcomes of the development of CBHAs. I also, however, aimed to consider the implications of aspects of the housing association experience for certain current theoretical debates in the literature.

We shall see that my interest in different outcomes of the development of CBHAs, and in the particular theoretical debates I have chosen to address in the research, has been influenced by my experience of participation and by my own previously established orientations and interests. I must further acknowledge that these

influences meant I embarked on the research with certain general assumptions about CBHAs. For example, I was aware of the organisational complexity of CBHAs which appeared to stem from a number of influences. We shall see that CBHAs pursue a variety of goals; that they are dependent on the support of neighbourhood interests and organisations; and that they face extensive uncertainties. Also, a growing body of research has focused on the outcomes of state intervention in the field of social policy.⁽⁶⁾ I recognised from the start, therefore, that a major feature of the environment of CBHAs would be the complex of state agencies which supported and influenced their objectives, which funded their work and which ensured their accountability. I was therefore interested in exploring through the research what appeared to be potentially contradictory influences on their development. CBHAs were innovative organisations and their formation appeared to signify certain notable changes in the planning system. Yet, at the same time, they clearly operated in the context of intervention and controls by state agencies and within the framework of an established planning system. I therefore resolved to examine the outcomes of the development of CBHAs in the light of research on organisations,⁽⁷⁾ social movements and community action,⁽⁸⁾ and state planning and intervention.⁽⁹⁾ We shall see in later chapters how such research offered numerous hypotheses, which were relevant to my focus on housing associations. For example, studies of social movements and public participation in planning have pointed to the contradictory outcomes of such developments.⁽¹⁰⁾ They emphasise, on the one hand, tendencies towards innovation, some redistribution of

power between the planners and urban citizens and some improvements in social provision. On the other hand, they have generally stressed that organisational innovations have become subjected to pressures resulting in their routinisation; that participation in planning tends to result in the political incorporation of residents' groups, which were initially committed to advancing local interests and engaging in collective protest. Moreover, it has been argued that neighbourhood action, just like working class based collective action, has served both to modify and to reinforce the power of state agencies.⁽¹¹⁾ I shall refer to such debates at different parts of the thesis, and particularly in the concluding section where I shall consider their relevance to the housing association experience.

I have emphasised that neither my initial assumptions, nor the interests which have guided my approach to the research materialised from a void. Just as has been argued by critical social scientists in the C.W. Mills tradition, they have stemmed from my personal history, and they reflect my academic and social thinking.⁽¹²⁾ I shall now attempt to describe the interrelations between my personal background and the orientation of the research.

Personal influences, theoretical and substantive interests

There are two main aspects of my background which I would argue have especially influenced my approach to the research and to its development. First, I did not learn the craft of an established social science discipline. Rather I trained, in the 1960s, in the

emerging discipline of Organisational Analysis which highlighted the relevance of Sociological, Political, Economic and Psychological perspectives to the analysis of organisations. The discipline was also closely linked with those of Public Administration and Industrial Relations. If I had a leaning, it was towards Sociology, an interest which I was able to pursue when I subsequently lectured in Organisational Analysis, in Industrial Sociology and in Urban Sociology in different academic institutions.

Whilst the majority of my academic work was oriented towards industrial organisations, I developed an interest in housing and planning when I taught on a Sociology course for architects in 1973. However, even prior to that time, like many of my contemporaries I was critical of conventional planning strategies, especially the slum clearance approach and its effects on working class housing conditions and opportunities. Glasgow, like Liverpool where I had come from, had a centralist, traditionalist planning image. Both cities had been industrial, mainly working class cities in which class inequalities of choice, control and opportunity were reflected in housing provision and patterns of access. From the literature on urban studies and planning it was evident that there was growing academic criticism of the slum clearance approach, in Britain and America, and that there were signs of reaction by urban residents and professionals against both centralised planning and dispersal.⁽¹³⁾ Moreover, libertarian writers like Colin Ward were actively attempting to generate interest in planning alternatives and the extension of public participation.⁽¹⁴⁾

Against this background, the Assist architects' involvement in Govan in the early 1970s, which I shall describe in the thesis, appeared to be a positive development in Glasgow's planning scene.⁽¹⁵⁾

It might have been a logical progression for me to become involved with housing associations at that stage, but between 1974 and 1976 I lectured in Industrial Sociology. During that period I did, however, hear more about community based housing associations, and in late 1976 at a stage when I felt that I lacked any practical work experience, I resolved to leave academic work. During 1977 I worked as a Development Officer in Reidvale Housing Association, in Dennistoun, an area in Glasgow's East End. I learnt and I thrived on the intensity and variety of the small local office and I was amazed at the complexity of its work and its funding and bureaucratic context. Like most participants I did not have much time to reflect. I left Reidvale for the same personal reason which had influenced prior work decisions,⁽¹⁶⁾ otherwise it is possible that I might still have been a housing association employee.

During 1978 I resolved to embark on this study which I saw as enabling me to merge my academic and practical interests. Fortunately I was able to do so on a Social Science Research Council studentship in the Department in which I had previously studied and worked as a lecturer. I have already described how, when I started the research, I had intended that central to it would be two case studies of local associations, and in particular I was interested in highlighting

differences and similarities between them. As a participant in the early stages of an association's development I could not fail to become aware of the local differences between associations in terms of the scale of their building programmes, neighbourhood characteristics and local problems, the influence of key participants, and organisational relationships. It was not difficult, therefore, to select two associations which would highlight both organisational differences and similarities between CBHAs. I chose Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations with those ends in mind. Govanhill I selected because of its history of blight and local reaction; because of the larger scale of the planning area in which the association might potentially coordinate rehabilitation; because it was the first CBHA to be registered by the Housing Corporation in Glasgow; and because its progress highlighted the major technological uncertainties which have been experienced in the rehabilitation programmes of several CBHAs.⁽¹⁷⁾ Reidvale I selected because I had appreciated while I was a participant that there were certain differences in style, approach and circumstances between the two associations and because I had known it well during a short period of its development. We shall see that, unlike Govanhill, Reidvale was not recognised as an independent neighbourhood until a community worker encouraged the formation of a local Residents' Association in 1973 to liaise with the local authority on planning issues. In 1975 the Residents' Association pressed for the formation of a local housing association and Reidvale Housing Association was formed in

late 1975 and registered in April 1976. Reidvale HA was to operate in a compact homogeneous locality in contrast with the geographical spread and heterogeneity of Govanhill.⁽¹⁸⁾ In spite of their early differences we shall see that both associations faced many similar constraints and problems.

My initial intention was to employ sociological methods and perspectives which would illustrate key aspects of the development of the two associations. In particular, I wanted to highlight the interplay of, on the one hand, participants' choices and action and, on the other, structural and contingent influences. This approach to the analysis of organisational change and development was influenced by the work of several writers in Organisational Analysis, whose contributions I shall discuss in Chapter Nine of the thesis.

I have emphasised that I was not only interested in historical documentation and in narrating the housing association experience. There were certain theoretical questions and debates which I wanted to address through the research. These questions relate to my interest in several aspects of power and control which I believe are relevant to the housing association experience. I shall now attempt to clarify this interest.

Aspects of power and control

The questions about control which recur in the thesis relate to a variety of aspects of the development of housing associations in

Glasgow and nationally. First, I have suggested that a distinguishing feature of CBHAs is their goals of involving local residents in control of their affairs and of ensuring that the administration of rehabilitation and housing management is adaptable to the needs and preferences of local people. I am therefore interested in exploring how far, and in what ways, CBHAs have offered scope for participation to local residents in CBHA areas. I am interested in examining the outcomes of local participation for those residents who became involved in managing their local associations and for those whose housing interests they affected. At the same time I am interested in certain central organisational features and outcomes of housing associations. We shall see that the official internal control structure of CBHAs involves local people in responsibility for policy, and officials in responsibility for implementation. This control pattern is common to many organisations in the state and voluntary sectors and in the thesis I shall employ perspectives in Organisational Analysis and Public Administration to highlight the tensions and contradictions which are common to many such organisations.

I have described my intentions of exploring through the research the influences of, on the one hand, local participation and local accountability and, on the other, the implications of state intervention and controls for housing associations. Moreover, I should emphasise here that my interest in aspects of power, control and housing outcomes is reflected in several recent and influential studies of housing policy and urban politics. The studies by Lambert, Paris

and Blackaby,⁽¹⁹⁾ Saunders⁽²⁰⁾ and Dunleavy⁽²¹⁾ are all relevant here. In the concluding section, therefore, I shall compare some of my findings about the development of Glasgow's CBHAs with certain conclusions about housing policy and urban politics derived from research carried out in Birmingham and London Boroughs.

Turning to focus on the structure of the thesis, I have emphasised earlier that my approach is historical and that Parts One and Two of the thesis provide a background to the development of housing associations, nationally (Part One) and in the Glasgow case (Part Two). Chapters One to Five therefore concentrate on political, economic and planning influences on the development of housing associations; on the intentions and values of housing association participants; and on the outcomes of collective action.

Parts Two and Three of the thesis narrate several different aspects of the development of Glasgow's CBHAs between 1974 and 1983. In Part Three, Chapters Six and Seven describe how Glasgow associations became involved in national and urban representative organisations and how their participants entered into lobbying and campaigning in order to influence their environment of state funding and controls. Chapter Eight describes the complexities and uncertainties of rehabilitation and the various private sector interests which were influenced by the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy in Glasgow. Chapters Eight and Nine also explore the outcomes of CBHAs in terms of industrial relations developments and in terms of their significant

organisational characteristics. Chapter Ten in Part Four sets the scene for the case studies by highlighting the characteristics of the neighbourhoods in which Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations were formed in the 1970s. Chapters Eleven and Twelve focus on the development of the two associations as housing producers, as local landlords, as management systems and, finally, in terms of the dynamics of local participation and accountability which effect them.

At several points in the thesis I shall refer to research and debates which are relevant to these different aspects of the housing association experience, as for example in Chapters Three, the Introduction to Part Three of the thesis and in Chapter Ten. At these points I shall highlight certain theories about urban politics, public participation and the power inequalities among organisations which serve to influence policy making and its outcomes.⁽²²⁾ Also, prior to the case studies, in Chapter Nine I shall focus on certain themes in the literature on Organisational Analysis in order to highlight key aspects of my approach in accounting the development of Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations. In Chapters Thirteen and Fourteen I shall pursue my interest in different aspects of power and control more theoretically and at that stage I shall address more specifically certain current theoretical debates. Whereas in Chapter Thirteen I shall deal generally with housing association experience, in Chapter Fourteen I shall focus more specifically on the outcomes of the development of CBHAs.

It will become apparent to the reader that I am approaching housing provision by housing associations as an enterprise which is closely linked with the state's involvement in housing production and allocation. In doing so I have diverged from those perspectives which distinguish sharply between the role of state agencies in capitalist production and in providing for social consumption. Housing associations are not state agencies. We shall see that as voluntary organisations involved in producing and allocating housing, they are significantly dependent on state funding and have played an increasingly important role in the implementation of state housing policies. Moreover, I have suggested that certain distinguishing characteristics of CBHAs imply a shift in control to area residents and the establishment of a new form of social ownership and control over local housing. I would further suggest that the state funding and public accountability of associations should serve to highlight important features of state intervention and control, which I shall discuss in Chapter Thirteen.

Having outlined the background to my approach and the questions which have influenced the scope and structure of the thesis, I shall now turn to discuss the methods which I have applied in the research.

Research methods

We have seen that there are certain key aspects of my approach to the research: first, it involves a historical perspective; secondly, my aim is to account for the processual development of associations, in Glasgow and nationally, between 1973 and 1983; and thirdly, a central aim has been to explore structured influences on power inequalities and housing opportunities, as well as the dynamics of power and control which are reflected in the development of housing associations. In the context of these different research interests I have employed a variety of empirical research methods. Unlike Lambert, Paris and Blackaby's 'straw man' of the conventional researcher or C.W. Mills' academic 'bureaucrat', I have not limited my data largely with the intent of ensuring its manageability.⁽²³⁾ I have been eclectic in the methods I have adopted, the sources of my information and in my definitions of relevant data.

In terms of the methodological assumptions underlying the approach to the research, I would suggest that my approach reflects the difficulties inherent in simplistic categorisations of theoretical approaches in social science.⁽²⁴⁾ For instance I would argue that my approach is both inductive and deductive.⁽²⁵⁾ Whilst I shall mainly attempt to contribute to theoretical debates on the basis of my observations about housing associations (an inductive approach) I have argued that my interest in specific theories and debates has also stemmed from my prior immersion in certain bodies of theory. Further, it will become evident that my approach has been influenced by writings

in Marxist theory, in critical sociology, in systems analysis and in Weberian sociology, as well as by the academic disciplines which I have mentioned earlier. Moreover, in accounting for the developments in which I am interested, as I have suggested earlier, my approach aims to take account of, on the one hand, structural influences and, on the other, the role of individuals and of collective action. As well as being interested in describing the established, structured influences on the housing association experience, I am interested in how participants perceive and interpret these structures and how such perceptions are reflected in participants' action and the development of housing associations. This interpretative emphasis stems for my part mainly from the work of Weber in Sociology, whilst we should remember that the emphasis on political and economic influences and on structured inequalities has been most notably reflected in the work of the Marxists.⁽²⁶⁾ We should also note, however, that certain influential theoretical works would imply that the traditions of Marx and Weber are not mutually exclusive and that there is considerable common ground in the theoretical interests of these schools.⁽²⁷⁾

Moreover, I would emphasise that this common ground is particularly relevant to the concerns of the critical social scientists who have influenced my approach. For these writers have dualistic aims of, on the one hand, illuminating the characteristics of structured constraints and contingent influences on participants' action and, on the other, of identifying the meaning of such constraints for participants and their intentions. One of the purposes of such

research is to highlight the scope and potentials for action through which people might modify and ameliorate the constraints which impinge on their interests. I would suggest that my focus on aspects of control in the housing association experience is consistent with the aims of critical theorists. (28)

Turning specifically now to discuss research methods, I should emphasise that different methods were adopted in the pursuit of different kinds of information. For instance in the attempt to provide a historical account of the voluntary housing movement, I concentrated on the literature on housing and planning and on studies of the housing association movement. I was interested in identifying the main historical strands of the housing association movement and how these were reflected in more recent developments (Chapter One); in the ways in which the development of the movement reflected political and economic influences and state policies (Chapter Two); and in identifying key aspects of housing associations as a Third Arm of housing provision (Chapter Three). I also aimed to understand more recent developments in government policy and their implications for housing associations, between the late 1960s and early 1970s. To those ends I conducted interviews with senior Scottish Development Department officials, with senior officials in the Housing Corporation, and with officials and members of the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations. These interviews were all lengthy and relatively open-ended and unstructured. (29)

My account (Chapter Four) of the historical background to the development of housing associations in Glasgow is based on a review of the literature on housing and planning in Glasgow and the West of Scotland. In contrast, my study of the development of a policy initiative (that of Glasgow's CBHAs) is based on my own research (Chapter Five). I conducted a series of interviews with local councillors, local authority officials, Housing Corporation officials, architects and community workers. All those interviewed were selected because of their involvement in different roles in Glasgow's planning scene between 1969 and 1974, and had been connected in some capacity with the origins of the CBHA/rehabilitation strategy. I also interviewed officials and members who had participated in housing associations in Glasgow, between 1969 and 1974, with the aim of learning about their early intentions and expectations. I examined official reports and papers relating to the early development of housing associations and I was given access to such documentation by the local authority and the Housing Corporation. Moreover, with the purpose of comprehending the development of policy within the Corporation of Glasgow, I analysed the Minutes of its Housing Committees between 1969 and 1974, as well as The Glasgow News, an independent newspaper which covered that period.

In terms of my focus on various outcomes of the development of Glasgow's CBHAs between 1974 and 1983 I again drew on a variety of sources of information. I analysed Minutes and official reports of the local authority, the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations

and the Glasgow Forum. I also interviewed housing association participants, and drew on my interviews with government personnel. Moreover, between 1978 and 1981, I attended as an observer meetings and conferences of the Glasgow Forum of Housing Associations and of the Scottish Federation. There can be no doubt, as I have suggested earlier, that my questions and observations during that period were influenced by my prior participation, as well as by the regularity of my contacts with participants during the research. Since 1980 I have been actively involved as a member of a neighbourhood housing association and, subsequently, as a member of the Council of the Scottish Federation. I would suggest here that my research has inevitably influenced my contribution as a participant since 1980. On the other hand, I would suggest that my participation created both difficulties and opportunities for the research. I shall clarify this point later.

I shall first describe the research methods employed in my attempt to provide an account of the origins and development of the two associations. I was interested in highlighting the differences and similarities in planning, employment and social characteristics of the two neighbourhoods in which Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations were formed in the early 1970s. Once again I drew on a variety of sources of written material, including planning reports, census information and historical accounts of the two neighbourhoods. I also carried out interviews with local authority planners and local

councillors, community workers and representatives of neighbourhood groups, and moreover, as the research progressed I attended some public meetings and planning working groups in both neighbourhoods.

Both Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations agreed that I should have access to their files, receive their Committee Minutes, interview staff and Committee members and attend meetings between 1979 and 1981. Between 1979 and 1981 I spent approximately two days a week carrying out these tasks in both their offices. In Reidvale local people remembered me in my former capacity as an official and in Govanhill, by 1981, local shopkeepers were complaining to me about their problems. There is no doubt that I felt increasingly involved with the experiences of both associations during that period. I had become an "ear" to many parties, against which could be sounded out a multitude of issues and problems. My "policy" was not to make judgments unless I was specifically requested to do so. Whilst at times I did receive such requests, it is perhaps more remarkable how seldom they occurred. I would suggest that participants held varying conceptions of my role and of my neutrality as a researcher. Moreover, there were changes in my involvement over time, ranging from my prior participation as an official, to my increasing involvement with CBHAS during the research on a number of different fronts. At the same time, I had focused the research on different dimensions of the housing association experience and it would follow that any partisan assessments I held in one sphere (for example, in relation to state funding and controls) would not necessarily serve as indicators regarding my

approach to aspects of industrial relations or neighbourhood politics.

Further, whilst discussions about research methods have pointed to the significance of a continuum ranging from detached observation to full blown participant observation in qualitative research,⁽³⁰⁾ in my case it is evident that such a clear-cut categorisation is not really possible. Whilst the research was initially influenced by prior participation, I would suggest that between 1978 and 1980 it corresponded as far as was possible to the more "detached-observer" end of the continuum of participant observation, and that since 1980 it has shifted towards increasing participation or to 'Research-Action' in Lambert et al's terms.⁽³¹⁾

My participation was a crucial factor in keeping the research alive during my writing up and updating phase. However, it also generated ethical problems. Whilst most participants with whom I shared my involvement knew that I was carrying out a research project on housing associations, there were ethical considerations, which led me to limit my "data", as far as I was able, to that gained from situations where I was acknowledged as a researcher. In particular, the research had stretched out timewise to the extent that I believed that few participants could understand the range of my interests, which in any case were difficult to communicate succinctly. Participation clearly also meant access to privileged information and I therefore had to make judgments about its place in terms of the research. Moreover, I was aware that my participation enabled access

to the voluntary sector to a far greater extent than to the state agencies in which I was also interested. Against this background the research was likely to be biased towards an emphasis on the perspectives and problems characterising associations and at times, potentially to their detriment. These concerns also affected the case studies.

Against this background it is relevant that many studies have pointed to the greater likelihood of researchers' access to, and identification with less powerful groups.⁽³²⁾ Recognising the potential of "overload" in terms of the housing association experience I resolved therefore to remind myself continually of the sources of different aspects of my data. I further resolved to "officially" update my data in 1982 and 1983, when I carried out a further programme of interviews and updated information. Moreover, I resolved to have my draft case studies read by certain longstanding participants (staff and Committee members) in both associations. This decision alleviated my concerns about the possibilities of incorrect factual information and of infringing on confidentiality. The "draft" case studies were read by two participants in each association prior to their updating in 1983. I made some minor amendments as a result of certain corrections and comments, for which I was exceedingly grateful. I approached in a similar fashion the material on state controls and on the development and outcomes of collective action (Chapters Six and Seven).

Finally I want to consider further the role of the case studies in Part Four for the research as a whole. In a sense the case studies can be viewed as self-standing and detailed accounts of the development of two Glasgow associations (Chapters Eleven and Twelve). I have described earlier the intensive research approach which I adopted with the aim of exploring the processual development of the case study associations. I would argue that such an approach was essential to take account of historical influences and to illuminate the interplay of constraints and action. I would also argue that the case studies were a major influence on the research as a whole. My close monitoring of the two associations served continually to alert me to the similarities and differences between them and to suggest indicators which demanded further exploration. These indicators were relevant to housing associations more generally and to the wider questions in which I was interested, about control, decision-making and relations between the voluntary sector and the state. Just as Bechhofer and others have argued about participant observation, I would argue that the intensive case study approach enables 'the continuous generation and testing of "hypotheses"'.⁽³³⁾

Having described the research focus, my approach to the research and the research methods which I have adopted in the thesis, Part One of the thesis will explore historically the changing relations between the Voluntary Sector and the State.

Notes and References to the Introduction to the Thesis

- (1) See T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, (eds.), A History of Sociological Analysis, Heinemann, Basic Books, 1978. Particularly relevant is A. Dawe's article, 'Theories of Social Action', pp. 362-417 which stresses the links between social structure and social action. Also T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet's article stresses how the structuralist emphasis in sociology has stemmed from the work of Marx and Durkheim, and can be either static or dynamic in character, pp. 557-598.
- See also the typification of Weber's Action approach in M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Unwin University Books, 1974, and K. Marx, Early Writings, Introduced by L. Colletti, New Left Review, 1974.
- (2) C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Pelican Books, 1970.
- (3) Ibid, p. 165.
- (4) A. Giddens, Sociology, A Brief but Critical Introduction, Macmillan Press, 1983, p. 16.
- (5) See F. Bechhofer, 'Current approaches to empirical research: some central ideas', in J. Rex, Approaches to Sociology, An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 70-91. Bechhofer and others, like B. Fay, have stressed that this conventional, mainstream research model of the natural and physical sciences may be inappropriate for much social research. See also B. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, George Allen and Unwin, 1975, pp. 70-110.
- (6) See for example, A. Giddens, Sociology, A Brief but Critical Introduction, 1983, op. cit., pp. 77-96; N. Ginsberg, Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 1-19; I. Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State, Macmillan Press, 1980, pp. 1-16; V. George and P. Wilding, Ideology and the Welfare State, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976; R. Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1969.
- (7) See S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Organisation, Class and Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, for a summary of key issues and debates in organisational analysis. See also Chapter Nine where I shall focus on such debates.

- (8) See Chapter Three, the Introduction to Part Three of the thesis, Chapter Ten and Chapters Eleven and Twelve for references to and discussions of the literature on community action, social movements, public participation and urban politics.
- (9) See Chapter Thirteen for a discussion of theories of state intervention and control and their relevance to the housing association experience. See also B. Jessop, The Capitalist State, Martin Robertson & Company Ltd., 1983, for a comprehensive analysis of the literature on the Capitalist State.
- (10) See for example, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham, Heinemann, 1979; H. Stretton, Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries, Oxford University Press, 1978; G. Kirk, Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society, Croom Helm, 1980; C.G. Pickvance, (ed.), Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, London, Tavistock, 1976.
- (11) These arguments are typified in C. Cockburn, The Local State, London, Pluto Press, 1977.
- (12) C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, 1959, op. cit., see Appendix on Intellectual Craftsmanship, pp. 215-219. See also B. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, 1975, op. cit., pp. 93-97. Fay stresses that a critical social theory is necessarily influenced by the practical and social concerns of researchers.
- (13) See H. Rose, The Housing Problem, Heinemann, London, 1968, an influential text which was critical of housing policies and which emphasised the human face of housing problems of the 1960s. See also R. Pahl, Whose City?, Second Edition, Penguin, 1975 and R. Pahl, Patterns of Urban Life, Longman, 1970.
- (14) See C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, The Architectural Press Ltd., London, 1974 and C. Ward, Anarchy in Action, George Allen and Unwin, 1973.
- (15) See Chapter Five.
- (16) A new addition to the family!
- (17) See the case study of Govanhill Housing Association in Chapter Eleven of the thesis.
- (18) See the case study of Reidvale Housing Association in Chapter Twelve of the thesis.

- (19) See J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, Macmillan Press, 1978 and C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, Urban Renewal Policy in Birmingham, 1979, op. cit.
- (20) P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation, Penguin, 1980.
- (21) P. Dunleavy, 'An issue centred approach to the study of power', Political Studies, 1976, Vol. XXIV, No. 4, pp. 423-34, and 'Protest and quiescence in urban politics: a critique of some pluralist and structuralist myths', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 1977, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 193-218.
- (22) With regard to this focus on interorganisational relations, see W.M. Evan, (ed.), Interorganisational Relations, Selected Readings, Penguin, 1976. See also J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British Local Government, Cambridge University Press, 1979, pp. 146-163 and pp. 213-256. Also P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1977, Second Edition.
- (23) See J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, 1979, op. cit., pp. 21-22, and C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, 1970, op. cit., pp. 113-132.
- (24) These difficulties have been clearly identified by T. Campbell in Seven Theories of Human Society, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 25, and pp. 1-50.
- (25) Several critical theorists in social science have recognised the value of such a dualist approach, as well as the difficulties associated with it. See, for example, F. Bechhofer, 'Current approaches to empirical research: some central ideas' in J. Rex, (ed.), Approaches to Sociology, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974, pp. 70-91. Bechhofer stresses the value of grounded theory as opposed to 'mindless empiricism', p. 73. See also A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1977, pp. 132 and 148-162; B. Fay, Social Theory and Political Practice, 1975 op. cit., pp. 70-91; A. Gouldner, The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology, Heinemann Educational Books, 1971, pp. 481-512 and T.B. Bottomore, Sociology as Social Criticism, George Allen and Unwin, 1975, pp. 11-18.
- (26) See P.S. Cohen, Modern Social Theory, London, Heinemann, 1968.
- (27) See, for example, A. Dawe, Theories of Social Action, 1978, op. cit.

- (28) For example A. Giddens, New Rules of Sociological Method, 1977, op. cit.; A. Giddens, Sociology, A Brief but Critical Introduction, 1983, op. cit.; T. Bottomore, Sociology as Social Criticism, 1975, op. cit.; K. Marx, The Grundrisse, Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 1973, foreword by M. Nicolaus, pp. 7-64.
- (29) As Gold has suggested, my interviews permitted considerable scope for participants to influence the range of key issues under discussion, albeit within the constraints of the framework of indicators determined by myself. See R.L. Gold, 'Roles in sociological field observation', Social Forces, Vol. 36, 1958, pp. 217-223.
- (30) Ibid. See also F. Bechhofer, 1974, op. cit., pp. 84-85, and J.G. McCall and J.L. Simmons, (eds.), Issues in Participant Observation, Addison-Wesley, 1969; M. Dalton, Men Who Manage, Wiley, 1959, H. Gans, The Urban Villagers, Free Press, 1962; J. Gower Davies, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, Tavistock, 1972, pp. 233-236; P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation, Penguin, 1980, pp. 325-352.
- (31) See J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, Macmillan Press, 1978, op. cit., pp. 20-31. See also C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, Heinemann, 1979, op. cit., pp. 193-195.
- (32) P. Saunders, Urban Politics, 1980, op. cit., pp. 325-328.
- (33) F. Bechhofer, 1974, op. cit., p. 74.

PART ONE

THE VOLUNTARY SECTOR AND THE STATE

CHAPTER ONE

THE DEVELOPMENT OF VOLUNTARY HOUSING IN BRITAIN

In the Introduction, CBHAs were described as a locality-based and locally controlled type of housing association which has been vested with a significant role within the planning context of housing rehabilitation in Glasgow between 1974 and 1983. Further it was suggested that CBHAs in Glasgow represented a deviation from traditional forms of housing association and from patterns of development of voluntary housing provision in other cities. However, CBHAs operate within the same national framework (of politics, legislation, economic change and housing provision) which forms the context of housing associations in general.

Chapter One covers selected themes relating to the development of housing associations in Britain and is divided into two main sections. Section One, by way of introduction, identifies some key questions relating to the notion of the voluntary housing movement as a Third Arm of housing provision in the context of state funding and control. In Section Two I shall identify the complex range of organisations associated with the movement over the last century and examine some attempts at classifying housing association types. In Section Three I shall propose a simple framework outlining major historical trends within the movement, and finally I shall focus on certain aspects of CBHAs. In the second chapter of Part One, the political and economic context of the movement will be further examined. National

housing policy and legislation and local authority policy will be discussed in terms of their effects on the development of the housing association movement. The concluding chapter of Part One will examine questions relating to housing associations as a Third Arm of housing, focusing especially on developments during the 1970s.

1. The Voluntary Sector and the State

The housing association movement has frequently been referred to as the 'Third Arm' of housing provision in Britain. The 'Third Arm' concept, as it has been applied by successive governments, refers to the role of housing associations in supplementing and complementing housing provision by statutory agencies and by the private housing sector.⁽¹⁾ However, for participants in voluntary housing the concept also serves to emphasise significant aspects of organisation, control and provision of housing which distinguish the work of housing associations from housing provision by the state and the private sectors.

For many participants within 'the movement' a significant aspect of its identity has been its voluntarism, its ability to incorporate voluntary action and co-operative effort in the management of housing, and to act independently of state control in the development of housing alternatives. So, for example, principles of co-operative ownership and management are embodied in the development of one sector of the movement.⁽²⁾

Ward and Hands suggest that another aspect of the 'Third Arm' is that the aims of movement organisations are to develop alternative means of access to housing and increased variety in housing provision. These writers emphasise that housing association provision should meet the needs and preferences of groups not catered for by statutory and private agencies.⁽³⁾

Central government housing policy and legislation of the late 1960s and 1970s served to effect incremental change in the planning context and in opportunities for development by the voluntary sector. Elements of different Housing Acts (most recently the Housing (Scotland) Act 1969 and the Housing (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1972) were modified and integrated within the Housing (Scotland) Act 1974, which established a comprehensive framework of funding controls. The 1974 Housing Acts,⁽⁴⁾ therefore, represented an overall shift in central government policy towards encouraging and enabling an expanded role for the voluntary sector in providing housing for rent.

Historically, and in the present day, there is a confusing array of types of housing association, in terms of their objectives, their membership and the client groups which they serve.⁽⁵⁾ Until 1964 housing association (HA) objectives primarily reflected the varying interests and priorities of their Management Committees, as well as the policies of local authority funders. However, the 1964 Housing Act established a quasi-governmental organisation (or quango),⁽⁶⁾ the Housing Corporation, following government concern about the steady decrease in the private rented housing sector since the war.

Regarding the decline of private landlordism, Cullingworth suggests that there was a number of contributing factors: rent controls, problems associated with management, maintenance and repair, and competition from 'tax-favoured owner-occupation and subsidised local authority housing'. The Housing Corporation (HC) was initially directed towards stimulating unsubsidised housing provision by HAS, and it was intended that building societies would lend about two-thirds of the costs of schemes.⁽⁷⁾

Labour and Conservative governments during the 1970s have extended the powers of the HC. Since 1974, the HC has been charged with the functions of controlling the proliferation of HAS through a new system of registration; promoting the formation and expansion of registered HAS in accordance with central government housing policies; monitoring the operations of HAS; and encouraging effective liaison between local authorities and HAS.⁽⁸⁾ Finally, under the 1979 Conservative government, the role of the HC in Scotland was expanded with regard to resource distribution, until it matched the powers delegated by central government to the longer-established central and regional offices of the HC in England.⁽⁹⁾ The HC therefore occupies a key role in the system of resource distribution which operates to delimit the work of HAS. The political consensus between the main parties in Parliament regarding the extended role of the HC and the growth of the HA sector was evident during the Second Reading of the Housing Bill, which became the Housing Act 1974.⁽¹⁰⁾ During the debate, the MP for Hornsey commented:

... this is an unusual Parliament. Certainly this has been a very unusual debate. I do not recall any previous housing debate that evoked so little interest. Normally housing debates are debates of great heat and occasion. This has been an extremely tame affair . (11)

Having briefly illustrated the growing central government support for the Third Arm, during the 1970s, I shall attempt to summarise the main aspects of housing associations which distinguish their work from that of housing provision by the state and private sectors.

From the preceding discussion we can identify four main characteristics of the Third Arm. First, the voluntary housing sector extends opportunities for public participation to individuals and interest groups excluded from influencing housing provision by the private and public sectors. Secondly, the voluntary sector is seen as providing alternative forms of tenure to both the municipal and private sectors. Thirdly, housing provision by housing associations and housing co-operatives can serve to meet housing needs which are not provided for by the other main sectors. Fourthly, the 'voluntary' dimension of housing associations is associated with high expectations for organisational autonomy and for the scope to develop a variety of approaches to housing provision, which may not necessarily conform to the priorities and methods of government agencies.

These four aspects of voluntary housing have not received equal recognition by interested parties. While the second and third aspects have been identified as outcomes of HA provision by politicians, government officials, movement participants and academics, the first

and fourth aspects have been primarily emphasised by HA participants. Also, in my emphasis on all four aspects, I have chosen to recognise an underlying contradiction between the value placed on autonomy and new housing initiatives by movement participants, and the outcomes of growing political support and central government spending in terms of increased state direction and control.

I shall now examine the main sectors of the housing association movement and the attempts of writers to impose some order on a disparate and complex nexus of organisations by classifying them into housing association types. In Chapter Three I shall draw some conclusions regarding the four main characteristics of the 'Third Arm', particularly with respect to its growth during the 1970s.

2. Classifications of Housing Associations

In much of the literature on housing associations (HAs) writers have attempted to classify the dominant types of organisation within voluntary housing. In general those who have attempted to impose some conceptual order on the HA movement have stressed the difficulties of this task arising from the extensive variation in HA objectives, products, client groups and organisational structures.

One such classification is a typology of housing associations presented by the National Federation of Housing Associations, which includes six categories of housing association:⁽¹²⁾

1. General family associations. These have provided general family housing for rent for those in need. Groups initiating the development of such associations generally had charitable aims or at times a combination of moral and political interests in relation to housing provision. For example, the older charitable trusts of the nineteenth century were largely concerned with providing general family housing while, more recently, housing associations like Christian Action (Glasgow) and the Family Housing Association Ltd. (Manchester) both initially had strong links with Shelter.
2. Associations providing housing for old people. Many associations in this category have been formed through some particular local need and the endeavours of socially minded local people, members perhaps of a church or religious body, voluntary organisation, Rotary or Soroptimist Club. The majority have been formed by local bodies but some operate nationally or on a county or regional basis.
3. Associations providing housing for Industrial Workers. These were generally started post-1945 by employers wanting to attract workers into a new area, where housing provision was limited or non-existent. One example quoted by the National Federation is the Coal Board Housing Association

which, after nationalisation, took over existing colliery housing associations and expanded their work.

4. Self-Build housing associations. These are formed by groups of individuals building their own houses with their own combined labour. Since the first association was formed by a group of ex-servicemen in Brighton in 1949 over 10,000 houses have been built by nearly 1,000 associations. The early examples built houses for letting to their members but more recently they have built for owner-occupation.

5. Co-ownership housing societies and associations. ⁽¹³⁾
 Co-ownership housing societies are funded by the Housing Corporation under the provisions of the 1961 legislation. Co-ownership associations were promoted by the National Federation and funded by local authorities under the provisions of the Housing Act 1969, whereby small groups of seven or more aimed to purchase and modernise existing housing. Since the Housing Rents and Subsidies Act 1975, co-operatives have had access to Housing Corporation funds. Regarding co-ownership, a 1979 NFHA guide to Committee members stated that:

No new co-ownership schemes have been approved in recent years and some schemes in the pipeline have been converted to rental as co-ownership housing has lost its viability. (14)

Reasons for the decline of co-ownership will be discussed further in a later section.

6. Housing Associations providing for special groups. These include associations concerned with housing for immigrant workers, the physically or mentally handicapped, ex-offenders and one-parent families. Often the aims of those involved in establishing 'special needs' associations, as they are frequently termed, have been similar to those identified in relation to the first two categories of housing association.

The above typology is based on a range of distinguishing criteria. First, there is the type of housing provision which is directed towards meeting specific categories of need, e.g. general family, special groups and housing for the elderly. Secondly, there is the process of housing provision, e.g. self-build, while the third set of criteria relates to the nature of ownership and control of housing, e.g. co-ownership and housing co-operatives.

Matheson,⁽¹⁵⁾ in his historical analysis of the development of housing associations, uses two different forms of classification. First, a classification of housing associations is used which is

similar to that of the National Federation and is based on differences in terms of housing product and in relation to the social groups for whom housing is produced. Secondly, in his discussion of the development of housing associations in Glasgow, he uses the terms 'traditional housing association' to describe associations in the charitable tradition and 'community-based housing association' to describe the form of housing association which has become numerically predominant in Glasgow.

Matheson's terms highlight certain characteristics which provide another basis of differentiation between types of association. Traditional or conventional associations have these characteristics: they aim at providing a housing service for social groups which have an identifiable housing need or preference; they generally operate over an urban, regional or national spread; and thirdly, control of policy is by a Management Committee of which the members are predominantly professionals, or individuals whose skills or interests are related to the goals or activities of the organisation. Community-based housing associations, on the other hand, do not focus on providing for special needs, they operate in relation to socially- or planning-defined localities or neighbourhoods; they are run by management committees of which the members are local residents whose housing interests therefore may be affected by the policy of their associations. The central criterion on which the above comparison is based relates to the formal structure of participation in, and control of, the association as an organisation.

A similar classification is used by Page et al.,⁽¹⁶⁾ who employ the terms 'traditional' and 'special' associations, although in their framework the 'special' category covers all associations of which membership aims are not 'benevolent or philanthropic'. These writers use a different classification for highlighting patterns of 'motivation' of those forming housing associations. In their usage, traditional associations have aims of helping others. A second pattern of motivation relates to those 'who want to house themselves' and their third and residual category implies 'professional self-interest' (e.g. cost rent and sponsored co-ownership) which is outlawed by current legislation.

Colin Ward distinguishes between associations in terms of patterns of control and the nature of involvement of members of their management committee:

Most housing societies and associations are not democratic tenant-controlled bodies. Some are just as autocratic as the most paternalist of local authorities. Others have an insufferable air of 'charity' about them. A few seem to exist purely for the sake of the flow of fees they provide for the professional people involved in them. (17)

Although he points to controls implied by the 1974 Act which are aimed at increasing accountability and preventing abuses, Ward is clearly disappointed that the 1974 Act makes no reference to democratic or tenant control of housing associations and gives little encouragement to housing co-operatives. He quotes Dick Leonard from Hansard:

The man who has been left out in the provisions of this Bill, as he has so often been left out by this government in the past, is the tenant. There is no word in the Bill about requiring housing associations to conform to minimum democratic criteria ... This part of the Bill, in fact, appears to be a charter for paternalism. (18)

These comments were made in 1974. However, since that time, the central government departments in England and in Scotland which are responsible for the implementation of legislation relating to housing associations, and the Housing Corporation, have all made policy statements supporting attempts by housing associations to establish structures of democratic control and tenant involvement in decision making. (19)


3. An Alternative Model of Housing Association Types

I shall now suggest a framework for locating housing association types on a comparative and historical basis. In the following classification I shall distinguish between different types of HA objectives and provision as they have occurred historically. The framework is based on these propositions:

1. that there are two main sectors of development identifiable within the voluntary housing movement, which I shall describe as the Social Service (or Charitable) Sector and the Mutual Benefit Sector;

2. that the basis of comparison rests on the dominant goals of housing associations which in turn relate to 'who benefits' from housing provision.

Classification of Housing Association Types in Terms of Dominant Goals Relating to 'Who Benefits' from Housing Provision



Regarding the classification, I am aware that all HAs cannot be subsumed within my categories. However, this does not negate its general applicability. The purpose of the diagram is to illustrate

general historical developments within the major organisational sectors and to emphasise that CBHAs involve a mix of elements. Finally, I should state that in employing the concept of 'who benefits' the classification bears no direct relation to Blau and Scott's comparative framework. (20)

3.a. The Social Service or Charitable Sector

Housing associations in this sector have historically embodied wide-ranging aims. Housing goals have varied over time and between cities in relation to the national planning and legislative context, the characteristics of local housing provision and the attitudes and interests of both local authorities and housing association members. Significant aims of organisations within this sector have been directed towards:

1. increasing the avenues of access to housing for social groups viewed as unable to compete within the housing market for a variety of reasons, e.g. poverty or other associated social problems;
2. providing housing which will meet the special needs of social groups which are not catered for by existing housing provision, e.g. the elderly, mentally handicapped, single persons;
3. increasing the general provision of rented housing in the context of a declining rental housing sector,

or in its total absence, e.g. cost rent societies
or industrial associations.⁽²¹⁾

The charitable initiatives of philanthropists and property companies in the nineteenth century are well-documented examples of the early phase of development of the movement. In general, the term 'Victorian philanthropy' has been applied to the efforts of individuals and organisations which were aimed at improving the housing conditions of the working class.⁽²²⁾

By the mid-nineteenth century, the new middle class and the aristocracy were faced by different reports pointing to the significant relationship between overcrowding and poor sanitation and the prevalence of ill-health and high mortality rates within working class ghettos of urban housing. Social reformers committed themselves to providing structurally sound housing within inner urban areas, during a period when those with a speculative interest in building were increasingly attracted to building away from the centre where land was cheaper.

Examples of philanthropic organisations were the Peabody and Guinness Trusts, which were founded on the basis of large donations by wealthy individuals in 1862 and 1899 respectively. Tarn⁽²³⁾ describes how The Peabody Trust built large, drab tenement buildings surrounding an open courtyard, and shared toilet and kitchen facilities were provided to allow for supervision of usage. Most building by charitable associations took the form of lodging houses, often tenemental, for single male workers or artisans, or terraced family housing.

Also, during the nineteenth century, property companies were formed with the aim of developing model dwellings, e.g. the Metropolitan Association for Improving the Dwellings of the Industrious Classes, 1841. Their aim was to provide good quality housing for workers, but it was also made explicit that the capitalist was to receive compensation for his investment. In effect, both types of societies made dividends of between 1 and 5 per cent - the difference being that the commercial society limited the return on investment to the private investor, while the charitable societies reinvested the profits in further housing provision.

The philanthropic societies had at times an approach to their tenants which was explicitly both paternalist and authoritarian in character. For example, the Peabody Trust locked the gates to the scheme at night-time and a warden was employed to ensure rules were kept. Tarn outlines the debate amongst nineteenth century capitalist reformers, which focused on the appropriateness and relevance of 'charity' as a means of improving working class housing conditions. Some, like Octavia Hill, argued that the real problem was of management or control and the provision of incentives, so that the poor had to be taught to live decently in their existing conditions. Central to this debate were ideological assumptions about the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor and about 'self-help' being a precondition of self-respect. Tarn's analysis shows that it was the emphasis on self-help which became central to reformist efforts after the 1870s. Gauldie⁽²⁴⁾ points out that philanthropic provision was not generally aimed at the poorest sections of the working class and Merrett quotes Sir Sydney Waterloo of the Improved Industrial Dwellings Co. who,

in his evidence to the Royal Commission on the Housing of the Working Classes, 1885, referred to the housing needs and preferences of three different strata of the working class:

... it would not have been right to build down to the lowest class, because you must have built a class of tenement which I hope none of them would be satisfied with at the end of 50 years; we have rather tried to build for the best class, and by lifting them up to leave more room for the second and third who are below them. (25)

There are few such examples of Philanthropic or charitable nineteenth century provision in Scottish history and where these occurred they generally focused on providing lodging houses⁽²⁶⁾ - for example, the Glasgow Association for Establishing Lodging Houses for the Working Classes, formed in 1847.

Historical accounts of housing provision have described the above nineteenth century examples as the model which came to be adopted by the local authorities.⁽²⁷⁾ The Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, followed by the 1909 and 1919 Housing and Town Planning Acts, increasingly vested local authorities with the power and the obligation to house the poor, and provided them with subsidies to further this end. However, loan facilities and subsidies were also available to charitable associations. During the inter-war period there was considerable growth in the number of charitable associations, despite the fact that local authorities were often either ignorant of their existence and their activities, or saw no advantages to be gained by involving housing associations in housing provision. Also, from the turn of the century onwards, land prices increased steadily, thus

creating financial problems which constrained the development of the charitable sector.⁽²⁸⁾

In 1935, the National Federation of Housing Societies was formed as a central co-ordinating body of the voluntary housing movement. By this time, 226 societies were in existence, of which 100 were affiliated to the Federation. By 1961, 679 societies were registered, and since that time there has been a steady increase in affiliated membership. The vast majority of these organisations can be said to fall within the Social Service or charitable sector, as defined at the start of this section.⁽²⁹⁾

Apart from the steady growth in charitable associations providing general family and special needs housing, the 1961 and 1964 Housing Acts encouraged the growth of unsubsidised or cost-rent associations. Legislation enabled groups of professionals to form an association aiming to provide housing for rent and to obtain loan finance for their projects from building societies and local authorities. The professional management committee members were entitled to earn fees for professional services they provided to the association. Matheson⁽³⁰⁾ suggests that these schemes held aspects in common with the nineteenth century low-dividend property companies, where 'restrained economic advantage' was a guiding motive for involvement in the association and rent levels, due to lack of subsidy, excluded low-income groups. However, cost-rent associations by the mid-1960s were experiencing difficulties largely due to steadily increasing interest rates which resulted in high rents and, in 1968, when legislation introduced an option-mortgage subsidy in relation to co-ownership

schemes, many cost-rent societies began to develop co-ownership schemes.

3.b. The Mutual Benefit Sector

A dominant goal of organisations within this sector is meeting the housing needs and preferences of their membership. A significant, but relatively small sector of the movement, of which the membership clearly holds mutual benefit goals, is that of housing co-operatives.

3.b.1. Influences on the development of Housing Co-operatives

Ward⁽³¹⁾ describes Building Societies of the 18th century as having characteristics in common with co-operative housing. These early societies were formed by groups of individuals who saved to buy land on which to house themselves. On completing the first house, the association borrowed on its security to continue building. The society was disbanded when all members were housed through this process. Ward describes these organisations as mutual benefit working class organisations and he likens them to the housing finance pools of groups of immigrants in the present day. In the nineteenth century, building societies became permanent institutions, 'separating off those who wished to save from those who wished to build'. Hands also describes early co-operative housing efforts, such as those of the Rochdale Pioneers in Lancashire which became a model for co-operative efforts in Scandinavian countries, and nineteenth century co-partnership housing societies which were sponsored by benefactors.⁽³²⁾ One example was Tenant Co-operators Ltd., Upton Park, London, which was

established in 1888 and in which Beatrice Webb was involved as a committee member. The association started by acquiring six houses and at a later stage began to build its own houses. All tenants were shareholders and shares were priced at £1. Others were allowed to acquire shares to a limit of £200. Initial capital required was loaned by government. This example will be seen to have similarities with both neighbourhood co-operatives and community-based housing associations of the 1970s.

The co-operative theorists are clearly concerned with the fact that housing co-operatives have never become a major force within the voluntary housing movement as was the pattern in Sweden. Ward suggests that:

the early efforts of poor people to improve their housing conditions failed to expand for lack of capital. Investors, then as now, found easier ways to get rich than by financing working class housing. This is where the Victorian philanthropists moved in, satisfied with a modest return on their capital. (33)

Therefore several different factors have served to constrain the development of the co-operative sector of the movement during this century, namely that the British housing association movement has never thrown off its charitable emphasis; that planning legislation has encouraged virtual monopoly of provision of housing for rent by local authorities; and that the system of funding and the legal context within which co-operatives must operate are so highly complex that they have discouraged initiatives in that direction. However, during the 1970s there has been increasing government support for the development of housing co-operatives.

Both Ward and Hands have pointed to the pattern of development of the housing association movement in Scandinavian countries as a model on which the British movement and British policy-makers could usefully draw. Waddilove⁽³⁴⁾ describes the Swedish model as having developed on the basis of tenants' initiative and 'the tenants' unions of Sweden discovered that the best way of preventing the making of undue profits from a housing shortage and to raise housing standards was to build and administer their own homes'. In 1924, tenants' unions merged to form a National Association of Housing Societies (known as the HSB) and by the 1960s housing co-operatives were producing 20 per cent of annual housing built.

For these writers a major factor influencing the pattern of development of the movement in Britain has been the political commitment of trade unions and the Labour Party to municipalisation as the most effective strategy for improving the housing conditions of the working class. By contrast, in the early part of the twentieth century in Sweden, tenants and trade unionists aimed to take control of housing at a local level. Ward's libertarian position emphasises that the strategies adopted by the British Labour movement have embodied traditional values of paternalism and authoritarianism. For Ward, housing provision for the working class, which has increasingly been provided within a framework of bureaucratic state provision, clearly reflects such values.⁽³⁵⁾

Interestingly, writers have suggested that the HSB, the Swedish housing associations' representational and promotional body, has played a more extensive role in influencing housing provision than the NFHA

has in Britain. The HSB is described as providing extensive support to individual associations in the form of relevant technical expertise, research facilities and information - to the extent that Swedish local authorities now avail themselves of the services provided by HSB.

However, Hand's account of Swedish developments, which is more recent than that by Waddilove, presents a more complex picture. He describes the HSB as having developed into a paternalistic bureaucracy which is viewed as such by some member associations. Also, in recent years many tenants have sold their shares on the open market and co-op rental prices have inflated to the extent that low wage-earners are generally excluded from access. Therefore, recent developments in the voluntary housing movement in Sweden appear to reflect housing values associated with an advanced capitalist economy, rather than the values of the co-operative housing movement. Thus the model which Ward and Waddilove have compared so favourably with the British pattern of development, on closer examination might not appear to have operated any more effectively in meeting the housing interests of the working class than has the British movement. In Chapter Two we shall see the similar significance of political and economic influences for the British movement and its role in housing provision.

Greve's study of voluntary housing in three Scandinavian countries⁽³⁶⁾ shows that government housing policy has generally established the conditions which have facilitated the development of voluntary housing activity, particularly by housing co-operatives. He states that:

One common feature of policies, however, is the encouragement given to voluntary collective enterprise on the construction and management of housing Housing co-operatives and related forms of association for building, owning or managing housing have developed far more strongly and extensively in Denmark, Norway and Sweden (and in several other countries of Western Europe) than in Britain.

He concludes, however, that Scandinavian developments must be analysed in the context of the political and social culture which emphasises social divisions between individuals, families and communities to a greater extent than social class divisions.

3.b.2. Types of Co-operativism

One important and continuing debate within the voluntary housing movement involves conflicting views on which forms of ownership can be said to embody principles of co-operativism and therefore to deserve the label of housing co-operative. For example, one perspective would exclude from the co-operative movement both co-ownership schemes and tenant management schemes on local authority estates. For example, co-ownership schemes involve collective ownership and management by tenants of the scheme who also hold an individual share in its capital which can be realised on conclusion of the tenancy. However, in tenant management co-operatives such as the Summerston co-operative based on a local authority estate in Glasgow, tenants have no legal rights of ownership but hold collective responsibility for housing management policy and implementation.

Non-equity Co-operatives

For the purists, like Hands, the only true co-operatives are non-equity co-operatives, where tenants collectively own or lease the

property and have either no individual share in the capital or hold a stake which is limited to a share repayable on leaving at its original par value. That is:

A housing co-operative is a co-operative society which corporately owns a housing estate in which each member occupies or is a prospective occupier of the dwelling. (37)

However, others have shown preference for a less rigid definition of housing co-operatives and they point out that housing co-operatives are constrained by their political and legislative context, which defines limits to the kind of co-operative developments that are possible at different periods of time. So for Ward and others it is appropriate to view a range of legal forms of ownership, as well as types of control over housing (e.g. tenant co-operatives) as linked with the co-operative movement. Therefore the co-operative sector of the movement consists of varying degrees and forms of co-operativism⁽³⁸⁾ and reflects the influence of government policies, controls and funding, as well as economic developments affecting housing provision, and rents and local knowledge of opportunities for co-operative housing provision in different regions and at different times.

For example, co-ownership housing was promoted in 1961 and 1964 as a means of combining advantages of ownership and renting. Co-ownership, like cost-rent housing, was aimed at catering for groups who did not wish to buy or who were only just unable to afford to purchase 'a home of their own'. Growing mortgage interest rates served to ensure that co-ownership rents were high, although the Housing Finance Act 1972 entitled co-owners to rent allowances which

perhaps served to prevent total exclusion of working class prospective tenants. (39)

Since 1977 the Housing Corporation has attempted to promote different forms of co-ownership as by this time increasing mortgage rates had served to reduce the attractiveness and viability of co-ownership in its original form. Equity-sharing and community leasehold schemes are similarly intended to provide for young couples and the elderly. Further, the existing co-ownership stock has been largely transferred into private ownership since the Housing Act 1980, which has established the right to sell for co-ownership societies. (40)

By 1981 the vast majority of societies had elected to sell. A Roof article stresses that the terms at which co-owners can buy are more favourable than for other sectors and quotes a manager of a co-ownership society as stating that 'the Act has given people such favourable terms that they can hardly refuse them'. (41)

Other examples of co-operativism, reflect similarities to community-based housing associations (CBHAs), which are the central focus of the research.

Neighbourhood Housing Co-operatives have developed and grown in size and number during the 1970s, in the context of legislation which has encouraged an area-based approach to rehabilitation. These associations have definite similarities to the community-based housing association model which was adopted within Glasgow. Neighbourhood co-ops operate within a small and clearly defined locality and they aim at the acquisition and rehabilitation of sub-tolerable housing within a planning framework, defined by the 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts.

Examples are the Holloway Tenants' Co-operative in Islington and the Granby and Canning Co-operatives in Liverpool. The Liverpool Co-ops have professional services supplied by a secondary housing co-operative, Neighbourhood Housing Services Ltd Liverpool, as they are too small to finance these services for themselves.⁽⁴²⁾

Membership of these co-operatives is obtained through buying a pound share and they seem to vary as to whether non-tenants are precluded from becoming shareholders. The management committee consists of local residents who are elected from the body of shareholders at the Annual General Meeting of the Association.

Tenant Management Co-operatives are the fourth and last type of co-operative I shall describe. Legislative support for devolving management and maintenance functions to tenants of local authority schemes, was established in the 1975 Housing (Rents and Subsidies) Scotland Act.⁽⁴³⁾ Further, Scottish Office support has been publicly expressed for Tenant Management Co-ops which have been promoted by the local authority, the SSHA, and the Tenant Participation Advisory Service (TPAS) in Glasgow. These co-operatives range from newly-built schemes occupied by tenants who have expressed an interest in active participation in local management of the scheme (for example Summerston with 247 houses was formed in 1976/77), to a scheme of 190 units (Speirs) where tenants are involved in managing the modernisation of their housing. At a TPAS Conference on co-operatives⁽⁴⁴⁾ there was evidence of growing interest in housing co-operatives across a wide range of groups - the Conference was attended by Allan Stewart, the Conservative Minister for Home Affairs,

the Co-operative Union, officials and councillors from Scottish local authorities, co-op tenants and representatives from housing associations. At the Conference, representatives from Speirs Co-op referred to their links with Yoker, a neighbouring community-based housing association, which they identified as having certain common objectives and problems.

3.b.3. A Note on the Membership of Co-operatives

A final point on co-operative schemes funded through the Housing Corporation is that to date they have largely benefited middle-class tenants. Steve Platt⁽⁴⁵⁾ describes how several co-operatives have developed from 'licensed squatting' groups. In 1970 an Advisory Service was formed to show that 'ordinary people can organise collectively to run their own affairs ... and that the weakest can become strong through the principle of mutual aid'. In practice however, the co-operative associations which emerged from this movement were primarily initiated and joined by middle-class, educated people seeking housing.

Further, Platt emphasises the role of local authorities and the Housing Corporation in initiating such co-operative housing developments, thus dispelling any assumptions that they have 'emerged' out of a grass-roots movement. He suggests that where such schemes have largely involved working class tenants, this has been the outcome of local authority policy or of the co-ops policy which prohibits from membership 'professional people', or those with the capacity to compete in the housing market. In general, participants' awareness

of complex legislative conditions and of access to administrative and funding support by housing associations and by the HC appears to have been a key influence on the transition from squatting to licensed squatting, and finally to the formation of a co-operative.

Finally there has been a steady growth in the numbers of housing co-operatives from 105 in April 1977, to 291 in July 1980.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Co-op membership more than quadrupled during this period from 3,509 to 14,264 members, and between 1977 and 1980 the percentage of co-op members housed increased from 53% to 67%. By 1982 in Scotland there were seven established housing co-operatives. The Lister Housing Co-op in Edinburgh, formed in 1976, is engaged in improving 130 tenement flats which it acquired from a private landlord. Glasgow co-ops to date have been mainly working class tenant-management co-ops in local authority and SSHA housing, which were largely promoted by the authorities.

4. Community-based Housing Association - A Hybrid of Service and Mutual-Benefit Types

Community-based housing associations (CBHAs) have aims which relate to the concerns of both sectors of development outlined above. They are housing associations which were established within the context of legislation which supported a systematic and area-focused approach to rehabilitation and which provided loan and grant facilities to finance the acquisition and improvement of sub-tolerable housing.

In a statutory and legal context they are housing associations which are concerned with providing specific housing services. The Housing Act, 1957 s. 189 defines a housing association as

a society, body of trustees or company established for the purpose of or amongst whose objects or powers are included those of constructing, improving or managing or facilitating or encouraging the construction or improvement of houses, being a society, body of trustees or company who do not trade for profit or whose constitution or rules prohibit the issue of any capital with interest or dividend exceeding the rate for the time being prescribed by the Treasury, whether or without differentiation as between share and loan capital.

However, it will be seen that in terms of their formal aims and within the urban planning context, services are provided by the CBHAs for their tenants as well as for owner-occupiers in the locality in which they are based. In effect, the locality-based character of CBHAs establishes differences in kind between these housing associations and traditional housing associations within the service section. Also, it follows that the aims of voluntary participants may focus on both improving housing conditions in their locality (service aims) and achieving improvements in their own housing conditions (mutual-benefit).

CBHAs, like the neighbourhood co-ops, have a membership which is drawn primarily from the locality which they serve and local residents are involved in the formal controlling body of the association. Therefore, their structure and local base imply that the membership of CBHAs have common interests relating to housing and that these will be represented in the Management Committee of the association.

The differences between CBHAs and conventional housing associations are recognised by movement participants and by those in central and local government agencies who work in relation to them. However, the term CBHA until 1983 was nowhere to be found in legislation or statutory documents which define operational and funding procedures for housing associations. On the other hand, the similarities between CBHAs and housing co-operatives have increasingly been recognised within the movement and by government agencies. (47)

I have therefore presented CBHAs as a hybrid, embodying characteristics of both the co-operative and social service sectors. Parts II and III of the thesis will emphasise the uniqueness of CBHA development in Glasgow as well as common aspects of the housing association experience of wider social, economic and political influences. However, I shall embark on this theme in Chapter Two, which focuses historically on political and economic influences on the development of housing associations.

Notes and References to Chapter One

- (1) Regarding this point, J.B. Cullingworth raises questions regarding the meaningfulness of the concept of the Third Arm in Essays on Housing Policy. The British Scene, George Allen and Unwin, 1979, pp. 130-131; and Colin Ward comments 'All the political parties express their support for the housing society idea (lip service is always paid to it as housing's third arm)', C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, The Architectural Press, London, 1974, p. 52.
- (2) A. Gilmour, Appendix II, 'The Democratic Process', pp. 161-164 in C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, op. cit.
- (3) C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, op. cit., especially Chapter 5, 'Housing Associations, The Co-operative Way', pp. 48-58. See also C. Ward, Anarchy in Action, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 67-73 and John Hands, Housing Co-operatives, Society for Co-operative Dwellings, 1975, Chapter 10.
- (4) The 1969, 1972 and 1974 Housing Acts were drafted separately for Scotland from the legislation applying to England and Wales.
- (5) The Department of the Environment (DoE), Housing Associations: A Working Paper of the Central Housing Advisory Committee, HMSO, 1971. This report is generally known as the Cohen Report. It stressed the diversity and fragmentation of the 3,000 or so associations, affiliated to the NFHA in 1970, pp. 69-70.
- (6) Cawsons refers to the dispute about terminology regarding the terms QUANGO and QUAGO. He defines QUANGO as a 'quasi-non-governmental organisation' and a QUAGO as a 'quasi-governmental organisation'. 'The difference is one of relative autonomy from state interference: the quango can bark; the quago usually purrs', A. Cawsons, Corporatism and Welfare, Social Policy and State Intervention in Britain, Heinemann, 1982, p. 127n.
- (7) Cullingworth in Essays on Housing Policy, p. 37, op. cit. states that in 1945 over 50% of dwellings were rented from private landlords. By 1961, the proportion fell to a third. The private landlord sector declined further to comprise one-fifth of total housing stock in 1971 and by 1977 it was only 15% of the total stock.

- (8) The criteria for Registration of Housing Associations, by the Housing Corporation (HC) were defined by the HC following consultation with the Housing Associations Registration Advisory Committee, under Section 13 (4) of the Housing Act, 1974, The Housing Corporation: Practice Notes for Housing Associations, Revised Edition 1976, Appendix 1, pp. 41-46. Also, the supervision, monitoring and control responsibilities and powers of the HC were defined in Sections 19 to 27 of the Housing Act, 1974. These powers were modified and extended in the Housing Act, 1980, Parts I and II of Schedule 16 (Sections 124 to 126) NFHA, The Housing Act, 1980, A Guide for Housing Associations, November 1980, pp. 43-47.
- (9) Since the 1980 Housing Act, the HC has been vested with further responsibility for project and scheme approval. New arrangements were implemented in England, April 1981 and in Scotland, October 1982, in the form of the Approved Development Programme. Under this system, the HC proposes an annual programme to the Secretary of State for approval, Scottish Federation News, July, 1982.
- (10) Hansard, Volume 873, 1974 records the debate on the second reading of the Housing Bill, May 6-17, 1974, pp. 42-167.
- (11) Hansard, op. cit. p. 144. The MP for Hornsey expressed his surprise at the lack of dissent which was evident in the Labour government's implementation, without major amendment, of a Bill which had been introduced by the Opposition.
- (12) L. Waddilove suggests that housing associations fall into fairly well-defined groups although groupings are not mutually exclusive. NFHA pamphlet, A Guide to Housing Associations, December 1978, pp. 16-19.
- (13) The 1964 Housing Act established separate channels of funding for housing societies (unsubsidised, cost-rent housing) and housing associations (non-profit, charitable housing), although these terms have always been used synonymously within the movement. Under the 1957 Housing Act, housing associations received loan and grant finance from local authorities. Only, since the Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1972, have housing associations been entitled to borrow from the Housing Corporation and the 1974 Housing Act established Housing Association Grant (HAG), a once and for all capital subsidy, which was channelled through the Housing Corporation to both housing associations and housing societies.
- (14) NFHA, Housing Associations, A Committee Members Handbook, 1979, p. 87.

- (15) M. Matheson, Housing Associations in Glasgow, Discussion Paper Number 8, Discussion Papers in Planning, University of Glasgow, August 1976. Especially pages 14-15, 38-59 and 63-66 regarding classification.
- (16) D. Page (ed.), Housing Associations - Three Surveys, Research Memorandum No. 7, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, September 1971, pp. 2-4.
- (17) C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, op. cit., p. 53.
- (18) C. Ward, op. cit., pp. 53-4.
- (19) Housing Corporation Guidance Circular for Registered Housing Associations, In the Public Eye and, accompanying letter from the Labour Minister for Housing and Construction to Lou Sherman, Chairman of the Board of the Housing Corporation, 3 October 1977, were clearly directed at emphasising accountability.
- (20) P. Blau and W. Scott, Formal Organisations, A Comparative Approach, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 43. The writers apply the criterion of 'who benefits' as a basis for classifying four types of organisation: mutual-benefit, such as trade unions, where the membership is prime beneficiary; business firms, where owners are major beneficiaries; service organisations where the clientele is the major beneficiary, as with voluntary agencies, and fourthly, commonwealth organisations which exist to serve the general public. The purpose of the typology for Blau and Scott is to link together organisations faced by similar problems and characteristics.
- (21) National Federation of Housing Associations (NFHA), Special Projects Through Housing Associations, An NFHA Guide, 1978, and Housing Associations, A Committee Members Handbook, 1979, op. cit., particularly Appendix 10, pp. 85-89.
- (22) J.N. Tarn, Five Per Cent Philanthropy, An Account of Housing in Urban Areas, between 1840 and 1914, Cambridge University Press, 1973; and E. Gauldie, Cruel Habitations: A History of Working Class Housing. 1780-1918, London, Allen and Unwin, 1974, Part 4.
- (23) J.N. Tarn, op.cit., p.
- (24) E. Gauldie, 'The Middle Class and Working Class Housing in the 19th Century', pp. 12-35 in A.A. MacLaren, (ed.), Social Class in Scotland, 1974.
- (25) Quoted in S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, p. 17.

- (26) M. Matheson, 1976, op. cit., p. 38.
- (27) S. Merrett, 1979, op. cit., Appendix 1, pp. 307-319.
- (28) S. Merrett, 1979, op. cit., p. 17.
- (29) M. Matheson, 1976, op. cit., pp. 7-8 and DoE, Housing Associations, 1971, p. 71.
- (30) Matheson, op. cit., p. 7.
- (31) C. Ward, 1974, op. cit., pp. 48-49.
- (32) J. Hands, Housing Co-operatives, op. cit., pp. 16-19.
- (33) C. Ward, op. cit., p. 49.
- (34) L.E. Waddilove, Housing Associations, London, Political and Economic Planning, 1962.
- (35) C. Ward, op. cit., pp. 50-52.
- (36) J. Greve, Voluntary Housing in Scandinavia, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper No. 21, 1971.
- (37) J. Hands, Housing Co-operatives, op. cit., pp. 57-60.
- (38) C. Ward, op. cit., Chapter 9, pp. 104-115.
- (39) J.B. Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, 1979, op. cit., p. 119, and Matheson, 1975, op. cit., p. 9.
- (40) NFHA, The Housing Act, 1980, A Guide for Housing Associations, November 1980, op. cit., pp. 25 - 26.
- (41) Roof, September/October, 1981.
- (42) Report on Granby, Alt and Canning Co-ops, by M. Kinghan, (Draft) Institute of Community Studies, August 1978. The questions raised regarding the dynamics of internal control, management difficulties and local control over allocations suggest important similarities between CBHAs and Neighbourhood Co-ops.
- (43) Housing (Rents and Subsidies) Scotland Act, 1975, Section 5.
- (44) TPAS Housing Co-operative Conference, 16 September 1982, Mitchell Library.

- (45) S. Platt, Roof, March/April, 1982.
- (46) Housing Corporation, The Directory of Housing Co-operatives, 1981.
- (47) It is interesting that following representations by the SFHA during 1982 to the Minister regarding implications of Schedule 16, Housing Act, 1980 for housing associations, the Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment, stated recognition of the significance of CBHAs in affecting the 'unique development of Housing Associations in Scotland not paralleled elsewhere' and the government's consequent willingness to amend Schedule 16 in relation to CBHAs (April 1983).

CHAPTER TWO

GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC CONTEXT OF VOLUNTARY HOUSING

In Chapter One I have identified certain developmental trends within a historically diverse and complex housing association movement in Britain. Emphasis was placed on two main sectors of the Third Arm, housing associations and housing co-operatives, which in total own and manage a tiny minority of housing in Britain (approximately 2% by 1979).⁽¹⁾ In this chapter I shall focus on political and economic influences on the voluntary housing movement in Britain, its overall growth and the differential rates of expansion of different sectors of the movement at different periods of its history. As housing associations historically have been minority providers, my intention is to illustrate at a general level the key factors influencing their development, apart from housing association policies and their dissemination amongst groups 'outside the state' with an interest in involvement in housing provision.⁽²⁾ Chapter Two focuses on four phases in the development of voluntary housing.

My aim in this chapter is to illustrate the extraordinary complexity of the context of the housing association movement which increasingly became active in Glasgow's Inner Areas after 1974, and to illustrate that much of the HA experience can only be understood with reference to the general economic and political context of housing and planning. In this endeavour, Chapter Two has become a complicated structure of a chapter incorporating both a historical and a thematic approach to the development of housing associations.

Four Phases in the Development of Voluntary Housing

The development of housing associations in Britain has been significantly influenced by political interpretations of their potential role in housing provision, in the context of changing social and economic conditions. Matheson⁽³⁾ has identified four main stages in the growth of the housing association movement. The following discussion will examine these four phases of development as they have been influenced by changes in social and economic conditions and in housing policy and legislation.⁽⁴⁾

Phase One: Capitalist philanthropy and state support (pre 1st World War)

The nineteenth century charitable housing provision by capitalist industrialists, which was described in the preceding section, represented the early phase of development of voluntary housing. While Ward⁽⁵⁾ reminds us of the co-operative, 'self-build' aspects of 18th century building societies, and Hands⁽⁶⁾ provides an account of housing co-ops during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it is evident that the charitable approach has dominated voluntary housing provision. Ward comments thus:

The housing society movement, born of Victorian philanthropy, has never since thrown off its charitable emphasis, and in this respect is in marked contrast with the co-operative housing associations in European countries. (7)

This phase of provision was seen to reflect economic divisions, class inequalities and contradictory ideologies within 19th century Britain.⁽⁸⁾ Charitable provision by wealthy merchants and industrialists was stimulated by concerns about the political consequences of the chronic housing conditions suffered by the poor and about the spread of disease, and by religious ethics influencing the conduct of 'charity'. In contrast, early co-operative housing efforts were stimulated by socialist principles emphasising mutual support and decent housing as a right.

Following MacLaren's analysis⁽⁹⁾ of Calvinist ideology in Scotland, which stresses the importance of 'self-help', it is perhaps not surprising that charitable provision did not take similar root in the North. However, in Glasgow, chronic disrepair and extreme shortages of adequate housing, against a background of waves of immigration and severe threats to public health, stimulated concern by rich merchants. The City Improvement Trust, vested by the Council with the power to build new dwellings, was the outcome of such concerns. In contrast, Robert Owen's industrial, social and housing experiment which began in 1799 was influenced by principles of socialism and co-operativism. Ironically, this experiment developed from the work of his father-in-law, D. Dale, a respected merchant, whose religious motives did not preclude the exploitation of child labour.⁽¹⁰⁾

Regarding the housing provision by the '5 per cent' philanthropists, it is evident that by the late 19th century such limited dividends were insufficient incentives for developers; that the lettings policies of

philanthropist societies frequently excluded access to the poor on both moral and economic grounds; and that increasingly such societies pressed for government subsidy. Merrett concludes that:

The most vital achievement of the philanthropic movement was its failure. It demonstrated that for those who had eyes to see laissez-faire contradictions were not to be resolved by laissez-faire responses. (11)

Phase Two: State housing and the voluntary sector (1st World War until 1960)

Merrett has systematically documented the path of national housing legislation which, particularly since the Housing of the Working Classes Act, 1890, has established the municipality as the key agency providing working class housing and tackling housing obsolescence, overcrowding and health hazards in British cities. (12) Also, since the Labouring Classes Dwelling Houses Act, 1851, housing legislation has made loan and grant facilities accessible to charitable associations. By the turn of the century, these charitable associations faced financial difficulties in the context of rising land prices and fluctuating rent control.

Despite its dependence on government subsidy the housing association sector continued to expand as a minority provider of general family and special needs housing. The growth of housing association provision was influenced during this period by charitable intentions and pressure group action, by the growing knowledge of the organisational and housing possibilities offered by HAs, and by attitudes of local authorities, to their role. In

parallel with this growth in minority housing provision, production by the mainstream housing sectors was influenced significantly by political and economic change.

Council house provision was initially the outcome of growing working class industrial militancy and housing struggles and of working class political influence on legislation during the 1920s, as the Labour party and the ILP gained in Parliamentary strength. Since the 1920s, municipal provision has been supported by both major political parties, despite their ideological differences. In general, the rate of municipal housing production has been influenced by international, political and economic developments and by the periodic booms and slumps of British capitalism which have affected resource allocation and central government control over local authority expenditure.

Studies of housing and planning by Merrett,⁽¹³⁾ Broadbent,⁽¹⁴⁾ Stretton⁽¹⁵⁾ and Marxist writers⁽¹⁶⁾ have emphasised that state housing provision is significantly influenced by developments in the private market, which affect interest rates on loan funding and the costs of housing production. I have much sympathy with Merrett's comment:

The British system of housing finance is a wonderfully grotesque monster whose anatomy perplexes even those who spend their lives in its study. (17)

The housing association sector in producing housing has been as much affected as have state agencies by economic developments influencing

building costs, employment trends in construction and the organisational capacity of local construction firms.

During this first phase of development the voluntary housing sector attempted to provide specialist housing with the support of local authority funding. Frequently housing associations and pressure groups which encouraged their formation aimed to provide alternatives to the mainstream emphases in housing supported by the establishment of the building professions.⁽¹⁸⁾ If we examine the dominant values of the planning profession, during the 1950s and early 1960s it is evident that the planning establishment of the time believed that they knew best regarding the future housing interests of the urban working class. John Palmer, in his introduction to R. Goodman's After The Planners⁽¹⁹⁾ quotes Newcastle's City Planning Officer of the early 1960s who by 1971 was Chief Planner at The Department of the Environment.

In a huge city, it is a fairly common observation that the dwellers in a slum area are almost a separate race of people with different values, aspirations and ways of living ... One result of slum clearance is that a considerable movement of people takes place over long distances, with devastating effect on the social groupings built up over the years. But one might argue, this is a good thing when we are dealing with people who have no initiative or civic pride. The task surely is to break up such groupings even though the people seem to be satisfied with their miserable environment and seem to enjoy an extrovert (social) life in their own locality. (20)

Synthesis

The preceding discussion has focused on interrelated political and economic influences on state housing provision in the post-war period until 1960. During Phase Two the housing association sector continued to expand but was influenced by the varying support and planning emphases of local authorities. The mainstream ideology of the voluntary sector reflected values of charity, paternalism and caring and this charitable sector of the movement dominated housing provision. Development of the voluntary sector was, therefore, haphazard and unco-ordinated until the 1960s, by which time the most significant characteristic of the movement was its diversity. However, from 1960, we shall see that housing associations were incrementally viewed by successive governments as a vehicle for implementing state housing policies.

Phase Three: Movement growth and new opportunities for expansion (1961-1974)(a) The decline of private housing for rent

By the early 1960s the Conservative government of the day was concerned about the steady decline of the private rental housing sector. With the aim of increasing provision of housing for rent, the 1961 Housing Act made £25 million available in loan finance to England and Wales and £5 million to Scotland, for approved housing associations providing houses for letting, but no element of subsidy was involved. This political and funding context stimulated the development of cost rent and co-ownership societies.

I suggested in Chapter One that the complex administrative and financial context of co-ownership meant that co-ownership failed to become, as some had hoped, a means for extending co-operative housing provision in Britain. Ward comments that 'only groups containing someone with specialist knowledge were likely even to understand, let alone operate the scheme'.⁽²¹⁾ Alongside general growth in housing provision by the charitable sector during the 1960s, government reports pressed for rationalisation of fiscal and legal provisions in order to extend the role of housing associations in tackling Britain's major housing problems.⁽²²⁾

Another aspect of the new forms of housing association promoted by central government during the 1960s was the scope offered by them for furthering economic self-interest. Architects and lawyers were able to participate on the committee of management of a housing association and to act in a fee-earning professional capacity on schemes commissioned by the association. Not surprisingly there was, during the 1960s, growing media criticism of the scope for professional financial advantage to be gained particularly from committee membership. However, perhaps surprisingly, the Cohen Report (1971) commented thus:

It was expected that people from the professions would take part in this way, and recognised that many of them would apply their skills in return for the fees they would receive. ⁽²³⁾

Such opportunities were restricted under Section 26 of the 1974 Housing Act and since 1974 there has been growing emphasis on public accountability and central government control which has been

significantly mediated by the Housing Corporation. (24)

(b) The promotion of the voluntary sector through the HC

Finally, the 1964 Housing Act illustrated further the fact of central government support for the voluntary sector in providing housing for rent. The Housing Corporation, a Quango, was established as a central lending bank and as a promotional, co-ordinating and advisory agency. Ward commented thus:

Then in 1964, as though the government had lost faith in the National Federation as a mechanism it set up the Housing Corporation in a style to which the NFHS(A) could never aspire, with offices in Park Lane, Admiral Sir Caspar John at the helm and the power to dispense another £100 million in loans to housing societies for both cost-rent and co-ownership schemes. (25)

In its initial form the Housing Corporation (HC) represented to both major parties a vehicle for stimulating the growth of cost-rent housing provision, which by 1970 was regarded as non-viable by the HC and by housing associations. Also, by 1971, there was clear recognition that further subsidy and new systems of operation were essential if the Third Arm was to extend its role. Lobbying by the NFHA and central government reports served to reinforce growing political support for the housing association sector and for systematising the organisational and financial context of housing association development. This reconsideration occurred during a period within which a Conservative government (elected 1970), resolved to continue along the same lines as the previous Labour administration in constraining public expenditure, of which an increasing proportion was incurred by the local state - approximately one-third of state expenditure by 1973 -

and in limiting the rate of inflation. (26)

It is perhaps remarkable that between 1960 and 1974 there was significant expansion of the traditional charitable sector producing 'general family' and 'special needs' housing and during this period this sector trebled in volume until there were 1,565 such associations registered in 1974 with the NFHA. This growth had resulted from pressure group action, NFHA promotional support and from local authority funding rather than from central government policy. In 1966 a pressure group was formed aiming to improve housing provision for the homeless and for groups inadequately housed - Shelter, the National Campaign for the Homeless. Alongside its campaigning efforts, Shelter provided both funding and support to housing associations and its work served to increase public and local authority awareness of charitable associations and their potential role. (27)

(c) Housing obsolescence and the role of the voluntary sector=

A major focus of housing pressure groups in the mid-1960s was on the persistence of the slums in Britain's older urban areas and on the conventional strategies for tackling housing obsolescence involving slum clearance, dispersal and redevelopment. In parallel, there was a growing redirection of approach within the central state which was manifested in government reports and new emphases in legislation. (28)

Following the 1964 Housing Act, central government had charged local authorities with the responsibility of co-ordinating house improvement within a comprehensive area - focused strategy. This co-ordinating role of the local authority was envisaged

as a means of increasing the pace of rehabilitation of Britain's decaying private sector stock. Since the 1949 Housing Act grants had been made available to local authorities and private owners to undertake house improvement. Take-up of grant, by owner-occupiers in the main, increased markedly from 1949 to 1955, at which point annual take-up of grant stabilised at around 35,000 until 1959. Cullingworth concludes that, 'a rate of improvement of 35,000 a year was very modest in relation to the scale of the problem to which the improvement policy was directed' and, that it had not encouraged much improvement in the private rental housing sector. (29)

The 1964 Housing Act encouraged local authorities to implement compulsory area improvement by designating improvement areas. In practice, the process proved so cumbersome that it was criticised by the Public Health Inspectors who had initially favoured the compulsory area approach. By 1968, Ministry of Housing and Local Government Reports showed that only 136 out of 1,400 local authorities (England and Wales) had declared improvement areas, and that within such areas only 10 per cent of houses designated for improvement had been improved. The compulsory approach was, therefore, in question as a universal strategy for tackling obsolescence. (31)

The 1969 Housing Acts (The Housing Act 1969 for England and Wales and the Housing (Scotland) Act 1969) incorporated recommendations of various government committees and research reports. (32) These included a stress on voluntarism rather than compulsion as the

basis of participation in improvement schemes by private owners, within areas designated for grant aid by local authorities. The legislation for England and Wales involved the central planning concept of General Improvement Areas (GIAs). Following local authority designation of a GIA and the determination of plans for the improvement of housing and environment, practical outcomes were to be dependent on voluntary co-operation of owners within the framework of a higher level of grants. The Scottish legislation emphasised the concept of Housing Treatment Areas which could be designated by the local authority for either demolition or improvement according to assessment of housing and environmental conditions. As with the English Act, the emphasis was on voluntarism and a flexible approach. However, the Scottish Act also included a new housing standard, the 'Tolerable' standard, which replaced the concept of 'fitness' which had been based on public health criteria.

The voluntary housing sector by the late 1960s had become increasingly active in the acquisition of slum housing from owner-occupiers and landlords and in subsequent improvement work with the aid of grant. The institutional and funding context of this work was altered by the Housing (Financial Provisions) Act, 1972, which established the Housing Corporation in a more central role in relation to all types of housing association work.⁽³²⁾

The 1972 Housing Finance Act established a more viable financial basis for housing associations by giving the Housing Corporation the power to finance 'Fair Rents' schemes relating to the

provision of housing for rent and by providing an element of subsidy in relation to new building by housing societies. As a result many cost-rent schemes changed to a fair-rents basis. The Act also enabled the Housing Corporation to provide loan finance to housing associations (Section 77). However the 1972 Act also signified a more important policy change - namely the Housing Corporation's new role in funding schemes providing housing for which rents would be assessed and monitored under the 'fair rents' Rents Registration machinery established under Crossman's Rent Act of 1965. This machinery was intended to 'lay the foundation for a better relationship between landlord and tenant of rented property, by introducing a new and flexible system of rent registration'.⁽³³⁾

The third phase of development of the movement therefore involved a significant expansion of different sectors of the movement, although Matheson points to the limited development of the movement as a whole in Scotland - 2% of all fair-rent schemes and 5% of co-ownership were based in Scotland (the comparable figures for the South East of England being 26% and 35%). Also, between 1961 and 1971, membership of the National Federation grew from 679 to 2,300 and the charitable sector trebled in numbers of associations. Most provision by the charitable service section was aimed at housing those families who were either rejected by the local authorities (such as rent defaulters) or who did not meet the criteria of their waiting lists. A significant proportion of provision also aimed at providing for the elderly.⁽³⁴⁾ Under the 1972 Housing Finance Act these charitable associations were entitled to the loan facilities of the HC

for new building, but they were also obliged to charge fair rents.

(d) Urban variations

In Glasgow and Scotland in general it was during this third phase of development of the movement that housing associations began to contribute as a significant Third Arm of housing provision. By 1974 there were eleven traditional charitable associations operating in Glasgow District - three of these providing general family housing, three providing for special needs and five which were primarily concerned with conservation in relation to specific localities. The first housing association, Christian Action, was formed under the aegis of Shelter in 1965.

This expansion took place in the context of significant differences in local authorities' policies towards the involvement of housing associations. Page's 1971 study⁽³⁵⁾ of 86 local authorities illustrated that only 10% of his sample viewed the housing association movement as a Third Arm providing a choice in housing tenure and 13% of the sample saw no potential role for housing associations in their areas. Page's survey showed that some local authorities were wary of committing funds to agencies over which they had no political control; that some authorities simply equated housing associations with a charitable paternalist approach; and that housing associations did not generally present themselves to local authorities as a potentially effective medium of housing provision. Cullingworth arrives at similar conclusions:

Some local authorities were keen to see associations making a contribution to local needs (whether supplementary or complementary to public provision). Others saw them as unnecessary competitors for scarce resources or as an out-of-date and redundant form of housing provision ... a few authorities envisaged a large role for associations which would reduce the need for further public authority housing and, indeed, might even take over a significant part of the local authority's stock. (36)

Differences in degrees and forms of political acceptance by local authorities of housing associations have affected significant variations in the role of the voluntary sector in different British cities. In this context the development of housing associations provides a good example of how, in certain areas of housing policy, national legislation establishes conditions of operation, controls and guidelines, while a degree of choice which varies over time is retained at local authority level regarding implementation.

Synthesis

I have emphasised two major sets of influences on policy relating to the private housing sector, which culminated in the 1974 Housing Act. First there were important housing problems and planning issues towards which legislation was addressed. For example, we have seen that economic changes and political controls served to decrease the profitability of private landlordism, resulting in general decline in Britain's stock of housing for rent. There was also the related and persistent problem of extensive private sector housing obsolescence. Between 1969 and 1974, the state offered the 'carrot' of grant aid to stimulate private owner house improvement and from the mid-1960s local authorities were incrementally vested with a co-ordinating

role in area improvement. However, by 1969 co-ordination depended on voluntary take-up of grant and partnership with the private sector, rather than on the 'stick' of compulsory purchase. Another point about area improvement is its association with planning objectives and local interests emphasising the retention of inner area neighbourhoods. This approach was in sharp contrast to compulsory re-development and social dispersal which typified urban planning in the 1960s. By 1971, there remained 1.2 million unfit houses in England and Wales and at 1973, 10% of Scotland's housing stock of 180-190,000 homes had been identified as unfit. (37)

In the context of Britain's declining private rental sector central government chose to promote the Housing Corporation and the voluntary housing sector. Since 1964 central government has approached the Housing Corporation as a medium for implementing its policies relating to private housing and for channelling the work of housing associations in the direction of government priorities. While 1961 and 1964 Housing Acts promoted cost-rent provision and co-ownership, 1969 and 1972 legislation emphasised rehabilitation and expanded the HC's role in fair rents provision. In this context I would suggest that the HC presented itself to central government, by 1973 when the 1974 Act was being drafted, as an appropriate channel for directing a growing housing association movement towards the rehabilitation of inner area housing. Further, against a historic background of varying local authority support for housing associations, both major political parties favoured the establishment of a more centralised system of promotion, subsidy and control.

The second major influence on policy was the interrelated economic and political developments which dominated the 1970s and affected the position of local authorities in relation to central government and the voluntary sector. Local authority expenditure by the early 1970s had become an increasing focus of central government concerns and controls. By 1973 local government expenditure was almost 15% of GNP and represented one-third of total public expenditure. Also, in the ten years following 1965, the public sector debt more than doubled from £10,000 million (1965) to £24,000 million (1975), resulting in interest repayment as a growing proportion of public expenditure. In 1974 the Layfield Report identified that 59% of local authority borrowing was from the private sector. Therefore, local authority expenditure was extensively influenced by growing interest rates and price inflation which were stimulated by the quadrupling of oil prices late in 1973 by OPEC. In 1974 central government was not simply concerned with constraining local authority capital expenditure, under pressure from the IMF it was interested in reducing it markedly.⁽³⁸⁾ Against the background of these macro-economic developments and the restricted resources available to local authorities, it is not surprising that housing associations, and the 'carrot' of central government funding mediated by the HC, began to look more attractive to some local authorities.

Finally during the late 1960s and early 1970s the NFHA had lobbied for government to institute a more viable legislative and funding framework for the voluntary sector. Shelter's campaigning efforts and promotional support for housing associations also served

to increase their credibility as effective agents of house improvement (e.g. Glasgow and Manchester). Further, during these years, politicians of different shades had become actively engaged in working with housing associations on the ground so that there was a growing awareness of their potential within both Parliament and local government. The political support for an expanded role for the voluntary sector was, however, inevitably accompanied by extended controls over housing association development by both central and local government. Growth and incorporation appeared as parallel tendencies between 1974 and 1982.

Phase Four: Expansion, incorporation and a new politics (1974 - 1982)

The major characteristic of this fourth phase has been that housing associations have experienced relatively greater ease of access to central government funds, although the flow of resources has been considerably affected by economic and political developments. At the same time, associations have experienced increasing controls and direction by central government and have thus developed into a small but not insignificant Third Arm of housing. During this period, however, the historic diversity and small scale of housing associations as organisations and their politicisation within urban and national movements have served to sustain a contradictory tendency stemming from values of autonomy and independence in housing provision. Further, there has evolved a new politics which is neither urban nor class-based, which will be explored in Parts Two and Three of the thesis. Finally, during this phase the movement showed that it could produce results, despite marked changes in government policy.

(a) Housing obsolescence, housing policy and the 1974 Housing Acts

Matheson states that the 1974 Housing Act 'was the legislative culmination of various strands of thought in the housing field'.⁽³⁹⁾

The Act also embodies the corporate approach to policy making and implementation. It encouraged systematic co-ordination by local authority departments in association with central government agencies at a local level, of strategies relating to a specific policy issue.⁽⁴⁰⁾

It established a firmer and more viable financial context by making loan and grant facilities available to associations which are registered with the Housing Corporation. All forms of subsidy under the legislation are offered at the discretion of the Secretary of State and housing association schemes must be approved by the Housing Corporation and the Scottish Development Department (Department of Environment for schemes in England, Northern Ireland and Wales) before they are entitled to grant.

(b) A growing national consensus over rehabilitation and the role of housing associations

The parliamentary debate on the new housing legislation⁽⁴¹⁾ (which had been drafted by the previous Conservative government in 1973 and was to be implemented by the 1974 Labour government) showed the Right Hon Margaret Thatcher (Conservative) and Crosland, the Labour Minister as strong party spokesmen. While Crosland favoured the Bill's emphasis on rehabilitation, he reiterated the Labour Party's commitment to municipalisation and the extension of Direct Labour. Thatcher in contrast stressed Conservative support for extending the role of voluntary housing. The 1973 Conservative Bill's Clause 40(3) had empowered local authorities to acquire sub-tolerable

property but, on submitting the CPO to the Secretary of State, the authority was required to submit proposals for the disposal of land to a registered HA. This power was omitted in the 1974 Act. However during the debate a Labour politician closely involved in Shelter and the National Federation of HAs commented that:

The NFHA believes that it would make its position very difficult if this power existed and that its relations with local authorities would deteriorate as a result.

The debate, therefore, showed that major areas of consensus were focused on the case for rehabilitation and the role of housing associations. However, it was evident that some Labour spokesmen were concerned that HAs should not be regarded as potential substitutes for the housing functions of local authorities, while for those on the right of the Conservative party, such a development would clearly have been welcomed.

(c) A more favourable funding environment for housing associations

The 1974 Act provided a very generous form of capital subsidy - housing association grant - for approved projects by housing associations registered with the Housing Corporation (Section 29, Housing Act, 1974). HAG, as it has been termed, is intended to meet the cost of housing provision that cannot be recouped from rental income (approximately 85% of capital costs). Also, Sections 31 to 33 of the 1974 Act established three types of Deficit Grant, one of which in particular (Revenue Deficit Grant) has provided important financial support to new associations which, in spite of sound management, may have insufficient income to meet costs of maintaining and managing housing.

However, by 1983, the continuance of RDG was in increasing doubt following policy statements by Ministers and civil servants.

(d) Centralised planning and the area approach to tackling obsolescence

The 1974 Housing Acts reinforced the approach of 1969 housing legislation which encouraged local authorities to adopt a comprehensive area-focused approach to rehabilitation of sub-standard housing. The 1969 and 1974 Housing Acts reflected two areas in which housing policy was evolving towards change. First, they encouraged a 'comprehensive' approach to local housing needs and problems by local authorities. This planning approach conceives of local authorities as co-ordinators of all agencies operating in the housing field, at local level. Secondly, they emphasised a strategy of tackling the problem of housing obsolescence on an area basis within each local authority's planning district, based on systematic analysis of local provision and housing problems.

The emphasis on area improvement strategy embodied in these pieces of legislation can be seen to reflect the emphasis of planning reports in the 1960s upon extreme local variations in socio-economic factors as well as in physical housing conditions.⁽⁴²⁾ Such reports identified the existence of multiple deprivation in specific geographical areas on a range of criteria such as educational provision, housing, employment and health, and their recommendations were generally that special treatment was required in relation to the social problems of these areas. Central government aid channelled towards specific urban localities, such as the GEAR project in the East End of Glasgow and partnership agreements between central and

local government where a local authority was identified as having extensive problems in its constituency, were a reflection of a similar approach.

More recently, the Housing (Repairs) Act has aimed at counter-acting problems identified in Scotland in relation to the Action Area planning concept. For example, a frequent criticism has been that where a specific area has less than 50% sub-tolerable stock there are more restricted grants available to owner-occupiers and these areas may involve significant housing problems in the future. 1978 legislation entitled local authorities to establish Repairs Schemes outwith Action Areas and to apply the Action Area concept somewhat more flexibly. Regarding the area emphasis Cullingworth has questioned the feasibility of a comprehensive area policy over the whole of a housing market area, and Mason has argued that there will be no significant impact on housing obsolescence if government subsidy to the private sector is strictly channelled on an area basis. (43)

(e) A planning emphasis on public participation and voluntarism

Another emphasis in recent legislation is on public participation in planning in relation to improvement as a strategy. Local authorities since the Skeffington Report have been encouraged to provide notification of their proposals and to establish means by which local residents can participate in discussions regarding decisions affecting their localities. The 1969 and 1974 legislation used the concept of voluntarism in relation to the implementation of house improvement strategies by local authorities and this planning concept is clearly related to the aim of retaining a mix of house tenure and reflects a growing

ideological commitment to home ownership. The 1974 legislation, while placing an obligation on local authorities to take action with regard to their sub-tolerable stock within a reasonable time period, also aimed at providing the opportunity for owners to take responsibility for carrying out the improvements themselves so that improvement would not inevitably result in increasing municipalisation, as had slum clearance in the past.

In general, the 1974 legislation established an organisational context within which housing associations were to act as junior partners to local authorities in accordance with a framework of priorities established by central government. The voluntary housing movement has expanded quickly since 1974 and its growth has paralleled the increasing incorporation of housing associations to housing policies formulated by the state at national and local levels. In 1978 the Chairman of the Housing Corporation described housing associations as major agents of urban renewal in many of the worst inner city areas,⁽⁴⁴⁾ and the Scottish Green Paper on Housing, 1977, stressed that the government recognised the contribution of housing associations to date and intended to 'rely on the movement backed by the Housing Corporation, to continue to play an effective role in helping remedy the Scottish housing problem'.⁽⁴⁵⁾

(f) Thatcherism and the revival of ideology, 1979-1983

Since 1979 housing associations, together with all public sector agencies, have operated within the monetarist and privatisation policies of the Thatcher Conservative government. Merrett in Owner-Occupation in Britain, 1982, provides a lively and systematic

account of the impact of the radical Conservative government which came into power in 1979 with dominant intentions of restoring 'the fortunes of British capital' at a time when British capitalism was experiencing its most extensive crisis since the 1930s. Merrett identifies three major aspects of Conservative government policy:⁽⁴⁶⁾ first, to reduce the rate of inflation thus increasing British competitiveness in foreign markets and the real rate of interest to capitalists; secondly, to reduce the rate of growth in unit labour costs and slow down the rate of wage inflation by increasing technological advance in parallel with reduction in the power of organised labour and the growth of unemployment; thirdly, by reducing state expenditure partly through transference of real resources to the private sector. I agree with Merrett that the major difference in housing policy between the present Conservative government and that of 1970-1974 is the emphasis on privatisation, rather than on regulating state housing production. Further, since 1979, there has been growing evidence of building society support for this policy.

Synthesis

Therefore, the housing association experience during this fourth phase was influenced significantly by political and economic developments, by housing issues and planning policies, and by state control. Central government control over capital expenditure by HAS was mediated by routine scheme expenditure control and by annual cash allocations. In the mid 1970s housing associations were faced by the Labour government's public expenditure cuts which in 1976-1977 threat-

ened a 50% reduction in the construction programme for England and Wales. However, the Housing Corporation, supported by central government, secured a £50 million loan from a group of merchant banks which reduced the impact of the cuts. N. Ginsberg comments that 'this overt intermeshing of public bodies and private capital is unusual in the welfare field'.⁽⁴⁷⁾

By 1977, 10% of new starts in England and Wales were by HAs. In Scotland, a young and expanding housing association movement was protected by the Scottish offices of the Housing Corporation and by the Scottish Development Department from the imposition of cuts, as well as by the campaigning efforts of the Scottish Federation and Glasgow associations. The major problem experienced regarding the flow of resources stemmed from the two tier system of expenditure control, based on the administration of cost limits, by the Housing Corporation and central government departments (the Department of Environment for England and Wales and the Scottish Development Department for Scottish associations). Scheme approval was highly bureaucratic and at times chronically subject to delay, with the consequence of planning uncertainty for housing associations and local residents.

Under the 1979 Conservative administration, housing associations and the Housing Corporation were increasingly dominated by the annual cash allocation and by expenditure halts, to the extent that the Housing Corporation even imposed one itself when it feared that cash limits might be exceeded in 1980-1981. Further, like local authorities, both HAs and the HC operate with the knowledge that

underspend (or overspend) could have serious implications for housing production in future years.

We have also seen that the development of the voluntary sector was affected by dominant political party ideologies relating to housing provision. For example, it is evident that by 1974 there was a significant area of political consensus supportive of rehabilitation and an extended role for housing associations. While, for the Conservatives, housing associations were particularly attractive as an alternative to municipalisation, I would suggest that Labour support for a Third Arm was based on pragmatic considerations that local authorities could not tackle large-scale obsolescence alone and that the voluntary sector could be directed towards rehabilitation within a more effective framework of subsidy and control.

The ideological emphases of the 1979 Conservative government carried contradictory implications for housing associations. On the one hand there was continued support for a non-municipal sector represented in the generally growing allocation to housing associations. On the other hand, there was growing political concern regarding the level of public subsidy to housing associations which, in effect, had brought a growing proportion of private sector housing into social ownership. The Conservative government in its 1979 Manifesto was committed to extending private ownership and certain aspects of 1980 housing legislation served to put into effect these political intentions. The 1980 Housing Act encouraged housing associations to

develop policies supporting the sale of properties to tenants, while council tenants were given the right to buy at discount from 3 October 1980. The exclusion of charitable housing associations, co-operatives and co-ownership societies⁽⁴⁸⁾ followed from representations by the National Federation and housing co-operatives and from a working party set up in 1980 by John Stanley, the Minister of Housing.

Regarding co-operatives and co-ownership societies, these now have the option of voting to change their rules in order to sell and disband. Charitable associations are encouraged to opt for sales at discount prices, although as the Charity Commissioners have commented, 'it is not normally in the interests of a charity to dispose of its assets at less than value'.⁽⁴⁹⁾ The outcome has been that co-ownership is virtually defunct and in the context of restricted sales policies operated by many associations there are current concerns that compulsion may soon be introduced.

A related emphasis in government policy has been on rehabilitation for sale (Section 127(1)) and on shared ownership as methods of extending owner-occupation.⁽⁵⁰⁾ A small but growing proportion of such schemes has been co-ordinated since 1981 in the context of considerable promotional work by the Housing Corporation. The subsidy to private owners in such schemes is significant as market prices are generally insufficient to cover the cost of acquisition and works.

Also, the upwards revision of improvement grant levels since December 1980 has stimulated improvement grant take-up by private developers. Also more significantly the 1981 Local Government Act which entitled local authorities to demand repayment of improvement

grant if houses were sold within five years. Subsequent developments were the focus of a House of Commons debate during which one Edinburgh Labour Member of Parliament commented 'it has opened the door to speculative developers to pile into the unimproved sector, and do it up on the back of public funds'.⁽⁵¹⁾ Increasingly housing associations have been unable to compete with private developers in acquiring property. Since 1980 there has been steady reportage of harassment of tenants by private developers hoping to realise vacant possession price for their property after improvement. It is also evident that the standard of improvement by private developers has often been poor in comparison to that by housing associations and local authorities.⁽⁵²⁾

Finally, since 1980, there has been a growing emphasis on market factors in the determination of rents by rents officers and the 1980 Housing Act, Section 60, removed 'the brakes off' rent increases for housing association tenants.⁽⁵³⁾ There is no question that rent levels have jumped markedly in the early 1980s and for those on steady incomes the option of buying is looking increasingly advantageous. It therefore appears that housing associations have come to be seen by central government as a vehicle for privatisation and the extension of 'home ownership'. However, local authorities have approached differently the new opportunities offered by 1980 legislation. For example, Edinburgh District Council has looked favourably on grant applications by private developers, a policy supported by Alan Stewart the Conservative Minister for Home Affairs, while Glasgow District Council has been more selective in granting approval.⁽⁵⁴⁾

In contrast with government policies of the mid 1970s, which stimulated the growth of HAs and enabled them to further a variety of intentions, current policy contradicts with those HA and co-operative objectives which emphasise social ownership and control. In making this point, I reject as an oversimplification Norman Ginsberg's description of HAs as 'essentially private landlords funded by public monies'.⁽⁵⁵⁾ This statement may be applicable to some varieties of HA, such as 1961-type co-ownership schemes and recent instances of associations formed purely to produce housing for sale, which are concerned with the realisation of profit for private benefit or with regenerating the private housing market and which show similarities to the joint-stock companies of West Germany. But housing associations generally are collectivities oriented to the provision of housing for mutual-benefit of their membership, or as a service to disadvantaged housing interest groups in terms of their location in the urban housing system. They are not primarily motivated by goals of profit, although they are likely to be concerned with both efficiency and effectiveness. Finally, they are subject to a wide variety of government controls and constraints on their activities as developers and landlords of housing. The following chapter will emphasise further that the voluntary housing sector, particularly certain sections within it, is in many aspects more akin to the public rather than the private housing sector, in terms of objectives, housing provision and increasing accountability.

Notes and References to Chapter Two

- (1) Dave Clarke Column, Scottish Federation News, April 1983. In an article titled 'So Just Who Do We Think We Are', the Scottish Federation research officer emphasised that the Scottish HA movement is still a very small, highly specialised movement.
- (2) S. Hatch, Outside the State, Voluntary Organisations in Three English Towns, Croom Helm Ltd, 1980, pp. 13-16.
- (3) M. Matheson, Housing Associations in Glasgow, 1976, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
- (4) I have redefined Matheson's 'phases' following a survey of the literature on housing and planning and an analysis of developments after 1976. Therefore while I found Malcolm Matheson's paper an enormously helpful starting point, my terminology and analysis are not directly derived from this paper.
- (5) C. Ward, Tenants Take Over, 1974, Chapter 5, op. cit., pp. 48-58.
- (6) J. Hands, Housing Co-operatives, 1975, op. cit.
- (7) C. Ward, op. cit., p. 49.
- (8) S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979, pp. 3-60 and Appendix 1.
 A.A. MacLaren, Introduction to Social Class in Scotland, John Donald Ltd, 1974, (edited by A.A. MacLaren), pp. 1-9.
 J. Melling, 'Clydeside Housing and the Evolution of State Rent Control' in Housing, Social Policy and the State, edited by Melling, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 139-164.
- (9) A.A. MacLaren, Religion and Social Class, The Disruption Years in Aberdeen, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1974, pp. 145-157.
- (10) F. Worsdall, The Tenement, A Way of Life, A Social, Historical and Architectural Study of Housing in Glasgow, W. and R. Chambers Ltd, 1979, Chapters 1 and 2, pp. 1-26, provide an illustrative account of 19th century conditions and the background to the City Improvement Trust.
- (11) S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, 1979, op. cit., p. 18.

- (12) Merrett, op. cit., Appendix 1.
- (13) Merrett's State Housing in Britain, op. cit., pp. 31-107, provides an excellent account of this period. I also found his more recent Owner Occupation in Britain equally lively and informative in relation to private sector developments. S. Merrett with F. Gray, Owner Occupation in Britain, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982, pp. 1-41.
- (14) T.A. Broadbent, Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen & Co Ltd, 1977, pp. 58-60.
- (15) H. Stretton, Urban Planning in Rich and Poor Countries, Oxford University Press, 1978, Chapter 5, pp. 46-58.
- (16) J. O'Connor, The Fiscal Crisis of the State, St Martins Press, New York, 1973, particularly pages 3-10 in which O'Connor develops his framework for analysing contradictory functions of the capitalist state, and pages 23-25 in which O'Connor emphasises the interrelations between private and state sectors. See also N. Ginsberg, Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan Press, 1979, Chapter 5; M. Harloe, 'Private Housing the State and the Working Class', Captive Cities, pp. 108-137.
- (17) S. Merrett, State Housing in Britain, op. cit., p. 419, makes this comment prior to presenting the most comprehensive breakdown of housing finance in the literature in Chapters 6 and 7.
- (18) See J.R. Mellor, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, Chapters 3 and 4, pp. 88-156 and
G. Kirk, Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society, Croom Helm, 1980, Chapters 3, 4 and 5 and
E.W. Cooney, 'High Flats in Local Authority Housing in England and Wales Since 1945' in Multi-Storey Living, The British Working Class Experience, A. Sutcliffe (ed.), Croom Helm, London, 1974, Chapter 6, pp. 151-180.
- (19) R. Goodman, After the Planners, Pelican Books, 1972, Introduction to British edition by John Palmer.
- (20) R. Goodman, After the Planners, 1972, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
- (21) C. Ward, op. cit., pp. 52-53

- (22) For example, the Milner-Holland Report, HMSO, Report of the Committee of Housing in Greater London, London, HMSO, 1965, which stressed both the decline of private landlordism and Rachman-type exploitation and the unfavourable tax treatment of housing associations.
- (23) Cohen Report, 1971, op. cit., p. 40.
- (24) The Housing Act, Section 26, 1974, specifies that a registered association may not make gifts, pay any dividends, bonuses to members of the association other than in accordance with its rules and Section 27 requires the declaration of any pecuniary interest in a contract or proposed contract, specifying a fine up to £200 for any committee member convicted of not complying with the Section. Schedule 16 of the Housing Act, 1980, increases controls on committee members in amendment to Section 27.
- (25) C. Ward, op. cit., p. 56.
- (26) T.A. Broadbent, Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, Methuen & Co, 1977, pp. 56-57.
- (27) M. Matheson, 1976, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- (28) J.B. Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, op. cit., Chapter 5, 'Improvement and Slum Clearance', pp. 74-97, and
P. Norman, R. Madigan and J. English, Slum Clearance, Croom Helm, London, 1976.
- (29) J.B. Cullingworth, op. cit., p. 79.
- (30) Cullingworth comments that these reports (Ministry of Housing and Local Government, Housing Statistics No. 9, April 1968 and No. 10, July 1968) encouraged a dual-pronged approach involving slum clearance and house improvement.
- (31) For example, the Central Housing Advisory Committee, Our Older Homes: A Call for Action, (Denington Report), HMSO, 1966; White Paper, Old Houses into New Homes, Cmnd. 3602, 1968, and Scottish Housing Advisory Committee Report, Scotland's Older Houses, 1967, pp. 122-124.
- (32) The 1972 Act also removed the distinction between housing associations, funded mainly by the local authorities under the Housing Act, 1957, and housing societies which were funded through the HC since the 1964 Housing Act.

- (33) J.B. Cullingworth, op. cit., p. 67. The criteria for rent fixing specified for Rents Officers, 'age, character, locality and state of repair' and not personal circumstances of landlord and tenant. However since the Housing Act, 1980, Rents Officers have increasingly included capital value (market factors) in their calculation.
- (34) M. Matheson, op. cit., p. 10.
- (35) D. Page, (ed.), Housing Associations: Three Surveys, University of Birmingham, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, 1971, pp. 60-67.
- (36) J.B. Cullingworth, op. cit., p. 66.
- (37) Department of the Environment, 1973, House Condition Survey, England and Wales, 1971 and
Towards Better Homes: Proposals for Dealing with Scotland's Older Housing, Cmnd. 5339, 1973.
- (38) T.A. Broadbent, Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, op. cit., pp. 129-130 and pp. 130-135.
- (39) Matheson, 1976, op. cit., p. 12.
- (40) See C. Cockburn, The Local State, Management of Cities and People, Pluto Press, 1978, Chapter 1 for a discussion of the corporate approach.
- (41) Hansard, Volume 873, 1974, May 6-17, 1974, pp. 42-167.
- (42) Ministry of Housing and Local Government, The Deeplish Study: Improvement Possibilities in a District of Rochdale, HMSO, 1966; M.H.L.G. Barnsbury Environmental Study, M.H.L.G., 1968, HMSO, Report of the Committee on Housing in Greater London, Cmnd. 2605, Milner Holland, 1965.
- (43) Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, 1979, op. cit., pp. 97-7 and quoting
T. Mason, 'Intention and Implementation in Housing Policy, A Study of Recent Developments in Urban Renewal', Journal of Social Policy, Volume 6, Part 1, January 1977, pp. 27-28.
- (44) Sir Lou Sherman's Introduction to the Housing Corporation Annual Report and Housing Corporation News, Summer 1977, 1978/9.

- (45) Scottish Housing, A Consultative Document, HMSO, 1977, pp. 89-90 and p. 99.
- (46) S. Merrett, op. cit., pp. 311-321.
- (47) N. Ginsberg, Class, Capital and Social Policy, Macmillan Press, 1979, p. 125.
- (48) Housing Act, 1980, Chapter 1 of Part 1, Sections 2 and 122 refer to co-operatives and Section 137 refers to charitable associations.
- (49) NFHA, The Housing Act, 1980. A Guide for Housing Associations, NFHA, November 1980, p. 25.
- (50) Housing Act, 1980, Section 127(1) and Housing Corporation Circulars, for example, Information No.5, 10.12.82, The HC in Scotland, which stresses the government's emphasis on home ownership and encourages Improvement for Sale and Shared Ownership Schemes.
- (51) Robin Cook, MP (Edinburgh Central), House of Commons Adjournment Debate, 12 November 1982. Quoted by David H. Clarke in Scottish Federation News, November 1982.
- (52) Recent examples have been documented in Roof, 'Improvement Grants for Profit', November-December, 1981 and 'Life in Bergerland, Victims of a Property Boom Landlord', November-December, 1982.
- (53) NFHA, Guide to Housing Act, 1980, pp. 27-29.
- (54) Agenda, BBC1, Scotland, 17.4.83, examined this issue, interviewing both the Minister for Home Affairs and District Councillors in Edinburgh and Glasgow.
- (55) Although I disagree with Ginsberg, N. Ginsberg, op. cit., 1979, p. 126, I am aware that central government and sections within the movement view housing associations as part of the private sector.

CHAPTER THREE

HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS AS THE THIRD ARM OF HOUSING

In this final chapter of Part One I shall summarise the main aspects of the housing association sector, with the intent of establishing some preliminary conclusions about its distinctiveness. In Chapter One I suggested that the literature on the voluntary housing sector points to four main distinguishing characteristics of housing associations as a Third Arm of housing. The first three of these characteristics relates to housing association objectives, while the fourth stresses the contradiction between housing association (HA) objectives and external controls. To recapitulate, the Third Arm concept implies that housing associations are involved in establishing new initiatives in control and in extending public participation in housing; establishing alternative forms of tenure and providing for housing needs not met by the public and private sectors. Finally, I would suggest that housing associations reflect inconsistencies between their objectives of autonomy and of developing new housing initiatives and the outcomes of government funding and controls. I shall now examine these four aspects of the Third Arm in relation to developments between 1974 and 1983.

1. HAs and the Expansion of Public Participation

At a minimum level we can point to a growth in participation in housing provision which has simply been due to the expansion of

the voluntary movement during the 1970s. However, degrees and forms of participation, including the criteria governing access to membership of individual HAs, are significantly determined at policy level by the executive or Management Committee of individual associations.

The general expansion of the voluntary sector is reflected in the growth in numbers of HAs affiliated to the National Federation of Housing Associations (the NFHA), and to the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (the SFHA). Since 1974, the growth of the voluntary sector is also reflected in numbers of HAs registered with the Housing Corporation. NFHA membership figures⁽¹⁾ have grown from 100 in 1935 to 679 in 1961 and by 1979 membership totalled over 1,700 associations. Also, by April 1980, 2,985 associations had registered with the Housing Corporation⁽²⁾ (the HC), of which 2,685 have a head office based in England, 192 in Scotland and 108 in Wales. Regarding growth in Scotland, in 1976 the SFHA was formed with 70 members and at December 1981, 121 associations and 6 co-ownership societies were affiliated to the SFHA.⁽³⁾

Aspects of participation may be related to the scale of organisations in the voluntary sector. The NFHA commented in 1979 that 'about 20% of associations are run entirely voluntarily, and of the remainder the vast majority have less than five employees'. Also, in relation to numbers of housing units owned and managed by associations, in 1978 almost 90% of affiliated HAs were managing less than 250 units, while only 3% (40) owned and managed over 1,000 units.⁽⁴⁾ In Scotland in 1981, a significant

majority of affiliated associations had less than 250 units in management (approximately 65%) and out of 127 member organisations of the SFHA only 2 national associations owned and managed over 1,000 units. (5)

The voluntary sector therefore involves a large number of small, democratically structured organisations which work in relation to a very limited but growing proportion of Britain's total housing stock (2-3% of total stock). While the movement apparently offers new opportunities for involvement in control over housing by the members of HAs and by their tenants we must remember that in practice participation will vary according to the policies and approaches of different associations. For example, we have seen that the co-operative sector of the movement has always placed emphasis on values of member and tenant participation, whereas the traditional or charitable sector of the movement has been concerned with 'providing for' tenants, rather than involving them in control. Regarding participation in HAs the NFHA comments:

Some critics of the movement have called housing associations 'self-perpetuating oligarchies'. It is suggested that housing association Committees are self-selected and, statutory requirements apart, are responsible to no one but themselves. Whilst associations may feel that this is unjust, it is nevertheless true that unlike local authorities, housing associations do not consist of members elected to represent their tenants and the community (6)

Studies of democratic organisations (7) have pointed to the prevalence of tendencies to oligarchic control and bureaucracy as outcomes of organisation growth. However, some writings on democratic

organisation and political alternatives have presented a markedly more optimistic view.⁽⁸⁾

Research has pointed to complex and varied influences on patterns of participation and control in political and voluntary organisations. For example, Lipset et al's⁽⁹⁾ study of the International Typographical Union emphasised the key role of powerful groups in influencing and sustaining opportunities for participation. Also, studies of producer co-operatives such as the Scottish Daily News⁽¹⁰⁾ have identified these factors as important in influencing organisational outcomes and relationships: the actions of powerful individuals and of external interest groups and organisations; the pressures of competition within the capitalist market, despite government subsidy; and the lack of managerial skills, particularly during the early stages of life of the co-operative. Other writers⁽¹¹⁾ have emphasised ideological and cultural influences on patterns of political participation, which vary over time and between societies.

Returning to our focus on the scope for participation offered by the voluntary housing sector, we shall see that during the 1970s, novel forms of housing associations extended opportunities for participation in their control to working class residents of economically depressed inner urban areas, which were also generally characterised by chronically poor housing conditions. CBHAs in Glasgow and the neighbourhood co-operatives in Liverpool 8 and North London are examples of this trend. These neighbourhood based, small and locally controlled associations partly stemmed from local dissatisfaction with, and active local opposition to, local authority

plans affecting the localities. They presented a marked alternative to traditional government strategies for tackling sub-tolerable housing, which typically offered minimal opportunities for local people to influence the future of housing and its environment.

Since the latter half of the 1960s, however, some government agencies have encouraged the formation of participative organisations in the fields of housing and planning - for example, tenants associations, community councils, and tenant management co-operatives can all be seen as part of a more general trend. This policy development has involved growing support by government officials for recognising conflicting interest groups; for devolving certain functions to localised interests; and for consultation with local interest groups on specific, locally relevant issues, within a wider, centralised system of planning. A 1977 White Paper, Policy for the Inner Cities, made these points regarding local interests and voluntary groups:

Involving local people is both a necessary means to the regeneration of the inner areas and an end in its own right. Public authorities need to draw on the ideas of local residents to discover their priorities and enable them to play a practical part in reviewing their areas. Self help is important and so is community effort ...
(Paragraph 34)

The government recognise that in some areas, people feel alienated from or apathetic to the impersonal workings of central government - and indeed of local government too ...
(Paragraph 36)

There is scope for the development of new methods such as area management or neighbourhood planning ... to provide the local authority's services in a way more closely attuned to the requirements of the area ...
(Paragraph 37) (12)

Therefore, in the context of recent developments in government thinking it is not surprising that we should find, in the practices of local authorities, a growing emphasis on decentralised housing management, on new structures of participation, and on funding and partnership arrangements with voluntary agencies. We should also recognise the likelihood of discovering similarities in the objectives and organisation structures of neighbourhood-based housing associations, housing co-operatives and tenant management co-operatives. These innovatory organisations in the housing field are generally young (1970s) and further they are extensively dependent on government support and funding, due to the capital costs of building and maintenance work. Regarding differentiating characteristics, there is the point that CBHAs and the neighbourhood co-ops involve decentralised ownership and control of housing in formal terms, while for the local authority Tenant Management Co-ops, housing remains in municipal ownership.

We cannot assume, therefore, that housing associations provide a significant alternative at the present time to the public sector in terms of extending opportunities to their clients and to the public for influencing housing provision, choice and accessibility. Goals of extending involvement in the social control of housing are, however, characteristically stressed by supporters of the Third Arm.

At this point, I shall tentatively conclude that HAs, as small organisations in the housing field, offer greater scope for extending participation in control and for local interest groups to influence their policies, than may be possible for large and bureaucratically

structured housing authorities. However, this point is tempered by recognition that access to participation and influence will be dependent in practice on the policies and styles of Management Committees and staff in housing associations as well as on demands for participation by tenants and other groups affected by HA policies. Clearly, a local base and local management does not automatically imply extensive local participation or housing management which is sensitive to local and varied housing needs, although I would suggest that dominant values relating to housing and planning, which are supported by movement participants, serve to emphasise the extension of public participation. Finally, I shall contend here that the scope of participation will be significantly influenced by controls and constraints external to HAs. We shall return to questions regarding participation and control in Part Five of the thesis.

2. Alternative Forms of Tenure

The second distinguishing aspect of the Third Arm has been suggested by the argument that HAs historically have served to provide alternative forms of tenure to local authorities and the private sector. Cullingworth⁽¹³⁾ comments that "alternative forms of tenure" has been a banner under which many different campaigns are being waged'. However, it is reasonable to conclude that the voluntary sector has offered alternative patterns of ownership to the two major housing sectors.

By April 1978, of the 2,658 HAs registered by the HC, 1,405 associations were providing housing for rent (dwellings and hostels);

67 were co-operative societies; 643 were co-ownership societies and 343 were almshouses.⁽¹⁴⁾ In sum, the majority of associations provide houses for rent according to a non-profit orientation, while operating within the constraints of the Fair Rents system and local and central government policies.

As 'landlords', housing associations reflect aspects of both public and private sectors. HAS embody a form of collective or social ownership. Further the provision of housing by HAS is intended by participants as a social service oriented to meeting certain housing needs, or as a collective means of accommodating varying 'rights of access' to decent housing. Even while recognising that HA participants hold varying political beliefs, we can conclude that voluntary housing objectives differ markedly from an approach to housing as a capital investment through which financial profit can be realised for private gain. In this context, HAS have more in common with municipal housing than with private sector developers and landlords.

Further, like local authorities, HAS are influenced significantly by political changes which affect those central government agencies which fund and control the direction of their work. The promotion of home ownership and privatisation by the Housing Corporation since 1980 is clearly a reflection of the policies of the Conservative government which was elected in 1979. A conglomeration of new housing association jargon has evolved in the wake of these policies. Housing associations have become involved in 'Improvement for Sale', 'Shared Ownership Schemes' and, in some cases, independent companies have been formed by special needs associations to permit

them to produce housing for sale. Also, alongside central government influences, housing associations are dependent on the planning priorities of local authorities and on political support at that level.

As for the similarities between HAs and private sector housing, these result partly from a government policy of including HAs within the framework of the Fair Rents system, which was first applied to the private rental sector under Crossman's Rent Act of 1965. Since 1972 housing associations have been obliged to register their rents with the Rents Registration Service, which was designed as a flexible system of rent regulation in the interests of private landlords and tenants. We will see in Part Three and Part Four that HAs have experienced difficulties in their role as landlords, within the context of rents registration during the 1970s.

Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude at this stage that, while the Third Arm involves varied forms of social ownership and control, in practice such forms are significantly influenced by government policy and the framework of rent control applied to the private sector.

3. Alternatives in Housing Provision

The third characteristic of the Third Arm is its emphasis on catering for housing needs not provided for by either the public or private sectors. Traditionally, organisations in the voluntary sector have focused on providing housing for disadvantaged groups.

Voluntary Housing, the journal of the NFHA, illustrates that during

the 1970s, associations have provided housing for groups with special needs, such as the elderly, the handicapped, ex-offenders, ex-psychiatric patients and children leaving care. Some HAs have entirely specialised in providing for one type of housing need (for example, Hanover and Bield for the Elderly, and Key for the Mentally Handicapped). Further, the mainstream of housing provision by HAs has concentrated on alleviating the poor housing conditions which existed in many working class urban areas. However, traditional charitable associations providing general family housing have increasingly become involved in identifying and meeting special housing needs in partnership with voluntary organisations. For example, the Merseyside Improved Houses (MIH), prior to 1974 legislation, had released improved housing to local voluntary organisations and by 1978 ten small schemes catered for groups ranging from female ex-offenders to homeless black and white young people.⁽¹⁵⁾

Also, several established HAs like MIH, were involved in the improvement of sub-tolerable housing in inner urban areas. Since 1974 central government policy, implemented through the allocation of loan funding by the Housing Corporation, has stressed the role of the voluntary sector in developing housing in 'stress areas' and in special needs provision. As for the general characteristics of those who gain access to housing association properties, a 1978 NFHA Report concludes that:

It was clear that housing associations were taking a high proportion of households out of very poor physical conditions, as well as taking some of the worst housing directly into social ownership and improving it. More than five times as many new

association tenants were lacking or sharing each basic amenity in their previous accommodation as those in the country's population as a whole ... Over a third of those housed were homeless or about to become homeless (including domestic conflict cases and those of harassment by landlords) and 15% of those housed required extra social support or specially designed accommodation. (16)

Further, almost half of tenants surveyed had no earned income and were dependent on state benefit; 30% of lettings were to the elderly; 10% to single parent families and 16% were younger single people.

In general, this first survey of housing association tenants in England showed that HAs are serving to meet needs not catered for by the public and private sectors. A similar pattern was increasingly evident in Scotland by 1982.⁽¹⁷⁾ However, it is important to note that while HAs have specialised in certain types of housing provision, certain local authorities have increasingly become involved in special needs provision and in co-ordinating house improvement in dilapidated inner areas.

In this context, there are marked differences between cities.⁽¹⁸⁾ For example, Newcastle Council embarked on a decentralised approach to area improvement in the district of Byker in the early 1970s; Dundee District Council developed various forms of special needs housing during the 1970s; Edinburgh District has recruited Area Officers to co-ordinate private sector tenement improvements. In other cities like Glasgow and Liverpool, housing associations have played a major role in Inner Area improvement and in special needs provision. Therefore, there are significant variations in the role of housing associations in different cities and in their opportunities

to provide the specific types of housing in which they are interested, for groups which they have identified as in need.

4. Organisational Autonomy and the Contradiction of External Funding and Control

We have seen that political support for the role of a Third Arm of housing provision has been an important aspect of housing policy during the 1970s. Support has been manifested in the growing allocation of funds to the voluntary sector, which has in turn enabled significant increases in housing provision by HAs. Between 1972 and 1978 the HA share of public expenditure rose 2.7 times in real terms and between 1972 and 1978, the proportion of public expenditure allocated to HAs rose from 9% to 21%. By 1979, HAs accounted for a quarter of public sector development.⁽¹⁹⁾ Like local authorities, between 1980 and 1982 HAs experienced expenditure control by the Conservative government in the form of moratoria (1980) and a virtual freeze on loan finance for new schemes, while the overall cash allocation increased, but not in line with inflation. For the younger Scottish movement, the cash allocation through the Housing Corporation to HAs was permitted to increase at a faster rate between 1976 and 1982 - from £27 million (1977/1978) to over £81 million (1981/82 and finally to £100 million in 1982/83.⁽²⁰⁾ However, for HAs throughout Britain by 1980, more than half of the annual allocation was taken up by a large number of building schemes on site, implying significant restraint on approvals for the new programme. During 1981-2 the number of new approvals was at its lowest level since 1974-5.⁽²¹⁾

In general, growth in the government allocation did not extend opportunities for housing production by HAs. In Scotland this was not insignificantly due to a backlog of 5,900 houses acquired by HAs and awaiting improvement (Strathclyde) and of 130 new build schemes (3,500 houses) with loan approval, but no approval to go on site. (22) In parallel the government encouraged HAs to develop a policy supporting the sale of their stock to sitting tenants.

Therefore, alongside the growth in public resources allocated to the voluntary sector, there has been a growth in more explicit and wide-ranging controls by government agencies to ensure increased public accountability. Certain controls, such as those on 'duality of interest' have been extended as a result of political pressure by the NFHA. For example, in an NFHA Report on the Housing Act 1980 it was stated that:

The Federation, following an overwhelming vote at our AGM in 1978, had urged the government to end any 'duality of interest' between those on the committee and those receiving any financial reward from the work of an association. (23)

Since enactment of the 1980 Act, however, HAs have lobbied for a further amendment to correct new anomalies arising out of Section 16, Part II.

There are, as we shall see, significant structural tensions between the decentralised organisational controls emphasised by housing associations and the centralised controls emphasised by government policy. Also, the values of diversity and voluntary

initiative supported by participants in HAs, coexist uneasily with the uniformity and consistency associated with bureaucratic accountability and control. The Scottish Minister for Home Affairs, stated in June 1981 that:

Underlying these provisions is the government's firm belief that while associations seek to develop and to extend their interest into a wider range of activities it remains necessary that there should be the maximum level of accountability for the use of government funds. (24)

Questions regarding accountability and the tensions between organisational autonomy and central control have long been the focus of theorising in the social sciences. These themes are to be found in studies of the relations between governmental organisations; between voluntary organisations and the state and between democratic, bureaucratic and professional aspects of organisations. I shall reconsider the housing association experience in the context of such research in Part Five.

At this point I shall conclude that the advantages gained through government support for HAs in terms of their expanding role in housing provision, have in practice become associated with the growing incorporation of the Third Arm. By incorporation I mean that the Third Arm has been absorbed within a wider systematic framework of planning and controls by central and local government agencies. Also, incorporation implies that the representative bodies of the voluntary sector are increasingly absorbed into consultation and negotiation with government agencies. However, in Part Three we shall see that the growth of housing association activity and the common experience of

problems on the ground has served to stimulate the growth and strengthening of common interest organisations which have served to influence, temper and contradict certain policies of state agencies.

Notes and References to Chapter Three

- (1) NFHA, A Committee Members Handbook, 1979, op. cit., p. 86.
- (2) Housing Corporation Annual Reports, 1979-1980 and 1980-1981.
- (3) SFHA paper on HAs affiliated to the Federation, SFHA, 1982, and SFHA Review Body Report, 1981.
- (4) NFHA, Committee Members Handbook, op. cit.
- (5) SFHA, Review Body Report, op. cit., and SF News, April 1983.
- (6) NFHA, Committee Members Handbook, 1979, op. cit., Appendix 5, p. 66.
- (7) A.W. Gouldner, 'Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy' in Sociological Theory edited by L.A. Coser and B. Rosenberg, Macmillan, 1964, pp. 500-509; R. Michels, Political Parties, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press, 1949; P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, University of California Press, 1949, and Max Weber's classic study of bureaucracy in H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, From Max Weber, Essays in Sociology, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946.
- (8) The organisation of large-scale institutionalised democracy has been discussed by Marxists like V. Lenin in The State and Revolution, New York, International Publishers, 1932, and A. Gramsci, 'The Programme of the Workshop Commissars' in G.A. Williams, Proletarian Order, Pluto Press, 1975, pp. 123-132; by libertarians, Paul and Percival Goodman, in Communitas, Vintage Books, 1960, Chapter 7; and by social democrats, such as P. Blumberg, Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, Constable and Co., 1968, Chapter 1.
- (9) S.M. Lipset, M. Trow and J.S. Coleman, Union Democracy, Glencoe Illinois, Free Press, 1956.
- (10) R. McKay and B. Barr, The Scottish Daily News, Canongate, Edinburgh, 1976, and S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Organisation, Class and Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 516-522.
- (11) M. Mann, Consciousness and Action among the Western Working Class, Macmillan Press, 1973, Chapters, 3, 7 and 8; A. Giddens, The Class Structure of the Advanced Societies, Hutchinson, 1973, and J. Goldthorpe, D. Lockwood, F. Bechhofer and J. Platt, The Affluent Worker: Political Attitudes and Behaviour, Volume 2 and The Affluent Worker in the Class Structure, Volume 3, Cambridge University Press, 1969.

- (12) HMSO, Policy for the Inner Cities, June 1977, Cmd. 6845.
- (13) J.B. Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, op. cit., p. 130.
- (14) NFHA, Housing Associations, A Committee Members Guide, 1979, p. 86, A.10.3.
- (15) G. Filken, 'Special Housing Needs: Why So Special?', Voluntary Housing, Volume 10, No. 5, September 1978, and R. Wurtzburg, Special Projects Through Housing Associations, an NFHA Guide, revised edition, 1978.
- (16) NFHA, A Committee Members Guide, op. cit., p. 85, A.10.2.
- (17) SFHA, A Housing Programme for the 1980s, Proposals for a Five-Year Framework for Development for the Association Movement in Scotland, SFHA, 1982.
- (18) For examples of different approaches, see NBA, New Approaches to Urban Renewal, The National Building Agency Report for the DoE, May 1981.
- (19) NFHA, Committee Members Handbook, op. cit.
- (20) Letter from Housing Corporation, Scottish Head Office, supplying information on request, October 1982.
- (21) Housing Corporation Annual Report, 1982.
- (22) SFHA, A Housing Programme for the 1980s, op. cit., p. 34.
- (23) NFHA, The Housing Act 1980, A Guide for Housing Associations, op. cit., p. 44.
- (24) A Message from Malcolm Rifkind MP, the Scottish Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment, Housing Corporation, Scottish News, June 1981, Issue No. 2.

PART TWO

A HISTORY OF HOUSING AND
HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS IN GLASGOW

CHAPTER FOUR

A HISTORY OF HOUSING AND POLITICS IN GLASGOW

The previous chapters have examined economic and political influences on the development of voluntary housing in Britain. In this chapter I shall focus on historical processes which have interacted in shaping the urban context within which housing policy and issues in Glasgow developed during the 1970s.

1. Industry, Class and Housing in 19th Century Glasgow

(a) Commercial and industrial developments

Glasgow's position on the Clyde has clearly influenced its commercial and industrial development. By the 17th century, Glasgow was a trading centre for a range of products and raw materials, including wool, linen and coal exports and wine, timber and paper imports. During the 18th century, tobacco importing established a rich trade position for the city and merchants became established as an economically powerful group. By the 19th century, the production of cotton had become a major industrial enterprise with a strong market position, although by the end of that century, foreign competition resulted in a decline in Glasgow's trade position in the international market for textiles. During the latter half of the 19th century, Glasgow became an important industrial and commercial base for investment in shipbuilding and heavy engineering, and Norman describes Glasgow as 'a nineteenth century boom city built for profit by private enterprise'.⁽¹⁾

(b) Industrialisation, urbanisation and housing

Checkland's historical account⁽²⁾ of the development of industrial Glasgow suggests that certain basic characteristics of Glasgow's modern urban structure are rooted in developments which took place prior to 1880 in relation to patterns of land use for industry, and for working class and middle class housing. Butt⁽³⁾ and Worsdall⁽⁴⁾ have also emphasised the extent to which Glasgow's heritage of pre-1919 tenement-building in the inner areas reflects characteristics of the social and economic structure and dominant values of the 19th century.

The distinctive characteristic of the built environment of the inner urban areas of Glasgow and of other Scottish cities is the architectural form of the stone, generally four-storey, tenement building. While tenement building is not unique to Scottish cities, the proportion of tenement building was significantly higher in Scottish cities as compared with English nineteenth century housing, and high-density, high-rise housing was most extensively developed in Glasgow. In English cities, the predominant form of 19th century working class housing produced was that of terraced housing and back-to-back court dwellings.⁽⁵⁾

Different reasons have been suggested as to why the tenement became so significant as a housing form in the City of Glasgow. First, it has been suggested that trade with Europe influenced the cultural awareness of wealthy merchants and the aristocracy about the architectural solution of the tenement buildings which were

characteristic of European cities in Italy, Germany and Holland.⁽⁶⁾ Secondly, there was the availability of sandstone as a natural resource. Thirdly, land was restricted for urban development due to the existence of burgh boundaries which had been rigidly defined by statute prior to the 16th century. Against this background housing developers favoured the vertical architectural solution which incorporated high population density, and which was characteristic of the architectural approach of the walled cities of Italy. Fourthly, there were economic factors. Those who acquired and developed land were required, under Scottish law, to pay feu duty (an annual fee) to the seller. It was therefore in the interests of developers to maximise their investment through the building of high density housing. Baird's⁽⁷⁾ analysis shows that for the second half of the 19th century, it was no more costly to build a stone dwelling house in a tenement, than it was to build a comparable cottage of brick. However, tenement building allowed for more houses per acre and was therefore a more profitable form of housing development.⁽⁸⁾

The inner tenement areas of modern Glasgow were largely developed as a means of providing high density housing to cater for the rapidly growing urban population resulting from the industrial expansion of the late nineteenth century. From the late 18th century onwards, rural immigrants from Central Scotland, Ireland and the Highlands and Scottish Isles were attracted to the city by the growing demand for labour. A new wave of population expansion accompanied the second industrial revolution of heavy engineering on Clydeside. Middlemas states that 'two impulses accelerated the natural tendency of the city centre to become a slum'.⁽⁹⁾ The first impulse was the

immigration of de-populated and starving Irish (after the 1840 famine) and of the Highlanders after the Clearances; and the second was the steady drift of prosperous classes to suburban housing with gardens and to the West End of the city.

The main booms in housing production were between 1866 and 1876, when an average of 4,000 houses were produced per year, and between 1892 and 1901, when 3,000 houses were produced on average per year. (10) Also, between 1861 and 1891 the city boundaries were extended and the housing stock increased from 86,600 to 140,800. The vast majority of house building was to cater for the expanding working class population of the city. It was largely tenement building including small housing units, the majority being two apartment dwellings.

(c) Housing obsolescence, overcrowding and poverty

By the mid-nineteenth century the City of Glasgow was already facing the issues of extensive slum housing, overcrowding and poor sanitation. Worsdall refers to the chronic population densities which existed by 1840, largely as the result of expansion of the textile industry. A committee reporting on sanitary conditions in different cities in 1859 (after two major cholera epidemics caused by defective water supply, in 1849 and 1854) stated that: 'tenements of great height are ranged on either side of narrow lanes with no backyard space, and are divided from top to bottom into numberless small dwellings all crowded with occupants'. (11)

In 1866, the City Improvement Trust was established under the Glasgow Improvement Act. The Act entitled Glasgow Corporation to compulsorily acquire and demolish old properties within the inner areas; to realign streets; to control new building and to build model lodging houses to accommodate the poor. Other legislation, in 1855 and 1862 (controlling the water supply) and in 1867 (regarding standards of building and sanitation) empowered sheriffs to impose minimum standards in 88 acres of slums. The 1866 Improvement Act led to the demolition of 16,000 houses by 1914, while between these years the City Improvement Trust built only 2,199 houses. As Norman states: 'public intervention was largely confined to demolition of the worst houses and control of overcrowding in the remainder.'⁽¹²⁾ Further Improvement Acts were passed in 1871 and 1897. However, by 1917, when the Royal Commission on Housing in Scotland reported, there was clear evidence of chronic overcrowding. In 10.9% of Glasgow houses there were more than four persons per room; in 27.9% there were more than three persons per room; and in 55.7% there were more than two persons per room. The comparable figures for English cities were 0.8, 1.5 and 9.4% respectively.⁽¹³⁾

(d) Social class, social status and tenement housing

Smith⁽¹⁴⁾ describes how the residents of the earlier tenement buildings of the 17th and 18th centuries in Edinburgh were mixed in social class terms. This pattern changed, however, with the building of Edinburgh's New Town in the late 18th century, at which time wealthier residents chose to live in the more elegant terraced housing

of the New Town. There were similar changes in social class residential patterns in Glasgow's tenements. The trend by the second half of the 19th century in Glasgow was for the new middle classes and the wealthy to move out of the areas where industry was based, in the East End and the Inner areas, to the grander Victorian terraces, tenements and detached housing in the West and South of the city.

However, the 19th century-built tenements embodied significant variations in terms of spatial, aesthetic and structural standards, depending on whether the builder was providing housing for labourers, artisans or the bourgeoisie. It is also likely that housing standards varied according to the organisational abilities of the builders, the availability of materials, and the profit margins pursued by different builders. (15)

Nineteenth century values relating to social status and class differences have therefore been reflected in the city's older tenements. These are expressed in terms of variations in the quality of the basic tenement structure, in space standards and in aesthetic details such as tiled closes and cornices. Differences can be observed both within individual neighbourhoods (from one end of a street to the other, or between streets) and in the general tenement characteristics of different localities, such as the West End (Hillhead and Hyndland) and the East End (Bridgeton/Dalmarnock and South Dennistoun). Pacione comments on the pattern of geographic and social polarisation of different classes within Glasgow:

The workers and factories in the East End and the middle-class housing and business quarter in the West End, may be interpreted as a spatial expression of 19th century class consciousness. The middle-class efforts to avoid industries and industrial workers intensified as their numbers increased in the city.

So the middle-classes migrated to the North-West and South of the city, where the pattern of street geography involved

curves, crescents and irregular angles, in sharp contrast to the earlier grid pattern close to the city centre. (19)

By 1914 Glasgow's population involved a significant concentration of working class housing in the inner areas. Indeed Glasgow had the most densely populated central urban area in Europe, with 700,000 people living within three square miles of Glasgow Cross by 1914.

Checkland suggests that certain values relating to housing are culturally and historically specific to Scotland, and to Glasgow in particular.

For example, he contends that a lower proportion of family income has generally been spent on housing by Glasgow families than by residents of other British cities. (17) It is most probable that this pattern reflects the employment instability and job insecurity which have formed a significant part of the experience of a large section of the working-class population of the city.

2. Industry, Politics and Housing 1900 - 1939

(a) Industry, employment and housing

During the 20th century the dominant trend characterising Clydeside's industrial base has been one of decline. Checkland, Middlemas, and others have identified the major factors influencing the decline of heavy engineering, steel and shipbuilding industries.

Significant influences have been the growing scale of obsolescence of industrial plant and the preference of major industrialists for investing capital abroad rather than re-investing at home; inter-firm competition which inhibited corporate attempts to rationalise regional production; and the growing inability of Clydeside firms to compete in international markets against more recently industrialised nations.⁽¹⁸⁾ This general decline, which has continued into the early 1980s, was tempered by two periods of revival - the first in the late 1930s brought on by rearmament, and the second, between 1945 and the late 1950s, which involved industrial expansion on Clydeside in parallel with growing labour unrest. Rescue attempts were periodically made by individual industrialists and by finance capital, although since the 1960s these have involved central state intervention and support initiated by both Labour and Conservative governments. There are therefore marked parallels in the development of central state policies responding to the consequences of obsolescence in both private housing and industry.

Other employment trends in Glasgow have paralleled developments in the rest of Britain. While new industries developed during the post-war period and became a significant source of employment (e.g. Linwood), the major owners of capital and major industrial employers were increasingly to become multinational companies. Traditional engineering concerns were supported by commercial or government financial investment and encouraged to diversify (e.g. Beardmores, Fairfields).

In the context of this industrial decline succeeding generations of the city's working class have experienced significant periods of job insecurity and unemployment and wage levels lower than those for comparable work in the South.⁽¹⁹⁾ Checkland states that during the period of post-war (post-1945) recovery the per capita income in Glasgow and the West fell around 10% lower than for Britain as a whole and the unemployment rate of 3% to 3.5% was approximately twice the national rate.⁽²⁰⁾

(b) Politics, conflict and ideology

Glasgow's history has also been associated with a strong trade union and labour movement and, at certain periods, with militant protest against housing and industrial conditions, which led the establishment to fear political disorder and revolt and which earned the city the label of 'Red Clydeside'. Checkland suggests that Glasgow's reputation for labour militancy and radical protest, which was established by the 1920s, has influenced the pattern of industrial investment in the region until the present day.⁽²¹⁾

Three major influences on political developments which established this reputation have been emphasised by Middlemas.⁽²²⁾ First, as we have seen, at the turn of the century Glasgow's working class population experienced more chronic conditions in housing, health and employment than existed in any other city in Britain. In 1900 Glasgow's population was 750,000 and increasing at a rate of 4% per year. Overcrowding was most prevalent amongst immigrants from Ireland and the Highlands and 25% of the city's population lived in one-roomed

houses (single-ends), while one in seven households had lodgers. Rents were high in relation to wages, and those of new housing were unaffordable by workmen whose wages were lower than those in England for comparable work. The death rate was the highest in Britain at 20 per 1,000 although there were significant variations between slums and residential areas within the city - for example, the difference between that for Blackfriars, 'the most congested slum in Europe' (29.2%) and Pollock (10.3%) being explained by the Trades Council in 1918 in terms of climatic variations, despite the fact that they were only two miles apart!

Secondly, there developed a committed and radical working class leadership group, several of whose members were affiliated to the Scottish Independent Labour Party (the ILP). Despite the diverse social backgrounds and varied leftist politics within the leadership, the group was unified by these characteristics: it held aims of politically educating the working class; there was a general openness to internal political dialogue; the group had little confidence in the parliamentary labour movement's ability to realise gains for the city's working class and it supported a variety of political strategies. Its members were active in Beardmores at Parkhead, 'the last of the 19th century industrial giants' (Kirkwood), on the Trades Council and in the Seamen's Union (Shinwell), in the Scottish Labour College (John Maclean, an ex-school teacher), in schools (John Maxton, a teacher in Shettleston, influenced by anarchist writing) and on the city council (Wheatley as councillor for Shettleston on Lanark County Council). Their varied political affiliations ranged from the ILP

which defined itself as a political and socialist wing of the Labour Party, to Marxist groups such as the Scottish Democratic Federation (SDF) which represented internationalism and direct action. While the Labour Party grew in size and strength in England, the Clydesiders focused, between 1906 and 1914, on developing a socialist programme, aiming at significant rather than revolutionary change. (23)

Thirdly, political action on Clydeside involved rent strikes organised by soldiers' wives and supported by the Trades Council after landlords had increased rents (1915). Wheatley and a socialist lawyer fought the landlords' policy on the council and in the courts, while large numbers of trade unionists demonstrated their solidarity. There were further rent strikes between 1920 and 1922 following the relaxation of war-time rent restriction which served to increase rents by 30% in 18 months during a time of major unemployment. (24)

Industrial militancy centred on unemployment during the 1906-1908 slump and on de-skilling (dilution) and government controls on labour imposed by the 1915 Munition Act. (Many trade unionists however accepted dilution provided that it did not equalise the position of women at work!) Opposition by the Clyde Workers' Committee resulted in Lloyd George forming a committee to investigate causes of industrial discontent in Glasgow, although unrest in other cities, such as Sheffield and Belfast, was even greater. Following the war the government broke strikes during a worsening slump and in 1919 strikes caused closures of large firms and protest eventually culminated in large-scale demonstrations in the city.

By 31st January 1919, under the leadership of Shinwell, a Joint Committee of all Interests, West of Scotland, was set up and demanded a 40 hour week as a means of minimising the effects of demobilisation on unemployment. 100,000 were eventually on strike and a demonstration was held in George Square during which the Riot Act was read, the police, army and tanks were called in to control the demonstration and leaders such as Shinwell were arrested. The Scottish TUC only gave the strike its official backing at the point where people were already returning to work. After the demonstration, the Glasgow Herald commented: 'The Joint Strike Committee was an anarchical outburst ... the first step towards the squalid terrorism that the world calls Bolshevism'.

(c) Municipalisation and housing

Despite these fears of revolution, labour leaders pursued electoral politics. For example, Wheatley became Minister of Health in the first Labour government of 1924. Since 1909 Wheatley had pressed for low rent municipal housing first, as a member of Lanark County Council and secondly, on Glasgow City Council after Shettleston had been absorbed within its boundaries. Wheatley had first entered parliament in the 1922 election when ten out of Glasgow's fifteen parliamentary seats were gained by IIP representatives - the election having been fought on Wheatley's housing programme.

Wheatley's policies focused on significantly increasing the provision of municipal housing by extending central government subsidies. In Glasgow since 1919 both the Conservative administration and the

growing Labour group represented on the Council had promoted the development of municipal housing schemes.

During the inter-war period two of the largest schemes were peripheral 'garden suburbs' characterised by mainly low-rise housing (cottages and terraces) and by a relatively high quality of amenity including open-space, library facilities and local shops. Knightswood and Mosspark, which were built during the 1920s, were high status local authority schemes and Glasgow Corporation's allocation policies and rent levels together ensured that their high amenity houses were mainly accessible to semi-skilled and white-collar workers.

The Corporation also developed large, low-cost and less attractive schemes which neighboured industry. For example, Blackhill in the East of Glasgow was built in the 1930s to provide almost 1,000 houses, which neighboured gas works, in a high density scheme. Poverty, low rents and housing allocation policies interacted to ensure that Blackhill housed mainly the poorest sections of the working class. In total during the inter-war period 54,289 houses were approved for building by the Corporation; 10,235 were approved for development with state assistance and 9,106 houses were built by private developers. (25)

Therefore, in Glasgow a Conservative administration promoted extensive municipal housing provision against a background of housing shortages and obsolescence, working class protest and Establishment concerns about working class radicalism. Since the early 20th century the Labour Party and the left exerted growing influence on the

Corporation and since 1933 until the present day the Labour Party has been in continuous control except for two intervals totalling five years.

3. Post-War Developments in Housing and Planning

(a) Politics, industry and the inner areas

I shall now discuss certain important aspects of political and economic change which have affected Glasgow's inner areas since 1945. First, there was a decline in political and class consciousness which was influenced by growing affluence and industrial opportunities; by the vigorous inter-war and post-war housing programme in the city, which stimulated the building industry and provided many families with a decent home for the first time; and by the general growth of the Welfare State. Industrial conflict focused on relative gains between industrial groups, either within Glasgow firms or between plants based in Glasgow and their English counterparts. (26)

Secondly, there was industrial decline and increasing external control of industry. During the 1960s the decline of shipbuilding and engineering entered a new down-turn which reached an all-time low in the slump of the 1970s. Industrial militancy was greatest in higher paid new industries which involved English or American ownership and control (27) and Firm illustrates that by 1975, 59% of manufacturing workers were employed in non-Scottish companies. Growing external industrial ownership was paralleled by increasing government aid to, and control of, Glasgow's failing industries and by 1975 Conservative

and Labour governments had committed £101m of public money to shipbuilding on the Clyde.⁽²⁸⁾ The significant trend of growing unemployment during the late 1970s and early 1980s has not been accompanied by a revival of working class militancy.⁽²⁹⁾ I would suggest here that the dominant political culture in Glasgow is characterised by resignation and fear of loss of work, accompanied by the traditional working class cynicism and humour about inequalities of power, wealth and advantage.

Thirdly, during the 1970s and early 1980s, there have been further notable changes in city politics. During the early and mid-1970s the growing influence of the Scottish National Party led to the Labour Party losing office and to a reduced majority when in control. However, increasingly internal divisions within the SNP have affected its declining influence. Also since the latter 1970s the Liberal Party has gained increasing support and, since the early 1980s in its alliance with the Social Democrats, particularly so in the more middle class areas of the city. While there are well-established political groups of the further left in the city, e.g. the Communist Party and the Socialist Workers Party, these have consistently remained minority groups. However, their members have been influential in certain industries where they have occupied a central role at branch level - for example, the Communist Party in shipbuilding on the Clyde. The Communist Party has also been actively involved in "community action" in certain neighbourhoods (e.g. Govanhill and Govan).

In Chapter Five we shall see that against this wider urban political background there was a growing convergence within the local authority of support for new structures of participation in planning

during the 1970s and for partnership with the private housing sector. At the same time there were growing demands for public participation and neighbourhood-focused political action has increased within the city. Further, these developments continued against a background of growing political conservatism and national revival of Tory ideology which emphasised values of 'voluntarism' during the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Different elements of planning have interacted to influence working class experience of housing in the inner areas. Since the inter-war period, planning has attempted to improve these aspects of urban life:

- (1) The reduction or containment of unemployment by improving work opportunities. Since its formation in 1975 Strathclyde Regional Council has been responsible for regional industrial policy.
- (2) Improvement of housing and the physical environment. Glasgow Corporation (which became Glasgow District Council in 1975) has concentrated on relieving overcrowding and housing shortage; on house improvement in the private and public sector and on environmental improvement. Since the mid-1970s the local authority has assumed a more explicit planning role in relation to private sector development.

- (3) The development of an effective road network in order to provide good communication links for industry.

I shall now examine more closely certain developments in housing and planning, in Glasgow after 1945, which have significantly affected Glasgow's inner areas.

(b) Central-local dynamics in planning

It is generally agreed that planners at central and local government levels have been unable to develop an effective programme for resolving the economic, industrial and employment problems of Glasgow and of Clydeside. Central government subsidy and the planning partnership of local and central state planning agencies have comprised the approach to declining industry, foreign competition, outmoded technology, unemployment and a high level of migration. (30)

The 1946 Clyde Valley Plan proposed the relocation of Lanarkshire's obsolescent steel industry to a site near the shipyards; the creation of industrial estates for new industries; central renewal proposals for the scenic areas; and finally an overspill of 100,000. Major planning reports after 1945 emphasised support for the growth of industries rather than any attempt to arrest the decline of outmoded heavy industries. (31) The overspill programme involved central-local partnership in designating new towns - for example, East Kilbride, 1947; Livingstone, 1962; Irvine, 1966.

This policy of planned decentralisation and retention of a greenbelt to restrict urban sprawl was initially opposed by Glasgow Corporation. However, during the 1950s the Corporation came to accept the Scottish Office's proposals regarding overspill and the voluntary relocation of industry and population. In the event, that policy proved more difficult to realise than had initially been assumed. (32)

The planners had intended that, by encouraging voluntary depopulation of the inner city areas, speedier urban renewal would be possible. In fact the house letting policies of the New Towns initially gave priority to Glasgow residents who had employment prospects in the New Town and, as a result, those migrating to the New Towns were predominantly skilled workers. By March 1963, 57% of tenants of East Kilbride had been drawn from Glasgow and 34% from other areas of Lanarkshire. It was only after 1959, when house criteria were relaxed, that more Glaswegians, without prospective jobs, could apply with a chance of success to be residents of East Kilbride.

The pattern has therefore been migration to New Towns, to 'the South' or even abroad. During the 1960s, the West of Scotland lost about three-quarters of its increase in population through emigration and, by the second half of the 1960s, conditions on Clydeside had been once again identified as the most extreme on a range of criteria relating to housing and unemployment. (33)

While all inner area localities have been affected by these general trends, they have not all been affected similarly. Local patterns have varied according to characteristics of the local industrial infrastructure: clearly specific closures or reductions in a major firm's workforce have a concentrated effect on specific localities. Examples of such centres of industrial employment in different localities are Dixons Blazes, Govanhill; ⁽³⁴⁾ Beardmores, the East End; Shipbuilding, Govan; and The Clyde Iron Works, Cambuslang - all of which have been the cause of considerable localised unemployment. Even new industries developed on the boom of the 1960s, such as Linwood, have proved unable to maintain security of employment during the present recession.

It was also the case that many Glaswegians chose to commute to East Kilbride rather than to move house. In 1959, 50% of those working in East Kilbride were commuters. So it would seem that the overspill policy did not serve to improve housing or work opportunities for the majority of those living in the worst housing conditions. In 1976 the government abandoned plans for Scotland's sixth New Town at Stonehouse and there is evidence of reversal of the policy of urban decentralisation.

For example, The Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) Project, established in May 1976, has been presented as involving a partnership between different planning agencies - The Scottish Office, Glasgow District Council, Strathclyde Region, The Housing Corporation - under the co-ordination of the Scottish Development Agency. The six 'key

issues' defined by the project include 'the problem of poverty and the opportunity to tackle it in GEAR' and 'the fostering of residents' commitment and confidence through their involvement in the planning, implementation and management of services, and facilities in GEAR'.⁽³⁵⁾

The overall aim of the project has been to co-ordinate the contributions of different agencies in attempting to arrest social and economic decline and depopulation - all within the framework of Skeffington-type public participation.⁽³⁶⁾

A major emphasis of the GEAR project has been on increasing social confidence in the East End against a background of population decline by 45% to 45,000 within the GEAR area between 1971 and 1978. This decline represents five times the rate for Glasgow and seven times that for the region.⁽³⁷⁾ A project similar to GEAR is being co-ordinated at Maryhill and the planners have described both these projects as based on the concept of New Town development, although they are obviously primarily part of 'Inner City' policy.

Since GEAR's inception, it has been subject to criticism on several counts. First, Hogwood has shown that the majority of funding allocated to the project was diverted from already programmed expenditure and that only about £40 million of the stated allocation of £120 million represented new money.⁽³⁸⁾ Secondly, the planning aid officer of the TCPA argued in 1978 that the six local plans previously formulated by Glasgow District Council have been little affected by the establishment of GEAR, and that public participation has in effect provided 'minimal scope to show what the people of the area might

contribute to the revival of its social and economic life if they were given the chance'.⁽³⁹⁾ The lack of effective public participation has also been explained in terms of the traditional apathy of the area's residents; the absence of sufficient locally-resident professionals and community activists; and of the long-standing suspicion towards public authorities.⁽⁴⁰⁾ Thirdly, it has been argued that the establishment of GEAR has simply led to a new tier and structure of planning bureaucracy which has had limited effect to date in bringing industrial investment in the Cambuslang Recovery area or in the East End. Fourthly, Booth et al have pointed to the inter-organisational politics stemming from the formation of a new tier such as GEAR, which they typify as a 'mutually-antagonistic non-government organisation', a Mango!⁽⁴¹⁾ Finally, questions have been asked as to the appropriateness of such schemes in relation to the broader urban problems of the city as a whole, particularly if the implication is that resources are diverted from elsewhere.

Despite these criticisms, it is notable that since the initiation of the SDA co-ordinating role, there have been visual improvements in the area as the product of environmental (land renewal) schemes. Factory units have been built and occupied although large-scale closures have continued, not surprisingly at a time of recession. SSHA house building, for rent and for owner-occupation, has provided some of the more attractive public housing developments in the city. The main point, however, is that the concept of GEAR, despite practical shortcomings, reflects a change in the philosophy of planning in the

1970s in the city of Glasgow.

(c) Changes in housing policy

1. Slum clearance and redevelopment

In Chapter Three I described how the planning approach of the 1960s increasingly incorporated an emphasis on social provision according to area needs.⁽⁴²⁾ Housing policy in Glasgow, towards the late 1960s, began to change from a centrally directed approach, which incorporated universalist strategies aimed at controlling and improving chronic housing conditions, towards increasing acceptance of a partnership approach with other agencies which stressed the varying housing problems of different localities. The area emphasis is also reflected in the approach of Strathclyde Region.⁽⁴³⁾

During the inter-war period, the Corporation reacted to the city's housing problems with its policy of slum clearance and new house building. Municipal housing, subsidised through rates and by financial aid from central government, was given priority initially by a Conservative administration. National legislation (1919, 1923 and 1924) initiated council estates both on the periphery and more central areas, which did not necessarily provide for those with the greatest housing need. Checkland argues that for those early schemes (e.g. Knightswood), which involved low-rise family housing with gardens, access to housing largely depended on income and ability to pay rent - so that the majority of tenants were white-collar, skilled or semi-skilled workers. Pacione states: 'The theoretical basis of

the policy formulated by the Conservative government was the filtering process, houses vacated by people moving to new estates then became available for those who could not afford the higher rents'.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Also, several writers seem to have arrived at the following conclusions. In general, house lettings policy and practice were influenced by ideological notions which were both authoritarian and paternalist and it was the intention that the new housing should cater primarily for the 'deserving poor', who would be capable of benefiting from improved housing conditions. Secondly, the cumulative effect of the pattern of housing provision by Glasgow Corporation was that a 'hierarchy' of housing schemes developed, and this resulted in inequalities of opportunities for access to good council housing for working class residents in the city. For example, when less attractive schemes were built (e.g. Blackhill in the 1930s), which were low cost and therefore provided lower rent housing, they tended to become areas which housed a large proportion of families with problems. Schemes, like Blackhill and Barrowfield, which were built purely to provide housing and, for economic and other reasons, neglected to incorporate any social services or amenities, came to represent a philosophy of 'give us the houses and to hell with planning'.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Different housing schemes have successively become socially labelled as involving an excessive degree of violence and crime - for example, Easterhouse during the late 1960s for gang warfare and Blackhill during the late 1970s. Both instances have involved considerable media publicity, reaction by local residents, and finally, a commitment to provision of amenities and to housing and

environmental improvement by the local authority. (46)

Checkland also reminds us of the fact that Glaswegians have historically held low expectations of housing space and housing standards and have preferred to allocate a lower proportion of income to expenditure on housing. By 1939 only 29% of houses had four rooms or more as compared with 80.3% in England and Wales. (47)

2. Changing Tenures

A consequence of redevelopment and of extensive obsolescence has been change in housing tenure patterns in the city. The private rental sector has steadily decreased in proportion to the total housing sector. This pattern was reinforced by the policy of low-rent, subsidised, municipal housing and the ideological and pragmatic rejection of private landlordism within the Labour Party. The practical reasons for displacing private landlordism related to political aims of controlling housing standards and rent levels. By 1965, private landlords owned 38% housing; owner-occupiers, 19%; and the Corporation owned 43% housing in the city. The slow rate of building for owner-occupation is evidenced in a 1970 Report which shows that between 1919 and 1969 only 19,842 houses were built for private ownership, and between 1960 and 1970 private building for owner-occupation was only at the rate of 142 per annum. In contrast, by 1970, Glasgow Corporation had provided 145,000 houses and the Scottish Special Housing Association had built 10,000. (48)

Norman projected, from trends evident in 1972, that by 1981 70% housing would be council owned and 30% owner-occupied, and commented

that 'the main problem of housing policy will then be that of administering such a large number of houses both humanely and efficiently'.⁽⁴⁹⁾ At that time there was no housing association movement to speak of in the city, nor was there a central government policy of privatisation. Since the second half of the 1970s at Glasgow District Council, councillors and officials have shown less conviction regarding the viability of further municipalisation in the city. For instance, there has been less extreme rejection of the policy of council house sales than might have been expected during 1979-82 within the council, and Housing Plans have emphasised commitment to the establishment of a mix of tenure types in the inner areas.⁽⁵⁰⁾

3. The critique of slum clearance

We have seen that the planning emphasis until the late 1960s was on planned urban decentralisation and depopulation, and on inner area redevelopment and renewal. As described in Chapter Two, planning at local authority level was influenced significantly by central government initiatives.

In 1945 the local authority had confronted an extreme housing shortage, estimated at some 80-90,000 units. The planners had initially operated in terms of a 'Township' concept in the design of schemes such as Easterhouse, Castlemilk and Drumchapel. Altogether, five large council schemes were built on the periphery, including Easterhouse and Castlemilk, until eventually these schemes absorbed around 10% of Glasgow's population. At their inception these schemes were built without shops, pubs, and other amenities. The District Council's own

Reports have provided evidence of the unattractiveness and unpopularity of some of these schemes in recent years. One Planning Report in 1978 showed that from certain larger schemes, between 20% and 30% of the population would have preferred rehousing to the better amenity or higher status schemes of the West End and South of the city. (51) Commercial and social facilities, programmed for development after housing provision, were still being provided in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

Also, post-1945, the Corporation had focused on the physically deteriorating inner areas. The poorly maintained, mainly privately landlarded, tenement areas of the inner city, were defined by 1957 as requiring redevelopment or slum clearance, followed by renewal. In 1957, 29 comprehensive development areas (CDAs), covering 8% of the city (2,700 acres) were proposed by the City Architect and Planning Officer.

The critique of slum clearance in Glasgow has focused on the lack of co-ordination between the different departments involved with comprehensive redevelopment; the cumbersome and time-consuming process of plan submission, planning act CPOs (compulsory purchase orders), public inquiry and plan approval; and finally on the lack of stated social aims and objectives of the CDA strategy. In general, until the stage of plan approval, cleared land must remain derelict. Also, the phasing of clearance by the Sanitary Department which aims to meet high targets of clearance of unfit housing on a 'worst-first' basis, generally has paid no reference to the phasing of redevelopment

plans. The net effect is that the programming of plans has never been able to keep up with the fast rate of clearance, so that large tracts of housing in the East End, Partick and Maryhill have been cleared some years before planning approval for redevelopment has been attained. Norman commented, 'The surprising thing about Glasgow's housing is that after one hundred years of slum clearance and fifty years of public building, there are still so many inadequate houses'. (52)

Once clearance proposals are approved and a CPO implemented, local residents may have had to wait a considerable period of time before receiving what they feel to be a suitable rehousing offer from the Housing Management Department. During this time residents frequently live with vandalism and break-ins, particularly as the residents of a single tenement are seldom rehoused simultaneously. Since 1969, delays in implementing CPOs have meant that residents have generally been rehoused prior to their tenement falling within local authority ownership. In fact, Glasgow residents affected by clearance have been relatively disadvantaged in this context when compared with inner area residents of other cities, where generally houses were cleared only after compulsory purchase and the local authority held responsibility for securing empty property. (53)

In Glasgow there was no great groundswell of grassroots opposition to the progress of clearance and rehousing in the inner areas. However, it is indisputable that the experience has frequently been traumatic and unpleasant and that many residents

did not want to leave their homes and local connections. However, for others, the chance of a decent house was a clear priority of interest. In some areas, concerted opposition developed in relation to local plans, during the late 1960s and 1970s. Local reaction by working class residents was at times given considerable impetus and support by community workers or concerned individuals, e.g. Partick, Govanhill, Gairbraid Avenue, Maryhill.⁽⁵⁴⁾ In certain areas there existed a tradition of interrelated activism in both industrial and community politics, and the presence of grassroots leadership (Govanhill). However, there is no evidence that such a pattern is typical of Glasgow's inner areas. In fact, even where such a pattern was the case a significant characteristic of community politics would seem to have been divisions of political focus and interest and of leadership (Govanhill, Govan). In many areas the experience of clearance and rehousing produced little evidence of community action or of collective reaction or opposition.⁽⁵⁵⁾ At any rate, out of the 29 CDAs proposed in 1957 only nine had been approved by 1980, the last of which was accepted in 1973.

The 1957 Act, as well as enabling slum clearance and overspill, established subsidy to offset the high costs of high-rise building - in order to alleviate the interrelated problems of inner city land restricted for development and housing shortage. During the 1960s the local authority was committed to the high-rise solution offered by the planning and architectural professions. Glasgow was allowed by the Scottish Office to build at higher densities than anywhere else in Britain (e.g. Red Road flats), even on the outskirts of the city.

Despite reductions in the subsidy which facilitated high-rise development in 1962 and 1967 (when subsidy was reduced from £60 to £30 per flat), the high-rise policy was continued.

Smith asks why the Scottish Office supported the continuation of high-rise building, even while it was increasingly being rejected elsewhere on both economic and social grounds. He suggests that one likely reason was that during the 1960s, three successive Chief Planners operated at the Scottish Office, so that technical scrutiny of Glasgow's plans may not have been as rigorous during the 1960s as during the 1950s. By 1971, nearly 40% of all dwellings built by Glasgow since 1957 were high-rise dwellings, and between 1965-70, the proportion of high-rise building was far greater for Glasgow than for the rest of Scotland. (56)

Another general consequence for the inner areas has been the continued presence of large tracts of visual dereliction and decay. That this has affected the image of the city held by outsiders is unquestionable. A Glasgow Herald 'Exclusive' article (5.8.80), reported on the strong reactions by local councillors to a newly published tourist guidebook to Scotland, which was promoted by the British Tourist Authority. The German author, P. Sager, introduces a chapter devoted to Glasgow with these comments:

By the Clyde, the unemployed sit and drink. Children play Celtic v. Rangers in large empty wastelands. Weeks earlier whole rows of houses still stood here, now piles of rubbish burn in the city centre. In Glasgow this is called the blitz of the bulldozers - a Town breaking up. I have seen districts in Calton and Anderston which resembled a battlefield rather than a redevelopment area ... Sometimes I thought: am I In the Bronx or the Bowery, or perhaps in Belfast ...

The fact that a tour of the city organised by the Tourist Office is not called a horror trip is thanks to skilful planning of the route and publicity.

and later he states:

Is this the city which in the 19th century called itself after London, the Second City of the British Empire? Today Glasgow is first: its social and economic problems are worse than those of England's worst town, Liverpool. (57)

4. A shift in policy

It is this sort of external image of housing and the environment which has characteristically been held by foreigners and communicated by media presentation of Glasgow's housing, alongside delinquency and crime. (58) There has been less interest shown in Glasgow's positive initiatives.

By the mid-1970s there was evidence that the local authority had changed from 'a reactive problem-solving approach' to obsolescence, and an 'imposition relationship' with residents of the inner areas, towards an approach involving 'anticipatory and innovative' decision-making and a willingness to negotiate with parties affected by policy. (59)

The multi-faceted approach of the local authority emphasised the complexity of the urban housing problem and recognised that a variety of agencies and groups could contribute towards housing provision including the Housing Corporation, the SDA, housing associations and local residents and, since the late 1970s, private developers also.

Further, whereas during the early 1970s the local authority reacted defensively and in an authoritarian style towards resident demands and criticisms of its policies, by the late 1970s, the Glasgow District Council Housing Group on the council was more open to resident consultation and various forms and degrees of participation in planning.

CBHAs are the outcome of a planning partnership between the Glasgow District Council and the Housing Corporation, which together established an organisational network within which inner area residents have occupied a key managerial role in rehabilitating the city's older housing stock. Similar partnerships between the local state and voluntary organisations are evident in other areas of social policy. (60)

Chapter Two showed that housing associations prior to the late 1960s played a minimal role on Glasgow's housing scene. Although the traditional, charitable form of housing association had no strong roots in Scottish history, in other cities like Edinburgh and Dundee large, professionalised associations were established prior to the early 1970s. There is no doubt that the municipal centralist tradition opposes that of voluntary and local initiative. Checkland bemoans the lack in Glasgow of what he terms the 'voluntarist principle' with its powers of scrutiny, criticism and initiative. He suggests that 'a combination of neighbourhood participation and generalised voluntarism is necessary where municipal collectivism is far advanced as in Glasgow'. (61)

The planning experiment of CBHAs, on which we shall now focus, has involved both neighbourhood participation in working class inner areas and generalised voluntarism. Chapter Five presents a case study of developments in urban policy between 1970 and 1975 which provided the context to the formation of CBHAs.

Notes and References to Chapter Four

- (1) P. Norman, 'A Derelict Policy', Official Architecture and Planning, (OAP), Volume 35, 1972, pp. 29-32.
- (2) S. Checkland, The Upas Tree, Glasgow, 1875-1975, University of Glasgow Press, 1977.
- (3) J. Butt, 'Working Class Housing in Glasgow, 1851-1914', in The History of Working Class Housing - A Symposium, edited by S.D. Chapman, David and Charles, 1971.
- (4) F. Worsdall, The Tenement: A Way of Life, A Social Historical and Architectural Study of Housing in Glasgow, Chambers, 1979.
- (5) J. Tarn, 'French Flats for the English in 19th Century London', pp. 19-40 and A. Sutcliffe's Introduction, pp. 1-18, to Multi-Storey Living, The British Working Class Experience, edited by A. Sutcliffe, Croom Helm, 1974.
- (6) C.A. Oakley, The Second City, Blackie and Sons, London, 1946, p. 47.
- (7) R. Baird, 'Housing' in The Scottish Economy, edited by A.K. Cairncross, Cambridge University Press (CUP), 1954, pp. 201-2.
- (8) R. Smith, 'Multi-dwelling building in Scotland, 1750-1970', A Study based on housing in the Clyde Valley, in A. Sutcliffe, op. cit., pp. 207-243.
- (9) R.K. Middlemas, The Clydesiders, Hutcheson & Co Ltd, 1965, p. 18.
- (10) J. Butt in The History of Working Class Housing, 1971, op. cit.
- (11) F. Worsdall, The Tenement, A Way of Life, 1979, op. cit., Chapter 2.
- (12) P. Norman, A Derelict Policy, op. cit., p. 30.
- (13) S. Checkland, The Upas Tree, Glasgow, 1875-1975, op. cit., p. 20.
- (14) R. Smith in Multi-Storey Living, op. cit. describes how tenements catered for different social classes, pp. 212-217, and discusses the different periods in which tenements were built in Edinburgh and Glasgow, pp. 215-216.
- (15) F. Worsdall, The Tenement, A Way of Life, op. cit., Chapter 8.

- (16) M. Pacione, 'Housing Policies in Glasgow since 1880', The Geographical Review, 1979, p. 397.
- (17) S. Checkland, The Upas Tree, Glasgow, 1875-1975, op. cit., p. 18.
- (18) Middlemas, op. cit., p. 97 described how two of 'The Clydesiders' sought to influence their employers (an Upper Clyde shipbuilding company and Beardmore's in the East End) to invest in more advanced technology in the 1920s.
- (19) Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 43-44 describes how the average unemployment for all trades in Clydeside, 1906-1908, was just less than 20%, while the average unemployment in England was 7%.
- (20) Checkland, op. cit., pp. 46-48.
- (21) Checkland, op. cit., p. 57.
- (22) Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 19-20.
- (23) See H. McShane's personal account of his involvement with the ILP and his critique of its emphasis on personality politics. H. McShane, No Mean Fighter, Chapter 7, Pluto Press, 1978 (written by Joan Smith).
- Also, Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 42-52.
- (24) Middlemas, op. cit., pp. 66 and 102.
- Also, McShane, op. cit., pp. 74-76
- (25) Checkland, op. cit., p. 40.
- (26) G. Brown (ed.), The Red Paper on Scotland, op. cit., particularly articles by J. Firm, 'External Control and Regional Policy', pp. 153-169 and J. Scott and M. Hughes, 'Finance Capital and the Upper Classes', pp. 170-186.
- (27) Sociological research of the 1960s illustrated trends characterising industrial and political attitudes of higher paid workers. See B.M. Berger, Working Class Suburb, A Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia, University of California Press, 1968 and J.H. Goldthorpe, et al., The Affluent Worker, Industrial Attitudes and Behaviour, Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- (28) D.R. Hay and J. McLaughlin, 'The UCS work-in: an interim catalogue', Scottish Labour History Bulletin, No. 8, 1974, p. 27 and Checkland, op. cit., pp. 51-53.
- (29) Glasgow Herald, 16 March 1983, A. Massie, 'Why Britain is Behind Thatcher with 3,500,000 out of work'.

- (30) See R.E. Nicoll, 'The Glasgow Region', Official Architecture and Planning, January 1972, pp. 25-28. Also, M. Pacione, The Geographical Review, 1979, op. cit., pp. 402-403.
- (31) For example the Toothill Report (1961); the Report on the Scottish Economy published by the Scottish Council (Development and Industry) and the Cairncross Report (1952) which is described by Nicoll op. cit. as embodying a similar approach. See also A. Henderson, 'Industrial Overspill from Glasgow, 1958-1968', Urban Studies. Vol. 11, 1974, pp. 61-79.
- (32) E. Farmer and R. Smith, 'Overspill Theory, A Metropolitan Case Study', Urban Studies, Vol. 12, 1975, pp. 151-168.
- (33) V. Cable, Glasgow, 'Area of Need', pp. 232-6 in the Red Paper in Scotland edited by G. Brown, EUSPB, 1975. See also Second Review of the Development Plan, Areas of Need in Glasgow, June 1972.
- (34) A. Slaven, 'The Dixon Enterprises' in Studies in Scottish Business History edited by P.L. Payne, Cass, 1967.
- (35) The Future for GEAR, Key Issues and Possible Courses of Action, GEAR, July 1978. The six key issues were defined as Housing Allocation policies to be adopted in meeting local needs and in attracting people to the area; action to make the housing stock in GEAR more attractive (p. 3); the problem of opportunity and the opportunity to tackle it; the fostering of residents' commitment and confidence through their involvement in the planning, implementation and management of services and facilities in GEAR; the provision of community support services and facilities to meet the specific needs of the GEAR community and the promotion and support of community initiatives as part of a co-ordinated approach to services by all interested parties.
- (36) People and Planning, Report by Committee on Public Participation in Planning (Skeffington Report), HMSO, 1969. See also J.B. Cullingworth, Town and Country Planning in Britain, London, George Allen and Unwin, 6th edition, pp. 259-263.
- (37) GEAR, Report on Household Survey, p. vii, 1978.
- (38) B. Hogwood, 'An Analysis of GEAR', Unpublished paper, Department of Politics, University of Strathclyde, December 1976.

- (39) R. Cowan, Viewpoint 2, 'Strong hand, heavy hand', Town and Country Planning, November 1978, pp. 490-492.
- (40) S. Nelson, 'Participating in GEAR', Strathclyde Area Survey, University of Strathclyde, 1980.
- (41) S.A. Booth, D.C. Pitt and W.J. Money, 'Organisational Redundancy? A Critical Appraisal of the GEAR Project', Public Administration, Vol. 60, Number 1, Spring 1982.
- (42) See Social Worker, Volume 6, No. 270, March 1976.
- (43) Strathclyde Structure Plan, 1977, A Consultative Draft, Department of Physical Planning, Strathclyde Regional Council, Glasgow (particularly section 3.10 and 5.30 focusing on housing and pp. 35-38 which focus on area variations in employment).
- (44) M. Pacione, op. cit., p. 399.
- (45) Checkland, op. cit., quoting a councillor, p. 40.
- (46) G. Armstrong and M. Wilson, Social Problems, Social Control and the Case of Easterhouse, Paper presented to British Sociological Association Conference, 1971.
- (47) Checkland, op. cit., p. 40.
- (48) See Report of the Glasgow Housing Programme Working Party, The Corporation of Glasgow and the Scottish Development Department, 1970.
- (49) P. Norman, A Derelict Policy, OAP, 1972, op. cit., p. 31.
- (50) Glasgow District Council, Housing Plans 1 and 2, 1977 and 1978.
- (51) Glasgow District Council, Glasgow, Implications of Population Changes to 1983 and Planning Policy Report, 1978, Appendix on transfer requests.
- (52) P. Norman, op. cit., pp. 29-30.
- (53) J. English, R. Madigan and P. Norman, Slum Clearance, The Social and Administrative Context in England and Wales, Croom Helm, 1976.
- (54) There have been several case studies of the impact of planning strategies for different localities. For example, see S. Jacobs, 'Community Action in a Glasgow Clearance Area: Consensus or Conflict', pp. 165-184, The Sociology of Community Action. Sociological Review Monograph No. 21, University of Keele, 1975 and Marian Jacobs, 'The Reidvale Papers', Paper 2,

Mile End Project, Young Volunteer Force Foundation, 1975.

This paper provides an account of the development of Reidvale Residents' Association and of local pressure for rehabilitation.

- (55) Sociologists have identified general patterns of social dislocation and trauma caused by slum clearance - for example, M. Young and P. Willmott's classic study, Family and Kinship in East London, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1962 and N. Dennis, Public Participation and the Planners' Blight, Faber and Faber, 1972. On the other hand, studies have emphasised that residents of some inner areas have been only too glad to leave their neighbourhoods - for example, R. Mellor, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 65-88 and K. Coates and R. Silburn, Poverty, The Forgotten Englishmen, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp. 99-100.
- (56) R. Smith in Multi-Storey Living, The British Experience, *op. cit.*, p. 237.
- (57) P. Sager, Scotland - History and Literature; Architecture and Countryside, 1980, (British Tourist Association).
- (58) For example, G. Armstrong and M. Wilson's study of Easterhouse in the late 1960s and early 1970s stressed the role of the media in the social labelling of Easterhouse as a delinquent area. G. Armstrong and M. Wilson, 'City Politics and Deviancy Amplification' in Politics and Deviance, edited by I. Taylor and L. Taylor, Penguin, 1973, pp. 61-89. The self-consciousness of Easterhouse people regarding the external image of their area is represented in local publications such as, The Writing on the Wall: New Images of Easterhouse, edited by Reverend Ferguson, Great Western Printers, 1977.
- (59) J. Richardson, 'The Concept of Policy Style', pp. 1-16 in Policy Styles in Western Europe, edited by J. Richardson, George Allen and Unwin, 1982. Richardson applies the concept of 'policy style' in comparing approaches of European governments to political participation and to management decision-making. However, the concept may be meaningfully applied to decision-making in different government agencies and in relation to different policy issues.
- (60) For example, in the fields of Mental Health, Education, Epilepsy and Alcoholism, voluntary agencies have developed to varying degrees effective working relationships with Social Work Regional Departments which represent more or less formal partnerships.
- (61) S. Checkland, The Upas Tree, *op. cit.*, pp. 94-95.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE ORIGINS OF A POLICY INITIATIVE

In this chapter I shall concentrate on the origins of CBHAs in Glasgow as a key aspect of the city's strategy for tackling tenement obsolescence in the inner areas. I shall explore the significant influences on policy change within the District Council between 1969 and 1974 and the emergence of the partnership between central and local government agencies which formed a major aspect of the context of CBHA development.

In general Chapter Five discusses a complex range of influences on policy development between 1969 and 1974, both thematically and historically. As a case study of policy change, the chapter emphasises the significant role of individuals and groups during a period characterised by planning uncertainties, changing relations between government agencies, growing constraints on public expenditure and social criticism of past planning strategies. It therefore considers the effects of political, economic and social developments on housing policy in Glasgow during the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Chapter Five focuses on the first phase of development of CBHAs in Glasgow. In Part Three of the thesis I shall examine the outcomes of the policy initiative of CBHAs in Glasgow during two further phases of development. We shall see that between 1975 and 1979, a growing number of CBHAs embarked on local house improvement programmes within the context of controls operated by government agencies which were concerned with ensuring their accountability. In experiencing these

controls, CBHA participants developed awareness of interests in common with the national housing association movement. During the 'third phase' of development between 1979 and 1983, CBHAs demonstrated their capacity as local housing producers. Further, we shall see that their development and collective action was significantly affected by the changing national political and economic context of housing provision and, in particular, by 'Thatcherism' and privatisation.

Chapter Five is divided into three sections. Section One identifies the factors under consideration at the local authority which influenced the policy of rehabilitation; it examines the interest of traditional associations in rehabilitation; it describes the local authority's early approach to rehabilitation and local reactions to early schemes co-ordinated by the local authority and, finally, Section One discusses the role of officials in influencing policy change. Section Two focuses on the development of the concept of CBHAs as an alternative model for implementing rehabilitation. This Section traces the growing support for this approach by documenting the role of the Assist architects who campaigned for an alternative strategy; the experimental formation of the first CBHAs; and the subsequent generalisation of this experiment as an urban policy. Finally, Section Two considers aspects of city politics, a key influence on the planning context of CBHAs. In the third and last section of Chapter Five I shall examine some implications of the case study, to which I shall return in Part Five, the concluding part of the thesis.

1. Housing Obsolescence and the Influences on Policy Change,
1969-1974

In Glasgow, by 1970, officials at the Scottish Office and the District Council were working in partnership in analysing the extensiveness of sub-tolerable property in the city and in defining strategies in relation to the problem. Their subsequent joint statement in the form of a working party report⁽¹⁾ made a commitment to a programme of rehabilitation in inner urban localities. Voluntary improvement of older housing in the private sector had been encouraged by previous legislation which made available grants and loan facilities to individual owners. While the number of improvements by individual owner-occupiers and private landlords had steadily increased during the 1960s, in effect there was very little impression made in relation to the large stock of housing which lacked adequate sanitary facilities and which was in very poor structural condition.

The 1970 Working Party report identified 75,000 properties as below the Tolerable Standard, 65,000 of these houses as requiring demolition and the remaining 10,000 as being favourable for improvement. A second important report⁽²⁾ identified these major characteristics of housing in Glasgow - that 77% of Glasgow's housing consisted of tenements or flats (as compared with 61% for Clydeside as a whole); that regarding tenure, 57% of houses were rented in the public sector, 20% were in the private, unfurnished, rental sector and 20% were owner-occupied.

(a) Social, financial and administrative considerations at the local authority

The emphasis on a strategy of co-ordinated improvement involved a significant change in the approach of the planners. Since the 1957 Housing Act, Glasgow Corporation had declared more Clearance Areas than any other city in Britain. By the second half of the 1960s the local authority was the focus of consistent criticism by the media, by academics and by working class residents of inner urban areas. The Comprehensive Development Area (CDA) approach, and planning uncertainty, were blamed for the 'blight' and further deterioration of tenement areas. Expectation of compulsory redevelopment within the inner areas meant that owners had little incentive to invest in maintenance. Further, clearance served to destroy local communities and family networks in the inner areas. The local authority was also criticised for the unforeseen consequences of its strategies for resolving the post-war problem of housing and land shortage - for the growing dissatisfaction with high rise as a housing form, in parallel with increasing evidence of its costliness. The inadequacy of social facilities built in to the large outlying schemes, e.g. Easterhouse and Blackhill, and the experience of social 'labelling' by their residents, resulted in further dissatisfaction with the local authority's housing provision. (3) Finally, the terms 'authoritarian' and 'paternalist' have been used to describe the approach of both the planners and the Housing Management Department. (4)

To a large extent, the local authority during the post-war period had been responding to a major problem of housing shortage, as had several other British cities.⁽⁵⁾ Its planning strategies were influenced by the availability of central government incentives (e.g. subsidies for high-rise buildings (1950s) and for high density low-rise buildings (1960s), as well as by architectural fashions during the post-war period.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s Glasgow Corporation's growing emphasis on rehabilitation was also influenced by economic considerations. We have seen that during the 1960s new building became increasingly costly and land prices and building costs escalated so that calculation of the relative economic advantages of rehabilitation and new build in general favoured rehabilitation.⁽⁶⁾ Another important economic factor was the extensiveness of Glasgow Corporation's housing debt by the late 1960s. Therefore, even if the Corporation had favoured a major programme of urban renewal in the inner areas, such a policy would not have been feasible in financial as well as political terms.

Between 1969 and 1974 the local authority sought additional funds from central government to aid the housing programme. For example, the SSHA was approached regarding its potential future role in the city and in December 1971 the Corporation approved a resolution that it should seek from central government details of the 'massive aid' promised to alleviate the Corporation's financial problems.⁽⁷⁾

Regarding the movement from clearance to redevelopment, a senior official at Glasgow District Council emphasised that cost efficiency

of rehabilitation had not been the most significant factor influencing the Council's deliberations. He suggested that:

Of much greater importance was a 'gut' feeling - experienced by many members as well as officers - that enough was enough as far as large-scale re-development was concerned; a feeling that was inspired as much as anything else by the ever stronger resistance to rehousing which was being displayed towards the end of the 1960s and during the early 1970s. (8)

There were also administrative considerations. Several studies have shown that the process of area rehabilitation is inherently complex and uncertain - in terms of building technology, the capacity of building firms and the variety of interests affected. (9) It is therefore fair comment that large-scale, voluntary rehabilitation presented a daunting task to the local authority in the early 1970s. As one of the early opponents of clearance commented in interview:

Glasgow Corporation was trained to be a butcher rather than a surgeon. Rehabilitation required a delicate knife. Also the Corporation wanted to attempt a participative approach, but didn't know how. (10)

Participative rehabilitation was also supported by certain councillors elected to the local authority between 1971 and 1975 as representatives of Labour, Progressive and Liberal parties. Political changes were therefore significant in influencing policy changes at the local authority which in general supported rehabilitation.

Where cost factors did influence policy development was in the decision to opt for housing associations as a means of implementation. (11)

The opportunity to improve Glasgow's inner tenement areas, with the aid of central government funds administered through the Housing Corporation, encouraged the local authority towards rejecting the municipal solution.

(b) The interest of 'traditional' associations in rehabilitation

In some large British cities, by the late 1960s, there were long-established housing associations, with considerable experience in the organisation of house improvements in inner urban areas (e.g. MIH, Liverpool and FHA Ltd, London and Manchester). Increasing access to central government funding of rehabilitation led some local authorities to support such housing associations by expanding their role in the area of rehabilitation.

In Glasgow, however, there were no such long-established housing associations, although there was in existence by this time one traditional association which had an interest in developing a similar role.⁽¹²⁾ This association concentrated its development activities on the acquisition and improvement of properties in two tenement areas. In relation to housing management its aim was largely to provide housing for those who did not meet the criteria of local authority allocations, and for those who were homeless or evicted for non-payment of rent by the local authority or by other landlords. Initially, this association was funded by Shelter, which later withdrew its sponsorship when the association refused to accept a no eviction clause and the condition that Shelter should be the main referral agency. Another 'traditional' association was a branch office of a national association.

Also, in Glasgow there were no established housing co-operatives. This reflected the pattern in Scotland as a whole, where a limited number of co-ownership schemes and isolated instances of self-build schemes, formed the totality of experience in the 'mutual benefit' sector of voluntary housing.

(c) The local authority's early approach to rehabilitation and local reactions

Between 1969 and 1974, several options were considered at local authority level in relation to developing the programme of rehabilitation in the city. In 1970, the Improvement and Rehabilitation Sub-Committee considered different strategies for implementing rehabilitation, on which officials were required to report as follows:

- (i) through the medium of a special section set up within the Corporation;
- (ii) by a housing association, sponsored by the Corporation but including invited nominees from appropriate outside bodies;
- (iii) by SSHA under suitable joint agreement with the Corporation.

The second approach was later considered by the Special Sub-Committee on Housing Associations (November 1970) and between 1970 and 1973 negotiations took place regarding the potential for housing associations to operate as local authority's agents in implementing

rehabilitation in different areas. Initially, the local authority focused on two large tenement areas - Old Swan and Oatlands. The intention was for the local authority to co-ordinate improvements after compulsorily acquiring the properties from owners who chose not to fund improvements or who wanted to be rehoused. In both projects, the process was fraught with a range of problems. At the Old Swan there were extensive administrative delays in implementing CPOs and there was considerable opposition by the residents who wanted to remain in the locality. Three families remained isolated in the block some three years after the initial notification of CPO, one of whom had bought a gun for security reasons. At Oatlands, where both the tenement buildings and their environment had more extensively deteriorated, residents were less committed to remaining in the area. The Oatlands Residents Association concentrated on protecting residents' interests in relation to rehousing by the Housing Management Department. It is interesting that by 1972 a Labour councillor, the Deputy Convener of the Housing Committee, commented at a conference:

The tragedy of rehousing is that its a grind from beginning to end - a very slow process indeed ...
The recent tendency is for prospective council tenants to become choosy. (13)

In both Old Swan and Oatlands, residents were given support by official and voluntary community workers or activists. At Oatlands, representatives from the community work agency, Crossroads, which initially was involved in the Gorbals, aimed to develop and support a strong residents association in the area. At the Old Swan, where

there was an attempt at voluntarism, public meetings were called by the local authority to explain the plans for the area. A small number of architects and community activists, who had long been critical of the lack of participation in planning, attended these meetings. Their aim was to develop awareness by local residents of their legal rights, and of different strategies accessible to residents by which they might counteract the power of the local authority bureaucracy. (14)

These individuals were part of a small nucleus of young professionals working in different aspects of housing and planning. In an unstructured way they focused on providing support to interest groups which developed in response to housing issues. Open and collective opposition to housing policies of the local authority was increasingly evident by the turn of the decade. This was expressed at public meetings in different areas (Partick, Old Swan, Maryhill, Gorbals) which were attended by local authority officials; in representations made by resident groups to local authority committees - for example, in criticism of lettings criteria and their effects; and in demonstrations at the City Chambers. (15)

It is interesting that in both the cases of Oatlands and Old Swan, the Council discussed whether to involve housing associations. In late 1971, sub-committee deliberations were influenced by local residents petitioning against the involvement of a particular charitable association in Oatlands and, in December 1971, a group of professionals submitted proposals to Glasgow Corporation that they

should form a housing association to co-ordinate improvements. However, following reports by the Chief Sanitary Inspector and the City Architect no action was taken on this proposal.

In the case of the Old Swan where local residents were keen to remain in the area, initially the local authority invited owner-occupiers to participate in improving with the aid of loan and grant. Following a poor response in March 1971, the Clearance and Rehousing Sub-Committee resolved to proceed by applying a CPO and a Control of Occupation Order under the Housing Scotland Act 1969, and the first phase of houses was programmed for improvement by September 1971. The Sub-Committee further resolved that those displaced from the area would have first choice of the completed houses. Most significantly the Committee proposed that the Corporation should form a housing association, the Swan Court Housing Association Limited, to which the completed development would be leased. The Board of Management of Swan Court Housing Association was to include both nominees of the Corporation and of Old Swan tenants who would jointly be responsible for housing management of the completed block. (As far as I am aware there has been no further reference to Swan Court Housing Association since the Housing Committee Minute 29 March 1971.)⁽¹⁶⁾

As for developing a programme of comprehensive tenement rehabilitation throughout Glasgow's inner areas, I suggested earlier that the task must have presented itself as problematic in both administrative and economic terms. Tenement rehabilitation is inherently more complex administratively than is the process of

improvement in relation to sub-standard terraced housing in England. This is due to the structural interdependence of housing units and central services such as plumbing and access, as well as to the fact of tenure mix. Also, the construction industry in the city was typically unstable and lacked experience in the field of comprehensive tenement improvements.⁽¹⁷⁾ Delays due to contractors going into liquidation were experienced both at Old Swan and Oatlands.

In Glasgow, tenement improvement was also administered by property owners and property factors (managing agents) who held majority ownership of certain tenements. In all, Glasgow Corporation declared five Housing Treatment Areas for Improvement⁽¹⁸⁾ and 'the factors' carried out improvement work in two of these with the aid of loan and grant facilities under the 1969 Housing (Scotland) Act. I shall examine the implications of the new urban policy for the factors and private landlords in Chapter Eight.

(d) The role of officials

By the early 1970s in Glasgow a working partnership had been formed between the Scottish Office and Corporation officials in relation to the issues of housing obsolescence and deterioration. For example, at the time of the great storm in Glasgow (1968), Scottish Office officials had come to work together with local authority officials in the Storm Damage Unit. This Storm Damage Unit became the Clearance, Improvement and Rehabilitation Section in November 1970.

The extensiveness of damage to older tenement property was more significant than is perhaps remembered. Aerial photographs were taken of the city so that a general picture of the distribution and extent of damage was gained. Systematic research examined the implications of the problem in different localities and information collected was published in the 1970 Working Party Report.⁽¹⁹⁾ For the Scottish Office officials this research became a basis for the discussion of planning concepts which were later to become incorporated in legislation on Scottish housing.⁽²⁰⁾ We can therefore conclude that the role of officials was significant in both the shaping of policy at a national level and within the city in relation to rehabilitation.

2. An Alternative Model for Implementing Rehabilitation - Voluntary Improvement and the Community Based Housing Association (CBHA)

(a) The role of Assist

Architects at Strathclyde University who were interested in tenement improvement played a key role in influencing the direction of events.⁽²¹⁾ In 1969, one final year architecture student, who later went to work in the Scottish Office, carried out a project on the technical aspects of tenement improvement. Another student, R. Young, became interested in determining how improvements could be executed on a voluntary basis. As a final year student he went to live and work in Govan - an area he perceived as characterised by a strong sense of community. His interest in voluntary improvement was continued as a postgraduate student.

Young and his supervisor, J. Johnson, defined 'voluntary improvement' as implying that: first, owner-occupiers would have the opportunity to carry out improvements themselves (Compulsory Purchase would not apply) and, secondly, that residents would not be forced to move out of the locality, so that the community and family networks would be retained.⁽²²⁾ With the support of his Department and of the New Govan Society, whose members were largely middle-class residents of Govan who were committed to improving the area,⁽²³⁾ Young formed the Tenement Improvement Project (TIP), Govan. Public meetings were called to inform residents of possibilities for improvement under 1969 legislation. In 1971, an approach was made to the local authority proposing that TIP should be its improvement agent in a Treatment Area in Govan. However, as a condition of agreement, TIP had to prove that residents in the area would co-operate. Young carried out a survey of residents' preferences and finally presented a Feasibility Report to the Corporation which led to approval of TIP as agents of the local authority.

The initial aim held by Young and his co-workers at Assist, was that Assist (TIP) would occupy a key role in area rehabilitation in Glasgow as a centrally co-ordinated administrative and technical service agency with local branches. This model of a series of Assist offices working in partnership with the local authority had been influenced by a planning initiative pioneered by the Welsh Office at Newport, Gwent. However, being aware of growing central government support for housing associations, the Assist architects also saw the

scope of housing associations as a corporate device for acquiring property from owner-occupiers and landlords. By 1973, a locally-based housing association was proposed as a realistic strategy for implementing voluntary rehabilitation in the inner areas.

In effect Young had operated as an entrepreneur, taking advantage of areas of uncertainty and potential support within the changing bureaucratic framework of policy making, and being prepared to adapt intentions and strategies in order to realise more practicable objectives.⁽²⁴⁾ A former senior improvement officer in the Land Clearance, Improvement and Rehousing Section at Glasgow District Council, Theodore Crombie, commented that the 'constructive demonstration' approach, adopted by Young and Assist in their efforts to convince the local authority that an alternative approach was feasible, served as a more important catalyst than did the protest action and news sheets distributed by community activists, including Young some two years previously! However, he suggested that the protest had served to reinforce the questioning of the compulsion approach which was already taking place, particularly amongst officials, at the local authority.

It is worth noting at this point that the organisational model of CBHAs proposed by Young and the TIP, was only tenuously related to the housing association movement. A senior member of Assist commented:

Our main concern was to influence the local authority to operate differently - by taking account of the interests of local residents, by establishing a more participative approach and by accepting the feasibility of a more sensitive approach to rehabilitation.

Therefore, we can assume that the voluntary housing movement was virtually irrelevant to many early participants in CBHAs, whose intentions were to restructure the framework of control and housing opportunities which characterised Glasgow's inner areas. In effect, the voluntary housing movement provided a vehicle for achieving varied aims of different interest groups.

The 'community housing association',⁽²⁵⁾ in Govan was to provide relevant professional services and to ensure local accountability through the representation of local interests on the Management Committee. Future developments led to the establishment of this model of housing association as a means of implementing rehabilitation throughout the city during the 1970s.

For several months, TIP had been involved in an attempt to gain legitimacy and support for their approach from local authority officials. By this time, however, some officials and councillors were questioning the effectiveness of the strategy of improvement adopted in relation to the Old Swan and Oatlands. The extensive delays and resident opposition were important factors influencing the development of sympathy with the Assist approach. Mr Crombie stated:

In an overall sense I held the view that rehabilitation should compensate for the dislocation and trauma caused by redevelopment within the city. In effect, the CPO approach resulted in the same dislocation and trauma through rehabilitation. (26)

(b) The first community-based housing associations

Central Govan Housing Association was formed in 1972 and Assist provided development (administrative and co-ordinating) and architectural services. Support for Assist's alternative approach was expressed by Corporation officials during 1973 when a second housing association was established in Govanhill. In response to treatment area notification to Govanhill residents by the Clearance and Improvement Section, one resident contacted the View (the Community Work Agency referred to previously). The Community Worker suggested that Assist be approached for advice. An Architect/Community Worker in Assist met with local residents who later visited Govan. The House Improvement Section agreed that Assist should carry out a feasibility exercise, similar to that which Young had done in Govan, in the Govanhill area. Public meetings were held and a Steering Group was formed and met regularly in a resident's house. Despite the information that an established housing association was showing interest in operating within the locality, Govanhill Housing Association was formed and registered with the Housing Corporation in July 1975, two local residents having lent the £50 requested for registration. (27)

In both Govan and Govanhill, the memberships of the Management Committees were initially mixed in terms of their social and economic

backgrounds. First, there were residents of the housing which in the future would be affected by the improvement programme and, secondly, there were individuals (sometimes professionals or local business people) who lived outwith the treatment areas, but whose work and/or identification with local interests led to a commitment to this social experiment in the housing field. This is one aspect in which CBHAs have developed differently. While some association committees in the initial stages reflected the above 'mixed' pattern, others formed committees involving only those whose housing interests would be directly affected by the Association.

In the early stages of an association's life (particularly prior to the first AGM), committee composition would seem to be a function of a range of factors: the geography of the locality, the development of contacts between individuals in relation to housing issues, and the extent to which steering group members define it as advantageous to incorporate relevant expertise in housing and administration within committee membership. In several associations at different stages the question of committee membership has been defined and approached as a policy issue related to the question of access to shareholding. (28)

Associations like Govan and Govanhill were established on the basis of, or in connection with, existing residents' organisations. The Housing Corporation's local office tried different methods of forming CBHAs. For example, Tollcross Housing Association was

promoted in 1973 by an architect from the National Building Agency (NBA) who worked as architect/development officer. In Linthouse, a factors' group was initially appointed by the Housing Corporation to co-ordinate improvement work, and in Elderpark the Housing Corporation dispatched one of the group of pre-selected and trained development officers to form the local association.

We have seen that TIP, which was later termed 'the Assist', played an important role in supporting the formation of early associations. Assist later developed into an architectural practice with branches in three areas providing architectural services to local associations. By 1982, Assist had diversified its interests towards innovatory developments such as the Fishmarket project (a development planned to house small businesses) and many architects trained at Assist had established practices working in rehabilitation in the city. Finally in November 1983 Assist's distinctiveness was reaffirmed when it left Strathclyde University and formed itself into a co-operative.

(c) From social experiment to housing policy: significant individuals and interconnections

Two developments during 1973 were significant in affecting the future role and predominant form of housing associations in the city. It is suggested here that these developments were pre-conditions to the policy of establishing CBHAs within a framework of partnership between central and local government departments and agencies. First, during 1973, it was known by significant individuals located in

different organisations that forthcoming legislation would involve . an expanded role and more resources for the Housing Corporation in promoting, funding and monitoring housing associations. The new Act was to place emphasis on a higher standard of improvement within the framework of a co-ordinated area-based approach. The central planning concept of Action Areas (for improvement and/or demolition) would replace that of treatment areas (Scotland) and General Improvement Areas (England).⁽²⁹⁾

Secondly, personal interconnections between individuals involved in the housing field, within the city and operating at national policy level, formed the basis of interactions which affected later developments. One interviewee commented: 'What happened next involved a series of personalised events, which I suspect are characteristic of British politics'. A similar perspective was held by many others who participated in the events of that period.

The Housing Corporation's head office was aware of the extensiveness of Glasgow's housing problems. The Chairman of the Housing Corporation, Lord Goodman, asked his personal assistant, David Astor, to visit Glasgow. Astor's brother-in-law, who worked in Crossroads, a community work organisation in the Gorbals, introduced Astor to Geoff Shaw who was group leader of the Labour Party, and representative of the new Labour politics. Shaw had also been involved on the Steering Group of Govanhill Housing Association. Astor was introduced to Young and to TIP's operations in Govan. Later that year

Lord Goodman visited Glasgow and TIP in Govan. In 1974 the Glasgow Office of the Housing Corporation was established and Young was appointed Senior Administrative Officer with overall responsibility for co-ordinating the growth and development of the voluntary housing movement in the city. The Glasgow Office was a sub-office of the Edinburgh Office of the Housing Corporation. However, the HC, London, was in an experimental frame of mind and its chief, Lord Goodman, encouraged a direct link between himself and the Glasgow Office, regarding developments in Glasgow as a personal initiative.

Therefore, by 1974, when new legislation was enacted three important factors had been established. First, central government finance through the agency of the Housing Corporation would significantly fund rehabilitation within the city. Secondly, the regional office of the Housing Corporation was headed by individuals who were committed to the establishment of a form of housing association which deviated from conventional patterns of organisation and control. Thirdly, a constructive and co-operative working relationship between officials within the Housing Corporation's Regional Office and the Improvement Section of Glasgow Corporation was firmly established.

There are two other points worthy of mention here regarding both the approach of key individuals and of the local authority- Housing Corporation partnership. We have seen that Young became Senior Officer of the Housing Corporation's Glasgow Office and that his office liaised extensively with senior officials at the local authority. This

relationship was officially designated a partnership in which the District Council was vested with seniority.⁽³⁰⁾ During 1974 the partnership negotiated a programme for forming CBHAs in different areas of the city.

The partnership aimed to support, influence and monitor the role of housing associations in implementing the rehabilitation policy. Further, from the start its approach was to harness sectional interests towards the rehabilitation strategy. There are numerous examples of how this approach operated in practice. For instance, from its earliest considerations about the role of housing associations, the local authority showed interest in monitoring their role and contribution and, in November 1970, the Glasgow Family Housing Association was promoted by the local authority as an association which would operate under the aegis of Shelter, and which would liaise between the local authority and associations in the city.⁽³¹⁾

However, by 1974, the 'partnership' had identified additional ways in which CBHAs and the rehabilitation programme could be facilitated in different areas. First, the local authority agreed to commission detailed surveys of tenement housing proposed for rehabilitation, so that the phasing of Action Area declaration would be based on relevant technical information. Secondly, in 1975, the Glasgow Office of the Housing Corporation employed a lawyer, Jim Hastie, who subsequently developed a legal service to aid associations in acquiring properties. Thirdly, it was agreed that a mechanism should be established through which houses for sale on the private market

could be acquired and later sold to associations following their registration as legal entities. Fourthly, there was recognition that associations would benefit if the rehabilitation policy were to be supported by the property factors, so the approach was 'to take the factors along with the policy'.

The Glasgow Fair Housing Association was formed by 'the partnership' in 1974. Its aims were to acquire properties in advance of areas being declared for improvement. Glasgow Fair's share-holding consisted of one share owned by the Property Owners and Factors, and three shares each held by the District Council and the Housing Corporation. In March 1975 the District Council resolved that properties owned by Glasgow Family be transferred to Glasgow Fair Housing Association. (32) Glasgow Fair continued its functions and served as an important channel of liaison until 1983 when it was disbanded. This liaison function complemented the role of the joint Housing Corporation-District Council Working Party which has continued to the present day.

In general, therefore, the partnership operated with a pragmatic approach to the technical and administrative problems and the sectional urban interests which defined the context of the rehabilitation programme. However, this pragmatism was always guided by more general longer-term objectives pertaining to the future role of local housing associations in the city. The partnership, therefore, worked to establish the basis for a pattern of housing association development, which in terms of their organisational form and their role in the urban

planning context, has increasingly become recognised as unique to the city of Glasgow.

We have seen that examples of CBHAs are to be found in Scottish cities like Edinburgh (Buchanan Street) and Dundee. Also, I have emphasised similarities between CBHAs and the neighbourhood co-operatives in Liverpool and London in terms of both organisational structure and processes. However, the 'uniqueness' of the Glasgow pattern lies in the fact that over 20 CBHAs have been established as local authority agents in implementing the rehabilitation policy and that their management committees of local residents have been incorporated within the urban planning context.

The partnership which promoted CBHAs since 1974 was regularly criticised by CBHA participants prior to 1980 for the delays experienced on the ground and for encouraging high expectations regarding CBHA autonomy and 'local control', for example at public meetings. However, in contradiction to any such alleged idealism, we have seen that the planning innovators operated with a political realism and an intent of providing administrative support for CBHA development. By 1978 Glasgow's housing associations were allocated a larger proportion of funding than the more established associations to the East of Scotland. Also, when the Scottish Office of the Housing Corporation was formed in 1978, Raymond Young became the Chief Officer for Scotland and Jim Hastie, his lawyer deputy, became Senior Officer for the West of Scotland. By the 1980s, we shall see that in communications between government agencies and CBHAs, any former

romanticism of community, and of local autonomy, had been displaced by emphasis on the practicalities of 'the real world' of financial controls and privatisation under the Thatcher government.

(d) The urban politicians and the political context

We have seen in Chapter Four that Glasgow District Council has been under the political control of the Labour Party during the post-war period and that this has had significant consequences for housing policy. The Labour Party's approach to problems of housing obsolescence, housing shortage, and the poverty of working class housing in the city has been to emphasise the role of the local authority in the provision and improvement of working class housing. The tenure mix in the city is a clear expression of the implications of this position. Private landlordism and ownership were seen as related to the poor maintenance of property in inner tenement areas and it was therefore defined as being in the best interests of the city's future housing stock and of inner area residents to compulsorily clear the slums and rehause their residents.

During the period under focus (1969-1974), the long-standing control by the Labour group and its post-war planning strategies, were both in question. Political changes were taking place within and outside the party. Certain Labour Councillors were publicly critical of the planning achievements of the Labour-controlled Council.⁽³³⁾ Others gave support to residents' groups in developing local involvement in the control of housing through the establishment

of CBHAs,⁽³⁴⁾ or in exerting pressure on the local authority. An important political development during this period involved the changing balance of power at the City Chambers. Support for SNP increased, the Labour group's control was weakened, and there was a Tory majority between 1968-1970 as well as later in 1976.

The establishment of CBHAs in the city can be viewed as a deviation from the established pattern of control over working class housing in the city. It also involved a commitment to the retention of tenement areas in the inner city and to providing residents with the opportunity to remain in their localities if they so preferred. Within the Labour group there was no clear consensus as to the advantages of either of these developments. Some Councillors saw rehabilitation as a second rate housing solution for their constituents and stated their preference for a demolition and new build policy although, in fact the realistic alternatives accessible to their constituents were frequently a house in the peripheral schemes or in high-rise development. Other Councillors questioned CBHAs in terms of their political accountability.⁽³⁵⁾

After 1974, when the Labour group had a massive majority, the influence of the Labour group was again important, and it was during this period that certain Councillors fought hard to gain support for CBHAs. The Labour Party at that time was controlled by its leadership through 'a system of patronage' in relation to 18 committees on which its members served. One Labour Councillor stated that many members

of the Labour group became 'completely sold on CBHAs and their contribution to Glasgow's housing provision'. It was also during this period of Labour control that SSHA⁽³⁶⁾ involvement was re-established in the city. It is perhaps not surprising that this occurred during a period when three well-known Labour MPs were in Ministerial positions at the Scottish Office.⁽³⁷⁾

Prior to 1973, within the Conservative, SNP and Liberal groups, there was similarly no consensus in this policy area. However, at a general level, there was criticism of the extent of municipalisation in the city and of the centralised bureaucratic control implied by the CDA and CPO process. Against the background of media and academic criticism and resident reaction, housing and lettings policies were increasingly blamed for having restricted access to good council housing for a range of groups (e.g. the single, young marrieds), for concentration of the elderly in inner areas (New Towns policies which affected employment opportunities in inner areas) and for lack of access to family housing within the city. Rehabilitation was increasingly viewed within the Council as a means of reversing such trends. However, there was general concern within the local authority that the rehabilitation policy should not serve to expand the role of private developers in the city.⁽³⁸⁾ Such concerns led to support for the role of housing associations.

During the 1970s both officials and councillors were increasingly aware that many of those who had been displaced by demolition, and rehoused on outlying schemes, wished to return to new inner area schemes.

The pressure on the Housing Management Department, through applications for transfers and for acceptance of a new criterion in Letting (local houses for local residents), was considerable. Also, those who have worked with CBHAs are well aware that many Glasgow people have left the schemes to buy or to rent inner area houses which lacked inside toilets and were frequently in poor structural repair.

Their main interests were to return to live near their family, to have access to the established shopping facilities of such areas, and to avoid the costs of travel to work and shopping. (39)

Pressure group action by neighbourhood and city-wide groups and the frequently described phenomenon of 'people voting with their feet' by refusing to accept rehousing offers, were therefore both tendencies which influenced policy reconsideration. However, as in other case studies of housing policy, my account has attributed a key role to the influence of officials and the growing interconnections between officials in local and central government agencies. (40)

There is no doubt that the officials' influence on policy was well-recognised by politicians. As one influential Labour Councillor commented:

I don't think you can ignore the influence of personalities. Some officials and councillors come to be viewed as informed and as having integrity and where this is so they become placed in a position of trust ... their views will be listened to seriously. (41)

Certainly, during the second half of the 1970s, Councillors from all major political groups made public statements in support of the programme of rehabilitation and of the role of CBHAs as agents. As one Conservative Councillor told a meeting of the Glasgow Forum⁽⁴²⁾ 'Believe you me, this is a partnership - we can't do it without you and you can't do it without us'. An SNP Councillor reinforced his comments by stating, 'We are fighting a last ditch stand to preserve communities ... CBHAs represent a last ditch attempt to regenerate the declining inner areas'. He added that 'the SNP approach is laissez-faire ... we do not believe that the Council should take on the role of big brother to CBHAs'.

Despite such statements of political support, CBHA participants have expressed feelings of vulnerability in relation to the local authority. Both committee members and staff have stated their concerns that 'If we don't prove ourselves, the Council may decide to take over'. By the late 1970s, it appeared that CBHAs had achieved legitimacy and support within the city.⁽⁴³⁾ However, CBHA participants have never felt secure about the continuance of political support.

It is interesting that by 1981 there were two significant emphases in local authority housing policy pertinent to the role of housing associations. First, CBHAs were still upheld as a distinctive urban housing initiative by Councillors of different persuasions. Secondly, the local authority's housing policy emphasised the District Council's role in harnessing the resources of the private sector or the 'Alternative Strategy' as it was termed.⁽⁴⁴⁾ By this time Building

Society offices, promising finance to Repair Schemes, were established in CBHA localities, thus increasing social and financial confidence in the inner areas, and the local authority had publicised joint initiatives, such as Homesteading in Easterhouse, with private developers. By 1982, as in other cities, associations were faced with 'the carrot' of private sector support for the regeneration of the inner areas, alongside the contradiction that increased investment by property finance served to increase competition between housing associations and private developers for both land and buildings.

3. Implications of the Case Study

(a) Constraints and action

In the preceding account of policy developments between 1969 and 1974, I have emphasised the significance of two types of influence, these being environmental constraints, on the one hand, and individual and collective action on the other.

On the constraints side I have emphasised the political and economic context of housing policy, including such factors as established strategies for tackling obsolescence in the privately-owned tenemented inner areas, and changes in the functions and relations between government agencies (the inter-organisational context). In summary, we have seen that during a period of national economic decline and resource restraint on local authority housing expenditure, Glasgow Corporation was attracted by the offer of central government funding.

However, it was also evident that, irrespective of the funding question, there was growing questioning within the local authority regarding the effectiveness of past strategies for tackling the problem of housing obsolescence and such questioning by 1973 had led to considerable support for rehabilitation.

However, I have also emphasised the collective action of social movements and pressure groups which aimed to improve housing access and provision for the mainly working class residents of the inner areas. The actions of groups like Shelter, and the growing movement of opposition to the clearance strategy had served to reinforce the growing support within the local authority for the consensual developments in national housing policy towards rehabilitation and towards institutionalising public participation in planning.

While these larger 'situational' factors have been important, we must also remember the significant role of individuals and their interconnections in shaping the policy initiative of CBHAs. The role of Young and Assist was clearly significant in influencing key policy-makers, such as T. Crombie within the local authority, and senior officials within the Housing Corporation regarding the form of housing association to be encouraged in the city. CBHAs involved ideological connotations of community control, regeneration and local initiative, which appealed to groups of varying political persuasion. This form of housing association also presented local residents with practical opportunities for participating in the rehabilitation of their areas.

Regarding the emergence of the new planning initiative we have seen that established planning values, structures and practices were in some flux against a background of both the persistent and extensive problem of housing obsolescence in Glasgow's inner areas, and growing concerns about access to the resources necessary to alleviate the housing problem. Therefore a range of contributing factors established a chink in the planning system and offered scope to influential inter-connections between individuals, and to entrepreneurialism, in affecting a policy innovation.

However, the outcome of this policy innovation has clearly been influenced by the corporate approach to planning which became widespread in government agencies during the 1970s, for example in the Housing Plan system adopted in the latter 1970s by Scottish local authorities with central government encouragement. Corporate planning has involved the efforts of public agencies to apply business management techniques in approaching complex problems by integrating the contribution of specialist departments within a centralised policy-making structure; by clarifying objectives and by systematically evaluating alternative strategies. (45)

I shall make the distinction here between corporate management and planning and the corporatist theory of state control. Corporatism refers to a form of state control and policy-making involving 'a complex process of bargaining and negotiation between the state and corporate groups'. (46) I shall suggest here that two related tendencies - the comprehensive area approach to tackling inner area housing

obsolescence, and the structured involvement of a multiplicity of agencies in co-ordinating rehabilitation, have served to link corporate planning with increasing corporatist control. However, I shall examine further the relevance of the corporatist theory of state control for our understanding of relations between the voluntary sector and the state in Part Five.

Finally, we have seen that by 1975 there had emerged within the city a new system of relations between public agencies such as the Housing Corporation, the Glasgow District Council and the Scottish Development Department. The centralised planning partnership between the Housing Corporation's Glasgow Office and Glasgow District Council in effect significantly controlled access to the authority and funding required by CBHAs. However, this partnership operated within the framework of financial control and resource allocation determined by central state departments such as the SDD and the Treasury and by the national boards of the Housing Corporation.

(b) Phases of development

Chapter Five has concentrated on Phase One, 1969-1974, the first of three phases of development of associations in Glasgow between 1969 and 1983. I shall conclude by summarising the key aspects of the remaining two phases.

Phase Two, 1975-1979

This second phase saw the implementation of the planning strategy of rehabilitation and CBHAs, and its institutionalisation.

Two experimental attempts at establishing CBHAs became a model for the formation of associations in 25 areas of the city.

In Part Four of the thesis we shall see how against a background of changing governmental controls, CBHAs developed in their respective localities. Individual patterns of development reflected the influence of key personalities and groupings within committee and staff; relations with local neighbourhood pressure groups; local aspects of planning, housing obsolescence and commerce; and the dynamics of relations between the CBHA and state agencies, which controlled access to key resources. This phase of development was, in general, influenced by the tensions between a corporate, ⁽⁴⁷⁾ centralised and rationalist mode of planning and the local interests and accountability of CBHAs. These tensions stimulated growing bureaucracy and professionalisation and the tendencies towards political incorporation of the Third Arm.

Phase Three, 1979-1983

By 1979, CBHAs were established as local housing agencies with a significant role in housing production and allocation in Glasgow's inner areas. During this third phase there was growing professionalisation within CBHAs and associations showed their capacity as efficient reproducers of the local housing stock. Further, in terms of relations with government agencies, there was evidence of distancing in relations between the HC, West of Scotland, and CBHAs - the HC's role becoming formalised as the central government agency

allocating resources to HAs, and monitoring and supervising their activities. In parallel CBHAs have become involved in a variety of forms and levels of political action directed at minimising the effects of bureaucratic and economic constraints on their operation, or at modifying such constraints in line with their objectives.

During Phases Two and Three, a fast growing housing association sector was permitted by central government to steadily increase its overall expenditure while local authority expenditure was significantly curtailed. By 1982-1983, capital expenditure by Scottish housing associations exceeded that of other government housing agencies in Scotland. It is perhaps not surprising that by this point questions were being raised in certain quarters about this deployment of resources. CBHA participants were beginning to feel less comfortable about political support for their continuing expansion - particularly in view of the apparent shift in local authority policy towards an increasing pragmatism about the role of private developers and about relations with the private sector.

Finally, in Section One of this chapter I described the local authority's early attempts at rehabilitation. By 1983, Glasgow District Council has completed both the Old Swan and Oatlands schemes, as well as some much larger rehabilitation developments where the strategy of CPO and rehousing was also applied. It is interesting that later projects did not receive the same local criticism and adverse publicity as did Oatlands and the Old Swan. I would suggest the following reasons. First, while later schemes (48) were larger and

administratively complex they have been advantaged by the accumulation of experience of rehabilitation amongst building contractors and within the local authority. However, a second and more significant factor may have been that, as at Oatlands, residents were happy to be rehoused from these particular areas in the context of cumulative social problems and physical decline.

In conclusion a key outcome of the local authority's rehabilitation strategy of the 1970s is the marked signs of physical improvement in the city's inner areas in the early 1980s. In some areas like Maryhill and Queens Cross and Govanhill the rehabilitation output reflects the product of years of work by local associations, of local authority co-ordinated rehabilitation schemes and of repairs area schemes since 1978. Further, in some areas, tenement rehabilitation schemes have been implemented by SSHA and in certain areas grant has been taken up by private developers. The popularity of inner area housing is markedly evident at the point where associations open their waiting lists.⁽⁴⁹⁾ Throughout the city the CBHA experience is that demand for inner area houses, both improved and unimproved, far exceeds supply.

In Part Three of the thesis, Chapters Six and Seven will concentrate on the developing relations between Glasgows CBHAs and the national housing association movement in the context of political and economic changes between 1974 and 1983. Finally, in Chapters Four and Five I have examined the background to, and origins of, the CBHA rehabilitation strategy in Glasgow. In the final chapter of the thesis

I shall attempt to compare some of the outcomes of this strategy with those identified by studies of public participation and urban renewal in other cities, such as Birmingham. (50)

Notes and References to Chapter Five

- (1) Corporation of Glasgow and the Scottish Development Department, Report of the Glasgow Housing Programme Working Party, 1970.
- (2) J.B. Cullingworth and C.J. Watson, Housing in Clydeside, 1970, SDD, HMSO, 1971.
- (3) These criticisms were expressed in numerous editions of the Glasgow News, an 'alternative' newspaper which was published between 1972 and 1975.
- (4) These were terms used in interview by councillors of different parties and by local residents affected by clearance, while Checkland, op. cit., p. 95, uses the term 'municipal-collectivist' to describe the approach of the local authority.
- (5) J.B. Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, op. cit., Chapter 5, pp. 75 - 77.
- (6) S. Merrett, Owner Occupation in Britain, op. cit., 1982, Chapters 11 and 12.
- (7) Minute of Glasgow Corporation, Print No. 1034/12/1970-1971.
- (8) Mr T. Crombie in a letter commenting on the first draft of this chapter, (October 1980). Mr Crombie was the senior official in the Storm Damage Section of the Clearance, Improvement and Rehousing Section of the Housing Department of the then Glasgow Corporation. In 1971 Mr Crombie became the senior official of the Clearance, Improvement and Rehousing Section and in 1978 he left the Housing Department to work in the Administration and Legal Services Department, Glasgow District Council.
- (9) See, for example, S. Merrett, op. cit., 1982, Chapter 12 and J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, Allocation, Access and Control, Macmillan Press, 1978, pp. 151-154.
- (10) Interview with architect, August 1981.
- (11) In 1970 the local authority formed a Special Sub-Committee on housing associations (Corporation Minute, Print No. 10, Housing 680, 1970-1971) to consider their potential role in housing provision. Initially the Sub-Committee considered each housing association request for grant aid on its merits.

- (12) Christian Action Housing Association Limited, which in 1982 became the West of Scotland Housing Association Limited.
- (13) Speaking at a Conference titled 'The Future of Glasgow', organised by Glasgow University Planning Society, 5 February 1972.
- (14) Between 1978 and 1980 I interviewed community activists who had supported the residents' case at both Oatlands and the Old Swan.
- (15) By March 1972, forty-five tenants' associations had affiliated to the Glasgow Council of Tenants' Associations which campaigned against the growing emphasis on economic viability in the determination of council rents under the 1972 Housing (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act; against the Council's slum clearance approach and for higher standards of housing maintenance. See Glasgow News, February/March 1972.
- (16) Minutes of the Clearance and Rehousing Sub-Committee during 1970 and 1971 illustrate the absence of a consensus view that the Corporation should attempt the voluntary approach. For example, Glasgow Corporation Print No. 19, 1673, 21/12/1970 documents that following a proposal recommending the voluntary approach in a different area, an amendment was made favouring the immediate use of compulsory purchase. The amendment was defeated by only one vote.
- (17) See Part 3, Chapter 8. Also, see M. Thornley, Part 3 of Rehabilitation Case Study in The Architects' Journal, Volume 9, February 1977.
- (18) The five Treatment Areas were Cathcart, Linthouse, Old Swan, Oatlands and Govan.
- (19) Report of the Glasgow Housing Programme Working Party, 1970, op. cit.
- (20) For example, in the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1974.
- (21) The Assist approach was documented by M. Thornley, Parts 1 and 2 of Housing Rehabilitation Case Study in The Architects' Journal, 10 November 1976 and 8 December 1976.
- (22) I held interviews with past and present members of the Assist between 1979 and 1981.
- (23) The New Govan Society included a Minister of Religion and a member of a shipping family.

- (24) My account of the development of Assist's approach has largely been drawn from interviews and discussions with R. Young, Jim Johnson and M. Thornley, all of whom were central participants during that period. I recognise that my account does not do justice to the internal differences of opinion within Assist between 1971 and 1973 regarding its future role. That, however, is another story!
- (25) 'Community housing association' is the term coined by R. Young to describe Glasgow's neighbourhood-based housing associations. These associations have generally come to be termed 'community-based housing associations'.
- (26) Interview with Theodore Crombie, January 1979.
- (27) M. Thornley, The Architects' Journal, 10 November 1976, op. cit.
- (28) For example, Central Govan Housing Association's Rule Book required that the AGM should determine what percentage of committee members should be tenants.
- (29) I am grateful to Raymond Young's comments on my draft case study in which he pointed out that the separate Acts for England/Wales and Scotland reflected the youth of the Scottish movement in comparison with the long-standing of English associations. The Housing Act 1974 was framed so that associations could take the initiative in declaring HAAs. This was not the case in the Housing (Scotland) Act which applied to a younger movement.
- (30) The partnership and its objectives were outlined in a Housing Corporation, Glasgow Office paper, 'The Policy Programme of the Housing Corporation, Glasgow Office', 1974.
- (31) Glasgow Corporation Minute of the Sub-Committee on Housing Associations, Print No. 16, 1429, 1970-1971.
- (32) Minute of Clearance and Rehousing Sub-Committee, Print No. 23, Housing 1735, 17 March 1975.
- (33) See V. Cable, 'Glasgow's Motorways and Technocratic Blight', New Society, 5 September 1974.
- (34) For example, Councillor Geoff Shaw at Govanhill and Councillor John Ross at Queens Cross.

- (35) Interviews with Councillors and statements by Councillors at meetings of the Glasgow Forum (1978-1982), as well as Glasgow District Council's Housing Committee Minutes all served to illustrate the lack of consensus regarding rehabilitation in the late 1960s and early 1970s. For example, Minutes of the Housing Committee, Print No. 4, 259, 1973-1974 and Print No. 5, 354, 1973-1974.
- (36) The Scottish Special Housing Association was a quango formed in 1937 to channel central government funds into Scottish housing provision. At times of restricted funds, Glasgow District Council approached SSEHA to increase its work in the city, for example, in November 1976. See Glasgow District Council Minutes, Print No. 25, 1540, 1976-1977.
- (37) By 1977-1978, SSEHA completions represented 17% of all public sector housing completions in Scotland, SSEA Annual Report.
- (38) Reservations about expanding the role of private developers were Minuted by the Building Sub-Committee following discussion of a Development Plan and Policy Report on Housing, Print No. 26, 2168, 20 March 1974 and later discussed at the Housing Committee, Print No. 26, 2164, 27 March 1974.
- (39) I carried out interviews with senior officials in the House Letting Section at Glasgow District Council (November 1980) and in several housing associations between 1979 and 1980. I have also drawn here on my experience as a participant.
- (40) For example, see J. Edwards and R. Batley, The Politics of Positive Discrimination, An Evaluation of the Urban Programme, 1976-1977, Tavistock, 1978, Chapter 5, pp. 110-143; and D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, The Politics of Urban Change, Croom Helm, 1979, Table 8.1, 'Agenda Setting in National Urban Policy', pp. 264-5 and Chapter 4, 'Housing and Slum Clearance', pp. 107-158; and P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker and A. Webb, Change, Choice and Conflict in Social Policy, Heinemann, pp. 69-72.
- (41) Interview with Chairman of the Housing Committee, Glasgow District Council, November 1979.
- (42) Glasgow Forum meeting attended by representatives of Tory, Labour, SNP and Liberal Parties, May 1979.
- (43) In October 1977 the Housing Committee (Glasgow District Council Minutes, Print No. 7, 618, 1977-1978) approved the Response by the City of Glasgow District Council to the Green Paper, Scottish Housing - A Consultative Document of which Point 21, Paras. 86-7 stated the Council's support to the continuing encouragement of housing associations.

- (44) See J. Kernaghan, Harnessing the Resources of the Private Sector in Making the City Work, Enterprise and Democracy in Urban Europe, published by Glasgow District Council for Project Turin International, 1981, pp. 119-122.
- (45) For a discussion of corporate planning see G. Kirk, Urban Planning in a Capitalist Society, Croom Helm, 1980, pp. 104-109 and J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British Local Government, Cambridge University Press, 1979, Chapter 5, pp. 118-145.
- (46) A. Cawson, Corporatism and Welfare, Social Policy and State Intervention in Britain, Heinemann, 1982, p. 41. Cawson emphasises that this process of bargaining and negotiation is not necessarily geared to the interests of individuals and associations of individuals lying outside the corporate sector.
- (47) See Part One, Chapter Three, for my earlier emphasis on these contradictions.
- (48) The Nansen Street scheme was approximately the same size as the Old Swan; Hathaway Street, approximately twice its size and the Firhill Street scheme was more than twice the scale of the Old Swan scheme.
- (49) For example, Whiteinch and Scotstoun HA, by mid-1984, will have allocated approximately 30 houses to applicants from a Waiting List of 500 - (after advertising locally in June 1983, the Waiting List had been opened and filled over one weekend!). Also, when Reidvale HA officially opened its Waiting List, in February 1983, there were 850 applicants for approximately 40 houses (680 of the 850 applicants satisfied the official criteria of entry to the Waiting List).
- (50) See, for example, J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, Press, 1978, and C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Not Much Improvement, Heinemann, 1979.

PART THREE

COMMUNITY BASED HOUSING ASSOCIATIONS:

A SOCIAL EXPERIMENT IN PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION TO PART THREE

Part Three will consider two significant aspects of CBHA development between 1975 and 1983. Chapters Six to Eight will focus on the broader context of political, economic and administrative influences on the experience of CBHA participants and Chapter Nine will examine the implications of organisational growth and external influences for organisational and industrial relations. Throughout Part Three, I shall seek to identify influences which help to account for similarities and differences among CBHAs in their particular localities, and between CBHAs and conventional associations.

In this Introduction, I intend to identify the links between varied aspects of the development of CBHAs, the preceding historical accounts of urban politics and housing policy, and some key questions relevant to our understanding of CBHAs. However, at this point it should be stressed that overall the research makes references to a short and youthful period in the development of CBHAs, their representative organisations and their collective political action. By 1983, although the oldest CBHA had been in existence for ten years (Central Govan) and the second (G.H.A.) had been registered nine years previously, the majority of CBHAs averaged between two and five years of experience (post registration).

A perspective on the Development of CBHAs

I shall suggest here that the development of CBHAs should be seen in relation to a social movement which has had both local and national dimensions. Bottomore⁽¹⁾ defines a 'social movement' as a 'collective endeavour to promote or resist change in the society of which it forms part'. He suggests these differences between political parties and social movements. First, social movements are less organised than political parties; secondly, 'belonging to' a movement is a matter of identification with a social outlook, ideology or doctrine and of readiness to participate in collective action rather than of paying membership dues; and thirdly, political action of social movements is generally more diffuse than that of political parties. Bottomore concludes from his study that where social movements are successful they

establish preconditions for changes of policy or regime by bringing into question the legitimacy of the existing political system (in part or in whole), creating a different climate of opinion and proposing alternatives.

My account of the development of policy in Chapter Five, has presented CBHAs as the outcome of an urban social movement. Further, I have described CBHAs as the outcome of strategic compromise by a number of urban interests: inner area residents, community workers and activists, and certain planners, architects and politicians. All these parties were concerned with changing established structures of control over housing. They were also

interested in influencing the local authority to depart from its conventional procedures for tackling the issue of housing obsolescence in the inner areas.

In taking account of the role of individuals in influencing movement outcomes my approach differs from the structuralised Marxist perspective of Castells,⁽²⁾ which has been so influential on studies of social movements. My approach is therefore more akin to that of Pickvance⁽³⁾ and Saunders.⁽⁴⁾ For example, in Chapter Five we saw that the planning partnership between government agencies which gave support to the establishment of CBHAs throughout Glasgow was significantly influenced by the efforts and approach of certain key individuals. These officials and professionals, who favoured an alternative approach, had access to influence on the basis of professional and bureaucratic positions, experience and contacts.⁽⁵⁾ However, strength of purpose, persistence and historical accident also played an important part in developments.

'Historical accident' is an appropriate term to describe the significance of the growing uncertainties and new conditions facing local authority policy-makers in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which provided the scope for an alternative approach. Major uncertainties related to the resources required to implement an extensive programme of rehabilitation; to question of effectiveness of administrative procedures; and to the likely co-operation, or lack of it, of inner area residents and commercial interests. In the context of these uncertainties, the new conditions offered by

1974 legislation and central government policies established access to central government funding as well as to alternative agencies to implement the programme. Against this background, CBHAs presented an attractive option to different interest groups.

The description of developments between the late 1960s and early 1970s did not suggest that the objectives of participants in the social movement were well-defined or clearly articulated. Also, it was emphasised that aims directed at an alternative approach towards tackling housing obsolescence were not peculiarly, or even explicitly, held by groups whose housing interests were directly affected by the housing policies under challenge. Community workers, professionals, local councillors and council officials and, later, officials of the Glasgow branch of the Housing Corporation, all played an important role in articulating the possibility of an alternative approach.

Therefore my account has considered the effects of individual and group action against the background of wider political, economic and cultural influences on housing problems, politics and planning in Glasgow. The historical analysis (Chapters Two and Four) represents an attempt to demonstrate structural influences on social problems or 'stakes', and on relations between interest groups in the urban system.⁽⁶⁾ The key problem on which I have focused has been housing obsolescence in Glasgow's inner areas, and its effects on people's lives. The key 'stakes', on the other hand, have been related to issues of control over the future of local housing and of the housing opportunities of local residents.

In considering wider historical influences on urban politics in Chapter Four I suggested that the political inaction of working class residents of the inner areas is not at all surprising. Political inaction was explained in terms of the inter- and post-war political culture of the West of Scotland; and of the long-standing political control of the local authority by a Labour party which supported centralised and bureaucratic control over municipal housing.⁽⁷⁾ However, in the previous Chapter, it was argued that party ideologies of planning and housing provision, and related conflicts, changed markedly during the decade of the 1970s.

CBHAs therefore presented themselves as a viable means of affecting improvements in inner area housing. However, as a result of the formation of CBHAs in several areas of the city, their participants forged new links and identities of interest - some of which held conflicting implications. Through such links awareness steadily increased as to common experiences of constraints, controls and problems. Local residents participating in CBHAs developed reference points outside their localities, such as participants in CBHAs in different areas and the housing association movement nationally.

In Part One I described the development of two main sectors of the voluntary housing movement in Britain - a co-operative ('mutual benefit') sector and a charitable ('service') sector.⁽⁸⁾ It was emphasised that there were differences in the aims and values characterising associations in the two sectors, the charitable sector

reflecting its origins in bourgeois philanthropy and the co-operative sector originating with aims of working class, mutual benefit. Further, I suggested that CBHAs represent a mix of mutual benefit and service aims. We shall see that there are marked differences of style and approach between CBHAs and the mainstream of the Scottish housing association movement which stem from the origins, social composition and the emphasis on local accountability of CBHAs. Also these 'differences' have affected at times variations in the significance of problems and issues for associations, as well as in the approach of associations to lobbying government on common issues.

The phases of development of CBHAs as a social movement relating to housing provision in the city of Glasgow, and nationally, can be summarised in these terms:

1. The formative phase (1972 - 1975)

During this period tenuously connected objectives and strategies were adopted by individuals and urban groups who aimed to influence the local authority towards adopting an alternative strategy. Key intentions included the rehabilitation of inner area housing; the retention of communities and increased public participation in planning. The formation of CBHAs represented a means towards such ends. Further, the policy emphasis on CBHAs was unique to Glasgow

and a recent research report states that

The model of the integrated area-based and community-controlled organisation does not seem to have been a central influence on Edinburgh District Council's strategy for rehabilitation, whereas it was the main focus of Glasgow's policies. (9)

2. The development of CBHAs as an urban movement (1975 - 1979)

The extensive formation of CBHAs stimulated new linkages between participants in different areas of the city. Participants increasingly identified common interests and experiences in the context of the system of local authority planning and central government control. During this period, despite affiliation to the national housing association movement, CBHAs stressed their differences from conventional associations - in terms of their objectives, structures and internal and local relations, and in terms of the Glasgow housing and planning context. Collective action by Glasgow associations was aimed at reducing the effects of centralised controls and constraints, and increasing awareness of politicians and government officials as to the reasons for the slow progress of the area improvement programme. The Glasgow Forum of CBHAs was formed as a channel for discussion and for common action in 1978.

3. CBHAs' involvement in Glasgow housing and in national lobbying (1979 - 1983)

Increasingly since 1979, CBHAs have shown their capacity as housing developers. Visible signs of area improvement have effected marked change in the character of several CBHA localities. In parallel, CBHAs became major local landlords operating from increasingly professionalised neighbourhood offices. Further, since 1979, there has been growing CBHA participation in the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (the SFHA).

In 1980, the Glasgow Forum was incorporated as a regional sub-committee of the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations - the national body representing and servicing HAs. The Forum pressed hard to increase the responsiveness of the SFHA to local circumstances between 1980 and 1982. Therefore, during this period political action stemmed from national and regional bases of interest.

In general, by 1982 it was evident that the political interests of CBHA participants had become increasingly linked to the national voluntary housing association movement. However, it was notable that CBHA participants still emphasised their differences in aspects of objectives, experience, constraints and development. Further, it is interesting that while CBHA objectives in general lay stress on local involvement and participation they have not systematically attempted to forge links with other organisations

with similar housing objectives in this city. In some areas such links (e.g. with tenants' or residents' associations and/or community councils) have furthered mutually desired projects. However, in the majority of areas this has not been the prevailing pattern.

The approach established in Part One has stressed the significance of political and economic developments for the housing association movement. Continuing this perspectives I shall emphasise the key resources sought by housing associations as being Authority and Funding.⁽¹⁰⁾ Chapters Two and Four illustrated that the growth and development of housing associations depended on political support by central government and local authorities which served to legitimise their planning role. Further, while all organisations require a degree of legitimacy and support, CBHAs are unable to pursue their objectives without approval and legitimisation by statutory planning agencies, which control access to funding. In Chapter Five I emphasised that CBHAs operated within a corporate planning system involving a systematic partnership between central and local government agencies. This 'partnership' focused its intentions on regenerating Glasgow's inner areas, with CBHAs as locally-managed voluntary organisations playing a key role in implementation. Chapters Six and Seven will examine the development of CBHAs in Glasgow in the context of control by government agencies. I shall further consider the implications of the CBHA experience of constraints and controls in Part Five, the concluding section of the thesis, at which point I shall examine perspectives on inter-

organisational relations, power and control.⁽¹¹⁾ Chapter Eight will describe relations between CBHAs and other groups and organisations which control access by CBHA participants to the resources and co-operation they require. CBHAs, in co-ordinating a programme of area improvement, are dependent on external expertise, technology and the co-operation of commercial interests and private owners. Chapter Eight, therefore, considers CBHA relations with building professionals, building contractors and commercial interests. It will also focus on a different dimension of interorganisational relations - between collectivities of employers and employees. Finally in Chapter Nine I shall examine selected studies and perspectives relevant to the analysis of organisations, which I believe should help in explaining certain organisational outcomes of the CBHA experiment. This experiment, we shall see, vested local residents with formal control of locally-based housing associations characterised by diverse goals and tasks, by involvement in the complex technology of tenement rehabilitation and in an intricate interorganisational network which involved relations with public and private sector agencies. Against this background I shall focus on the structuring of CBHAs as organisations during the period 1975 to 1982.

Notes and References to Introduction to Part Three

- (1) T. Bottomore, Political Sociology, Hutchinson & Co., 1979, pp. 41-42.
- (2) M. Castells, 'Theoretical propositions for an experimental study of urban social movements', pp. 147-173 in Urban Sociology, critical essays edited by C.G. Pickvance, Tavistock Publications, 1976. Castells states that a social movement 'springs from the conjuncture of (1) a particular type of structural combination, which cumulates several contradictions, and (2) a particular type of organisation' (p. 168).
- (3) C.G. Pickvance, 'On the study of urban social movements', in Urban Sociology, Critical Essays, 1976, op. cit., pp. 193-218.
- (4) P. Saunders, Social Theory and the Urban Question, Hutchinson, 1981, pp. 187-208.
- (5) The influence of local authority officials and councillors, and of urban professionals, e.g. architects, on housing opportunities and on outcomes of demands and protest has been emphasised by J. Rex and R. Moore in Race, Community and Conflict, A Study of Sparkbrook, Oxford University Press, London, 1967; by R.E. Pahl's earlier work, R.E. Pahl, Patterns of Urban Life, London, Longmans, 1970 and by P.J. Dunleavy, 'Protest and quiescence in urban politics: a critique of some pluralist and structuralist myths', International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 193-218. However, writers have also warned against over-emphasising the power of 'urban managers' or gatekeepers and against neglecting the political and economic constraints on the role and approach of urban planners. See J.R. Mellor, Urban Sociology in an Urbanised Society, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 127-166; 'Urban Managerialism Reconsidered' in R.E. Pahl, Whose City, Penguin Books, 1975, Chapter 13, pp. 265-285; and T. Nichols, Ownership, Control and Ideology, George Allen and Unwin, 1969.
- (6) There are similarities with Castells' approach here. However, where Castells speaks of structural determinants, I am referring to structural constraints and influences. See M. Castells in C.G. Pickvance, 1976, op. cit., p. 151.

- (7) These forms of social and political control are representative of what Lukes has termed a 'third dimension of power'. This involves the subtle and less visible ways in which potential issues are kept out of politics 'through the behaviour of groups and the practices of institutions'. See S. Lukes, 'Power and Authority', Chapter 16, in A History of Sociological Analysis, edited by T. Bottomore and R. Nisbet, Heinemann, 1978, pp. 633-676.

Also Westergaard and Ressler have pointed to forms of political and social control which are 'anonymous, institutional and routine' and which involve 'no activity on or off-stage by any individual or group'. See J. Westergaard and H. Ressler, Class in a Capitalist Society, Heinemann, London, 1975, p. 247.

- (8) These are my own definitions. See classification in Chapter Two.
- (9) D. MacLennan et al, The Rehabilitation Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland, A report prepared for the Scottish Development Department, Central Research Unit Papers, April 1983, p. 12.
- (10) A similar emphasis on Authority and Funding as the key 'resources' sought by organisations is to be found in the work of S. Krupp, Pattern in Organisation Analysis, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, pp. 174-177; J.K. Benson, 'The Interorganisational Network as a Political Economy' in L. Karpik, (ed.), Organisation and Environment, London Sage, 1978, pp. 69-102.
- (11) See Chapter 13.

CHAPTER SIX

ACCOUNTABILITY, RESOURCES AND POLITICAL ACTION

(1975 - 1979)

Introduction

In previous chapters I outlined the complex interrelations between government agencies responsible for funding, controlling and monitoring the activities of housing associations (HAs). I described how in 1974 the Glasgow District Council (GDC) and the Glasgow office of the Housing Corporation (HC), jointly developed a strategy of area-based co-ordination of tenement rehabilitation which established a major role for neighbourhood-based housing associations (CBHAs). Further, in Chapter Three, it was argued that while formal responsibility for policy-making within associations rests with their executive (Management Committee), in practice, their objectives imply considerable dependence on resources controlled by external agencies and organisations.

I have emphasised that the key resources sought by HAs are Authority and Funding.⁽¹⁾ HAs, in the first instance, seek approval and legitimacy for their objectives from state and planning agencies. Secondly, their housing objectives imply capital expenditure by central or local government agencies. The SDD circular 10/1975, which outlines the operation of the 1974 Housing Act, makes explicit the general framework of control by government agencies. Paragraph 3 of the circular states that 'As a corollary

of the higher level of support all housing associations requiring assistance from public funds will be subject to stricter control'.⁽²⁾ The functions and interrelations of government agencies in relation to resource control are highly complex. Also, it is evident from the preceding analysis of the development of voluntary housing that there are important variations in the planning approach of different local authorities, as well as in the policies of different regional offices of the HC.

In general, Chapter Six focuses on how the development of CBHAs in Glasgow was influenced by political and economic constraints and controls between 1975 and 1982. Chapters Six and Seven cover related, but different, themes. First, we look at the ways in which HAs are obliged to seek approval for their operations (HAs and authority relations); secondly, the CBHA experience of financial control and resource allocation will be examined; Chapter Seven concentrates on the collective action directed at reducing constraints and its outcomes, and examines how changes in the national political and economic system affected CBHAs. Chapter Eight considers relations between selected urban interest groups and organisations and CBHAs. The central characteristics shared by these selected groups and organisations are these: first, their interests (e.g. in terms of professional, financial, housing outcomes) are tied to developments affecting housing in the inner areas; secondly, they control resources sought by HAs - for example, technical expertise, labour, local support and co-operation.

Chapter Six is divided into four main sections, the first of which outlines key aspects of the planning context of CBHAs. In particular, this section focuses on CBHA relations with the local authority and on the significance of the partnership, between Glasgow District Council and the Housing Corporation, for CBHAs in Glasgow. In Section 2, I shall concentrate on the CBHA experience of planning and financial controls operated by a Central Government Department, the Scottish Development Department (SDD), and by the Housing Corporation (HC). In order to illustrate aspects of the operation of bureaucratic controls and their effects on housing production by CBHAs, I shall focus on the system of Project Area Approval, Cost Limits and their effects on building standards, and on specific implications of Acquisition Cost Limits for tenement rehabilitation. Section 3 considers the effects of scheme scrutiny on the delays experienced by CBHAs in co-ordinating local rehabilitation schemes prior to 1979 and, finally, Section 4 describes how the experience of delays stimulated CBHA participants to engage collectively in political action which was aimed at influencing government agencies.

I shall apologise here to the reader for the complex structure of this chapter. However, its subject matter is extraordinarily intricate in terms of the range of controls which are part of the national housing association experience, of the changes in these over time, and of specific aspects of the Glasgow housing association scene. Further, this 'maze' of controls and effects is an important aspect of the experience of new committee members and staff in CBHAs and housing associations generally.

1. The Planning Context of CBHA Rehabilitation

HAs require the approval of central and local government agencies before they can acquire, build, or improve housing. It has been established that HA formation depends on central government policy and funding; on local authority interpretation of legislation and housing plans; and on the policies of regional HC offices which, in turn, are influenced by HC head office priorities.⁽³⁾

In the first instance, prospective HAs require to be officially registered with the HC.⁽⁴⁾ Registration is a precondition of obtaining loan finance and housing association grant (HAG).⁽⁵⁾ The HC office to which a prospective steering group applies is obliged to ensure that the group is capable of realising specified objectives.⁽⁶⁾ Registration is, therefore, influenced by economic and planning conditions and by the evaluation of housing provision and needs by the HC, as well as by assumptions of HC officials as to the potential competence and effectiveness of the prospective HA executive body in realising its objectives.⁽⁷⁾ However, it was also suggested in the last chapter that HA formation is clearly dependent on the knowledge of urban residents, who desire to become agents of housing provision, about the possibility of forming a HA and about the roles of different government agencies.

(a) Relations with the local authority

In Glasgow, the development of increasing support by councillors of all parties and by officials was identified previously as a signi-

ficant factor influencing the role of CBHAs. The mutually-agreed planning approach between the local authority and the HC Glasgow office established a systematic framework for the development of CBHAs and their extensive role in implementing area improvement. The fact that 25 CBHAs had been formed by 1981 in Glasgow, as compared with the minority role of this type of association in Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen, provides clear evidence of this working partnership. SDD officials described the planning relationship between the local authority and the HC as more extensively 'developed and co-ordinated' than in other cities.⁽⁸⁾ As a result, the phasing of planning approvals by the local authority (Housing Action Areas for improvement) and by the HC (Project Area Approval) was more systematically phased and co-ordinated in Glasgow.

Despite the generally more systematic planning context, CBHAs have described varying experiences and problems in relation to planning approval. For example, the 'partnership' had established a preliminary phased programme for both HA formation in different areas and for the zoning of areas for improvement. As a result there were situations where a residents' group aimed at HA formation, in advance of the phased programme. The experience of certain associations was that the exertion of pressure on the local authority and the HC served to bring forward their registration (e.g. Reidvale 1975); or by the stage when the HC had come to emphasise the advantages of scale (1978 onwards), neighbourhood groups wanting to form a HA were encouraged to combine their efforts with those

of residents in a neighbouring locality (e.g. Springburn and Possilpark; Bridgeton and Dalmarnock).

The local authority officials involved in co-ordinating area improvement had, in 1975, commissioned a physical and social survey of the feasibility of tenement improvement in different areas. The survey was carried out by private architects commissioned by the Council. Association participants have suggested on the basis of experience that the survey, while generally advantageous from a centralised planning perspective, reflected the partiality and superficiality of surveys in general. It presented a static picture of buildings and neighbourhoods and in some instances the survey was inadequate in providing technical information on the structural condition of tenement buildings (e.g. Govanhill, Rutherglen).⁽⁹⁾

For certain associations gaps in internal communications between local authority departments served to affect their experiences of development. For example, in one early formed CBHA, local residents on contacting officials within different sections of the local authority, received contradictory information. Another association was faced by pressure from SDD during 1981 to reduce the size of its first Project Area, at a time of central government funding restraint. In the event, the Management Committee based this major decision partly on assessments made within the Private Sector Section at GDC, although later the association discovered that assessments had been made by Environmental Health officials some time previously which were particularly relevant to the properties in question.

The general experience of Glasgow associations between 1975 and 1979 was that, as direct contacts developed with officials holding the power to influence programme approval, such problems were less likely. As several case studies⁽¹⁰⁾ have illustrated, unofficial channels of communication operate as an important influence on decision-making and outcomes. For CBHAs in Glasgow unofficial contacts between officials in housing associations, and in the local authority and the Housing Corporation, have provided a significant source of information and influenced decision-making. While such unofficial communications will be self-evident to experienced participants, new committee members and staff may well be unaware of the regularity and significance of 'phone calls' and discussions which follow meetings, or which take place during the frequent social gatherings such as the 'Openings' of completed improvement schemes.

Most CBHAs have had a constructive and co-operative working relationship with the local authority. In fact, local residents who were involved in forming their local association described in interview how they had been surprised at the extent of co-operation and support from some GDC councillors and from officials dealing with the house improvement programme. This 'surprise' was explained by references to prior conceptions of the local authority which were founded on 'bad press' and local experiences. However, participants in different CBHAs described varying patterns of interest and support by local councillors at the formative stage.

There is no question that as CBHAs have diversified their objectives, they have had to re-negotiate support within the local authority. For example, the regular experience of structural problems, together with growing recognition of the constraints on producing a variety of house size and types through tenement rehabilitation, have generally encouraged CBHAs to develop an interest in operating as area renewal agencies.

For certain associations, the scope of the CBHA improvement programme had been agreed by the local authority, the HC and the association from the start. For example, Elderpark HA was responsible for a 1,000 house rehabilitation programme in an area in Govan, and celebrated the completion of its improvement programme in June 1982 at a scheme 'Opening' attended by the Secretary of State and representatives of the local authority and the HC, as well as participants of associations from different areas and local residents. The ceremony also celebrated the completion of a new build scheme which had been promoted in 1977, thus taking five years to complete. Elderpark, like certain other associations, had had to lobby for support and recognition of its role in new building. In certain situations there is a clear conflict of interest between the local authority and the CBHA, for instance, where the GDC owned the prospective site in question.

For other CBHAs, conflicts of interest stemmed from existing or proposed demolition plans which affected housing either within or adjacent to their approved areas. In certain instances CBHAs

effectively pressured local authority officials and councillors and HC officials to overturn such plans (e.g. Yorkhill 1980, Reidvale 1978). In other areas, where the CBHA fought alongside other residents' groups in opposing a major plan involving road-building and demolition, such action proved advantageous to local interests (e.g. Govanhill 1973, Milnbank 1981). At other times, where CBHA participants aimed to prevent a plan for demolition, they were unable to gain the confidence of the residents affected by the proposal. For example, this was the pattern when extreme structural faults meant that residents' immediate housing interests were advantaged by the potential for local authority rehousing, and disadvantaged by the alternative cost implications for owners if the building was to be retained (e.g. Rutherglen 1980).

(b) The local authority-Housing Corporation partnership

As for improvement objectives, approval for new building projects is required from both the local authority planning department and the HC. Therefore, in relation to different building aims, HAs are dependent on local authority and HC approval of their planning role, as well as on resource allocation by central government. However, there is one significant difference in the CBHA experience of the planning context, as compared with that of HAs in other cities. The co-ordinated area role established from 1974 for CBHAs has ensured the relative absence of competing housing objectives between associations. In other cities, such as

Edinburgh and Manchester, the local authority and the HC have recognised the presence of competing interests in terms of area of operation, and the HC has assumed the role of arbiter. (11)

In general, the planning partnership between the HC and the GDC is recognised by participants as establishing a favourable planning environment. CBHA officials who have taken up housing association jobs in other cities, have commented that 'Glasgow associations don't know how lucky they are!'. However, it is important to remember that, by mid-1983, associations had not held systematic discussion with the local authority regarding their future role in housing provision in different areas. For CBHAs, the process of gaining approval for projects over the next ten to twenty years will inevitably be characterised by uncertainties and difficulties. In the context of the diversification of goals towards new building, problems will be exacerbated if CBHAs and the local authority do not develop a mutually-supported framework defining the longer-term planning role of these organisations. I would suggest that the realisation of an agreed planning role will depend as much on the initiative of CBHAs individually and collectively in Glasgow, as it will on gaining political support within the local community. Further, the effectiveness of initiatives taken by associations will depend on the clarity with which they define their housing objectives. The 'Glasgow Forum' of CBHAs has made some attempt to stimulate discussion on these questions by inviting councillors to speak at Forum meetings.

It is interesting that although the longer-term role of CBHAs as agencies involved in housing production has not been confronted, a different pattern has characterised discussions regarding the role of CBHAs in allocating housing. Between 1976 and 1980 the local authority initiated regular discussions first, with individual associations, and later with the Glasgow Forum on this question.⁽¹²⁾ In 1980 housing associations entered into agreements with GDC that the local authority would have nomination rights to 50% of empty houses improved by CBHAs with a House Lettings policy approved by the Housing Department.

From the local authority's standpoint, it was advantageous to establish an agreed framework for allocations which would ensure that a proportion of housing association improved houses would be on offer to those on the GDC Waiting List at some future date. In contrast, it is in the interest of CBHAs to establish an approved framework for housing production, especially as we have seen that CBHAs have diversified their production goals. Whether CBHAs in the future operate within a favourable planning environment will significantly depend on the sophistication with which CBHAs define and press for their longer-term interests, as well as on political support within the local authority. For example, the increasing interest of CBHAs in operating as area renewal agencies, carrying out rehabilitation and new building, will not be realised if the local authority policy in the 1990s should emphasise municipal building, or private developers, as the major renewal agencies in CBHA areas.⁽¹³⁾ Further, it is evident that planning

approval for CBHA projects will ultimately depend on economic resources and controls determined by central government and mediated by the Housing Corporation.

2. Central Government Agencies, Accountability and Controls

(a) The significance of Project Area Approvals

The preceding discussion focused on CBHAs' experience of planning approval and support by the local authority. Planning approval for housing projects which include specific building improvement schemes is also required from the Housing Corporation. This is termed Project Area Approval under the 1974 Housing Act. As described previously, the Scottish Development Department approves Project Area Submissions by the Housing Corporation, as well as Action Areas for Improvement proposed by the local authority. Central government control of planning approvals by both the HC and GDC reflects the fact that such approvals imply an expenditure commitment based on an assessment of the project's 'value for money in terms of housing priorities'.⁽¹⁴⁾

It is fair comment that prior to 1980, CBHAs had not recognised the significance of Project Area declaration in terms of resource commitment. There was general awareness that SDD operated an 'economic cut-off point' beyond which rehabilitation was not economically viable. The Needleman Formula⁽¹⁵⁾ on which the 'cut-off' point is based, takes account of these variables - physical costs of

repair, the future life of the modernised property, and interest rates - in establishing the economic viability of improvement as opposed to new building. The Scottish Office applies a modified version of the formula which considers social implications of respective planning decisions, and other economic costs implied, such as land acquisition. In 1974, J. Gower-Davies argued that 'While Needleman's formula is undoubtedly useful, it becomes dangerous, when it is used in an automatic way'.⁽¹⁶⁾ Davies' argument rests on a critique of both the economic and social assumptions built in to the formula.

CBHAs have, at different times, confronted difficulties in gaining approval from SDD where it has been evident that the economic viability of improvement was held in question - for example, where buildings with structural problems within previously approved Action Areas were the subject of high tender costs, or where a structural fault suddenly appeared in the midst of a tenement block being considered for Project Approval. In such instances CBHA officials generally found that, where HC officials were prepared to support the retention of such housing, on the basis that the alternative would mean both area blight and the probability of further demolition, SDD were prepared to apply their implicit criteria relatively flexibly.⁽¹⁷⁾

Apart from such clear-cut problem cases, between 1974 and 1979, CBHAs generally interpreted major delays in Project Area Approval (PAA) declaration as largely affected by short-staffing, and/or

inefficiency within the HC and SDD. However, following the experience of a 'moratorium' on expenditure announced by the HC in November 1980, and the developing concern regarding future resource allocation by the Conservative government, delays in Project Area Approval were increasingly interpreted as reflecting SDD assessments of future resources as well as 'value for money' of schemes. Between 1980 and 1982 CBHAs experienced lengthy delays in Project Area Approval, as well as SDD conditions on Project Area Approval which were designed to ensure a lesser resource commitment by central government. For example, there was increased emphasis by SDD on securing agreement to a restricted programme of acquisition by the CBHA in the area for which its role in co-ordinating house improvement was approved. In general, between 1980 and 1982 Project Area Approvals virtually ceased, as did Housing Action Area Approvals by the local authority.

The discussion of the process of planning approval illustrates that CBHAs are ultimately vested with the authority to co-ordinate house improvement and new building by central government. Further, it is evident that the experience of gaining planning approval is significantly inter-related with developments in the economy which have implications for government expenditure. In the following chapter it will be argued that the political ideology of the government of the day mediates between economic conditions and resource allocation in different aspects of public sector provision. These points will be further illustrated by examining the process of scheme approval by housing associations.

(b) Cost limits and building standards

All HAs involved in rehabilitation, following Action Area and Project Area approval, plan an improvement programme. Each building contract requires scheme approval by the HC regional office. To enable a framework for scheme approval which is accountable and delegatable, SDD adopted the system of cost limits applied in England and Wales by the Department of the Environment. The general concern of associations in Scotland, particularly those co-ordinating area rehabilitation in Glasgow by 1977, was that the cost limits system was inappropriate to the requirements of tenement rehabilitation. Associations argued that these cost limits did not relate to the extensive disrepair of the common areas of tenements in Glasgow.⁽¹⁸⁾

In 1979 the English NFHA's Cost Limits Working Party stated that the cost limit system had 'envisaged that 10% of schemes would be over the prevailing cost limits and require submission to the Department of the Environment'. The Report commented that the large volume of referrals of tenders which were submitted for approval, but which exceeded cost limits, resulted in detailed scrutiny by the HC and Department of the Environment, and frequently in lengthy delays. Also delays sometimes overstepped the expiry date of tenders, thus demanding re-negotiation or re-tendering of contracts and, at times, causing further over-cost-limit submission. The report concluded that the cost limit system was not working as intended.⁽¹⁹⁾

The Scottish experience had been similar, although it never reached the extremes of requirement to re-tender. In Glasgow, until 1980, CBHAs experienced lengthy delays and uncertainties in scheme approval. Under 1974 legislation, the HC was delegated the authority to approve schemes for which costs fell within cost limits set by central government (SDD). Scheme submissions which exceeded cost limits required referral by the HC to SDD for approval.⁽²⁰⁾

By 1978, it was evident that the large volume of schemes affected by dual monitoring and delays in approval was influenced by a number of factors. For example, costs to associations of acquiring tenement houses varied by locality and housing market factors. Also, the extent of repair and improvement to common areas of the tenement building varied with the prior extent of building decay and HA policies regarding building standards. Another factor influencing the probability of scheme submissions exceeding cost limits was inclusion of amalgamation or 'twin-ups' of houses within the contract - the proportion of amalgamations partly reflecting HA policy regarding housing mix, which is an implicit objective of the improvement programme. Finally, a significant factor affecting scheme costs and their relation to cost limits was the high level of economic inflation reflected in rising building costs during the latter half of the 1970s (see Appendix 1).

An SFHA Rehabilitation Committee in 1978 produced a paper on delays in approval.⁽²¹⁾ It commented that Glasgow associations

wished to ensure the awareness of the Board of the HC and of SDD officials about their concerns, by illustrating the CBHA experience of delays in a number of schemes. The report stressed that schemes appeared to have been subject to delays at SDD despite prior detailed monitoring by HC officials. The paper highlighted the insecurity felt by those 'on the ground'.

We are concerned about the general feedback from SDD that schemes 'seem very expensive'. We are worried about the way the phrase the 'economic cut-off point' is bandied about with no real explanation given about the formula used in its calculation, or its application (Para. 2).

(Further) there is general concern among Associations about the real reason behind the delays being experienced. The view has been expressed that these delays are caused less because of concern about structural stability or rising costs, but rather more because of concern over the possible council housing surplus in Glasgow and a lack of confidence in community based Housing Associations.

Finally the report emphasised the legislative commitment to inner city rehabilitation through CBHAs and the hope that this commitment would be echoed by a similar administrative commitment at SDD to speed up approvals and, therefore, the improvement programme. (22)

I now propose to illustrate in greater detail how the structure of funding controls operated to constrain HAS and the pace of the improvement programme with reference to the factors mentioned above.

(c) Acquisition costs and cost limits

As described previously, HAs are entitled to acquire houses from owners of sub-tolerable housing who do not choose to bear costs of improvement. Cost limits for house improvement cover acquisition and improvement works costs - the SDD Circular 10/1975 specifying both 'Works Only' and 'Acquisition and Works' cost limits.⁽²³⁾

In general, acquisition costs reflect housing market influences rather than the state of repair of the tenement house or building. A paper produced by the SFHA's Research Officer (January 1980)⁽²⁴⁾ stressed that the structure of cost limits makes no allowance for anomalies stemming from market variations.

The argument for the inclusion of an acquisition element in the total cost limit is that acquisition and works can cross-subsidise each other. Flats bought cheaply are assumed to require greater expenditure on repair and improvement.

However, Dave Clark's paper shows clearly that, in practice, there is only a weak statistical relationship between approved works expenditure and acquisition costs. The same point was argued at an SFHA Conference on Standards, March 1979, attended by representatives of HAs, the HC, and SDD. The architect, J. Johnson from Assist, stressed that the structure of cost limits is based on a fallacious assumption that acquisition costs reflect the physical condition of tenement property.

Everyone knows that in Glasgow this is often not the case - for example, Linthouse, Central Govan and Elderpark HAS operate within a half-mile radius of Glasgow, but unimproved flat prices in the Linthouse area, separated from the other two associations by Elder Park, are some £1,000 to £1,500 higher; leaving the association that much less money to spend on improvements. The difference in price reflects a social status division across the park and the property in Linthouse is in a worse condition structurally than in Govan. (25)

In practice, however, despite the inevitability of anomalies where government officials applied the system of acquisition cost limits rigidly, CBHA staff working in areas with high acquisition costs have found that officials of the HC and SDD have approached the acquisition and works cost limit relatively flexibly. In some parts of Partick and Govanhill, acquisition and works costs generally exceeded cost limits while scheme costs approximated the cost limit for works only. In general, associations recognised that building costs were given greater weighting in the approvals process than acquisition costs. If this had not been the case, associations in high acquisition cost areas would have been penalised by a lower standard of improvement.

The significant point here is that cost limits, as formal controls on housing association expenditure, are mediated by central government officials whose interpretation influences the experience of HAS on the ground. Some participants have commented that the enforcement of savings, or reduction in standards, has been more inequitable in relation to schemes demanding high repair costs than for those involving high acquisition costs. Where improvement

schemes have been submitted involving both a high repair element and high acquisition costs, savings have been enforced and delays experienced in approval. However, HA staff have suggested that, where a consistently strong case has been presented to approval agencies that market anomalies significantly affect costs, central government officials have approached the problem sympathetically.

As for the costs of building works, their relation to cost limits was markedly influenced by inflation in the British economy during the latter half of the 1970s. Rising building costs reflected the steadily rising costs of transport, raw materials and labour. Between February 1975 and April 1978, under the then Labour government, the level of cost limits was not increased.

The steadily rising cost of improvement schemes resulted in a large proportion of HA schemes being referred by HC Technical staff to SDD's Technical Section for second-stage scrutiny. Two factors led Glasgow associations to assume that their experience of lengthy delays in approval was both more extreme than that for other cities, and was also more likely to persist. First, CBHAs in Glasgow generally operated in tenement housing areas characterised by a predominance of one, two or three apartment houses. The presence of overcrowding, and concerns that locality-based HAs should provide for a mix of housing needs, led associations to aim at providing varied housing in terms of size and amenity wherever possible. Glasgow's CBHAs, from their position as local landlord, laid stress on the production of larger housing units through amalgamation. (26)

Associations carrying out amalgamations or 'integrations' of flats, faced difficulties in relation to cost limits due to the consequent increase in common costs per house.

The second factor influencing higher costs of rehabilitation in Glasgow is the generally higher specification of repair costs by Glasgow's CBHAs. CBHAs have aimed at extensive repair to the common parts of tenement buildings rather than specifically to the houses or flats. The reasons are these: CBHAs were approved agents of the local authority in the co-ordination of comprehensive tenement improvement - improving houses for private owners as well as those owned by the association; secondly, CBHA tenements show signs of extensive and long-term structural decay; thirdly, CBHA officials and consultants with prior experience of housing association rehabilitation work in England pressed to include a higher standard of repair. As a result, scheme costs submitted were increasingly in excess of cost limits and consistently higher than those in other cities. Frequently, the emphasis changed from one of 'patch and repair' to one of full replacement,⁽²⁷⁾ e.g. of roofing - the general intent being to minimise future maintenance and housing management problems.

Between 1974 and 1977 CBHAs varied in terms of standards and costs of repair, and the early-formed CBHAs experienced uncertainty regarding the approach and advice of consultants (e.g. Tollcross, Central Govan and Govanhill). However, by 1977 certain CBHAs and their professional consultants consistently pressed for higher

repair standards (e.g. Reidvale, Elderpark and Partick). Their approach stimulated debate on standards between CBHA participants and the HC. Exchange of ideas through informal meetings and communications served to encourage the development of common standards generally incorporating a high proportion of common repair costs. Further, certain CBHAs and their professional consultants stressed that extensive repair was not necessarily more costly, as contractors (building firms) favoured its less finicky demands on their organisation of manpower and work on site. This 'gut' approach became favoured, as the 'patch and repair' approach had frequently resulted in post-improvement problems, such as damp rot. There was, therefore, an increasingly substantiated case for extensive repair on grounds of future economic management. These arguments were presented to SDD by the HC and by associations, and at times SDD officials were invited to 'leave Edinburgh for the day and come and see for themselves'.

3. Scheme Scrutiny and Delays

By 1978 the experience of delays in approval of individual improvement schemes was common to Glasgow associations. Delays were significantly affected by the bureaucratic process of scheme approval administered by the Housing Corporation with the purpose of ensuring public accountability. However, SFHA and HC officials have emphasised that delays were also affected by the efficiency, 'or lack of it', of associations on the ground.

Between 1974 and 1980 an eight-stage submission process had been in operation. As well as demanding extensive paperwork within HAs, there were three stages in particular which were regularly associated with delays. These were Project Area Approval, the second stage of cost plan submission (SHC/2), and the fourth stage of approval, at all of which costs submitted were regularly in excess of cost limits and cost submissions were, therefore, referred by the HC to SDD. The SFHA argued that the HC's intent in operating these procedures from 1974 was to streamline the processing of approvals, and suggested that the experience of delays implied that the procedures had unintended consequences. (28)

SDD exercised its role in second stage scheme scrutiny from a distance. The general pattern experienced on the ground was for officials of the HC Technical Section to request savings from HA Development staff responsible for co-ordinating the improvement contract. Cuts in specification at times had implications for CBHA policies on standards, and internal debate was required prior to agreement. SDD's role in initiating demands for reductions in specification was often criticised by HA participants in these terms:

They are distanced from problems faced by CBHA staff and committees and cannot recognise the consequences of restricting standards for our future maintenance role.

All they are interested in is cost efficiency - the quality of housing desired by local people is irrelevant. We all know that in some (CBHA) areas, local authority

improvement work to neighbouring blocks has been to a much higher standard, yet we have to fight to retain small concessions

Conflict over improvement standards affected relations between the HC and CBHAs and by 1978 there had been a gradual wearing away of the HC's protective and maternal role in relation to CBHAs. The Glasgow office of the HC had been active in advising and supporting HAs during their formation, and officials were regular attenders of CBHA steering group meetings. However, as a result of increasing awareness of conflicting expectations, the HC became redefined as an agency of central government control.

Mutual recognition of such changes was evident at the SFHA Conference on Standards, March 1979, referred to previously. The Chief Officer of the HC, Scotland, prefaced his talk by describing his perspective as 'from the blunt end', in response to the housing association consultant's view which was described as 'from the sharp end'. The Chief Officer clarified that an HC Consultative Paper on standards which had been unfavourably received by CBHAs and their consultants, represented 'the government view'. He stressed that the HC and SDD 'are jointly one agency in this context', and that the standards proposed in the HC paper were those of the 'Paymaster'. A central purpose of the HC Guidance Note had been to emphasise the financial accountability of HAs in producing housing, as well as the role of the HC as monitor. The role of the HC as agent of central government control was further stressed by the architect who quoted

an article which argued, 'Why have a Housing Corporation at all, or if one must have one, why not be honest and call it part of the SDD or Department of the Environment?' (29)

However, as implied by the discussion of acquisition costs, there is evidence in the pattern of approvals that government agencies implicitly recognised that cost limits prior to 1978 had been inadequate, and that inflation regularly ensured that cost limits would be unrealistic. For example, during 1977, average approval for Works Only costs was 38% over cost limits.

4. Delays and the First Stages of Collective Action

Concern over delays stimulated CBHA participants to engage in collective political action. Intentions were to reduce constraints on improvement work and to develop awareness amongst politicians and officials of central and local government as to the causes of delay. By 1978 participants in Glasgow associations were well aware that officials at the local authority, as well as within the HC and SDD, were disappointed at the general pace of HA improvement throughout Glasgow. It was also suspected that delays were partly explained by 'the authorities' in terms of the 'greenness' and inexperience of lay committees and their young professional staff. (30)

On the other hand, some associations had taken independent action and contacted their MPs and/or the Secretary of State to criticise the length of time projects were apparently held up at SDD. Some even risked going to tender without final approval. (31)

Inevitably, the extent to which officials and their committees departed from the formal structure of the approvals process varied with the presence of qualities of confidence, imaginativeness and entrepreneurialism within different CBHAs.

The Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (the SFHA) had formed a Working Party on delays during 1977. The Working Party focused on the causes of delays and aimed at increasing the recognition by MPs and central government of problems caused by delays for HAs and local residents.

Early in 1978 Glasgow associations resolved to take independent action following a meeting initiated by an East End association. At this meeting concern was expressed regarding the possibility of a freeze on CBHA acquisitions - acquisitions being the basis of resource commitment to capital expenditure by central government. General frustration regarding delays and restrictions on improvement standards was also expressed. The outcome was a decision to send a delegation, including staff and committee members, from Glasgow HAs involved in tenement rehabilitation to lobby MPs at Parliament. The general aim was to make politicians aware of the difficulties facing the young Glasgow movement and the residents of the localities in which CBHAs operate. In a paper⁽³²⁾ presenting their case, the political implications were outlined:

The programme of tenement rehabilitation has been an integral part of policies for the preservation and regeneration of the inner city. If the work slows down or stops, members of housing associations and their tenants will lose what confidence they have in the future of the areas they live in.

Rightly or wrongly, they will feel that they are victims of a process which began by raising their expectations, and which will end in disappointment and frustration of their hopes

If the processes are going to take longer, so long that some houses will fall down, or be demolished as dangerous, morale could (and maybe should) collapse; the social and political implications of alienating so many potential and actual opinion leaders in the inner city ought to be disturbing to the Government.

A further delegation took place in August 1978.

Following this action there were two developments. First, the associations which participated in the action resolved to form a common organisation to further collective interests. The Glasgow Forum of CBHAs was formed in Autumn 1978.⁽³³⁾ Despite some changes in participants and formal structure over time, the Forum's monthly meetings for both staff and committee at which common problems and issues are discussed are a well-established part of housing association life in the city. The Forum has also sustained its generic lobbying role to date (1983) and has both educational and political aims.

The educational function of the Forum began with regular meetings of staff from different associations. By 1982, the Forum was operating with four specialist staff Forums (Development, Housing Management, Finance and Maintenance) which reflected the

functional divisions within housing associations accompanying their growth in scale of tasks and in personnel. Staff forums regularly raise issues for discussion at the monthly meeting attended by Committee members and visiting speakers.

In 1980 the Forum was reconstituted as a regional sub-committee of the SFHA after a period during which Forum participants pressed for formal recognition by the SFHA Council. In effect, the Forum was 'incorporated' by the SFHA. At this time regional committees were also established in Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. Between 1981 and 1982 the Glasgow Forum exerted pressure within the SFHA in an attempt to increase the accessibility, accountability and responsiveness of the SFHA's elected Council. Following this, a Working Party on the Internal Structure of the SFHA proposed changes (e.g. in the voting system) which were implemented during 1982/83.

This chapter has examined certain aspects of the operation of controls by government agencies between 1974 and 1979. The experience of such controls served to stimulate the formation of mutual benefit organisations through which HAs engaged in collective action aimed at furthering their interests. The HA experience of changing governmental and economic constraints, and the development of collective action by HAs, will be further examined in Chapter Seven where I shall concentrate on developments post-1979.

Notes and References to Chapter Six


- (1) See Introduction to Part Three.
- (2) Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 10/1975, Housing Act 1974, Housing Corporation, Housing Associations and Housing Authorities in Scotland, page 1, paras. 2-6.
- (3) Housing Corporation Annual Reports and official letters to all registered Housing Associations annually outline the Housing Corporation's Investment Programme and the policies of the Board of the HC on resource allocation.
- (4) Scottish Development Department(SDD) Circular 10/1975, op. cit., paras. 10-11 defines the HC's role in registration under the 1974 Housing Act.
- (5) See Housing Act 1974, Part II, Section 13 and 14.
- (6) In Scotland, only associations registered under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act 1965 (Section 13(1)(b) of Housing Act 1974) are eligible for registration with the HC. However, associations are entitled to register also as charities under the Charities Act 1960.
- (7) Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 10/1975, op. cit., specifies that Committee Members must declare any financial interests they hold in relation to contracts entered into by their association, identifies the HC's role in monitoring housing associations (para. 10) and specifies conditions of funding (paras. 12 and 13). The 1980 Housing Act extended these controls.
- (8) Such comments were made by SDD officials in interviews held in November 1978, November 1979 and March 1980.
- (9) For example, associations have found that the survey was not able to provide information regarding certain causes of structural instability, e.g. undermining or other ground conditions, nor on conditions such as extensive dry or damp rot which by nature are dynamic.
- (10) See, for example, A. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, The Free Press, New York, Collier-Macmillan Ltd., 1954, Chapter 3, pp. 59 - 85; P. Blau, The Dynamics of Industrial Bureaucracy, University of Chicago Press, 1963, pp. 144 - 159 and pp. 231 - 249; D.H. McKay and A.W. Cox, The Politics of Urban Change, Croom Helm, London, 1979, Chapter 7, pp. 233 - 261, and P. Hall, H. Land, R. Parker and

- A. Webb, Change Choice and Conflict in Social Policy, Heineman, London, 1978, Chapter 5, pp. 58 - 85.
- (11) Interviews with housing association officials in Manchester and Edinburgh, between 1979 and 1980.
 - (12) Interview with senior official, Re-letting Section of the Housing Department at Glasgow District Council, November 1979.
 - (13) By mid-1982 there was no official channel for discussion of common issues between CBHAs and the Glasgow District Council, although the Glasgow Forum has regularly served that purpose. The Glasgow District Council-HC Official Working Party, established in 1974, was however still in operation.
 - (14) Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 10/1975, op.cit., p. 7, paras. 31-32.
 - (15) L. Needleman, The Economics of Housing, London, Staples Press, 1965, pp. 200 - 204.
 - (16) J. Gower Davies, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, Tavistock Publications, 1974, pp. 204 - 209.
 - (17) Interviews and discussions with housing association staff between 1978 and 1980.
 - (18) This point was argued by staff who had worked in both English and Scottish associations.
 - (19) National Federation of Housing Associations, Cost Limits Working Party, 1979.
 - (20) Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 10/1975, op. cit., Part 2, p. 17 (Appendix).
 - (21) SFHA Rehabilitation Committee, 1978 Paper on Delays in Approval for Community-Based Housing Association Projects.
NB. Appendix 2 detailed progress of approvals for 32 improvement schemes submitted by 7 CBHAs between April 1977 and January 1978.
 - (22) SFHA Rehabilitation Committee Report, op. cit., p. 2.
 - (23) Scottish Development Department (SDD) Circular 10/1975, op. cit., p. 17, Annexe to Part 2.
 - (24) D. Clarke, Structure of the System of Cost Limits, SFHA, January 1980.

- (25) Paper presented by J. Johnson, Senior Lecturer in Architecture, University of Strathclyde, to SFHA Conference on Rehabilitation Standards, March 1979. 'As seen from the Sharp End: A Critique of the HC Scottish Practice Note 2/1978', p. 6.
NB. While the figures quoted here are outdated the points about anomalies are still relevant.
- (26) SF News, David Clark Column, Spring 1979. The terms 'amalgamation', 'Twinning-up' and 'integration', are used interchangeably by participants to refer to the production of larger housing units by structurally altering and reducing the number of flats in a tenement building.
- (27) This emphasis on replacement and renewal is often termed the 'gut' approach.
- (28) SFHA Rehabilitation Committee Paper, 1978, op. cit., p. 2.
- (29) J. Johnson, 'As seen from the Sharp End', 1979, op. cit., p. 6. Johnson is quoting here from R. Barcroft, 'Out of the Public Eye', Architects' Journal, No. 10, Volume 169, 7 March 1979, pp. 471-487.
- (30) This was suggested in interviews with officials of the Glasgow District Council, the HC and the SDD, between 1979 and 1980.
- (31) SFHA Research paper, January 1980, op. cit.
- (32) Paper presented by Glasgow associations to 'Meeting between Delegation from Glasgow Housing Associations involved in Tenement Rehabilitation and Members of Parliament in London', Tuesday, 18 April 1978, p. 1.
- (33) I attended the Glasgow Forum as an observer between 1978 and 1981, by which time I had become involved as a participant.

APPENDIX 1

Changes in the Rehabilitation Cost Limits Compared to Changes in Building Costs



* Adjusted to take account of inclusion of VAT up to January 1980

Source: David Clark Column, S.F. News, Spring, 1981.

CHAPTER SEVEN

CONSTRAINTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION, 1978-1983

In this chapter I shall continue to focus on state controls over expenditure, production and housing provision by housing associations. As in Chapter Six I shall examine the efforts of housing associations to modify through collective action the controls operated by state agencies. We shall see that the effects of many controls were similar for all housing associations in Scotland, while certain controls had specific outcomes for CBHAs.

Chapter Seven is divided into four sections. Section One continues with the focus on Cost Limits and the Scheme Approvals process, and examines how collective action by Scottish housing associations served to influence the operation of these controls by the SDD and by the Housing Corporation. Section Two concentrates on the politics of resource allocation to the voluntary sector. Section Three considers the significance of party political ideologies in influencing policy developments affecting housing associations. Finally in Section Four I shall emphasise three aspects of central government policy which have import for associations at the present time - namely the issues of Expenditure Control, Privatisation and Rents.

Section One : The Modification of Bureaucratic Controls

In Chapter Six I discussed the delays experienced by associations in the process of scheme approval. I suggested that

delays had been significantly influenced by the cost criteria imposed by the SDD and by the periodic double scrutiny by the Housing Corporation and by the SDD. However, by 1983, such delays had become less of a problem for Scottish associations and in this section I shall describe the changing operation of these controls, between 1978 and 1983.

1.(a) Cost Limits

Regarding cost limits, the SDD increased these in 1978 against a background of persistent building cost inflation⁽¹⁾ and since that time there has been a regular, almost six-monthly, upwards adjustment. However, until after 1980, these improvements did not alter the pattern of periodic double scrutiny, as such reviews were inevitably post hoc in relation to rising actual costs.⁽²⁾

In the previous chapter I described the early lobbying by the Glasgow Forum and by the SFHA Council over delays. There were different interpretation of the outcomes of lobbying. Housing association participants viewed their efforts as having stimulated the increase in, and regular review of, cost limits. SDD officials commented in interview that cost limits in 1978 were due for an increase anyway, while certain HC officials argued that lobbying had been effective.⁽³⁾

It is also important to recognise that the HC, at Board level and in regular meetings with SDD, is involved in making bids for resources and in discussing changes in government policy which affect its monitoring role. On the one hand, therefore, the HC liaises with and lobbies SDD aiming to advance the interests of housing associations, while on the other hand it monitors their performance. Thus the role of the HC clearly has contradictory aspects.

Since 1978, the SFHA has systematically argued that it is the structure of the Cost Limit system which most seriously constrains the quality and type of housing produced by housing associations.⁽⁴⁾ On the other hand, the SDD has held reservations about housing association objectives regarding rehabilitation. For example, in 1980 the SDD⁽⁵⁾ replied to the SFHA case which emphasised difficulties faced by associations aiming to amalgamate houses to provide larger family dwellings:

However the Department would not agree with the assertion that the most appropriate method for providing family housing is necessarily through the integration of existing small tenement flats. Housing mix decisions should be taken exclusively in the light of identified housing needs in an area and the intrinsic suitability of particular tenements for adaptation to meet such needs.

Also, regarding the standards of rehabilitation, and its economic viability, the paper argued:

It is by no means certain that rehabilitation should be aiming to produce housing of comparable standards and life to that of new build. Much of the original impetus for rehabilitation arose in the belief that it would be a cheaper, shorter term solution which would allow resources to be distributed more widely With an overall surplus of houses and a wide variation in the match of house size to households between one area and another, there is now more than ever a need to have regard to all the circumstances of particular cases without making dogmatic assumptions about the size or standard of houses that rehabilitation is to produce.

The Department's comments were most applicable to rehabilitation by Glasgow's CBHAs, whereby local associations focused initially on improving housing conditions for existing residents through tenement improvement. The response from the CBHA point of view has been that CBHAs are not party to any centrally-co-ordinated planning of housing provision involving systematic evaluation of longer-term housing needs in the city, as well as in CBHA localities. Thus CBHAs can only really plan according to the requirements of existing residents and to CBHA policies regarding future housing mix.⁽⁶⁾ Also it has been argued that while there may be a marked excess of houses in Glasgow, it is frequently the case that empty houses are in a state of disrepair, or even uninhabitable, and are located in housing schemes which are unattractive to residents in the inner areas in which CBHAs operate.⁽⁷⁾

The SFHA approach to influencing government policy has involved mainly conventional lobbying strategies. Meetings were held with local councillors and MPs and, following a meeting in the House of Commons in August 1979, a number of MPs resolved to form an all-party Parliamentary Group 'to provide a forum in which the SFHA could discuss with them matters affecting housing association work in Scotland'. Also the SFHA has regularly produced papers and made representations, which have become a focal point in tripartite discussions involving the HC, the SFHA and the SDD.

At a meeting of the SFHA and the Minister, in August 1979, the structure of current cost limits was emphasised as a major issue 'in delaying the housing association area renewal programme and in militating against the production of a balanced housing mix through rehabilitation'. Following this meeting a tripartite working group was formed involving the Federation, the SDD and the HC, in order to review the current system and make proposals for its modification. A 1979 SFHA proposal stressed the requirement for a system which reflected the specific problems of tenemental improvement. However, SDD rejected this proposal on the grounds that it was based solely on the Glasgow experience and did not directly relate to the SDD's criteria of economic viability (the economic cut-off point). A second SFHA report incorporated cost evidence from Dundee and Edinburgh and in October 1980 the SDD stated its agreement in principle to the Federation's argument.

In December 1980 a joint meeting resolved to form a small technical sub-group, including representation from the SFHA, the HC and SDD Building Directorate, in order to assess current tender submissions as a basis for specific proposals relevant to the 1981 review of cost limits (redefined as Delegated Cost Levels, or DCLs, in 1980).⁽⁸⁾ The SDD specified a standardised form for cost information collation by the HC and by the SFHA. No further meetings took place and by late 1981 it was evident that there had been some reconsideration of the prior 'in principle agreement' within SDD, and that the internal momentum within SDD in support of changing the system was no longer present.

In effect the development of policy regarding cost limits represents a case of 'non decision-making' within SDD. As Bachrach and Baratz have suggested,⁽⁹⁾ powerful groups, or individuals in powerful positions, may resolve to suppress or thwart 'a latent or manifest challenge to the values or interests of the decision-maker'. In the case of rehabilitation cost limits, the values in question centred on the role of CBHAs as local agencies meeting varied local housing needs (including those of families) through rehabilitation and, secondly, regarding the economic viability of rehabilitation where improvement standards aim to produce housing of comparable standards and life to those of new build.⁽¹⁰⁾ Although local rehabilitation associations, and the SFHA on their behalf, have expressed views on these issues, by 1982-83 they had not been confronted in public debate.

Finally, in 1982, the SFHA took on board the SDD's emphasis, that housing association objectives could only be assessed in terms of their national and urban planning context, in its 'Proposals for a Five-Year Framework for Development for the Association Movement in Scotland'.⁽¹¹⁾ This paper, however, had not by April 1983 become a focus of systematic dialogue between the HC, the SDD and the SFHA.

One factor which those participating in negotiations have identified as significant in affecting such non decision-making, is the lack of continuity of SDD officials to whom representations have been made. CBHA staff have referred to the frequency of turnover of SDD officials who handle aspects of HA work. One commented that he had found direct communication with SDD officials generally very helpful.

However, having discovered the correct point of contact at SDD and after developing some sort of constructive understanding, we 'phone back the particular official only to discover that he has been moved on.

Apart from the regular review of cost limits there has been some change in the approach of central government to cost limits as a form of expenditure control. First, there is the trend characterising financial control within the state towards delegation within clearly defined and delimited spending powers.⁽¹²⁾ The reference to 'delegated cost levels' would imply a similar trend in relation to the scrutiny of rehabilitation projects.

Secondly, since 1981 the SDD has emphasised its preference for the HC to assume the central role in scheme scrutiny. The earlier criticism of delays has subsided and it now appears that single scrutiny has been enabled by less bureaucratic rigidity and by more realistic cost levels. A 1981 SDD Circular⁽¹³⁾ which outlined proposed increases in cost levels comments in Paragraph 3:

It is intended that this increase will reduce the number of cases being referred to the Department for approval. Associations are reminded, however, that there is a continuing need to adopt a more cost-conscious approach when dealing with rehabilitation projects.

1.(b) Procedures of Scheme Approval

As described in Chapter Six the complex submission process through which associations sought Housing Corporation approval for loan finance for individual building contracts, had also been a focus of criticism by associations and by the SFHA. In June 1980 a modified approvals system was established by the HC. The new system did not in fact significantly reduce the number of stages at which associations were required to make submissions to the lending authority. However, it is generally agreed that the new system has introduced greater rationality and effectiveness into the approvals process.

We have seen that the operation of the former approval system was associated with major and often dual scrutiny at the stages of Project approval, of submitting proposed costs (SHC/2), and of

tender return (SHC/4). The new system concentrates scrutiny by the HC at the stage when final costs are known (tender approval). Since 1981 scheme scrutiny has been less associated with delays, largely due to internal policy revision within the HC.

However, since 1981, the new system of approval has not been tested under economic conditions similar to those operating prior to 1979. Between mid-1981 and 1983 the rate of building cost inflation markedly declined. Also, the general recession in the building trade stimulated competition for housing association rehabilitation contracts which was reflected at times in lower tender prices. During the first half of 1982 tenders for some CBHA contracts came in lower than for similar schemes a year previously.⁽¹⁴⁾

I have focused separately on these two mechanisms of control over housing association production. However, such controls are experienced by those working on the ground as significantly inter-related, and as being similar in their effects. At times CBHA participants have found it difficult to identify which specific aspect of the system of controls produced delays. Were delays caused by the Approval agency (if so, which one?); by cost limits and their weighting; or by the operation of bureaucratic procedures? Not surprisingly new committee members generally found difficulty in grasping the maze of constraints and at times local residents directed their frustration caused by delays towards their housing association.

I have described these controls as bureaucratic mechanisms' for ensuring accountability and for containing public expenditure. The interpretation and implementation of controls by powerful officials in government agencies implicitly reflects their orientations to the role of housing associations in rehabilitation. The case of cost limits would also suggest the significance of political values and support in influencing policy outcomes. In the absence of political will, therefore, we should expect no significant policy change at central government level, towards recognition of the role of CBHAs both in reproducing tenement housing and in meeting existing housing needs in Glasgow's inner areas. However, the significant increases in the level of cost criteria (cost limits/levels) between 1978 and 1981 clearly represented growing recognition and support amongst key officials and politicians for the approach to rehabilitation by CBHAs in Glasgow.

As for the scheme approvals process, this is an internal device of the HC for monitoring the viability and effectiveness of housing association production. The modified system established in 1980 clearly represented the political will to alleviate conditions under which HAs operated by removing excessive bureaucracy. This 'will' existed at senior levels of officialdom within the HC and amongst HC board members.

Finally, I have no doubt that lobbying of all types and at all levels served to affect political will, thus realising practical advantages to housing associations with respect to these controls. Changes constituted 'reforms' or incremental adjustment. They did not alter the established structure of power, nor did they involve any marked shift towards increased autonomy of associations. However, they did serve to ease the web of government control experienced in the mid-1970s. These bureaucratic controls operate within the wider economic context which affects resource allocation to housing associations and on which I shall now focus.

Section Two : Cash Limits and Resource Allocation

Between 1979 and 1983 there were significant developments in the funding context of housing associations. Changes in the structure and process of bureaucratic scheme approval and in control over the detailed allocation of resources have already been illustrated. However, 1980 was the turning point at which the Scottish housing association movement confronted concerns regarding future funding.

CBHAs, and Scottish associations generally, had diversified their housing objectives during a period of contracting government expenditure on Housing and the Social Services.⁽¹⁵⁾ Despite this general trend, CBHAs in Glasgow had been formed against a background of commitment by local and central government planners to their involvement in an extensive programme of tenement rehabilitation.

CBHA participants therefore were generally confident until 1980. that central government funds allocated to the movement would be sufficient to sustain an expanding programme of area rehabilitation. (16)

There are two major aspects of resource allocation which have implications for access to funds and for the annual programme of work. First, there is the system of cash control operated by central government. Secondly, there is the level of resources allocated by the Treasury to the Scottish HA movement each year, and this resource 'cake' is further distributed according to Housing Corporation Board policy.

2.(a) The System of Cash Control

The year 1980-81 was the point at which the Tory Government instituted a formal system of 'Cash Limits' on HA expenditure - thus placing the Housing Corporation under a similar framework of expenditure control to local authorities. The new system was publicised by the HC and the SFHA and was described as a means of increasing the efficiency of expenditure control by the HC. (17)

Although the Corporation, like other government agencies is now working to a 'cash limit' there is no intention to place housing associations under a similar control. However for the first time, associations are being asked for their proposals for tenders, as well as land acquisition and missives concluded. In addition the Corporation will be asking associations how many design and cost submissions are likely to be made so that we can predict both future workload as well as expenditure.

The cash limit system involved formalisation, extension and modification of practices already in operation. Resource allocation by central government, prior to 1980, was represented in SDD's agreement to fund acquisition of existing buildings for rehabilitation associations, and to fund land acquisition for associations involved in new building. The underlying principle was that funding commitment to acquisition necessarily implied future funding of building work. Cash limits, therefore, demanded more detailed forward planning both by associations and by the HC, and carried the potential for a more exact framework of central government control over annual expenditure. In general, as a tool of expenditure control, cash limits focus on levels of expenditure, while central government housing policies influence the overall resource allocation to the housing association sector and types of housing produced by HAs.

2.(b) Resource Allocation and Campaigning

Between 1977 and 1982 there was rapid growth in the number of Scottish HAs registered by the HC and in the scale of their rehabilitation and new building programmes. Despite a change in government, the deepening of the economic recession and increasing cuts in public expenditure, the overall resources allocated to Scottish HAs by central government continued to increase.

However, the Scottish HA experience took place against a background of reduction in funds allocated to HAs in England and

Wales.⁽¹⁸⁾ It is, therefore, not surprising that the young and growing Scottish HA movement confronted the issue of inadequate funding some six years following the expectations generated by the 1974 Housing Act.

The political character of resource allocation has been clearly emphasised by students of public policy. For example Heclo and Wildavsky,⁽¹⁹⁾ 1974, commented that 'the Treasury is the most political of all departments and public expenditure is the most political of all the Treasury's work'. For housing associations, significant issues associated with resource allocation relate to the size of the overall cake; its distribution between HAs operating in different areas and producing a variety of housing types; and the structure of decision-making on resource allocation. From 1980 these issues became the focus of increasing interest amongst HAs and their representative organisations.

Prior to 1980, resource levels were adequate for the demands of a young movement whose difficulties largely stemmed from the preliminary organisation and development of housing programmes in different localities and in specialised housing provision. For CBHAs, 'gearing up' problems included difficulties in establishing resident preferences in mixed ownership tenements; insufficient decant houses; unforeseen technical problems identified by consultants; difficulty in gaining agreement of commercial owners due to the absence of grant funding; unrealistic cost limits during periods of inflation and the bureaucratic

approvals process. These administrative, technical and financial constraints, as well as the lack of experience of early participants, ensured that associations did not fully take up their annual allocation.

1978 was the year when the Scottish HC's role in distributing the resource cake was formalised. Prior to December 1977 HAs were required to estimate expenditure for the following financial year. These 'bids' for resources by individual HAs collectively provided the basis for the HC's bid to central government. In a letter from the HC to all registered HAs in Scotland,⁽²⁰⁾ the HC commented:

The Corporation was aware that the year 1978/79 would mark the point in the development of the movement in Scotland where realistic bids would far exceed the finance available. For the first time therefore we have been forced to make specific allocations to associations

The Scottish HC at this point assumed explicitly the established allocative role of its English counterpart. Since its formation in 1964, the HC in England had been empowered to loan funds according to the priorities of central government.

In England the HA movement had faced the problem of restricted funds during the second half of the 1970s, and in this context the allocative function of the HC was well-recognised. During 1979, it was reported that English associations took the largest share of all housing cuts by the new Government.⁽²¹⁾ Further, the experience of limited funding stimulated the NFHA to

develop its campaigning and lobbying strategies.

By 1979, Scottish HAs had, therefore, not directly experienced the effects of central government financial restraint. The Conservative Government of April 1979 stressed that support for the movement in Scotland would be reflected in the level of resources allocated. In July 1980 the Minister for Home Affairs replied to certain points raised by the Glasgow Member of Parliament who was Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group:

The Government recognise that the voluntary housing movement has an important role to play in meeting a variety of housing needs. Associations can therefore be assured of our continuing support for their activities in both the new build and rehabilitation fields ... the housing association movement will continue to be a priority item in the allocation of Scottish housing funds. (22)

In November 1980, HAs in Glasgow experienced the sharp end of trends affecting public sector agencies generally. At an SFHA Conference⁽²³⁾ which was attended by the Chairman of the Board of the HC, it was announced that the HC would not approve any further schemes for HAs in the East of Scotland until the following financial year. This 'moratorium' on expenditure resulted from HC concern that its Regional Office was heading for an overspend on its 1980-81 cash limit.

One month later a moratorium was applied by the Scottish Office to HA expenditure in the West of Scotland. From 21 November 1980 the Housing Corporation was unable to approve new building

contracts for Glasgow HAs. In the first moratorium, therefore, the HC had independently exercised expenditure control within the framework set by central government, while in the second, cash control was enforced by the Scottish Office in the form of the moratorium which was to be reviewed at the turn of the year.

The moratorium produced new uncertainties although associations were affected differently. Those with scheme submissions awaiting tender approval, which was required from the HC before work could start on site, were most immediately affected. Associations were informed by the HC that should they choose to deviate from the approvals procedure they would suffer the penalty of exclusion from loan funding which was a prerequisite to receipt of grant. Also associations with Project Area submissions awaiting approval at the SDD, were faced with uncertainties regarding their longer-term development.

Against this background, committee members had to explain to their tenants why their homes were not being improved on schedule and their staff had to negotiate with builders and consultants to re-phase the building programme. In the event, some building firms chose to accept a hiatus without financially penalising the association. Other contracts required re-negotiation.

The moratorium, therefore, had serious implications for the cash flow situation of building firms. Inevitably, too, employment opportunities were severely reduced in a building industry which,

as a result of government economic and housing policies, had become geared up to rehabilitation, against a background of general decline in the demand for new building. An Edinburgh Labour MP⁽²⁴⁾ argued in parliamentary debate:

It is perverse that we should have a housing moratorium when one in four construction workers in Scotland is unemployed. Future generations will regard with bewilderment the economic policies of a Government who stop the housing work that is desperately needed when the skilled resources to complete the job are standing idle.

The response of most residents directly affected by delays was one of resigned acceptance of the inconvenience caused. Public meetings were held by several Glasgow CBHAs to ensure that residents knew that the cause of the hiatus in the improvement programme was external to their local association, and to inform residents of the association's strategies for coping.

Different strategies were adopted by associations in the attempt to influence the funding context. Members of Parliament were contacted, as were local councillors, and the HC and SDD, regarding delays in PA approval and the longer-term funding which was essential to sustain the programme. At public meetings and in individual communications with MPs and others, reference was made to prior expressions of political support by the major parties. Politicians and government officials were reminded of the effects of HA formation on local expectations.

Associations' representatives stressed that delays carried serious implications for the housing stock programmed for improvement - in particular where structural problems existed. Further, it was argued by older associations that such delays were likely to cause future housing management problems. As described earlier, funding commitment since 1974 had been based by the HC on approval of an annual programme of acquisition. By 1980, many HAs had acquired a significant stock of unimproved property. Committees, therefore, became concerned that inadequate resources would serve to establish them as slum landlords - a role which the local residents joining CBHA committees had never envisaged.

In this context, the SFHA Council and the Glasgow Forum embarked on a programme of lobbying, campaigning and public relations. The approach to lobbying differed in the West from that of established associations, mainly in the East, whose representatives held longest experience on the SFHA Council and within the national political and planning context.

The 'establishment' used conventional British lobbying methods, making both informal and unofficial approaches to politicians and civil servants. The Glasgow Forum on the other hand was distanced both socially and geographically from centres of power and active participants resolved to develop an independent campaign during 1981, while also supporting efforts of the SFHA.

During 1980 the SFHA had developed its research and information base to ensure systematic presentation of the case for resources for Scottish HAs. This work culminated in the SFHA Report, 'Who Cares', 1981, and in the increased interest of the SFHA Council in extending the dialogue on resource allocation, both between the SFHA and government agencies and within the movement.

The Glasgow Forum resolved independently to publicise the housing association case. The Forum organised a public exhibition which was opened by the Minister on 22 November 1980 and was attended by representatives of local and central government agencies and the press. Ironically, the Minister from the Scottish Office had just announced the moratorium on expenditure in the West over the previous weekend. However, in his speech the Minister emphasised the benefits which HAs had brought to the areas in which they worked, and he referred to the importance of 'the teamwork' between the HC, HAs and the Glasgow District Council, which had produced such effective results in Glasgow. The Minister also re-asserted the Conservative Government's support for the work of the HA movement and concluded that 'we intend to match that commitment with resources'. (25)

Another main speaker at the Exhibition opening was the Director of the Scottish CBI, who described the development of CBHAs as a remarkable urban achievement:

Glasgow has generally been identified with bad housing stories. This is a good story It is now time to tell the world what Glasgow has achieved.

He then referred to the moratorium and to a recent prior government announcement of proposed £100 million public expenditure cuts:

I believe that there are now signs that cuts in public expenditure are being made in the wrong places. Private industry has taken measures to control inflation - the CBI supports the government here - but the latest measures are indeed misplaced.

The 1980 campaign on resources received extensive publicity, both locally and nationally, in November of 1980. (26) A Guardian article of 22 November 1980 stated:

Almost 700 flats earmarked for immediate renovation ... are now lying empty. And it is estimated that up to 800 building jobs could be lost as a result of this cutback. Companies face bankruptcy and teams of craftsmen skilled in tenement renovation will be broken up

And The Times Planning Reporter commented on 24 November 1980:

A successful housing improvement programme in Clydeside, until recently the most deprived area in Britain, is in jeopardy Associations claim that the ban is likely to mean that around 700 flats and houses will be left empty and vandalised and will eventually cost much more to repair.

The Glasgow Forum was invited to present the Exhibition at the House of Commons and at the London headquarters of the HC and, during 1981, Forum participants gained experienced in lobbying politicians and officials.

The Forum's first delegation to Westminster took place on 20 January 1981. Its purpose was to make MPs aware of the consequences of insufficient funding for Glasgow's improvement programme and for the work of HAs in Scotland. Three further 'lobbies' were organised during 1981. Participants argued that it was essential to sustain pressure on the Government to ensure an adequate resource allocation for 1982-1983, and several Glasgow associations supported the delegation.

Glasgow association representatives participating in the lobby of MPs stressed to those working in the 'East' that they were not arguing solely in support of CBHAs in the West. Following the March 18th delegation to Parliament, which included representation from HAs involved in both rehabilitation and new build, an extra £3.8 million was allocated to special needs associations by the Government.

The Minister met with the unofficial delegation in the House of Commons despite his surprise discovering its arrival, as he had received the first Forum delegation only two months previously! In the intervening period the resource allocation for 1981-82 had been announced.

On 12 May 1981, the Forum Exhibition was shown in the House of Commons on the sponsorship of J. Craigen MP, the Chairman of the Scottish All Party group of MPs. Delegates later attended a reception at the London headquarters of the HC. The last delegation of 1981 took place in October, following a rally in Glasgow. The delegation was met by George Younger MP at the Scottish Office headquarters, Dover House. That same month the Government announced an extra £7 million allocation to Scottish HAs which reputedly resulted from revenue from sales to sitting tenants.⁽²⁷⁾

The approach of Glasgow CBHAs in campaigning may have surprised those who had perceived these locality-based associations as parochial in emphasis or as non-political. In November 1980, the Development staff Forum and the main Glasgow Forum had formally outlined a position regarding the allocative and funding priorities of the HC. This position supported the HC's previously established proportional allocation of resources between rehabilitation and new building. Further, the Forum argued that the HC should provide financial support for newly-formed HAs. This position, however, was not supported by all. Some participants were critical of the HC for registering new associations during a period of marked public expenditure restraint, and in the January Parliamentary debate one MP argued: 'Perhaps no new HAs should be established because the existing ones are already competing for a diminishing cake'.⁽²⁸⁾

This statement did little to encourage the confidence of participants in the newest CBHA (Rutherglen) who had begun to doubt the future of the house improvement programme in their area. In this association's first Project Area (PA) the vast majority of people lived in tenements which were in an equivalent state of disrepair to that characterising Action Areas for Improvement throughout Glasgow, and 80% of houses were without inside toilets. In this context the approach of Forum participants was generally sympathetic and anything but parochial. (29)

Those at the receiving end of Forum delegations faced large enthusiastic turnouts of staff and committee members, as well as some unconventional appeals. One committee member took the Minister's hand as he was about to leave the delegation. After describing in graphic detail the conditions she and others faced in her tenement, she said, 'Mr Rifkind, if you can't do anything for us there is only God left'.

During 1981 the Glasgow Forum extended its campaign by petitioning within Glasgow for more resources for HAs. In October it organised a colourful rally through the city centre, after which the Forum Chairman and a member of the Executive rode on a Tandem from Glasgow to Downing Street, where the petition was delivered. These efforts during 1980 and 1981 were rewarded by widespread media coverage. There is no doubt that the Forum's campaigning increased in effectiveness as a result of the input of new participants who had previously worked for Shelter, as well as from an

increased activism. Further, at national level, a 'Housing Association Week' was co-ordinated by the SFHA in October 1981, during which various events and scheme openings were held in major Scottish cities.

Following the general experience of cuts in funding by local authorities, the SSHA and English associations, it is not surprising that uncertainty regarding future resource allocation was prevalent amongst Scottish associations. Against this background the SFHA Conference, June 1981, was titled 'It's a new Ball Game, Players and Management must know the rules - are you aware?'. Between 1981 and 1983, however, the overall resource allocation to Scottish associations had continued to increase to £100 million for 1982-83 and £107 million for 1983-84.

We have seen that in Scotland generally between 1980 and 1982 housing associations adopted a multi-faceted approach to lobbying for increased resources necessary to sustain their housing programmes. With regard to lobbying and its effects, one senior official commented: (30)

Everyone lobbies. Those who say they don't only mean that they lobby differently. The parallel of lobbying is advertising. It can serve to tip the balance in decisions towards one alternative rather than another.

As for the question of whether senior politicians or senior civil servants exercised greater control over resource allocation, it is difficult to say. However, in his address to the SFHA Conference

1981, a Conservative Minister commented:

If you know the programme 'Yes Minister', you'll know who is most important I am only a temporary aberration.

2.(c) Growing Resources, Growing Accountability

In Chapter Three I suggested that the growth of the housing association sector, and of the resources allocated to it, has been accompanied by the extension of state control to ensure public accountability. The 1974 Housing Act (Sections 19 and 20) had established the central role of the Housing Corporation in monitoring the affairs of housing associations. The Housing Act, 1980, expanded these powers. It promoted standardised accounting procedures (Schedule 16, Sections 124 and 125); extended controls over committee membership, decision-making and procedures (Section 126); and strengthened the inquiry powers of the Housing Corporation (Section 129).

I referred earlier in this chapter to the contradictory aspects of the role of the Housing Corporation. It was suggested that the Housing Corporation provides support to associations and shares certain organisational interests in common with them, as for example in relation to the flow of funding. However, the Corporation is also charged with the responsibility of ensuring the proper practice, efficiency and effectiveness of associations. It is, therefore, an agency of state control.

During the period of major delays in approval between 1977 and 1980 the volume of criticism directed by associations towards the HC reached a peak and during this time the Corporation's Glasgow office experienced markedly high staff turnover. However, since 1980 there has been greater formality and clarity, with more clearly defined roles and relations. This development has served to diffuse criticism.

The extended statutory powers of the Corporation, the growth of the housing association sector and of the SFHA, the policies of the HC Board and the role of key officials have all been important in affecting relations between the HC and associations. In general, there has been some distancing in relations between the HC and associations and I would suggest that the 'maternal' image of the Corporation in the West, where Glasgow's CBHAs were 'the baby', is most definitely in decline. Secondly, there has been an internal restructuring of the Corporation which has clearly segregated its functions of monitoring and inquiry from those of scheme supervision and resource allocation and promotional work with new associations.

In 1982 a centralised Scottish monitoring unit was formed, this being ultimately responsible to the monitoring division in London. Finally, the SFHA has increasingly taken on board advisory, training and support functions in relation to associations. From the associations' point of view I would suggest that the contradictory implications of the HC's role have been somewhat reduced

and that relations between associations and the Corporation reflect awareness of mutual dependence and a considerable degree of mutual trust and respect. However, the control functions of the HC would also imply the inevitability of conflict.⁽³¹⁾ I shall explore further these relations in the case studies in Part Four of the thesis.

Section Three : Party Ideologies and the Housing Association Experience

I have argued that central and local government planning policies have influenced support for the growth of the housing association sector. In Part One I demonstrated that by 1974 there was significant convergence between the policies of Conservative and Labour parties nationally regarding the role of housing associations. Since that time, and particularly since 1979, there has been a growing revival of party political ideological debate on housing issues. However, we shall see that party ideologies at times place emphasis on contradictory values.

Scottish associations in their attempts to influence resource allocation were able to stress those ideological aspects which held direct appeal to Tory philosophy. Concepts of 'self-help', 'voluntarism', 'community regeneration' were of import in the associations' emphasis on their housing contribution. Further, in Part One we have seen that the voluntary movement has historically been supported by Conservative and Liberal political values.⁽³¹⁾

Regarding the Labour Party I have suggested in Chapter Five that by the later 1970s Labour's approach to housing had become less centralist and bureaucratic. Therefore, at the present time, Glasgow's CBHAs represent less of a contradiction to mainstream developments in housing than they did during the 1970s. Also it is evident that a key factor influencing their development was the practical constraints and uncertainties faced by the Labour party in office during the mid-1970s. However, by the early 1980s there was a significant all-party political support for institutionalised participation and for a partnership with the private sector. There was also recognition by Labour politicians that this approach could be construed as being as paternalistic as the traditionalist centralism of Labour. (32)

There are, therefore, contradictory aspects of Labour ideology, which have implications for housing associations. For example, in the Spring of 1983 associations learned of a lobby which aimed to influence the Scottish TUC and Scottish Labour Party policy against housing associations, and to divert funds from the housing association sector towards local authorities. (33) In the context of a declining direct building labour force and of reductions in local authority new starts, this development was not really surprising. However, this pressure group did not achieve sufficient political support during 1983 to make the resource allocation to the housing association sector a public issue. On the question of resource allocation to Scottish HAS

between 1979 and 1983, I am suggesting that certain aspects of Conservative ideology have acted as a buffer between the voluntary housing movement and the Government's policy of public sector cuts to date. However, there are certain points to be made regarding political ideology as an intervening variable in relation to present and future resource allocation to HAs.

First, in the context of the current economic depression and the scope for political change, there can be no guarantee that the HA movement in Scotland will continue to be allowed to expand. Secondly, even if the resources allocated by central government are sufficient to sustain a programme, the housing plans of individual councils can significantly affect the take-up of resources in different cities. Labour-controlled councils facing pressure from declining direct works departments, and in the context of house sales, may opt to expand their own building programmes. On the other hand Conservative-controlled councils may opt to extend opportunities to the private sector.

In Section Three I have emphasised that political values relating to housing provision and the role of different housing agencies are both complex and contradictory. Between the late 1960s and late 1970s I would suggest that there was a trend of growing political convergence regarding the role of the voluntary sector and planning strategies for meeting local housing needs and for tackling housing obsolescence. The dominant planning approach

emphasised advantages in incorporating localised housing interests by institutionalising participation in planning and in working in partnership with the private sector. However, I would suggest that the policies of the Thatcher Government have stimulated a revival of traditional Conservative housing values, emphasising individual responsibility and private competition, in contradiction with both the socialist emphasis on municipal care and provision and the tradition of emphasis on bourgeois philanthropy. Therefore, at the present time, housing associations operate in the context of increasing ideological conflict.

Section Four : Current Issues

1. The Outcomes of Tight Expenditure Control

We have seen that a major emphasis of the present Thatcher Government has been to enforce expenditure restraint. In this context it is important to note that despite an apparently growing resource allocation to Scottish associations, the cash limit system has been markedly effective in containing capital expenditure. In this respect housing associations have fared no differently from other public sector agencies producing housing.

For those working on the ground, the cash limit system demands an unrealistic fine-tuning of expenditure on capital works which entail longer-term planning in the context of uncertainties. The rate of future production is indicated by the development pipeline -

the backlog of projects approved in principle but not yet on site. For associations in England and Wales it has been argued that the current allocation is only sufficient to fund a capital programme of 20,000 homes, almost half that envisaged in the mid-1970s.⁽³⁴⁾ Further, the growing decline of new approvals has occurred despite the apparent reversal of the trend of major reduction in the capital expenditure allocation which characterised the later 1970s. In Scotland the number of new schemes approved in 1982-83 was just over 2,000, its lowest level since the early 1970s. N.B. Between 1977 and 1980, the average annual rate of new approvals was 5,600 units. This pattern has continued into 1983 and the reduced cash allocation for 1983-84 can only reinforce the trend.⁽³⁵⁾

Clearly local authorities have been hit hard by cuts in their allocation and by 1981 new starts on site comprised only 40% of the 1977 level.⁽³⁶⁾ By 1983 central government rules defining penalties for overspending resulted in what The Guardian referred to as creative or 'alternative' accounting by some authorities, as well as in a variety of expenditure schemes designed to avoid underspending.⁽³⁷⁾

In the context of concerns that underspending would reduce new building starts in the following financial year, the cash limit system served to encourage expenditure peaks in the months immediately prior to the end of the financial year and there were frenzied attempts to find 'quick spend' projects. For example, in March 1983 in Glasgow there was a sudden rise in employment of

joiners who were employed by firms carrying out window replacement for both the local authority and housing associations. Against this background housing associations, like other public authorities, criticised the system of cash control and the restrictions it placed on effective longer-term planning. However, consciousness of cash controls, together with cumulative experience of rehabilitation in the city, have encouraged the HC and associations to programme area improvements on a 'worst first' basis, rather than according to where associations had gained majority ownership in tenements.

2. The Implications of Privatisation

In Part One, Chapter Three I suggested that the Conservative Government's emphasis on regenerating the private housing market has important consequences for the housing association sector. The policies supporting public sector house sales and establishing favourable conditions for profit for private developers have both served to challenge the planning role of housing associations which was established during the 1970s.

We have seen that the Tenants' Rights (Scotland) Act 1980,⁽³⁸⁾ following representations by the SFHA during 1979, recognised the underdeveloped state of the movement by establishing a 'Right to Sell' as opposed to the Right to Buy.

By 1983, however, government ministers were concerned about the slow take-up of sales opportunities by Scottish associations.⁽³⁹⁾

The Minister for Home Affairs and the Environment stressed to the 1982 SFHA Conference that 'it is essential that associations adopt a positive stance to their sales policies', and criticised associations which had adopted 'a wholly negative stance' despite the Voluntary Sales Code. (40)

Further, in 1983 it became known to associations that there was interest in legislative amendment of exclusions from the Right to Buy for English associations, and in March 1983 a Private Bill was moved at the House of Commons by an Edinburgh Conservative MP who aimed to amend the Tenants' Rights Etc (Scotland) Act so as to extend the right to purchase to secure tenants of certain types of housing association. (41) This Bill was defeated by only eight votes thus causing concern that a future amendment on similar lines might prove successful.

The major argument against sales by housing associations duplicates the general criticisms emphasised by Shelter, namely that public sector sales, by depleting mainly the higher amenity public housing stock, will serve to worsen the plight of the poorly housed at a time when there are 180,000 households on Scotland's public sector house waiting list. (42) For housing associations the impact of a compulsory sales policy would serve to directly contradict associations' objectives of increasing housing opportunities by expanding and improving the stock of housing for rent. From the perspective of the Conservative Government, however, housing associations have developed with the aid of

government funds into major landlords in the inner areas. Further, alongside this development there has been overall decline of private housing ownership in inner area localities. The SFHA in this context has emphasised to government the varied ways in which CBHAs have supported owner-occupiers within area improvement programmes, despite difficulties faced by both parties in relation to insufficient levels of grant. Also in Scotland generally, some housing associations have embarked on rehabilitation for sale and shared ownership schemes and on new build for sale to the elderly.⁽⁴³⁾ However, in Glasgow rehabilitation for sale has largely been a last resort in the face of the alternative of impending or probable demolition, and most associations are of the view that against the background of complex management and maintenance problems experienced with tenemental housing in the inner areas, the effect of sales would be to revive historic problems of housing obsolescence which many housing associations had been formed to counteract.

That housing associations are operating within a markedly changed economic and planning context is further evidenced by the favourable opportunities established for private profit under 1980 legislation.⁽⁴⁴⁾ The 1974 Housing Act had imposed restrictions on profiteering by private owners improving with grant aid by applying the implicit 'carrot and stick' method. In effect, owners selling improved houses within five years of uptake of grant were required to repay a proportion of the grant. This restriction was imposed by a Labour Government which intended to preclude

speculative gain by private developers as well as threats to the security of tenants. In practice, however, the local authority in Glasgow applied conditions of repayment flexibly with regard to owner-occupiers.

This restriction was removed by the Local Government Act, 1981. Also developers had greater access to higher levels of grant. As a result, opportunities for speculative improvement increased. By 1982 local authorities in Scottish cities had been approached by private developers aiming to build housing for sale. Increasingly associations with an interest in new build or in rehabilitation faced competition by private developers for planning approval from the local authority. In the context of uncertainty regarding future resource allocation for both local authority and HA capital expenditure, it is highly probable that private developers will become more active agents of government policy, while the quality of rehabilitation will be less subject to public scrutiny.

Apart from the implications of the new 'pragmatism' for the role of the private sector, there are signs that the effectiveness of area improvement by HAs has served to stimulate local housing markets. In certain Glasgow localities (e.g. parts of Govanhill and Partick) ⁽⁴⁵⁾ housing prices increased between 1974 and 1981 at a pace which exceeded the general rate of house price inflation and, in such localities building societies and private developers have shown renewed interest. Increasingly associations attempting to

acquire property at District Valuer prices have been outbid by private owners and by 1982-83 there was growing public criticism of the standards of improvement carried out by some private developers in these areas with the aid of government subsidy.

The main point of this discussion on privatisation is that early-formed expectations in Glasgow, that CBHAs would develop as major partners in urban renewal, have been brought into question by the changing relationship between the state, housing associations and the private housing sector. Similar influences have affected associations in their role as landlord - in particular in relation to rents.

3. The Question of Rents

I referred in Chapter Three to the fact that housing association rents since 1972 have been determined by rents officers employed by the Rents Registration Service within the framework of the Fair Rents system.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Rent levels and rent increases for housing association tenants have therefore been significantly influenced by legislation defining variables to be included in rent assessment; by policies of the rent registration service; by the approach of individual rents officers and by assessments of the Rents Assessment Committees⁽⁴⁷⁾ to which appeals against rent officers' decisions can be made by either landlord or tenant.

Between 1974 and 1979 it is fair comment that Scottish associations were generally uncritical of the system. The Rents Registration office was an independent agency and its autonomy led associations to believe that rent setting was not subject to political control. Also, there was general acceptance of the legislative criteria defining rent determination, rents officers being required to take account of the 'age, character and locality of dwellings'.

CBHA participants also accepted the system of external rent setting. Committees had no desire for an alternative system vesting them with the responsibility for determining rents for their neighbours or for themselves. However, by 1981 Glasgow associations had become increasingly critical of the system.

Criticisms focused on both the apparent anomalies in rents determined by rents officers and on the significant pace of rent increases for both unimproved and improved properties, between 1981 and 1983. Regarding the question of anomalies, there was concern that houses in the same state of decay were charged variable rents and that anomalies were apparent in rents set for improved houses. Rents became a growing focus of discussion for housing management staff and committees and at the Forum. By 1982 the general view was that anomalies were produced by varying subjective perceptions held by Rents Officers regarding character and locality. (48)

Further there was the growing concern at trends affecting the level of rent increases and at the general ineffectiveness of appeals to the RAC, either by tenants, or jointly by the association and tenants, against the rents set by Rents Officers.⁽⁴⁹⁾ New build associations also expressed growing concern about anomalies. Fair rents determined for sheltered housing, produced to the same standard but located in different localities, varied at times significantly. Different groups within the SFHA, the area and staff forums therefore pressed the SFHA Council to initiate dialogue between key agencies.

Against this background representation was made to the Rents Registration Office and to the SDD and a Fair Rents Working Party was formed by the SFHA Council to investigate the problem. Also following an initiative by a Council member who argued that the Fair Rents system was designed for a housing sector characterised by goals of profitability, a Working Party was formed by the SFHA to examine the feasibility of alternatives to the present system.

It is significant that participants varied in approach to these questions. While all wanted to see anomalies removed, the questions of rent levels and the rate of rent increases were subject to differing views and interpretations. In fact, the issue of rents inevitably impinged on the varied political ideologies of participants. While by 1983 there was no open dialogue to this effect, it was evident to participants that some associations

were favourably disposed towards rent increases, while in other sectors of the movement there was a general concern that rent increases should be contained as far as possible within the bounds of fairness and feasibility. However, by 1983 many associations were concerned about the levels of rent increases since 1979. In Glasgow, CBHA registered rents in 1978 were frequently higher than those set by the local authority for comparable housing. However, between 1979 and 1983 Conservative Government policy resulted in local authority rents increasing fast, to the extent that it was difficult to determine trends affecting differentials.

Associations have become increasingly aware that since 1979 the role of the Rents Officers has been modified. In January 1979 the independent government agency of the Rents Registration Office was relocated within the offices of the SDD and its career structure was integrated with that of the civil service. Further, the 1980 Tenants' Rights Act stressed the significance of market factors in rent assessment. Rent Officers were to continue to pay regard 'to the age, character and locality of the dwelling house in question and to its state of repair'. However, they also were to apply their 'knowledge and experience of current rents of comparable property in the area' and therefore to take account of housing market factors.

By 1983 there was a growing view that the Rents Registration Office was less autonomous from Government control than its statutory

position implied and there was agreement that pressure should be exerted to reduce anomalies. In February 1983 representatives from the SDD and the Rent Registration Service agreed to attend the Glasgow Forum to explain recent developments to associations and to hear their point of view. At this meeting major concerns were expressed regarding the pace of rent increases and a representative from Govan described how rent levels had become a focus of a Tenants' Association which was considering a rent strike against the three CBHAs operating in Govan. In general, from the CBHA position in Glasgow, it appears that the rate of increase of registered rents remains largely outwith the control of both associations and their tenants.

By 1983, moreover, there was evidence that the funding conditions within which associations operate were becoming more restrictive. Policy statements heralded that Revenue Deficit Grant, a discretionary payment, was likely to be gradually phased out; a proposed Grant Redemption Fund implied that accumulated surplus was open to repossession by the state; and that rent appeals by associations, where these are effective and interpreted by the SDD as implicating 'non-maximisation' of rents by associations, could affect the payment of capital grant (HAG) by the SDD.

In conclusion the growing resource allocation to Scottish associations has been accompanied by policies of privatisation and increasing rents - developments which may have significant consequences for the longer-term planning role of housing associations.

Summary and Conclusions

Given the complexity of the material covered in Chapter Seven I shall summarise the four sections of the chapter. In Section One I concentrated on two bureaucratic mechanisms operated by central government and by the Housing Corporation in order to control housing association capital expenditure. Also in Section One I documented the housing association lobbying which focused on modifying these constraints. Section Two concentrated on the flow of resources to the housing association sector; on the system of cash control; on associations' campaigning for increased funding; and finally on the growing emphasis on the Housing Corporation's monitoring and supervisory functions which accompanied the growth of the housing association sector. Section Three considered the significance of party ideologies, both nationally and locally, for the development of housing associations and emphasised that different aspects of party ideologies have been contradictory in terms of their outcomes for different housing sectors. Finally, Section Four focused on three selected aspects of government housing policy which have important consequences for housing production and management by housing associations.

Therefore, Chapters Six and Seven have both emphasised the effects of political and economic developments and of government controls on the housing association movement, between 1975 and 1983. We have seen that certain controls affected all associations in a similar pattern to that experienced by other public sector housing

agencies (for example, the system of cash limits and the policy of privatisation); other controls were specific to the housing association sector (such as the monitoring and supervisory role of the Housing Corporation); in certain aspects associations were treated by Government as part of the private housing sector (the system of rent determination); and finally that certain controls had outcomes which were peculiar to the planning role and circumstances of CBHAs.

In some instances constraints were experienced as being so complex and nebulous that collective action by associations lacked direction and focus - for example regarding delays in approval and the issue of rents. Also the diversity of objectives and values of housing association participants had similar outcomes. Further, between 1978 and 1983 there were increasing demands by representative organisations on state agencies for consultation and negotiation over issues affecting housing association interests, and by 1982-83 there was evidence of growing regularity of these practices. I shall consider the implications of incorporation in Part Five.

Notes and References to Chapter Seven

- (1) In 1978 cost limits were increased by between 16 and 27 per cent.
- (2) Housing Corporation in Scotland, Circular No. 7, 1980. 'Rehabilitation Projects. Procedures for obtaining HC loan finance for work to existing buildings'. This Circular outlines the structure and operation of cost limits.
- (3) Interviews with SDD officials between 1978 and 1980.
- (4) SFHA, 'Background Paper on Cost Limits Restructuring', SFHA 1981.
- (5) SDD Comments on SFHA Submission (September 1980), on 'Cost Limits Restructuring', October 1980, Sections 3 and 4.
- (6) Jim Johnson in his paper 'As seen from the Sharp End: A Critique of the HC Scottish Practice Note 2/1978', op. cit., page 8, questions whether it is possible for social needs to be determined on an area basis: '... in what is too often a local planning vacuum without any apparent co-ordination of housing policies and whereby at times a range of separate agencies produce and reproduce housing in the same area'.
- (7) Glasgow District Council, Housing Plan 2, 1978 projected a vacancy rate of 3.1% of total stock by 1983. The 1978 'surplus' was between 32,800 and 44,100 houses while the Waiting List stood at 50,500 applicants. (A vacancy rate of 2% is regarded as normal, allowing for turnover and decanting.) Housing Plan 2, 1978, pages 15-16, Paras. 2.4.1, 2.4.9 and 2.4.10. And in England, by 1982, the Housing Emergency Office (HEO) formed in 1977 campaigned to promote schemes to make effective use of empty houses, Roof, March/April 1982, pp. 21-23. The numbers on G.D.C. Waiting Lists by 1982 were 70,000.
- (8) SFHA, 'Background Paper on Cost Limits Restructuring', 1981.
- (9) P. Bachrach and M.S. Baratz, 'Two Faces of Power', in F.G. Castles, D.J. Murray and D.C. Potter, Decisions, Organisations and Society, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971.
- (10) The SDD's Comments on SFHA Submission of September 1980', Section 4, (October 1980).
- (11) 'A Housing Association Programme for the 1980s, Proposals for a Five-Year Framework for Development for the Association Movement in Scotland', SFHA, 1983.

- (12) T.A. Broadbent, Planning and Profit in the Urban Economy, 1977, op. cit., pp. 134-136 presents the argument that central government financial controls underly the relations between central and local government agencies. Further I would argue that the powers of central government departments have become increasingly explicit under the present Conservative Government.
- (13) SDD Circular 11/1981, Housing Act 1974: Housing Association Grant, Delegated Cost Levels for Improvement Projects.
- (14) SDD, Scottish Housing Statistics, HMSO. Numbers 16 to 20 identify changes in the rate of building cost inflation; and trends affecting rehabilitation contract prices were a regular focus of discussion at meetings of Glasgow associations. See also Housing and Construction Statistics, MHLG, June 1981, Tables 1.3 and 2.15.
- (15) Government Expenditure Plans, 1980-81 to 1983-84, Cmnd. 7841, Hansard, Table 1.6 and Roof, March /April 1982 and 1983.
- (16) I. Dyer, 'Housing Associations in Glasgow' in Making the City Work, Glasgow District Council, 1982, op. cit., pp. 115-118.
- (17) Scottish HC News, May 1980, Issue No. 1.
- (18) The HC Annual Report, 1976-1977, illustrated a significant decrease in unit approvals (England and Wales) for New Building as compared with approvals for 1975-1976. Further the Report pointed to the increasing policy emphasis in allocation to stress area and HAA rehabilitation, HC News, Summer 1977.
- (19) H.H. Hecllo and A. Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money, Macmillan, 1974, pp. 216-217.
- (20) Housing Corporation 'Circular to all registered housing associations in Scotland', 14 April 1978, p. 2.
- (21) The Guardian, 5 December 1980, 'New Ban will hit housing associations', David Hencke.
- (22) Letter from M. Rifkind MP, the Minister for Home Affairs to J. Craigen MP, 30 July 1980, quoted in Scottish Federation News, November 1980.
- (23) SFHA Conference on New Legislation, 24 October 1980.
- (24) Robin Cook MP (Edinburgh, Labour) in parliamentary debate following questions put by Jim Craigen MP (Maryhill, Labour) Chairman of the All-Party Housing Association Parliamentary Group. H.C. Debs 15 January 1981, Columns 1644-1650.

- (25) M. Rifkind MP, quoted in Scottish Federation News, December 1980.
- (26) The 1980 campaign was covered in 14 articles in various newspapers between 22 November 1980 and 25 November 1980.
- (27) By this time the SFHA was arguing that £100 million a year was necessary to meet the previously committed annual programme, Who Cares: A Report on Scotland's Neglected Housing Problems, by David Clark, Research Officer, SFHA, October 1981.
- (28) Jim Craigen MP, Maryhill, H.C. Debs 15 January 1981, Glasgow 1644.
- (29) The Glasgow Development Forum's 'Interim Paper on Allocation of Resources to Housing Associations working in Strathclyde', was adopted as official policy at the Glasgow Forum meeting 15 January 1981.
- (30) Interview, November 1981.
- (31) My account here does not do justice to variations in regional experience and in associations' perceptions of local offices of the HC. See also the account of political appointment of HC Board members, and of associations' strong criticisms of the HC in England, in Roof, September/October 1982, pp. 12-14, which I would suggest serve to reflect English associations' longer-term experience of cuts and of privatisation policies.
- (32) Making the City Work, Glasgow District Council, op. cit., pp. 102-108.
- (33) Proposal for resolution to Perth Labour Party Conference, 11 March 1983, which was withdrawn.
- (34) 'Association Tendering Grinds to a Halt', Roof, November/December 1982, p. 9.
- (35) SFHA, A Housing Programme for the 1980s, op. cit., p. 34, and Housing Cash Limit 'Cause for Concern' - Additional £20 million needed, SFHA Press Statement, 15 December 1982. See also The Scotsman, Thursday 19
- (36) S. Hilditch, 'Build Homes Build Hope', Roof, November/December 1981, pp. 16-17.
- (37) The Guardian, Home News, 25 January 1983.

- (38) Tenants' Rights Etc (Scotland) Act 1980, Chapter 52, Part I, Sections 9-11 identify housing agencies for which sales are enforceable; Part II, Section 11 defines the principles excluding association tenants from security of tenure as defined by other housing agencies. N.B. The Right to Buy was established for public sector and housing association tenants under the Housing Act 1980.
- (39) Allan Stewart MP in his address to the SFHA Annual Conference, 1982.
- (40) The Housing Corporation in Scotland, Circular 14/1980, 'Voluntary Sales by Housing Associations'.
- (41) Debate in House of Commons on Housing Association Tenants' Rights (Scotland), 16 March 1973.
- (42) 'Disastrous Warning on Sales', Roof, September /October 1981, p. 6, and 'The Great Divide', Roof, Vol. 7, No. 6, November/December 1982.
- (43) In 1983 the SFHA published further advice to associations, SFHA Advice Note, 'Housing Associations Sales Policies No. 1' 1983 in the light of these concerns, having earlier emphasised the range of initiatives by associations in support of the voluntary code, Paper by David Clark, SFHA Research Officer, 'Home Ownership Initiatives and Sales of Association Houses'.
- (44) See S. Merrett, Owner Occupation in Britain, 1982, op. cit., Chapter 16.
- (45) Interviews with CBHA Staff, 1982.
- (46) See J.B. Cullingworth, Essays on Housing Policy, Chapter 4, George Allen and Unwin, 1979, pp. 61-73, for an analysis of relevant legislation.
- (47) Rent Assessment Committees are appeal bodies which have a membership drawn from a panel of lawyers, valuers and laymen.
- (48) A Glasgow Housing Management staff forum produced a paper on anomalies for Information, Consideration and Reaction, 1981 which stimulated a joint meeting on rents between the SDD and the SFHA in October 1981.
- (49) Rutherglen HA Ltd and West Motherwell HA Ltd which carried out appeals to reduce rents established by the rents officers, were surprised at the statements of concern by both the SDD and the Housing Corporation which followed their appeals (1982-83).

CHAPTER EIGHT

CBHAs AND THE EMERGENCE OF INTERESTS

In Chapters Six and Seven I concentrated on the dynamics of relations between CBHAs, housing associations nationally, and state agencies. We have seen that inter-relations involved, on the one hand, significant power inequalities and related conflicts (mainly in relation to state agencies) and, on the other, transactions characterised by reciprocity and exchange⁽¹⁾ (both in terms of relations with state agencies and housing association pressure groups).

In this chapter I shall explore the evolving relations between CBHAs in Glasgow and certain other groups, whose work and financial interests have been linked with the development of CBHAs and rehabilitation in Glasgow. First, I shall examine the relations between building related professionals and CBHAs (Section One). Secondly, I shall consider how different commercial interests - building contractors, landlords and property factors, and shopkeepers - have been affected by rehabilitation and the development of CBHAs (Sections Two and Three). Thirdly, I shall focus on interest groups which have stemmed from the divergent employment interests of employers and employees in CBHAs (Section Four).

In attempting to explain the development of these intergroup and interorganisational relationships, I shall emphasise here that professional and commercial interest groups control varying resources (knowledge, skills, labour, technology and property) which are sought by CBHA participants in pursuing their organisational objectives. Also we must remember that the private, commercial

enterprises, which I shall discuss in Sections Two and Three, are oriented to profitability and competition in the capitalist system of housing production and housing consumption. Further, with respect to the employment interest groups we shall see that the institutionalisation of conflict over industrial relations issues, on a city-wide scale, has served to establish a further external influence on work relations in CBHAs. Finally, we shall see that all these different types of interest groups have been influenced by the political, economic, legislative and administrative context of CBHA development.

Before I turn to examine these different interest groups, I shall remind the reader that, while this and preceding chapters emphasise the importance of external influences for the CBHA experience, my overview of that experience should not imply that CBHA participants respond similarly to external constraints. Therefore, I recognise that my generalised account of the development of CBHAs cannot do full justice to the range of strategies adopted by CBHA Committees or officials. However, the case studies in Part Four should go some way towards illustrating this diversity of approach.

1. The Urban Professionals

CBHA objectives emphasise their role in co-ordinating the improvement of sub-tolerable housing in their areas. Each improvement contract requires local committees to employ the skills of architects and quantity surveyors for the design, costing and

and submission of schemes to the Housing Corporation. These professionals are also responsible for monitoring the progress of schemes on site. Also, where the structural instability of buildings is suspected as a problem, the expertise of Structural Engineers may be required to make recommendations on special measures necessary to ensure the long-term viability of tenement buildings.

The role of the architects connected with Assist between 1969 and 1974, has already been discussed in Chapter Five. Their commitment to rehabilitation, to tenants' and residents' participation in design, and to local accountability, all reflected a professional ideology, or set of values, which established them as minority critics or radicals within their profession. The values that were demonstrated during that period were aligned to those held by radical planners and social critics.⁽²⁾ The radical critique of architecture embodied a view of the average architect as accepting of, and constrained by, the career structure and dominant values of the profession, as well as by the economic, political and bureaucratic context within which planning and architecture typically operate.

In general, during the early stages, rehabilitation did not prove attractive to the architectural profession. The dominant emphasis in architecture views professional achievement as related to excellence in formal aspects of design.⁽³⁾ Social constraints and considerations and technological constraints are viewed, in some architectural schools, as knowledge to be absorbed through practical

training and experience after design skills have been learnt. It is perhaps not surprising that Assist developed in a school in which students were encouraged to think in terms of such constraints on the design process - an approach which was not always liked by students, or by the wider profession. Members of Assist in the early stages at times experienced rejection of the value of their contribution by the profession's establishment. After the Director of Assist had delivered a paper at a conference, one Professor said, 'It was not worth travelling all the way from Birmingham to hear a talk about the conversion of flats', and another establishment figure commented, 'rehabilitation - all that you need is a good Clerk of Works and a Social Worker'.⁽⁴⁾ So, during a period of boom in new building work, rehabilitation was clearly viewed as a less attractive, second rate activity within the profession - despite the fact that architects' fees for rehabilitation have been proportionately higher than those for new building (10% for rehabilitation as compared with 5.8% for new building).

During the 1970s, there was a steady decline in the volume of new-building in both public and private sectors. By the late 1970s the policy of rehabilitation had become well established at local authority level,⁽⁵⁾ and rehabilitation and environmental improvement had become the major work involvement for many architectural firms in the City. Also, the 1978 Housing Repairs (Scotland) Act has allowed the local authority to develop repairs schemes in tenement areas where the majority of housing is above tolerable standard,

thus reinforcing the emphasis on improvement in architectural work. (6)

In general, architects have been encouraged by CBHAs to establish local offices and to get involved in consultation with residents over their preferences in design, however restricted their choices might be. Also, they have experienced more direct accountability to both their client (the CBHA) and the user (tenant or owner-occupier). For example, it is not unusual for local residents who are members of the relevant sub-committee to interview architects regarding delays in a contract on site, or to emphasise the approach required of the architect in relation to local residents.

There has been an interesting consequence of the experience of rehabilitation in the CBHA context for the architects and structural engineers whose skills have increasingly been drawn on in rehabilitation. Individual professionals have described how they have gradually become aware of the extent to which technical decisions are made within a social context and therefore have social implications. For example, at a 1979 conference it was argued by one structural engineer that decisions relating to the future life of tenement properties could not be based purely on technical and economic criteria:

Value judgments are inherent in such decisions, as is risk-taking I'm prepared to put my reputation at stake. So should Housing Associations and the Housing Corporation if two hundred residents want to remain in the locality. They must be prepared to take risks with public money and should pressure the Scottish Development Department to do so. (7)

The structural engineer was referring to cases where under-mining had been identified as implying the need for costly structural engineering solutions as a precondition of rehabilitation. His comments serve to illustrate that professional ideologies and practice in the City have been affected by the participation of professionals in the process of rehabilitation; by their involvement with CBHAs; and by their growing recognition and understanding of the problems faced by working class inner area residents.

Within Assist in the early stages there was no consensus view regarding the form of organisation, or the role of the architect, appropriate to locality-based rehabilitation. Some assumed that the architect would occupy a central role in servicing the Management Committee in their policy-making functions, in liaising with individual residents and in co-ordinating the development of the CBHA, as well as in providing architectural services. This was the model adopted at both Govan and Govanhill, and in Tollcross (where the National Building Agency carried out development work) in the early stages.

On the other hand, the model which was encouraged through the Housing Corporation's advice to new CBHAs established the Development

Officer's role as central to the organisational structure in its early development phase. Architects were therefore placed in the role of consultants with a more conventional professional remit. Therefore, some architects who were attracted by the more generalist role described above have to some extent experienced decreasing job satisfaction.

It was also the case that, at the time the local authority was considering alternative approaches to the implementation of rehabilitation, one member of Assist strongly favoured the establishment of a city-wide Assist type operation which would provide technical and administrative services for locally-based Management Committees. The formation of The new Housing Association in 1979 incorporates this model in providing services to associations which cannot afford to employ staff themselves. (8)

After seven years of growth of the rehabilitation 'industry', tenement rehabilitation had developed into a major aspect of the work of many architectural practices in the City. By 1982, the recession in the building industry had ensured that CBHAs were able to select architects who had gained considerable experience in rehabilitation work. Therefore policy developments, the economic context of building and the growth of CBHAs have affected the work of building professionals in Glasgow. However, in turn, developments within the professions have had import for CBHAs and their relations with government agencies.

For example, as architects have gained experience in the complex technology of rehabilitation and in dealing with wide ranging structural problems of old tenements, there have been changes in the architectural approach to rehabilitation. It is interesting that many architects who favoured improvement rather than clearance of Glasgow's older tenements, identified with intentions of conserving buildings and communities and of providing opportunities for resident participation in the process of house improvement. The experience of CBHAs and their architects to date, within the context of current planning conditions, has been influenced by inherent contradictions stemming from different objectives relating to locally-co-ordinated rehabilitation. For instance, there is a continuous tension between resident choice, the speedy co-ordination of improvement and CBHA control of improvement standards in the long-term interests of people and housing in their areas. Further, some of these tensions are evident in relation to the position of owner-occupiers whose 'choice' has been restricted by grant levels which have regularly been inadequate to cover the costs of both repair levels favoured by CBHAs and the local residents on their committees; and improvement standards preferred by the owner-occupiers.

In the context of the administrative requirements of CBHA rehabilitation, the constraints of funding and of the tenement structure, the role of architects in the process of rehabilitation has become more clearly defined. The architect's role is now recognised as requiring an enlightened approach to design; technical

expertise relating to the specification and monitoring of building work on the tenemental site; consultation and adaptability regarding resident requirements and preferences within the bounds of planning, economic and technical constraints; advice-giving with regard to policy-making by the CBHA committee; and finally, working in partnership with other building professionals where specialised advice is required for specific contracts.

One major area in which architects have influenced CBHA rehabilitation is that of building standards. Even those firms which in the mid-1970s favoured a 'conservation' approach have discovered that in many areas the extent of disrepair of common parts of the tenement, as well as of the internal condition of houses, demands an emphasis on extensive replacement and renewal of the building. At the present time there is less arbitrary emphasis on the validity of conservationism or the 'patch and repair' approach and more firms are favourably disposed towards what is now termed the 'gut approach' which produces the fact and feeling of being in a new house through rehabilitation.

Despite this changing emphasis, efforts are generally made to retain aesthetically pleasing features, internal or external to tenement buildings. The overall trend towards what can only be defined as higher standards of repair, has in my experience been generally favoured by Management Committees and local residents throughout the city. Finally, regarding architects and the CBHA

approach to rehabilitation standards, it should be noted that some firms have acted as 'pace-setters' influencing both architectural practices and CBHAs throughout the city.⁽⁹⁾

As for the role of structural engineers, they too have influenced both government policy and the approach of CBHAs to the technical problems experienced in rehabilitation. Structural engineers have over time convinced architects, CBHAs and government agencies of the need to provide additional stabilisation to certain tenements, and to apply a variety of methods in order to counteract structural deficiencies and problems, such as risks associated with the unstable ground conditions which have stemmed from past undermining in areas like Govanhill to the South, Partick and Queens Cross to the West, and Shettleston, Tollcross and Parkhead to the East of the City. Finally, the growing experience of such problems by CBHAs has led to the increasing regularity of their employment of structural engineers in rehabilitation contracts.

In this section I have pointed to the reciprocity and mutual influence between CBHAs and their professional consultants. On the one hand, CBHA policy-making and its outcomes are dependent on the skills and advice offered by their professional consultants. On the other hand, I have argued that the local accountability dimension of CBHAs has had implications for professional orientations and decision-making. In the case studies we shall see that the dynamics of local accountability have led CBHA participants, and their consultant professionals, to question established guidelines

about aspects of risk and of housing standards in rehabilitation - an outcome which has been expressed in mutual criticism, by CBHAs and professionals, of government policies. In general, professional standards are evolving against a background of local pressure and of the increasing knowledge of urban professionals about inner area housing conditions and residents' preferences. CBHAs, as the official 'client' of architects and structural engineers, serve as a vehicle through which professionals gain information about the locality and local housing conditions, and about residents' concerns and preferences. However it must be remembered that, despite this reciprocal influence, in the last resort architects and quantity surveyors are dependent for future work on the continuing goodwill and future workload of the CBHA Committees which employ them.

In the following sections of Chapter Eight I shall examine the relations between CBHAs and certain commercial interests which further influence CBHA policies, activities, and their local housing environment. The interest groups which will be discussed here are building contractors; landlords and property factors (property management agents) and shopkeepers.

2. Commercial Interests and CBHAs

2.a. The building contractor

Interest in rehabilitation was slow to develop amongst contractors in the West of Scotland. We have seen that during the

1960s public sector new building was at a peak and new building was considerably less complex organisationally, less uncertain, and therefore almost certainly more profitable than rehabilitation.

The early experience of area rehabilitation in Glasgow served to highlight the instability and unpredictability which has long been characteristic of the industry. A large firm working on a local authority scheme in the early 1970s went into liquidation, while the firm which took over gathered expertise, expanded rapidly and became extensively involved in rehabilitation throughout the city. In general the decline in new building during the 1970s, the growing emphasis on rehabilitation in government policy and the formation of CBHAs have meant that rehabilitation became a significant source of work for many building firms in Glasgow.

Many contractors were unhappy about these developments. CBHA rehabilitation required contractors to learn new administrative rules and to develop new organisation structures. For example, while rehabilitation requires fewer crafts than new build (e.g. bricklayers), other skills become more important (e.g. plumbing, plastering and joinering). In general, the work process is more complex than new build and in some ways the skills are more exacting, demanding 'cut and fit' techniques rather than the assembling of standardised units, as in new build. A senior official of the Scottish Construction Industry Group commented in interview:

Contract management in rehabilitation is far more complex than in new build where the contractor starts with a 'virgin site'. Some firms could not cope and they got their fingers burnt. Organisationally they were deficient and obviously this resulted in delays on site etc. However others became masters of the game and expanded almost into monopolies. (10)

Rehabilitation as a work process is inherently uncertain.

Both CBHAs and contractors learn through experience that the full extent of structural problems can only be determined after work has begun on site. For example, it is not until after the tenement building is stripped out that the extent of wet and dry rot or plaster repair can be gauged. Therefore builders much prefer to work in tenements from which people have been decanted, to carrying out modernisation work with tenants 'in-house'.

Particularly in their early stages of growth, CBHAs organised small-scale contracts of one or two tenements. The size of contract is restricted by the number of empty houses available for housing residents while work is in process (Decant Houses) and by the availability of tenements with no acquisition problems, and both these requirements cause problems for young CBHAs. The organisation of work, manpower and equipment is therefore particularly complicated for contractors operating in rehabilitation on small contracts which may be spread throughout the city. Also, where owner-occupier improvements are involved, the contractor may have to cope with variations in the specifications for different flats.

CBHAs and contractors relate on the basis of different sets of expectations and so conflict is at times inevitable. This is reflected in the content of the Building Contract. Once a contract between a CBHA and the contractor concerned is approved by the Housing Corporation, it is likely that the builder's aims are to complete the job, according to the architect - drawn specification, within a reasonable time-scale, and to maximise economic returns. The CBHA is concerned that the job should be completed within the proposed time period, while ensuring a good standard of workmanship. The association's aim here is to minimise future maintenance costs. The contractor is also interested in speedy payment of work completed.

Regarding the contractors' conception of CBHAs, the Director of the Scottish Building Employers' Federation suggested that 'housing associations are small businesses yet one gets the impression that they don't always see themselves that way'. At one stage, contractors had experienced difficulties over the promptness of progress payments, and attempts to tackle the problem seemed to contractors to result in 'buck passing' between associations and the HC. However he suggested that such difficulties had largely been ironed out. He emphasised that by the 1980s there was evidence of more respect amongst contractors for CBHAs.

On the whole relations between builders and housing associations are good. As clients I would say they have a slight edge on local authorities. There is far less bureaucracy and it is usually possible to get to the people who make the decisions. The main thing we like is that everyone is ready to talk.

2.b. Some influences on contract delays

At times CBHAs and contractors recognise that they are mutually disadvantaged by external influences on delays, while at others there are conflicts of interest and disputed assessments regarding which party to the contract is to blame for delays. Delays on site can be caused by a multitude of factors, e.g. structural problems (particularly dry rot), industrial conflict, bad weather, unclear architect's instructions, workmanship which requires correction or re-doing by the Association. The building contract allows for the offsetting of certain costs to the injured party, in the form of liquidated damages which are borne by the contractor where the architect as arbitrator decides he was responsible for delays (e.g. disorganisation on site). Compensation is claimed by the contractor from the CBHA if he can argue that delays were caused by the association, its professional consultants, or by unforeseen circumstances. The Building Contract negates the contractor's responsibility on a range of criteria, e.g. inclement weather, unforeseen structural problems, shortages of material. More recently, CBHAs have been faced with claims for extra payment by contractors a long time after contract completion.

In general, associations' staff and committees view CBHAs as the more vulnerable party to the Building Contract, being extensively dependent on the contractor's commitment and efficiency. Some staff have suggested that certain firms, which are administratively sophisticated and which stress their economic efficiency, may apply

considerable managerial expertise in analysing the progress of contracts on site in the financial interest of the building firm, and in claiming compensation. Associations have also been concerned about the shortage of contractors willing to tender for their contracts. In 1979 five contractors were involved in 95% of rehabilitation work in Glasgow.⁽¹¹⁾ By 1982, when associations in the city were striving to meet expenditure targets, there was concern that if any large contractor was to go bust, of the half dozen or so working in several areas of the city, this would have major repercussions for expenditure on rehabilitation in the West for 1982-83. The general pattern is the same at the present time (January 1984) despite the fact that associations have made several attempts to involve new contractors in Glasgow's rehabilitation programme. For example, one large firm, experienced in District Council modernisation and new build outwith the city, won several tenders in 1982 in different CBHA areas. This firm soon gathered a reputation of being fast, efficient and as having a capacity for good workmanship. In 1983 the same firm resolved to withdraw from housing association rehabilitation in Glasgow, having concluded that its earlier expectations had been too optimistic. The current pattern is that approximately 12 large contractors dominate the rehabilitation scene in the West of Scotland, while at random other firms win single contracts.

2.c. Two examples of contract delays

Both CBHAs which I have observed most closely, over the period of the research (Reidvale and Govanhill), have experienced a particularly problem fraught contract. These contracts involved the discovery of a severe structural problem after work had started on site. (12)

The Reidvale contract was a six close contract for which the contract period was originally estimated at six months. In all, the time taken to complete was about 17 months. Five months after the start of work, while stonecleaning was in progress, the association was informed of suspected faulty stonework at a rear wall. A stone expert was consulted and recommended that at least two tenements required part demolition and rebuilding. Having gained the necessary approvals for the extra work and costs, work continued on site and a revised completion date was established between the architects and the association. Eleven months after the start of the contract the contractors submitted a claim for disruption and disturbance, and requested it should be met in the form of an Interim Payment to account. The association requested fuller information as a precondition of payment. This claim was settled at a later date, the Housing Corporation agreeing to provide loan finance, but a further claim was later received. Contract completion was therefore 12 months later than had been originally estimated.

In Govanhill, one six close phased contract involved a tenement which had taken 18 months to completion, while three others took between nine months and one year. By the time the second close was completed, the Management Committee were becoming increasingly concerned about standards of workmanship and regular occurrences of delays. At this stage in one of the tenements, which was already three months behind schedule but near to completion, the stairwell collapsed and required temporary shoring up. After the necessary approvals of additional costs for rebuilding, work continued on site. However three months later further problems ensued: a plumbing sub-contractor went into liquidation causing substantial delays and later other sub-contractors went into liquidation; the main sub-contractor asked for a time extension; and finally claims were made against the association for materials and abortive work.

In both these cases of delay, the responses and interpretation of events by the association and the local residents affected showed these similarities: first, at certain stages, both Management Committees reacted to their growing concerns by attempting to determine where blame for certain aspects of delay should be apportioned, and by ensuring that further guarantees of completion were requested of the contractor; secondly, as new completion dates were given and then by-passed, the residents affected became distressed and very resentful; thirdly, both associations were aware that during the contract period, turnover of technical staff

served to inhibit consistent control over the contractors; fourthly, administrative problems were experienced in terms of restriction on the flow of decant houses and other contracts had to be put back as a result.

At Reidvale, an Action Group was formed by the affected residents, led by a resident who has been consistently active in local politics. The Action Group brought press attention to the issue, while denying that they blamed the association. Later they demanded a meeting with the Directors of the building firm, who declined the invitation, but broke precedent by agreeing to meet with the Management Committee to give some account of the reasons for delay and to suggest further completion dates. The Directors sat through this meeting, knowing that members of the Action Group, together with their District and Regional Councillors, were waiting to hear its outcome. When work was still not complete, after four months on site, some 20 or so residents staged a demonstration at the Contractor's office and demanded to see the Directors. The Directors agreed to meet the group on the building site that afternoon, although later it turned out that even the assurances given at that point proved to be unfounded.

The Reidvale case was an untypical instance of resident reaction to the experience of delays. However, it highlights the extent of bitterness, frustration and anger which may be associated with the experience. It also would appear to suggest that local accountability may have certain consequences for building contractors!

Another important aspect of CBHA life is that conflict of interests is at times part of the experience of Management Committee Members and is significantly related to the different social roles which they occupy. The Reidvale example illustrates this point as three of the Management Committee Members including the Chairman of the association were residents of the closes affected by the delays, and the Chairman's close had been one of the first to be completed.

The Committee Members, who were also tenants, took a serious view of the Committee's managerial responsibilities in relation to delays in general. However, in this extreme example, their families were personally affected by the experience. Like the other residents of the six closes, their expectations were not realised and they were disappointed with and critical of the contractor. However, when the other residents chose to demonstrate at the contractor's office and demanded a meeting on site, the Chairman argued that the Management Committee members, who were legally the building firm's employers, should not participate, despite their support for the Action Group.

The Action Group, on the other hand, was critical of this response and perceived it in terms of the Management Committee's unwillingness to express solidarity with the residents' case. This would suggest that the Action Group members did not make any distinction between the social and formal organisational roles and

obligations of Management Committee members, in contrast with the Committee members who responded by emphasising their role obligations in relation to the association. However, it was evident that some Committee members experienced emotional conflict and personal disturbance in the context of contradictory pressures.

Such delays have been a common experience. It is now believed that contract periods estimated were too ambitious in the early stages, when 8-12 weeks was the aim. At present, six months is the general expectation but several contracts have taken much longer to complete. Consequences for local residents temporarily living in decant houses involve, at a minimum, disturbance of plans (e.g. holidays, new furniture), and at their most extreme, severe distress. Family crises or nervous conditions are obviously exacerbated by the experience of delays.

Finally, these examples have served to emphasise the implications of role conflict for CBHAs, which will be further illustrated in Part Four, in relation to housing management in CBHAs. It is, however, worth noting here that in interview some officials raised the point that conventional housing associations have increasingly been criticised for the 'conflict of interests' which ensues from situations where Management Committee members are professionals (e.g. architects or lawyers), who may gain in economic terms from acting as paid consultants to the association. However, in CBHAs, Management Committee members are frequently individuals whose housing interests are directly affected by the association.

CBHA staff and Management Committees in the early stages have limited knowledge of the organisational problems on site. Further, in Chapter Five I emphasised the frustrations experienced due to government controls, which at times have constrained the structure and process of work to a significant degree. As one experienced architect commented: 'Contractors are sometimes confused as to whom they are employed by, whether it is central government or the housing association'.⁽¹³⁾

Regarding government controls, there is an area of common ground between contractors, CBHA staff and committees, and architects, although at times for different reasons. At Conference and Seminars all parties voiced criticisms of the effects of different controls where these appeared to be the cause of delays.

Contractors, CBHAs and architects at the present time are generally committed to a high degree of renewal in order to achieve a better standard of improvement, the reduction of future maintenance costs and greater ease in the organisation and process of work. Finally, building contractors have lobbied government for more funds in partnership with the Glasgow Forum (1981), as well as regularly through the SCIG, which is a body representing building contractors, the building professions, civil engineering contractors, building materials producers, sub-contractors and trade unions. A similar inter-related strategy of lobbying was adopted in December 1983, when Scottish associations were faced by their first cut in

resource allocation, and the Glasgow Forum of CBHAs attempted to co-ordinate a concerted lobby in the West of Scotland to press for more resources.

For the CBHA and its consultants, the persistent problem is how to control contractors in the context of the range of uncertainties built in to the process of rehabilitation and the existing form of the building contract. A common strategy has been that many CBHAs have chosen to incrementally incorporate technical and financial expertise within their organisations. Finally, for contractors it would appear that, where choice is available, new building or local authority rehabilitation - which involve bigger and/or more repetitive contracts; a more flexible system of approval; and a greater emphasis on renewal - will be a preferable source of work and income.

3. The Owners of Sub-Tolerable Property

3.a. Private landlords and property factors

Landlords of tenement property in the inner areas were clearly affected by legislation which placed an obligation on owners of housing within action areas to execute improvements. When locally based housing associations were approved as agents operating within Treatment Areas (under 1969 Act), and within Action Areas (1974 Act), some landlords were glad of the opportunity to dispose of their property. They had experienced a freeze on rents (1971), and

increasing costs of repair and maintenance, so decreasing profitability and even losses were important in influencing their definition of the situation. Heavy insurance costs and management fees reinforced these trends. Also, many landlords were elderly small-scale owners who saw no value in bearing the costs of improvement, despite the alternative of accepting a low 'tenanted' value for their property.

In some instances there were defunct trusts, where the owners had died, thus leaving property factors with the administrative and financial burden of maintaining the property. Factors were generally happy to forego their management fees in these situations. Therefore, in the context of uncertainties in relation to the future role of housing associations and the effects of legislation on their position, many landlords chose to sell and some CBHAs acquired large portfolios of property in their early stages. Others were more interested in retaining ownership. Some landlords had already executed improvements under the 1969 legislation - for example, in Treatment Areas in Govanhill and Govan - although these improvements were to a significantly lower standard than required by 1974 legislation, and did not generally include common repairs.

As landlords became more informed as to the implications of legislation, and of the role of CBHAs, the pattern changed. Some landlords who owned tenements in relatively good structural repair, or which were located in the areas with a favourable position in the housing market, chose to bear the costs of improvement themselves.

After the system of rent registration was established, some landlords were able to increase their rents according to the facilities offered by their properties. Also, as they became more aware of loan, and even grant facilities available from the local authority, these landlords were more likely to identify their interests with the retention of ownership.

However, some landlords who have chosen not to sell have also shown an unwillingness to improve, when approached by the housing association regarding rehabilitation of their properties. More recently, since 1979, the local authority has been prepared to exercise compulsory purchase in this situation. However, the lengthiness of this process has made it a less favoured option for CBHAs. Therefore, CBHAs have experienced considerable problems and uncertainty in co-ordinating improvements, due to the landlords' responses. At times landlords expressed interest in selling, then changed or delayed their decision. Clearly, in financial terms from the landlord's perspective, the price of sale will increase as the property market inflates, so there may be little advantage in selling quickly. In fact, in the rare recent cases where the CPO process has been set in motion landlords have generally sold up prior to implementation.

Finally we have seen that 1981 legislation served to establish more flexible conditions of grant, thus encouraging private landlord development. As a result, housing associations increasingly compete

directly with private developers for even derelict buildings, and private developers 'are being subsidised directly and substantially from public resources'. However the extent of this varies with the politics of individual local authorities. (14)

3.b. The property factors - Glasgow's private sector housing management specialists

Glasgow's property factors deserve special mention as they have been so central to the experience of tenement living in the city's inner areas. There is no doubt that some firms of property factors would have preferred to halt the deterioration of Glasgow's tenements and even to attempt large-scale improvement. From the factors' point of view, however, they were inhibited both by the costs of improvement, and by the absence of political support in the local authority. During the 1930s, the Property Owners and Factors Association had acquired a tenement on Tollcross Road, which included 12 two apartment flats, with the sole intention of demonstrating the feasibility of comprehensive improvement. A representative of the Association commented that the 'experiment' had depended on the co-operation and support of the Glasgow Corporation. In the 1930s, an attempt to develop the scheme failed due to the by-laws of the Corporation. The Association tried again in the early 1960s when the scheme was progressed to the stage of inviting tenders from six contractors. However, the Corporation was unable to provide adequate grant or loan funding. Nor was the Corporation prepared to meet the Association's request for rehousing of existing tenants, although

the Association had proposed to offer eight improved houses to people on the GDC Waiting List.

Apart from this prototype scheme, several factors had, since 1945, independently developed plans for tenement improvement, which were similarly scrapped due to lack of available funds. The Property Owners and Factors Association has long argued that rent levels in Glasgow have been too low to allow slack for adequate maintenance. A representative of the Association stressed the Francis Committee's comments in 1971 on a table of registered rents which emphasised that rents fixed by ROs and by RACs were 'modest' in comparison with English rents, but suggested that the Rents Registration service was operating in a 'somewhat hostile climate'.⁽¹⁵⁾

Therefore, the property factors recognised that tenement rehabilitation in the private sector would require public subsidy, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s some property factors had become interested in forming housing associations. The final irony, therefore, for the Property Owners and Factors Association occurred when their 'prototype' tenement was sold to Tollcross Housing Association in 1974, their own scheme having failed previously due to the absence of political support. Against this background it is not surprising that the factors held reservations about the expansion of CBHAs with the aid of extensive government funding.

Clearly the growth of CBHAs has served to contract the potential market for a professionalised property management service.

However, the factors were well aware of the co-ordination problems faced by CBHAs in the context of mixed ownership rehabilitation. As CBHAs have grown, the majority have chosen to develop housing management as an 'in-house' function. This policy has aimed at ensuring control over future standards of property maintenance, and increasing the accessibility of management services to local residents. As this trend has progressed and rent collection and cyclical maintenance programmes have been taken over by CBHAs from the factors, the latter have had to bear some loss of income. Some associations have attempted to rationalise the number of factors operating in relation to housing in their ownership with the co-operation of the factors themselves. Their intention was to employ the services of those they defined as the 'better', more efficient factors in order to increase their control over the quality of housing management.

One might have expected a hostile response to these developments. However, there was no attempt at concerted opposition by the Property Owners and Factors Association in the city. I would suggest that lack of concerted opposition to a development which clearly was adversely to affect their interests, could be attributed to three main reasons. First, historically, factors worked competitively in relation to each other within local property markets in the city, and this may have restricted the development of a common and concerted approach to the issue. Secondly, we have seen that the earlier efforts by the property factors to gain local authority funding and support for their

role in tenement house improvements, had proved unsuccessful. Thirdly, some experienced property factors had become involved on the Steering Group of certain CBHAs in the early stages (Govanhill, Tollcross, Govan). Also the general approach of Assist, the Housing Corporation and the Scottish Federation emphasised the importance of developing a co-operative relationship with factors and drawing on their experience and services, so that initially CBHAs did not in fact threaten the factors' position. Therefore, it was only by 1976, when Reidvale, Elderpark and Queens Cross HAS began at an early stage to develop a Housing Management function that factors were fully aware of their potential loss of income, and even of staff to CBHAs.⁽¹⁶⁾ I would suggest, however, that despite the lack of concerted opposition by the property factors, the confidence of CBHAs about their ability to provide a more efficient and sensitive housing management than the factors, and the factors' communications with young CBHA staff, who apparently lacked experience in the property market, must have been a source of irritation to long-established family firms.

It is interesting that in different Scottish cities the relations between housing associations, landlords and property factors have developed differently.⁽¹⁷⁾ In Dundee, factors have been involved with two of the larger housing associations' management committees and there has been little emphasis on developing an internal housing management function. In Edinburgh and Aberdeen, where there has been less emphasis on comprehensive and co-ordinated

area improvements and more on conservation of buildings and private ownership, landlords have tended to retain ownership and improve themselves. Also in Edinburgh and Aberdeen, property management did not develop as an independent commercial function as the legal profession traditionally carried out management services for tenement owners. Further, while Glasgow District Council has historically been viewed as authoritarian, it is interesting that the Conservative-controlled Edinburgh District Council has applied powers of compulsion forcing private owners to carry out repairs.⁽¹⁸⁾ Thus the co-ordination necessary due to the multiple ownership of tenements, served to stimulate local government control over private owners in the absence of private co-ordinating agencies. The key role of the property factors is therefore largely peculiar to the West of Scotland (Glasgow, Paisley, Greenock), and to Dundee where property management has frequently been a family business crossing the generations.

Therefore, urban differences would appear to have stemmed from the dominant approach of associations' committees and staff, of the Regional Office of the Housing Corporation and of the local authority. From the landlord's point of view, assessment of the extent to which improvement may increase the value of their investment in property, has clearly been a key consideration.

Finally we have seen that as profit-seeking agencies, the property factors, private landlords and private developers have interests in common which have clearly been affected by the

development of housing associations and by local and central government policies.

3.c. Shop owners and other owners of non-residential properties in CBHA areas

Like landlords, the owners of commercial properties in CBHA areas vary significantly in their characteristics. They range from small family concerns (e.g. corner shops), which may earn a relatively low income and rely heavily on low overhead costs, to large national concerns, some of which operate financially by subsidising low-income branches from the earnings of more profitable ones.

Legislation relating to area rehabilitation only concerns itself with housing, yet in Scotland, to a far greater extent than in England, the inter-dependence of housing and commercial properties is a function of the structure of tenement buildings and of the legal context of ownership of tenement property. Title Deeds specify the proportional financial responsibilities attributable to the owners of tenement property for maintaining the common parts of the building. Commercial owners, therefore, are legally obliged to pay a share of the cost of common repair, yet they may gain no direct advantage from the expenditure on common repairs required of them. It has been argued, however, that in some areas the alternative for shop-owners would have been demolition and significant loss of clientele and income, or even dislocation.

CBHA improvement of tenements involves extensive consultation and negotiation between CBHA staff and commercial owners. Until 1979, no facilities were available offering access to loan and grant by central government or by the local authority, and this led to continuous pressure by CBHAs and the Scottish Federation on the government agencies. Commercial properties, large and small, were not favourably disposed towards accepting the required expenditure.

In 1979, Glasgow District Council proposed a scheme involving loan and even grant facilities in extreme cases in order to alleviate the situation affecting the small shopkeeper, many of whom had begun to take legal advice on their rights. The scheme proved enormously complex administratively as had been expected by the GDC officials who developed the scheme by 'cobbling together bits and pieces of a number of Acts and powers'.⁽¹⁹⁾ The Shops (Repair) Scheme was unable to solve the problem and the vast majority of commercial properties did not meet the criteria of grant. It, therefore, did little to minimise the resentment of shopkeepers towards CBHAs.

The GDC officials who designed the scheme were well aware of potential implementation problems. They were, however, hopeful that their attempt would serve to increase recognition within the SDD of the severity of the problem.

The SFHA and the Glasgow Forum raised the issue of grant funding for commercial properties at every opportunity. At one meeting of the Glasgow Forum, attended by representatives from SDD, the Forum spokesman explained the problems facing CBHAs and shopkeepers in action areas. In response, a senior official at SDD who had only recently become responsible for housing association affairs, was heard to exclaim, 'My goodness, this sounds like a "dogs dinner"'.⁽²⁰⁾

A variety of strategies was adopted by CBHAs in relation to commercial properties. In some districts with vast shopping areas (e.g. Duke Street, Partick, Govan), CBHAs concentrated on improving housing in the side streets first. This option was not necessarily contradictory to an emphasis on tackling housing with least amenity first, as housing on main shopping streets frequently had internal toilets, and secondly, was generally more spacious. However, concerned that there might be no forthcoming resolution of the funding problem, several CBHAs began to proceed on a piecemeal basis, by consulting and negotiating with non-residential property owners regarding their share of costs for common works and for improvement to their own property. Where shopowners refused to co-operate, a minority of CBHAs proceeded to take them to arbitration to resolve their share of costs.⁽²¹⁾ However, the legal wrangles likely to ensue from such proceedings had not been confronted fully by 1982-83.

Some CBHAs have adopted a strategy of acquiring shops to speed up the process of improvement. At the pre-improvement stage the association's costs are in excess of rents, and after improvement economic rents would be prohibitive to small shopkeepers. Therefore, if the CBHA Management Committee is committed to retaining small shopkeepers and the service they provide to local residents, then they may have to build up an overdraft as they have no access to grant facilities if local shopkeepers cannot afford the costs of improvement themselves. While the Housing Corporation did not favour a policy of acquiring non-residential properties, they were appreciative of the problem. Therefore, when there was no alternative means of carrying out comprehensive improvements, the HC approved loan funding for the acquisition of shops by CBHAs. By 1983, one CBHA had acquired and improved over 12 shops and the majority of associations had acquired a scattering of shops in their areas.

In some areas where CBHAs operate, residents, shopowners and the association are all aware that on the other side of the street where a GDC Improvement Scheme has taken place, shops have been acquired and internally improved. In these instances committees view the process of CBHA area rehabilitation as unreasonably constrained by the bureaucratic system of funding, and shopkeepers hold low regard for the credibility of CBHAs.

Shopowners have discussed their situation in Action Areas at meetings of the Glasgow Federation of the Self-Employed.

Exchange of experiences has served to highlight the different approaches of CBHAs to shops in their areas. Recognition of varying common repair specifications stimulated an approach on the part of shops which stressed their divergent interests in relations to CBHAs, and resulted in increasing uptake of legal advice. (22)

Against this convoluted background to the 'shops' question, the SDD commissioned a research project in Spring 1981 to be co-ordinated by the Steering Group on which the SFHA and the HC were represented. Therefore, after some six years of representations and accumulated experience of the problem, the SDD Research Project symbolised central government's recognition of its implications for housing association tenement rehabilitation. In mid-1982, the historic pattern of non-decision-making (based on the SDD assertion that subsidy to non-residential properties in Action Areas was not possible within the existing legislative framework), was overturned when the SDD announced that from 1 April 1983, grants and loans would be available to non-residential properties in tenements. (23)

While this development establishes a more constructive funding framework for the co-ordination of comprehensive area improvements, CBHAs are still left to operate within 'a dogs dinner'. Knowledge of access to forthcoming grants meant that CBHA negotiations with shopkeepers continued to be highly sensitive in 1983, particularly in schemes affecting several private owners. I would suggest that the new conditions are likely to

reinforce the awareness of shopkeepers that they have faced unequal conditions over time, and between and within CBHA areas. Further, some CBHAs are concerned that proposed grant levels are inadequate in relation to actual costs of repair work. However, the 50% grant means that genuine cases of hardship are more likely to be resolved.

Finally, the shops question illustrates further the tensions between central government policy and the scope for local authority discretion. For example, the GDC Housing Committee questioned (5 May 1983) that grant should be allocated indiscriminately as this would benefit multiple chains, for example, pubs, as well as small shopkeepers facing hardship. The Committee demanded further investigation of procedures for implementation. Also the SDD has specified that local authorities have discretion regarding the back-dating of grant. (24)

Preceding sections have focused on the ways in which the development of CBHAs has affected certain urban interest groups which have been significantly connected with the CBHA work process and its environment. These interests have been seen to control different resources required by CBHAs. Architects and related building professionals control essential skills; building firms control labour, machinery and technical skills required by the technology of rehabilitation; and the property factors, landlords and shopkeepers exercise varying forms of economic control over the properties which CBHAs seek to improve.

Regarding the relations between CBHAs and these external interests, there is evidently a multi-directional process of influence. The development of CBHAs and rehabilitation has clearly served to influence the fortunes and work of private interests such as architects and property factors. However, such groups operate within the same political, economic, technological and planning environment, within which CBHAs attempt to seek their organisational interests and objectives, and have therefore experienced similar constraints. At times, however, different urban interests have independently exerted considerable influence on the speed and quality of CBHA rehabilitation. Finally, we have seen that an important influence on relations between certain business interests and CBHAs has been the contradiction between, on the one hand, their orientation to profit and on the other hand, the local accountability and social objectives of CBHAs.

A central aim of Chapter Eight has been to provide a generalised account of the development of CBHAs as neighbourhood-based agencies involved in local housing reproduction. We have seen that CBHA rehabilitation has developed in the context of technological uncertainty and complexity; central state bureaucratic controls and funding and a range of political uncertainties (governmental, institutional and local). Against this background, it would appear that efficient and speedy rehabilitation (the Development work of associations) may be enhanced by an entrepreneurial approach involving the taking of initiative by

staff and committee.

The discussion so far has pointed to tensions and conflicts between CBHAs and external agencies. It could be taken to suggest that CBHAs are characterised by a consensus of interests amongst their participants. However, we shall see in the final section that like all organisations the CBHA employment relationship is characterised by conflicting interests of employers and employees; and that industrial relations conflicts affecting CBHAs as 'young', innovative and ideological organisations have reflected the early expectations of participants about the nature of work and participation in CBHAs.

4. The CBHA Employment Relationship and the Institutionalisation of Conflict

In this section I shall discuss industrial relations developments affecting Glasgow's CBHAs.⁽²⁵⁾ I shall describe how the unionisation of staff and the federation of CBHA committees in their role as employers stemmed from participants' growing awareness of divergent work interests on the employment front; and how the development of an embryonic city-wide system of industrial relations affected CBHAs. Following this, I shall attempt to explain these developments, first, by highlighting aspects of the employment relationship which are unique to CBHAs and, secondly, by pointing to similarities with patterns of work conflict and industrial relations which have been identified by research on industrial relations.

4.a. An evolving system of industrial relations

In 1976 when there were only six CBHAs in Glasgow, some staff began to raise questions about pay differentials between associations in relation to the same jobs. Also at that time some officials were of the view that personalised negotiations over pay and work conditions were harmful to staff and Committee relations which were significantly based on mutual trust.

This group of CBHA employees decided to unionise and formed a branch of the T&GWU. While some Management Committee members favoured this development, preferring a depersonalised context for such negotiations, others saw unionisation as inappropriate to the CBHA context, as did some association staff members. Some Management Committee members who were committed trade unionists in their place of work believed that trust and personalised relations should be the basis for resolving employment issues in CBHAs. However, the majority of Management Committees decided to form an organisation which would provide a forum for discussion of a range of issues affecting Management Committees of CBHAs. The Glasgow Federation of Community-Based Housing Associations was formed early in 1977.

While the T&GWU branch worked at developing proposals for regularising pay differentials and job definitions, the employers within the Glasgow Federation became concerned that the efforts of the union branch were in effect resulting in a situation where

employees were collectively taking the initiative in influencing the developing organisational structures and the allocation of work and responsibilities in CBHAs. The union was also exerting pressure on the Federation to establish a negotiating committee over their pay proposals. As a result, the Glasgow Federation by the end of 1977, had become essentially a body representing the interests of employers on matters of employment in CBHAs.

Six years later, negotiations have become increasingly routinised between the Federation and the union, although certain CBHA committees have opted not to affiliate to the Federation or have left the Federation. These CBHAs today carry out direct negotiations with union or staff representatives. However, it is an interesting reflection of the characteristics of CBHAs that the negotiating committee of the Glasgow Federation incorporates some experienced trade union members and negotiators! The Housing Association branch of the T&CWU in 1980 had a membership of over 150 employees and the level of unionisation in housing associations was around 90 per cent. In 1983 the branch membership is over 180. The level of unionisation has decreased somewhat although frequently branch meetings involve over 50 members.

4.b. Aspects of conflict

Negotiations have centred on work conditions (maternity leave, paternity leave and time off in lieu) as well as on proposed changes in organisational structure and pay awards.

For example, during 1979 discussions centred on the employers' proposal to establish a job description for the post of Director. At that time a large proportion of branch members opposed hierarchical centralisation of internal control and in particular rejected the authoritarian connotations of the title of Director. The branch suggested that an alternative post of Co-ordinator was more appropriate to CBHAs. However, by 1980, the branch resolved that where staff in an association supported the establishment of a post of Director, the branch would not oppose any such appointment. Such senior appointments are now commonplace in CBHAs.

Union-employer conflict arose in relation to two instances of what the union defined as unfair dismissals in 1977 and in 1980. In response to the 1977 case of dismissal of a development officer, pressure was put by the branch on the Management Committee concerned to reconsider its decision, and on the Housing Corporation to intervene in its 'monitoring' role. The branch worked at publicising the issue amongst local residents of the area in which the CBHA was based. The area was leafleted and union members demonstrated at the association's AGM. The case was taken to an Industrial Tribunal and finally an appeal was made and lost. The branch strategy, in effect, was an attempt to emphasise the local accountability dimension of CBHAs. (26)

Apart from the issues of work conditions and local (or plant level) conflicts, a major area of conflicting interests between the union and Federation has concerned wage increases and salary

structures. In this respect, CBHAs have reflected typical processes of collective bargaining - the employers' side generally favouring a lower increase than that demanded by the union. For example, in May 1980, the union proposed an inflation-linked increase (19.8%) which was rejected by the employers and the final settlement was 18%. The 1981 round of negotiations involved an element for comparability in the staff claim of 13% and the negotiations were resolved at 11%. In 1982 the claim again involved an element for comparability. However, this time there was marked disparity between the initial claim by the union branch of 19.8% and the employers' side's subsequent offer of 4%.

In 1982, prior to the settlement of 9%, the tensions which already characterised relations between employers and employees escalated into a classic industrial dispute. The union branch called on its members to implement phased industrial action. Several committees of 'federated' associations then served notice on staff who were not fully performing their contracts. In effect, there was a widespread 'lock out' although subsequently parties to the dispute disagreed as to whether strike action or a lock out had been the case. At any rate the dispute reached such proportions in some CBHAs that confused residents and tenants observed picketing and heated exchanges outside their local association's office.

Following the dispute it was notable that its continued effects were most marked in associations where staff-committee conflicts had been the pattern prior to these more recent developments. (27) However, some participants on both sides have since criticised the approach of their representative organisations, and both the Employers' Federation and the Union branch lost some members following the dispute.

During the 1982 dispute, both the Federation and the union appeared to be dominated by attitudes which perhaps can best be described as distortions of more general employer and staff concerns and ideologies within CBHAs. On the employers' side there was emphasis on 'showing them who is in control' and on the importance of 'demonstrating a responsible approach to pay settlements'. On the staff side, the issues were comparable rates of pay, the right to a 'cost of living' award', alongside general concerns that committees in some associations were giving insufficient recognition to the contribution of their staff. However, in effect, the staff claim requested financial recognition by mainly working class committees at a time of public sector restraint, generally low pay settlements and high unemployment. The outcome was hardening of attitudes, escalation and non-compromise. As for the nine or ten associations which settled prior to the city-wide agreement, participants in the dispute interpreted their approach in terms of seeking the easy option.

Many participants feared that the intense conflict of that period would have long-term harmful effects on work relations in their associations. However, by the autumn of 1982, the intensity had declined, although it was evident that the system of industrial relations was in some flux. The union branch was aware that the T&GWU officialdom would not necessarily offer support in the case of a repeat performance, and some members left the branch. Also, the employers' body was aware that its approach had not been supported by a number of associations. Perhaps coincidentally there was a later turnover of chairpeople in both bodies. Secondly, there was evidence of the desire of both employers and staff to minimise the hassles of the annual pay round, and even before the 1982 settlement, some staff and committee members were considering ways in which the established pattern of annual negotiations might be modified. Between 1982 and 1983, negotiations centred on the conduct and implementation of an extensive comparability study which was proposed by the Employers' Federation and which was eventually funded jointly by the Housing Corporation and the District Council - a clear expression by these government agencies of their interest in management and work relations in CBHAs.

It is interesting that, following the progress of the comparability study, the employers' body appears to be diversifying its goals. At the present time, the Federation operates as a 'mini-CBI', inviting government and politicians to speak to its members, and co-ordinating educational and training

events. Increasingly, the Glasgow Federation's objectives and functions would seem to coincide with those of the SFHA and its regional forum, the Glasgow Forum, on which are represented both staff and committee.

Thirdly, in 1983 unaffiliated associations' Committees entered into joint discussion. Their aim was to prevent random pay settlements in 1983 and to exchange ideas on work issues. The '1983 Group' has invited staff representation from participating associations and discussions with Employers' Federation and union representatives. At present, the group has no formal constitution or long-term objectives and appears likely to continue with this informal approach.

In conclusion, the system of industrial relations was still in flux some nine years after the formation of CBHAs. However, by 1983, there were signs of increasing routinisation and standardisation on the pay front and of the will of Committees and staff to further these processes following a period of intense industrial strife. Finally, the developments which I have documented here were peculiar to Glasgow. Neither the extent of unionisation in Glasgow nor the development of an employers' association was duplicated elsewhere, and in no other city was there such intense conflict on the industrial relations front, as was the case in Glasgow in 1982. In the East, associations chose to base their pay scales on local government or civil service scales and to tie annual increments to national negotiations. Local bargaining

focused only on regrading and special work conditions. Also Glasgow associations by the early 1980s had established higher rates of pay through collective bargaining for middle and lower grades than had associations in the East, which paid higher rates for senior positions.

4.c. Some influences on conflict in CBHAs

In following chapters we shall see how the organisational growth of CBHAs has served to absorb within their offices a variety of staff backgrounds, and thus to increase the complexity of the Committee's role as a collective employer and manager. We shall also see that many early participants assumed that CBHAs would differ from other types of work organisations; that their work relations would reflect the extensive commitment (moral involvement) of participants, and a style of relations based on trust and co-operative work effort. However, the preceding account suggests that CBHA growth has been associated with a variety of tensions and conflicts, both within the staffing organisation, and between staff and Committees. Conflict has stemmed from divergent perceptions and expectations about the roles of groups in decision-making and about the structuring of internal control (the distribution of power). Also, CBHAs have experienced conflicts over pay and work conditions. In these respects CBHAs reflect patterns of conflict and the causes of conflict which have been documented and debated by writers on industrial relations in different work and organisational contexts.

I have described the evolving system of industrial relations which originated out of a growing consciousness amongst CBHA staff of their common interests as employees (in selling their labour), and amongst CBHA Committees of their common interests as employers (as the buyers of labour power). Industrial Relations theorists have emphasised that an Industrial Relations system, although demonstrating elements of consensus, 'is fundamentally one of conflict' and that the negotiated rules and regulations applying to the workplace are means of regulating conflict.⁽²⁸⁾ They have also stressed that industrial conflicts are not simply about economic stakes. Thus Flanders suggests that we should view negotiated settlements as 'compromise settlements of power conflicts'.⁽²⁹⁾ Hyman in his classic study of Strikes, describes the 'mainsprings of conflict' as income distribution, job security, power and control, and social alienation.⁽³⁰⁾ I have suggested that such issues were reflected in the CBHA experience. Also Fox has emphasised that many disputes are not in the deepest sense about money, but rather about 'justice' and 'fairness'.⁽³¹⁾

Studies of industrial disputes have largely focused on business firms yet their conclusions clearly have relevance to the experience of CBHAs. We have seen that prior to 1982 conflicts centred on pay structures, perceptions of injustice (dismissals) and expectations about control (hierarchy). However, in 1982, conflict focused more specifically on money, although I would suggest that underlying the dispute were concerns about control, trust and fairness.⁽³²⁾

For example, I have referred to the emphasis on 'committee control' and 'responsibility' which was common to the frame of reference of committee members. These concerns stem from their accountability both to the neighbourhood and to government agencies, and Committees' conceptions of responsible action are partly derived from their understanding of the expectations of local residents, staff and statutory bodies. On the pay issue, reference points are drawn from the work experience of Committee members and their knowledge of publicly-known awards - a frame of reference which is likely to generate lower pay offers than are desired by those union members whose reference points are the branch's aims and conceptions of 'fair' remuneration, comparability and maintaining members' living standards.

Finally, on the industrial relations front, I have been particularly conscious of how developments in Glasgow's CBHAs have shown similarities to other high trust, explicitly ideological organisations, such as trade unions,⁽³³⁾ professional organisations,⁽³⁴⁾ voluntary organisations⁽³⁵⁾ and co-operatives.⁽³⁶⁾ Such organisations are associated with expectations about the moral commitment of their participants; with varying aspects and degrees of bureaucracy; and with control by lay Committees. I would also suggest that there are certain parallels between CBHAs and other public sector organisations which are characterised by an official distinction (and practical structural tension) between on the one hand, policy-making and control by a lay elected collective and,

on the other, administration by paid, permanent officials. (37)

In Chapter Nine, I shall relate these tensions to two sets of structural contradictions - those between bureaucratic and democratic and bureaucratic and professional principles of organisation. However, I would argue that tensions and conflicts must also be seen as related to the interplay between normative commitments, and the more instrumental work orientations and interests which characterise work organisations in capitalist society, in which remunerative control is a significant dimension. (38)

Notes and References to Chapter Eight

- (1) For a similar perspective see K.S. Cook, 'Exchange and Power in Networks of Interorganisational Relations', Sociological Quarterly, Vol. 18, 1977, pp. 62-82. Also, J.K. Benson, 'Innovation and Crisis in Organisational Analysis', Sociological Quarterly, 18, 1977, pp. 3-16 and A. Wassenberg, 'The Powerlessness of Organisation Theory' in S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley (eds.), Critical Issues in Organisations, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977, pp. 86-98.
- (2) For example, R. Goodman, After the Planners, Penguin Books, 1972; J.A. Palmer's Introduction to the British Edition, pp. 9-50; J.C. Turner and R. Fichter, Freedom to Build: Dweller Control of the Housing Process, New York, Macmillan, 1972; and C. Ward, Anarchy in Action, George Allen and Unwin, 1973, pp. 7-73.
- (3) See C.S. Jencks, Modern Movements in Architecture, Pelican, 1971, pp. 11-94.
- (4) Interview with Jim Johnson, Director of Assist, November 1979.
- (5) In Housing Plan 2, 1978, pp. 22-27, Glasgow District Council programmed the rehabilitation of 20,660 houses (12,630 by housing associations) by 1983/84, while 11,216 were programmed for demolition by that date.
- (6) Prior to the 1978 Housing (Repairs) (Scotland) Act there was concern that tenement blocks requiring structural repair while not meeting the criteria of action area declaration were in danger of significant deterioration or demolition due to lack of grant and co-ordination facilities.
- (7) An experienced structural engineer speaking at SFHA Conference on Rehabilitation Standards, November 1979.
- (8) The new housing association provides services to smaller local associations like Pollockshields and Hillhead, which generally operate outwith action areas and which own fewer properties than the majority of CBHAs. The new's role is similar to that of Edinvar (Edinburgh) which has provided services to Buchanan Street Residents' HA and to that of Neighbourhood Housing Services in Liverpool, a secondary association providing services to the neighbourhood co-ops.

- (9) For example the 'gut' approach was pioneered by architects working at Elderspark HA, Glasgow between 1979 and 1981, who later formed an independent private practice. Also the earlier influence of Assist was documented in Chapter Five.
- (10) Interview with Mr Campbell, Director of the Scottish Building Employers' Federation, May 1981. Mr Campbell was also Secretary to the Scottish Construction Industry group.
- (11) Paper presented to Development Staff Forum, November 1979. The housing associations' perspective was gauged through interviews and discussions with staff and committee and through participation. (During 1977 as a member of staff and since 1979 as a committee member.)
- (12) I attended committee meetings in both associations regularly between December 1978 and 1980. It was not until November 1979 that I suddenly realised that the same contractor was employed on both problem-frought contracts!
- (13) Interview with member of the Assist, October 1979. Several private architects, who became extensively involved in rehabilitation, had previously worked for Assist.
- (14) Dave Clarke, 'Public Subsidies to Private Developers - Who Pays?', Scottish Federation News, November 1982. See also Chapter Seven.
- (15) The 'factors' perspective was discussed in interview by an official of the Property Factors and Owners Association, May 1983. He was referring to the Francis Report, Report of the Committee on the Rent Acts, Cmnd. 4609, 1971.
- (16) Regarding relations between CBHAs, the local authority and the factors, I held interviews with a senior official in the Reletting section of the Housing Management Department, Glasgow District Council in January 1980, and with Development and Housing Management staff in Partick, Tollcross, Elderspark, Parkhead as well as in Reidvale and Govanhill HAs. In particular, I interviewed staff who had previously worked in factors offices between 1979 and 1981.
- (17) These differences were clarified in an interview with the Secretary of the Property Owners and Factors Association, May 1983.

- (18) Edinburgh had a special Parliamentary Act, the Edinburgh Confirmation Order Act, 1967, which strengthened the power of repairs notices. This was rescinded by the Civic Government Scotland Act, 1983, which generalised the powers of local authorities to enforce payment for specific common repairs, where there was not 100% agreement. Also the 1978 Housing (Financial Provisions) (Scotland) Act reaffirmed scope for authorities to implement repairs orders as specified under the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1969, Section 24. See the First Report on Housing Action Areas, SDD, 1980, pp. 24-25, HMSO.
- (19) I am indebted here to Mr T Crombie, Department of Legal and Administrative Services, Glasgow District Council, for his helpful explanatory comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.
- (20) May and October 1980 meetings of the Glasgow Forum were attended by senior SDD officials (successively in post), who had agreed to discuss the shops question.
- (21) Paper on 'Non-Residential Properties in Action Areas' by David Black, Finance Officer of Partick HA, presented to the Development Staff Forum, August 1980.
- (22) Reported by participant at meeting of Self-Employed Federation, March 1982.
- (23) The Civic Government (Scotland) Act, 1982, Paragraph 4 of Schedule 3 adds a new sub-section to Section 10A of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1974, which extends the definition of 'a house' where a property forms part of a building which also contains a house or houses. Therefore, shops become entitled to grant provided by Section 10A (1) (a) for houses which the subject of repairs notices served under Section 24 of the Housing (Scotland) Act, 1969.
- (24) SDD Circular No. 10/1983, paragraph 10 states 'it will be for local authorities to decide whether or not to exercise their discretion under Section 2 (3) (b) of the 1974 Act in respect of works commenced prior to approval of the application'.
- (25) Between 1979 and 1981 I interviewed representatives of the Glasgow Federation and the Union Branch and I monitored industrial relations developments which I updated in 1983.

- (26) I participated as a Union member in this dispute, which took place during the year I worked as a Development Officer at Reidvale Housing Association Limited.
- (27) Interviews with participants to the dispute, 1982.
- (28) See, for example, the exposition of a sociological perspective on industrial relations in J.A. Banks, Trade Unionism, Collier-Macmillan, 1974, pp. 11-26.
- Also A. Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry, Collier-Macmillan 1971, pp. 135-181, 'Conflict and Joint Regulation'; R. Hyman and I. Brough, Social Values and Industrial Relations, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975, pp. 227-253 and R. Hyman, Strikes, London, Fontana, 1972.
- (29) A. Flanders 'Bargaining Theory: The Classical Model Reconsidered', B.C. Roberts (ed.), Industrial Relations: Contemporary Issues, London, Macmillan, 1968. Quoted in J.A. Banks, 1974, op. cit., pp. 11-12.
- (30) R. Hyman, Strikes, 1972, op. cit., pp. 82-105.
- (31) A. Fox, Man Mismanagement, Hutchinson & Co., 1974, pp. 65-66.
- (32) Fox has also emphasised the significance of the moral dimension of trust in industrial relations. See A. Fox, Beyond Contract: Work, Power and Trust Relations, London, Faber & Faber, 1974.
- (33) See R. Lumley, White Collar Unionism in Britain, Methuen & Co., 1973, Chapter 4, pp. 66-104; J.E.T. Eldridge, 'Trade Unions and Bureaucratic Control' in Trade Unions Under Capitalism, T. Clarke and L. Clements, Fontana, 1977, pp. 175-183.
- (34) T.J. Johnson, Professions and Power, Macmillan Press, 1972, particularly pp. 51-74; J.A. Jackson, Professions and Professionalisation, Cambridge University Press, 1970, op. cit.; and C.W. Mills, White Collar, the American Middle Class, Oxford University Press, 12th Edition, 1964, pp. 112-141 and 301-323.
- (35) S. Hatch, Outside the State, Croom Helm, 1980, op. cit., particularly pp. 27-39; and A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, The Free Press, 1961, op. cit., pp. 43-44.

- (36) D. Flanagan, A Centenary Story of the Co-operative Union of Great Britain and Ireland, 1869-1969, Co-operative Union Ltd., Holyoake House, 1969; K. Coates, editor, The New Worker Co-operatives, Spokesman Books, 1976 (see papers by K. Coates and D.C. Jones).
- (37) See P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, George Allen and Unwin, 1977; Self discusses questions of agency control and autonomy; the tensions between professionals and administrators; and relations between political and administrative roles in government agencies. Chapters 3-5, pp. 87-191. Also, J. Dearlove in The reorganisation of British Local Government, Cambridge University Press, 1979 focuses on similar questions in relation to local government from a more critical perspective.
- (38) See J.H. Goldthorpe, 'Industrial Relations in Great Britain', Chapter 12, pp. 184-224, in Trade Unionism under Capitalism, edited by T. Clarke and L. Clements, Fontana, 1978; A. Etzioni, A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organisations, Free Press, 1961, op. cit., pp. 4-6, 30-39 and 59-66. Also, R. Hyman in Strikes, Fontana, 1974, points to the interplay of economic and non-economic sources of wage demands, pp. 106-139.

CHAPTER NINE

A PERSPECTIVE ON THE ORGANISATIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF CBHAs

Introduction

It is now time to pause for a moment in order to remind the reader of the key questions which have guided the account so far. My main focus is on Glasgow's CBHAs and we have seen that CBHAs represented an experimental form of organisation in Glasgow's planning context, which offered new opportunities for local residents to influence housing developments in their localities. In describing their origins and development I have first attempted to answer such questions as: 'What were the major influences on the shift in local and national housing policy from slum clearance towards rehabilitation?' 'In what ways, and to what extent, do Glasgow's CBHAs reflect characteristics of the voluntary housing movement, in terms of goals and ideology, and the wider political and economic influences on the development of housing associations?' 'What has been the impact of DBHAs on Glasgow's housing and planning context and within the Scottish housing association movement?'

I therefore embarked on a historical account of the voluntary housing movement; of the goals and ideology of its participant organisations; and of the wider political and economic influences on its development (Part One). In Part Two of the thesis I focused historically on developments in housing and politics in Glasgow which have influenced the evolving role of the voluntary housing movement in the city.

In Part Three I focused on post-1974 developments and I have attempted to illustrate the various and interacting influences on the experience of CBHAs. These influences included national political and economic developments, relations between government agencies and the experience of governmental controls by Scottish associations in general, and by CBHAs in particular (Chapters Six and Seven); the actions of external groups and organisations whose interests were affected by the development of CBHAs and of rehabilitation (Chapter Eight). Also, throughout I have taken account of the objectives and interests of housing association participants which have influenced their approach to external constraints and to wider developments. The key questions which have guided this account have been: 'To what extent, and in what ways, do housing association participants have control, as housing developers and as landlords?' And in the case of CBHAs I am also interested in how far they are able to influence the rate and quality of housing production, and other aspects of housing provision in the interests of the working class residents of the tenement areas in which they operate. In the concluding section of the thesis I shall return to these questions about control.

Chapter Nine is intended to serve two main purposes. First, before the case studies in Part Four, I want to introduce some theoretical propositions which have been developed through the analysis of different types of organisations. The concepts and theories which I shall discuss in this first section have been

selected on the grounds of their relevance to our understanding of the organisational development of CBHAs, and to the questions about control to which I shall return in Part Five. In the second section I shall apply selected concepts and themes in order to highlight certain common organisational features and issues and tensions which have characterised the CBHA experience to date.

Section One : Organisational Environment, Structure and Goals

An important theme in the work of classical social scientists like Marx,⁽¹⁾ Weber⁽²⁾ and Veblen,⁽³⁾ has been their focus on power relations and control in capitalist society. The exploration of this theme led Marx to focus on the economic structure of capitalist society and Weber to focus on the growth of rationalisation and bureaucracy in Western societies, as significant influences on the experience of work, on power relations in and between organisations, and on relations between the state and civil society.⁽⁴⁾ These concerns are today reflected in the social science schools of organisational analysis, of public administration and of the sociology of organisations.

In turning to the work of writers identified with these schools I shall first point out that the organisational focus has at times reflected contradictory concerns. For instance, writers on organisations have demonstrated considerable interest in increasing organisational effectiveness and efficiency, or a 'managerialist approach'⁽⁵⁾ and it has been argued that researchers frequently

identify with the goals and ideology of organisations under focus, without making their own values explicit.⁽⁶⁾ Also different critiques have suggested that organisational studies have frequently been restrictive in terms of the range of questions pursued and in terms of the variables explored through research. The focus of many studies has been limited to the 'boundaries' of particular work groups or organisational sub-sections, or it has ended at 'the factory gates'.⁽⁷⁾ The sociological perspective, however, has been more generally associated with the exploration of extra-organisational influences in the attempt to increase understanding of organisational processes.⁽⁸⁾ Also the more radical critics of organisational analysis have generally stressed an approach which focuses on the dynamics of power, control and conflict.⁽⁹⁾

1.a. Organisational environment and organisational structure

Increasingly research on organisations has attempted systematically to analyse the different ways in which organisations are influenced by their environments; to conceptualise different aspects of the environment of work; and to assess the extent to which the autonomy and discretion of organisational participants are delimited by environmental factors.⁽¹⁰⁾ The organisational environment has been defined as 'the total political, social and economic surroundings of the organisation',⁽¹¹⁾ and it has been argued that the environment is both a threat and a resource to organisational participants.⁽¹²⁾ On the one hand, organisations are shaped by their environments while, on the other, organisational

participants act in order to regulate or to assert control over external influences.⁽¹³⁾ Further it is today well recognised that a key aspect of the environment of organisations is that of other organisations which control resources sought by organisational participants. It is argued that in pursuing their objectives, organisations enter into relations with other organisations which may be characterised by reciprocity, in situations of mutual advantage and, by competition and conflict, for example where organisations are under threat, or where organisational interests and purposes are contradictory, and where control over resources is concentrated.⁽¹⁴⁾

In general, studies have pointed to these different contextual influences on organisations: technological factors (the ideas, techniques and mechanical systems which influence the organisation of work); the power of other organisations and of state agencies; market conditions; the legal system; location and related cultural factors, such as attitudes to work and towards authority, which are reflected in the work behaviour of organisational participants; and finally, wider political and economic influences, such as class relationships, the dominant beliefs in a society and how these are mediated by powerful groups in the context of changing economic conditions.⁽¹⁵⁾

Following this general discussion of the organisational environment I shall now turn to a body of research which has attempted to establish the relationship between specific aspects of the environ-

ment and characteristics of organisational structure. In using the term organisational structure I am not simply referring to the official structure of organisations (as identified by the organisational chart and in official statements). I am more generally referring to those regular, continuous and patterned features which characterise organisations over time.⁽¹⁶⁾ It follows that the concept of organisational structure refers, on the one hand, to an officially sanctioned system of rules, controls, relations and behaviour and, on the other, to unofficial practices which have become established over time.⁽¹⁷⁾

One school of organisational theory, the Aston School, has attempted to empirically assess and to measure the significance of different environmental factors and contingencies in influencing aspects of organisational structure. They have explored the influence of contextual variables such as the origin and history of the organisation; location; ownership and control; size; official goals and ideology; technology; resources and interdependence. Also these contingencies have been examined in terms of their influence on these dimensions of organisational structure: specialisation, standardisation, formalisation, centralisation and configuration (as illustrated in the organisational chart). In general the key influences on organisational structure have been identified as technology, size and location.⁽¹⁸⁾ Also, the outcomes of organisational growth have been shown to be increasing specialisation, the development of hierarchy, and the formalisation and standardisation

of procedures, all being trends which have been identified as characteristics of bureaucracy.⁽¹⁹⁾

One influential finding, which I shall explore further here, has stressed the impact of technology and of uncertainty on organisational structure and power relations. For example, Burns and Stalker⁽²⁰⁾ have identified two main types of organisational structure from their study of the Scottish electronics industry - the mechanistic or bureaucratic type; and the organic structure, which is characterised by an emphasis on professional authority, and a network structure of control and communication which enables a greater flexibility of action and of decision-making. The study led Burns and Stalker to conclude that electronics firms, all of which operated in a highly uncertain, competitive and changing technological and economic environment, were more effective and adaptable if they operated with an organic rather than a mechanistic structure.

In the same vein, Child⁽²¹⁾ has summarised research which points to three types of environmental conditions in which organisations operate. First, environmental variability refers to 'the degree of change which characterises environmental activities relevant to an organisation's operations', and several writers have argued that uncertainty and change have become common characteristics of the environment of modern organisations.⁽²²⁾

Child also emphasises that variability produces uncertainty, which is most effectively responded to in organisations characterised by adaptive, and flexible, or organic, rather than mechanistic, structures. The second environmental characteristic to which Child refers is that of complexity, and several studies have illustrated how complex tasks and environments influence organisational role specialisation and related problems of internal coordination.⁽²³⁾ Child terms the third type of environmental variation 'environmental illiberality', which refers to 'the degree of threat that faces organisational decision-makers in the achievement of their goals from external competition, hostility or even indifference'. Regarding this variable, studies have suggested that the more illiberal the environment, the more organisational participants tend to concentrate on survival - an emphasis which may result in centralised decision-making and tighter controls.⁽²⁴⁾ Also, studies have suggested that when key organisational decision-makers are concerned about organisational survival, in the context of external threats or hostilities, they may resolve to incorporate or co-opt potentially hostile groups into the organisational structure of control and decision-making.⁽²⁵⁾

For the moment I shall suggest here that these findings involve a mixture of prescriptive and descriptive statements about organisational structure. On the one hand, writers are referring to influences on organisational structure which have been identified through research. On the other hand, they are suggesting that certain

types of organisational structure are most conducive to organisational effectiveness in the context of specific environmental conditions. Also, the view that organisational decision-makers may opt for a management structure which is more or less appropriate to environmental conditions, clearly raises further important questions about control. For example, 'To what extent do organisational elites or key decision-makers have the power and discretion to influence organisational structure and behaviour?' Also, 'To what extent are organisational characteristics simply determined by environmental constraints and contingencies?' Later in this section I shall examine Child's contribution to this question, which I believe helps in providing a necessary balance to a deterministic view of constraints. However at this point I shall select certain propositions which are relevant to our focus on CBHAs, from the studies on which I have drawn so far.

We have seen in previous chapters that the environment of CBHAs is characterised by a high degree of uncertainty about funding and authority and that uncertainty characterises the technology of rehabilitation. Further, it is evident that all housing associations have experienced marked changes (variability) in economic, political and planning developments, as has been the case for state agencies generally. We have also seen that CBHAs have experienced opposition to certain of their housing objectives from central state agencies (for example, regarding the provision of general needs housing)⁽²⁶⁾ and to some extent from other interests which are focused on housing⁽²⁷⁾

('illiberality' in Child's terms). On the other hand, we have seen that CBHAs have experienced cooperation and support from certain external groups and agencies; that there have developed certain routinised, standardised relations with interest groups and organisations in the Glasgow housing context and with state agencies (for example, in terms of relations of external accountability and control).⁽²⁸⁾

Therefore, from the discussion in this section we can assume that the organisational structure of CBHAs is likely to reflect conflicting structural tendencies - tendencies towards flexibility but also towards centralisation and bureaucracy. Also, in Section Two of this chapter we shall see that the complex goals of CBHAs imply the growth and complexity of organisational structure. Having pointed to such competing tendencies in CBHAs, I shall now concentrate on a further theme in the literature - a perspective which emphasises that organisational tensions may stem from the coexistence of differing patterns of organisational structure. In general these tensions reflect contradictory aspects of internal and external control.

1.b. Contradictory aspects of organisational structure

Several studies of organisation and bureaucracy have pointed to the significance of tensions and open conflict stemming from contradictory aspects of organisational structure.⁽²⁹⁾ First, following Weber, studies of bureaucracy have identified the trend towards growing specialisation, hierarchical control, an emphasis

on rules and regulations and impersonal criteria of decision-making which has paralleled the increasing scale and complexity of organisational tasks. However aspects of bureaucracy have been identified as conflicting with the principles of democratic organisation.

1.b.1. Bureaucracy and democracy

Weber suggested that the emphasis in bureaucratic organisation on impersonal criteria of decision-making is complementary to political aims of egalitarianism. However he argued that certain structural tendencies of bureaucracy are in conflict with democratic principles. For example, while democratic organisation and accountability imply that those affected by organisational policies should have access to sharing in organisational control and decision-making, bureaucracy, on the other hand, stresses the value of accumulating expertise amongst officials. (30)

Michels' and Selznick's studies, of political parties and a trade union respectively, have pointed to the tendencies of increasing bureaucracy and oligarchy (self-perpetuating, professional and stable leadership) in democratic organisations. (31) However, Lipset et al's study of the ITU, a large American printing union, illustrates that for the ITU the outcome of union growth, increasing organisational complexity and internal power politics was the institutionalisation of a two-party system and other democratic methods such as referenda. (32) The writers conclude that the

ITU, in contrast with tendencies to oligarchy in other unions, is a deviant case which suggests that 'men's wills through action can shape institutions and events ...'. Thus, like Gouldner,⁽³³⁾ Lipset et al reject the mood of pessimism implicit in conclusions about the inevitability of bureaucracy.

Like Gouldner and others I would suggest that, in the face of organisational growth and complexity, key decision-makers in organisations may choose to establish aspects of bureaucracy, such as specialisation and standardisation in order to increase organisational effectiveness. I would argue that in the same vein, organisational decision-makers make choices about democratic procedures and external accountability.⁽³⁴⁾ However, it should be recognised that such choices are likely to be influenced by participants' perceptions about 'clients, holders of political power, or other prominent groups' in the organisation's environment.⁽³⁵⁾ Further, the take-up of democratic procedures and demands for citizen participation are likely to reflect important aspects of the wider political environment, such as dominant political ideologies, patterns of ideological control and political consciousness. As Westergaard and Resler have commented, 'there is power inherent in anonymous social mechanisms and assumptions' and 'Power is to be found more in uneventful routine than in conscious and active exercise of will'.⁽³⁶⁾

Following these propositions about power and control, I would argue that we cannot simply explain aspects of organisational control by reference to organisational structure or to participants' perceptions, or by relying on empirical research, such as my case studies of CBHAs.

I shall return to these questions about power and control in the concluding section of the thesis. However, I shall now discuss a different structural tension which has been pointed to in the literature on organisations, namely that between bureaucracy and professionalism.

1.b.2. Bureaucracy and professionalism

Bureaucratisation and professionalisation have been identified as parallel outcomes of increased organisational growth and complexity. Studies have suggested that bureaucracy and professionalism imply contradictory patterns of control and coordination; and secondly that role conflict is common to the situation of professionals employed in bureaucratic organisations. (37)

The occupational groups which I shall term 'professions' are those characterised by a distinguishable body of knowledge, expectations, aspirations and values. While doctors, lawyers and teachers are traditional professionals, sociologists have analysed the process of structural and attitudinal change through which historically many occupations have achieved professional status.

The professionalisation of occupational groups involves, first, the institutionalisation of a system of formal education, training and examination; and secondly, the establishment of an ethical code defining attitudes appropriate to internal (colleague) relations and external relations with clients and the public.⁽³⁸⁾

In relation to this code of behaviour writers like Gouldner⁽³⁹⁾ and Hall⁽⁴⁰⁾ have stressed professional autonomy or self-control as a key aspect of the ideology (belief system) of the professions. Self-control and adherence to common standards are two of the central aims of professional socialisation and education. A further aim is to enable professionals to apply their skills to 'highly non-routine problems and tasks involving complex technology and variable and unstable raw materials'. Gouldner has also stressed that the main reference points for professionals in assessing their performance are frequently external to the organisation in which they work. Professionals are the 'cosmopolitans' rather than the 'locals'. Also, it is argued that professional control is significantly based on trust.

In contrast, bureaucratic control emphasises centralised decision-making and hierarchical control which is mediated through rules, regulations and instructions. The central contradiction for professionals in organisations has therefore been identified as that between professional autonomy and hierarchical dependence.⁽⁴¹⁾

Later in this chapter, and in the case studies in Part Four, we shall consider the implications of these structural tensions for the development of CBHAs. However, to conclude this discussion of organisational structure I shall now focus further on the ways in which sociologists have emphasised, on the one hand, constraints and determinism, and on the other, the scope for choice and action in organisations.

1.c. Constraints and choice

The preceding discussion has focused on environmental influences and on internal structural tensions. We are left with these central questions. 'To what extent should we view organisational developments as the direct outcomes of such influences and tensions?' Or conversely 'Do organisational participants have access to exercising discretion and choice in ways that produce significant organisational, and even environmental, outcomes?' In response to these questions I shall draw on Child's discussion of 'strategic choice', which emphasises the scope for political action and for choice, and which denies that constraints are necessarily 'acute or immutable'.⁽⁴²⁾

In general the concept of strategic choice implies that organisational participants make choices in respect of both contextual and structural factors, and Child builds on Chandler's emphasis on 'strategy' which stresses the capacity of powerful elite groups in organisations to determine:

the basic long-term goals and objectives of an enterprise, and the adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out these goals. (43)

Child's approach therefore emphasises that there are power inequalities in organisations, and that a minority of organisational participants normally have the power to take initiatives on key issues.

Child argues that while environmental conditions and structural factors impinge on organisational decision-making, we must recognise the scope for the 'dominant coalition' (power group, or power elite) to influence organisational outcomes by making choices about organisational goals, structure and external relations. Child states:

Incorporation of the process whereby strategic decisions are made directs attention on to the degree of choice which can be exercised in respect of organisational design, whereas many available models direct attention exclusively onto the constraints involved. They imply in this way that organisational behaviour can be understood by reference to functional imperatives rather than to political action. (44)

Therefore, the role of strategic choice is to emphasise areas of discretion in the 'planning and ordering of work, together with its meaning for those involved'. It leads us to examine processes of organisational politics, and power inequalities and conflicts in organisations, as well as decision outcomes. Further, it leads us to consider how the actions of powerful groups in organisations (dominant coalitions) are frequently political actions which are

aimed at influencing or modifying environmental constraints and contingencies.

It should be clearly evident by this stage that Child's perspective has been reflected in my approach to the developments which have been documented in preceding sections. However, I shall raise certain questions here about Child's approach. First, Child is both a sociologist and a management theorist who is interested in questions about the effectiveness of organisational design and management policy-making (strategy). Now while I agree with his emphasis on the significance of social and political action, and with his rejection of a simplistic determinism, and associated pessimism about constraints, I would suggest that his approach could lead to the converse of an underemphasis on the significance of constraints and of overoptimism regarding the scope for choice and political action.

Child stresses that while we have no means of measuring political factors, we must examine both political processes and choice in order to assess their effects on organisational developments. I have argued earlier, however, that the complexities of power and control cannot be adequately explained through the empirical analysis of intra- and inter-organisational relations and of constraints and contingencies and I shall return to this point following the case studies, through which I shall explore the interplay of constraint and choice in CBHAs. Finally, Child's emphasis on choice and strategy is clearly relevant to the analysis of organisational

intentions or goals, and to the organisational inequalities and tensions which influence their evolution. In the following section I shall therefore focus more specifically on organisational goals.

1.d. Power, Conflict and Organisational goals

So far I have mainly focused on the interface between organisations and their environments. I shall now focus more specifically on internal relations, although I would argue that we cannot realistically discuss internal aspects of organisations without reference to external factors. Studies of intra-organisational relations have been informed by different ideological standpoints.⁽⁴⁵⁾ For example, one school of organisation theory suggests that organisations should be conceived in terms of 'a social contract-like consensus between the members of a co-operative group who agree to work together in order to achieve their goal'⁽⁴⁶⁾ - a conception which we shall see was held by early participants in CBHAs. The alternative approach to analysing organisations has stressed the inevitability of organisational conflict, while recognising that many aspects of work behaviour may reflect consensus rather than conflict,⁽⁴⁷⁾ and we have already seen tendencies to conflict in CBHAs.

These different perspectives are therefore associated with different types of focus and models of explanation in the study of organisational behaviour. The approach which assumes an implicit consensus has focused on the dominant, shared value system of

organisations which are seen as microcosms of the wider society. On the other hand the conflict approach has emphasised that such consensus cannot be taken for granted and that organisational participants occupy different class positions in society, and their divergent economic interests and prior work and social experience influence both work attitudes and organisational power relations.

Studies of organisational power relations have focused on organisational tensions and conflicts and on the attempts by interest groups to exercise control over their work environment. They have shown that sectional interests develop within organisations as the result of specialisation, hierarchical divisions and economic interests, and that organisational groups differ in their ability to control key organisational resources, such as expertise, funding and support, and to respond to uncertainties.⁽⁴⁸⁾ Further, they have demonstrated that power inequalities in organisations stem from internal influences such as the official distribution of authority, as well as from external influences such as technological uncertainties and the actions of external agencies. Finally organisational conflicts have been shown to be influenced by the differing frame of reference of participant groups, and power struggles and conflicts have been identified as a significant source of organisational change.⁽⁴⁹⁾ We have seen some of their outcomes in the sphere of CBHA industrial relations in Chapter Eight.

I shall stress here that my approach to analysing work relations in CBHAs emphasises power relations, or the dynamics of control, and the inevitability of organisational tensions and conflict, as important aspects of the organisational development of CBHAs. Having briefly introduced the concepts of organisation structure and control and outlined a perspective on organisational conflict, I shall now develop a perspective on organisational goals.

1.d.1. The complex evolution of organisational goals

Definitions of organisational goals frequently imply that there is a consensus amongst participants about organisational goals. For example, Etzioni's frequently quoted definition implies that organisational goals are collective intentions or objectives which shape the activities of organisations. Etzioni states that by organisational goal we mean 'a desired state of affairs which the organisation attempts to realise'.⁽⁵⁰⁾ This definition carries the connotation of an 'explicit or tacit agreement'⁽⁵¹⁾ about organisational practices. However current wisdom in organisational analysis emphasises that we cannot take such consensus for granted, but must examine the practical pursuit of organisational goals in order to assess the significance of consensus and conflict amongst participants in influencing organisational goals.⁽⁵²⁾ Further, Perrow and others have stressed the role of powerful groups in influencing goal priorities.⁽⁵³⁾

The main contribution of goal analysis has been to emphasise the diversity of organisational goals and the complexity of influences on their evolution. However goal analysis has included a number of perspectives on organisational behaviour. For example, Silverman, from the social action perspective, conceives of any organisation as 'the outcome of the interaction of motivated people attempting to resolve their own problems', and therefore as an instrument or means for attaining a multiplicity of goals.⁽⁵⁴⁾ For Simon, a decision-making theorist, goal-setting involves purposive, rational behaviour.⁽⁵⁵⁾ However for Thompson and McEwen (contingency theorists) 'goal-setting behaviour is purposive, but not necessarily rational'.⁽⁵⁶⁾ They state that goals may be the outcome of 'accident' or 'blundering', and 'the most calculated and careful determination of goals may be negated by developments outside the control of organisation members'.⁽⁵⁷⁾

My approach to the evolution of organisational goals in CBHAs denies that there is any serious contradiction between, on the one hand, the social action approach which emphasises the influence of participants' intentions and interests on organisational goals and, on the other, that which emphasises the significance of contingencies and external constraints. Like Hall and Perrow I shall stress the significance of the interplay of internal and external influences; of participants' intentions and interests which influence organisational attempts to regulate environmental effects; and the impact of constraints and contingencies.⁽⁵⁸⁾ This approach has already been applied in Chapter Five where we saw that the official goals of

CBHAs were influenced by the problems, intentions and concerns of the different groups interested in the issue of inner area housing obsolescence and in working class housing opportunities in Glasgow. Also we have seen that the extensive formation of CBHAs was enabled by the institutionalisation of relations between government agencies which focused on promoting housing associations and on ensuring their public accountability. If we consider this evolving background of complexity and institutionalised controls, we can simply conclude here that the practical pursuit of CBHA goals will be inevitably influenced by external factors, as well as by participants' intentions. In the case studies I shall illustrate a further aspect of the external relations of CBHAs, which stems from aspects of their local base and local accountability. Also, in Part Four, my focus on the processual development of my case study associations will allow me to identify the significance of the interplay between individual and group orientations and environmental contingencies and constraints, in influencing the evolution of CBHA goals or policies.

1.d.2. The multiplicity of goals in organisations

A further conclusion of goal analysis has been that organisational participants may pursue a multiplicity of goals, and Perrow comments that 'organisational goals are not only multiple, but may also be conflicting, and that they can be pursued all at once or in sequence'.⁽⁵⁹⁾ Perrow identifies five categories of goals. These are societal goals which specify the goals and

services which at a general level, 'fulfil societal needs'; output goals, which are defined in terms of consumption groups for which the organisation provides goods or services, e.g. consumer goods, health or educational provision; system goals which specify intentions about internal organisational characteristics, such as internal growth, organisational structure, profit levels; product characteristic goals such as quantity or quality, style, variety or uniqueness; and finally, derived goals which stem from participants' awareness of the organisation's potentialities developed through activities oriented to seeking official organisational goals. (60)

I would argue that Perrow's categorisation identifies qualitatively different types of goals which have varying significance for organisations. However, the categorisation's main utility is to help us recognise and describe different groups towards which organisational goals are oriented, and Perrow and others have stressed that organisational goals may be internally and/or externally oriented. (61)

1.d.3. Official and unofficial goals

A more important point which emerges from goal analysis is the argument that we cannot simply identify organisational goals by reference to official statements about goals, which imply a consensus of organisational intent. Perrow uses the term 'operative goals' to refer to 'the ends sought through the actual operating

policies of the organisation'.⁽⁶²⁾ Also Mohr distinguishes between 'true organisational goals' which are supported by a consensus of intent amongst participants and operative goals which may simply be supported by powerful individuals, for example by chief executives who 'commonly are able to impose their wills upon much of the behaviour of their organisations'.⁽⁶³⁾ To Mohr's case of the powerful chief executive, I would add that we must also take account of powerful external groups or agencies which have the capacity to influence operative goals.

For example, Gouldner's famous case study⁽⁶⁴⁾ of the entrance of a new manager into a gypsum plant showed how the new manager's authoritarian style contravened the established expectations of both miners and the former manager who had favoured an informal, consultative and lenient management style. However the change in management style was not simply the outcome of the personality and approach of the new manager, nor did it mainly reflect problems relating to managerial succession, as Gouldner implies. I would suggest that it may also have been the outcome of head office emphases on tightening up control against the background of the high rate of managerial succession experienced by the plant.⁽⁶⁵⁾

Guest's study⁽⁶⁶⁾ of a car plant has suggested that the appointment of a new chief executive can have different outcomes. In Guest's car plant the predominant orientation to work on the part of assembly line workers was instrumental or calculative, rather than moral.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The appointment of a new manager with a more open,

consultative management style had the effect of improving both industrial and interpersonal relations in the plant. However Perrow argues that the old (ineffective) manager in Guest's case study had faced continual interference by headquarters in the administration of the plant which also lacked proper facilities, while the new manager was vested with trust by his superiors.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Therefore in neither study was managerial style an independent variable in influencing internal goals and outcomes.

Also, Selznick's study of the Tennessee Valley Authority (the TVA) has shown that the actions of powerful groups outwith the TVA served significantly to affect its operative policies. The TVA was formed following Roosevelt's New Deal legislation (1933), as an experiment in devolving control and in extending opportunities for local participation in the implementation of new policies. However at times local community leaders were resistant to proposed changes and Selznick defined the administrator's strategy in the face of such opposition as that of co-optation, an approach involving bargaining, buying-off and the incorporation of dissenting groups into the leadership of the TVA.⁽⁶⁹⁾

I shall suggest here that both Gouldner's and Selznick's case studies of very different types of organisation, and of differing organisational issues, are relevant to our understanding of CBHAs. In the case studies I shall consider the outcomes of appointments of senior officials or chief executives in the context of institutionalised expectations about internal control and about

management style. Further we shall see that, just as in the case of the TVA, CBHAs may be faced by local opposition and dissent in relation to which influential participants are likely to develop coping strategies and to modify policies in order to sustain local support.

The main thrust of this discussion is that we should expect that organisational goals will be subject to modification over time. Goal analysis has suggested two further concepts which focus our attention on the evolution and modification of organisational goals - these being the 'succession of goals', and 'goal displacement'. Both these concepts emphasise varied influences on goals and serve to support Mohr's statement that 'no goal is the goal' in an organisation. (70)

1.d.4. Goal displacement and succession

The concept of goal displacement was developed through the study of bureaucratic organisations. Following Weber's classic analysis of bureaucratic authority as one of three types of legitimate authority, (71) writers have pointed to the prevalence of rigid adherence to organisational rules, work methods and structures which were designed to ensure rationality and efficiency in bureaucratic organisations. Blau concludes from his study of two civil service departments (an Employment Agency and an Agency implementing Roosevelt's New Deal legislation) that 'ritualistic conformity with established rules and regulations' stems from

varying influences.⁽⁷²⁾ The main point is that the rules and regulations, which were established as official organisational strategies to ensure the efficient and effective pursuance of official goals, may end up being treated by participants as ends in themselves.

Regarding the concept of goal succession, Blau stated that:

the succession of organisational goals is most conspicuous in innovating organisations, since some of their initial objectives tend to become obsolete, but it is not confined to them. (73)

A clear example of goal succession was illustrated in Sills' study of the Foundation for Infantile Paralysis.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Following the discovery of the Salk vaccine and the potential of achieving its initial goal, the Foundation's voluntary members became interested in applying the innovatory skills developed within the Foundation in furthering other causes. Sills concludes that due to the fact that many Foundation volunteers were able to assess and articulate the longer-term implications of their work, the Foundation became

an organisation as deeply committed to its mode of operation as to its current purposes it is an organisation which is as committed to a means as it is to an end. (75)

Similarly Selznick describes the TVA's strategy of co-opting the representatives of critical groups as displacing the TVA's official objective of grass roots participation and he concludes that 'organisations are moulded by forces which are tangential to their

rationally ordered structures and stated goals. (76)

What is the relevance of these concepts of goal succession and goal displacement for our understanding of housing associations? I would remind the reader that in the historical account of the voluntary housing movement (Chapters One and Two) we have already seen how the initial objectives of different types of association were modified and changed as the result of entrepreneurialism and management choices to diversify objectives. (Associations providing general family housing began to produce housing for special needs or vice versa.) However, the significant factors which have influenced a succession of goals or a shift in policies have been access to government funding and changing government policies. (Cost rent societies changed to co-ownership societies in the 1970s; and in the 1980s co-ownership societies affected by the imposition of the right to sell have begun to develop housing for sale or for shared ownership.) In the case of CBHAs it is evident that their organisational goals have multiplied and diversified over time. Only one CBHA has completed its original area rehabilitation programme (77) and the majority of CBHAs have several years ahead before completing their initially specified housing objectives. Already however the majority of associations have officially specified their interest in new building and redefined their overall objective as more generally that of area renewal. Also I have already argued in Chapter Seven that the longer-term role and objectives of CBHAs will depend on strategic choices by

participants about goals and resource deployment, as well as on the housing policies of, and resource allocation, by local and central government agencies.

In the final part of this first section I shall consider the implications of this discussion for our understanding of the evolution of goals in CBHAs and of similarities and differences between them.

1.e. Similarities and differences

A final point to be drawn from studies of organisations is that they have illustrated marked differences in the character and style of organisations, as well as shared characteristics which reflect common influences such as organisational growth, professionalisation and environmental constraints. While much of the preceding discussion highlights common organisational characteristics, a concept which serves to highlight organisational differences is that of 'organisational culture'. Eldridge and Crombie have commented:

The culture of an organisation refers to the unique configuration of norms, values, beliefs, ways of behaving and so on that characterises the manner in which individuals and groups combine to get things done. The distinctiveness of a particular organisation is intimately bound up with its history and the character-building effects of past decisions and past leaders. It is manifested in the folkways, mores, and the ideology to which members defer, as well as in the strategic choices made by the organisation as a whole. (78)

They further emphasise that it is the constant exercise of choice by organisational participants which is the most significant influence on the distinctiveness of organisations. In conclusion we are again reminded of the organisational tensions between, on the one hand, the influence of personalities, of choice and action by key groups of participants and, on the other, the influence of external contingencies and constraints which affect organisations similarly, either by limiting the scope of discretionary decision-making or by encouraging common strategies which generate similar organisational tendencies.

In the case studies I shall explore further these tensions between constraint and the scope for discretion in CBHAs.

In the following section I shall discuss how certain common aspects of the CBHA experience reflect some of the themes which have been theoretically approached in the first section. Section Two is divided into three parts. First, I shall provide a general description of how young CBHAs in Glasgow developed in the context of economic, political and interorganisational uncertainties and constraints. I shall also attempt to illustrate how, despite these common circumstances of CBHAs, participants' choices have affected organisational differences between CBHAs. Following this, I shall focus on two important aspects of organisational structure in CBHAs which have been influenced both by external factors and by participants' intentions - these being elements of bureaucracy in the official structure of CBHAs and the trend of increasing

professionalisation. Finally, I shall characterise the official goals of CBHAs, which I have determined through analysis of official reports and statements. The purpose of this characterisation is to highlight ideological aspects of CBHA goals, as well as their complexity and diversity, some ten years after the formation of Glasgow's first CBHAs.

Section Two : The Organisational Development of CBHAs

2.a. Environmental uncertainties, complexities and choices affecting young CBHAs

There were many similarities between the local residents who joined the Steering Committees of CBHAs and the working class residents of the inner areas of other cities who became involved in public participation strategies of the 1970s.⁽⁷⁹⁾ They were mainly working class people who had not generally been active in mainstream politics; who were distanced from and often suspicious of state planning agencies; and who had no prior management experience or experience in the workings and interrelations of state agencies.⁽⁸⁰⁾ However in several cases, in the early stages, CBHA Steering Committees involved or were supported by professional people, by community workers or by local councillors.⁽⁸¹⁾

The Steering Committees faced significant uncertainties. For example, initial funding came in the form of an 'establishment grant' provided by the local authority, and bank overdraft facility guaranteed by the Housing Corporation. This financial framework

enabled young CBHAs to set up office. A further important factor was the understanding of local bank managers, some of whom had not heard of housing associations in the early stages. Guaranteed debt and uncertainties about future income therefore represented the financial basis which enabled local Committees to employ staff - a situation about which many participants were very unhappy.

As Child has suggested⁽⁸²⁾ we can view the process of organisational growth in CBHAs as representing a series of attempts to acquire organisational expertise and to increase participants' control over environmental complexities and uncertainties. We have seen that CBHA Committees have become collective employers, and generally following registration the associations have appointed their first Development Officer (DO) to plan and co-ordinate the house improvement programme and to service the Committee in its policy-making and monitoring functions.

The first DO has tended to be a person of all trades: establishing office organisation and systems for information collection; carrying out a residents' survey in the locality and answering queries in the office; filling in the appropriate forms, where owner-occupiers wish to sell to the association, or in connection with gaining the necessary approval for improvement schemes; liaising with government agencies on different issues and with the consultants appointed to develop the first scheme. It is the DO's work in acquiring properties and in advancing improvement

contracts which has generated the initial flow of income to the association in the form of allowances.⁽⁸³⁾ Further, to the extent that he/she is a central point of contact between the CBHA and local residents, the first DO's approach to local residents has been an important factor influencing residents' attitudes to the CBHA.

Other early staff appointments have generally included a secretary/receptionist, a second DO (depending on the scale of the initial project area approved by the GDC, the HC and the SDD), a Housing Officer, a Maintenance Officer/Clerk of Works and an Administrative Officer cum Bookkeeper. The Housing Officer is responsible for assisting the Committee in developing a Lettings or Allocations Policy, for establishing administrative systems required by the association's growing role as landlord (for example, a rent-collection system) and for ensuring effective written and personal communications with tenants. The technical appointment reflects the association's interest in monitoring building standards on site and in maintaining flats in association ownership.

Finally, associations formed after 1977 were advised by HC officials to employ an Administrative/Finance Officer as their second or third senior appointment. In general, therefore, since 1977 there has been increased awareness of the administrative complexity of housing association work and of the need for systems of financial control and monitoring. After 1980 other environmental constraints influenced staff appointments. For example, government funding restraint resulted in the approval of smaller project areas

by the SDD, and served to lower participants' confidence in the future pace of the improvement programme. As a result the expansion of Development staff was restricted.

There are further similarities in the organisational structure and style of young CBHAs. In the first year or so the CBHA office has usually been a single tenement flat occupied by between three and six staff. Lines of authority, specialisation and office routine have generally not been very apparent and responsibility has been shared to the extent that secretarial staff have often played an important role in providing information to local residents.

A further pattern has been that Committee members in many CBHAs have paid frequent visits to their office. In some associations Committee members have become involved in day-to-day affairs as well as in official Committee business. To illustrate the range of participation here are some examples: in several associations Committee members have produced discussion papers and requested meetings on different issues; in others Committee members have helped staff in conducting a survey on a particular topic; they have assisted staff with transporting items, e.g. during decanting, when they have helped elderly residents with moves and have boarded up empty houses which were vulnerable to vandalism. Also, Committee members have attended staff meetings with consultants on specific contracts as well as meetings with HC officials, and certain secretaries have become involved in routine correspondence. Not

surprisingly, however, extensive involvement characterised only a minority of CBHAs in the early stages, e.g. Yoker and Reidvale, and patterns of involvement have varied with staff attitudes and the approach, employment and family circumstances of Committee members. (84)

Apart from these unofficial patterns, CBHA business has been carried out according to the complex rules which govern their official procedures and the decision-making roles of association personnel. Also increasingly associations have added to the general guidelines of their Model Rules by increasing their Sub-Committees; by recording new policies; and by formalising the distribution of responsibilities between staff and Committee and within the official staff structure.

Therefore, as I have suggested earlier, CBHAs can be seen to reflect both bureaucratic tendencies and the characteristics of a more organic, flexible type of organisational structure. (85) In general the organisational culture of CBHAs is influenced by participants' expectations and by the nature of organisational tasks. On the one hand, participants have expected flexibility, informality, normative involvement, trust and discretion to characterise CBHAs. On the other hand, they have emphasised Committee control, administrative efficiency and the employment of staff with practical skills and building trade experience, who are not necessarily morally committed to the goals of CBHAs. However in the case studies we shall see that participants hold contradictory

values and expectations which serve to generate organisational conflicts, and that different types of control coexist as persistent, interrelated features of the organisational structure of CBHAs.

A further point about the organisational structure of CBHAs is that these 27 associations in Glasgow have experienced a faster rate of organisational growth than the majority of associations in Britain.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Also, as an experiment in neighbourhood-based housing agencies, CBHAs are unique in their scale and complexity, features resulting from the CBHA area improvement programme which was resolved as a corporate strategy between the regional office of the Housing Corporation, the local authority and the SDD. While many housing associations in Britain operate without staff, Glasgow's CBHAs, five years after their formation, have employed on average between eight and fifteen staff, depending on the scale and progress of their housing improvement programme and on the extent to which they have chosen to provide housing management services for their tenants.⁽⁸⁷⁾

I have now described some of the variations between young CBHAs in terms of organisational structure, work relations and operative goals. I have also pointed to certain similarities between CBHAs, which following their initial 'gearing up' phase, had incorporated within their organisations a noticeable variety of expertise, of work orientations and types of commitment and of social backgrounds of participants. Also, I have described CBHAs as innovative work organisations which have been characterised by

an unusual employment relationship between local residents and their professional staff. We have seen that this employment relationship affected city-wide industrial relations developments. In Chapter Eight I argued that, on the one hand, CBHA work and employment relations have reflected patterns which have been found to characterise different types of work organisations in capitalist society while, on the other, CBHA developments were the outcome of the heightened expectations for involvement during the formative phase of CBHA development. I have also suggested that participants' early expectations about the CBHA workplace are most likely to reflect the pattern in other types of normative or ideological organisations, in which participants seek to realise certain values, and in which participants are not simply concerned about instrumental or economic rewards from their involvement. Finally, we have seen that work expectations and relations in CBHAs evolved on the basis of cumulative experience, which was communicated both within and between associations.

I shall now discuss some further contextual influences on the organisational structure and work relations characterising CBHAs, and at the end of this chapter I shall return to the question of how strategic choices have influenced differences between CBHAs.

2.b. Contextual influences and structural tensions in CBHAs

From the preceding theoretical discussion in Section One I shall abstract certain points about bureaucracy and professionalism which I believe are relevant to our understanding of CBHAs. First, aspects of bureaucracy have been found to stem from increasing organisational

growth and from the complexity of tasks and of organisational environment. Also, it has been argued that non-bureaucratic structures are both more likely to evolve, and to be more effective, in the context of environments characterised by extensive uncertainties and change. On the other hand, it has been shown that organisational groups may attempt to control uncertainties and external threats by standardising procedures or by incorporating dissenting groups into the policy-making structure of their organisation. Finally in Section One, I have outlined some of the debates on the tensions between bureaucracy and democracy, and between bureaucratic and professional forms of control in organisations. (88)

I have suggested that young CBHAs involve aspects of bureaucracy in parallel with non-routine, flexible and unique patterns of work relations. In the rest of this section I shall explore certain common external influences on bureaucracy and professionalism in CBHAs, and through the case studies I shall consider how far, and in what ways, the tendencies to bureaucracy and professionalism conflict with the goals of CBHAs and are reflected in tensions within them.

2.b.1. The tendency to bureaucracy in CBHAs

It is important to note that aspects of bureaucracy in CBHAs in the first instance stem from the Model Rules of housing associations. These specify the basic official structure of control of housing associations, which is approved by the Housing

Corporation. (89) These aspects of bureaucracy are clearly designed to ensure the public accountability of associations by clarifying and centralising the location of responsibility and authority in the collective executive body. Moreover, they imply a markedly hierarchical model of Committee control over staff which is therefore implicit in CBHAs even at the stage of their first staff appointment. The organisational assumptions implicit in external guides are suggestive of a centralised, hierarchical and routinised system of internal control. It is a model of control which reflects the prescriptions of the classical management theorists, (90) and which has been shown to contradict with forms of control which characterise both professional and organic types of organisation.

A further point is that the model of formal control which is implicit in the official structure of housing associations assumes a division of labour whereby the Committee retains responsibility for policy and officials are responsible for implementation. For example, an NFHA guide states that:

The Committee of Management acts for and in the name of the Association. The Committee must retain the ultimate control of all aspects of the association's work and must ensure that its financial and legal responsibilities are properly fulfilled. The powers of the Committee are very wide and although particular functions may be delegated to sub-committees, the Committee of Management retains the responsibility for ensuring that these functions are properly carried out. The Model Rules allow little power to be delegated entirely to staff and although many functions may be given to employees by those associations that are employers, responsibility for these aspects of the associations work still remains firmly with the Committee. (91)

However the NFHA guide implies there may be contradictory aspects of control in associations. Having argued that in theory, Committees can delegate little to their staff, on the question of staff appointments it suggests that:

Since the senior executive is to be held responsible for the success of the organisation - his or her opinion is likely to be paramount in this selection process. (92)

These tensions, and the dynamics of control in practice, are not however recognised in the model of organisational control which is implicit in Housing Corporation (Monitoring Division) statements about Committee control. In its supervisory role the Monitoring Division is concerned with two main questions. 'Are the Committee of Management in control of the association?' And 'Are the activities of the association consistent with the objects of a non-profit-making housing body in receipt of public funds?'⁽⁹³⁾ Now while associations generally accept the legitimacy of monitoring, and are interested in improving their operations and procedures in the name of increasing effectiveness and accountability, it is worth commenting that the framework of monitoring serves to emphasise an internal focus on procedures and on hierarchical control. Moreover, we have seen that scheme approvals procedures operated by the Housing Corporation inevitably serve to accumulate associations' dependence on bureaucratic procedures.⁽⁹⁴⁾

As a result some participants have become concerned that there are pressures to increasingly involve Committee members in administrative details - a trend which carries the risk of diverting them from policy issues and from the prime objectives of their involvement. Therefore, many participants face the contradiction that while they are committed to improving local housing opportunities and provision and, while they are concerned with ensuring that their association effectively pursues policies which further these aims, the pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness in practice may result in goal displacement. I shall return to these tensions in the concluding section of the thesis.

In the first section of this chapter we have seen that organisational behaviour and decision-making practices may not necessarily reflect the official and stated goals and structure of organisations. The studies to which I referred in that section have implied that organisational behaviour and decision-making are influenced by the differing expectations, backgrounds and intentions of participants, the actions of powerful groups in organisations and their reactions to external controls and constraints. Further, many studies have illustrated that the influence of individuals and groups on organisational practices may reflect their capacity to control organisational uncertainties (by virtue of their leadership qualities, their expertise or their unofficial work contacts) rather than the responsibility and authority vested in them by their position in the official structure of control.

These points have also been illustrated in the literature on public sector bureaucratic organisations where a key focus has been on the respective powers of bureaucratic officials and elected members in decision-making. Several writers on local government have questioned the assumptions of a clear role division in policy-making between councillors and officials.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Dearlove states:

First, the policy-administration dichotomy is a quite inadequate way to describe the working of public bodies and the division of labour between elected and official participants. Second, the issue is not whether officials have power but to what extent they have power. Third it is not possible to generalise over time, place and issue as to the relationship between councillors and officers. ⁽⁹⁶⁾

And Self argues that 'it will always remain impractical to put "questions of policy and questions of detail" into insulated compartments'.⁽⁹⁷⁾

In the case studies we shall see that contradictory aspects of control in CBHAs have served to influence tensions in relationships and, in this respect, there are similarities between CBHAs and other types of organisations. In the following section I shall concentrate on a further organisational contradiction - that between bureaucracy and professionalisation.

2.b.2. Organisational learning and professionalisation

From the preceding discussion I shall suggest that the evolution of CBHA policies has been influenced by internal reflection on local experiences as well as by external relationships. CBHA

participants in Glasgow exchange attitudes, experience and advice through informal contacts and through involvement in common organisations. Alongside the influence of government agencies, these "exchanges" have served as an important influence on the organisational development of CBHAs.

I have discussed how increasing hierarchy and bureaucracy characterised the first phase of CBHA growth. Professionalisation has been a parallel phenomenon in two senses of the word. First, while many housing associations operate without staff the scale of the housing programme of individual CBHAs made it inevitable that implementation would be dependent on paid officials. Secondly, there has been a growing emphasis on advantages of specialised training focused on different staff functions.⁽⁹⁸⁾ Since 1980 there has been a steady increase in the provision of training for Committee members by the Scottish Federation of Housing Associations (SFHA), the Glasgow Forum and the Glasgow Federation of CBHA employers. Also, while individual CBHAs have established "in-house" training to varying degrees, since 1978 CBHA staff have established city-wide forums to discuss specialist issues and to hold training events. At the present time there are specialist forums for Development, Housing Management, Maintenance and Finance staff, and in 1982 senior staff formed a Management Development forum to focus on management issues in CBHAs. These forums meet on a regular basis in the Glasgow office of the SFHA.

In relation to staff growth and professionalisation, some Committees initially responded by questioning the time spent in staff discussions outwith the office and the value of internal staff meetings. However, a dominant view held by staff in associations formed prior to 1977 was that neither staff nor Committees had appreciated the administrative complexity of the tasks at hand. These comments made in interview by long-experienced DOs are representative of such views. (99)

I now see myself as having been part of an organisation which was responsible and being paid for a sensible approach to house renovation and for giving residents a good deal.

I joined the association with positive expectations. The job seemed to be an unlikely kind of crack in the way the world works. It was a chance to keep out of technocratic circles. It seemed to involve community action but also the fluke of resources to spend, however I was sceptical because of my past work experience. In practice, the key aspect of the job has been coordination and administration.

What we didn't realise at the start was the importance of efficient administration and of the non-paternalist aspects of professionalism.

From the point of view of Committee members, many referred in interview to the discrepancy between their early assumptions about Committee control and their experience of organisational growth, complexity and external controls.

When we were formed the Housing Corporation told us 'you're in control'. We believed that. None of us understood how our associations would grow, that we would be held responsible as employers and managers and how much training was needed for us to accept these responsibilities. We were naive and we were thrown in at the deep end.

And a past chairman commented in interview on the expectations of Committees which are implied by Housing Corporation monitoring.

The Committee is expected to be in control of policy and of the association's affairs. We are in a cleft stick. How do we develop policy without working in partnership with staff? We have to rely on staff to guide us as to how and what we should monitor. The Housing Corporation and the Federation haven't recognised that or haven't worked out how to help. And what happens when we have management problems with staff? Maybe it's easier for the Glasgow associations which were formed later. When we were formed no-one had considered these questions.

These views were still being expressed within individual associations, and at meetings of the SFHA and the Glasgow Forum in 1982-83. There were different influences on these trends of professionalisation and of increasing questioning about Committee control and related training requirements. First, we have seen that the experience of growth and complexity served to generate increasing demands for training and support. Secondly, there was the scepticism and concern within government agencies about devolving control to local groups in working class localities. A Tory councillor who has long supported CBHAs provided an account of such scepticism.

This type of indifference was mirrored in some areas of the Civil Service. One elevated civil servant, with polystyrene injected into his veins, wrote about housing associations, 'what is the basis on which unemployed glaziers will be able to run a housing association?'. (100)

Perhaps more significant than such scepticism was a third influence - the emphasis on public accountability of housing associations by HC and SDD officials. For example, a former Chairman of the Board of the HC stated at the 1981 SFHA Conference which was titled 'It's a New Ball Game, Players and Management - Are you aware of the rules?'. (101)

The movement requires increasing professionalisation at all levels ... Volunteers are now directors of multi-million pound businesses. If you had realised what you had let yourself in for when you started, you might have given up. (101)

Against this background the SFHA has attempted to help associations cope with the implications of their public accountability. In 1980 a Personnel Manager from ICI carried out a study commissioned by the SFHA through the offices of the Scottish Action Resource Centre, on the training needs of CBHAs. His report, (102) while recognising variations between associations, emphasised the lack of management and administrative skills and 'organisational, structural and attitudinal' problems in CBHAs. It recommended a variety of training strategies. The initial response to the report amongst Glasgow associations was aggressive and defensive, however in later discussions it was commented at the Forum that 'it only told us what we all know anyway'. Its recommendations have been increasingly incorporated within the training policy of the SFHA, and the active interest of Committee members in educational aspects of their involvement was

still a distinctive characteristic of many of Glasgow's CBHAs by 1984.

In conclusion I would suggest that professionalism and bureaucracy in CBHAs have been trends influenced by central and local accountability. Local residents want a professional housing management service and are concerned that their local association should operate fair and systematic allocative procedures. Moreover, local people are interested in knowing that associations pursue correct procedures in distributing public funds, for example in the tendering of contracts, and this interest in public accountability coincides with the approach of central government agencies. However, as well as extending accountability, the trends of professionalism and aspects of bureaucracy represent means through which association participants gain confidence in the face of uncertainties and of complex goals and tasks. Bureaucracy - the establishment of records, systems and routine procedures - provides a point of reference to past decisions, to an accumulated stock of knowledge, and to the logic of policy development. Professionalism also should serve to generate a reasoned approach to the multifarious problems, situations and special cases which are a normal part of the CBHA work process.

In the case studies I shall consider these developments as they have affected two CBHAs in Glasgow and I shall return to draw some conclusions about the tensions relating to bureaucratic, professional and democratic aspects of CBHAs in Part Five, the final section of the thesis.

2.c. CBHA : Goals, ideology and strategic choice

In this section I shall discuss the goals and ideology of CBHAs. First I shall present a classification of CBHA goals which is intended to describe and clarify the main goals pursued by CBHA participants. This classification is based on statements about goals in official reports and in interviews, as well as on my observation of CBHA activities. In general it should serve to characterise the official, rather than the operative goals of CBHAs⁽¹⁰³⁾ and, therefore, I shall attempt to highlight some aspects of operative goals following the classification. I shall conclude the section by focusing on ideological aspects of CBHA goals which serve to highlight their distinctive organisational character.

2.c.1. A classification of the official goals of CBHAs

In classifying the goals of CBHAs I am abstracting and simplifying reality, and therefore the classification cannot represent the complex of goals pursued in any particular CBHA, at any one time.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾ It distinguishes between four categories of goals: first, those which relate to housing production; secondly, those relating to housing management and allocation; thirdly, those relating to public participation, local accountability and to neighbourhood provision; and, fourthly those which are more internally oriented.

Housing Production

1. To establish and administer a sensitive approach to rehabilitation in a planning-defined locality.
2. To acquire property from landlords and owner-occupiers who do not wish to carry out improvements themselves, thus establishing a new form of tenure in the locality; to take responsibility for the required organisation of improvement, management and maintenance of property in the association's ownership.
3. To coordinate owner-occupier improvements on behalf of the local authority with the aim of administering comprehensive tenement improvements.
4. To develop, or to organise the development of, new building in the locality in relation to defined needs (e.g. large families, the elderly, the handicapped), sometimes in conjunction with specialist housing associations.
5. To employ and to monitor the work of professional consultants (architects, quantity surveyors, etc.) in implementing the association's policies about standards and approach to local residents.
6. To ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of the building programme - recognising its implications for the association's role in maintaining properties, and for the longer-term housing mix in the area.

Housing Management and Allocation

1. To provide and implement a lettings system which takes account of the interests of residents in the locality in the context of housing needs and provision in the City of Glasgow.
2. To implement policies sensitively in the context of knowledge relating to local conditions and to individual family circumstances.
3. To ensure the effective coordination of rent collection and of housing maintenance, independently, or in partnership with property factors.
4. To coordinate local authority rehousing in partnership with the Housing Management Department at Glasgow District Council, for those residents who do not wish to remain in the locality.

Public Participation, Local Accountability and Neighbourhood Provision

1. To involve local residents in decisions relating to housing as a process - as they are affected as individual family units (through means of consultative design and close/block representation), and in relation to the broader housing interests of local residents (e.g. through means of information provision, public meetings).
2. A related objective is to encourage local residents to participate in the Committee structure of the association, and in CBHAs the majority of Committee members reside in or near the project area of the association.

3. To increase confidence in the locality and its future, through both house and environmental improvement, and to ensure that the area becomes, or remains as, an attractive base for living by improving neighbourhood facilities.

NB While the funding and administrative provisions of the 1974 Act are focused purely on housing provision, in several CBHAs participants have become involved in generating neighbourhood services.

Internal or System Goals

The goals which I have discussed so far are primarily both official and externally oriented. However, CBHA participants also pursue internally-oriented goals, or systems goals in Perrow's terms. For example, goals of efficiency and effectiveness and the proper conduct of association affairs are aims which are relevant both to internal systems and to public accountability. Other internally oriented goals relate to the administrative organisation and its structure, to the structure and process of staff pay and work conditions and finally to the criteria for defining access to association membership.

2.c.2. CBHAs and operative goals

The operative goals pursued by CBHA participants are more complex and diverse than my characterisation of official goals would suggest. In discussing the official goals of CBHAs I have generalised from

official statements about goals in different associations. While there are variations to be found in the official goals pursued by CBHAs (for example in relation to policies about membership; housing provision for special needs, new building; and on the criteria for allocations) the operative goals of associations are inevitably more varied and diverse as these reflect cumulative and on-going choices by CBHA participants as well as contextual influences.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ For example, on the production side since 1978 several CBHAs have become actively involved in lobbying and campaigning strategies in order to increase the quality and speed of area rehabilitation, while other associations have not chosen to become involved in such strategies. Secondly, the evolution of housing standards reflects, on the one hand, associations' cumulative and shared experience with housing maintenance problems and, on the other, advice by professional consultants.

As landlords, CBHAs vary in their allocations policies and in their practices of allocating houses. For example, in certain associations, the allocation of houses has been depersonalised to ensure objectivity by the implementation of a "points" system, while in others it has been argued that the special circumstances of house applicants should be considered within the framework of a more flexible allocations policy. Further, in some associations, Committee members choose to know the names of applicants in their sub-committee discussions, while in many associations this practice is not pursued. In general, all such issues have been the subject of internal

disagreements and debate (between staff and Committee, and amongst staff) which have influenced the evolution of policies, as we shall see in the case studies which follow.

I have suggested in earlier chapters⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ that control over certain housing issues rests primarily outwith the framework of housing association policies. I shall explore this argument by focusing on the evolution of operative goals (policies) in Part Four and by considering aspects of power and control which have been reflected in the housing association experience in Chapter Thirteen.

Finally, on questions of public participation, local accountability and neighbourhood provision, there are again notable differences between CBHAs. The majority of CBHAs have become involved in some form of neighbourhood provision (e.g. for the elderly). Also, certain associations have been notably committed to working with other local groups, such as Community Councils, and on local initiatives, such as neighbourhood centres (Reidvale and Yoker) and more recently co-operatives (Yoker). A further general pattern is that when associations have pursued such objectives it has been a minority of staff and Committee members who have been initiators and who have been most active on these fronts. Also following the discussion in Section One of this chapter, this "minority" may coincide with the power group or dominant coalition in the association.

Finally, on the question of local accountability, associations have differing policies about access to membership (for example, while Elderpark and Reidvale HAs draw their membership from within their Action Areas, the membership zone of others like Central Govan and Rutherglen is wider than their action areas). Also, to different degrees, associations have attempted to communicate with local residents about housing issues affecting the association and its work. For example, in some CBHAs participants have published regular newsletters, they have supported the publication of a newspaper for housing association tenants, they have held regular public meetings and/or they have regularly attended meetings of other local groups, e.g. residents' and tenants' associations. On the other hand, the main concern in most associations has been to improve the tenements and to become fair and efficient landlords, so that the extension of local participation in association affairs has not always been a dominant objective. It is interesting that having speedily and effectively completed its initial area rehabilitation programme, Elderpark HA is now focusing on discussions about devolving control by establishing housing co-operatives.

All these examples serve to illustrate zones of discretion or areas of choice through which participants have influenced their associations' operative goals. In the case studies we shall see how strategic choices by dominant groups have influenced the goals of two CBHAs over time. Finally I have emphasised earlier that the evolution of operative goals is influenced by internal and external

contextual factors as well as by participants' choices. Through the medium of the case studies I shall illustrate this interplay of internal and external factors and its effects on the evolution of specific goals.

2.c.3. The ideological distinctiveness of CBHAs

Following this discussion of the goals of CBHAs I shall now point to certain ideological aspects of the goals of CBHAs and I shall suggest here that these ideological aspects serve to influence the distinctiveness of the organisational culture of CBHAs. (107)

In Chapter Three I suggested that certain goals of CBHAs are similar to those of tenant co-operatives, while others are similar to those pursued by conventional housing associations and even by local authorities. There are, however, certain values which are implicit in the goals of CBHAs which distinguish them from these other agencies which are interested in housing provision. In general the official ideology of CBHAs emphasises values of community and of community development; local control of housing production and allocation; and the retention of inner area neighbourhoods through both rehabilitation and new building. The ideology of CBHAs also implies that housing provision should be administered differently from traditional practices of the local authority by involving an approach which takes account of resident requirements and which is locally accountable. These values were expressed by Glasgow CBHAs in a collective statement to MPs:

The Committee members are all volunteers, many first-time volunteers, who have given a lot of time and effort to recruit members, to convince neighbours of the value of preserving their community by their own efforts. By their work they have made and are making an act of faith in the future of their local community. ... The social and political implications of alienating so many potential and actual opinion leaders in the Inner City ought to be disturbing to the government.

And, on the reasons why GDC and the HC encouraged the formation of CBHAs, the statement continues:

- (a) Here was a way to provide alternative forms of tenure and expand the small non-council sector of housing.
- (b) Here was a way to revitalise the deprived tenemental areas of Glasgow with the aid of Central Government funds.
- (c) Here was a way of involving local residents in decision-making and the management of their areas.
- (d) Here was a way to improve Glasgow's sub-standard tenements without municipalisation and with the retention of the owner-occupier.
- (e) Here was a way for the local authority to carry out their new responsibilities under the Housing Act in a more sensitive and successful manner than had been achieved on schemes such as the Old Swan at Pollockshaws. (108)

This collective statement illustrates the dominant values which are emphasised by CBHA participants in legitimising their associations' role and activities to both government agencies and to local people. It also serves to highlight expectations about the distinctive style of CBHAs as organisations, and we have seen some consequences of these expectations in this and the previous chapter.

In general the second section of Chapter Nine has attempted to apply to the organisational development of CBHAs some of the theoretical themes and perspectives which were outlined in the first part of the chapter. In doing so, my intention has been to highlight some of the influences on similarities and differences between CBHAs. These influences have included, first, external constraints and structural influences which may be reflected in organisational tensions and problems; and secondly, the role of powerful groups in influencing organisational outcomes. I shall explore the interplay of these influences on the evolution of two CBHAs in Chapters Eleven and Twelve. However, prior to the case studies of Govanhill and Reidvale Housing Associations, in Chapter Ten, I shall focus on a different aspect of the environment of CBHAs, that of the neighbourhoods in which the local associations were formed in 1973 and 1976 respectively.

In discussing these two localities I shall take account of the historical, political, economic and social characteristics which provided the local context of CBHA formation and early development.

Notes and References to Chapter Nine

- (1) See, for example, K. Marx Early Writings, introduced by L. Colletti, Penguin, 1974, pp. 282-309 and K. Marx, Capital, Allen and Unwin, 1957, pp. 633-661.
- (2) Max Weber, Economy and Society, edited by G. Roth and G. Wittich, Bedminster Press, 1968, Volume 3, Chapter 11; and Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organisation, edited by A.M. Henderson and T. Parsons, Macmillan, 1975, reprinted in O. Grusky and G.A. Miller, (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations, Basic Studies, Second Edition, The Free Press, Collier Macmillan, 1981, pp. 7-36.
- (3) T. Veblen, The Theory of Business Enterprise, Scribner, 1904; and T. Veblen, The Instinct of Workmanship, Norton, 1941.
- (4) See J.E.T. Eldridge, Sociology and Industrial Life, Part Three, Nelson, 1971; J. Freund, The Sociology of Max Weber, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1970, pp. 218-244; and J.E.T. Eldridge and A.D. Crombie, A Sociology of Organisations, George Allen and Unwin, 1974, pp. 136-149; N.P. Mouzelis, Organisation and Bureaucracy, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967, pp. 7-37.
- (5) See D. Silverman, The Theory of Organisations, Heinemann, London, 1974, pp. 215-219. See also R. Bendix, 'The Impact of Ideas on Organisational Structure', in O. Grusky and G.A. Miller, The Sociology of Organisations, Basic Studies, New York, Free Press, First Edition, 1970, pp. 529-536. Bendix describes managerial ideologies as 'all ideas which are espoused by or for those who exercise authority in industrial enterprises, and which seek to explain and justify that authority'. The concept of managerial ideologies is clearly applicable to all types of organisation.
- (6) See G. Burrell and G. Morgan's Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, Heinemann, London, 1979, p. 312. See also, C.W. Mills, The Sociological Imagination, Pelican, 1970, pp. 87-132.
- (7) As argued by D. Silverman, The Theory of Organisations, 1974, op. cit., Chapter 7, pp. 147-174; S. Parker, R. Brown, J. Child and M. Smith, The Sociology of Industry, George Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp. 182-191 and S. Drupp, Pattern in Organisational Analysis, A Critical Examination, Holt Reinhart and Winston, 1961, pp. 75-85.
- (8) C. Perrow, Complex Organisations, A Critical Essay, Scott, Foresman & Co., 1972, pp. 145-204; and O. Grusky and G. Miller, (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations, Basic Studies, 2nd Edition, 1981.

- (9) See G. Burrell and G. Morgan, 1979, op. cit.; J.K. Benson, 'Organisations: A Dialectical View', in O. Grusky and G. Miller, 1981, op. cit., pp. 201-227; and S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Organisation, Class and Control, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980, pp. 483-555.
- (10) See H.A. Landsberger, (ed.), Comparative Perspectives on Formal Organisations, Little, Brown and Company, 1970.
- (11) A.K. Rice, The Enterprise and Its Environment, London, Tavistock, 1963, p. 15.
- (12) C. Perrow, Organisational Analysis, A Sociological View, Tavistock, 1974, pp. 112-115.
- (13) J.D. Thompson, Organisations in Action, New York, McGraw Hill, 1967.
- (14) See W.M. Evan (ed.), Interorganisational Relations, Penguin 1976; see also the Introduction to Part Three of the thesis.
- (15) See S. Clegg and D. Dunkerley, Organisation, Class and Control, 1980, op. cit., Chapters 10, 12 and 13.
- (16) See G. Salaman, 'Classification of Organisations and Organisation Structure: The Main Elements and Interrelationships', in G. Salaman and K. Thompson, (eds.), Control and Ideology in Organisations, Open University Press, 1980, pp. 56-84.
- (17) See for example A. Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry, London, Collier Macmillan, 1971; and S. Krupp, Pattern in Organisation Analysis, 1961, op. cit.
- (18) For a summary of the Aston research and of American studies involving a similar approach, see R.H. Hall, Organisations: Structure and Process, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1972.
- (19) J. Child, Organisations: A Guide to Problems and Practice, Harper and Row, 1977, pp. 31-32 and pp. 145-157.
- (20) See T. Burns and G.M. Stalker, The Management of Innovation, London, Tavistock, 1961.
- (21) J. Child, 'Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance', in G. Salaman and K. Thompson, People and Organisations, London, Longman, 1973, p. 96.

- (22) For example D. Schon, Beyond the Stable State, Temple Smith, 1971; and F.E. Emery and E.L. Trist, 'The Causal Texture of Organisational Environments', Human Relations, 1965, 18, 1, pp. 21-31.
- (23) J. Child, Organisation Structure, Environment and Performance, 1973, op. cit., pp. 92-94.
- (24) For example see R. Michels, Political Parties, Glencoe, Ill., Free Press, 1949.
- (25) See for example P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, New York, Harper and Row, 1966.
- (26) See Chapters Six and Seven.
- (27) See Chapter Eight.
- (28) See Chapters Five, Seven and Eight.
- (29) On the theme of structural contradictions, see T. Elster, Contradictions and Possible Worlds, J. Wiley and Sons, 1976, pp. 66-68, 134-150; see also A. Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory, Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Theory, Macmillan Press, 1979, pp. 131-164.
- (30) See M. Weber, 'Bureaucracy', in O. Grusky and G. Miller, (eds.), The Sociology of Organisations, The Free Press, 1981, pp. 7-34.
- (31) R. Michels, Political Parties, translated by Eden and Cedar Paul, Crowell-Collier, 1962, particularly pp. 61-73 and pp. 167-173; and P. Selznick, TVA and The Grass Roots, 1949, op. cit.
- (32) S.M. Lipset, M.A. Trow and J.S. Coleman, Union Democracy, The Free Press, 1956.
- (33) A. Gouldner, 'Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy', American Political Science Review, 49, pp. 496-507.
- (34) This emphasis on organisational choice is also evident in the work of V. Lenin in The State and Revolution, New York, International Publishers, pp. 42-65; in P. Selznick's, 'Rejoinder to Wolin', in A. Etzioni's A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, Holt Reinhart and Winston, 2nd Edition, 1970, pp. 149-154.

- (35) S.N. Eisenstadt, 'Bureaucracy, Bureaucratisation and Debureaucratisation', in A. Etzioni, A Sociological Reader on Complex Organisations, 2nd Edition, Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1970, pp. 304-312.
- (36) J. Westergaard and H. Resler, Class in a Capitalist Society, A Study of Contemporary Britain, Penguin, 1982, pp. 144-145. See also M. Mann, Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class, Macmillan, 1973, pp. 24-33 and pp. 68-74.
- (37) See A. Gouldner, 'Cosmopolitans and Locals, Towards an Analysis of Latent Social Roles', Administrative Science Quarterly, Volume 2, 1957-8, pp. 281-306 and pp. 444-480. Also, Professions and Professionalisation, edited by J.A. Jackson, Cambridge University Press, 1970, especially articles by G. Harries-Jenkins, pp. 51-108 and by T. Leggatt, pp. 153-178.
- (38) See J.A. Jackson, Professions and Professionalisation, CUP, 1970, op. cit., pp. 1-50; P. Elliott, The Sociology of the Professions, Macmillan, 1972, pp. 14-57; H.L. Wilensky, 'The Professionalisation of Everyone?', American Journal of Sociology, Volume 70, 1964, pp. 137-158.
- (39) A. Gouldner, 'Cosmopolitans and Locals', ASQ, Volume 2, 1957-8, op. cit.
- (40) P. Hall, 'Professionalisation and Bureaucratisation', in G. Salaman and K. Thompson, (eds.), People and Organisations, Longman, OUP, 1973, op. cit., pp. 120-133.
- (41) Hall reminds us that we cannot simply assume the presence of structural tensions between bureaucracy and professionalism as some established professions have 'rather weakly developed professional attitudes', and organisations in which professionals' work vary widely in their degree of bureaucratisation. See G. Salaman and K. Thompson, OUP, 1973, op. cit., p. 132.
- (42) See J. Child, 'Organisational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice', in G. Salaman and K. Thompson, (eds.), People and Organisations, 1973, op. cit., pp. 90-107.
- (43) A. Chandler, Strategy and Structure: Chapters in the History of the Industrial Enterprise, Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1962, p. 13.
- (44) J. Child, 'Organisational Structure, Environment and Performance: The Role of Strategic Choice', 1973, op. cit., p. 90. See also J. Child, Organisations, A Guide to Problems and Practice, Harper and Row, 1977. The vast majority of this text is devoted to aspects of managerial choice.

- (45) See G. Burrell and G. Morgan, Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis, 1979, op. cit., pp. 10-20 and T. Campbell, Seven Theories of Human Society, Clarendon, Oxford, 1980, Chapter One, pp. 3-24.
- (46) This approach is perhaps most notably represented in the work of Parsons. See T. Parsons, 'Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organisations', Administrative Science Quarterly, Vol. 1, pp. 63-85 and 225-239.
- (47) See for example, A. Fox, A Sociology of Work in Industry, London, Collier-Macmillan, 1971 and S. Krupp, Pattern in Organisation Analysis, 1961, op. cit.
- (48) For example, M. Crozier in The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, London, Tavistock, 1964, has shown the significant relationship between Power and Uncertainty in his case studies of a Tobacco Manufacturing Company and of a Civil Service Department in France. See also M. Dalton, Men Who Manage, New York, Wiley, 1959.
- (49) See for example, A.W. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, New York, Free Press, 1954; and also A. Gouldner, Wildcat Strike, New York, Free Press, 1965.
- (50) A. Etzioni, Modern Organisations, Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Prentice-Hall, p. 6.
- (51) L.B. Mohr, 'The Concept of Organisational Goal', p.473, American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, 1973, pp. 470-481.
- (52) See L.B. Mohr op. cit. 1973 and P. Georgiou, 'The Goal Paradigm and Notes Towards a Counter-Paradigm', ASQ, Vol. 18, 1973, pp. 291-310.
- (53) C. Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations', American Sociological Review, Vol. 26, 1961, pp. 854-866; and C. Perrow, Organisational Analysis: A Sociological Review, Belmont, California, Wadsworth, 1970, pp. 133-174.
- (54) D. Silverman, The Theory of Organisations, Heinemann, 1974, op. cit., p. 126.
- (55) H.A. Simon, 'On the Concept of Organisational Goals', ASQ, 1964, 9 (1), pp. 1-22.

- (56) J.D. Thompson and W. McEwan, 'Organisational Goals and Environment: Goal-setting as an Interaction Process', in G. Salaman and K. Thompson, (eds.), People and Organisations, 1973, op. cit., pp. 155-168.
- (57) J.D. Thompson and W. McEwan, 1973, op. cit., p. 156.
- (58) See R.H. Hall, Organisations, Structure and Process, Second Edition, Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, 1977. The approach I am emphasising here which stresses the significance of both constraints and action, is also reflected in the work of A. Dawe in 'The Two Sociologies', British Journal of Sociology, 21, pp. 207-218 and in J.A. Banks, Trade Unionism, Collier-Macmillan, 1974, p. 11-26. Banks comments, 'to assume, therefore, that the reference to social systems must perforce imply a belief in the impotence of human beings is unwarranted. On the contrary, in this world men consciously fabricate systems of interlocking roles in order to obtain control over what would otherwise be at best unintelligible and capricious', p.23.
- (59) C. Perrow, Organisational Analysis, A Sociological View, Tavistock, 1970, p. 135.
- (60) C. Perrow, 1970, op. cit., pp. 134-135.
- (61) L.B. Mohr, in 'The Concept of Organisational Goal', American Political Science Review, Vol. 67, 1973, uses the term 'reflexive' in referring to internally-oriented goals and 'transitive' to refer to externally-oriented goals, pp. 475-476, op. cit.
- (62) C. Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations', ASR, Vol. 26, December 1961, p. 55.
- (63) L.B. Mohr, 1973, op. cit., p. 474.
- (64) A. Gouldner, Wildcat Strike, New York, Free Press, 1965.
- (65) A. Gouldner, Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy, Free Press, New York, 1954, pp. 96-98.
- (66) R. Guest, Organisational Change, Homewood, Ill., The Dorsey Press, 1962.
- (67) R. Guest and C.R. Walker, The Man on the Assembly Line, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1952.
- (68) C. Perrow, Organisational Analysis, A Sociological View, San Fransisco, Wadsworth, 1970, Chapter 1.

- (69) P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, Berkely, University of California Press, 1949.
- (70) L.B. Mohr, 1973, op. cit., p. 472.
- (71) See M. Weber, Essays in Sociology, edited by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 196-214. Also R.K. Merton (ed.), Reader in Bureaucracy, Glencoe, 1963; F. Mouzelis, Organisation and Bureaucracy, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967 and M. Albrow, Bureaucracy, London, Pall Mall, 1970.
- (72) P. Blau, The Dynamics of Bureaucracy, University of Chicago Press, 1955, p. 235.
- (73) P. Blau, 1955, op. cit., p. 243.
- (74) D.L. Sills, The Volunteers: Means and Ends in a National Organisation, Chicago, Free Press, 1957.
- (75) D.L. Sills, 1957, op. cit., p. 159.
- (76) P. Selznick, TVA and the Grass Roots, op. cit., p. 251.
- (77) Elderpark Housing Association in 1983.
- (78) J.E.T. Eldridge and A.D. Crombie, A Sociology of Organisations, George Allen, 1975, p. 89, Chapter Five, Organisational Cultures, pp. 86-124. See also B.A. Turner, Exploring the Industrial Subculture, Macmillan, 1971, Chapter One, pp. 1-8.
- (79) See R. Darke and R. Walker, Local Government and the Public, Leonard Hill, 1977; J. Lambert, C. Paris and B. Blackaby, Housing Policy and the State, Allocation, Access and Control, Macmillan, 1978, pp. 118-146, Case Study 4; and P. Saunders, Urban Politics, A Sociological Interpretation, Penguin, 1980, pp. 127-136 and pp. 273-296.
- (80) See D. Maclennan et al, The Rehabilitation Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland, A Report prepared for the Scottish Development Department, Scottish Office, April 1983, p. 40, Table 4.1 shows that 57.3% of Glasgow Committee members surveyed were unemployed and only 17.7% were managers or professionals as compared with 18.6% not working and 31.2% professionals or managers in Edinburgh associations.
- (81) Six out of the first nine CBHAs formed in Glasgow either had professionals involved on their Steering Committees or they had community workers or architects involved in a recognised supportive capacity.

- (82) J. Child, Organisation, A Guide to Problems and Practice, Harper and Row, 1977, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
- (83) SDD Circular 10/1975 explains the structure of allowances payable for different aspects of CBHA work.
- (84) These varied influences on patterns of organisational structure and behaviour have been discussed at Conferences and Seminars organised by the SFHA and by the Glasgow Forum of CBHAs, particularly since 1980.
- (85) See Section One.
- (86) 'Almost 90 per cent of associations have less than 250 units in management and only 3 per cent have over 1,000. About 20 per cent of associations are run entirely voluntarily and of the remainder the vast majority have less than 5 employees.' Housing Associations, A Committee Members Handbook, NFHA, 1979, p. 86, Para. A.10.4.
- (87) Maclellan et al conclude from their 1979 survey that Glasgow associations averaging 36.3 months in age, employed an average of 8.1 staff, The Rehabilitation Activities and Effectiveness of Housing Associations in Scotland, April 1983, p. 45, Table 4.3. My average is based on data about staffing structure supplied by six associations in 1981 and on analysis of Annual Reports in 1982.
- (88) See Section 1.b.
- (89) Most associations which seek Housing Corporation funding register with the Housing Corporation Model (HSA) (Scotland) rules as corporate bodies under the Industrial and Provident Societies Act, 1965, See Appendix 1, A Committee Members Handbook, NFHA, 1979, op. cit.
- (90) For example, Fayol stressed the advantages of hierarchy and of centralising authority, (unity of command). See H. Fayol, General and Industrial Management, London, Pitman, 1949.
- (91) A Committee Members Handbook, NFHA, 1979, p. 5, para. 2.
- (92) NFHA, 1979, op. cit., pp. 5-6, para. 5.
- (93) Housing Corporation in Scotland, Scottish Guidance Note, 'Housing Corporation Registration and Supervision Responsibilities', March 1983.

- (94) See Chapters Six and Seven.
- (95) See for example, R.A.W. Rhodes, 'The Lost World of British Local Politics', Local Government Studies, Vol. 1, pp. 39-59; and J.G. Davies, The Evangelistic Bureaucrat, Tavistock, 1972, pp. 89-92.
- (96) J. Dearlove, The Reorganisation of British Local Government, Old Orthodoxies and a Political Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 1979, p. 54.
- (97) P. Self, Administrative Theories and Politics, George Allen and Unwin, 1979, p. 150.
- (98) Staff specialisation and professionalisation have also characterised conventional associations and these trends have been encouraged by the SFHA, the NFHA and the Institute of Housing. See Growing Pains, Coping with the Problems of Growth in Housing Associations, NFHA, 1978. However, the emphasis on training for Committee members is particularly characteristic of Glasgow's CBHAs.
- (99) I interviewed senior staff and experienced Committee members over the period between November 1978 and December 1981.
- (100) I. Dyer, 'Housing Associations in Glasgow', p.116, in Making the City Work, Enterprise and Democracy in Western Europe, edited by Bob Allen and published by Glasgow District Council for Project Turin International, 1980, pp. 115-118.
- (101) I attended the 1981 SFHA Annual Conference as a participant.
- (102) Basil Murphy, 'The Training Requirements of Community-based Housing Associations in Glasgow', SFHA Report, 1980.
- (103) C. Perrow, 'The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organisations', American Sociological Review, Volume 26, pp. 854-866.
- (104) I recognise that there may be similarities between my generalised description of central aspects of CBHA goals and Weber's Ideal Type method as discussed by J. Freund in the Sociology of Max Weber, Allen Lane, Penguin Press, 1968, pp. 59-86. However, I do not intend that my descriptive model should have any analytical or explanatory relevance, beyond serving to highlight and clarify key characteristics.
- (105) In discussing operative goals here I am drawing on my experience as a participant in 1977 and between 1981 and 1983, as well as on my interviews and observations between 1979 and 1981.

- (106) See Chapters Six, Seven and Eight.
- (107) See Section 1.e.
- (108) Collective statement presented by delegation from 19 Glasgow associations involved in rehabilitation to Members of Parliament at the House of Commons, 18 April 1978.