


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*JOB-CREATION SCHEMES IN THE  
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND: A STUDY  
OF ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION*

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JOB-CREATION SCHEMES IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND:

A STUDY OF ADAPTIVE IMPLEMENTATION

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'THE UNEMPLOYMENT IN OUR BONES  
ERUPTING IN OUR HANDS IN STONES'

Seamus Deane (1972)

GRADUAL WARS Irish University Press

(Figures are located in the text and tables between the text and the References)

Youth unemployment became part of the political agenda in Ireland during the 1974-1977 recession. Unemployment has always been a central issue on the governmental agenda, because of its traditionally high levels since the foundation of the state in 1922. From 1975 onwards, repeated concern was expressed in Parliament, through the mechanisms of parliamentary questions and in adjournment debates on the employment prospects of young people. The National Youth Council, also sought to highlight the issue from this time onwards. The first policy response, directed specifically towards the young unemployed, was initiated by the Industrial Training Authority (AnCo) in 1975, followed by an Environmental Improvement Scheme initiated by the Ministry of the Environment. The opposition party Fianna Fail (FF) made youth employment a major plank of its election manifesto in 1977, because of the growing problem of youth unemployment, and the identification of the youth vote as a significant segment of the electorate. The FF manifesto proposed the establishment of an Employment Action Team drawn from central government ministries, trade unions, youth and community organisations to make suggestions on ways of alleviating youth unemployment. The team proposed a Work Experience Programme to be run by the National Manpower Service (NMS). In addition, the Ministry of Education was given responsibility for a job creation scheme. These schemes now form the core of direct measures available to combat youth unemployment.

The schemes involved a large variety of actors, central government ministries, local authorities, the National Manpower Service (NMS), the Industrial Training Authority (AnCo) and voluntary organisations, operating at different levels of government. The focus of this paper, is an analysis of the degree to which the schemes fulfilled their objectives, and were evaluated over the time period 1976-1982. Part One of the paper examines the nature and extent

of youth unemployment in Ireland. It has been claimed in the implementation literature that one of the main criteria determining the success or failure of policies is the tractability of the problem to be solved (Sabatier et al 1981). The nature of the policy instrument will also affect goal attainment because a well administered policy if it is the wrong policy can do more harm than good. Part 2 of the paper gives an overview of the four schemes. A central focus of this paper, is the implementation process and because of the large variety of actors involved in the administration of these schemes and the multilevelled nature of the delivery systems, it is important to analyse the implementation process at both macro and micro level (Berman 1980). The schemes are directed towards the same segment of the population with the result that the administration of each scheme is effected by the existence of the others particularly at the level of local delivery networks. Part Three of the paper will thus, focus on the implementation process. This offers the possibility of examining the utility of different approaches to the study of implementation.

During the 1970s, implementation research provided many insights into the variables that effect the manner in which policies and policy instruments are administered. Factors such as communication, control, resources, co-ordination, bureaucratic structure all effect the implementation of policies (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Van Meter & Van Horn 1975, Nakamura and Smallwood 1980, Barret & Fudge 1981). Despite the growing literature in the field, no encompassing theory of the implementation process is offered. One writer in attempting to synthesize the various approaches, distinguishes between strategies based on 'programmed implementation' and 'adaptive implementation' (Berman 1981). The first approach identifies problems in the implementation process arising from ambiguity of policy goals, the

participation of too many actors and resistance on the part of implementing actors. Programmed implementation requires clarity, precision and comprehensiveness in the preliminary policy (Sabatier et al 1979 Mazmanian et al 1981).

The second approach offered by Berman is to regard implementation as an 'adaptive process'. He suggests that the implementation process should allow policy to be modified, specified and revised according to the unfolding interaction of the policy with its institutional setting. Much of the research on the implementation process, suggests that implementation is an extremely complex series of interactions between different institutional actors. Recent research examining the process from a 'bottom up' perspective highlights the importance of 'street level bureaucrats' and the delivery systems at local level. The ability of the central actors to structure the implementation process is limited because of the substantial formal and informal discretion of local delivery personnel (Elmore 1978, Hanf and Scharpf 1978, Lipskey 1971).

Berman gives his analysis a predictive quality because he relates the two strategies to different policy environments, arguing that one can identify key variables that will indicate the best type of implementation strategy given the policy context. Five characteristics are outlined. It is Berman's contention that (a) the scope for change involved in a policy, (b) the basic soundness of the analysis of the problem, (c) the extent of conflict over goals and means, (d) the structure of the institutional setting, and finally (e) the stability of the environment, together determine the most likely implementation strategy. Fig. 1 relates these variables to the job creation schemes in Ireland.

FIGURE 1

TYPES OF POLICY CONTEXT

CHARACTERISTICS OF THE POLICY CONTEXT	STRUCTURED 'PROGRAMMED IMPLEMENTATION'	UNSTRUCTURED 'ADAPTATIVE IMPLEMENTATION'
a) Scope of Change	Incremental	Major*
b) Analysis of the Problem	Basically Sound	Uncertain*
c) Level of Conflict over goals and means	Low Conflict*	High Conflict
d) Structure of the Institution Setting	Tightly Coupled	Loosely Coupled*
e) Stability of the Environment	Stable	Unstable*

\* Indicates the characteristics of policy context in relation to the Youth Employment Schemes

The four schemes fall within the parameters of the adaptive model for all variables except the level of conflict. The degree of change involved in the programmes was significant for all of the implementing agencies, as they represented new programmes which were unlike other policy instruments administered by these agencies, and for central government the schemes represented new instruments of employment policy. The agencies were uncertain about the outcome of the various schemes as they had insufficient data about the extent and geographical spread of youth unemployment. Furthermore, they could not anticipate the displacement effects of the various schemes, nor was

an analysis of the relative effectiveness of job creation versus wage subsidies undertaken. The co-ordination structure of the implementing systems was 'loosely coupled' as the schemes developed relatively independently of one another and distinct organisational networks emerged to administer each scheme. The environment in which the schemes operated was unstable because the measures were regarded as temporary and were grafted on to the workload of existing administrative units. The implementing agencies were not assured of multi-annual financing which inevitably introduced a degree of uncertainty to the schemes. Conflict about the development of the programmes was low both at political level and in the bureaucracy. The absence of serious conflict at party political level stems from the fact that all political parties regarded youth unemployment as a serious economic problem and opposition to any proposal to alleviate youth unemployment was difficult. At a wider political level, the absence of conflict resulted from the limited nature of the scheme in terms of public expenditure and thus their limited impact on the distribution of benefits to other segments of the population; expenditure on these schemes in 1977 amounted to just over one million pounds. Bureaucratic conflict might have been anticipated as the schemes involved such a large number of ministries and agencies. This was not the case because the schemes were developed independently and almost in isolation of each other with result that conflict at the level of central government was absent. The fact that an issue involving low conflict should have the other features of adaptive implementation suggests that Breman's typology might need refinement.

The implementation process should however, by and large display the characteristics of the adaptive model, or more simply disorderly learning. The schemes are now firmly established in a policy arena with routinized procedures and rules of the game. Evaluation was used to promote adaptation and change in the schemes. Informal appraisal of the schemes, involving the



implementing agencies, the financing agencies and politicians was continuous. The significance of such appraisal is frequently underestimated in the literature on evaluation. A systematic evaluation of the schemes was carried out in 1979, financed by the EC Commission (Rees 1979). The implementing agencies were extremely sensitive to this evaluation and the conclusions led to a gradual change in the schemes particularly in terms of the degree of overall coordination. Two further reports which built on the Rees study are of significance. In 1980 a sub-committee of the Manpower Consultative Committee issued a report on Youth Unemployment followed by an OECD report on Youth Employment Policies in the Republic of Ireland (OECD 1983). The conclusions and recommendations of both the informal appraisal and the technical evaluation gradually filtered through the system. Part 4 of the paper examines the process of adaptation.

#### PART I: THE PROBLEM

There are two variables of significance in understanding the problem facing Ireland in attempting to provide employment for its young people. Firstly, as a result of rapid economic expansion during the 1960s, Ireland has experienced a demographic transformation of major proportions characterised by a rise in the aggregate population (2.9m 1971 to 3.4m 1979) and a consequent change in its age structure. Ireland has the youngest population in the European Community with 49% under 25 years. Existing population trends are projected to continue into the next century, while the other European Community states will have static or declining populations. Secondly, emigration, the traditional safety valve up to the end of the 1960s for Ireland's surplus population, is no longer viable given the employment problems in most OECD

states. During the 1970s, a century's long trend of emigration was reversed with a net inflow of 108,900 persons between 1971 and 1979. These two factors have contributed to an increase in the size of the labour force. It is estimated that the labour force will increase at a rate of 18,000 per year up to 1986 (NESC Report 63 1982). Ireland's industrial structure further accentuates the problem because of employment losses in traditional industries. In 1980, gross job losses in manufacturing industry were estimated at 27,000. Job creation in the modern, largely foreign owned sector is not keeping pace with job losses. Given the growing size of the labour force, the prospect of a reduction in manufacturing employment and an outflow from agriculture, it is clear that there is and will be a great strain on the job creation capacity of the economy.

Ireland has traditionally experienced high levels of unemployment and is thus a surplus labour economy. Table 1 shows that unemployment rose during the 1973-1977 recession, declined in the period 1978-1979 due to an upturn in the economy and a significant injection of capital into the economy by the Government to increase employment (Government White Paper on the Programme for National Development 1978). With the second rapid increase in oil prices in 1979, unemployment began to rise steadily. Ireland's rate of unemployment of 12.1% in 1982 is significantly higher than the average for European Community of 9.31%. In 1979, 93,000 persons were on the Live Register which records those receiving unemployment benefit. By 1982 this figure had risen to 148,000, an increase of 60% in three years (Manpower Information Quarterly 1979, 1982). Apart from the impact of the international recession, a loss of competitiveness by Irish firms, because of high wage increases in the period 1978-1981 and cut backs in public expenditure, have contributed to rising unemployment.

The level of youth unemployment is consequently high but the ratio of youth to adult unemployment has been below the average for many OECD countries. In 1979 youth unemployment was 2.4 times the adult level, in contrast to 3.3 times for France and Britain, and almost 7 times the adult rate in Italy (OECD Report 1978). This led the OECD report (1983) to conclude that youth unemployment in Ireland should be dealt with as part of a general employment policy. The report, also, concluded that as a category, youth were not as discriminated against in the Irish labour market as they were in many OECD states. An analysis of the age distribution of persons engaged in training, shows that of the 70,000 trainees part financed by the European Social Fund in 1979, 50,000 or 70% were under the age of 25 (Commission Document 81.1). The bias in favour of youth is again reflected in recruitment to Industrial Development Authority (IDA) sponsored new industries. An IDA survey shows that 50% of all recruits to newly established industries are under 25. Given that there are serious job losses in Ireland's traditional industries, it appears as if older workers are not being retrained, which must represent a skill loss to the economy.

In analysing youth unemployment there is a serious problem of information, an essential ingredient of policy-making. The Live Register under-represents youth and female unemployment because of ineligibility for benefits. Furthermore, the Live Register was not disaggregated on the basis of age until 1980. During the period when the job creation measures were being developed, the only accurate source of information on youth unemployment was the Labour Force Surveys conducted in 1975, 1977 and 1979 by the European Community. This led the Manpower Consultative Committee reporting on Youth Unemployment, to conclude that existing sources of information on the level of youth unemployment were insufficient in terms of coverage and frequency of

compilation. The inadequacy of the available information did lead to problems in the implementation of the job creation programmes, because it made targeting the schemes towards certain segments of the young unemployed, or towards areas of high youth unemployment virtually impossible.

Although, the ratio of youth unemployment to adult unemployment is not as high as in other OECD states, it is still quite high. Unemployment rates among teenagers (15-19 years) are high being almost twice the adult rate. The young adult rate (20-24) is broadly in line with the level of adult unemployment. Table 2 summarises this data. The Live Register which under-represents youth unemployment shows that the number of teenagers on the register rose from 7,660 in 1980 to 14,723 in 1982, an increase of almost 100% in two years. The number of young adults (20-24) on the Live Register has increased in similar proportions, from 15,842 in 1980 to 32,000 in 1982 an increase of 100%. The overall level of unemployment rose by 66% in this period (CSO stats).

An analysis of the three Labour Force Surveys on the basis of Sex and Age sheds further light on the dimensions of the problem. Almost two-thirds of female unemployment is accounted for by women in the 15-24 age cohort, although their share of the female labour force is approximately 45%. Similarly, young males account for 33% of total male unemployment and just 23% of the total male labour force (See Table 3). Available data does not allow an accurate analysis of the socio-economic and educational background of disadvantaged youth. It is estimated that each year between 6,000 and 7,000 young people leave school with no qualifications. The 1981 School Leavers Survey published in 1982, indicates that unemployment among young people is highest among those who leave school without any qualifications. The level of unemployment was 40% among those with no qualifications, 24% among those with Inter-Cert./Group Cert and less than 20% among those with Leaving Certificate.

## PART 2: GOVERNMENT RESPONSES TO YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT

With the publication of the First Programme for Economic Development (1958-1963), industrial development financed by foreign investment became the main vehicle for job creation. A modern industrial economy, fuelled by export led economic growth was the central goal of economic policy. Employment policy was geared towards economic growth rather than the needs of specific groups in the labour market. The role of the State in industrialisation has two dimensions. Firstly, a package of incentives to attract mobile foreign investment was created. Secondly, the State assumed responsibility for the provision of infrastructure that would make Ireland an attractive location to foreign industrialists. As part of this infrastructure, it was felt that manpower institutions should be established. In 1967 a Ministry of Labour was created, followed by an Industrial Training Authority (AnCo) in 1968. The National Manpower Service (NMS) with responsibility for guidance and placement was established in 1971 and there are a number of other minor training agencies. The manpower network is thus a relatively new addition to Ireland's administrative machinery and is relatively complex.

Rising unemployment during the 1970s, led successive governments to expand the range of instruments available to combat unemployment. Measures characterised by strategies to influence the demand for and supply of labour were developed. An extension of the training services was the main policy instrument geared towards effecting the supply of labour. Little active consideration has been given to work sharing or early retirement. Two measures designed to increase the demand for labour in the economy were direct job creation and employment subsidies. In addition, guidance and placement services were expanded. These measures are primarily directed towards

alleviating youth unemployment. Figure 2 gives a summary of the main policy instruments referred to above.

FIGURE 2

SUMMARY OF DIRECT MEASURES TO COMBAT UNEMPLOYMENT

Supply Oriented

Training (AnCo)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Revision and Extension of the Apprenticeship Scheme (1975)</li> <li>b) Expansion of the Training Capacity (1) Increased Training Centres (2) External Training Services</li> </ul>
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Vocational Preparation	Career Training Programme (1977)
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Demand Oriented

Job Creation Schemes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a) Community Youth Training Programme (CYPT) 1976</li> <li>b) Environment Improvement Scheme (EIS) 1976</li> <li>c) Temporary Grants Scheme for Young Unemployed (TGS) 1978</li> <li>d) Work Experience Programme (WEP) 1978</li> </ul>
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Wage Subsidies	<p>Premium Employment Programme (1975) replaced by Employment Incentive Scheme In 1977</p> <p>Scheme for the hardest hit industrial sectors-Textiles, Footwear, and Clothing</p>
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This paper examines the four employment creating schemes - the Community Youth Training Scheme (CYTP), the Environmental Improvement Scheme (EIS), the Temporary Grants Scheme for Young Unemployed (TYS) and the Work Experience Programme (WEP). The CYTP is organised and run by the Industrial Training Authority. The Ministry for the Environment is responsible for the EIS, the Ministry of Education for the TYS, and WEP is run directly by the National Manpower Service (NMS). The National Manpower Service which would appear to be the 'natural' implementing agency for all measures of this kind, was only given direct responsibility for the last measure to be developed in 1978.

#### Community Youth Training Programme (CYTP)

This scheme was established on a pilot basis in 1975 with the aid of the European Social Fund (ESF) and subsequently expanded in 1976. It is designed to supplement the existing range of AnCo courses. Its target population is young unemployed persons with no previous work experience. As the title suggests, the programme involves community projects part financed by voluntary organisations. The main objectives of the programme is to impart basic industrial skills, to develop the self confidence of the trainee and to provide experience of a work environment. Improving the employability of the trainee is a corollary of this. A subsidiary objective is the provision of community amenities. Project length varies from four months to one year. Participants remain on a programme for a minimum of twelve weeks, although in practice length of participation is usually longer. AnCo has developed an elaborate managerial system to administer the programmes. The scheme is organised at local level through an AnCo Training Centres where a Senior Instructor is responsible for about three projects at any one time. He provides the link between AnCo headquarters in Dublin and the project/sponsor. Projects are vetted at local level by a committee comprising

of trade union officials, employer organisations and the local community organisations. A committee of AnCo personnel and the Irish Congress of Trade Union (ICTU) vets projects at national level. At the committee stage, a thorough analysis of the project in terms of finance, nature of the work and the displacement effects if any, of the project is carried out. Each project has a foreman who plays a central role in the implementation of the scheme on the ground and an AnCo instructor monitors the projects on a daily basis.

#### Environmental Improvement Scheme (EIS)

The programme is designed to provide employment opportunities for young unemployed persons by enabling Local Authorities to set up projects of recreational and environmental value. Selected projects must have a high labour content, at least 60% of the total financial allocation. Local Authorities receive information about the scheme from the Ministry of the Environment in the form of circulars. The circulars set out the amount of finance available for projects and general guidelines of the kinds of projects required. The initiative concerning potential projects lies with the Local Authority. At national level the scheme is administered by two divisions in the Ministry of the Environment. One division is responsible for the executive administration and financing of the scheme. A second division (Employment Division) is responsible to the government for the achievement of job targets and encourages Local Authorities to participate in the scheme. At local government level, the District Engineer is responsible for designing and submitting projects to the Ministry. The projects are monitored in the form of quarterly returns by the Local Authorities to central government. Periodic visits are made by Ministry officials to oversee the projects on the ground. Projects vary in length from five weeks to three months but rarely longer. The participants are largely male, unqualified, unskilled and untrained. The



Manpower Service is responsible for recruitment to the schemes but this has proved problematic in many local areas.

#### Temporary Grants Scheme for Young Unemployed (TYS)

This scheme is intended to provide young people, who have not worked before or have had an unsatisfactory work experience, an opportunity to participate in a work experience programme. A secondary objective is the provision of community amenities. The scheme is administered by the Ministry of Education from head office in Dublin. Applications for finance are made by local youth organisations. Eligibility is based on assessments made by the Ministry; the organisation must show that it is capable of carrying out the proposal by providing finance for the labour costs and supervising the project. The grant is paid in instalments, 40% when the initial eligibility criteria have been satisfied, a further 40% when the project is underway to the satisfaction of the Ministry. The final 20% is paid once the work is completed. Weekly returns are made by the sponsor to the Ministry detailing the number employed and the wages paid. Apart from visits by Ministry officials to the projects, this is the main form of control. Since 1979, the scheme does provide a grant of £80 per week towards the cost of employing a supervisor. Prior to this there was no systematic supervision on site. Projects tend to last for six months. The participants must be registered with the NMS prior to participation on the scheme and be unemployed for four weeks prior to the scheme. There is no trade union surveillance to control displacement at either local or national level.

#### Work Experience Programme (WEP)

The aim of this scheme is to assist young people who have difficulties in getting permanent employment, by giving them the opportunity to get experience

in a range of jobs. The National Manpower Service (NMS) is the sponsoring organisation for the scheme which is organised through the network of regional and local offices. NMS placement officers arrange for employers in both the public and private sectors to offer a young person six months placement. Each participant must be offered at least four types of work experience by the employer. Prior trade union approval is required to ensure that displacement does not take place. However many participants are placed in non unionised small businesses. The selection of a trainee rests with the employer, the NMS supplies a list of potential candidates. An element of training is included in the scheme and provision is made for 'day release' to attend courses. The programme is aimed at people in the age bracket 18-20 who have left school and are unable to find employment. An allowance of £30 is paid to the participant by the employer who is reimbursed by the NMS. The scheme is monitored by Placement Officers who visit each participant at intervals of seven weeks. They ensure that the trainee is getting sufficient work experience and discuss future placement prospects.

From the synopsis of the schemes, it is apparent that they are characterised by a multiplicity of objectives. Their main purpose in terms of macro-economic policy is the overall reduction of unemployment as those registered on those programmes are no longer considered unemployed. Secondly, the schemes are structural instruments aimed at one segment of the labour market - youth. Apart from the CYTP which was developed to suit young persons that could not get places on the AnCo skill based courses, the programmes are not geared towards the disadvantaged young persons, who for educational and socio-economic reasons could not hope for full time employment. The provision of socially useful goods and services is a stated objective of three of the programmes (CYTP, EIS and TYS). Initiatives relating to such goals rests with

community, sports and youth organisations in the case of the CYTP and TYS.

A further set of goals, directly related to the participants are discernible. Increased employability is a central objective of all schemes but most explicit in the objectives of the Work Experience Programme (WEP). The WEP aims at facilitating the transition between school and work by producing young people with work experience, the lack of which can be a major constraint to employment. All schemes aim to influence the attitude of the young unemployed by exposing them to a work environment and good work practices. This is particularly evident in projects involving disadvantaged youth on the CYTP programme. A training component is explicitly provided for in the WEP and CYTP and implicit in the TYS. Fig. 3 outline the objectives of the programmes and the relative weight accorded to them. Neither the EIS or the TYS can be considered structural instruments because they do not include a meaningful training content apart from rudimentary training of learning by doing. There is a heavy emphasis in both these schemes on the provision of amenities.

Because the schemes developed at different times under the auspices of different administrative units, their mode of operation and conditions of employment all differ. The duration of employment is shortest in the EIS with an average participation length of eight weeks. The TYS and the CYTP last from between fourteen and eighteen weeks. The WEP is standardised at six months. These variations exist because of the project nature of the schemes. Payment levels differ significantly from one scheme to another, despite the similarity of the project work. In 1981, a participant on the WEP received £30 per week, on the EIS £90 per week, on the TYS £60 per week, and on the CYTP between £28 and £39 per week depending on age. A breakdown of the participants on the basis of sex shows that the schemes are heavily biased

FIGURE 3

## GOALS OF THE JOB CREATION SCHEMES

General	CYPT	EIS	TYS	WEP
-reduction of high unemployment	xxx	xxx	xxx	xxx
-structural problems in labour market	xx	-	-	xx
-Provision of socially useful goods and services	x	xx	xx	-
<u>Specific Objectives</u>				
<u>Participants</u>				
- acquisition of skills	xxx	-	-	-
- influence attitudes	xx	xx	xxx	xx
- increase employability	xx	x	x	xxx
xxx -central element				
xx -important element				
x -peripheralelement				

FIGURE 4

## SUMMARY OF THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT SCHEMES

	SPONSOR	STARTUP	MODE OF OPERATION	DURATION	PAYMENT(1981)*
EIS	Ministry of the Environment	1976	Local Authorities	5weeks-3months	£90
TYS	Ministry of Education	1977	Community Organisations	14 weeks	£60
WEP	National Manpower service	1978	In-firm	6months	£30
CYPT	AnCo	1976	Community Projects	11weeks-18months	Trainee Allowance
*per week					

towards males. An average of 95% of the CYPT participants are male, 100% on the EIS and 90% on the TYS. Only WEP programme provides a plurality of places for females. A yearly average of 60% of the participants on the WEP are girls. Fig. 4 summarises this data.

The nature of the work experience provided on the schemes partly explains the sex bias. The CYPT, TYS and EIS provide unskilled and semi-skilled manual work. The CYPT aims to provide training in such skills as bricklaying, carpentry, painting. The site foreman and AnCo instructor are responsible for ensuring that this training takes place. The nature of the work provided by the Environment Scheme is largely of a 'pick and shovel' variety. The stipulation that at least 60% of the project costs should be spent on labour restricts the kind of projects that are eligible. The low level of capital input to the scheme means that it is difficult for them to include skilled work. Similarly, the vast majority of TYS projects involve construction and renovation work. Unlike CYTP the Temporary Grants Scheme provides no systematic training. Whether or not training takes place depends on the degree to which the supervisor adopts a training role. Work on the TYS ranges from the 'pick and shovel' variety to basic skills such as painting. The work provided through the Work Experience Programme is very different to the project type. It is largely of a clerical and administrative nature which explains its attractiveness to young unemployed girls.

Data on the level of finance invested in these schemes show their growing importance as instruments of employment policy in the latter half of the 1970s. Expenditure rose from £1.5m in 1977 to £9.6m in 1979. The uneven pattern of resource commitment to the job creation schemes underlines the difficulty facing the implementing agencies in planning on a medium term basis. Expenditure peaked in 1979 which reflected the then government's

policy of spending its way out of a recession. Cutbacks in public expenditure are responsible for the pruning of the schemes in 1980 and 1981. The establishment of a youth employment levy in 1982 made up of one per cent of each earners' gross income greatly increased the level of finance available for these schemes in 1982 and 1983. Only the Work Experience Programme received additional financial resources each year in the period 1977-1981. Expenditure on the environment scheme was the most erratic, it peaked at £4.401 in 1979 fell to £.9m in 1981 and rose again to £4m in 1982. In 1982 the Work Experience Scheme was the largest scheme receiving £5.2 million. The two amenity schemes received £6.3m. Estimated expenditure in 1983 again shows large increases with a doubling of expenditure on the environmental improvement scheme. Table 4 summarises the data on expenditure.

The Environmental Improvement Scheme is the only scheme where an attempt was made to target expenditure to areas with particularly high unemployment. The Ministry of the Environment makes allocations to each Local Authority on the basis of numbers on the Live Register. Although these figures did not until 1980 accurately reflect youth unemployment, it was at least an attempt to target the finance. The distribution of finance for the project schemes (CYTP, TYS), depends entirely on the initiative of local organisations. All schemes are eligible for part financing by the European Social Fund (ESF) since 1979 and must therefore fulfill not only national criteria but also ESF criteria. Fifty-five per cent of the cost of the WEP and the CYTP, are borne by the ESF. Its contribution to the other schemes (EIS, TYS) ranges from between 17 and 22 per cent (Commission Doc. 81/1). The availability of a source of funds external to the State, that is received in grant form, increases the attractiveness of these policy instruments to central government.

### PART III IMPACT OF THE SCHEMES

The programmes have a symbolic impact as they are evidence of a willingness on the part of successive governments to do something about youth unemployment and thus have an important role to play in agenda management. An analysis of public opinion surveys in Ireland in the post 1973 era suggests that unemployment rather than inflation is perceived as the most important economic problem. In 1982 75% of respondents to survey on the most important problem facing Ireland stated that jobs for many people was the most significant issue and only 31% cited inflation. The figures from a survey conducted in 1977 were 33% citing jobs and 37% citing inflation (Irish Times Survey 1977 and Market Research Bureau of Ireland 1982). Moreover, youth unemployment is regarded as a priority both because of the structure of the population in Ireland which makes the age bracket (18-25) an important segment of the electorate and youth unemployment affects parents who are concerned about the future of their children. High levels of youth unemployment may in the perceptions of politicians pose a threat to the stability of the political system. Throughout Western Europe, governments have responded to youth unemployment by a variety of special employment programmes.

Assessment of the impact of the schemes must be tackled at a number of levels. Firstly, the schemes are part of macro-economic policy, as instruments to deal with a structural problem in the labour market and as a short-term counter-cyclical response to rising unemployment. Secondly, the schemes have a number of secondary objectives in terms of the individual participants. The different levels of analysis must be further related to the nature of the policy instruments and the implementation process. At macro-level one can ask if job creation measures are appropriate to combat unemployment. It is beyond the scope of this paper to answer this question, apart from observing that most States in the OECD engaged in temporary job

creation during the 1970s, as they provided a relatively cheap way of combating short term unemployment. No public body in Ireland assessed the relative effectiveness of job creation schemes versus other forms of employment stimulation such as wage subsidies. Initially, the schemes were envisaged as counter-cyclical measures, but the persistence of high levels of youth unemployment and the age structure of the Irish population now requires a structural approach.

Clearly, the schemes have created a certain number of jobs that would not otherwise have existed. The level of participation in the schemes rose from 360 in 1976 to over 12,000 in 1982. The Work Experience Programme is the largest programme with a total of 22,100 participants between 1978 and 1982. Table 5 summarises the relevant data. In relation to the level of youth unemployment, the figures do not appear to be more than a palliative. During 1981, when 9,450 participated in the schemes the number of young unemployed on the Live Register in July 1981 was 34,902. Unless the displacement effect of the schemes is accurately established, it is not possible to predict what the level of unemployment would have been if the schemes did not exist. The administration of the Community Youth Scheme (CYTP) best guards against displacement and there was considerable trade union involvement in monitoring the scheme. There is no trade union involvement in either the Environment Scheme or the Temporary Grants Scheme because these schemes are run by ministries that would not have close relations with the social partners unlike the Ministry of Labour. The displacement effects of the Work Experience Programme could be considerable as employers could use temporary employees as cheap labour. Trade Union officials have complained about this, and the Youth Employment Agency is now undertaking a study of the displacement effects not just of the WEP but also of a pre-employment scheme involving in-firm



placement.

The temporary jobs are not created without a cost. An analysis of the net cost to the State of these schemes is difficult because the implementing agencies absorb the overhead costs into their general budget. A crude cost per job can be worked out by correlating the yearly number of participants with the programme budget. Although these figures must be treated with caution the high cost of the Environment Scheme is striking; it cost approximately £7,000 per job in 1980-81. This contrasts sharply with the costs of the other two project schemes, the TYS and the CYTP. The WEP is the least costly of the schemes because of the low level of payment to the participants. Table 6 gives a crude estimation of cost per job.

It is pertinent to ask questions not just about the quantitative aspects of the programmes, but also the quality because the schemes have a number of secondary objectives. These objectives are stated as increased employability, inculcation of basic skills and attitude changes towards employment among the young participants. All of the participants are exposed to the type of work discipline, good time keeping and supervision that one would expect in permanent employment. Increased employability is dependent on a number of variables, such as the value of the work experience gained by the participants, and the nature of the skills acquired. With the exception of the CYTP and the WEP, little emphasis is placed on the training objectives of the schemes. AnCo's attention to training reflects its general commitment to training as the industrial training authority. The training content of the Work Experience Programme is less systematic; employers have to ensure that each trainee is given four different types of work. The kind of work available on the EIS and TYS was largely of the 'pick and shovel' kind involving little, if any, semi-skilled work and thus offer little in terms of

employable skills.

The placement level of the WEP is high, at least 80% of participants find full time employment and in 1979, 50% of the participants got jobs in the firm where they had temporary positions. The Manpower Service, the organisation responsible for the programme is the national placement organisation, has a well established network of contacts with employers to ensure placement. There are no statistics available of the placement level on the CYTP though many of the participants graduate from the programme to skill based AnCo courses. Placement rates for the two project programmes are extremely low at 30% (Commission Doc. 81.1) which reflects the lack of any systematic training content in the programmes and the absence of any placement effort at the end of the project.

The public authorities have made no attempt to evaluate whether or not the schemes succeed in changing the attitudes of the hard to employ young people. The EC evaluation of the four schemes stressed the importance of the local delivery networks. It was found that where the local on-site supervisor adopted a 'God-Father' approach of encouraging the young people, he was able to stimulate their interest and change attitudes. On the CYTP, particular attention was paid to employing the right kind of supervisor and added back-up was given to the CYTP participants, in the form of daily visits from an AnCo Instructor. Direct supervision on the EIS and the TYS was less systematic. Participants on the WEP were treated as a normal employee, by the employer. It was thus up to the participants to keep a diary on the different kinds of work undertaken to ensure the required job rotation.

The relationship between job needs and the kinds of jobs created must be assessed. Some of the schemes notably the EIS, TYS, and WEP fell short of

their annual targets which suggests some mismatch as a number of project organisers had difficulty in recruiting people. Given that all of the project schemes (CYTP, EIS, TYS) were dependant on initiatives emanating from the local level it is not surprising that there were problems in the spatial distribution of the schemes. The spread of projects was thus haphazard and of an ad hoc nature. The report on Youth Unemployment by the Manpower Consultative Committee concluded that most of the disadvantaged young people do not come into contact with the employment agencies. Given the demand for places on job creation schemes and training programmes, the manpower agencies cream off the best applicants. The EC evaluation of the Work Experience Programme, concludes that the NMS wanted to send the best possible recruits to the prospective employer. The OECD (1983) report explains this in terms of the institutional ethos of the Manpower Service. Established in 1971, with responsibility for placement and guidance and not welfare benefits, the NMS did not want to be tainted with any explicit concern for the unemployed. There is no automatic cross registration of persons on the Live Register and NMS job seekers. As a relatively new manpower institution, the NMS is still in the process of establishing its credibility with employers. This may limit its institutional sympathy for government programmes intended to improve the employment opportunities of the unemployed (OECD Report 1983). An analysis of the participants on the Work Experience Programme concurs with this. Most participants are recent school leavers with a good educational record. The quality of the participants is reflected in the high placement rate of the scheme.

The manner in which the schemes have evolved reflects an incremental approach of dealing with the problem of youth unemployment. Successive governments responded to the problem by establishing new programmes without paying

attention to the interaction between the schemes on the ground, or the global problems of youth unemployment. In fact, it is doubtful if the statistical evidence on the problem was sufficiently accurate to allow central government to respond in a programmed fashion. Neither was information available, on the characteristics of the young unemployed, that would have allowed a response attuned to the needs of specific groups under the umbrella term 'young unemployed'. The programmes were adopted on the basis of a short term strategy and grafted on to the existing workload of administrative agencies, two of which (Education and Environment) were not strictly part of the manpower network merely one suspects because they could mount programmes. Neither ministry was concerned with the manpower policy aspects of the programmes, either in terms of targeting them towards specific problem groups or with the local demand for skills that might be picked up on the programmes (OECD Report 1983). The lack of an explicit training content in these programmes reflects the lack of training experience and expertise available to both these Ministries. Figure 5 outlines the organisation of the schemes.

FIGURE 5

ORGANISATION OF THE SCHEMES

	Trade Union / Employer Involvement	On Site Supervision by Sponsor	Administrative Respon- sibility for Schemes	Monitoring by Sponsor
CYPT	YES	Daily	AnCo	Weekly :Quarterl
EIS	-	Weekly	Local Authority	Quarterly
TYS	-	Periodic Visits	Voluntary Organisation	Weekly
WEP	Formally but not always in practice	Every 6weeks	National Manpower Service	Local Monitorin

The plurality of programmes created a number of problems. At the level of central government it meant that no single agency was responsible for youth unemployment and no single administrative unit was examining the pattern of activities and how the schemes related to overall manpower policy. At micro level, a number of specific problems can be discerned. Three of the schemes (CYTP, TYS, EIS) were project based, with the result that there was competition for recruits in some areas. The different rates of pay further accentuated this problem making the TYS more attractive to recruits than the CYTP. No attempt was made at national or regional level to ensure that the spatial distribution of projects did not lead to competition. Recruitment difficulties were also caused by the weak links between the Manpower Service and the three project schemes. Theoretically responsible for recruitment for

all schemes, the NMS had little role to play in relation to the CYTP, and haphazard involvement in the EIS and TYS. In response to suggestions that there might be competition among the schemes an Interdepartmental Committee on the Coordination of Youth Employment Schemes was established in 1979. This amounted to a traditional device pursuing negative coordination defined by Self as the avoidance of overt conflict between administrative agencies. It did not represent 'positive coordination' defined as the development of coherent strategies aimed at specific problems (Self 1978). The Committee held few meetings and concluded that there was no overlap among the schemes despite the concurrent existence of the problems noted above. The channels of information from the local delivery level to the centre did not provide the kind of information that would allow central government to examine the existence of overlap as officials in Dublin did not know what was happening on the ground.

The level of control and monitoring differs from scheme to scheme reflecting the organisational networks available to the sponsoring agencies. Control was more frequent and systematic on the CYTP, where there was very thorough vetting of the projects prior to start up. AnCo established a four-tier the system of control, Foreman level on site, AnCo Instructor, AnCo Senior Instructor located at a Training Centre and the Training Centre Division at head office. Trade Union and employer involvement at local and national level ensured that minimum displacement took place. Furthermore the network ensured adequate control over financial resources and more significantly control over the development of both the project and the trainee. Control was also relatively effective in the operation of the WEP, through the Placement Officer located in the regional and local offices of NMS. The most significant problem in relation to the operation of the WEP was the absence of

Trade Union involvement to check against displacement in many cases despite the formal stipulation that such involvement is required. Central control of the TYS and the EIS was largely in terms of weekly and quarterly returns by the sponsors to the relevant ministry. There were periodic but unsystematic visits by departmental officials to the project sites to check against abuses. Little or no attention was paid to the efficiency or effectiveness of the project or the manner in which the participants were benefiting from the project.

Responsibility for the administrative burden arising from the schemes varies from scheme to scheme. AnCo assumes major responsibility for the paper work on the CYTP. The District Engineer assumes responsibility for the paper work arising out of the EIS. There have been some complaints about this extra work from the District Engineers, particularly as it involves small amounts of money in relation to their total budget. The absence of a regional/local network is apparent in the TYS. The Ministry of Education relied on the local voluntary organisation to keep adequate records and to organise the administrative requirements for payment such as health contributions. This can pose problems for voluntary organisations without full-time employees.

#### PART 4: THE PROCESS OF ADAPTATION: THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY

The implementation problems in relation to job creation schemes highlighted above are not unique to Ireland. Two EC reports that examined temporary job creation schemes in all of the Member States noted difficulties because of multiple objectives, multiple agencies, lack of control and monitoring, gaps in the information and database, absence of adequate training, problems in

relation to placement and difficulties in calculating the cost to the State of such measures (Faulkner 1977, Karsten 1980). In its election manifesto of June 1981 the Fine Gael party proposed the creation of a Youth Employment Agency (YEA) to institutionalise the problem of youth unemployment in the machinery of government. They joined a coalition government after the election and the YEA was legislated for in November 1981 and established in 1982. The choice of a new administrative unit is suprising given the already complex nature of the manpower network. Its attractiveness stems from the fact that the establishment of a new agency had the appearance of a new initiative and its creation was also congruent with Ireland's administrative tradition which fosters the growth of a large number of state sponsored agencies to promote economic development. In addition, the government avoided the conflict that would have ensued if it attempted to give responsibility for youth unemployment to either of the existing manpower agencies. The agency is funded by a Youth Employment Levy made up of 1% of each earner's gross income. It represents a subsidy from the employed to the unemployed and amounted to £40M IR in 1982, its first year of operation and £66 mIR in 1983. The creation of the Fund ensures the availability of financial resources to promote schemes on a continuous basis which takes the uncertainty out of the yearly budgetary cycle.

The agency was given a large number of functions but not necessarily powers in the YEA bill, which can be broadly classified as a) evaluation, b) innovation, c) coordination and d) policy proposals. In relation to evaluation, the Agency was given the task of analysing the effectiveness of existing programmes and has established its own research unit. Furthermore the Agency was entrusted with a number of new functions in relation to youth employment; it can finance co-operative ventures among groups of young unemployed, develop



and administer new training programmes. It would appear as if this latter competence could conflict directly with AnCo's training mandate under the 1968 Industrial Training Act. The coordination and integration of the existing programmes to ensure that there is no duplication among them is an evident role to entrust to this Agency. Finally, the Agency was given a role in policy formation as it has the possibility of submitting views to the Minister of Labour on educational policy.

The Minister's statement to Parliament on the creation of the Agency clearly outlines the thinking behind its establishment. It was the Minister's contention that, because of Ireland's demographic structure, particular attention must be given to the problems of youth employment and the transition from school to working life. The ad hoc nature of the job creation schemes and the absence of coordination was severely criticised. The Minister stated that "we do not have a comprehensive and integrated range of programmes and I am convinced that there is need for such a package" (Dail Debate 331.214). The Minister also questioned the utility of the existing programmes to disadvantaged youths who need skill based courses. The Minister's statement suggests that during the period 1977-1981, there had been a process of adaptative learning among politicians as the weaknesses of the existing programmes were acknowledged. An overview of the various roles that the YEA is expected to fulfill suggests that there might be conflict between evaluating and extending programmes and establishing new programmes and ventures. Legislation can structure the implementation process by establishing the lines of inter-agency contact. The bill creating the YEA, does not however provide guidelines on the Agency's relationships with the other well-entrenched manpower agencies. It was given given 'the power of the

purse' which should be its major resource in establishing links with the other agencies. Formal control over financial resources, at least, gives the YEA a seat at the table.

As the YEA has only existed for eighteen months we must be cautious in reaching definite conclusions about its role and functions. During its first year of operation the Agency gave priority to improving the information systems on youth employment and unemployment. The decision to build up an extensive information base on youth employment was a necessary step if the Agency wished to direct the policies and programmes of the well established manpower agencies. Studies on the implementation of large scale social programmes in the United States through federal grants-in-aid provide sufficient evidence that knowledge and power are closely interrelated (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973, Williams 1980). Knowledge allows an agency to speak with authority as an issue and to evaluate proposals emanating from other agencies. This has meant that the analysis of the youth employment problem is much sounder today than it was when the schemes were launched in the mid 1970s.

The co-ordination of existing programmes was one of the first tasks undertaken by the Agency. Criteria for access to all of the programmes was standardised and recruitment centralised through the National Manpower Service. The YEA has established a standardised set of data requirements for the sponsoring agencies to enable it to evaluate the schemes. It is not yet clear whether the other agencies will comply with these requirements. This kind of co-ordination removes some of the most glaring malfunctions in the programmes. Furthermore the YEA bill gives the Agency the power to finance and direct programmes in addition to the programmes of the ministries and

training agencies. The Agency has part financed a variety of projects at local level with such diverse scope as horticulture, hair-dressing, a fast food project, a computer project, and the payment of youth development officers. This involves the YEA in direct project appraisal and management. In 1982 a total of 50 projects were approved for grants.

The YEA produced a major policy statement in December 1982 called A Policy Framework for the Eighties which set out the objectives of the agency in the area of employment creation, education and training and the co-ordination of policy with other agencies. This latter area has been most problematic for the Agency because it is tied up with the use of the Youth Employment Levy. The policy document recognises the existence of conflict and acknowledges that the agency must transform its formal control over the expenditure of the levy to real control if it is to have a meaningful place in the manpower network. In 1982 proceeds from the Levy were allocated to AnCo and CERT on the basis of the number of trainees they had under 25 which meant that over 50 per cent of the levy went directly to fund traditional training programmes. In fact the YEA only controlled four million of the total levy of £45 million in 1982. This pattern has been maintained in 1983 when the Agency will control £9.7 million of a total of £66.5 million. In its report to the Minister of Labour for 1982, the board of the Agency clearly states that 'there has been one major issue which remains unresolved; the Agency's role in decision making about the allocation of the Youth Employment Levy'. One can anticipate that this question will remain of central concern to the YEA as it tries to forge a role for itself in the manpower network.

The stated aim of the Agency is to move to a situation with all of the manpower agencies where funding is provided on the basis of programmes agreed

with the Agency. This is a daunting task for a number of reasons. Firstly, the Agency was established in a period of crisis with the result that it attempted to have a visible impact on the problem of youth unemployment quickly, which was impossible. Secondly, the Agency suffers from a lack of staff as there were no more than 12 people in the agency up to the end of 1982. The situation improved somewhat in 1983 but it remains a very small administrative body. Its size is minute in relation to the scope of action given to it in the initial legislation but more importantly in relation to the other manpower agencies it deals with. Relations with the other manpower agencies, particularly AnCo, have been uneasy. It is inevitable that bureaucratic competition will develop, if the arrival of a new Agency can encroach on the competences and methods of operation of a well established agency particularly, if the new agency tries to establish influence on the budget of the existing agency which is clearly the aim of YEA as it seeks greater control over the expenditure of the Levy. The Director of AnCo has stated that 'if it happened that the council of AnCo decided to run a programme for the under the 25s and the Youth Employment Agency decided not to fund it we would not drop our plans. We would go to the Minister! (Business and Finance June 1983) It is likely that bureaucratic competition will continue to be a feature of relations between AnCo and the YEA. It is difficult to assess the agencies' relations with the National Manpower Service because the latter is a hived-off section of the Ministry of Labour and is not a very public body.

The YEA in an attempt to increase its influence over the administration of programmes now seeks to establish administrative arrangements at sub-national level to co-ordinate the large variety of schemes now operating. In a policy document entitled A Community Managed Integrated Programme for Young People

the agency sets out its arguments in favour of a decentralised approach to youth unemployment by establishing local intermediary agencies known as Community Training and Employment Consortia (COMTECs) covering broadly a local authority administrative area. It is envisaged that sponsors of projects at neighbourhood level would put forward proposals for education, training and work-experience projects to the COMTECs who would establish local programmes in conjunction with the Agency. This is clearly a good approach as the existing schemes are highly fragmented and not responsive to local conditions and needs.

The Agency held a major conference in June, 1983 to discuss the proposals for the establishment of the COMTECs. Some participants at the conference expressed considerable anxiety about increased bureaucratisation and increased complexity in the manpower network. Others however, expressed support for a decentralisation of the manpower agencies and manpower policies. The YEA is currently drawing up plans concerning the establishment of COMTECs. Their successful establishment will require the active participation of the other manpower agencies particularly AnCo and the NMS and of a number of Ministries such as the Ministry of Labour, Education and Environment. The exact composition of the COMTECs is unclear although the initial policy document suggests that a COMTEC would typically comprise representatives of major community interests, primarily employer organisations, trade unions, local educational bodies, the local authority, manpower agencies and representatives of young people. A consensus on the establishment of COMTECs must thus be forged among a large number of different interests both public and private. It would seem that ministerial direction may be necessary to ensure that central government ministries and state agencies cooperate with this venture.

The YEA is operating in a very difficult environment because its existence inevitably meant that the existing policy network was disturbed. Moreover, the establishment of an agency to combat a particular problem highlighted the issue in the public mind and increased expectations that something could be done about youth unemployment despite continuing adverse economic conditions. The Agency has also been adversely affected by criticism of the existing programmes despite the fact that the Agency has little control over these programmes. Over the last year, there have been many newspaper and journal articles highlighting abuses in the schemes and their potential to displace workers by creating a pool of cheap labour. The director of the YEA has readily accepted these criticisms about the schemes, but in the absence of alternatives the agency can at best limit and control the abuses. (Irish Times, 21.9.1983, Business and Finance 16 June, 1983). The Youth Employment Levy which was established in 1982 to combat youth unemployment is a further source of criticism. We noted above that the levy is largely spent on existing schemes and has merely been a substitute for exchequer expenditure. This is not entirely true as the real impact of the levy has been to provide a source of funds for youth schemes at a time when public expenditure cut backs would have affected them, as was happening in 1981 and 1982 prior to the introduction of the levy. However, in public perceptions the levy is another form of taxation, in addition to an already heavy burden of direct taxation.

## CONCLUSION

In this paper, four schemes to combat youth unemployment were analysed from an implementation perspective. We anticipated that given the context in which the schemes evolved, the implementation process would be adaptative in nature. There was a gradual process of institutional learning which led to the resteeering of the programmes and the creation of a new administrative agency. This does not mean that the process of adaptation has ended despite the fact that the characteristics of the policy context, discussed in the introduction to the paper, have changed which suggests that Berman's typology has weaknesses. The analysis of the problem of youth unemployment has improved with more correct information on its extent, duration and geographical spread. The schemes now operate in a more stable budgetary environment with the introduction of the youth employment levy. Furthermore the structure of the institutional setting is more tightly coupled with the establishment of the Youth Employment Agency (YEA) with direct responsibility for the co-ordination of programmes. On a continuum from structured 'programmed implementation' to unstructured 'adaptative implementation', most of the characteristics outlined in Figure I moved nearer the 'programmed implementation' end of the continuum.

One important variable has, however, moved in the other direction and this is the level of conflict over goals and means. At the outset there was low conflict in this policy area because it involved little public expenditure and there was general agreement on the need to respond to youth unemployment. The level of conflict has increased for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the creation of the Youth Employment Agency introduced a new element to the manpower policy network and led to bureaucratic competition between itself and the other manpower agencies. Secondly, the agency was established during a

period when the level of unemployment was rising and the intractability of the problem was increasing. Thirdly, criticism of the schemes has increased as the number of participants grew with the existence of new finance in 1982 and control over the administration of the schemes, which was never good in relation to some of the schemes, declined. Fourthly, the establishment of the levy became identified as another source of taxation in the public mind. Criticism of the schemes increased resentment to the levy because it could be immediately identified with this form of public expenditure.

The increase in the level of conflict in this policy subsystem suggests that adaptative implementation will remain the norm for the foreseeable future. Moreover, it highlights the importance of the political context of policy implementation. This is evident at administrative level with the emergence of bureaucratic competition, and at a political level as the question of the levy becomes involved in a wider political debate on taxation and government expenditure. It begs the question as to whether or not structured implementation is ever possible in public policymaking. Berman's typology might be best suited to private bureaucracies.



TABLE 1

<u>LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN IRELAND 1961-1982</u> (selected years)							
	1961	1971	1975	1977	1979	1981	1982
% of the working population	6.9	6.3	6.9	9.3	8.8	10.3	12.1
SOURCES: Census of Population 1961, 1971 Labour Force Surveys 1975, 1977, 1979 Central Statistics Office 1981, 1982							

TABLE 2

<u>YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT RATES BY AGE AND SEX 1961-1982</u>								%
	1961	1971	1975	1977	1979	1980	1981	1982
Young Males								
15-19	15.7	14.6	20.3	19.0	12.6			
20-24	6.8	7.5	12.0	12.7	8.3			
Young Females								
15-19	14.9	9.9	16.9	14.9	12.9			
20-24	4.9	4.1	7.4	7.2	5.0			
Total								
15-19	15.4	12.6	18.7	17.2	12.6	9.8	15.3	18.0
20-24	6.0	6.9	10.1	10.4	6.9	6.8	10.9	14.3
Total Workforce	6.9	6.3	6.9	9.3	8.8	8.2	10.3	12.1
SOURCE: Same as for Table 1 Figures for 1980-1982 taken from a document of the Youth Employment Agency, December 1982.								

TABLE 3

SHARES OF THE LABOUR FORCE AND UNEMPLOYMENT 1975-1977-1979				%
	1975	1977	1979	
<u>Females 15-24 Years</u>				
Share of Labour Force	45.5	44.9	45.2	
Share of Unemployment	67.8	68.6	60.3	
<u>Males 15-24 Years</u>				
Share of the Labour Force	22.4	22.1	23.1	
Share of Unemployment	35.4	35.4	32.1	
SOURCE: Labour Force Surveys 1975, 1977, 1979.				

TABLE 4

	YOUTH UNEMPLOYMENT SCHEMES				-EXPENDITURE (IR£'000)			
SCHEME	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983 *
CYPT	382	616	1,934	2,070	1,950	3,441	na	na
EIS		350	3,200	4,430	2,700	986	4,000	8,000
TYS		280	700	1,400	1,500	550	2,300	3,400
WEP			100	1,500	2,100	2,300	5,200	7,000
Total	382	1,246	5,944	9,400	8,250	7,277	11,500	18,400
SOURCE: MINISTRY OF LABOUR AND THE YOUTH EMPLOYMENT AGENCY *estimated								

TABLE 5

NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS ON THE JOB CREATION SCHEMES 1975-1982							
PROGRAMME	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
CYPT	360	480	1,480	1,900	1,700	2,100	6,300
EIS		100	450	700	350	150	700
TYS		365	1,170	2,000	1,800	700	1,300
WEP			1,700	5,000	4,600	6,500	4,300
<u>TOTAL</u>	360	945	4,400	9,600	8,450	9,450	12,600
SOURCE: Dept of Labour, Youth Employment Agency.							

TABLE 6

ROUGH COST PER JOB ON THE PROGRAMMES						
PROGRAMME	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	£1r'000
CYPT	1,283	1,306	1,089	1,147	1,638	
EIS	3,500	7,111	6,328	7,714	6,573	
Tys	0,767	0,598	0,700	0,933	0,785	
WEP		0,064	0,300	0,456	0,353	
Derived from Tables 4&5						

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