

POLICE CULTURE AND ORGANISATION

by NEIL WALKER

UNIVERSITY OF STRATHCLYDE

DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF PhD,

1991.

Vol 1

ABSTRACT

The British police has become a more controversial institution over the last 30 years, during which period the interest of social scientists in the nature of policing has intensified accordingly. As knowledge has accumulated, researchers have increasingly sought to influence the policy-making process through their findings and recommendations. One aspect of policework which remains poorly understood, yet whose illumination is crucial to the success of these efforts, is the process whereby policy is implemented within the organisation. This study addresses this issue through an analysis of relations of power and influence within four Scottish Divisions. Attention is centred upon the main 'line' organisation connecting uniform patrol to the divisional hierarchy, and in particular, upon the role of the patrol sergeant as a crucial intermediary rank. It is argued that, against a background of an indeterminate mandate and a rigid bureaucratic framework, recent changes in public attitudes and expectations, in the political and legal environment of policing, in its organisational and task structures, and in police officers' orientations to work and authority, have eroded the basis for consensus between ranks and exacerbated mutually instrumental attitudes. This more instrumental climate is self-perpetuating, frustrating attempts at all levels to maintain or re-establish harmonious relations. For the sergeant, these problems emerge as a set of strategic and existential dilemmas which requires them to manipulate a declining resource, namely trust, in balancing the demands of seniors for effective and legitimate performance, and those of juniors for feasible working targets and protection of operational discretion. Sergeants employ many devices to this end, with only limited success. The transformation of inter-rank relations such as to reconcile these aspirations requires instead a broader package of reform measures, with the restructuring of the system of police accountability as its centrepiece.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my appreciation to the Economic and Social Research Council and the Scottish Home and Health Department who provided me with the resources necessary to undertake this study. Just as important were the countless police officers in the four divisions, and elsewhere, who gave me my raw material and much else. Thanks are also due to many academic colleagues, and, in particular, to Roy Wilkie and Stephen Bennett, whose friendship I value as much as their advice. Their encouragement and goodwill sustained me through many dark hours. Last, but by no means least, I would like to thank Gillian, Ross and my parents. Each helped in more ways than they know or I have room to acknowledge.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE	THE POLICE TRILEMMA	7-20
CHAPTER TWO	CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANISATION : TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE	21-105
A.	INTRODUCTION	21-27
B.	THE EXISTING LITERATURE	27-87
C.	CULTURE AND STRUCTURE : TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE	87-97
D.	THE ROLE OF THE UNIFORM PATROL SERGEANT	97-105
CHAPTER THREE	TWO SPECIES OF POWER RELATIONS	106-147
A.	THE CONCEPT OF POWER : SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS	106-119
B.	TWO SPECIES OF INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL POWER RELATIONS	119-139
C.	NORMATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL POWER RELATIONS: SOME ADDITIONAL FEATURES	140-147

CHAPTER FOUR	THE RESEARCH : SOME GENERAL FINDINGS	148-207
A.	THE RESEARCH DESIGN	148-155
B.	THE RESEARCH : SOME GENERAL FINDINGS	156-204
C.	SUMMARY	205-207
CHAPTER FIVE	POWER IN THE POLICE ORGANISATION :	
	SITUATING THE SERGEANT	208-247
A.	PATTERNS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RANKS	209-243
B.	SITUATING THE SERGEANT	243-247
CHAPTER SIX	RECENT CHANGES IN POLICE ORGANISATION	248-330
A.	A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK	248-255
B.	THE ELEMENTS OF CHANGE CONSIDERED	255-329
C.	THE DOUBLE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARADOX OF TRUST	329-330
CHAPTER SEVEN	PATTERNS OF INSTRUMENTALISM IN THE DIVISIONAL ORGANISATION	331-425
A.	PEERING THROUGH THE CELL BARS	331-334
B.	POLICE BUREAUCRACY IN CONTEXT	334-396
C.	REINFORCING THE INSTRUMENTAL CLIMATE : THE EMPATHY GAP	396-425

CHAPTER EIGHT	THE NEW MANAGERIALISM	426-465
A.	THE SEEDS OF AN ALTERNATIVE	426-432
B.	IMPEDIMENT TO THE NEW MANAGERIALISM	432-465
CHAPTER NINE	THE ROLE OF THE INSPECTOR	466-508
A.	INTRODUCTION	466-469
B.	THE INSPECTOR : A RANK APART	469-500
C.	IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SERGEANT	500-508
CHAPTER TEN	THE RESPONSES OF SERGEANTS	509-572
A.	INTRODUCTION	509-515
B.	THE VARIETY OF RESPONSES CONSIDERED	516-570
C.	CONCLUSIONS	570-572
CHAPTER ELEVEN	CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	573-612
A.	INTRODUCTION	573-576
B.	A REFORM PACKAGE	576-612
	<i>footnotes</i>	613-666
	<i>bibliography</i>	667-691
	<i>appendix 1</i>	692-750
	<i>appendix 2</i>	751-768

CHAPTER ONE

THE POLICY TRILEMMA

As with all areas of social research and analysis, the nature and level of interest in the police has varied according to the pattern of wider social and political concern with its institutions and practices. As recently as 1979, despite the existence of a relatively robust research tradition elsewhere, particularly in the United States,⁽¹⁾ the dearth of research into the British police was accepted as a "cliché"⁽²⁾ within the community of social scientists. Since then, however, there has been an "efflorescence"⁽³⁾ of empirical and theoretical writings, stimulated and sustained by an atmosphere of sharpened public and political controversy over the propriety, impartiality, effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of certain trends within policework - an atmosphere which had been building since the late 1950s but which came to a head during and after the inner-city disorders of 1981.⁽⁴⁾ Now, at the beginning of the 1990s, we are blessed with a much more comprehensive indigenous *corpus* of work emanating from a wide range of sources - from the academy to independent research institutes to government departments to the police themselves, and straddling a number of disciplinary boundaries - from criminology to the sociologies of law and deviance to

psychology to organizational studies to social history, and finally, to social and political theory generally.

In this introduction no attempt is made to map or explain the wider developments in the profile of policing referred to, although some attention is given to these tasks in chapter seven. Nor, in consequence, is any attempt made to construct a sociology of knowledge which links such developments to research programmes and initiatives in a detailed manner. Nor, finally, is any attempt made to provide a comprehensive freeze-frame perspective on the contemporary state of the paradigm - or rather, the loose coalition of sub-paradigms - which may attract the general label 'police studies'. Indeed, in the light of the multi-disciplinary character of this body of work and the rich variety of normative predispositions and theoretical orientations of its contributors, such a task would provide a formidable intellectual challenge in its own right.⁽⁵⁾ In eschewing these various ambitious projects, our aim instead is to identify and examine a few salient features of the burgeoning body of research in order to explain and justify the particular concerns of the present thesis.

Our starting point is to note one central theme which has become ever more insistent as the new hybrid discipline of police studies has expanded, namely a commitment to address questions of *praxis* - to pursue lines of inquiry of a type and to present findings and analyses in a manner calculated to exercise a practical

influence upon the nature and working of police institutions in the here and now.⁽⁶⁾ Of course, to a greater or lesser extent all types of social research, through the "illumination of the concrete processes of social life",⁽⁷⁾ have transformative potential. Unlike the natural sciences, the social sciences are inevitably involved in a "'subject-subject relation' with what they are about",⁽⁸⁾ harbouring the capacity through their knowledge-effects to reconstitute their very object of inquiry. Analysis of the dynamics and unintended consequences of patterns of social action inevitably provides materials on the basis of which claims as to the desirability, prudence and feasibility of existing social arrangements are made and pursued, even although the relationship between theory and practice may in some cases be complex and attenuated. The work of Marx or Machiavelli, for example, could hardly be said to have been easily assimilated within the contemporary social and political context within which each was implicated, yet the profound long-term practical influence exercised by these two thinkers and their followers is undeniable.⁽⁹⁾ Nevertheless, while strong distinctions between research which may have significant practical implications and that which may not can never be maintained, whether cast in terms of a dichotomy between "applied" and 'pure', or 'constructive' and 'critical' research, or between 'priests' and 'prophets',⁽¹⁰⁾ it remains true that the orientations of different research communities and audiences in different times and places and in respect of different disciplinary concerns are more or less conducive to the operation of a

constructive dialectic between reflection and action, thought and change. That the forms and circumstances of its unfolding may recently have begun to render police research more conducive to such a development is indicated in a number of features of its development; in the proliferation of 'in-house' government research; ^{'11'} in the concern of major funding bodies with the close monitoring of contemporary innovations and issues of controversy; ^{'12'} in the greater willingness of police forces to allow favourable access, and even to fund external research; ^{'13'} in the pursuit of systematic research initiatives by serving police officers themselves; ^{'14'} and finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the development of a spirit of "realism" ^{'15'} amongst even radically-inclined members of the research community, a concern to obtain a meaningful purchase upon key contemporary debates about policing, rather than to espouse a critical idealism which tends towards the *cul de sac* of structural fatalism.

These developments are, however, far from heralding a Comtean utopia. Limited general commitment to and investment in a reformist approach is one thing, the development of common substantive ends and an effective framework for the communication of research knowledge and its serious consideration within key policy-making and policy-implementation communities is quite another. Nor is this surprising, since, as suggested, the social roots of the new wave of research interest lie in various significant changes in policing and in its relationship to its environment, and in the increasingly

controversial implications of these changes. The polarization of public and political opinion thus encouraged is bound to be reflected in the range of attitudes and orientations within the research community itself, and indeed, so beset is the new approach with tensions and conflicts that one commentator has seen fit to characterize the general phase of development which it signifies as "contradictory"⁽¹⁶⁾ - the very factors which have stimulated the reformist orientation conspiring to frustrate its potential.

How do such contradictions manifest themselves? Basically, there may be identified three levels of debate in terms of which the possibilities of the new reformist approach to research and analysis are pursued, and where also the problems of and disagreements within such an approach are made evident, namely, *policy generation, policy content, and policy implementation*. Further compounding the problems identifiable at each of these three levels, the issues over which disagreements arise within each discrete domain are in turn closely interconnected in ways which are themselves controversial between the exponents of different schools of thought, and indeed, which provoke tensions and difficulties even within particular schools of thought. Ultimately, therefore, the success or failure of any attempt to devise a more intimate relationship between research and analysis on the one hand and practice on the other depends upon the capacity of the research community to negotiate this complex triangulation of problems which we will term the *policy trilemma*. It is with a cluster of problems

associated with the third level within this overall configuration - to wit, the level of policy implementation - that the present thesis is concerned. However, just because of the close interrelationship between its various parts, we must look at the policy trilemma in the round in order properly to situate and justify our more specific concerns.

As regards the first level of the policy trilemma - the question of policy generation - this has, at least until very recently,⁽¹⁷⁾ undoubtedly provided the most significant site of debate within the field of police studies. As policing has become a focus of political debate, so fundamental questions have been posed as to the appropriate institutional means by which the police should be rendered legally and politically accountable, and by which their policies should be influenced.⁽¹⁸⁾ While most analysts have been agreed that the present tripartite structure of accountability and control - the division of authority between central government, local government and the police themselves⁽¹⁹⁾ - is in a state of "arrested development",⁽²⁰⁾ the conceptual difficulties involved in the application of democratic theory in this area and the inescapably value-dependent nature of the choices required to be made have meant that a wide range of different solutions has been proffered. Some conservative commentators have opted for the maintenance of a *status quo* which allows the locally elected police authorities only limited powers of oversight of police policy and performance, or have even argued for the removal of the local

democratic element entirely.⁽²¹⁾ Others, through various more or less radical models of change, have advocated a more proactive role for the local democratic constituency, and a corresponding reduction in the formal operational autonomy of the Chief Constable and in the capacity of central government to exercise policy influence through the plethora of powers presently available to them to impose standardized norms of efficiency and effectiveness.⁽²²⁾ Yet others have suggested that the inevitable drift towards central administrative control entails that it through the introduction of new accountability structures at this level, rather than at the local level, that the democratic deficit, if there is indeed such a deficit, may be remedied.⁽²³⁾ But whichever line is taken, hard questions remain about the nature and limits of democratic involvement in policing. For example, since, as we shall see, many critical issues in policing concern the protection of minority rights and aspirations, to what extent can the logic of purely majoritarian solutions to policing problems be sustained? Relatedly, as both represent different and sometimes conflicting strains of democratic influence, how is the optimal balance to be struck between the general political accountability of a police force to an external constituency on the one hand, and the various forms of legal accountability of individual police officers for their specific actions on the other? Finally, as a further related issue, how are we to judge the relative merits of different types of democratic forum - local or central, police-specific or more broadly mandated?⁽²⁴⁾

Even insofar - as problems of policy generation may be successfully resolved, at least to the satisfaction of exponents of one of the broad positions outlined above if not more generally, it has been increasingly acknowledged in recent years that this by no means guarantees the emergence of optimal solutions in terms of the second level of the policy trilemma - policy content.⁽²⁵⁾ And just as it would be a proceduralist fallacy to suppose otherwise, so too it would be a positivist fallacy to suppose, in the alternative, that value differences as to the proper ends and means of policing are any more capable of eradication by the steady accretion of social scientific knowledge directed to the detailed examination of particular policies and their practical consequences, than is the ideal structure of policy generation capable of being definitively settled through sustained engagement at the still more rarified level of democratic theory. As is argued in more detail in a later chapter,⁽²⁶⁾ the practices of the police impinge too closely upon certain fundamental issues which do not permit compelling value-neutral answers - issues concerning the proper scope and aims of the public sphere and about the relationship between the public sphere and the domain of individual rights - to be capable of being entirely cordoned off from the mainstream of political controversy. Furthermore, even if feasible, too firm a concord amongst outside 'experts' over policing means and ends and too ready an acceptance of their wisdom within the policy-making community would not be desirable, since in a world short on moral absolutes it is impossible to conceive of the absence of a certain level of debate

over any significant social institution as indicative of other than a manipulated or overly-complacent consensus.

On the other hand, whereas general policy issues concerning the proper allocation of scarce policing resources and the relationship between policing objectives and other collective aspirations and individual claims may be hotly contested - and, within limits, should remain so - perhaps empirical inquiry and rigorous analysis can help to refine understanding about "good practice"⁽²⁷⁾ in respect of more modestly pitched substantive matters. Indeed, it is in this area of research that the greatest acceleration in terms of commitment of research energy and resources is presently evident, whether such research be concerned with methods of interrogation,⁽²⁸⁾ stop and search practices,⁽²⁹⁾ patterns of operational demand,⁽³⁰⁾ Policing Skills Training geared towards encounters with the public,⁽³¹⁾ community policing projects,⁽³²⁾ crime prevention initiatives such as Neighbourhood Watch,⁽³³⁾ or the rationalization of administrative procedures through computerization.⁽³⁴⁾

Nevertheless, while on balance the prognosis for research and analysis may be somewhat more promising in the area of policy content than in the area of policy generation, consideration of the relationship between these first two levels of the policy trilemma suggests a further set of obstacles in the path of a coherent research-driven culture of reform. On the one hand, it may be

contended by proponents of a more democratic structure for policy generation that the value of many substantive initiatives in the area of crime prevention and community policing, as well as of more traditional patrol and detection practices, may be dissipated by low levels of public support and co-operation, which in turn may arguably be linked to the relatively marginal role of local democratic elements within the present tripartite structure.⁽³⁵⁾ However one might define the effectiveness of policing, it is postulated, success will depend crucially upon high levels of consent amongst policed communities, and such consent is more likely to be generated through meaningful involvement of these communities in the construction, endorsement and review of policing policy. On the other hand, it may be contended by defenders of present accountability arrangements that the effectiveness of substantive policing strategies, new or old, depends instead upon the freedom of insiders to use professional discretion and expertise without fear of unwarranted or untimely outside interference.⁽³⁶⁾ In this way, issues at the two levels may be seen to be closely linked, yet the identification of the precise nature of these links and their implications for reform strategy is again deeply contentious. And again, rigorous research and analysis can help only to a limited extent, since the relevant arguments involve making comparisons between how things are and how things might be, comparisons demanding counterfactual speculations which cannot be anchored in rigorous empirical analysis.

Difficulties concerning the interrelationship between the component parts of the policy trilemma are further compounded when we turn to its third and final level, that of policy implementation. The problems associated with policy implementation may be divided into two sets. In the first place, there is the attitude of members of the policy-making community, both politicians and senior police officers. Notwithstanding the greater openness to systematic research and analysis commented upon earlier, the considered reception and application of research findings remains hostage to a number of other factors, including the still powerful strain of insular conservatism within many police institutions and the propensity of members of policy-making élites to view innovative possibilities as ideological window-dressing, as mere glosses to legitimize present practice rather than as ideas capable of making a real difference.⁽³⁷⁾ Against this, although it would be naive to assume that considerations of political expediency will ever be entirely submerged, to the extent that research and analysis throws up new reform possibilities, and in particular that middle-range substantive research demonstrates its practical worth through augmenting understanding of best and worst practice, then, building upon the modest foundations already in place, the tendency of members of the policy-making community to view the products of police research in an unduly sceptical or merely opportunistic manner may perhaps further recede.

A second and more fundamental set of problems associated with policy implementation concerns the capacity of policy-making élites, even if themselves receptive to changes, to operationalize such changes within the constraints and limits set by the police organisation itself. To what extent and by what means is it possible for these élites to co-ordinate and control the application of policy within a multi-tiered, multi-functional organization whose lower ranks enjoy considerable practical autonomy on account of their generally low visibility, their unpredictable work profiles, and the fact that, as with many service organizations, it is their situational decisions which have greatest impact upon the organization's clients?⁽³⁸⁾ Again, different, and more or less optimistic answers to this question are canvassed, and these different answers have profoundly different implications for how one addresses issues at the levels of policy generation and policy content. Put bluntly, to the extent that the issue of internal control is seen as problematical, then this may cause structures and initiatives which are supported at the other two levels to be compromised. It may be that that a particular set of arrangements for policy generation which is strongly supported in terms of one's democratic philosophy may be deemed unworkable on account of operational resistance to the very idea of external, democratic control. Similarly, it may be feared that certain substantive policies, although supportable in principle, run counter to the normative orientations and practical imperatives of the rank and

-

file and so may be subverted at the critical point of implementation. (33)

It is this last set of issues within the policy trilemma - the nature and extent of problems of policy implementation within the organization - which represents our particular object of analysis. The explanation for this focus is twofold. First, and more importantly, it is the problem of policy implementation which offers the most profound and disturbing challenge to any attempt to change the police in ways which are supported by rational arguments and popular demand, whether separately, or hopefully, in combination. In respect of matters concerning policy generation and content and their interrelationship, the limitations of the research enterprise and of the processes of public choice alike are intrinsic, reflecting the value conflicts endemic within a pluralistic culture and the inability of social science and social theory to escape the most fundamental of these conflicts. However, insofar as new findings, new ideas and new compromises may nevertheless promise some level of improvement in police institutions and practices in ways which would be generally endorsed, that such a promise might be thwarted by difficulties in policy implementation is a conclusion surely unpalatable to all committed to the beneficence of public institutions. This is not to say that countervailing forces within police sub-cultures should not be taken seriously other than as obstacles to be eliminated. Rather, as hopefully will be demonstrated, we should seek a depth of understanding of these

forces sufficient to provide means of addressing the reasons for such resistance as well as the phenomenon of resistance itself.

Secondly, despite its palpable significance, and despite the somewhat ironical fact that in earlier, generally less fertile phases of police research considerable attention was drawn to it and light cast upon it,⁴⁰ the issue of policy implementation within police organizations, with a few notable exceptions,⁴¹ has been the subject of comparatively little systematic new research in recent years. As is explained in the next chapter, mainstream theoretical positions on the difficulties involved in the internal control and co-ordination of organizational effort have tended to become entrenched in opposite camps, with debate between them assuming a somewhat sterile quality. The problems associated with intra-organizational relations thus pose just as pressing a challenge to police studies at an intellectual level as at a practical level. Let us now begin to address this double-layered challenge.

CHAPTER TWO

CONTROL IN THE POLICE ORGANISATION: TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE

A. INTRODUCTION

In chapter one the question of policy implementation within the British police was announced as the general object of inquiry of the present study, and reasons for this choice were provided. In this chapter, we develop a more specific framework for addressing this issue. We begin to outline the particular theoretical perspective which informs this thesis, and relatedly, to attempt to justify its *empirical* focus upon the role of the sergeant within the divisional management system.

These tasks are approached through an examination of the theoretical dispute which underlies the disagreement alluded to in chapter one concerning how to 'factor in' the question of implementation when addressing the other two aspects of the policy trilemma - policy generation and policy content. In order to assess the extent to which the directive influences present at the levels of policy generation and policy content will meet with difficulties at the stage of internal implementation, we must identify those underlying factors which are most significant in accounting for

patterns of action within the police organisation, and then analyse the extent to which, and manner in which, such factors facilitate or impede the effective control and co-ordination of the process of policy implementation.

As has been acknowledged by a number of the main contributors to the debate, the fundamental point of contention within the existing literature on the nature and limits of concerted action within the police organisation concerns the relationship between *culture* and *structure* - between ideational factors and material factors - as explanatory sources.⁽¹⁾ In a general sense, both "cop culturalists"⁽²⁾ and "structuralists"⁽³⁾ are agreed that, as presently constituted, police organisations are not easily susceptible to external control, but they disagree as to the reasons for this. For the cop culturalists, it is the microsociological perspective upon the informal cultures which operate within the police organisation - "the rules, norms and values which construct and guide the attitudes and behaviours of police officers"⁽⁴⁾ - that provides the level of explanation which in the last analysis determines the prevailing pattern of relationships and direction of activities within the organisation. In particular, as we shall see, they stress the lack of homogeneity - of unity of purpose and co-ordination of practice - *within* the police organisation, as a crucial factor in accounting for the problem of control. By contrast, for the structuralists it is the set of external, non-ideational forces impinging upon police action, such as the formal

organisational system and various environmental factors, including legal rules and resource constraints, which provides the ultimate explanatory touchstone.⁽⁵⁾ Accordingly, on the one hand, for the cop culturalists the directive capacity of the policy generation process and of its products, within either the present system or a reformed system, depends upon the ability of the system, together with other supporting measures, to "transform and co-opt"⁽⁶⁾ the informal values inherent in police sub-cultures, and they argue that the task of accommodating these strong sub-cultural tendencies places significant constraints upon the potential for effective policy implementation and control. On the other hand, for the structuralists, since the fundamental causal forces and the prime movers of change are deemed to be the external structures themselves, then provided these are properly harnessed and coordinated towards a preferred set of purposes, there is no necessary limit to their regulatory potential, nor to the changes that may be wrought through them.⁽⁷⁾ In simple terms, therefore, the general orientation of the cop culturalists inclines them towards a less sanguine view of the prospects of effecting external control and implementing external changes successfully than the structuralists

Now, to infer from this basic statement of theoretical divergence, and the divergence in understanding of the policy implementation process which flows from this, that the set of findings derived from the body of research on police organisations may be reduced to a simple analytical dichotomy would be a

grotesque caricature of the efforts of others, and no such inference is intended. To begin with, as is evident from the general terms in which the two approaches are described, each is capable of encompassing a wide range of viewpoints and orientations. Each represents a broad church within which differences exist at a more rigorous level of theoretical debate and a more detailed level of empirical inquiry.⁽⁸⁾ Closely related to this is the further point that, with few exceptions, exponents of the two approaches do not intend by their concentration on one dimension of analysis that the other dimension be dismissed as entirely irrelevant. For some, concentration upon either cultural or structural factors may simply reflect the demands of establishing a manageable research framework.⁽⁹⁾ For others committed to a more holistic approach, their insistence upon according primacy to one set of factors does not lead them to ignore the other set, but merely to allocate it a subordinate position within the overall explanatory scheme.⁽¹⁰⁾

In the light of these two qualifications, the current state of theoretical development in the study of police organisations should not be viewed as an opposition between two incommensurable paradigms, but rather - as will become apparent in the course of this chapter - as a continuum, with most commentators clustered around a range of positions between the opposite poles of cultural monism and structural monism. Nevertheless, the culture/structure distinction remains important, and not merely as a background against which the theoretical topography of the issue in question

may be displayed. More significantly, it also provides the conceptual problematic through which the most sophisticated attempts to theorize the problem of implementation and control are expressed, and in whose terms the limitations of such attempts may be accounted for. Thus, while the positive legacy of the culture/structure distinction is an analytical dualism which provides necessary leverage for advancing theoretical understanding, its negative legacy lies in the very tendency, reported above, of the exponents of this dualism to think in unduly dichotomous terms, and to continue to ascribe ultimate explanatory value to one dimension rather than the other. As the editors of a recent volume of papers on police research have contended, such a stark choice is unnecessary.⁽¹¹⁾ Indeed, we would go further and argue that the search for final causes is an illusory one. The explanatory pay-off from such exercises is always unconvincing, producing results which, as we shall see, may be incomplete or distorted. And it is only if this preoccupation is set aside, and cultural and structural factors are instead treated as co-ordinate variables, that the interplay between them can be fully explored, and the problem of control more adequately understood. In other words, *the search for a hierarchically organised framework of explanation tends to be at the expense of the search for a fully integrated framework of explanation - one which is capable of examining the interrelationship of cultural and structural factors in the round.*

In committing ourselves to the search for a fully integrated explanatory framework, we commit ourselves also to the view that only such a framework is capable of generating warrantable claims as to how efforts aimed at redirecting the police will be received and applied within the organisation itself. A multicausal framework of explanation, it is argued, far from precluding the determination of priorities in any strategy of consequential reform, is instead a necessary prerequisite to the performance of this task in a detailed and compelling manner. To think otherwise would be to misconstrue the relationship between theoretical explanation and subsequent *praxis* as one of linear correspondence, and to make the mistaken assumption that it is only explanatory schemes which are predominantly culture-based or structure-based which, by means of retaining their particular internal ordering schemes in their theoretical conclusions, are capable of providing coherent and manageable reform agendas. This argument is, however, a complicated one, and one that can only be demonstrated by example, an example which is developed throughout the thesis *culminating* in the final chapter where an ordered agenda for reform is, in fact, suggested on the basis of our multicausal perspective.

For the moment, the purpose of the present chapter is, as suggested, simply to lay new theoretical foundations and to justify our particular research orientation in the light of these foundations. We shall use as our touchstone the culturalist perspective which emphasizes a distinct and resilient division

within the organization in hierarchical terms, and which suggests this as a powerful impediment to the effective implementation of policy. Thereafter, tracing a path along the continuum between cultural and structural explanations of patterns of organisational action, we shall examine the various positions adopted and whether they suggest elaboration or modification of the basic culturalist position, or alternatively, its wholesale rejection and the construction of an entirely different explanatory framework. This will allow us to retain what is valuable in the present literature, to gain an understanding of its limitations, and thus to construct a problematic through which we may begin to develop and defend our own theoretical and empirical focus for advancing understanding of the crucial social forces at work within the police organisation, and of how these bear upon questions of policy implementation.

B. THE EXISTING LITERATURE

Margaret Archer has recently suggested that "for purposes of explanation culture swings wildly from being the supremely independent variable in some theories to become the passive dependent variable in others".⁽¹²⁾ Thus, as was noted in the previous section, within police sociology as elsewhere, cultural factors may be treated in a number of different ways, and may be accommodated alongside structural factors in a variety of different frameworks of explanation of social action. Furthermore, even for those who would accord superordinate explanatory status to cultural

factors - to the available symbolic forms through which police officers filter their experiences and construct meaning - this orientation does not necessarily commit them to a view which emphasizes diversity and divergence within the organization. Nevertheless, it remains contingently true that, on the basis of their various empirical investigations, cop culturalists tend to unite around the idea that differences of occupational perspectives and practice between key groups are entrenched so as to militate against intra-organisational harmony, and more specifically, as to prevent the general and unconditional accommodation of the putative controls and directives emanating from the various structural mechanisms which may be influenced by external constituencies. The apogee of this approach is to be found in the much documented notion of the 'two cultures'⁽¹³⁾ of policing, the idea of a binary division between management and workforce, with the former more compliant with external demands than the latter. We shall begin our critical review of the literature by examining this perspective, and by arguing that, despite its initial suggestiveness, it appears to be crude and imprecise. We shall then examine the various ways in which cultural factors have been elaborated upon and structural factors introduced in order to provide a more sophisticated analytical lens to focus upon the issue of control of the police organisation.

(1) The 'two cultures' of policing.

As suggested, the idea of police organisational life as characterized by the existence and interplay of two cultural paradigms has become something of a sociological commonplace, and has been endorsed, at least as a provisional orientation, by researchers working in an impressive variety of settings. From Amsterdam Punch has reported "a major schism between the work cultures of upper and lower ranks",⁽¹⁴⁾ in New York Reuss-Ianni and Ianni have commented on the distinction between 'street cops' and 'management cops',⁽¹⁵⁾ while Holdaway's work in a major English city has revealed a similarly conceived divide between 'managerial professionalism' and 'practical professionalism'.⁽¹⁶⁾

A number of common strands run through this literature, providing a basic set of descriptions of the content of the two distinct occupational cultures, and a number of pointers as to the possible bases of this distinction. Thus, while it is conceded that in general terms the exponents of both cultures may subscribe to a single conception of the organisational mandate, articulated in terms of preserving order and combatting crime⁽¹⁷⁾, it is contended that this thinly-layered consensus begins to crumble once the more particular demands of their respective work situations are brought into account. Management cop culture is concerned with the mandate on a "systemwide"⁽¹⁸⁾ basis, and is honed to respond to those audiences - the courts, those political agencies constituted through processes designed to render the police publicly accountable, and other relevant territorial and interest groups - which organise

themselves at an institutional level which matches that of the higher echelons of the police organisation. These twin features of the occupational milieu inhabited by the higher ranks - the need to be concerned with the specification and monitoring of objectives and standards of adequate performance in a generic sense, and to be cognizant of the pressure to justify their actions in external as well as internal contexts - begin to account for the distinctive nature of the mental set and work priorities of senior officers. The requirement to produce legible and verifiable forms of internal co-ordination towards collective ends and to provide adequate forms of institutional display elevate the demand to "project an acceptable, legalistic, rational face to the public"⁽¹⁹⁾ to the status of a dominant orientation.

By contrast, the occupational culture of the lower ranks is more inward-looking and is marked by unit specific concerns, the yardstick of effective performance of the operational officer being intimately tied to the demands and capabilities of the immediate peer group. This narrower vision is the product not only of their formal role within the organisation and the inherent limitations which this places on their cognitive and material capacity to impact upon the policing environment - to 'make a difference' in terms of the overall achievement of police objectives - but also of other features of their immediate work situation.⁽²⁰⁾ The conduct of police operational work, it has been widely documented,⁽²¹⁾ is

crucially informed by the pervasive presence of danger, uncertainty and unpredictability and by the capacity of the police officer to utilize powerful resources to deal with the problems and predicaments thus generated. This set of themes is well-captured in Bittner's famously incisive and concise depiction of the police operational function "as a mechanism for the distribution of non-negotiably coercive force employed in accordance with the dictates of an intuitive grasp of situational exigencies".⁽²²⁾ Appreciation of contextual variation, and of the need to "do something"⁽²³⁾ immediately - and in the absence of a well-rehearsed script - both in order to achieve a satisfactory resolution of an operational predicament and for reasons of self-preservation, signals a preoccupation with pragmatic and case-specific criteria of competence and an eschewal of these objectively measurable, aggregatable and transposable indices of activity more likely to be favoured by officers charged with the management of collective performance. Additionally, the double-edged sense of solidarity and isolation, which provides a further subcultural redoubt of the lower ranks, reinforces the development of a peer-dominated set of working priorities.⁽²⁴⁾ This is itself in part a product of an acknowledgement of a shared and exclusive sense of vulnerability to the exigencies of operational life, and of the inevitable sense of task interdependence and the propensity to categorize external groups in a defensive manner - in terms of their likely contribution to operationally specific problems - which emerges in the face of this hostile and unpredictable environment. It is further enhanced

by the inexorable process of distancing from outsiders which arises both from anti-social working hours and from various exclusionary cues - uniform, equipment and watchful demeanour - exhibited in the distinctive symbolic paraphernalia of the street-level police officer and registered in his relationships with various publics. All in all, this isolation/solidarity coupling erects formidable barriers against the reception of externally derived values into the working code.

Thus, certain fundamental differences in terms of work loyalties and methodologies provide the outline of the 'schism' to which Punch alludes. On the one hand, there is a managerial orientation which is outward-looking and committed to general and cumulative indices of competence and success while, on the other, there is an operational orientation which is inward-looking and committed to specific and episodic indices of competence and success. This abstract dichotomizing framework in turn contains the seeds of more specific differences and conflicts. General environmentally sensitive standards, of which the paradigm case is the public and universal standard provided by law, may, from the perspective of the lower ranks, be viewed as blunt and intrusive instruments, inadequately tailored to the contextually sensitive demands of operational work.⁽²⁵⁾ Further, and adding substance to this clash in methodological orientations, the parochial and defensive attitude of lower ranks helps to consolidate the sense

of bipolar division in two additional respects. It reinforces a number of other substantive cultural traits which a variety of writers have viewed as a product both of the values of the wider social groups from which police officers are drawn, and of the specific demands and pressures of policework. These include an action orientation, a machismo-centred mode of self-presentation, a binary moral code, generic suspiciousness, conservatism, and a prejudicial attitude towards minority groups with whom police officers are disproportionately involved in non-consensual encounters.⁽²⁶⁾ Each of these attributes may, at least on some occasions, run counter to managerial imperatives aimed at generating uniform internal standards and encouraging a sensitivity to the demands of disparate public constituencies. Moreover, operational insularity also invites and facilitates the construction of a wall of "secrecy and solidarity"⁽²⁷⁾ *within* the organisation, erected against senior officers in response to their opposition to this very entrenchment within operational ranks of certain attitudes and styles. In sum, the introspective and self-referential nature of the police operational culture endows certain of its more specific features with a self-propagating dynamic - an imperviousness to external modification - while its protective nature harbours these keynote attributes against the countervailing manoeuvres of senior officers.

While this line of argument adds some tone and substance to the gap thesis, it nevertheless remains a somewhat vaguely sketched and

imprecise-outline. It begs a number of questions, and these are not merely matters of detail, but, for a variety of reasons, must instead be viewed as issues of fundamental principle. First, how deep and how continuous is the identified divide? Within a social environment which is marked by a complex and ongoing series of exchanges and collective activities it simply makes no sense to talk of a cultural divide in absolute terms. The possession of a common discourse, of shared knowledge, and the existence and continuous rearticulation of an assemblage of mutually interdependent practices, all bespeak a situation where the 'gap' metaphor must be applied with some circumspection.

Secondly, to what extent is the gap overlain by other divisions, and by other allegiances? Insofar as the common core of background understandings, of access to shared intelligibilia, is supplanted by cultural variation - by the emergence of attitudes and perspectives which, transcending this common baseline, exhibit divergent tendencies - how plausible is it to view this divergence in one-dimensional terms? Rather than as marked by a single axis of division, is cultural heterogeneity not more persuasively viewed in terms of a criss-cross of overlapping distinctions tending to unite actors in accordance with certain themes and to divide them in accordance with others?

As we shall see, in attempting to gain some purchase on these two sets of questions from the existing literature, we begin to gain

a sense of how the cultural landscape, now viewed as a more complex formation, is to some extent conditioned by structural factors. However, a third challenge to the gap thesis questions more directly the adequacy of a framework of analysis which focuses primarily on cultural manifestations, and posits a more fundamental explanatory role for structural factors. It suggests that they may influence the internal workings and outputs of the police organisation, and thus may inform our understanding of the question of the amenability of the police organisation to external control, in a manner which may not be fully appreciated merely from an examination of the subcultural orientations of particular organisational groups. That is, this view suggests that, within the structural domain, there may be unobserved or unobservable processes at work which shape the organisation in a particular manner, cultural factors notwithstanding. (28) The pattern of world-views within the organisation, including the degree of uniformity or diversity may be one thing, but the overall pattern and direction of "socio-cultural integration" (29) is quite another. This more comprehensively conceived framework of organizational relations, it is claimed, may be influenced by the cultural dimension, but is not exhaustively defined nor decisively shaped by it.

(2) Redrawing the cultural map.

As indicated, the first two lines of inquiry challenge the persuasiveness of the gap thesis viewed simply as a proposition

about cultural division. On the surface, the grain of the two arguments may appear to run in opposite directions, since the first is concerned to avoid the *overemphasis* of the extent of division between junior and senior ranks which would be the upshot of too stark a version of the gap thesis, while the second is concerned with the insensitivity of such a thesis to other sources and forms of cultural divergence - its *underemphasis* of the general range and subtlety of variation of perspective exhibited within the ranks of the police organisation. However, at a deeper level, the two projects converge since their net effect is to suggest the need to qualify any conception of the cultural map of the police organisation as dominated by a division along a single horizontal axis. Accordingly, the arguments developed along each tack are essentially complementary, and may be considered cumulatively.

(i) Homogenizing influences.

If there is a significant undercurrent of cultural homogeneity within police organizations, a factor which contributes to this in an obvious and fundamental sense is "the internally self-sufficient career structure"⁽³⁰⁾ which operates within a number of policing systems, where all senior officers have risen through the ranks and have undergone training régimes and processes of operational socialization similar to those of their juniors. This provides a sizeable fund of common experiences and knowledge, and one which, if

we remind ourselves of some of the salient attributes of the operational sub-culture, is marked by its encouragement of group solidarity, its recognition of internally generated working standards and criteria of competence, and its maintenance of a sharp division between insiders and outsiders. Thus, the homogenizing effect of a common operational background has general and specific roots. It arises both from the common exposure to a similar general set of experiences, and from the more particular legacy of involvement in a solidary occupational culture which is guaranteed to senior officers. In certain cases also, the common entry point produces not only similar, but shared background operational experience, some lower and higher participants possessing a "specific particularistic knowledge"⁽³¹⁾ of one another which, if favourably developed, may cement cultural bonds rooted in the common work experience.

Nor is the element of cultural consonance simply a residue of historical experience. It may be further augmented by the ongoing task dependence between ranks. As with all bureaucratic organisations, the police organisation is characterized by a hierarchical division of labour which binds all members, directly or indirectly, in a structure of mutual dependence, the activity and objectives of each member often being influenced by the activities of colleagues at many different ranks and in many different departments.⁽³²⁾ Moreover, unlike many organisations, as was suggested in chapter one the police are characterized by a

considerable degree of practical autonomy amongst their lower ranks. On the one hand, this flows from the unpredictable, demand-led and territorially diverse nature of such work, and from its consequent "low visibility".⁽³³⁾ On the other, it derives from the fact that the value and acceptability of the products of the police organisation are, in the first instance at least, inevitably measured in terms of the specific performances of individual operational officers, and the reaction of clients and other contacts to these performances. In short, like many human service organizations, the police organization is a "street-level bureaucracy".⁽³⁴⁾ Thus, information control and monopolisation of key skills and tasks allows operational officers a greater leverage and influence within the framework of collective endeavour than is the case with many lower participants in commercial organizations, and ensures that the scales of mutual dependence are more evenly balanced than the formal allocation of authority would suggest. Now, the extent to which and manner in which this task interdependence has implications both for cultural patterns and for the strategic relationship between the two groups - encouraging the further development of common cognitive and normative frames of reference and of techniques of mutual accommodation - is a complex question, and one which will be addressed more fully within our own theoretical model.⁽³⁵⁾ For present purposes, while no precise answer may be provided, we can nevertheless assume that as regards the cultural dimension, a structure of mutual dependence inevitably generates at least some degree of harmony of occupational

perspective, and so may provisionally be adduced as a factor, albeit of indeterminate weight, which further qualifies an absolute version of the gap thesis.

If we look at these various factors in the round - similar formal and informal socialization processes, shared experiences, ongoing task dependence - then an undercurrent of cultural homogeneity becomes undeniable. Indeed, so suggestive are these ideas of a resilient empathy with and loyalty to the imperatives of the operational culture, that the question arises whether and how this continuing receptiveness on the part of senior officers may be squared with their ostensible allegiance to a separate framework of managerial values. A partial explanation of this apparent disparity may lie in the fact that, as is evident from the somewhat bare terms in which the notion of a managerial culture has been espoused, this is largely an "assumed category".⁽³⁶⁾ The dominant theoretical orientations of many researchers, together with problems of access, have contributed to a situation where direct evidence of the ideas and practices of police managers is thin on the ground, and accordingly, the empirical credentials of the idea of an autonomous managerial culture may be suspect.⁽³⁷⁾ However, while this cautions us to be wary, such evidence as there is suggests that wholesale dismissal of the managerialist thesis would be no less serious an error than its uncritical acceptance. Rather, we should be receptive to ideas and evidence which, while qualifying its terms, allow its basic insights to be woven together with the strands of argument

suggesting a more homogeneous framework. We should, in short, seek a theoretical resolution of the apparent tension between these two approaches.

We may begin to address this question by reference to the idea that senior officers encounter pressures and develop inclinations to take account of and respond to a variety of "audiences"⁽³⁸⁾ who have different expectations and make different demands of them. Most fundamentally, and most appropriately for present purposes, a basic distinction between internal audiences and external audiences may be envisaged. A number of writers have explored the nature and implications of the Janus-faced commitment which is thus entailed. Punch, for example, has argued that the competing demands of internal and external audiences produce a shifting pattern of organisational orientations.⁽³⁹⁾ In Gouldner's terminology, a police organisation at certain conjunctures and in certain aspects may be properly characterized as a "punishment-centred bureaucracy",⁽⁴⁰⁾ where vertical relationships are antagonistic in nature and the higher echelons develop a separate orientation involving a genuine embrace of the external influences alluded to above. By contrast, at other times and in other contexts the same organisation may be more accurately described as a "mock bureaucracy",⁽⁴¹⁾ where the strain of cultural unity comes to the fore, "patterns of indulgency"⁽⁴²⁾ develop, "vertical situational cliques"⁽⁴³⁾ assert themselves, and the idea of control being imposed upon a recalcitrant workforce from above becomes a mere

exercise in impression management designed to appease external audiences and to mask a more *generalized* organisational subservience to the dictates of the operational culture. According to Punch, the dynamics of this oscillating movement between mock and punishment-centred forms of control fall to be explained by reference to the shifting ways in which the ambivalence embodied in the cultural perspectives of senior ranks interrelates with certain limits inherent in the techniques of internal control on the one hand, and particular externally generated demands on the other:

"in terms of the 'implicit bargain' between bosses and workers ... in the police organization the senior officers are aware that they do not have effective control of the work process and implicitly delegate responsibility to the lower orders on the understanding that they will not be embarrassed or compromised by excesses. When deviance does get out of hand and the higher ranks feel forced to intervene then the 'implicit contract' switches from a diffuse one based on discretion and trust to a restricted position of low trust, close supervision, and direct control. Uncovering deviance exposes the lack of control at the top *forcing* officers to reimpose conspicuously their hold on the lower ranks who resent this illegitimate interference with their traditional 'rights' to autonomy" (44)

This contrast between appearance and underlying mechanism, between the mock representation of control and a subterranean framework of indulgency, is taken a stage further in the work of Shearing based upon a study of a large Canadian municipal police department. (45) He reveals the existence of a range of divergent styles and attitudes which flourish within the irreducible discretionary space afforded to operational ranks, only some of

these styles being consistent with the prevailing publicly articulated managerial ethos. Nevertheless, rather than posing fundamental problems of control for senior officers, he argues that this flexibility and versatility of operational response instead operates in symbiosis with the ambivalence which underwrites the police managerial role.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Invoking the idea of "functional deviance",⁽⁴⁷⁾ he suggests that the existence of an ineradicable core of 'wise officers' and 'real officers' committed to the attainment of subculturally approved, situationally justified results and unwilling to subscribe to the procedure-bound, standardized, externally answerable conception of "egalitarian justice"⁽⁴⁸⁾ publicly supported by their senior colleagues, permits these same senior officers to reap the benefits of such operational intransigence while absolving themselves of responsibility for its less palatable public consequences, an absolution periodically confirmed by the denunciation and scapegoating of particular deviants.

Thus, for Punch, the ability of the organisation to control its output of information and to engage in presentational strategies suggestive of a rigorous régime of internal control may effectively mask an underlying set of arrangements within which inter-rank collaboration is widespread and strict control is neither assiduously sought nor capable of effective prosecution. Yet this exercise in impression management is necessarily a precarious accomplishment. It is always vulnerable to overreaching on the

-

part of certain segments of the operational ranks, and to an increased public profile of organisational indiscipline and disorder - of entrenched venality or inefficiency, an imagery which demands peremptory and visible corrective action. With Shearing, the manipulative potential inherent in the configuration of internal and external control mechanisms is revealed in certain circumstances as being greater in scope and less susceptible to failure and damaging exposure, since even when the mask of internal control slips, this may be turned to organisational advantage without the radical disruption and reorientation envisaged by Punch. Ironically then, it is the particular combination of symbolic power and strategic weakness of senior officers - not only their ability to manipulate and control the external flow of information but also their acknowledged susceptibility to internal strategies of information manipulation and control - which may allow a degree of cultural uniformity to flourish behind the external facade.

The thrust of this type of approach is to stress the ambivalent nature of police management culture. It suggests that appearances may on occasions be deceptive, and that undue reliance upon the more public manifestations of the police cultural landscape as the empirical foundations for analysis may lead to a systematic misreading of the pattern of internal relationships. Thus, both the theoretical and evidential credentials of a strong version of the gap thesis are prone to critical scrutiny, as equally are those of any attempt to dismiss its terms categorically. More generally,

consideration of this range of critical responses to and qualifications of the gap thesis invites two observations.

In the first place, the arguments of writers such as Punch and Shearing suggest the importance of a *dynamic* and situationally sensitive view of patterns of cultural convergence and divergence within the police organisation. If we accept the gist of Punch's conclusions, the balance of cultural relations within a police organisation is fluid and ever-changing, and requires to be measured with precision instruments which reflect the particular constellation of factors and circumstances bearing upon external and internal relations at any point. And this lesson is underlined rather than undermined by Shearing's depiction of the manoeuvres available to senior officers to impose a more stable compromise between cultural accommodation and disciplined direction, for the import of this argument is not to contradict Punch's finding as to contextual variation, but rather to suggest that in scenarios less extreme than Amsterdam's corruption scandal of the 1970s, a more continuous structure of control and cultural relations may be evident, which in turn is informed by its own particular matrix of historical and situational preconditions. Therefore, a caveat must be entered against over-generalization.

Thus, for example, when Punch takes the Iannis to task for their uncritical acceptance of the nostalgic view of serving police officers in New York of the police organisation of the previous

generation as being marked by harmonious internal relations - the "good old days"⁽⁴⁹⁾ - suggesting instead that, broadly speaking, "the traditional police organization ... was characterized by petty regulations, harsh discipline, and meticulous attention to trivia"⁽⁵⁰⁾, one is bound to caution that such a sweeping cross-cultural hypothesis should be treated with at least as much scepticism as the culturally encoded institutional memory to which it is critically directed. Indeed, even if attention is restricted to the specific terms of Punch's theory of organisational adaption in the circumstances of a high-profile corruption scandal, we must guard against unreflective transcription of the terms and direction of the dynamic of change from one cultural setting to another. Punch correctly indicates a number of scenarios worldwide where some conformity to the pattern suggested by him was evident, including, in the context with which we are centrally concerned - that of the British police - the 'punishment-centred' response of Sir Robert Mark, Commissioner of the Metropolitan police from 1972-77, to the corruption charges made against the force's Criminal Investigation Department.⁽⁵¹⁾ However, the support for his wider thesis which he draws from this set of responses, including the flagship Operation Countryman initiative, must be qualified if we note a quite different broad trend in managerial philosophy which has emerged in its wake, namely the new "managerialism"⁽⁵²⁾ referred to by Holdaway - an emerging congeries of attitudes and practices which, far from being draconian in image and intention, has instead provided some encouragement towards participation in policy-making

and operational initiatives amongst the rank and-file, through initiatives such as Policing by Objectives and reforms in management training. (53)

Accordingly, the plausibility of the gap thesis, and of the various arguments which would criticise or modify it, are not immune from wider historical and environmental contingencies. This conclusion should not, however, be read as excluding any attempt to generate hypotheses couched at a general level, but serves merely as a cautionary note. For example, Punch's own work, despite the reservations expressed above, remains highly suggestive outwith its particular cultural setting. Further, in so far as environmental trends, though not universal, may be causally linked to a particular social, political and legal system, we may anticipate broad similarities in the balance of internal and external organizational pressures as between the various forces operating within that system. Indeed, the relevance of the excavations in two particular forces which provide the empirical focus of our study *depends* upon the plausibility of this assumption, for it is only thus that it is possible to draw general inferences as to the nature of internal relations in British forces from a more specific focus. In sum, the message to be drawn from the above discussion is that the pattern of cultural relations, and indeed the form of the entire network of co-ordination and control within police organisations, is partially explicable in terms of its emergence from a historically and situationally specific conjuncture of events, and that close

attention should be paid to this conjuncture, and to the generality of its application, in the process of generating data, formulating arguments on the basis of this data, and drawing conclusions of wider relevance on the basis of these arguments. The more particular significance of this point within the context of the present study will be explored in the concluding section of this chapter.

The second notable feature of the various arguments challenging a wholesale version of the gap thesis is that they are framed in either an unspecific or a negative mode. They indicate factors which, at the level of principle, derogate from the gap thesis, but do not ascribe determinate weight or detailed significance to these. They posit tendential movements within police organisations which map the shifting dimensions of the cultural gap, but apart from a general recognition of the importance of patterns of reciprocal influence between the police organisation and its environment, they do not precisely specify the causal mechanisms which underpin these dynamics. They counsel caution in generating general hypotheses and in utilizing certain forms of data, yet do not yet suggest concrete methods whereby a framework of inquiry may be constructed which takes cognizance of these problems. In order to begin to meet these difficulties more information and additional hypotheses in respect of patterns of belief and action in police organisations are required. In the first place, the nature of those cultural patterns which cut across or supplement the basic distinction between senior and junior ranks requires to be

explored, in order to discover whether these new threads can be woven into the fabric of analysis already provided so as to procure a more sophisticated and more powerful framework of explanation of the nature and conditions of differentiation within the hierarchical structure of police organisation. It is to this task that we now turn.

(ii) Alternative cultural alignments

As suggested earlier, as we move away from a crude version of the gap thesis, we find that structural factors are likely to be accorded a more significant role within explanations of organisational action. Nevertheless, this is only a general tendency, and when we address ourselves to the forms of cultural diversity within the police organisation which have been identified within the literature other than the basic, and contested, distinction between senior management and the rank and file, the culture/structure distinction, now deployed in a more subtle manner, remains a useful way of organizing discussion of these findings. In the first place, at the culturalist extreme of the continuum, there is an approach which attempts to explain cultural differences within the organization in terms of cultural differences within the wider society, and in particular, in terms of the demographic variables which underpin these more broadly based distinctions. Secondly, there is an approach which, while more aware of the structural pressures bearing upon policework, is primarily concerned with how

these pressures are thrown into the melting-pot and 're-worked' within the occupational culture, thus producing a range of stylistic responses. Thirdly, there is an approach which while still concerned with cultural diversity, attempts to explain this diversity in terms of a prior framework of structural difference.

If we turn to the first of these perspectives, the two demographic characteristics which have been posited as significant indicators of cultural difference within the police organisation are race and gender. However, although there exists evidence which points to race and gender-based differences in attitudes, and recent research in this field within British forces has removed the need for inordinate reliance upon extrapolation from American findings,⁽⁵⁴⁾ this line of argument would appear to be of limited utility for our purposes.

To begin with, the major thrust of police research in the area of race and gender-based distinctions has been concerned with the question of the existence and extent of a *general* orientation towards work within the police organisation which involves attitudinal or practical discrimination against members of the public on either of these grounds.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Where race-based and gender-based *differences* amongst police officers have been addressed, the concerns and findings of researchers have focused more on tensions in mutual attitudes attendant upon these cleavages, and less with concrete differences in behaviour towards significant external

audiences, including those exhibiting the same key demographic characteristics. ⁽⁵⁶⁾ Accordingly, while a cultural gap in these terms may have been discerned, the claims as to the divergence in practice which might accompany this are notably less far-reaching than in respect of other internal divisions which have been postulated, including the basic management/workforce opposition itself. And even where traces of a relatively significant, externally-directed differentiating trend have been indicated, namely in respect of the greater concentration by woman on service aspects of the police function and a more ambivalent attitude towards aggressive tactics in dealing with flashpoint public order situations, which reflects a degree of distancing from the machismo imagery of their male colleagues, the strength of this line of argument is qualified by the fact that by no means all policewomen endorse this alternative perspective. Some choose instead to adapt by assimilating and endorsing the dominant male ethos, becoming, in Ehrlich-Martin's terms, POLICEwomen rather than policeWOMEN. ⁽⁵⁷⁾ And heavily underlining the marginal relevance of this and other possible race and gender-based differences in attitudes to policework, and the corresponding differences in mutual perspective, is the continuing numerical predominance of male caucasians within British police forces. ⁽⁵⁸⁾ Moreover, proportional underrepresentation of women and ethnic minorities increases as one ascends the police hierarchy, and so the possibility of attitudes specific to these groups infiltrating cultural patterns within managerial ranks is even more slender. ⁽⁵⁹⁾

Thus, as independent influences upon culture, these demographic variables are of limited significance. They are of some relevance to our project in as much as they indicate a further, albeit not strongly defined, element of heterogeneity within the culture of the operational ranks, and thus provide an additional nail in the coffin of a crudely dichotomous version of the gap thesis. However, if the modest impact of these differences within junior ranks is considered alongside the even more peripheral status of gender and race-based differences within the dominant pattern of occupational perspectives of senior ranks, then the possibility of significant additional sources of inter-rank consensus or dissensus emerging from alternative alignments and oppositions organized along these lines is excluded. In short, these findings have profound implications neither for divergence nor for convergence between the respective constituencies of senior and junior ranks.

Furthermore, even if we look beyond their particular relevance to our understanding of the gap thesis, and attempt to assess the significance of their impact upon patterns of policing more generally, the independent explanatory value of the demographic variables remains in doubt. Although such tendencies may be accentuated within certain contexts of police organizational practice, it seems that the strains of sexism and racism within the male caucasian closely shadow prevalent patterns of discrimination within wider society. Now, it may be that the discrete causal significance of demographical variables is relatively weak *just because they are external in nature, and by definition do not form*

part of the assemblage of structural pressures which are intrinsic to everyday policework. Thus perhaps, as Reiner suggests, for the most part "the culture of the police [including aspects of cultural variation] depends not on individual attributes", which may be traced to the influence of wider socialization processes on the biographies of individual police officers, "but elements in the police function itself",⁽⁶¹⁾ and the immediate structural influences which define this function.

If this is the case, then, as suggested, our inquiry may proceed along one of two lines. In the first of these, structural factors - the material influence of environmental pressures, legal rules and organizational arrangements - broadly shape the demands, opportunities and dilemmas of occupational practice. They provide a general set of practical difficulties and imperatives from which the police role emerges as "a situational and interpretive predicament in its own right",⁽⁶²⁾ with different officers finding different solutions to this predicament. Yet one potentially serious difficulty in testing the 'operational styles' hypothesis lies in the fact that, unlike the demographic variables, criteria of difference which are couched in terms of the creative interpretive schemes and consequent work orientations of organisational actors cannot simply be located in pre-given categories. Instead empirically grounded taxonomies must be constructed, and the cognitively open aspect of this enterprise would appear to render it vulnerable to problems of internal consistency, there being no

guarantee that concepts and categories wrought within one field of research be reproduced or closely translated within another field.

Nevertheless, despite these potential pitfalls, Reiner has argued in an impressively comprehensive synthetic overview of research on diverse trends within the occupational culture of lower ranks that there is a "remarkable...degree of congruence" (63) between the separately constituted categorical schemes of researchers in Canada, the United States and Britain. He contends that, while the labels by which the relevant police types are identified may vary, this is a reflection of differences of emphasis in the focal concerns of the various studies and the conflicting normative preferences of their various authors. (64) Beneath this surface discordance, there is an undercurrent of agreement that four basic categories of police officer may be identified, namely "an alienated cynic, a managerial professional, a peace-keeper and a law-enforcer" (65). Further, the aetiology of each type is in all cases firmly grounded in the structural pressures and immediate practical exigencies of policework and, if the studies are considered cumulatively, an impressive panoply of factors underscoring the social identities of our four typical officers is revealed.

The alienated cynic is a cautious "uniform carrier" (66), disillusioned by the danger and uncertainty of his craft, unable to sustain a coherent and self-fulfilling work ethic in the face of the moral vicissitudes of daily operational life, and, in consequence,

prone to avoid difficult decisions and perilous tasks. The managerial professional is ambitious and upwardly-mobile, sensitive not only to commonly articulated operational dilemmas but also to the perspectives of senior officer and to their more holistic view of policing:⁽⁶⁷⁾ This combination of career consciousness and a somewhat qualified commitment to the perspectives of immediate colleagues to some extent marginalize such officers from the mainstream, placing them in the outside lane where their progress may be quicker but their solidarity is conspicuously open to doubt. The peace-keeper is the archetypal craftsman, the 'bobby' of conventional mythology who negotiates the ambiguities and difficulties of the operational role with prudent common-sense, pursuing objectives which are open to peer criticism neither as unduly idealistic nor as unduly cynical, and to that extent commanding general collegiate respect.⁽⁶⁸⁾ Finally, the law-enforcer is a "new centurion"⁽⁶⁹⁾ with a self-confident sense of mission, attracted to spheres of operational work such as the detective branch and fast action response units where the moral terrain seems more clearly demarcated and crime-fighting imperatives are highly profiled: whereas the peace-keeper represents that fabric of mainstream operational culture which addresses uncertainty and variety with a correspondingly flexible and circumspect set of responses, the law-enforcer tends to adopt a contrasting but equally common working technique in the face of a chaotic world, namely the imposition of a singular framework of ordered solutions.

-

This perspective further illuminates our understanding of the shortcomings of the gap thesis by providing a more fundamental method for distinguishing different strains within the occupational culture of the lower ranks, and thus exposing additional inadequacies in the notion of cultural cohesion at the 'sharp end' of police work. However, it is arguable that the 'operational styles' approach harbours an even greater potential for our purposes. As these differences are deeply inscribed in the structural tensions of policework, it is possible that they may have a more far-reaching legacy and so may account for variations in the occupational culture of higher ranks also. Practically informed stylistic similarities and differences may thus interweave with hierarchically informed criteria of difference in a manner which significantly qualifies the terms of the latter divide. If, as Hughes says, "career is ...a sort of running adjustment between a man and the various facts of life and of his professional world"⁽⁷⁰⁾, what happens to the careers of our four typical officers if and when they gain rank, and some of the more salient facts change? Is there nevertheless sufficient continuity of structural pressures and a sufficient depth of ideational commitment for similarly ordered variations to persist, and can we thus identify a set of entrenched stylistic referents which may forge a resilient bond across ranks?

Unfortunately, in line with the general neglect of detailed study of managerial ranks, the existing literature has provided very little evidence bearing upon this question. The one significant

exception is Reiner's own recent analysis of the occupational perspectives of the 43 Chief Constables in England and Wales.⁽⁷¹⁾ He identifies a number of common themes in their role perceptions. In particular, he notes a general commitment to a broad-based conception of the modern police function which emphasizes responsiveness to community needs and the centrality of a service orientation, so eschewing the idea of crime-fighting as the 'one best way' of implementing the police mandate. In turn, this wider perspective appears to be premised upon an acceptance that the ever-escalating problem of crime can never be solved, or even significantly eroded in a social context marked by the breakdown of the conventional family unit, the decline of the school as a source of social education, the temptations, opportunities and jealousies of mass consumerism, the general dissipation of absolute moral standards, and the divisions and tensions of ethnic pluralism. In combination, these factors point to a more modest and flexible conception of the proper aspirations and techniques of good policing.⁽⁷²⁾ Beyond this common baseline, however, he identifies a number of variations in the detailed working philosophies of the chiefs. In line with the approach which he documents and exemplifies at the operational level, he accounts for these differences both in terms of cultural factors - the combination of the dominant "zeitgeist of chief constabulary culture"⁽⁷³⁾ and the individuating "pedigree"⁽⁷⁴⁾ of particular chiefs, and in terms of structural factors - the particular problems to which chief constables are responding at any given time and the more institutionalized features of the local policing environment, including ecological factors,

class and ethnic mix and the balance of political power within the area.⁽⁷⁵⁾ Further reflecting his analysis of operational culture, he identifies four basic "breeds", namely the "baron", the "bobby", the "boss" and the "bureaucrat".⁽⁷⁶⁾

The baron is the archetypal rural chief constable, confident in a traditional "paternalistic"⁽⁷⁷⁾ structure of control as the most efficacious method of managing both his force and the community, which he sees as relatively free of the social cleavages which characterize more urban environments. The bobby is also an exponent of traditional, community policing methods, although within the somewhat more politically and socially abrasive environment of a small provincial city or a mixed urban/rural force.⁽⁷⁸⁾ His resentment at the increasing encroachment of political and legal factors upon his operational autonomy is matched by that of the boss, who is the quintessential chief of a large metropolitan force. He is a different type of traditionalist, his perception of the scale of crime and disorder in his area making him sceptical of the adequacy of the essentially harmonious model of the social contract subscribed to by his colleagues in smaller forces. Instead, he favours the more recent tradition of "fire brigade"⁽⁷⁹⁾ policing as a logistical necessity in an environment where "[e]ven the best policing amounts only to a Canute-like holding operation".⁽⁸⁰⁾ Finally, the bureaucrat fits the image of a chief favoured by the new conventional wisdom in the Home Office. 'Professionalism' is his bye-word. He eschews the traditional conservative models of policing, whether the guiding metaphor is 'oiling the wheels of

society', as with the baron and the bobby, or 'keeping the lid on' as with the boss. Instead, usually equipped with impressive academic qualifications, he favours a more proactive model - a planned interventionism requiring "surgical skills"^(e1), with the police hierarchy as the nodal influence within a new network of community control.

In expounding these categories, Reiner makes little attempt to make explicit connections between them and the various operational types. Nevertheless, a number of similarities may be observed. Both the baron and the bobby display some resemblance to the peace-keeper.^(e2) With his apocalyptic vision, the boss bears comparison with the law-enforcer, while the bureaucrat is an obvious analogue for the managerial professional. Unsurprisingly, only the alienated cynic provides a role model whose core attributes are not also found at chief constable rank.

Two possible objections may be sounded against any attempt to draw inferences from this study which are of general relevance to our present argument. In the first place, cross-rank stylistic similarities do not guarantee a strong foundation of cultural harmony. While officers of different ranks may evince general similarities of style and outlook, they may favour different approaches and have different mutual perspectives in the area of intra-organisational relations. For example, while he may recognize and applaud the overlap between his own traditional policing world-view and that of the baron or the bobby who may head his force, the

peace-keeper within the operational ranks may be less enthusiastic over his chief's equally traditional approach to internal discipline. He may view a regime which lays emphasis on strict hierarchical control as inimical to his need for operational discretion. Nevertheless, while such tensions must be acknowledged, and will be more fully explored in later chapters, common commitment to certain general norms and techniques remains an important facilitator, if not a guarantor of intra-organisational harmony.

A second objection concerns the limited basis of Reiner's study, and in particular, its exclusive concentration on the exalted rank of chief constable. It may be argued that the rank of chief is *sui generis*, and that our understanding of cultural variation at this rarified level does not permit us to draw any conclusions as to stylistic patterns at more modest managerial ranks, which, after all, provide a much more fertile and significant source of relations and transactions between the 'two cultures'. Against this, however, it may be urged that *just because* the rank of chief is so far divorced from the operational ranks, it provides the limiting test of cultural unity. If similarities can be traced across such a chasm, they may be more likely to exist within the more intimate setting of divisional organisation. At the very least then, the findings that we have abstracted from Reiner's work are highly suggestive in nature, further exploration of creative cultural diversity at management ranks holding out the possibility that the gap thesis be significantly qualified by evidence of cross-rank stylistic unity. More generally, as will be argued in the

concluding section of this chapter, the taxonomical form through which the 'operational styles' approach proceeds provides a useful model for our own research design.

As indicated earlier, the final method of exploring cultural alignments and differences in the police organisation other than those which are invoked in aid of the gap thesis, is concerned to explain varieties of occupational perspective and role performance more directly in terms of variations in the structural forces operating upon organisational actors. (83) The crudest version of this approach has often been described as the "machine model." (84) From this perspective, culture is viewed as entirely epiphenomenal. The orientations and behaviour of organizational actors, it is assumed, may simply be 'read off' from the imperatives contained in legal rules or the formal organization. (85) The sociological naivety of this most myopic form of structural explanation renders it useless for our purposes. However, not all attempts to explain cultural differences in terms of structural differences blithely assume simple unilinear causal relationships between discrete variables from the two domains. Others have developed more sophisticated frameworks, which, while continuing to assert the fundamental explanatory significance of structural difference, have conceptualized structural difference in a more complex and comprehensive manner, in terms of the interrelationship of a variety of structural factors. They have also remained mindful of the active, mediating influence of the cultural dimension - the particular symbolic template developed by different actors - in

making sense of these different constellations of structural forces
- or structural sets.

A significant point of departure for this type of analysis has been the basic functional division of labour specified by the formal organisational design. A number of writers have indicated differences in general occupational perspective arising from differences in job specification and role pressures as between uniform and criminal investigation branches of the force, and also between different units within the uniform branch. In the British context, the most systematic and comprehensive attempt to account for these differences in structural terms is to be found in the work of Jefferson and Grimshaw.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Concentrating in particular upon the tripartite distinction between C.I.D., Unit Beat and Resident Beat, they endeavour to demonstrate how three major 'structures'⁽⁸⁷⁾ underpinning policework - legal factors, the specific nature of the work and its organisation, and community or democratic influences - interrelate so as to determine work practices and orientations within each of these functional units in different ways. So, for example, its crime-orientated nature, the centrality of legal processes and institutions in dealing with particular cases at various stages, and the relative impotence of the external audiences typically encountered, contribute to defining C.I.D. work such that the legal mandate is placed centre-stage.⁽⁸⁸⁾ The centrality of the reactive call system - reported incidents requiring to be sifted and allocated in accordance with informally recognized criteria of relevance - ensures that Unit Beat officers are also heavily

influenced by law enforcement imperatives, although the low visibility of the work, greater variety of incident encountered, and the more frequent reliance upon substantive legal measures which are themselves more permissive in nature (e.g. public order offences) entails that there is great scope for creative interpretation and action within the interstices of their formally defined role.⁽⁸⁹⁾ As they have both a more proactive orientation and an official work remit which extends well beyond crime matters, general legal and organisational control systems and directive criteria are not well adapted to the circumstances of Residential Beat Officers, and they may instead be more amenable to external community interests, particularly since the nature of their task brings them more frequently into contact with relatively organised, articulate and influential external constituencies.⁽⁹⁰⁾

A further, and perhaps even more vivid example of how an initial concern with functional division may be transcended in the course of structural analysis - in this case with particular reference to community and work variables - may be found in the recent work of Hobbs.⁽⁹¹⁾ In his study of detective work in the East End of London, he argues that the typically "entrepreneurial" style of the C.I.D. officer is symbiotically matched to the ambient culture of the district - the "electric wheeler-dealer atmosphere"⁽⁹²⁾ which pervades working-class life in the market-places and in the pubs." The 'trade-offs' and 'fit-ups' [which] are part of the CID game, ...played within a commercial framework"⁽⁹³⁾, the "appropriation of East End vocabularies"⁽⁹⁴⁾ and the

presentation of work transactions "as reciprocal arrangements founded upon mutually profitable legitimate business relationships, the currency of which is information",⁽⁹⁵⁾ together provide an operational style which "amounts to a caricature of East End culture",⁽⁹⁶⁾ and which provides the detective with a sense of moral identity and a powerful arsenal of strategic resources:

"The sharp entrepreneurship of the East-Enders provides, when appropriated and reworked by the detective a potent occupational front that distances him from the restraints of the administratively bound uniform branch. The adoption of such a front also equips the detective with a stylistic format which neatly dovetails with the individualistic entrepreneurship demanded by the formal detective task as well as with the pervading culture that he encounters in the enacted environment of detective work. The control aspect of symbiosis is manifested in the status afforded to the detective by East-Enders, and the implication of the detective's appropriation and overt utility of East End style is that he is fully conversant with the origins and implications of the style's instrumentality."⁽⁹⁷⁾

Accordingly, for Hobbs, while he continues to focus on the uniform/CID division, what is distinctive about detective culture depends as much on environmental contingencies as it does upon the formal demands of CID work: The boundary which he specifies marks off the cultural identity of the London CID officer just as clearly from that of the *non-London* CID officer as from that of the London *uniform* officer.

How does this form of analysis, with its structurally informed view of differences in organisational perspective other than a simple horizontal divide, affect our understanding of the gap thesis

and its limitations? To begin with, although the functional division of labour provides an orienting framework, the logic of the approach pursued by these writers suggests that this is neither the only nor necessarily the most salient axis of differentiation from a structural perspective. Instead, a much more comprehensive range of distinguishing factors is exposed and explored. Thus, if we return to the more elaborate analytical framework of Jefferson and Grimshaw, each of the three major structural forces which they postulate is multi-layered in itself, and in combination they provide a rich mine of possible explanations of differences in work orientations which cut across the major axis of the gap thesis.

This commitment to the exposure of intra-organisational variety on a number of levels is reinforced when we consider a second major attribute of this type of structural analysis. Thus, for Jefferson and Grimshaw, although their preference for the language of 'structures' and 'structuralism' (the full implications of which will be brought out in the next subsection) leads them to use 'structure' as a generic label for each of the three main sets of influence on action within the police organisation, this does not cause them to dismiss the possibility of cultural factors retaining some independent explanatory value as mediators and filters of these structural pressures, and, in particular, as additional sources of *difference* in perspective and practice. At the conceptual level, this is achieved by sub-dividing the work structure into two distinct sets of determinants of police behaviour, one of which, "the occupational dimension",⁽³⁸⁾ refers to the very idea of the

semi-autonomous status of colleague norms, interpretative schemes and practices which is favoured by 'the operational styles' school. At the empirical level, too, Jefferson and Grimshaw follow through this commitment, their division of Resident Beat Officers into 'public relations', 'educator', 'spy' and 'patrol' types ⁽³⁹⁾ echoing the taxonomical approach discussed above.

Accordingly, the theorization of organisational variety and divergence in the work of Jefferson and Grimshaw, and indeed also in the work of Hobbs, is not properly viewed as an alternative to the operational styles approach, but rather as a complementary perspective. Within the parameters set by different structural pressures in different legal, organisational and environmental contexts, there is still scope for the construction of different cultural solutions. Thus, we are drawn towards a more expansive sense of cultural alignment and difference, and an even richer matrix of intra-organisational convergences and divergences than that envisaged above.

Nevertheless, and this is the third sense in which their approach illuminates our understanding of the gap thesis, Jefferson and Grimshaw's work does not suggest that vertically (functionally) defined and structurally explicated differences entirely negate the horizontal axis of difference favoured by exponents of the gap thesis. Indeed, as is evident even from the brief account of their work provided above, the distinct ways in which structural pressures are accommodated in various departments, rather than

suggesting a strong cultural homology within each department, by indicating the importance of legal and organizational control methodologies, point instead to significant intra-departmental tensions and strategic oppositions. Thus, drawing upon their own categories and formulations, one aspect of the work structure - the occupational dimension already referred to, exists in significant tension with the other aspect - the "organizational" dimension of "rules, policies, approved procedures, command and control".⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

In summary therefore, the structural approach, building upon the operational styles approach, provides us with additional insights into the inadequacies of the gap thesis, without discounting the value of the latter's basic hypothesis. But in the very comprehensiveness of the framework of explanation provided lies a potential disadvantage. Such a wide range of variables is now invoked to make sense of patterns of convergence and divergence within the police organisation, that it becomes difficult to locate the key sources and sites of harmony and disharmony, and thus to assess the full implications and potential of different frameworks of control and policy implementation. It may become harder to see the forest for the trees, and thus to cut a clear through-path. However, Jefferson and Grimshaw are themselves conversant with this danger, and suggest an additional explanatory dimension as a means of overcoming it. In order to focus upon this proposed solution, and to assess its value in qualifying or transcending the gap thesis, we must move to a higher level of abstraction and view their work not just as an exercise in *structural* analysis - examining the

significance of the non-ideational pressures and constraints bearing upon policework - but also as an approach deploying the theoretical apparatus of *structuralism*

(3) The primacy of structure.

So far, consistent with its application in the policing literature, we have used the notion of 'structure' and its cognates in a general sense, to refer to the non-ideational variables which help to explain social action. As suggested however, Jefferson and Grimshaw have sought to underwrite this approach by declaring their allegiance to a more fundamental set of theoretical imperatives within a tradition of thought known as structuralism.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Now structuralism itself is a somewhat loose label which has been applied to enterprises as diverse as Saussure's linguistics, Levi-Strauss's anthropology and the revisionist Marxism of Althusser.⁽¹⁰²⁾ Accordingly, its defining themes can only be identified in the broadest of terms. These are generally understood to include, *inter alia*, the decentring of the human subject, a stress upon the importance of linguistic analysis within social theory and the primacy of signifiers over what is signified, and an emphasis upon the relational nature of totalities.⁽¹⁰³⁾ Each of these themes is drawn upon by Jefferson and Grimshaw to some extent, but it is their emphasis upon the overarching idea of the relational nature of totalities which provides the beacon that guides their analysis through the cluttered theoretical landscape

depicted above. (104)

What is meant by the relational nature of totalities, and what is its precise significance for Jefferson and Grimshaw's enterprise? To some extent the answer to this question is presaged in the authors' insistence on the importance of looking at *relations between* the three major structural elements as a means of comprehending the significance of the (structural) whole. (105) In and of itself, however, this analysis is insufficient from the viewpoint of structuralism. Without further elaboration, the idea of the 'totality' threatens to become a protean notion, a dependent variable which is susceptible to the evershifting combination of its component parts and of no explanatory significance in its own right. It is thus that the possibility of an unmanageably fertile theoretical framework, incapable of making "unified sense" (106) of police organisational endeavour, is thrown into stark perspective. What is required in order to overcome this danger - the missing link in the structuralist equation - is a more stable and continuous sense of the totality, treated not merely as *explanandum* but also as *explanans*. And what provides this missing link for Jefferson and Grimshaw as for other exponents of structuralism is the idea of the relationships between the structural components themselves being ordered or patterned, rather than unfolding in an infinite sequence of arbitrary combinations.

But what can provide this unifying pattern in the context of policing? In Jefferson and Grimshaw's view it is the legal structure which performs this role.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Thus, for them, law has a double significance. Not only is it one of the component structures of organized policework, but also, and more crucially, "the relationship between the structures is structured by law."⁽¹⁰⁸⁾ They offer a number of reasons for according such a predominant role to the law as "organizer"⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ - as the missing link which allows the analyst to "grasp the unity"⁽¹¹⁰⁾ of police organisational life. To begin with, they stress that the idea of the police officer as an officer of law is central both to public perceptions of the policing role and to police officers' self-conceptions.⁽¹¹¹⁾ Although others have noted significant differences of emphasis in the expectations and preferences of these two groups,⁽¹¹²⁾ they argue that, in general terms, law enforcement and crime detection functions are accorded top priority by audience and actors alike.⁽¹¹³⁾ Nor should this be surprising, given the pervasive manner in which legal phenomena impinge upon the working context of policing - including the rules of substantive criminal law and the rules of procedural law, as well as "the complex apparatus involved in the administration of justice, especially...the prosecutor and the courts."⁽¹¹⁴⁾ However, the foundational structuring role of law rests on more than mere perceptions, however firmly held and however closely tied to the objective conditions of policework. More fundamentally, and more simply, it rests upon the fact that, as a general system of authoritative rules, it is law which purports to carry out the

very function which is crucial to the definition and understanding of the idea of structural totality, namely the constitution and regulation of the relationship between the three component elements - the work structure, the democratic or environmental structure, and the narrower legal structure of individual rights, powers and obligations itself.⁽¹¹⁵⁾ This purported capability is most manifest in terms of the *overarching* system of police accountability and control.⁽¹¹⁶⁾ For their part, the democratic and work structures are recognized within this wider regulatory system through the overlapping responsibilities and powers vested in two major *democratic* elements - the Home Secretary and the local police authority - to regulate, monitor and provide resources for the police with a view to ensure that *policework* in general is carried out in an adequate and efficient manner. A further set of connections can be traced between the legal structure and the work structure. Thus, within the domain of the legal structure, conceived of in its narrower sense, all officers are individually responsible to the law in its procedural and substantive aspects, and in terms of the *overarching* system of accountability, all are also in their operational activities subject to the overall directive influence of the chief constable. Thus, in the manner in which they are interpellated through the wider legal apparatus, the so-called tripartite system of supervision, we can see how the three structures "converge and combine".⁽¹¹⁷⁾ Both democratic sources and internal managerial sources exert influence over work functions, and these various forces and mechanisms, which may themselves exist

in mutual tension, in turn interact with, and both constrain and are constrained by the more specific legal structure which provides the regulatory and enabling framework most immediately pertinent to operational police officers themselves.

Does the developed theoretical perspective of Jefferson and Grimshaw permit new insights of a general nature into the 'two cultures' debate? It is certainly the case that, in refining their own brand of structuralism, these writers adopt a more committed stance within the culture/structure debate. If, as was suggested, the identification of three broad structural variables as causally significant promised a theoretical framework sufficiently flexible to accommodate 'culture' as a significant explanatory variable in its own right (on account of the fact that the work structure itself may be broken down into structural and cultural components) the addition of a structuralist gloss and the elevation of law to the status of "determinant structure"^(11a) changes the tenor of the argument somewhat. Although, as is argued later, the legal structure is not irrelevant as a source of cultural elaboration, its primary significance for Jefferson and Grimshaw is conceived of in non-ideational terms, as a set of external constraints and enabling mechanisms. Thus, in according ultimate priority to the legal structure, they also accord ultimate explanatory status to the structural dimension of social life more generally, and relegate cultural factors to a minor role. And in so doing, although their thesis is by far the more sophisticated and compelling, they place

themselves at a point on the culture/structure continuum which is not far removed from that of the exponents of the machine model.

But, whereas for partisans of the mechanical approach, the irrelevance of the gap thesis flows inexorably from their basic, if unjustified, faith in the legal and/or organisational machine as a precise blueprint for concerted organisational action, leaving no room for uncertainty or internal conflict, the means by which a similarly trenchant critique might be mounted from the structuralist position is less obvious. Indeed, at first glance, it is unclear whether law, in its superordinate explanatory role, lends *any* systematic pattern to our understanding of organized policework, and thus whether it is actually capable of achieving the general theoretical objective expected of it by Jefferson and Grimshaw. Ironically, it might seem that the very attributes of law which make it such an attractive candidate for the role ascribed to it by the authors also undermines its capacity to fulfil this potential. It is the *positive* and *formally authoritative* nature of law - the fact that it is not restricted to the terms of any prior normative code and that the coercive potential of the state lies behind it - which suggests that it may possess both the versatility and effective power to be successfully harnessed to the task of imposing a comprehensive order upon policework. However, if understood sociologically, then, as the authors themselves appreciate, any given body of law will tend to lack the underlying *telos* which might provide this all-emcompassing design.⁽¹¹⁹⁾ In

its emergence, interpretation and implementation, law instead provides a series of contexts within which groups and individuals with different interests engage in struggle. "Living law"⁽¹²⁰⁾ does not present itself as an internally coherent *corpus*, but instead tends to embody a multitude of conflicting rationalities. It represents an always provisional structure of norms and practices, its lack of a singular vision and of a comprehensive regulatory format in respect of any particular sphere of social action manifesting itself in the form of gaps and ambiguities at key points. And from this alternative perspective, rather than as means to the end of establishing a fully co-ordinated framework of action within any such sphere, its positive and authoritative qualities actually contribute to struggle and conflict over the content and meaning of law, the former quality permitting a diverse range of considerations to be brought to bear at the stages of emergence and application and the latter quality ensuring that the stakes are set highly for all players.

As suggested, Jefferson and Grimshaw would themselves acknowledge these points, and so recognize "the significant diversity and complexity"⁽¹²¹⁾ of law, both in its own terms, as a "formal structure",⁽¹²²⁾ and in relation to the democratic and work structures. But rather than viewing this more variegated conception of law as an impediment to their theoretical enterprise, they instead attempt to turn it to their advantage by focusing on and expanding one of its key themes, namely the contrast between law as

a central authoritative source on the one hand and the uncertainty and incompleteness of its effects on the other. ⁽¹²³⁾ This focus is already present in their discussion of different departmental functions where, it may be recalled, a significant explanatory variable was seen to be the extent to which the law, as the touchstone of the police mandate, was capable of influencing different types of officer in their tasks and overall work profiles. However, when Jefferson and Grimshaw's work is viewed in the round, these may be seen as no more than specific applications of a single master thesis.

This master thesis concentrates upon the "permissive" nature of the law in relation to focal organisational concerns. ⁽¹²⁴⁾ The key to understanding the source and implications of this permissiveness lies in the doctrine of 'constabulary independence', the idea that in pursuing the crime-related aspects of the operational mandate, the primary responsibility of each individual police officer is to the law alone. ⁽¹²⁵⁾ It is argued that, in these very areas where the writ of this doctrine runs and where legal rules are supposedly most central to operational work, namely in relation to crime detection and law enforcement, these legal rules typically do not provide clear and compelling direction. In the first place, the framework of substantive criminal law and procedural law, given its often open-textured nature, frequently fail to offer the operational officer precise instructions in particular situations where crime is anticipated or suspected, thus allowing that officer considerable

discretion.⁽¹²⁶⁾ More importantly still, this same framework offers no guidance at the wider level of operational policy. The legal framework is oriented towards policing as an individual rather than a collective endeavour, and thus can provide no instruction on the crucial question of how crime-related operational work should be collectively orchestrated and what general priorities should be established.⁽¹²⁷⁾ Furthermore, just because the law is deemed to be the supreme authoritative source of instruction for police officers in the key areas of operational policy, the idea of constabulary independence serves to deny such a role at a higher level to any other constituency, or indeed to law itself in providing an authoritative framework for such a constituency.⁽¹²⁸⁾ That is, the idea of constabulary independence, as one of the very themes which contributes to the notion of law as the fundamental authoritative source of the policing enterprise, not only fails to provide definitive answers to many crucial operational questions, but also places a protective canopy over this operational domain, so resisting the encroachments of other putative directive influences.

Thus, the public or democratic constituency is reduced to a "highly shadowy presence".⁽¹²⁹⁾ In legal terms, the main source of public influence is the police authority, but even it is permitted no direct involvement in policy-making in relation to mainstream operational matters. At the more informal level, the unpredictable daily flow of police/public encounters allows little opportunity for a public input which is informed, collective and authoritative. In

the second place, and even more crucially for our present purposes, despite their possession both of a panoply of internal control mechanisms, and - through the office of Chief Constable - of the formal power of operational direction within the wider structure of legal accountability, it is claimed that members of the organisational hierarchy do not exercise strong directive control over the law-related work of the constable either. Jefferson and Grimshaw develop and illustrate this point by differentiating between two types of policy issue which arose in their research force, drawing upon another general theme of structuralist thought to suggest that each has its own "characteristic discourse", and each harbours "different expectations of success in terms of influencing practice on the ground".⁽¹³⁰⁾

In the first place, there is the "administrative" policy issue whose defining discourse is "rational-scientific" in nature.⁽¹³¹⁾ Within this domain lie those tasks in relation to which "a rational-technical specification of means and ends"⁽¹³²⁾ is possible. As in the example considered by Jefferson and Grimshaw - the replacement of traffic cars on a force-wide basis⁽¹³³⁾ - the construction and application of optimal policy in such an area can be measured against identifiable criteria. The policy context is one where reasonable predictions are possible, thus allowing senior officers to lay detailed plans in advance and to monitor, and thus control, the implementation of these plans. The alternative type of policy issue identified by the authors is "operational" in nature, and its

characteristic discourse is "occupational common sense".⁽¹³⁴⁾ This is precisely the area where the legal duty of each individual constable is supposedly paramount. By contrast with administrative matters, operational matters tend to have an unpredictable flavour. The "superordinate responsibility"⁽¹³⁵⁾ of each constable to enforce the law in the various specific contexts in which it has a bearing upon his operational conduct creates a domain of action marked by diversity and discretion, and accordingly, this domain cannot readily be subsumed under a coherent general policy framework. A "policy vacuum"⁽¹³⁶⁾ tends to emerge and, as in the example cited by the authors of a putative divisional plan for a permanent and precise allocation of foot patrol officers in particular parts of the division, attempts at the detailed articulation of new operational priorities - in this case in the form of a new deployment policy - tend to run aground against the rock of "operational significance".⁽¹³⁷⁾ The open-ended nature of both the ends and means specified in the legal mandate of each individual officer entails that deference has traditionally been accorded to a pragmatic, craft-based common sense as the final "court of appeal"⁽¹³⁸⁾ for all participants in the policy process.

The dominant status of operational discourse is further underlined when it is considered that the two policy domains - operational and administrative - cannot be hermetically sealed off. In the authors' terminology, many matters present themselves as "mixed"⁽¹³⁹⁾ issues, where the two types of approach exist in

competition with one another. Thus, the issue of controlling petrol consumption raises questions of managerial efficiency and cost-effectiveness on the one hand, but threatens to impinge upon operational prerogatives on the other.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾ Similarly, in the example they provide of the emergence, or rather the non-emergence of policy in relation to the policing needs of racial minorities, the authors demonstrate the tension between management initiatives in the general area of 'community policing', in particular the development of community relations departments with Resident Beat Officers as their operational arm, and the more focused question of whether there should be formulated an operational policy on racially motivated attacks.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ In both cases, they argue, the ethos of operational autonomy in their research force was sufficiently powerful to prevent the application of precise administrative control techniques on the ground.⁽¹⁴²⁾ The overriding commitment to operational common sense ensured that general policies and their accompanying rational-scientific control methods were either excluded from the agenda altogether or modified in their substance and effects. Accordingly, the potency of the theme of constabulary independence tended to be decisive not only in these matters which fell squarely within the operational domain, but also as regards a large class of hybrid issues, where there was overlap between the operational and administrative domains and their respective languages and logics.

Thus, albeit by a somewhat labyrinthine route, Jefferson and Grimshaw eventually attain a position from which, joined by various others,⁽¹⁴³⁾ they are prepared to launch a direct attack on the gap thesis and its culturalist overtones. The gist of their argument, as we have already observed, is not so much that a binary pattern within police culture cannot be observed - indeed their identification of distinctive administrative and operational discourses is further testimony to that - but rather that it is of limited explanatory value, or, to use the words of an earlier commentator, that it is symptomatic of an undue fascination with "the icing sugar on the cake" rather than "the chemical processes which make the cake of policing possible at all".⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ Their structuralist perspective leads them to accord priority to the legal structure as the mechanism which ultimately determines the pattern of police action, and to postulate that the permissiveness of law in key areas creates a "space"⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ within which the occupational culture or cultures necessarily flourish unconstrained by managerialist imperatives. In other words, the two cultures thesis is marginalized in key areas, simply because there is absent an underlying structural grid which would lend meaning and significance to the idea of cultural division. The law, by championing operational autonomy in crime detection and law enforcement work and failing to provide a mechanism for the generation of substantive managerial policy in these same crucial areas, automatically resolves the issue of whose perspective

predominates within policing practice in favour of the operational ranks.

Further, just as it is a fallacy to concentrate on aspects of culture in diagnosing the state of the police organisation, so the structuralists argue that it is wrong to focus primarily on cultural factors as the prime movers of organisational change. Instead, it is contended, rather than a merely "assertive prioritization of the cop culture"⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ as the focus for reform, which is the unconvincing line adopted by even the most reflective exponents of the culturalist approach such as Reiner, attention should be channelled towards the "argued alternative",⁽¹⁴⁷⁾ which lies in analysis of the overarching legal structure. It is the discretionary régime permitted by this legal structure which renders problematic the question of top-down control within the police organisation, quite irrespective of cultural similarities or differences between upper and lower echelons. Accordingly, it is this discretion which must be curtailed if the planned and predictable implementation of change is to be a feasible option. Legal, structural change is the *sine qua non* of organisational change, and so must be accorded first priority in any effective process of reform.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

(d) False priorities.

The development of a "structural lens"⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ promises a deeper perspective on questions concerning the nature of organised police

work. Moving beyond the microscopic perspective favoured by exponents of the culturalist approach, it builds on their various analyses and produces a theoretical framework which, while cognisant of the complex patterns of sub-cultural allegiance, suggests an underlying causal mechanism which provides a more basic explanation of intra-organisational variety. In claiming that the legal structure provides the most significant mechanism for organisational co-ordination and control, but is nevertheless presently inadequate to this general regulatory task, the structuralist view accordingly insists that the key to resolving these problems of co-ordination and control and ensuring that the policy process is not frustrated at the point of implementation lies in the overhaul of this same legal structure.

But just how compelling is the picture painted by the structuralists? They are undoubtedly correct in focusing upon the legal structure - in all its complexity - as a significant explanatory variable, and one which must be constantly borne in mind when investigating the nature and significance of various strains of similarity and difference in work orientations. Nevertheless, it is contended that these insights can be accommodated without insisting upon the idea of the legal structure as the ultimate determinant and, indeed, that this insistence tends to distort their focus and divert attention away from crucial patterns and movements within organisational life. More specifically, their defence of a

hierarchical framework of explanation, with law at the apex of their theoretical pyramid, leads them to court two types of error.

In the first place, it may be argued that they risk underestimating the capacity of the organisational hierarchy to impose their definition of legitimate practice upon operational subordinates, or to negotiate its acceptance by them. In other words, they may understate the relative power of the 'organisational' aspect of the work structure to influence the overall pattern of policework as against that of the legal structure. This is not, however, to suggest that the potential of the internal hierarchical system of control is by any means ignored. In their analysis, Jefferson and Grimshaw consider various devices inherent in the command structure, such as supervision, discipline and training.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ They also consider the various forms of influence which flow from this network of controls, such as advice, commands, regular deployment patterns and general policy statements.⁽¹⁵¹⁾ Furthermore, as regards the most potent form of influence - policy - they undertake an analysis of management in action which is unrivalled in its detail. A painstaking conceptual analysis of the various stages of the process of policy consideration is utilized as a framework within which to engage in close examination of management meetings and policy files regarding the generation and operational fate of particular policies, including those referred to in the previous sub-section.⁽¹⁵²⁾ Nevertheless, and indeed by reference to this very empirical

examination, the authors conclude (as noted above) that in the central area of law enforcement, managerial influences are essentially subordinated to the legal structure, and to the operational discretion which it legitimates.

The authors, therefore, cannot be criticized for failure to test their premisses empirically. However, they are vulnerable to the charge of elevating an empirically-based, and merely contingent conclusion - a conclusion, moreover, which may be contested even on its own terms - to the status of a categorical proposition. While it is certainly the case that the framework of internal organisational control exists in some tension with the doctrine of constabulary independence, there is no reason why this tension should necessarily be resolved in favour of the latter. Indeed, in their detailed examination of the progress of the various 'operational' or 'mixed' policy issues referred to earlier - deployment of foot patrols, petrol consumption and racial attacks - Jefferson and Grimshaw set as much store by the wider *symbolic* resonance of, and deference towards the notion of operational autonomy as to the core regulatory message contained in the idea of constabulary independence in accounting for the ascendancy of operational common sense over rational-scientific discourse.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Thus, it would seem that, while the legal structure creates a propensity towards operational autonomy in key areas, it cannot itself guarantee this, but instead depends upon an associated set of embedded cultural traits for this result. But once this is

conceded, and the law is no longer seen as compelling a particular pattern of relationships, but instead relies on the strength of ideational commitments (which it helps to generate and sustain) to nullify other countervailing structural influences, the balance of structural forces seems much more precariously poised and much more fluid than the authors are prepared to admit in their conclusions. In other words, the pattern of relationships between the various structures, now seen as crucially mediated by cultural forces, appears both less likely to be absolutely favourable to one overarching structure (law) in any particular instance, and more susceptible to change from time to time and from place to place.

Thus, again on Jefferson and Grimshaw's own evidence, in the foot-patrol deployment and petrol consumption examples at least, the wishes of the organisational hierarchy exerted *some* influence on operational practice.⁽¹⁵⁴⁾ That the authors, nevertheless, construe these as policy failures, is explicable only on account of their adoption of a rigid test of policy success as the unqualified implementation of "an authoritative statement signifying a settled practice".⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ Yet such an exacting standard, by seeming to equate the absence of unqualified success with unqualified failure and so neglecting the possibility of *degrees of success*, is inappropriate to the inquiry Jefferson and Grimshaw are engaged in. The entire range of 'balanced' resolutions involving some form of compromise, recognition of which would require modification of their general thesis, is excluded by definitional fiat.

-

More broadly, as regards general trends in different settings and different periods, the recent growth of Policing by Objectives and similar rational-scientific techniques is powerful testimony to the fact that law enforcement practice need not unfold in a policy vacuum, nor even within a policy framework which conforms entirely to the imperatives of operational common-sense. ⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Indeed, one well-publicized innovation of the Metropolitan Police within this genre has been a specification of a set of crime-fighting priorities which has included racially motivated attacks, ⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ one of the very issues which Jefferson and Grimshaw observed as precluding the generation and implementation of top-down policy. Now, it is not claimed that this and other such initiatives have been an unqualified success, and this is due in part to the continuing potency of the discourse of operational common-sense, and to the themes of constabulary independence and of an indeterminate general police mandate which underpin this. ⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ Nevertheless, the very fact that this new movement has developed a robust presence *in competition with* the traditional values of operational autonomy, again suggests that the balance between structural forces and associated cultural traits is more fluid and dynamic than is contemplated by Jefferson and Grimshaw.

The second error which arises from the authors' insistence upon the primacy of the legal structure manifests itself in their deliberations upon the question of *praxis*. If it is conceded that the existing structure of legal relations is a powerful, if not - at

least in terms of the arguments advanced by the structuralists⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ - fatal impediment to significant organisational change, and further, that the re-alignment of this formal legal structure in tandem with the organisational control system may, by dispelling the tensions that arise from their present disalignment, be a necessary precondition of the construction of an effectively co-ordinated system of top-down control, this does not entail that the process of cultural reform be relegated to secondary status. While their recognition of a powerful residue of cultural division within the police organisation leads the structuralists to concede that "co-optive work on the cop culture"⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ may still be important, their identification of structural change as the *sine qua non* of the construction of a system capable of resolving the implementation problem leads them to confer priority upon this dimension of reform. But this reasoning appears to evince a straightforward logical error. Just because structural reform may be one necessary prerequisite of effective change does not entail that it is the only one. And there is nothing in the structuralist argument, apart from this false inference, to suggest that cultural change is not equally necessary to resolve problems of implementation and control. Indeed, if, as is attempted above, their reliance upon cultural tendencies to bolster the structural tendencies for which they argue is properly exposed, the equal and co-ordinate significance of the cultural dimension is underlined. Accordingly, in their prognosis just as in their diagnosis, the structuralists compensate too much for the culturalist leanings of much earlier

research, and so arrive at a position where structural factors may be accorded a false priority as the key indices of organisational endeavour.

C. CULTURE AND STRUCTURE : TOWARDS AN INTEGRATED PERSPECTIVE.

In our journey through the literature on organised policework in search of the factors which best explain patterns of organisational action, we have learned a number of lessons which may guide our research. In a negative sense, the most telling caution concerns the dangers involved in attempting to accord ultimate explanatory status either to cultural or to structural factors. Exponents of the gap thesis tend to concentrate unduly upon cultural factors, without adequate appreciation of the structural background. However, when further evidence of both a cultural and structural nature is brought to bear so as to modify the gap thesis, the police organisation is revealed as a forum within which a multiplicity of more or less compatible and more or less powerfully underpinned rationalities emerge from a wide array of background factors. We are thus confronted with a kaleidoscopic range of differences within the police organisation which threatens to blind us to any sense of overall pattern. In recognition of this, the structuralist school attempts to impose its own form of monogenic order upon the police organisation. While this is a more sophisticated treatment than that which generates the gap thesis, and is capable of accommodating a number of factors besides the supposedly determinant structure of

law as secondary variables, in the last analysis its error mirrors that of the culturalist approach, and it too produces a skewed perspective.

Yet the problem to which this putative solution is directed remains. If, as we must, we take seriously the complex vision of organised policework which emerges from the literature review, how are we to identify and make sense of these forces and processes which bear most significantly upon the effective implementation of police policy, forces and processes which, in turn, must be addressed and accommodated by exponents of change in policy generation and policy content?

As suggested, the starting point of our proposed solution is the belief that the idea of a hierarchy of explanation is chimerical, and serves to divert attention from more fruitful possibilities. There can be no conclusive epistemological arguments for asserting the priority of one dimension over the other. Nor, as we have seen, do any of the various substantive theoretical arguments which are generated from such a basis provide compelling endorsement of their one-sided initial premisses. (151)

Instead, they tend to provoke forms of analysis which, in providing close scrutiny of only one of the two major dimensions of social life - culture or structure - are thereafter either not concerned with the nature of the relationship between the more fully explored dimension and the other dimension, or even if they are so concerned,

on account of their underlying orientation they inevitably attribute disproportionate explanatory power to the more fully explored dimension. In either case, as we have seen, the resulting theoretical framework is inadequate to the complex reality of organised policework. Invariably, important aspects of one of the two dimensions fail to be appreciated, and in turn this means that the foundations for a fuller treatment of the relationship between the two dimensions are lacking.

But merely being alert to these dangers is not enough. We must also be able to show that, in adopting a more agnostic initial orientation and having eschewed any categorical stance as regards the determinant status of any particular dimension of social life, we can build upon the strengths of existing approaches and begin to supply what is missing from them. We must, therefore, seek to provide an approach which is more evenly concentrated across significant aspects of the social organisation of policework and more comprehensive in its remit, while sacrificing neither the commendable emphasis upon generality of explanatory *form* within the existing genre, nor the more suggestive of its findings of *substance*, including in particular the enduring if variable emphasis upon the gap thesis as containing a significant kernel of sociological wisdom, and the structuralist insistence upon the significance of law and of other forms of external constraints upon action.

—

The need for continuity with the existing tradition, and the valuable insights which it has generated, is acknowledged in our retention of the notions of culture and structure as analytically fundamental, while the aspiration towards a more even-handed approach is signalled by our treatment of these two notions as referring to co-ordinate dimensions of social life. But, how do we elaborate upon the core notions of culture and structure so as to provide a treatment of their discrete properties and of their interrelationship which is more comprehensive than previous approaches, yet which retains a commitment to a general pattern of explanation?

In order to make this next step, culture and structure must be reconceptualized in terms which are, first of all, sufficiently broad to encompass all significant phenomena within their respective spheres, secondly, sufficiently similar to one another in their theoretical structure to permit their interrelationship to be meaningfully assessed, and thirdly, sufficiently economically and precisely stated to produce from this analytical baseline a manageable overall framework of explanation. The key to this advance, it is suggested, lies in identifying culture and structure with two general rationalities, or forms of situational logic, under which may be subsumed the range of competing rationalities which we referred to as constituting the dominant image of organised policework to emerge from a rounded consideration of the existing research paradigm. If by means of this approach, which finds some

very general parallels within the wider organisational theory literature, (1962) the umbrella themes of culture and structure can be developed such that they display a similarity of conceptual form, then, in examining the relationship between the two dimensions, this 'conceptual fit' may allow us to uncover certain general propensities as regards their degree of mutual compatibility or incompatibility in different contexts and their relative ascendancy at different times. In other words, having refused to commit ourselves *a priori* to a universally applicable causal relationship between the two dimensions, we may be in a better position to examine the range of methods whereby they may become connected in practice. Rather than one fixed overall pattern of interrelationships, the empirically contingent nature of the balance of cultural and structural factors is recognized. Nevertheless, if the set of conceptual linkages between culture and structure is carefully forged, the relationship between the two need not be conceived of merely as an infinite variety of historically particular sequences. It may instead be theorized as a limited range of possible patterns of interconnection, the selection and articulation of any one of which in turn depends upon and is triggered by different patterns of background variables. Accordingly, within this more flexible and empirically sensitive framework, the terms of the relationship between the two major forces bearing upon the nature of organised policework may still be explicable in general terms, and the roots of the implementation

problem more clearly exposed. Let us now attempt to provide an outline of how this argument unfolds.

It will be recalled that our initial distinction between culture and structure rested upon the division between the ideational dimension in social life - the world of ideas and symbolic communications, and the non-ideational dimension - the world of materially-grounded capacities and constraints. How might these two primitive notions be developed for the purposes of analysis of the police organisation in a manner which, building upon the achievements of the existing literature, reveals a distinctive form of rationality, or situational logic, applicable to each? We may begin to answer this question by developing further two related insights of the structuralist approach. First, it has been contended that a significant missing element in police organisational research is a concentrated focus upon "management *in action*".⁽¹⁶³⁾ Although, as indicated in the previous section, the manner in which the remedy of this deficiency has been pursued - in particular the overexact definition of policy success in assessing managerial practice - has led to a disproportionate emphasis upon the significance of the permissive framework of law, the structuralist accent upon management in action also opens up more promising methodological and theoretical avenues. In particular, it alerts us to a central, if relatively neglected, aspect of police organisational activity, namely the set of relationships of mutual influence between management and workforce.

As most attempts at a general definition of the nature of organisations and organisational behaviour acknowledge, the crucial ingredient within any framework of collective action, and the crucial factor in understanding patterns of behaviour within any such framework, is the set of relations between individuals who make up the collectivity.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾ Underlining this point still further, sizeable and multi-functional collective concerns such as policing are inevitably regulated through formal systems, involving a complex combination of *stipulative rules* (standard operating procedures), *rules of structural design*, *rules of social technology* and *communicative rules* (as to all of which much more will be said later⁽¹⁶⁵⁾), designed for the very purpose of influencing such relations in the pursuit of collective goals. In a fundamental sense then, organisations are *about* interpersonal relations, and it is through such relations that collective effort is mobilised and problems of control and co-ordination emerge and are addressed. In the final analysis, therefore, the analysis of such relations will provide the acid test of the nature and limits of the gap thesis.

Secondly, the theoretical orientation of the structuralist approach, if not necessarily the language in which it is couched, in emphasizing the combination of a diverse array of background variables in accounting for organised policework, allows these vital relational processes to be unpacked in a comprehensive manner. Each of the 'structures' which underpin organized policework may be seen to influence the management/workforce relationship. Of most

immediate relevance are, on the one hand, the norms constructed and maintained within the occupational structure, and on the other, the resources and constraints which are a function of formal position within the organisational structure. In turn, these occupational and organisational dimensions are influenced by various aspects of the legal and democratic structures.

Thus, the focus upon management in action, and upon a multi-layered conception of structure, by addressing the manner in which the main causal forces underpinning policework actually bear upon the key set of processes within which the balance of intra-organisational power and influence as between the two major segments in the organisational hierarchy is fixed, throws up fruitful explanatory possibilities. In turn, our reconceptualization of culture and structure in terms of discrete rationalities should be tailored to exploit these possibilities. To begin with, the identification of the management/workforce relationship as a crucial dynamic in deciding how the balance of underlying causal forces will in practice be resolved within the police organisation alerts us to the need to define our two types of situational logic in concrete *relational* terms also. Secondly, if, taking the concrete relations between the two main organisational segments as our main empirical focus, we examine the theoretical relationship between the key explanatory sources in this light, then the centrality of the *work structure* - as the structure through which the influence of the other structures is mediated - becomes apparent. And if we redivide

the 'work structure' into its component elements - the 'occupational structure' and the 'organizational structure' - the distinction which this sets out between the various ideational influences which bear differently upon different organisational segments on the one hand, and the non-ideational resources and constraints which flow from the different positions of actors within the formal organisational system on the other, provides a means of focusing upon the concrete relationship between the two organisational segments which is faithful to the analytical dualism of culture and structure and which indicates the general manner in which this analysis should be developed.

In more specific terms, the relational theme may be incorporated into our new framework by viewing each dimension - culture and structure - as generating its own type of *power relation*. It is these two types of power relation, each with its own operating dynamic, which may be viewed as harbouring their own particular form of rationality, or situational logic. And if the idea of a power relation provides the form through which the notion of a situational logic may be expressed, the substantive content of each of these situational logics is in turn informed by the particular sense (noted above) in which cultural and structural factors impinge upon organisational actors implicated in crucial relational processes. Thus, as regards the power relation peculiar to the cultural dimension, its operating dynamic and situational logic may be viewed as *normative* in nature. Since the cultural

dimension speaks to the ideational elements in social life - the influence of ideas rather than of external coercive mechanisms - the normative power relation encompasses the various ways in which an identity or compatibility of perspective may or may not be constituted between different actors. Its outcome reflects the balance of symbolic resources available to each and how these are strategically deployed. By contrast, the relevant operating dynamic or situational logic of the power relation peculiar to the structural dimension may be viewed as *instrumental* in nature. The structural dimension speaks to the non-ideational elements in social life which constrain or enable individuals, and in this particular context, refers most directly to resources provided through the formal organisational structure. Accordingly, the instrumental power relation - so-called because it contemplates the utilization of some actors by other actors as means, or 'instruments', to their ends - encompasses the various ways in which, regardless of any identity or compatibility of perspective, actors may exploit the capabilities inherent in their formal organisational position to exert influence over or constrain other actors. Its outcome reflects the balance of material resources available to each and how these are strategically deployed. In summary, the essence of the cultural dimension and its attendant normative power relation lies in the negotiation of harmony and consensus between parties, while the essence of the structural dimension and its attendant instrumental power relation lies in conflict and struggle between parties over which of their differing preferences should be pursued.

-

It is through our elaboration of these 'ideal typical' (166) - conceptions of normative and instrumental power relations, and our subsequent inquiry into the ways in which these types of power are applied in practice and how they are interrelated, that it is hoped to provide an analysis of organised policework which, by integrating cultural and structural dimensions within a comprehensive whole, will advance understanding of the implementation problem. (167)

However, these conceptual cheques will not be fully endorsed or cashed in until a later stage. The comprehensive theoretical explication of the position here sketched is the subject of chapters three and five, while its empirical application (whose relationship with the theoretical enterprise, as the break in chapter sequence suggests, is one of mutual constitution) builds upon an initial statement of findings in chapter four and unfolds in detail from chapter six onwards. However, even the general formulations provided above are sufficient to suggest that, within our proposed framework, theoretical premisses are closely interwoven with methodological indicators. Let us, therefore, conclude this chapter by pursuing these methodological leads so as to account for our particular concentration upon the role of the uniform patrol sergeant within the research project.

D. THE ROLE OF THE UNIFORM PATROL SERGEANT

In the previous section the importance of studying management in action in order to gain an explanatory purchase upon the nature

-

of organised policework was argued. But can this general imperative provide a satisfactory basis for our more specific focus on the role of the uniform patrol sergeant? Further, if this narrower concentration can be justified in general terms, do the lessons which have been learned from previous research and fed into our general theoretical orientation provide more specific guidelines as to *how* we should approach the uniform patrol sergeant as an object of study?

As regards the first of these questions, the general strategic value of studying management in action and, in particular, the relational processes linking the higher and lower echelons of the organization, can indeed be seen to provide a persuasive rationale for the study of uniform patrol sergeants. Alongside this theoretical argument, however, other, more pragmatic considerations are also pertinent.

The theoretical argument rests upon the strategic significance of sergeants within the organisation on the one hand, and the ambivalence and tensions which attend their role on the other. As with all front-line supervisors in hierarchically organized bureaucracies, sergeants occupy the interface between the operational ranks and the ranks of middle and senior managers. They are thus at the heart of the network of relational processes through which organisational efforts to close the 'gap' and join the 'two cultures' are channelled. In strategic terms, theirs is the

most immediate responsibility for ensuring the implementation of organisational policy, and this they attempt against a background of considerable operational autonomy. Nor can their strategic role be viewed in simple 'top-down' terms, with sergeants merely the passive agents of organisational interests. There is little point in endeavouring to ensure that a particular policy or guideline emanating from an authoritative source is implemented in a particular instance, if the manner of its implementation is counter-productive in terms of the organisation's longer-term capacity for internal control, or if it has unacceptable side-effects for any of the various public constituencies of the police, or if the policy or guideline itself is not adequately tailored to the demands and limitations of operational policing. Sergeants thus have an important role to play in educating and motivating their officers so as to ensure competent and obedient performance, and their contribution is equally vital in providing feedback to policy-makers as to the adequacy of resources provided for the purposes of policy implementation and about the feasibility and wider operational implications of policy generally. Their success in performing these tasks will depend upon a number of different factors including the resources at their disposal, the quality of their managerial skills, their ability to devote sufficient time to those objectives which they perceive to be most important, and their capacity to win the trust and respect of both junior and senior ranks.

As this formidable checklist indicates, the official mission of sergeants is fraught with difficulties, their strategic success far from guaranteed. And this set of strategic tensions is exacerbated by the fact that in cultural terms also, sergeants tend to be caught in 'no man's land'. As first-line supervisors, there may be aspects of their biographies and working environment which pull them in different directions, and which stop them from fully endorsing either of the two broad variants of collegiate culture. They may wish to subscribe to aspects of each of the 'two cultures' simultaneously. Accordingly, the role of the sergeant in general, and the role of the uniform patrol sergeant in particular - as the main representative of 'line' management within the divisional organisation - may be seen as a crucible within which many of the countervailing forces of the 'organisational structure' and the 'occupational structure' are brought to melting point. The nature and extent of the problems encountered by sergeants provide a significant index of the obstacles placed in the way of concerted action within the police organisation, while the adequacy of the solutions which they shape provide an equally significant measure of the organisation's capacity to overcome these obstacles.

Despite the weight of these considerations, the theoretical case for concentrating on the role of uniform patrol sergeants should not be overstated. Notwithstanding the strategic centrality of their role, the network of critical intra-organisational relations between upper and lower echelons stretches well beyond the

ambit of the first-line supervisor. As we shall see, the open-ended frame of reference with which we approach the study of sergeants takes some account of this, by extending our range to the ranks of middle management at divisional level. However, as the perspective of inquiry remains sergeant-centred, our agenda is undeniably a limited and selective one, and accordingly certain additional pragmatic considerations must be invoked in defence of our choice.

In the first place, there is the relative neglect of the sergeant as an object of study within the research tradition. Van Maanen has complained that "sergeants have rarely been the explicit target of police studies", and that "[w]hen they have been studied, it has usually been incidental to the broader examination of a particular police function..."⁽¹⁶⁹⁾ While this lacunae has since been partly filled, not least by Van Maanen's own work in the United States,⁽¹⁷⁰⁾ and in the British context, by the work of Chatterton in particular,⁽¹⁷¹⁾ and also by certain focused elements within wider research enterprises such as the PSI Report and the Merseyside Police Report,⁽¹⁷²⁾ the study of this crucial intermediary role within the police organisation remains underdeveloped in comparison with research on operational activities. However, it is arguable that the study of sergeants has been no more neglected than the study of management in action in different functional units and at different ranks generally,⁽¹⁷³⁾ and thus we come to a final reason for concentrating on the role of the uniform sergeant, namely the

limited time and resources available. In order to construct a manageable research programme, some setting of priorities was required, and given the theoretical considerations canvassed above, it was felt that the least arbitrary choice available was to concentrate upon the largest and strategically most central unit on the first rung of the managerial ladder.

We shall return to the detailed methods applied in the study in chapter four. For the moment, having provided some theoretical grounding for the decision to centre our research on the uniform patrol sergeant in principle, three further considerations should be noted as providing a more definite shape to our approach.

First, we must take seriously the possibility, alluded to in section B that the wider social context within which organisational relations unfold may be in a state of flux and that external changes may significantly affect the manner in which managerial roles are performed. This is not to suggest that this dynamic element has been entirely ignored in existing sergeant-centred research. For example, Chatterton has studied the role of the British sergeant both in the late 1960s/early 1970s,⁽¹⁷⁴⁾ and again in the mid 1980s,⁽¹⁷⁵⁾ and has acknowledged the significance of the change from the street-orientated sergeant operating within the fixed points system of supervision who was typical of the earlier period, to the more station-centred sergeant of the later period with his greater reliance upon paperwork and the personal

radio as supervisory instruments. (176) In turn, this role transformation, it has been widely documented, (177) is closely linked to changes in the wider socio-political environment and technological context of policing. Nevertheless, the pattern of historical change is here depicted with a very broad brush, and is concerned only to draw comparisons between salient features of the two periods, each *synchronically* analysed. The thrust of the studies referred to earlier is to suggest that the balance between external and internal relations is an evershifting one, and is susceptible to a wider range of reciprocal influences than is captured within existing sergeant-centred research. A full understanding of the emergence and implications of the role of the contemporary sergeant, therefore, must be sensitive to this broader *diachronic* pattern, and must, within the limits of a research design which does not include a longitudinal study, employ techniques which aim to provide a more widely encompassing and more detailed analysis of the processes of change. (178)

Secondly, as indicated above, we must be wary of concentrating too closely on the sergeant rank, and must be ever-mindful of the wider pattern of organised policework that we are attempting to illuminate through our particular focus, which pattern - since the lines of causality run in both directions - also augments our understanding of the context within which sergeants operate. This has implications at both the macro-level and the micro-level. At the macro-level, we must attempt to advance understanding of the general

cultural and structural features of the police organisation and the general patterns of normative and instrumental power relations with which they are associated, and must attempt to explain how and to what extent these contribute to the much-debated gap between operational and managerial ranks. At the micro-level, we must recognize that ranks other than the sergeant are involved in attempting to contain or bridge the gap which exists at the more general level. The office of sergeant is not the sole repository of the conflicts, dilemmas and opportunities involved in mediating between two broad organisational segments. Accordingly the role of other ranks closely involved in this process, both senior divisional ranks and, in particular, the inspector rank must be considered.⁽¹⁷³⁾ The manner in which these ranks perform their roles may be significant not only in its own right in aggravating or alleviating potential sources of division within the police organisation, but also, within the seamless web of internal relations, has a direct bearing upon the resources and options available to sergeants in the performance of their own key intermediary role.

Finally, we must, on the other hand, ensure that this attention to the context within which uniform patrol sergeants operate does not obscure our concern with and appreciation of precisely how the sergeant role is enacted. In other words, we must guard against an 'oversocialized' view of sergeants, and must be alive to their role as active negotiators of solutions, rather than as passive bearers

of the predicaments of the organisation. In particular, drawing upon the techniques of the operational styles approach, we must build upon previous attempts to classify supervisory styles in similar fashion, (180) and attempt to trace adequately the *variety* of responses to the problems and possibilities inherent in the sergeant role. (181)

In summary, our aim is to account for the various forms of possible enactment of the role of uniform patrol sergeants in terms of the long-term and short-term cultural and structural pressures which shape their task, and to assess the implications of their key performances for our understanding of the anatomy of intra-organisational relations.

CHAPTER THREE

TWO SPECIES OF POWER RELATIONS

A. THE CONCEPT OF POWER: SOME INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

W.G. Runciman has recently argued that, for those involved in social theory and in its application to particular sociological projects, the concept of power "remains as impossible to do without as it is difficult to define".⁽¹⁾ Thus, different formulations of the idea of power provide key conceptual devices within many systems of social analysis, and it is often claimed that these formulations reflect the different preoccupations and value-preferences of different writers, and in turn produce different sorts of knowledge of the social world.⁽²⁾ On this relativistic view, power is "an essentially contested concept",⁽³⁾ inextricably tied to the methodological, epistemological, moral and political background assumptions of the author.⁽⁴⁾

The formidable and ever-increasing literature on the subject of power, and the intensity of debate within this literature, provide strong testimony in support of these sentiments.⁽⁵⁾ Accordingly, where, as in the present study, the theme of power is *explicitly* placed at the centre of one's explanatory scheme, the theorist is faced with the daunting prospect of embroilment in deep-rooted conceptual controversy. Nevertheless, in the present

chapter, it is intended to avoid lengthy entanglement in these matters, and instead, in more concrete vein, to concentrate upon developing the specific binary model of intra-organisational power relations outlined in the previous chapter. However, in so doing, we cannot entirely ignore the deeper current of debate, for that would be to court the opposite danger of theoretical naivety - of failure to appreciate what is at stake at the more fundamental conceptual level and how this must inform our more specific understanding of power.

In order to avoid either pitfall, and thus to pay our general theoretical dues with reasonable despatch, we must approach the tension referred to above in a constructive manner. To borrow a well-known analytical device,⁶ a distinction may be made between the general *concept* of power on the one hand, and on the other, particular *conceptions* of that general *concept* - such as ours - which are honed to meet specific explanatory purposes. If this is done, then it is possible to identify at the most general level a concept of power sufficiently broadly-based to be neutral between the various competing assumptions referred to above. On such a reading, various 'essential contests', while not resolved, are displaced to the secondary level, to the particular conceptions of the more general concept of power which are favoured by different authors. Some of the differences revealed at this secondary level may remain intractable, but the division of analysis into two levels nevertheless offers two distinct advantages to the theorist and to the theoretical enterprise generally. In the first place, as is the

case in the present study, it may be that the particular conception of power employed retains many of the characteristics of the more general concept of power. It follows that, to the extent that this is the case, it is possible to avoid 'taking sides' in respect of many of the deep-rooted issues referred to above when constructing an operational definition of power. Although, as we shall see, the theorist may still wish to address some of these issues at a later stage of his or her inquiry, he or she is not obliged to attempt to resolve them at the foundational stage. Secondly, to the extent that the particular conception of power does refine or modify the more general concept, the common base-line provided by the more general concept remains useful as a marker against which such refinements or modifications may be measured. Accordingly, the theorist cannot exclude certain arguably significant aspects of power simply by means of "definitional fiat",⁶⁷ but must instead make explicit his or her specific preferences, and attempt to explain them in terms of their heuristic value to the particular research enterprise in question. In bringing his or her particular concerns into the open, the theorist is thus required to pay attention to the internal coherence of his or her project, and also to the need to justify his or her choices in more general debate.

What, then, can the notion of power in its most primitive and general sense, upon which this ground-clearing exercise depends, be taken to refer to? Appealing first to conventional usage, we may look to the basic definition of power set out in the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary*, as the "ability to do something or anything, or

to act upon a person or a thing". Within the literature of social theory, a similarly all-embracing notion of power is to be found in the work of Giddens. For him, power in its broadest sense is simply "transformative capacity".⁽⁸⁾ Power is thus an indispensable ingredient in all forms of action, since to act "means being able to intervene in the world, or to refrain from such intervention, with the effect of influencing a specific process or state of affairs".⁽⁹⁾

With its wide-ranging remit, this notion of power avoids many of the disputes which have been addressed and transcends many of the limits which have been set by exponents of particular conceptions of power who, despite their selective focus, have attempted to trade in the theoretical market-place on the *general* utility of their definitions.⁽¹⁰⁾ Thus, power as transformative capacity is not confined to circumstances of overt conflict between actors, as in Dahl's "one-dimensional view".⁽¹¹⁾ Neither is it restricted to a "two-dimensional" perspective, embracing covert as well as open conflict - the exclusion of certain pre-resolved matters from the decision-making agenda as well as active struggle over these matters.⁽¹²⁾ Further, from the wider perspective here endorsed, even the well-known "three-dimensional view" of power favoured by Steven Lukes,⁽¹³⁾ which looks beyond the "behavioural focus"⁽¹⁴⁾ of the first two dimensions and admits of the possibility of power arising in apparently non-adversarial contexts, through the manufacture of a "false or manipulated consensus"⁽¹⁵⁾ directed against the "real interests"⁽¹⁶⁾ of those manoeuvred into it, is

-

both unduly narrow and unnecessarily contentious. Power as transformative capacity need not discriminate *at all* amongst the various possible states of mind of those influenced by the power-holder, or by groups of power-holders. Like the three-dimensional view, the idea of power as transformative capacity is not concerned to draw a line between those situations where persons 'acted upon' register opposition, and those where they register consent. But, unlike the three-dimensional view, nor is the more general concept concerned to draw a line within the latter category, between those situations where consent is manipulated and those where it is genuine. Rather, power as transformative capacity embraces all such contexts of action. Thus, in providing a basic conceptual definition of power, there is no need to attempt the epistemologically perilous task of specifying actors' 'interests' in a counterfactual manner - in terms other than those which would be acknowledged by the actors themselves - so as to distinguish 'real' from apparent commitments. (17)

More generally, the idea of power as transformative capacity, unlike many of its rivals, (18) does not restrict itself to the domain of interpersonal relations, or even of relations between groups. It is concerned not only with 'power over' other actors, but with 'power to' act generally. To revert to the language of our dictionary definition, it embraces power over 'things' as well as other 'persons' - power over the artefacts of the material world, including the power both to allocate material resources and to bring one's own aptitudes and skills to bear in the utilisation of these

resources, as well as power over the inhabitants of the social world. Finally, again in contrast with many other views, power as transformative capacity is not limited to the generation of "intended and foreseen effects",⁽¹³⁾ a proviso which, in demanding an onerous standard of rational consciousness on the part of powerful actors, excludes many of the means through which the wishes and objectives of social actors may be realised or frustrated.

As suggested above, the *conception* of power favoured and developed in the present study is faithful in many respects to this highly inclusive general *concept* of power. Given our overall objective of examining problems of policy implementation at divisional level, with particular emphasis on the role of the sergeant, we must be concerned with the entire range of ways in which the actions of organisational members may or may not be harnessed to organisational objectives, irrespective of the bases of these actions or the forms that they may take. Accordingly, in that, as explained earlier, the referential domain of the general concept of power as transformative capacity is so broad in scope as to be coterminous with the referential domain of the concept of action conceived of in its most general sense, the attractions of this most general concept of power from the standpoint of our research are obvious.

Most significantly, the concern with the realisation of transformative capacity, both in exchanges underscored by consensus and in exchanges underscored by conflict, mirrors precisely our

fundamental distinction between normative power and instrumental power. Therefore, we require the analytical scope provided by the notion of power as transformative capacity in order to ground our binary *conception* of power. However, this does not mean, to develop another argument adumbrated earlier in this section, that we are unconcerned with the issues addressed by those who have posited a more limited range of reference for the concept of power along the consensus/conflict continuum. Rather, such issues are seen for what they are, not as providing boundary criteria in respect of which certain types of relations may qualify or disqualify as effective instances of power, but instead as bearing upon the relative merits of conflict-based exchanges as against consensus-based exchanges, and of the different types of exchanges within these two classes. Thus, more properly viewed as questions concerning how different types of power are to be *evaluated*,⁽²⁰⁾ such issues will be addressed in a preliminary fashion under a separate heading in section C of this chapter.

Similar considerations apply as regards the forms of consciousness involved in the enactment of power relations. As suggested, it would be unduly restrictive to confine ourselves to those acts where power-holders display "discursive consciousness"⁽²¹⁾ - a full awareness of the conditions and ramifications of their actions. There are many ways in which actors within the police organisation can 'get their own way' or otherwise have their objectives fulfilled or protected, other than through conscious strategies deployed in particular episodes. Again,

however, this is not to say that such differences in forms of enactment of power relations, although not bearing upon the fundamental question of what counts as an exercise of power, are without importance in refining our understanding of power relations, and accordingly, these matters will also be treated under a separate heading in section C.

However, while these considerations suggest that our particular conception of power relations owes much to the general concept of transformative capacity, it is equally apparent from the terms of this conception, that it also involves some modifications of the general concept. What do these modifications consist of, and how are they to be explained and justified in terms of the particular concerns of our project?

The modifications to the general concept of transformative capacity which are contained in the particular conception of power supplied within our binary model of intra-organisational relations may be summed up by pointing to the fact that, in its basic form, the power relation designated within this particular conception display a *dyadic* structure⁽²²⁾ that is, it refers to the relationship between two individuals. The reasons why the dyadic focus presents itself as an attractive methodological point of departure within the present study have already been set out in chapter two.⁽²³⁾ The most crucial ingredient within any context of collective action - the control and co-ordination of which is our fundamental object of analysis - is the set of relations between

individuals making up the collectivity. The relational perspective is central both to an understanding of the informal dynamics of the divisional "life-world"⁽²⁴⁾ - what Jefferson and Grimshaw refer to as the 'occupational dimension' of the work structure - and also to the formal system of rules, or 'organisational dimension', through which it is attempted to regulate this life-world.

Nevertheless, this initial interpersonal focus suggests two difficulties. The first concerns its apparent exclusion of relations between persons and things - between actors and the material world as well as actors and the social world, while the second concerns its concentration on relations between individuals to the apparent neglect of the wider collective context within which power relations unfold. In both cases, however, the difficulties are only apparent. It is intended not to deny the importance of the wider dimensions of power referred to, but rather to provide a framework within which the significance of these wider dimensions can be appreciated within the context of intra-organisational power relations.

As regards the first objection, we have already indicated that analysis of the operation of power in the context of the police organisation must embrace power over things, as well as power over people. Indeed, the two may be seen as inextricably intertwined in the pursuit of objectives by organisational actors. Detailed analysis of this process inevitably reveals *mixed chains of action*, the individual links of the combination consisting both of exercises

of material power and of power- vis-a-vis other persons. Thus, for instance, an exercise of material power by supervisory ranks in the form of the utilisation of personal radios to monitor the work of operational ranks, may, by increasing the knowledge of supervisory ranks of the work of their subordinates, enhance their *competent authority* (see section B below) - which is a form of interpersonal power - over their juniors. The chain of causation may equally run in the opposite direction, as where a member of a supervisory rank uses his or her power of *persuasion* - another form of interpersonal power - in order to ensure that operational staff charged with the task of carrying out mobile patrols - involving the use of a material resource - perform such patrols within set guidelines and orders. The examples could be multiplied, as we shall see in the course of the study. Suffice to say for the moment that power over people and power over things are typically implicated in seamless webs of mutual causality. It is simply impossible to bracket them off in the course of empirical investigation, and for that very reason, it makes no difference whether one, rather than the other, is used as the starting point of inquiry.

While the thrust of the first objection may be easily accommodated, the second appears more substantial in that it suggests that the very metatheoretical rationale which underpins the choice of the dyad as primary may be undermined by the conceptual rigidity inherent in the dyadic form. How, this argument runs, is the individualistic perspective of the dyad to be squared with our appreciation that it is within a collective context that action and

the utilisation of power within the police organisation assume their greatest significance? Again, however, it should be recalled that the accordance of primacy to the dyad is merely a heuristic device, designed not to preclude but to illuminate understanding of the collective context. In principle, a pattern of collective power and action can always be broken into a number of constituent parts, each of which represents a dyadic power relation. A superintendent's 'football detail' - his or her set of instructions that a football match be policed in a certain way - depends for its successful operationalization upon his or her capacity to ensure that his or her chief inspector and inspectors act in a particular manner, and in turn, upon their capacity to ensure that their sergeants and constables act in conformity with their wishes. And while this example is of a specific initiative, the atomization of collective power into component parts does not depend upon the existence of a series of active and visible exchanges which tends to accompany any such specific initiative. If we recognize the various latent forms that power can take (see section C below), the technique of atomization can also be applied to more routinized constellations of practice involving a multiplicity of actors, such as the standard pattern of deployment of manpower and allocation of resources within a division which provides for the regular social topography of policework. Furthermore, the fact that we are dealing with a context which is structured by a formal organisational framework, provides additional support for concentrating on the constituent dyads in assembling the wider collective picture. The rules which make up the formal organization are characterized by their

generality of application. In turn, this tends to generate correspondingly general sets of pressures, constraints and opportunities for the actors situated, directed, enabled and confined by such rules. Exchanges between actors confronted with this general structure of rules therefore tend to display certain recurrent characteristics. The particular dyad tends to conform to a general type, and accordingly, concentration on the dyadic structure of our theoretical scheme need not be at the expense of the breadth and economy of its explanatory power.

Against this however, critics of the dyadic method of analysis would argue that the "building block"⁽²⁵⁾ approach fails to address an important aspect of collective power relations. On this view, simple aggregate analysis is not enough, since, to recall the structuralist logic explained in the previous chapter, each of the (dyadic) units cannot itself be properly understood prior to an appreciation of the totality (including those aspects of the totality supplied through the operation of other dyadic relations).⁽²⁶⁾ A macroscopic analysis which accords primacy to the wider collective context within which particular power relations operate must thus be preferred to a series of microscopic analyses. Yet while it is doubtless true that dyadic power relations cannot be bracketed off from their wider social context, the fact remains that there seems no plausible means of constructing a macroscopic analysis of intra-organisational power relations other than through the accumulation of microscopic analyses. If we acknowledge this fundamental methodological imperative, the problem of accommodating

more general social factors may still be overcome by attempting to recognize and incorporate such extrinsic social phenomena in the course of the microscopic analyses of particular types of dyadic power relations. This we attempt to do in developing our conceptions of normative and instrumental power relations in section B below. Thus, within the category of normative power relations, relations of *institutional authority* in particular are in large part viewed as dependent upon and constituted through the operation of social forces outwith particular dyadic relations. So also, the idea of an underlying *normative unity* which is developed recognizes the need to complement dyadic analysis by means of excavating the wider social dimension. Further, within the category of instrumental power relations, *the intercurative element* - the balance of mutual dependence between parties - will depend on the opportunities available to parties to the relationship to advance their objectives through other means, including these opportunities available within the context of other dyadic power relations in which they may be involved. In summary, taking account of the objection as to individualistic bias, the means through which dyadic analysis may generate understanding of the wider collective context of power relations may be depicted more aptly in terms of a 'jigsaw' metaphor than a 'building block' metaphor. In the course of inquiry, the theorist must attempt to develop and retain a general awareness of how the whole picture should fit together, but in the last analysis he or she must still solve the puzzle piece by piece.

Having thus attempted to situate and justify our binary model of intra-organisational power relations within a general theory of power, let us now proceed to develop a fuller view of each of the basic types within the binary model, before adding some further general refinements in section C.

B. TWO SPECIES OF INTRA-ORGANISATIONAL POWER RELATIONS

The scheme set out below through which our two species of intra-organisational power relations are examined is neither strictly typological nor strictly taxonomical. Although it owes much to the background theoretical discussion in the previous chapter and in section A above, as well as to the detailed theoretical writings of a number of analysts of power,⁽²⁷⁾ it is not simply an *a priori* conceptual scheme - a framework constructed in advance of data collection and determinative of the scope, focus and methods of inquiry. Nor, however, given this theoretical background, does it purport merely to represent a retrospective categorization of the data. Rather, reflecting the gradual development of the underlying theoretical perspective, it is a mixture of the two. As we shall see in the next chapter, some elements within those parts of the questionnaire dealing directly with power relations prefigure the form and substance of the theoretical model. Other elements of the model were finessed in the process of doing the fieldwork and reflecting upon the findings, although given the very general nature of the discussion in the present chapter, the manner in which the fully refined model was

informed by the research experience becomes clearer when the process of theoretical explanation of the empirical findings begins in chapter five. In short, therefore, as the task of constructing a theoretical framework was itself ongoing during the period of research, the relationship of the model to the empirical inquiry is correspondingly complex, the former both structuring and in turn being structured by the latter.

(1) Normative power relations

The elementary nature of normative power relations may be expressed in the following symbolic form:

The capacity of A to influence B to do C, or not to frustrate the achievement of C, by means of securing the normative agreement of B as to the desirability of attaining C.

Here, the compliance of B with A's wishes is independent of instrumental considerations; it is not merely a response to an instrumental strategy perpetrated by A. Nor, as in those instrumental power relations which contain a significant intercursive element, is the structure of mutual compliance merely contingent upon the intermediate utility of each party to the achievement of the independently conceived purpose of the other. (28)

Instead, the extent to which purposes come to be commonly valued provides the barometer of normative power relations.

Normative relations may take different forms relating to the type of influence that one person may have over another. First, there is *persuasion*. This occurs where a person presents arguments or appeals to another and where this second person, after considering the arguments, accepts what has been said as a basis for their own actions.⁽²⁹⁾ Secondly, there is *authority*. Whereas persuasion is the tested acceptance of another's judgement, authority is "the untested acceptance of another's judgement."⁽³⁰⁾ Or, as Raz puts it, a successful exercise of authority by *A* over *B* means that *B*'s reason for action is:

"content-independent... (T)here is no direct connection between the reason and the action for which it is a reason. The reason is the apparently 'extraneous' fact that someone in authority has said so, and within limits his saying so would be reason for any number of actions..."⁽³¹⁾

In other words, it is not what is said but who says it that is the crucial factor.

What endows *A*'s actions with authority? Leaving aside inducement and coercion, which are properly subsumed within our analysis of instrumental relations, there appear to be three types of normative authority. First, there is *personal authority*, where someone obeys out of a desire to please or serve another on account of an interpersonal bond or the other's personal qualities.⁽³²⁾ Secondly, there is *competent authority*, where someone obeys another out of belief in that other person's special or superior competence

or expertise.⁽³³⁾ Thirdly, there is what we shall term *institutional authority*, where the acknowledged right to command of one person and obligation to obey of another rest not upon the personal qualities or expertise of the first person, but upon the fact that the relationship between them is perceived to fall within a socially established or institutionalized category of relationships in respect of which the command/obedience model is deemed acceptable.⁽³⁴⁾ This is partly a simple matter of the occupation of a formally defined social position, such as rank in the police organization, but as we will observe in due course, it is also partly a matter of acting in a manner which is considered appropriate to the role or set of roles which is associated with the formal social position. In order to weave oneself fully into the fabric of institutional authority requires skilful image management and development.⁽³⁵⁾

What are the bases of these various types of normative power? Personal authority may be based upon "personal ties",⁽³⁶⁾ such as the affective bond of friendship, camaraderie or personal respect, or upon a belief in the personal qualities, or "charisma"⁽³⁷⁾ of the other. As regards the latter type of relational quality, following Weber, Shils has defined those charismatic individuals who may command such reverence thus:

"powerful, ascendent, persistent, effectively expressive personalities who impose themselves on their environment by their exceptional courage, decisiveness, self-confidence, fluency insight, energy, etc.",⁽³⁸⁾

Competent authority, which has received scant treatment in the literature in comparison to the other types of authority,⁽³⁹⁾ is based upon a recognition of the expertise of the other. It involves deferring to the judgement of others within a particular sphere of competence on the basis of certain warranties deemed to have been provided by them as to their fitness to make decisions. By their very nature, relations of personal authority and of competent authority are endemic within all areas of social life. For their part, institutional authority relations are less pervasive. Instead, their existence, character and strength depends upon the nature of the institution in question. Accordingly, whereas in the case of personal authority and competent authority, their *general* relevance to intra-organisational relations within the police may be assumed, and discussion of the *specific* manner in which they manifest themselves held over until chapter five, in the case of institutional authority, while again more detailed discussion is postponed until chapter five, some preliminary explanation of its general relevance to our particular study is required.

Institutional authority has a number of different sources. It may be based upon certain profane values associated with institutional longevity, which may in turn depend upon greater or lesser degrees of reflection on the meaning and significance of tradition.⁽⁴⁰⁾ More reflectively, the durability of an authority may be deemed to be indicative of its practical efficacy and social acceptability. Alternatively, established usage may lead to an

unreflective acceptance of authority as custom or convention.⁽⁴¹⁾ Taken to its most extreme this suspension of critical examination of practices endowed with the weight of tradition may lead to a process of *reification*, which involves the representation of a historically contingent state of affairs "as permanent, natural, outside of time."⁽⁴²⁾ An institution such as the police, which in its "new"⁽⁴³⁾ mode has survived for over 150 years throughout Britain with much of its original mandate and symbolic paraphernalia, and - most significantly for intra-organisational relations - with many of its principles of internal structural design still intact, is obviously a prime site for the articulation of many of these themes associated with historical resilience.

Another possible source of institutional authority lies in the the Durkheimian idea of the "sacred"⁽⁴⁴⁾, and, more specifically, in the notion, most systematically developed by Shils, that within any social order there is a "center"⁽⁴⁵⁾ - an axiomatic set of institutions and values which, although not necessarily fully endorsed by all members of that social order, is nevertheless commonly recognized as the source and embodiment of "tremendous power".⁽⁴⁶⁾ The very idea of a "center" reflects not only prevalent and resilient patterns of domination within a particular social order, but also the widespread cultural need to make sense of overbearing social structures - those sublime forces which fall outwith the domain of everyday manageable experience and over whose operation most individuals exercise little control. Thus the "center" is not merely part of the meta-language of the theorist, a

convenient label to attach to what are observed to be the key institutions and processes within a particular social formation, but also an integral part of a society's self-conception. It describes the form in which certain seemingly ineffable forces are recognized as such, as a "great ordering power"⁽⁴⁷⁾ endowed with an objective and asocial - or sacred - quality. This idea of sacredness, or sanctification, connects closely with the theme of tradition,⁽⁴⁸⁾ since the resilience of a particular set of socially significant institutional arrangements over a long time-span inevitably leads to the widespread identification of these arrangements with the central zone of society, and so invests them with the sacred power which permeates through that zone. More specifically, the idea of sanctification has much in common with the idea of reification, since both are concerned with the manner in which a contingent historical practice may be constituted as an unimpeachable guide to contemporary social arrangements. However, they differ in nuance in so far as the former operates through a process of explicit extrinsic reference - the claim as to the inviolability of traditional norms resting upon the fact of their stipulation by an external asocial force - while the latter operates through a process of implicit self-reference, involving the subtle and inarticulate inference by those who continuously confront an embedded set of social arrangements that the very fact of their durability is sufficient evidence of their 'naturalness' and indispensability.

We have already noted the claims of the police organisation under the rubric of tradition. If we add to this the well-grounded observation that the police constitutes an agency which, through its defining ethos, mandate and capacities is uniquely linked to the coercive and legal foundations of state power, and which enjoys a peculiar capacity to penetrate the enclaves of civil society,⁽⁴⁹⁾ then we can appreciate the strength of Manning's claim that the police role is significant repository and vehicle of the very "sense of sacredness or awesome power...at the root of the political order"⁽⁵⁰⁾ analysed by Durkheim and Shils. On first impressions, the significance of this application of the idea of sacredness to policing lies in its external reference, in how it might effect the relations of authority which pertain between the police and external agencies. However, if we take seriously Shils' claim that in respect of these institutions such as the police that are touched by "tremendous power", sacred authority is by its nature "concentrated at the peak",⁽⁵¹⁾ then we can appreciate how such power is also differentially distributed *within* such 'central' institutions. Accordingly, the theoretical insight developed above may be of direct relevance to our analysis of intra-organisational relations.

However, there is more to the process of abstraction from the circumstances of a particular authority-holder and a particular subject which is the foundation of institutional authority than the invocation of historical precedent and continuity, or the related ascription of a sacred quality to certain social roles. Legitimacy

may also accrue to the members of an institution by virtue of its claimed embodiment of more ratiocinative values and processes, as in the Weberian notion of rational legal domination.⁽⁵²⁾ At one level, legitimacy may be claimed on behalf of particular role incumbents on the basis of the capacity of the 'organisational structure', which ascribes to them their formal status, to co-ordinate the activities of members of the organization and to provide a clarity of purpose as regards the practices of individual members. For Weber, the paradigm form of formal organisation geared to the rational co-ordination and control of collective effort was that of bureaucracy.⁽⁵³⁾ The distinctive features of this type of organisation, as viewed by Weber, are well summarized by Beetham:

" hierarchy (each official has a clearly defined competence within a hierarchical division of labour, and is answerable for its performance to a superior); continuity (the office constitutes a full-time salaried occupation, with a career structure that offers the prospect of regular advancement); impersonality (the work is conducted according to prescribed rules, without arbitrariness or favouritism, and a written record is kept of each transaction; expertise (officials are selected according to merit, are trained for their function, and control access to the knowledge stored in the files."⁽⁵⁴⁾

The high degree of correspondence between the typical form of the police organisation and the form of bureaucratic organisation generally has been extensively documented.⁽⁵⁵⁾ Accordingly, in so far as authority does flow from the rationality and efficiency claims of bureaucracy, and to the extent that this authority in turn attaches to particular actors charged with operating the

bureaucratic machine, this basis of authority should figure -
significantly in our discussion. ⁽⁵⁶⁾

Finally, apart from that which relates to the substantive attributes of bureaucratic organization, the other, and related claim to legitimacy which is made on behalf of rational legal domination concerns the legitimacy of the sources of bureaucracy - the degree of correspondence of the rules which constitute and regulate the bureaucratic structure with the norms which pertain within the wider system of "legal authority" ⁽⁵⁷⁾ of the state. In so far as bureaucratic rules within the police are deemed to mirror or complement rules which themselves are properly enacted within the wider legal system, or are deemed to derive from senior officers within the organisation who in turn can claim authority in terms of a constitutional lineage, then, as well as providing another potent basis of authority for the institution before its external audiences, ⁽⁵⁸⁾ this source-based legitimacy may also provides a significant basis of internal authority for those formally charged with the promulgation or application of organisational rules.

While the variety of authority relations may be neatly subcategorized in terms of the source and constituent features of the authoritative claim, this is not possible in the case of the various forms of persuasion. In the last analysis, the defining feature of an act of persuasion consists in the reasons by which one is persuaded to act in accordance with a particular normative preference of another, and so diverse is this class of reasons that

it does not admit of internal subclassification in ways which reveal broad but meaningful patterns to which particular acts of persuasion may be seen to correspond, and in respect of which they may thus be identified and distinguished. Nevertheless, persuasion remains an important method by which normative power is exercised, not only in its own right, but also in terms of the "tendential law" (59) by which Wrong claims relations of persuasion may metamorphose into relations of authority, and so provide an important foundation for the latter. The most obvious example of this linkage is between persuasion and competent authority, whereby repeated examples of *A*'s competence, made manifest in the substance of that which *A* persuades *B* to do and confirmed in *B*'s retrospective judgement that *A*'s advice has been demonstrated to be valid, lead *B* to acquire sufficient confidence in *A*'s knowledge-claims to act on them thereafter without independently evaluating them. (60)

If we look more generally at how the various bases of normative power interact, it should be recognized that in many circumstances the relationship between persuasion, personal authority, competent authority and institutional authority is not additive. It is impossible to maximize one's normative power on all counts simultaneously. A degree of internal trade-off between the various sub-types is inevitable, and the nature of this trade-off is in part influenced by institutional position - that element of institutionally ascribed authority over which an officer has no control short of resigning his or her rank - and in part by the manner in which the officer himself or herself engages in the subtle

task of attempting to generate the optimum degree of authoritativeness and persuasive power from the interplay of the various sub-types. Further, as we shall elaborate upon in chapter five, there is an additional set of complex trade-offs involved for officers attempting to join normative power techniques and instrumental power techniques within their overall role performance. The manner in which the officer attempts these various interconnected tasks, the marriage of personal image and actions to the appropriate insignia of institutional authority and the way in which he or she manages the various trade-offs within the set of normative power bases, and between that set and the instrumental bases of power, we shall term the *authoritative style* of the officer. (61)

Before leaving the topic of normative relations, a final type of normative orientation must be mentioned, which although not easily subsumed under our analysis of dyadic power relations, (62) cannot be left out of the account in analysing the absolute strength of the normative dimension within police organizational relations, nor in analysing its relative strength vis-a-vis the instrumental dimension. Here we are referring to circumstances where *A* and *B* may be independently persuaded of the normative correctness of a particular course of action or of a general approach to policework, that is, where there is an *externally* explicable similarity or complementarity of objectives. This underlying *normative unity* arises from the operation of factors discussed in section B of the previous chapter, including similar pre-police experience, common

exposure to various forms of informal and formal occupational socialization, and shared work experience. It is not only of significance in its own right in accounting for elements of normative consensus, but also -- and more crucially, given the centrality of intra-organisational relational processes to day-to-day work practice and the sheer quantity and variety of concrete normative choices which have to be made - as providing a background which may facilitate the construction of normative agreement in particular dyadic relations. Thus, this underlying normative unity is inextricably tied up with the operation of normative power relations more generally.

(2) Instrumental power relations

The central characteristic of instrumental power relations is the existence of a context within which at least one party to the relationship requires the other to act or to refrain from acting in a particular manner in order that the first actor's wish be fulfilled, and of action by this first party calculated to meet this requirement by means which do not serve to eradicate any conflict of wants, or at least of priorities among wants, which may obtain between the two parties. Thus, the defining feature of instrumental relations is the attempt by one party to use the other party as a mere 'instrument', or pliable resource, in order to attain their desired end. Developing this idea to include the basic strategic forms through which instrumental power relations unfold, we may

express the attributes of the most simple type of instrumental power relation in the following symbolic form :

The capacity of A to influence B either to do C or not to frustrate the achievement of C [C being an end more valued by A than by B], which capacity being dependent upon either (1) threat or inducement, i.e. A's ability to influence the capacity of B to achieve D [D being more valued by B than by A], or (2) control of the allocation of key resources, i.e. A's ability to control B's access to resources required by B to achieve not-C.

Thus, two general sub-types of instrumental power relations may be identified. As will be demonstrated, the first - *threat or inducement*⁽⁶³⁾ - is the more refined and exact strategy, but also one whose successful execution is a relatively complex task, whereas the second - *control of the allocation of key resources*⁽⁶⁴⁾ - is a blunter instrument, but also one whose conditions of successful utilization are more elementary. Let us consider each of these in turn.

The relative complexity of a threat or an inducement lies in the fact that each involves a two-stage strategic process. For a threat or inducement to be effective requires not only that A be capable of influencing and willing to influence the achievement of D by B, but also that A is able to ascertain, or at least convince B of A's ability to ascertain whether or not B is acting so as to further or to resist the attainment of C. A must, in other words, be able to convince B both that A can affect B's future well-being in significant ways, and also that the nature of the action which A

may take in this respect is reliably informed by, and dependent upon *A*'s knowledge of the contribution - positive or negative - of actions taken by *B* in respect of ends desired by *A*. Thus, the coherence and success of deterrence-based and incentive-based techniques of this order are dependent upon the perceived ability of the party engaging in the relevant strategic initiative to verify whether the actions of the other party which it is intended to deter or to encourage have or have not in fact have taken place.

In order to distinguish between threat and inducement we must look at the first stage of this process - the manner in which *A* is capable of exercising influence over *B*'s well-being. In the case of threats, what is at issue is the capacity of *A* to impose negative sanctions upon *B*'s conduct - the 'iron fist' technique - whereas in the case of inducement what is at issue is the capacity of *A* to provide incentives to *B* and to reward him or her - the 'velvet glove' technique. (65) In both cases the structure of the second stage of the problem, that is, access to relevant information, is the same.

In contemporary British police organisations, such access may operate through four different media: personal monitoring, telecommunications, third party sources, and documentary sources. Personal monitoring is obviously the most comprehensive and accurate, but also the most inefficient in terms of time and resources. Indeed, the marginal reliance of senior officers upon this technique is reflected in the extended line of control within

the rank structure itself, and in the differential shift system, the senior officers above inspector rank working to a basic dayshift pattern while the operational ranks work in an alternating shift cycle which provides twenty four hour cover. More generally, having regard to the different strengths and limitations of the four media and the attempt to optimize overall monitoring capacity, these media are typically operated in combination. Thus, telecommunications, third party methods and personal monitoring may be combined, as where the sergeant reports to the inspector, via his or her personal radio, on activities of the constable witnessed by the sergeant. Or, telecommunications and documentary sources may be combined, as where a constable or a sergeant enters a synoptic crime report into a computerized databank whence it may later be retrieved in the form of a print-out by his or her seniors. Or, to take a final example, personal monitoring, third party and documentary sources may be combined, as where the sergeant enters his assessment of the qualities and potential of a constable in the latter's staff appraisal form, which will thereafter be scrutinized and completed by senior officers.

As to the control of the allocation of key resources as a strategy of instrumental power, the resources in question through which the capacity of the second party to influence the attainment of the first party's ends may be curtailed can be either corporeal or incorporeal - physical or intellectual. For instance, by his or her control of either type of resource, *an officer of senior divisional rank may ensure that a junior officer obeys orders to*

engage in foot patrol rather than mobile patrol - in a particular area, and that *the* junior officer is thereby denied the opportunity of acting in the furtherance of ends at odds ^{with} *A*, those of the senior officer. Thus *A* may render *B* unable to act contrary to *A*'s wishes in ways which *A* suspects *B* might otherwise do - whether through driving a police car recklessly or through straying from his or her beat in order to indulge in "easing behaviour" (EE) - either by depriving *B* of a car (a corporeal resource) or by refusing *B* access to a course permitting him to gain the necessary skills and knowledge to gain a police driver's certificate (an incorporeal resource).

The relatively unrefined quality of this instrument lies in the fact that it merely amounts to a power of veto. Control of the allocation of resources does not permit *A* to influence *B* to act in a manner which is conducive to a particular end valued by *A*, but merely to prevent *B* from acting in a manner contrary to *A*'s wishes in a particular case, or across a category of cases. It was earlier suggested that the ensuing lack of precision is to some extent compensated for by the fact that this second sub-type of instrumental power involves a less complex mode of execution, requiring a one-tiered rather than a two-tiered approach. There is no integral link between the availability of information gathering techniques and strategic success as there is in the case of the first strategy, since unlike that first case, control is effected through ensuring compliance in advance, and does not depend upon a process of retrospective verification. However, too much should not

be read into this distinction for, in practice, a properly informed strategy of control of access to resources requires a high level of knowledge as to the patterns of operational practices amongst those it is intended to control, on account of the fact that only such knowledge, by identifying the need for resource access controls in certain areas, can provide meaningful grounds for imposing such controls. Accordingly, albeit in a less constrictive manner, the strategy of control of access to key resources remains tied in with the issue of accessing information.

Further underlining the link between the two strategies of instrumental power, it may be noted that the two are often complexly fused. For example, it was found that the set of expectations within our research forces that territorial units should abide by the orders of the divisional controller in respect of their allocation to particular calls was enforced through a combination of the two sub-types. On the one hand, there was the latent possibility of the invocation of sanctions in the case of disobedience, a straightforward example of a threat-based strategy. On the other, there was the practice of generally disallowing 'talkthrough' between different units without the intermediation of the controller (again backed by the threat of negative sanction), together with the use of a technological device within the communications system which ensured that third party units could hear only the controller's voice in the latter's conversations with other operational units. The two techniques within this second strategy interlocked to restrict access to vital information - an

incorporeal resource - which might otherwise have provided units with reasons to 'stray off their own patch'.

If we move beyond this elementary model of instrumental power relations, the picture becomes more complicated once we recognize the intercursive quality within such relations - the extent to which a particular relationship is "characterized by a balance of power and division of scopes between the parties".⁽⁶⁷⁾ The very fact that interpersonal relations are entered into in any given context, presupposes *some* intercursive element, however slight. This is so because the acknowledgement by *A* that his or her transformative capacity *depends* upon control or influence over the actions of *B*, means that, *ex hypothesi*, *B* has some reciprocal capacity to influence *A*. Or as Giddens puts it, power relations inevitably operate in terms of a "dialectic of control",⁽⁶⁸⁾ where, irrespective of the *asymmetry* of resources between parties, the bare fact of their mutual engagement implies "the capability of the weak... to turn their weakness back against the powerful."⁽⁶⁹⁾ Nor should it be assumed that the *asymmetry* between the higher and lower echelons of the organisation is necessarily acute. For example, perhaps the most celebrated case-study in the literature of organisational theory, Crozier's analysis of a French state-owned tobacco monopoly, demonstrates how the non-transferrable expertise of maintenance workers in respect of key technical tasks meant that, despite their lowly formal status, they held a strong negotiating hand in relation to their peers and superiors within the enterprise.⁽⁷⁰⁾

-

And if we return to the context of the police organisation, given the strong network of task interdependence alluded to in the previous chapter, the intercursive quality of instrumental relations will in many instances be robust. The implications of this for our understanding of the nature of instrumental relations are significant, for in so far as it is recognized by both parties that the objective balance of power between them is relatively evenly poised - that each holds within his or her gift something which the other party values considerably - then it is no longer accurate, as in the simple model, to assess the strategy of the second party to the relationship (*B*) in merely defensive and reactive terms. Rather, a framework of mutual accommodation may emerge which, as we shall see, ⁽²¹⁾ may provide the preconditions for a more normative pattern of relations between them.

At the other extreme, there are also crucial areas of practice and strategy within the police organisation where no such reciprocity exists, and where one party is dispensable as a resource in the achievement of the ends of the other. However, where this is the case, it also, paradoxically, illuminates a further means whereby the situational logic of instrumental relations may be extended and modified in a normative direction. In brief, where the capacities of certain groups of actors are deemed dispensable by other groups of actors, then this tends to place members of the first group in an extremely vulnerable position within the organisation. In crude terms, they may be acted against with

relative impunity. In consequence, actors within this vulnerable group may look more closely to one another to protect their position and to achieve the ends *which* they seek within the organisation. There may develop a *concurrence* of objectives between them in terms of their common desire to counter the strategic threat against them. In such circumstances, the motivation for their strategies of mutual accommodation is the intermediate utility to all of such an accommodation in terms of the discrete ends of each, and as such, their relations still fall short of full normative consensus. Nevertheless, their relationships are qualitatively distinct from the mainstream of instrumental power relations, in that they do not involve the mounting of instrumental strategies against one another, but rather, a pattern of combined action in response to the instrumental threat of third parties. The framework of mutual accommodation in this special type of intercuratively organized power relation characterized by a concurrence of objectives is likely to be even more resilient than the instrumental power relation merely characterized by a strong reciprocity of objectives which was considered above, and accordingly, is even more likely than the latter type of relation to contain the seeds of its own transformation into a more normative structure. Again, consideration of the circumstances within which this might occur, and the significant general ramifications of such a process, will be postponed until chapter five.

C. NORMATIVE AND INSTRUMENTAL POWER RELATIONS: SOME ADDITIONAL
FEATURES:

(1) Normative and instrumental power relations: forms of
enactment

While the construction of the various forms of power relations cannot in the final analysis be understood apart from the intentional actions of the agents involved, it would be wrong to view the continuous implication of such relations in the day-to-day life of the organisation in terms of a set of discrete episodes, each consciously enacted. Thus normative relations may unfold in a manner not fully intended nor appreciated by the parties involved. Acts of persuasion may be unintended, as in many instances of 'learning by example', which provides such an important method of disseminating and assimilating knowledge in a craft-based enterprise. As regards authority relations, quite apart from the special case of institutional authority relations, which by definition operate to some extent independently of the actions and intentions of the authority-holder, there is a more general and irreducible element of latency in all such relations. The authority accorded to an agent is an aspect of their reputation in the eyes of the authority-subject, which in turn is dependent upon actions or qualities attributed or deemed attributable to the authority-holder prior to particular exchanges in which their authoritative reputation is implicated.⁽⁷²⁾ The existence of a resilient context

which is highly suggestive to either or both the putative authority-holder and the putative authority-subject, thus permits and encourages a significant degree of strategic economy in the operation of this particular type of power relation.

So also in the case of instrumental power relations, although they may be strategically motivated in particular instances, they too exert a less obvious but more pervasive sway over organizational proceedings. In the case of threats and inducements, the capability and propensity of *A* to make use of such techniques may be known to *B* through *B*'s experience of past threats or inducements by *A*, or by members of the same class of actors as *A*, and this sense of possibility - or "rule of anticipated reactions"⁽⁷³⁾, may be as effective in ensuring *B*'s compliance with *A*'s wishes as a more overt initiative on *A*'s part.

For its part, control of the allocation of resources is an instrumental strategy which operates independently of the attitude of the party subjected to the strategy, and accordingly, the rule of anticipated reactions does not operate in this context. However, the very fact that its situational logic precludes the involvement of the other party, and thus that its effectiveness does not in any sense depend upon the actions or reactions of that other party, suggests an important latent dimension within this power relation also. Although such matters will be explicitly raised from time to time, as there is no intrinsic requirement for the terms of access

to control of key resources to be continuously negotiated or reinforced, then, once set in place, a particular pattern of access will exclude certain options on the part of the subject party irrespective of the conscious design of either agent.

Taken together, these remarks underline the extent to which particular dyadic power relations tend to become embedded in recurrent patterns of action. In particular, in that the efficacy of standard operating procedures presupposes stable power relations, and, conversely, these power relations are themselves in the final analysis largely constituted and sustained through the operation of other organizational rules, namely rules of structural design, rules of social technology and communicative rules, the latent dimension of authority relations and instrumental power relations may be seen to operate in symbiosis with organizational rules so as to provide a relatively continuous backdrop to organizational practice. This reinforces the point made in section A above, that a microscopic perspective upon dyadic power structures does not prevent the discovery of general patterns of intra-organisational relations

**(2) Instrumental and normative relations: a preliminary
evaluation**

In constructing our classificatory scheme it is not our intention to suggest that either species of power relations is intrinsically and categorically superior to the other in respect of

any relevant dimension of evaluation. This caveat applies whether we focus on the evaluative dimension of most central concern to us, namely the likelihood of these power relations providing an effective, efficient and harmonious context for the implementation of organizational policy, or upon the related question of their capacity to respond to the aspirations and further the life-chances of organisational members. Instead for each type of power relation and in respect of all relevant evaluative criteria, we can point to a number of credits and debits on the balance-sheet.

If we look first at normative power relations, the act of persuasion appears to embody the values of autonomy, individual utility and rational consensus which, as noted below, are endangered under an instrumental regime. By the same token, however, particularly where *manipulation* is involved - "when B is *not* aware of A's intention to influence him but A does in fact manage to get B to follow his wishes",⁷⁴ the possibility looms large of the manufacture of a false consensus along the lines identified by exponents of the three-dimensional view of power. For its part, personal authority refers to forms of affective relationships which are generally valued and to important forms of nurturance based upon general role models, as well as to the dangers of extending friendship and loyalty in inappropriate ways and to inappropriate lengths, and of entirely surrendering the capacity of independent judgement in the face of the caprices and dictates of a revered other. Competent authority refers to a highly efficient method of

- passing on vital knowledge and skills, as well as to the dangers of losing sight of the boundaries within which the profession of specialist knowledge is legitimate and of creating orthodoxies of knowledge which are ill-adapted to changing circumstances.

In its traditional and sacred modes, institutional authority refers to the functional resilience and element of general acceptability of practices which have 'stood the test of time', as well as to the dangers of stultification and mystification implicit in an unreflective reverence for the past or an uncritical deference in the face of the "awe-arousing"⁽⁷⁵⁾ imagery in which powerful social roles are culturally encased. In terms of its bureaucratic referents, institutional authority signifies and endorses a complex set of rules designed to provide for the co-ordination of collective action in logistical terms, and to provide a sense of security, stability, and of transparent purpose and legible guidance as the basis for reflexive self-regulation on the part of members of the collectivity.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Finally, in terms of its constitutional referents, it provides a regulatory nexus connecting the police organisation to the wider legal system and/or a degree of correspondence with the imperatives of more widely legitimated institutions. However, against these legal rational values must be balanced the rigidity, rule-based pedanticism, inability to adapt, empire-building and tendency of sub-units to perpetuate which have been recognised as the collective pathologies of the bureaucratic system, as well as the arrogant dismissal of alternative views on

the part of superiors and self-seeking obsequiousness of inferiors which have been characterized as its individual pathologies. (77)

At first glance, it might seem that in net terms, instrumental relations are more likely to attract negative evaluation in accordance with the various criteria mentioned. Certainly, in that they are predicated upon a perceived conflict of ends between the two parties and the imposition of one of these sets of ends, they would appear to be at odds with values of autonomy and individual utility; and to encourage a cycle of action and reaction which diverts attention from common purposes, encourages the suppression of organisationally relevant information, and disillusion individual participants. (78)

However, there are two significant entries to be made in the credit column, both of which are premised upon the inevitability of a plurality of values within our culture. First, given any substantial and irreconcilable element of difference in the world-views of different groups, the effective co-ordination of endeavour required for successful, collective action may only proceed on the basis of the existence of a capacity to threaten or utilise positive and negative sanctions and resource access controls on occasions in order to ensure conformity with an integrated programme. Secondly, even those who are disproportionately subjected to instrumental power relations may prefer to accept the rules of this game - maximizing their return by responding to that part of the design

which is based upon incentives and developing their life-chances in other areas, rather than participate in an elaborate and essentially unsatisfying play of social solidarity. This form of pragmatic acquiescence or instrumental acceptance involves making the 'best of a bad job' rather than the "double negation"⁽⁷³⁾ expressed in the denial that the job is 'bad' in the first place; and if such acquiescence involves a withdrawal of commitment, it may be a strategic rather than a disillusioned and anomic withdrawal.⁽⁸⁰⁾ Finally, quite apart from these intrinsic benefits, as was foreshadowed in the previous section, instrumental relations may under certain circumstances contain a transformative dynamic, and may thus precipitate a more normative logic of operation.

These comments suggest that, although in a very general sense instrumental relations appear to exhibit the greater dangers and disadvantages in respect of the evaluative criteria mentioned, exclusive reliance upon either instrumental relations or normative relations is impracticable and undesirable within organised policework, as indeed it is in any sphere of social organisation. More concretely, how far and in what manner the positive and negative features of each species and subspecies of power relation - as conceived of in the ideal typical forms developed in this chapter - are realized in the balance which in practice is struck between them, and with what overall implications for the effective and efficient implementation of organisational policy, are questions which can only be resolved after precise empirical inquiry and

analysis. It is to that empirical task that we now -turn our attention.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE RESEARCH: SOME GENERAL FINDINGS

A. THE RESEARCH DESIGN

The research, which took place between March 1985 and June 1986, focussed on the work of sergeants in four police divisions displaying different environmental features. City (C) division is entirely city-based. The area of Riverside (R) Division includes a number of suburbs of another city, and a town situated on its boundary. Oldtown (O) Division straddles a number of large towns and smaller urban communities. Newtown (N) Division is the largest area of the four, and includes both a number of larger and smaller urban communities and large rural sections. The diversity of environmental settings was underlined by the fact that the divisions chosen are located in two different forces - Oldtown and Riverside Divisions in Force A and Newtown and City Divisions in Force B. This choice of two different forces also ensured a diversity of organizational settings, a variety of organizational context to match the variety of environmental context.⁽¹⁾

As explained in chapter two, the uniform patrol sergeant was chosen as the primary focus of study, as the main representative of 'line' management within the key first-line supervisory rank. The large majority of uniform patrol sergeants in the four divisions,

whether designated as section sergeants within particular time-shifts, or as area sergeants or relief sergeants,⁽²⁾ were interviewed in a semi-structured manner: 22 out of 29 were interviewed in 'O' Division, 20 out of 24 in 'R' Division, 24 out of 26 in 'N' Division, and 17 out of 18 in 'C' Division (N=83). A similar emphasis was placed upon station sergeants situated in the operations room at the various Divisional Headquarters, as they invariably work alongside a particular uniform patrol shift and were thus intimately involved in their work and conversant with their problems. 12 out of the 16 station sergeants in the 4 divisions were interviewed

Coverage of uniform patrol sergeants and station sergeants was not fully comprehensive for two reasons. First, and most significantly, a number of officers were unavailable on account of prolonged sick leave or other absence. Secondly, although senior officers in both forces were extremely co-operative in permitting general access to uniform sergeants, if individual officers nevertheless did not wish to take part or expressed reservations, then these views were respected. As well as permitting freedom of choice, the decision not to interview the very small group of unwilling respondents⁽³⁾ also avoided problems relating to the validity and quality of their responses. Such problems could not be underestimated in the present context, given the concentration on the examination of attitudes and perceptions and the related commitment to depth interviewing techniques which required that a close rapport be established with the respondent.

Further, the section sergeant(s) within one particular shift in three out of the four divisions were observed at work over a period of two tours of duty (fourteen working days). Short-term observation was also possible in some cases where the researcher was able to accompany the interviewee through the remainder of the shift during which an interview had taken place. Particular advantage was taken of this in City Division, the only division where it was not possible to conduct a more sustained piece of observational research, on account of the frustration of fieldwork plans due to the unanticipated absence through illness of a key research subject.

Semi-structured interviews were also conducted with four other groups of officers. First, although it was not part of the initial design, the enthusiasm and generosity of officers within the four divisions provided the opportunity to interview a smaller sample of sergeants representing the other functional specialisms. 8 out of 27 detective sergeants were interviewed, 2 out of 4 community involvement sergeants, and 1 out of 2 licensing sergeants. Neither of the 2 inquiry sergeants, nor the 1 administration sergeant, was interviewed. Many of these officers had previously worked as uniform patrol sergeants and all were presently engaged in work which was in some respects similar to that of the uniform patrol sergeant. Since the fortuitous circumstances of its generation entailed that this was a haphazard sample - its representativeness not guaranteed - reliance is not placed upon the aggregate quantitative findings from this miscellaneous group of interviewees. The interviews with this group (N=23) nevertheless provided a

valuable additional source of data which is drawn upon in later chapters.

Secondly, a sample of just over 50% of the uniform supervisory inspectors in the four divisions was interviewed. 7 out of 13 were interviewed in 'O' Division, 4 out of 8 in 'R' Division, 4 out of 7 in 'N' Division, and 3 out of 5 in 'C' Division. (N=18). The sample was designed to ensure its representativeness in terms not only of territorial location, but also of age and length of service.⁽⁴⁾ These criteria were regarded as particularly salient on account of the emphasis within the project, first, upon the importance of recent changes in the social organisation of policework and their possible effects upon the orientations of managerial ranks with differential experience of this changing work background and, secondly, upon the significance of inter-rank allegiances and understandings and their possible variation in accordance with the remoteness or otherwise of the experience of the senior officer of the work of more junior ranks.⁽⁵⁾

Thirdly, all available uniform staff at the rank of chief inspector and above were interviewed. At superintendent rank, 3 of the 4 Depute Divisional Commanders were interviewed, together with the 2 Sub-Divisional Commanders appointed at that rank (N=5). At chief inspector rank, members of the three different categories of uniform officers were interviewed: 1 of the 2 Depute Sub-Divisional Commanders; 6 of the 7 Sub-Divisional Commanders; and 1 of the 2 Divisional Staff Officers appointed at that rank (N=8). Ongoing

discussions also took place with each of the 4 Divisional Commanders at chief superintendent rank. In each case, the Divisional Commander provided important background information and was a valued discussant of preliminary findings. Thus, on account of their special role within the research project, although an attempt was made to cover the same general ground with them as with other senior respondents, it was not possible or desirable to replicate exactly the interview conditions of the others. Accordingly, while the views and other inputs of Divisional Commanders have contributed significantly to our final understanding, their responses are not grouped with those of other senior officers for purposes of quantitative analysis.

Fourthly, a small number of uniform constables was interviewed. Due to their relatively marginal status within the overall project, the availability of a significant body of existing research on their work and attitudes, constraints of time and the wish of the negotiating agencies that the time of operational officers should not be significantly encroached upon, this was a very modest sample, comprising a total of 12 officers, 3 from each division. Accordingly, while the perceptions and insights contained in a number of specific responses are drawn upon in the report, as with the group of non-uniform patrol sergeants and the Divisional Commanders reliance is not placed on the aggregate quantitative findings. In each division, the three officers were drawn from the same shift, which, in the case of Newtown, Oldtown and Riverside Divisions, was the shift in which detailed observational work of the

sergeant(s) took place. Length of service was chosen as a sampling variable, again in order to ensure some sensitivity towards changing work conditions and experiences and their effects upon research subjects. (e)

If we look more closely at the interviews with ranks other than sergeant, these served a number of purposes. First, they provided another set of perspectives on the role of the sergeant, perspectives which were privileged in that they belonged to officers who were themselves ex-sergeants or were in everyday contact with sergeants, and which would thus provide a valuable counterweight to the views of the sergeants themselves in any attempt to provide a rounded analysis of the role of the sergeant. Secondly, to recall the argument presented in chapter two as to the need to situate the crucial policy implementation role of sergeants within the context of divisional relations as a whole, as these views were expressed by officers having the capacity to influence the role of the sergeant, they also provided significant evidence of the pressures bearing upon the sergeant role. In other words, the perspectives of other ranks in respect of the role of the sergeant not only provided a valuable set of additional observations as to the nature of the sergeant's task, but also represented a set of attitudes and indicated a set of practical orientations which, to a significant extent, helped to *constitute* this task. To develop further the theme of the contribution of other ranks to the pattern of divisional relations, there was also addressed to these other ranks a series of questions as to the nature of their own role which were in similar

vein to the questions asked of them and of the sergeants themselves as to the role of the sergeant. This subsidiary tack of inquiry was particularly strongly developed in the case of the sergeants' immediate superiors within the divisional management chain, namely the inspectors, so reflecting their crucial complementary role within the process of policy implementation, and as fellow-mediators of divisional relations capable of influencing the role of the sergeant to a significant extent.⁽⁷⁾

Therefore, a total of 153 interviews were carried out within our various categories. Four different interview schedules were used for constables, sergeants, inspectors and senior officers respectively. These schedules are reproduced in **Appendix 1** to this thesis. The substantive themes covered within these interview are discussed in section B below.

As to the form taken by the interview, each was of 2 to 4 hours duration. Although a number of structured questions were included, emphasis was placed on pursuing more open-ended themes. General probing techniques were extensively used and also, where appropriate, more concrete probes which developed the discussion through reference (in a suitably anonymized form where necessary) to issues, events and trends of which the interviewer had been informed on other occasions. This accent upon an intimate, flexible and extremely intensive form of exchange reflected the fact that the interviews provided the central research instrument. This particular form of interview was also seen to be suited to certain more

specific demands of the research context, such as the need to win the confidence of a set of research subjects traditionally wary of external research initiatives⁽⁸⁾ and the need to stimulate reflection and focussed discussion upon matters which in many cases were otherwise rarely engaged with and which, initially at any rate, could only be presented to the subject at a fairly high level of abstraction.⁽⁹⁾

As it is based upon the perceptions of respondents, the interview technique can never provide a fully rounded conception of any set of roles. The observational work, by allowing more direct access to the practical and experiential context from which attitudes and perceptions emerge, provided a valuable additional source of material. Examination of documentary material relevant to the work of the sergeant and other supervisory ranks, which was another research method utilized, performed a similar supplementary function.⁽¹⁰⁾

Inevitably, the precise mix of methods chosen for the research involved a number of compromises. In particular, constraints of time and resources meant that intensive observational work had to be minimized in order to allow consideration of as wide and representative a sample of the sergeant rank and of other relevant ranks, as possible. Bearing these considerations in mind, every care was taken to match the research design to the needs of the project.

B. THE RESEARCH: SOME GENERAL FINDINGS

In this section the major quantitative findings from the various interview schedules are presented and an attempt is made to highlight certain general trends and pointers. We concentrate on the core groups which provided the main focus of the research, and the most comprehensive samples, namely the 95 uniform shift sergeants, 18 inspectors, and 13 chief inspectors and superintendents. The discussion is organized by reference to eight elementary themes derived from the questionnaires. These are (1) basic demographic characteristics of the research subjects; (2) job preparation and career development; (3) elementary features of present role, including major priorities and problems; (4) the bases of intra-organisational power and influence of promoted ranks; (5) relationships between ranks; (6) the role of the police supervisor as manager; (7) job satisfaction within promoted ranks; (8) the changing role of the police supervisor.

The first two themes indicate certain basic background socialization patterns, and point to certain perceived strengths and deficiencies in the police organization's own mechanisms for career development. The third theme concentrates on the content of the supervisory role and provides a touchstone for further reflections. Themes four and five present a more detailed focus upon relations within the division and provide the centrepiece of the attempt to operationalize the theoretical concern with the nature of power relations between ranks which has been developed in the previous two

chapters. The sixth theme attempts to broaden our perspective upon the nature of command relations by examining how 'management' in general is viewed through the various cultural grids employed by police officers, and how police management in particular is viewed in comparison to management in other industrial and commercial enterprises. The seventh theme is also couched at a more general level, attempting to tap significant indices of overall job satisfaction and motivation in the face of the more specific pressures and demands discussed earlier. Finally, the eighth theme recalls our earlier concern to introduce a dynamic element within our understanding; it endeavours to map the understandings of our subjects as to the manner in which their roles have changed and are presently developing.

Appendix 2 to this thesis presents the main quantitative findings in tabular form and should be examined alongside the discussion below. It should be underlined that this quantitative analysis is important only as a springboard for more detailed exploration. Later chapters will attempt to provide a deeper understanding of the findings in terms of our theoretical model, and will attempt to illustrate, develop and refine many of our tentative conclusions by reference to other data derived from the research, including not only the observational and documentary data, but also data drawn from interviews with other divisional personnel as well as data drawn from the open-ended questions and probes addressed to our core groups.

(1) Basic demographic characteristics.

The mean age of the sergeant sample was 40, with an average length of service of 18 years. The average ages of inspectors and senior divisional officers (considered collectively) were 44 and 47 respectively, while the average length of service of members of these two groups were 23 and 26 years respectively. In all cases these figures corresponded closely to divisional and national averages at the time of the research.⁽¹¹⁾ As regards gender, all but two (2.1%) of the sergeants interviewed were male, and all officers within the inspector and senior officer samples were male. With respect to the two senior groups, there were in fact no female officers in post ^{at} many of the relevant ranks within the research divisions. Nor was this surprising in terms of national trends, which again closely reflected the gender distribution in all three samples.⁽¹²⁾

(2) Job preparation and Career Development

This general category encompasses two sub-themes. First, as regards job preparation, our three core groups were asked about the nature and adequacy of training and general preparation for the sergeant rank, including the significance of formal qualifications, and about the potential for improvement. Inspectors were asked similar questions about their own role, and all categories were asked about the importance of formal qualifications at various levels within the organization.

All of the sergeants had undergone a short in-force course for newly promoted personnel. Nine (9.5%) of them had also undergone the recently introduced two-week central course for new sergeants at the Scottish Police College (SPC), while fifty seven (60%) had experienced the eight-week selected sergeants course at the SPC. Finally, eight (9.4%) had gained rank through the Accelerated Promotion scheme, which involved a year-long competitive programme of training, secondments and academic assignments for a small group of officers chosen annually from a national pool of candidates in accordance with rigorous selection criteria. Sixty two sergeants (65.3%) found the transition from constable rank either difficult or very difficult (Table 1) and sixty four (67.4%) felt that the organization had prepared them for the transition either not very well or not well at all (Table 2). Of the sixty one (64.2%) who identified specific ways in which the organisation could better prepare them for rank, thirty five (36.8%) mentioned more training, with special emphasis upon the teaching of practical skills during the early period of service, twenty one (22.1%) mentioned anticipatory experience either through 'acting-up' - assuming the responsibilities of a more senior rank prior to promotion (a practice already widespread in City Division (19)) or other more informal methods, while twenty (21.1%) mentioned more experience at constable rank prior to promotion (Table 3) Underlining the emphasis placed upon 'practical' experience at the expense of more 'academic' pursuits, fifty eight sergeants (61.1%) felt that formal qualifications, whether police-related (the compulsory sergeants

and inspectors promotion exams) or otherwise, were unimportant or not very important in the making of a good sergeant (Table 4).

Eleven out of eighteen inspectors (61.1%) also believed organisational preparation for the sergeant rank to be inadequate, but only four out of thirteen chief inspectors and superintendents (30.8%) were dissatisfied on this count (Table 2). Whereas sergeants emphasized more training followed by anticipatory experience and longer service in the constable rank as means of overcoming the problem of lack of preparation, both groups of more senior officers laid greatest emphasis on length of service in the constable rank, closely followed by increased training, with comparatively little favour shown towards schemes of anticipatory experience (Table 3). Ten inspectors (55.6%) and six chief inspectors and superintendents (46.2%) felt that formal qualifications were unimportant or not very important for officers of sergeant rank (Table 4).

When asked about preparation for their own rank, ten inspectors (55.6%) found the transition from sergeant to inspector either quite difficult or very difficult and eleven (61.1%) felt organisational preparation to be inadequate (Table 5). Of the twelve (66.7%) who mentioned concrete proposals for improvement, ten (55.6%) believed that further training could be provided beyond the five-week course for newly promoted inspectors run by the SPC, seven (38.9%) felt that inspectors would benefit from more anticipatory experience of work in the rank, and only one (5.6%) believed that greater service

in the previous rank - the sergeant rank - would be an improvement (Table 6). With only one exception, those inspectors who favoured anticipatory experience in their present rank did not also favour this technique as a means of preparing officers for the sergeant rank. When asked to explain this difference, all commented to the effect that the nature of the sergeant's role was closer to that of the inspector than was the constable's role to that of the sergeant and, accordingly, that a programme of anticipatory experience was more feasible and less disruptive in the former case. Finally, despite the fact that a majority of the inspectors experienced difficulty in their transition to their present role and dissatisfaction with the organisation's efforts in this respect, a majority (10=55.6%) still felt that this was a less difficult transition than that from constable to sergeant rank, and a further three officers (16.7%) felt that the earlier transition was no less difficult (Table 7).

As indicated, our three groups were also asked about the importance of formal qualifications at various ranks. Two general trends were evident from these responses. First, more senior ranking officers were more likely to attach value to formal qualifications at all ranks. Secondly, officers of all ranks believed formal qualifications to be of relatively greater benefit in the more senior ranks (Table 4).

The second sub-theme within this section is career development. All groups were asked a series of questions about the staff

appraisal and promotion systems. The formal staff appraisal system operating within both forces was very similar. (15) All officers were subject to annual written appraisal by a supervisory officer at each of the three immediately senior ranks, in accordance with a number of criteria, including job knowledge, application, management of subordinates, dependability and judgement, disposition, planning and initiative, and personal presentation. A counselling interview was also held by the most senior officer within the applicable range, who was responsible for making an additional general judgment as to the appraisee's readiness or otherwise for promotion.

Asked about the merits of the staff appraisal system, forty seven sergeants (49.5%) believed it to be a fairly good or very good system (Table 8). Forty six (48.4%) believed the aims of the system to be a mixture of individual career development and the securing of more effective performance in the officer's present role, whereas thirty seven (38.9%) indicated the former and twelve (12.6%) indicated the latter as the single objective of the system (Table 9). Fifty two (54.7%) felt that the counselling interview was either a fairly important or a very important aspect of the overall system (Table 10). Seventy sergeants (73.7%) felt that there was a recognizable promotion policy within their force, although fifty three (55.8%) qualified this by asserting that such a policy was only evident 'to some extent' (Table 11). Most sergeants who responded affirmatively singled out the system of promotion examinations and the staff appraisal system itself as the identifiable components of the promotion system. Finally, fifty

four sergeants (56.8%) felt that the promotion system was fair overall (Table 12). Thus, an extremely mixed response is evident in respect of the various dimensions of the career development system which were tapped. Probing underlined the equivocal nature of sergeants' attitudes to these matters by revealing that evaluation tended to be on the basis of relative rather than absolute standards. Those who provided generally positive evaluations of the staff appraisal and promotion systems remained unsure of their overall worth, tending to emphasize their merit only in comparison to previous régimes, when no formal staff appraisal system existed. For their part, those who provided negative evaluations tended to reject this 'better than nothing' approach, suggesting that the nepotism and arbitrary judgments characteristic of a previous age continued to thrive on account of the open-ended criteria inherent in the new system.

A larger percentage of inspectors and senior divisional personnel viewed the staff appraisal system as at least fairly good (10=55.6% and 10=76.9% respectively) (Table 8), understood the system to have a mix of individual and organizational objectives (14=77.8% and 12=92.3% respectively) (Table 9), felt that the counselling interview was at least a fairly important aspect of the overall system (15=83.3% and 13=100% respectively) (Table 10), believed there to be a recognizable promotion policy (14=77.8% and 11=84.6% respectively) (Table 11), and felt the allocation of promotions to be fair (14=77.8% and 12=92.3% respectively) (Table 12). Although this represented a more comprehensive

endorsement of the system of career development, probing nevertheless revealed that, as with the sergeants, the positive evaluations of inspectors tended to focus upon the relative rather than the absolute merits of the present system. (17)

(3) Basic features of the supervisory role

This section, by means of coding answers retrospectively, summarizes responses to a number of open-ended questions concerning the work priorities and problems of our three groups, and their views as to the attributes ideally required of officers of supervisory rank. The main focus is on sergeants, as all groups were asked about the priorities, problems and ideal attributes of members of this rank. However, a significant secondary focus remains on inspectors and senior divisional personnel, as they were also asked self-regarding questions of the above type.

Asked about their main priorities, sergeants provided answers which have been sorted into nine categories, and which are discussed in descending order of popularity (Table 13). Fifty seven (60%) mentioned general policy implementation, embracing comments such as 'running a tight shift' and 'policing the area well'. Forty three (45.3%) mentioned motivating the constables under their charge. Forty (42.1%) mentioned acting as a linkman or 'buffer' between junior and senior ranks. (18) Thirty seven (38.9%) mentioned meeting the administrative demands of senior officers - 'keeping your nose clean'. Thirty seven (38.9%) also mentioned looking after the

welfare of the constables - 'acting as nanny, social worker and father confessor'. Thirty five (36.8) mentioned paperwork duties specifically.⁽¹³⁾ Twenty six (27.4%) mentioned the maintenance of discipline amongst constables. Twenty four (25.3%) mentioned the training of younger constables. Finally, twenty three (24.2%) mentioned doing operational policework (including following through cases in which there was a personal involvement to the stage of giving evidence at a subsequent criminal trial).⁽²⁰⁾

Sergeants' perceptions of their main problems may similarly be sorted into seven categories (Table 14). Sixty three (66.3%) mentioned lack of resources to deal with policing problems properly, due both to a perceived general shortfall of provision and to the misapplication of available resources in various specific ways - such as 'constables twiddling their thumbs in court waiting for another postponement'. Forty five (47.4%) mentioned paperwork. Forty (42.1%) mentioned maintaining harmonious working relations with junior and senior colleagues - 'keeping the bosses and the men happy at the same time'. Thirty eight (40%) mentioned lack of time to carry out all duties adequately. Thirty six (37.9%) mentioned meeting the administrative demands of senior officers. Twenty eight (29.5) mentioned maintaining control of the constables under their charge - 'keeping tabs on what's going on' and 'keeping the men in check'. Finally, nineteen (20%) mentioned keeping the men well motivated.

When asked about the qualities of a 'good' sergeant, sergeants provided responses which may be arranged in nine categories (Table 15). Forty five (47.4%) mentioned the ability to cope under pressure - to remain unflappable. Indeed, 'flapper' was a common pejorative term within the research divisions. Thirty seven (38.9%) mentioned interpersonal skills - being 'good with people'. Thirty three (34.7%) mentioned organisational and administrative skills. Thirty three (34.7%) also mentioned the ability to command respect and retain credibility amongst colleagues of all ranks. Twenty eight (29.5%) mentioned the ability to win the trust and confidence of the men - 'you have to be approachable'. Twenty seven (28.4%) mentioned knowledge of the law and of police procedures. Twenty five (26.3%) mentioned 'common-sense' - the ability to apply knowledge in a 'practical' manner. Twenty (21.1%) mentioned high motivation. Finally, fourteen (14.7%) mentioned loyalty to the job above other interests and concerns. As a rider, it should be noted that the relatively infrequent allusion to matters of general aptitude and integrity - common-sense, motivation and loyalty - may to some extent present a distorted picture. In more general discussion, and in particular, in responding to a question as to the qualities of a good constable (where these three factors were mentioned most frequently) it became apparent that these factors were implicit in most sergeants' understanding of the desirable qualities of a police officer of any rank. Accordingly, it would seem plausible to assume that their relatively poor showing reflects their fundamental taken-for-granted quality rather than their relative insignificance. (21)

These considerations also apply in

interpreting inspectors' and senior officers' conceptions of the sergeant's role, as well as their conceptions of their own respective roles.

Patently, the factors listed within each of these sets of responses overlap and interconnect in various ways, and it is through an initial assessment of these interrelationships that certain basic conclusions may be drawn from these three sets of findings. To begin with, the fact that both the most frequently mentioned priority and the most frequently mentioned problem make reference to the general policing of the territory covered by the sergeant's uniform shift, reflects the fundamental importance of the role of sergeants as policy-implementers, responsible for making the decisions and carrying out the orders which ensure that general policing standards and policies are applied within their sphere of authority and influence. Although fundamental, these findings are neither surprising nor particularly illuminating, merely representing an affirmation of the sergeant's formal functions and responsibilities within the divisional hierarchy. Beyond the mundane re-articulation of the formal contours of their role and the perennial lament for more resources in performing this role, ⁽²²⁾ what are the more immediate substantive problems and priorities of uniform sergeants, and the qualities most sought after in meeting these demands?

Confirming our initial hypothesis as to the nature of the sergeant role, most prominent amongst these is a collection of

tasks, problems and qualities having in common an interpersonal dimension, focussing in particular on the domain of intra-organisational relations. This involves the motivation, nurturance and disciplining of the constable rank, the satisfaction of the demands of senior officers, and the provision of an efficient 'buffer zone' between these two constituencies. These matters require interpersonal skill and the capacity to win trust, confidence and professional respect from colleagues, all factors which figure prominently in sergeants' reflections on the qualities of the ideal role incumbent. *In a significant sense, therefore, sergeants appear to define their role vicariously, in terms of facilitating the performance of other roles - managerial and operational - within the organisation.* Relatedly, the prominence accorded to paperwork as a priority and a problem, and to legal and procedural knowledge and administrative skills as desirable role attributes, suggests a set of informational tasks and imperatives as an important adjunct to the interpersonal dimension, further emphasizing the strategic position of the sergeant as an organisational conduit or mediator. An additional significant extension of the interpersonal dimension relates to the extra-organisational context - relations with the public. It was apparent from the more detailed responses that the concentration on policy implementation, interpersonal skills and the ability to cope under pressure, as well as the residual concern with doing operational policework, speak to a concern not only with internal relations but also with external relations, in particular intervening effectively in aid of members of the constable rank in police-public encounters.

This especially refers to those which are inherently complex and require subtle interpersonal techniques (e.g. domestic disputes), those which are fraught with danger and may escalate (e.g. public disorder incidents) and those which involve inexperienced constables generally. The relationship between this set of external demands and the internal matters outlined above is seen to be symbiotic, not only in the sense that similar interpersonal skills are deemed to be required, but also in that the successful performance of one set of functions is deemed to run in tandem with the successful performance of the other. Thus, an effective intervention in a constable's operational predicament is also seen as an opportunity for on-the-job training, for motivation and supervision, and for meeting the demands of senior officers.⁽²³⁾ As one sergeant put it:

"This job is all about psychology, with the men and with Joe Public. That's the only way you keep everyone happy, and keep your own neck away from the noose."

Nevertheless, it to some extent reinforces the argument as to the centrality of the intra-organisational role that, unlike their senior colleagues, in their initial responses, sergeants, with the exception of the minority who named operational work as a personal priority, were not inclined to separate out relations with the public from the normal flow of day-to-day supervisory work.

If we focus more closely upon those features of this complex mix of decision-making, interpersonal and informational roles⁽²⁴⁾ which are seen to be problematical and upon the assets and attributes deemed to be required to deal with these problems, our

identification of the 'human relations' (25) dimension as central, particularly in respect of the intra-organisational dimension, augments our perspective. Noting the accent on separate demands from different organizational constituencies, and upon the difficulty of reconciling these demands - including the problems of time management, together with the value placed upon logistical skills, technical knowledge, various types of personnel-related skills and forms of impression management, and upon a general capacity to withstand pressure, we may begin to envisage the sergeant's role as involving a precarious balance between competing priorities and attitudes in a complex domain of internal politics, a balance which can only be struck by means of the assiduous application of a wide range of cognitive and interpersonal skills.

If we turn to inspectors' and senior divisional personnel's conceptions of the problems, priorities and ideal attributes of sergeants, further examination of Tables 13 to 15 suggest a significant degree of agreement with sergeants over these matters. Further, to the extent that there are notable disparities, some of these tend to reinforce rather than contradict sergeants' perceptions of their own role. Thus, in general terms, inspectors and senior personnel affirmed the view of sergeants themselves that their most important general function consisted of policy implementation, that lack of resources was a significant related general problem, that in more concrete terms a cluster of interpersonal and informational tasks and problems within the organization provided a significant core of the sergeant's role,

and that the ability to cope under pressure represented a pivotal skill. However, there were certain important variations upon this general theme.

First, while general policy implementation achieved top ranking as a sergeant's priority in the view both of inspectors and of senior personnel (15=83.3% and 10=76.9% respectively), and relatedly, lack of resources achieved equal top ranking as a sergeant's problem in the view of inspectors, (7=38.9%) the same issue ranked only third in senior divisional personnel's perceptions of sergeants' problems (5=38.5%).

Secondly, although, as suggested, interpersonal tasks generally were accorded the same paramountcy as in the perceptions of sergeants themselves, there were notable differences of emphasis within this set of priorities. In simple terms, there appeared to be a greater stress placed upon ensuring the disciplined performance of tasks by constables, and rather less emphasis placed upon personnel management tasks less directly concerned with control. Further, this variance in perception was more emphatic in the case of inspectors than in the case of senior divisional personnel. Thus, for inspectors, the maintenance of discipline ranked second amongst sergeants' priorities (11=61.1%) and first equal amongst sergeants problems (7=38.9%), whereas for sergeants themselves this same task ranked only seventh as a priority and sixth as a problem. Yet if we turn to certain key personnel management functions, namely motivating constables and looking after their welfare needs - ranked

second and fourth equal respectively in sergeants' own perceptions of their priorities - these tasks dropped to sixth equal ranking (5=27.8%) as sergeants' priorities in the eyes of inspectors. From the perspective of senior divisional personnel, again discipline was a higher priority, ranking second (8=61.5%). However, the more human relations-oriented personnel functions - motivation and welfare - also ranked highly in their perceptions of sergeants' priorities, ranking third equal (7=53.8%). Furthermore, it may be noted that doing operational policework was not perceived as a priority for sergeants by any inspectors or senior personnel, a factor reinforcing of the above trend in so far as the retention of an active operational role runs in tandem with the performance of more individualized human relations-oriented personnel functions.

Thirdly, although inspectors and senior divisional personnel retained a certain sensitivity to the sheer diversity of the sergeant's interpersonal functions and the difficulties of balancing and reconciling these, this was subject to certain significant limitations. On the one hand, in both groups the 'buffer' role was deemed to be fairly significant for sergeants, it being ranked third by inspectors (9=50%) and fourth by senior divisional personnel (5=46.1%), and, similarly, in both groups the maintenance of harmonious relations with both junior and senior ranks was mentioned fairly often as a problem, ranked third (6=33.3%) and fourth (4=30.8%) respectively. On the other hand, some of the specific factors contributing to the problem of balance in the eyes of sergeants, were ignored or accorded a lesser significance by the

more senior groups, suggesting that their empathy with the lot of sergeants was limited. Thus, only three inspectors (16.7%) and two members of senior divisional personnel (15.4%) mentioned paperwork as a problem for sergeants, as against forty five of the sergeants (47.4%). Similarly, lack of time to perform the role in a rounded manner, although mentioned by thirty eight sergeants (40%) as one of their problems, received no mention from any inspectors or senior divisional officers. Likewise, meeting the administrative demands of senior officers was not seen as problematical by any senior officers, and by only five inspectors (27.8%), although thirty six sergeants (37.9%) believed it to be so.

Finally, although ability to cope under pressure, interpersonal skills and organizational and administrative skills were generally rated highly as ideal qualities of sergeants by sergeants, inspectors and senior divisional personnel alike, there were significant disparities as regards respective evaluations of two role attributes. One set of cognitive attributes which rated only sixth by sergeants themselves, namely knowledge of law and procedure (27=28.4%), was rated second and first equal by inspectors and senior divisional personnel respectively. Conversely, the quality of approachability, which resonates closely with a human relations-oriented conception of the sergeants' functions, figured relatively highly in the rating of sergeants (5th, 28=29.5%), but very lowly in the rating of inspectors (9th, 4=22.2%) and senior divisional personnel (9th, 4=30.8%).

Therefore, beneath the general cross-rank consensus as to the prominence of an interpersonal role largely focussed upon internal relations, certain differences and tensions are revealed which help to make sense of the particular stance adopted by sergeants themselves. In the eyes of more senior personnel, and bearing in mind the differences between inspectors on the one hand and chief inspectors and superintendents on the other, we have identified a greater emphasis upon the disciplinary function of sergeants, a lesser emphasis upon those of their personnel functions requiring more intimate relations with the constable rank, and an unwillingness to regard administrative tasks, administrators, and the logistical constraints involved in performing a myriad different tasks adequately, as posing undue problems for sergeants. Given the influential role of these more senior ranks in defining and structuring the role of the sergeant, these gaps in perception may be translated into demands and attitudes which provide the material basis for the tensions and problems experienced by sergeants. If their seniors are perceived not to be fully appreciative of the weight of administrative pressure placed upon sergeants or the complexities of managing and motivating a uniform shift, then in the eyes of sergeants this may account for the inordinate demands made by seniors in respect of sergeants' administrative tasks, their provision of insufficient latitude in respect of sergeants' managerial tasks within the shift, and their general lack of sympathy with, and failure to appreciate the overall difficulty of the balance sought by sergeants in their daily working lives.

If we reinterpret these general trends in terms of the theoretical scheme outlined in the previous chapter it appears that sergeants and their senior officers differ in their views as to the proper orientation that sergeants should adopt in their power relations with juniors, and it is this difference in perspective which entails that sergeants are faced with conflicting pressures in the performance of their role. *Sergeants themselves prefer on balance a predominantly normative orientation in their relations with juniors, yet the perspective of their seniors inclines sergeants towards a more instrumental orientation, both in the direct sense that senior officers set greater store by an instrumental orientation on the part of sergeants towards their juniors, and in the indirect sense that the related emphasis of senior officers upon administrative efficiency as a non-negotiable priority reduces the scope for sergeants to develop normative networks of relations with juniors, which by its nature is a time-intensive pursuit.*

Now we turn more briefly to the problems, priorities and ideal attributes which inspectors and senior officers associate with their own roles. For inspectors, retrospective coding produced nine sets of priorities, seven sets of problems, and eight ideal role attributes. In each case, the responses could be subsumed under categorical schemes similar to those utilized in respect of sergeants, although the distribution of responses differed markedly.

Fourteen inspectors (77.8%) mentioned running the group as a main priority, ten (55.6%) mentioned maintaining discipline within the group, seven (38.9%) mentioned meeting the administrative demands of senior officers, seven (38.9%) mentioned paperwork, seven (38.9%) mentioned meeting the demands of individuals and groups external to the police, six (33.3%) mentioned the training of young constables, five (27.8%) mentioned looking after the welfare of junior officers, three (16.7%) mentioned acting as a linkman, and two (11.1%) mentioned motivating the men under their command (Table 16). The most frequently mentioned problem was lack of resources (12=66.7%), followed by responding to administrative demands (44.4%), maintaining control of junior officers (6=33.3%) and responding to the demands of external individuals and groups (6=33.3%), with paperwork (3=16.7%), lack of time to carry out all duties adequately (2=11.1%), and maintaining good relations with seniors and juniors simultaneously (2=11.1%) trailing markedly (Table 17). Finally, the possession of organisational and administrative skills was most often mentioned as a valued attribute (10=55.6%), followed by knowledge of law and procedure (8=44.4%), the ability to command respect from juniors (6=33.3%), the ability to cope under pressure (6=33.3%), interpersonal skills (5=27.8%), public relations skills (4=22.2%), common-sense (4=22.2%) and approachability (2=11.1%) (Table 18).

Although, as with sergeants, policy implementation remained a priority, with the associated problem of lack of resources and the interpersonal dimension in general remaining significant, a number

of differences in emphases as compared to sergeants' self-perceptions (and to a lesser extent also the perceptions of the sergeant's role held by more senior officers) should be noted. There appeared to be a greater emphasis on meeting the administrative demands of seniors, and upon the more impersonal administrative skills - procedural knowledge and general organizational abilities. Orientations towards the junior ranks appeared to be more instrumentally-based, with somewhat less emphasis upon personal relationships, although welfare and training functions, interpersonal skills and the ability to command respect still rated fairly frequent mentions. There also appeared to be a less strong sense of being inundated, or of being required to strike a precarious balance between competing functions. Finally, unlike the case of the sergeant in respect of whom basic operational policework was the only function mentioned which exclusively referred outwith the organization, a more generally conceived external set of tasks, namely treating with individuals and groups in the community - encountered as clients, complainers, related agencies (e.g. Procurators-Fiscal, Social Work departments) as well as suspects - was deemed to constitute a specific set of priorities and problems and to require a specific set of skills.

If we turn finally to the perceptions of their own role held by senior officers, retrospective coding produced seven sets of priorities, seven sets of problems, and eight sets of ideal attributes. Ensuring the proper running of the sub-division or the division was most frequently mentioned as a main priority

(12=92.3%), followed by looking after the welfare of junior officers (11=84.6%), maintaining discipline (10=76.9%), dealing with external groups (8=61.5%), paperwork (38.5%), meeting the administrative demands of senior officers (5=38.5%), and ensuring that junior officers were properly motivated (2=15.4%) (Table 19). Responding to the demands of external agencies matched scarcity of resources as the most frequently mentioned problem (8=61.5% each), followed by lack of time to carry out all duties properly (5=38.5%), and meeting the administrative demands of senior officers (5=38.5%), with paperwork (3=23.1%), maintaining good relations with all other ranks simultaneously (2=15.4%) and maintaining control over junior officers (2=15.4%) trailing much further behind (Table 20). Interpersonal skills were most frequently mentioned as a desirable attribute (11=84.6%), followed by organisational and administrative skills (9=69.2%), public relations skills (8=61.5%), the ability to command respect from junior ranks (7=53.8%), the ability to cope under pressure (7=53.8%), approachability (4=30.8%), knowledge of law and procedure (2=15.4%) and common-sense (2=15.4%) (Table 21).

Although the mix of policy-implementation and interpersonal functions provides the role of senior divisional officer with a familiar shape, more detailed analysis suggests that it cannot readily be equated either with that of the inspector or that of the sergeant. Senior officers share their sergeants' interest in more personalized managerial skills and in the welfare function, although these normative orientations sit alongside an equally strong interest in the control of subordinates by instrumental

means, a characteristic which was manifest in the inspectors' self-analyses. Furthermore, the external dimension, which also emerged as significant at the inspector rank, becomes more prominent while, conversely, the preoccupation with administrative skills and with meeting the demands of senior officers, which reached its apogee at the inspector rank, recedes somewhat but remains important. Accordingly, although senior officers' self-conceptions appear to be close to that of their sergeants in terms of the experience of being constantly pressurized by a variety of duties, this is not viewed in terms of a requirement to balance incompatible intra-organizational demands. In line with one of the basic tenets of the two cultures thesis addressed in chapter two, the major audiences for the senior officer appear to be the external and the internal constituencies of the organization respectively, whereas for the sergeant they are junior and senior colleagues respectively *within* the internal constituency. Additionally, the typical senior officer appears to be more confident than the typical sergeant in her/his capacity to respond to one key audience without alienating or rendering herself/himself vulnerable to the other. (26)

(4) The Bases of intra-organisational power and influence

On the basis of the answers grouped within the previous subsection, a picture begins to emerge of a heterogeneous set of role conceptions within and between supervisory ranks which is closely intertwined with a complex and equally variegated framework of inter-rank orientations. Not only do sergeants, as suggested

earlier; appear to differ to some extent from their seniors in their opinions of the first-line supervisor's most appropriate overall orientation towards junior officers, but these senior officers' own role conceptions vis-a-vis junior officers also appear to differ from those of their sergeants, the more senior officers in both cases placing greater emphasis upon instrumental techniques. In the present subsection, we consider answers to a group of questions which examine power relations within the division in a more direct fashion, and which thus provide a more sharply focused test of the plausibility of the inferences drawn above.

For the purposes of this examination, the three core groups were each asked to identify the bases of 'authority' over junior ranks of their own group and the other two core groups. Superficially, the use of the term 'authority' rather than 'power' might seem to circumscribe inquiry unduly, since as a term of art within the theoretical scheme adopted in chapter three, 'authority relations' are not co-extensive with 'power relations', but merely provide a subset of the latter. However, closer analysis will reveal that, as used in the structured part of the questionnaires, the idea of 'authority relations' did succeed in conveying all aspects of our more rounded conception of 'power relations' which could usefully be addressed by such means.⁽²⁷⁾ Nevertheless, even if its contextual use is clear and consistent with the general theoretical orientation, why adopt different terminology in the questionnaire from that adopted within the theoretical outline? The answer lies, paradoxically, in the need further to ensure accurate

communication of ideas between researcher and respondent. While, for theoretical purposes, it was important to distinguish authority in the narrow sense from power more generally, there is an accepted conventional usage of 'authority' (not to mention a fairly common theoretical usage²⁰) as more or less identical with 'power' in its most general sense. Thus, the *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* defines 'authority', *inter alia*, as "power to influence the conduct and actions of others". In the light of this strong conceptual overlap, it was felt that the majority of interviewees would be more likely to associate the concept of authority than the concept of power itself with this wide notion of interpersonal 'power', since although the concept of power does indeed have this wider meaning in both theoretical and conventional usage, it also has an alternative, and arguably more familiar conventional usage which is narrower in scope, being confined to *physical* force or capacity. Thus not only was care taken to ensure that 'authority' referred to as wide a range and variety of theoretically significant power bases as possible at the detailed level of question formulation, but the former term was in any case felt to be the most apt *general* term for the purposes of this project.

If we now turn to the more detailed terms of the interviews, in the case of each self-regarding and other-regarding question, five possible bases of power/authority were identified - formal authority attaching to rank (institutional authority), authority based upon personal knowledge, authority based upon expertise in the work of those supervised, authority based upon the use or threat of

disciplinary sanctions, and authority based upon the use of rewards and incentives. Each respondent was asked to rate each of these along a scale of importance, and was then probed further in order to elicit a fuller explanation. In the present subsection we are concerned with the aggregate responses to the structured element in this question.

For sergeants, incentives, expertise and personal knowledge were grouped closely together as the most important bases of power, with rank and discipline lagging far behind (Table 22). Eighty three sergeants (87.4%) mentioned incentives as very important or fairly important, eighty two mentioned expertise (86.3%), and seventy seven (81.1%) mentioned personal knowledge. However, at the top end of the scale, forty nine sergeants (51.6%) rated personal knowledge as very important, as compared to thirty (31.6%) and twenty five (26.3%) in the case of expertise and incentives respectively. Further, no sergeants felt that personal knowledge or incentives were unimportant, and only two (2.1%) felt that expertise was unimportant. By contrast, only thirty nine (41.1%) mentioned formal authority as very important or fairly important, and only thirty two (33.7%) mentioned discipline.

To some extent, inspectors and senior divisional personnel agreed with sergeants' perceptions as to the bases of power of sergeants (Tables 23 and 24). Thus both personal knowledge and expertise ranked highly for inspectors and senior divisional personnel in this respect, the former factor rated as at least

fairly important by fifteen inspectors (83.3%) and eleven senior officers (84.6%), and the latter factor being similarly rated by fifteen inspectors (83.3%) and ten senior officers (76.9%). Moreover, although formal authority received a high rating by a larger percentage of inspectors and senior officers than by sergeants themselves, eight (44.4%) of the first group and seven (53.8%) of the second group rating it as at least fairly important, in relative terms it was accorded a similar priority to that of the sergeants themselves, being rated as the least important basis of sergeants' power by inspectors and the second least important by senior officers. If, however, we turn to discipline and incentives, more significant disparities emerge. Thus, fourteen inspectors (77.8%) and eleven senior officers (84.6%) ranked discipline as at least a fairly important basis of sergeants' power as compared to only 33.7% of the sergeants themselves. Perceptions of the importance of incentives reveal a contrasting picture. Only nine inspectors (50%) and five senior officers (38.5%) felt this to be a very important or fairly important basis of sergeants' power as opposed to 87.4% of sergeants themselves.

A similar distribution emerges when we examine the perceptions of our three groups as to the basis of power of inspectors. For inspectors themselves and for senior officers, the troika of discipline, expertise and personal knowledge again emerged as most important, these three factors being mentioned by sixteen (88.9%), fourteen (77.8%) and twelve (66.7%) inspectors respectively as at least fairly important, and being similarly rated by twelve (92.3%),

-

ten (76.9%) and ten (76.9%) senior officers respectively (Tables 25 and 26). By contrast, formal authority and incentives, although still rated fairly highly by both groups in absolute terms with eleven inspectors (61.1%) and eight senior officers (61.2%) rating both as at least fairly important, were less important in relative terms. However, if we examine the attitudes of sergeants to the foundations of inspectors' power, a perceptual gap emerges similar to that registered in respect of the sergeants' own bases of power (Table 27). Incentives ranked beside expertise and personal knowledge as the most important, eighty-six (90.6%), eighty (84.2%) and seventy-four sergeants (77.9%) respectively rating these factors as at least fairly important, and discipline was again downgraded, languishing alongside formal authority as the least significant perceived basis of inspectors' power, fifty one sergeants (53.7%) rating the former and forty eight (50.5%) the latter as at least fairly important. However, the gap between the top three factors and the bottom two was in this case significantly less than in sergeants' self-perceptions.

If we turn, finally, to the views of our three groups as to the bases of power of senior officers, a general cross-rank consensus is evident for the first time, although the terms of this consensus differ from the various orders of priority discussed in relation to the foundations of authority of the other two groups. All three groups rated discipline, incentives and rank as the main sources of power of senior ranks. Twelve (92.3%), eleven (84.6%) and nine (69.2%) of the senior officers respectively considered these three

qualities to be at least fairly important (Table 28), the corresponding figures for inspectors being fifteen (83.3%), sixteen (88.9%) and thirteen (72.2%) (Table 29), and for sergeants, eighty-six (90.5%), eighty-eight (92.6%) and eighty (84.2%) (Table 30). Thus, rank figured for the first time as one of the most significant bases of power in the opinion of each group, with incentives figuring highly for the first time in the eyes of inspectors and senior officers, and discipline figuring highly for the first time in the eyes of sergeants. Similarly, each group accorded a comparatively poor rating to personal knowledge and expertise for the first time, these qualities being ranked as the least significant and the second least significant bases of senior officers' power respectively. Nevertheless, expertise retained a high overall rating in absolute terms, mentioned by eight senior officers (61.5%), nine inspectors (50%) and sixty three sergeants (66.3%) as at least fairly important. Personal knowledge fared less consistently well, being rated as at least fairly important by seven senior officers (53.8%) and eight inspectors (44.4%), but only twenty four sergeants (25.3%).

Overall, certain general trends emerge from these findings. First, all groups rate two of the normative bases of power - expertise and general knowledge - as being less important as one ascends the hierarchy. Secondly, unlike their senior colleagues, the most junior group - the sergeant group - rate the most draconian instrumental power source, namely discipline or the threat of discipline, as relatively unimportant for themselves and their

inspectors. Thus, in very general terms, the trends observed in these findings appear to be in line with the arguments outlined in the previous subsection, in that normative power sources seem to be more closely associated with junior managerial ranks and instrumental power sources with the more senior ranks, both in terms of general cross-rank perceptions of their appropriateness to specific ranks, and - to some extent cutting across this first proposition - in terms of rank-specific perceptions as to their general appropriateness. Furthermore, although there are two important exceptions to these trends, even these do not necessarily contradict the general argument. In the first place, the general affirmation of one of the normative power sources, formal or institutional authority, as an important basis of authority of more senior ranks, need not undermine the argument that senior officers display a generally more instrumental profile, since, as is argued in the next chapter, institutional authority is the type of normative power which is most compatible with a generally instrumental profile. Conversely, the insistence of sergeants against the views of their seniors that an instrumental power source, namely incentives, provides a significant power source for themselves, need not undermine the argument that sergeants display a generally more normative profile, and this for two reasons. First, as a mirror image of the previous argument, incentive-based power is the type of instrumental power which is most compatible with a generally normative profile, and secondly, the more developed responses of sergeants suggest that in any case incentive-based power is accorded greater credence as an ideal role attribute than

as an actual role attribute. Again these arguments are further expounded upon in the next chapter.

(5) Interaction within the division: Patterns of communication, consultation, understanding, influence and allegiance between ranks. (29)

Although the questions treated in the previous section provide a valuable general barometer of intra-divisional attitudes, they are not apt to discriminate between different aspects or qualities of the overall network of relations between ranks, and accordingly, the present set of questions provides this more specific focus. In particular, in light of the discussion in the previous chapter as to the dangers of assuming that particular types of power relations necessarily attract categorically positive or negative evaluation in terms of their capacity to realize either organizational ends or the aspirations of organization members, some of the questions dealt with here allow us to begin to uncover the complexity of the relationship between the general balance of intra-organisational relations on the one hand, and certain indices of value within organized policework on the other. As is evident from the following discussion, the various themes considered overlap considerably, although for expository purposes, the order set out in the subsection heading is generally followed.

Sixty sergeants (63.2%) felt that the quality of communication between them and more senior ranks within the division was very good

or fairly good. Although representing a comfortable majority, this compared unfavourably with the responses of inspectors and senior officers, fourteen (77.8%) and twelve (92.3%) of their groups respectively perceiving the quality of their communications with more senior ranks to be at least fairly good. When asked about the quality of their communications with more junior ranks, all groups also responded favourably, eighty five sergeants (89.5%), twelve inspectors (66.7%) and ten senior officers (76.9%) considering them to be at least fairly good and no members of any group considering them to be not at all good. In the case of sergeants alone, however, was the quality of communications with junior officers perceived to be better than that with senior officers (Table 31).

When asked about understanding between ranks, fifty one sergeants (53.7%) believed that their constables understood the sergeant's job at least fairly well, sixty six (69.5%) and forty (42.1%) felt a similar level of satisfaction with the degree of understanding of the sergeant's job shown by their inspector and their senior officers respectively, and forty nine (51.6%) also felt similarly about their inspector's understanding of the job of their constables (Table 32). For their part, inspectors were asked about the degree of understanding of the inspector's role demonstrated by their constables, sergeants and senior officers, seven (38.9%), nine (50%) and twelve (66.7%) of them perceiving that the understanding shown by each of these other groups respectively was at least fairly good. They were also asked about the degree of understanding shown by their senior officers of the jobs of the

junior officers under their command, and twelve (66.7%) felt that this also was at least fairly good (Table 33). Finally, senior officers were asked about the understanding of their role shown by constables, sergeants and inspectors, four (30.8%), seven (53.8%) and nine (69.2%) of them considering the understanding of each of these other groups respectively to be at least fairly good (Table 34). A general trend running through these findings is that supervisory officers are more likely to consider their seniors to have a good understanding of their job than their juniors, and within the set of junior officers, to consider the degree of understanding to diminish the more junior the rank. The second element within this proposition implies that distance between ranks is an important variable in this respect alongside relative status within the hierarchy, and indeed, as with the finding that sergeants view their constables as having a better understanding of their job than their senior divisional officers, the formal variable may even in certain circumstances outweigh the latter. (31)

The themes of understanding and communication were explored in a more directive manner in a series of three questions dealing with specific factors bearing upon the communicative process. The first develops the forementioned theme of distance between ranks and the consequences for managerial understanding of operational needs of having an extended chain of control (i.e. six ranks) within the police division. On being asked whether there was any truth in the view that some members of senior ranks were 'out of touch' with operational needs, seventy eight sergeants (82.1%), nine inspectors

(50%) and five senior officers (38.5%) themselves affirmed that there was at least 'some truth' in this proposition (Table 35). When asked why this was the case given the prior experience of senior officers in junior ranks, forty six (48.4%) sergeants suggested that senior officers' operational experience was outdated, thirty (31.6%) suggested that their operational experience had been too brief, eighteen (18.9%) suggested that they were preoccupied with other external demands, and seventeen (17.8%) suggested that they were preoccupied with other internal demands. A similar distribution of responses was evident in the answers provided by inspectors who addressed this supplementary question, although the minority of senior officers who felt this issue had to be addressed concentrated their explanations upon the distractions of other external and internal demands (Table 36). A second question inquired into whether candid communications between officers was adversely affected, in comparison to other organizations, due to the fact that the force was organised in a pronouncedly hierarchical manner. Fifty seven sergeants (60%), but only eight inspectors (44.4%) and four senior officers (30.8%) felt that this was at least to some extent true. Even amongst the sergeant rank, however, enthusiasm for this line of argument was distinctly tepid, only nine (9.5%) of the group believing it to be true to a great extent (Table 37). A third question considered the utility of the Police Federation as a vehicle for communication and consultation between ranks. Forty seven sergeants (49.5%), seven inspectors (38.9%) and six senior officers (46.2%) felt that the Federation performed

either a very useful or a fairly useful function in this respect (Table 38). (32)

Focussing more specifically upon the theme of consultation, sixty six sergeants (69.4%) pronounced themselves at least fairly satisfied with the degree to which they were consulted in the policy-making process at divisional level, twelve senior officers (92.3%) were also at least fairly satisfied with the opportunities available to sergeants for involvement in the consultation process, while for their part, fifteen and fourteen inspectors (77.8%) were similarly content with the quality of consultation afforded to sergeants and to members of their own rank respectively (Table 39). When asked how communication and consultation within the ranks might be improved, sixty eight sergeants (71.6%) were willing to specify methods of improvement, fifty-four (56.8%) mentioning more visits to the 'shop-floor' by senior officers, thirty (31.6%) mentioning the more efficient and comprehensive downward passage of information, and twenty eight (29.5%) mentioning more meetings at which policy options could be discussed and ideas sought. A similar distribution of answers emerged from the nine inspectors (50%) who responded to this inquiry, while of the five senior officers (38.5%) who made specific proposals in this respect, two (15.4%) mentioned more meetings and four (30.8%) pronounced themselves satisfied with the existing structures but suggested that junior officers should make greater use of these to communicate ideas and information (Table 40). Thus, a picture emerges of pressure from the lower supervisory ranks not for greater involvement in the policy-making process but

rather for greater personal contact and concentration on information dissemination by senior officers. Senior officers also stressed the facilitation of the passage of information rather than the provision of new or more widely encompassing policy-making fora, although for them blockages in the channel of communication were deemed to occur in the upward, rather than the downward direction.

Finally, questions were asked to elicit information about patterns of influence and allegiance within the division. Sergeants and inspectors were both asked which senior rank or ranks had the greatest capacity to affect their jobs on a day-to day basis (Table 41). For the sergeants, the inspector rank (67=70.5%) rated most highly, followed by the chief superintendent (Divisional Commander) (32=33.7%) and then the chief inspector (13=13.7%) and superintendent (8=8.4%) ranks. For the inspectors, the chief inspector rank (15=83.3%) rated most highly again followed by the divisional commander (10=55.6%) and then the superintendent rank (6=33.3%). A clear pattern thus emerges of the greatest capacity to influence being accorded to the immediately senior rank, followed by the Divisional Commander himself. Asked about which rank or ranks they felt closest to (Table 42), constables (36=37.9%) were the most popular choice amongst sergeants, followed by inspectors (21=22.1%) with chief inspectors (5=5.3%) and superintendents (2=2.1%) languishing much further behind. Fifteen sergeants (15=15.8%) nominated a number of different ranks, while sixteen (16.8%) professed not to feel particularly close to any other rank. When asked which rank or ranks were most supportive of them in their job,

the order of ranking of sergeants changed somewhat, although still no one rank emerged with a clear majority (Table 42). Inspectors were the most popular choice (25=26.3%), followed by constables (13=13.7%), the chief superintendent (8=8.4%), chief inspectors (7=7.4%) and superintendents (4=4.2%). Again, sizeable minorities either opted for a mixture of ranks (15=15.8%), or adopted an isolationist stance (23=24.2%) - claiming that no other rank was particularly supportive. For their part, inspectors felt closest to and best supported by chief inspectors (9=50% in each case), with sergeants trailing a poor second in both cases (3=16.7% and 2=11.1% respectively), and again a sizeable minority not feeling particularly close to (4=22.2%) or particularly well supported by (3=16.7%) any other rank (Table 43). For their part, senior officers at chief inspector and superintendent rank tended to nominate other senior divisional officers - chief inspectors, superintendents, the chief superintendent, or some mixture of these, as the closest and most supportive ranks, with only one chief inspector choosing a rank outwith this group, namely the inspector, as the closest rank and none nominating a junior rank as the most supportive (Table 44). Unlike their junior colleagues, no senior officers claimed that no other rank was particularly close to or supportive of them.

(6) The managerial role of the supervisory ranks.

In this section we consider the responses of all groups to a number of questions exploring the extent to which and the manner in

which the role of the police supervisor might be conceived of as being *managerial* in nature.

Sixty six sergeants (69.5%) considered themselves to be managers in their present job, as compared to fifteen inspectors (83.3%) and all thirteen senior officers (100%) (Table 45). Of the twenty nine sergeants who did not consider themselves to be managers, twenty felt the first managerial rank was that of inspector (21.1%), and nine that of chief inspector (9.5%), whereas all three inspectors who did not consider themselves to be managers felt that the first managerial rank was that of chief inspector.

When asked what the idea of management meant to them in the context of the police service, all groups provided a number of answers which were retrospectively coded (Table 46). Fifty two sergeants (54.7%) mentioned man management, thirty eight (40%) mentioned ensuring that the work of the shift was done efficiently, and twenty nine (30.5%) mentioned the utilization of organisational and administrative skills. Ensuring that the work of the group was done efficiently was most frequently mentioned by inspectors (10=55.6%), closely followed by man management and the utilization of organisational and administrative skills (9=50% for each), while the senior officers agreed with the sergeants that man management was most important (12=92.3%), followed again by the efficient running of the division (11=84.6%), and the utilization of organisational and administrative skills (6=46.2%). Two inspectors (11.1%) and six senior officers (46.2%) also referred to an aspect

of managerial work not considered by sergeants, namely the external dimension - coping with public demands and generally presenting an acceptable public image.

Fifty two sergeants (54.7%) felt that the job of a manager in the police organization was fairly different or completely different from that of a manager in other large organizations, while only thirty (31.6%) felt that it was much the same. Of the inspectors and senior officers, a small majority of those who felt qualified to offer an opinion, also felt there to be significant differences between management in the police and management in other large organizations, eight inspectors (44.4%) believing police management to be at least fairly different in kind with only seven (38.9%) believing it to be much the same, and seven senior officers (53.1%) believing it to be at least fairly different in kind with only five (38.5%) believing it to be much the same (Table 47). Finally, when asked whether other terms drawn from industrial or commercial management - such as foreman or supervisor - struck them as more appropriate terms in which to describe their present job (Table 48), seventy seven (81.1%) sergeants mentioned foreman, twenty five (26.3%) mentioned 'gaffer' or 'boss' and twenty three (24.2%) mentioned charge-hand. 'Supervisor' was universally rejected, a typical explanation being that 'it sounds as if you're a shop assistant in Woolworths.' Asked the same question in respect of their own job and that of the sergeants (Table 48), most inspectors (15=83.3%) felt 'boss' or 'gaffer' to be an appropriate self-description with foreman languishing far behind as the only other

appellation mentioned (6=33.3%), while many inspectors (13=72.2%) agreed with sergeants that foreman was a good description of the job of the latter, with charge-hand (7=38.9%) also gaining some support. Again, the term supervisor was dismissed. When asked about ways of describing the job of sergeants, senior officers favoured foreman and charge-hand (6=46.2% in each case) over gaffer or boss (2=15.4%), while five (38.5%) did not share their juniors' distaste for the term supervisor. With reference to inspectors, foreman was felt to be an appropriate description by eight senior officers (61.5%), followed by boss or gaffer which received six nominations (46.2%) (Table 49).

Certain general conclusions may be drawn from these findings. To begin with, more senior ranks believe that the mantle of manager fits their role than junior ranks believe it fits theirs. However, there remains a significant degree of support at all ranks for the view that management in the police is *sui generis*, and may not easily be equated with other managerial roles. This element of inter-rank consensus is reinforced when consideration is given to the content of the managerial role, the only significant disparities lying in senior officers' allusions to an externally directed role - a theme which reinforces certain findings about the nature of senior managerial work recorded in subsection 3 above - and, again in line with certain earlier findings as to role content and inter-rank orientations, in the somewhat different ranking of interpersonal as against impersonal managerial functions as between sergeants and senior officers on the one hand, and inspectors on the other.

Finally, the views of the various ranks on the appropriate vernacular for describing police managerial roles, suggest that the more junior ranks, in so far as they are prepared to compare themselves with any outside group, do so with reference to workers and junior management in the industrial sector, a view which is largely affirmed by senior officers, although their distribution of choices suggest a more modest view of the status of junior managerial officers than that perceived by the junior managers themselves.

(7) Job satisfaction within supervisory ranks

This section details the responses of the three groups to a set of questions aimed at discovering the degree of job satisfaction of the various ranks, how this changes throughout the course of their service, how it relates to the level of difficulty encountered or deemed to exist within a particular role, and what implications it has for the level of ambition of the officers concerned.

Eighty one sergeants (85.3%), fifteen inspectors (83.3%), and all thirteen senior officers (100%) felt that their career in the police so far had either exceeded or at least lived up to their expectations (Table 50). As regards job satisfaction in one's present role, sixty one sergeants (64.2%) felt fairly or very satisfied, as compared to eleven inspectors (61.1%) and twelve senior officers (92.3%) (Table 51). Further, forty five sergeants (47.4%) felt their job satisfaction in their present rank to be

higher than when they were constables, thirty three (34.7%) felt it to be lower, and seventeen (17.9%) felt that it was much the same (Table 52). Of the inspectors, seven (38.9%) felt that the inspector rank had been the most satisfying stage of their service, a further seven (38.9%) the sergeant rank, while four nominated the constable rank (22.2%) (Table 53). As for the senior officers, three incumbents felt the superintendent rank to be the most satisfying, five incumbent chief inspectors nominated that rank, and of the remaining five senior officers (38.5%) who were not most satisfied with their present rank, three (23.1%) mentioned the constable rank, two (15.4%) the sergeant rank, with the inspector rank receiving no nominations (Table 53).

Asked about the relative difficulty of their present role in terms of personal experience, sixty five sergeants (68.4%) felt it to be more difficult than the role of constable. Eight inspectors (44.4%) nominated their own role, a further eight (44.4%) that of sergeant, and two (11.1%) that of constable. Four superintendents and four chief inspectors nominated their present role, and of the remaining five (38.5%), four (30.8%) nominated the role of sergeant, and one (7.7%) that of constable (Table 54). When posed the further question of nominating which was the most difficult rank overall, a relative majority of sergeants (44=46.3%) still chose their own role, followed, in decreasing order of popularity, by that of the constable (23=24.2%), chief constable (19=20%) and chief superintendent (9=9.5%), with none of the other intermediate divisional ranks rating a mention. In the estimation of the

inspectors, the roles of sergeant and inspector were rated the most difficult with five (27.8%) mentions apiece, followed by the chief constable (4=22.2%), chief superintendent (3=16.7%), and constable (1=5.6%) roles, the chief inspector and superintendent ranks again receiving no mentions. Only two superintendents and one chief inspector rated their present role as the most difficult overall, the most popular choices being chief constable with four (30.8%) nominations and chief superintendent and sergeant with three (23.1%) nominations each (Table 55).

Finally, when asked to consider their future career hopes, only thirty nine sergeants (41.1%) were either fairly ambitious or very ambitious for further advancement within the service, as compared to eleven inspectors (61.1%) and nine (69.2%) senior officers (Table 56). However, in keeping with the other groups the level of ambition of sergeants appeared to have increased as they advanced through the service, only nine (9.5%) of them professing to be less ambitious than they had been in their previous rank, as compared with three inspectors (16.7%) and two senior officers (15.4%) (Table 57).

A general picture emerges of a body of lower and middle managers experiencing a fairly high and generally increasing level of job satisfaction, (33) although a significant minority of dissenters remain. In the case of the sergeant rank, this is notwithstanding the fact that it is generally rated as one of the more difficult ranks, as opposed to the inspector, chief inspector

and superintendent ranks, which are rated as most difficult by only a minority of present incumbents. The level of ambition of police officers also appears to increase as they advance in service. Accordingly, the findings documented in this subsection offer additional support for the argument adumbrated earlier (see subsection 5) that there is no simple relationship between the perceived difficulties and pressures attendant upon managerial roles and the existence of attitudes and practices which may have a positive value in individual or organisational terms - in this particular case attitudes bearing upon the short-term and long-term morale and motivation of supervisory ranks.

(8) The Changing role of the Police Supervisor

In this final section we consider responses by all three groups concerning the changing nature of the sergeant's role, and by inspectors concerning the changing nature of their own role. (34)

Fifty five sergeants (57.9%) considered that their role had become more difficult since they joined the service, twenty one (22.1%) less difficult, twenty (21.1%) felt that it had stayed much the same, and twelve (12.6%) felt unable to judge. In general, inspectors also and, to a lesser extent, senior officers felt that the sergeant's job had become more difficult during their service. Of the inspectors, nine (50%) felt that the sergeant's job had become more difficult, two (11.1%) less difficult, with five (27.8%) claiming that it had stayed much the same and two (11.1%) don't

knows, while six senior officers (46.2%) felt it had become more difficult, two (15.4%) less difficult, with four (30.8%) claiming that it had stayed much the same, and one (7.7%) don't know (Table 58). Asked about their own rank, again inspectors generally felt that it had become more difficult during their service, eleven (61.1%) claiming this as against two (11.2%) claiming that it had become less difficult, three (16.7%) considering it to have remained much the same, and a further two (11.1%) don't knows (Table 59).

Asked to predict whether the sergeant's job would become more difficult in the foreseeable future, a similar profile of responses emerged. Fifty sergeants (52.6%), ten inspectors (55.6%) and six senior officers (46.2%) felt that the sergeant's job would become more difficult, six (6.3%), two (11.1%) and two (15.4%) respectively felt it would become less difficult, with twenty five (26.3%), five (27.8%) and four (30.8%) respectively believing that its level of difficulty would remain much the same, and fourteen (14.7%), one (5.6%) and one (7.7%) respectively declining to make a prediction (Table 60). This trend was maintained when inspectors were asked the same question about their own job, eleven (61.1%) feeling that it would become more difficult, only one (5.6%) less difficult, with three (16.7%) considering that it would stay much the same and a further three (16.7%) don't knows (Table 61).

An important body of evidence bearing upon the reasons for the perceptions of increased difficulty, and, more indirectly, the prognoses of increasing difficulty, is available in the responses

provided by all groups to a question inquiring directly about perceived changes in the sergeant's role during the service of the said groups, and in the responses provided by inspectors to a parallel question about their own role. Retrospective coding provided a multiple categorization of responses, with most categories capable of further subsumption under two main groups - *external changes* and *organisational changes*. With regard to external changes, thirty five sergeants (36.8%) mentioned a generally more difficult and hostile work environment for policing, and twenty six (27.4%) mentioned a greater need to be sensitive to the demands of a diversity of external groups. With regard to the organisational changes, thirty two (sergeants (33.7%) felt that their rank had been downgraded within the organization, twenty four (25.3%) mentioned a greater reliance on technology - personal radios and more mobile patrols - with attendant advantages and disadvantages, ⁽³⁵⁾ twenty two (23.2%) mentioned more administrative demands, with frequent reference to paperwork, and twenty (21.1%) mentioned the changing profile of new recruits, with reference both to lower quality and less quiescent attitudes to authority, factors which although theoretically extricable tended to be collapsed together in particular responses. Finally, ten (10.5%) felt that there had been no significant changes, and fifteen (15.8%) were unwilling to pass judgment (Table 62).

Inspectors and senior officers also felt that the major external change affecting the job of the sergeant was a more difficult and hostile policing environment, ten of each group

mentioning this (55.6% and 76.9% respectively), with two inspectors (11.1%) and six senior officers (46.2%) mentioning the greater need to be sensitive to external groups. Inspectors were also at one with sergeants themselves over the most significant organisational change affecting the latter's role, ten (55.6%) claiming that it had been downgraded, with eight (44.4%) mentioning technological changes, six (33.3%) mentioning the changing profile of new recruits and five (27.8%) mentioning greater administrative demands. In this area, however, the perceptions of senior officers were at odds with those of their junior colleagues. Only three (23.1%) mentioned a downgrading of status in the rank of sergeant, and only one (7.7%) mentioned the changing profile of new recruits, with six (46.2%) mentioning technological changes and three (23.1%) mentioning greater administrative demands. Finally, three inspectors (16.7%) felt that there had been no significant changes and two (11.1%) felt unable to venture an opinion, with no senior officers registering responses in either of these categories (Table 62).

Asked about changes in their own job since they joined the service, inspectors offered a similar set of responses to those offered in respect of sergeants, although with certain significant differences. In respect of the external changes, as many mentioned the greater need to be sensitive to external groups as a significant change, namely eight (44.4%), as mentioned a more difficult and hostile policing environment. In respect of the organisational changes, again a downgrading in status was most frequently mentioned (8=44.4%), closely followed by the changing profile of recruits

(7=38.9%), with increased administrative demands receiving four (22.2%) mentions and technological changes three (16.7%). Finally, three inspectors (16.7%) felt that there had been no significant changes in their role since they joined the service, and four (22.2%) felt unable to offer an opinion (Table 63).

Notwithstanding these unsolicited responses, as a supplement our three groups were also prompted to comment upon a number of factors (overlapping considerably with the forementioned responses) bearing upon specific dimensions of change in the role of sergeants, and in the case of inspectors, in their own role also. These were structural changes in the organization, changes in recruits, changes in the attitudes of senior officers, changes in relationships with outside groups and in public attitudes, and technological and legal changes. Further, on the related theme of more general changes in perception during the course of the officer's career, all groups were asked about shifts in their attitudes towards fellow officers, the law and the legal system, the general public, and organisational objectives. The responses to these semi-structured and unstructured questions, as befits their nature, will be analyzed together with the above findings in a more discursive manner in chapter six, where we attempt to deepen our understanding of the relevance of organizational and environmental developments for changes in junior managerial roles generally, and the role of the sergeant more specifically.

C. SUMMARY

The broad picture presented above is one which suggests that the majority of uniform patrol sergeants define their role - their problems, priorities and most valued attributes - in terms of a cluster of interpersonal challenges, tasks and skills centring upon their relationships with colleagues in other ranks, and that these work imperatives are underpinned and informed by a generalized commitment to ensure that their subordinates carry out operational policework effectively and efficiently within the direction set by their superiors. In the enactment of their central interpersonal role they find it difficult to strike an appropriate balance between administrative demands from above and the perceived need to nurture, motivate and control those below. These difficulties are both logistical, concerning time management and the calculation of priorities, and social, concerning the maintenance of good relations with juniors and seniors through satisfying the conceptions of both constituencies as to sergeants' appropriate priorities and allegiances.

More specifically, if considered together, answers to questions on general role content, authority relations and - to a lesser extent - management philosophies suggest a difference in emphasis between sergeants and their seniors as to their most appropriate orientation towards their juniors. Sergeants favour a package of tasks and priorities weighted towards an intimate and personalized style of management - a predominantly normative

approach. Their seniors, on the other hand, while by no means dismissive of this aspect of the sergeant role, as with their own role conceptions they place more emphasis upon a general impersonal control function - an instrumental approach. Complementing this finding, sergeants felt there to be relatively less empathy with the nature of their job amongst senior ranks than amongst adjacent ranks, the former being to some extent 'out of touch' with operational demands.

The majority of sergeants, with some endorsement from more senior colleagues, see their rank as offering the most difficult challenge within the force - a challenge which has grown during their time of service and which is likely to become even more demanding. Internal factors, led by a decline in the status attaching to the sergeant's role, as well as external factors, led by a general increase in the hostility experienced in the social environment of policing, are perceived to be important contributory factors. Further, sergeants believe themselves to be ill-prepared for this first, and most treacherous, rung on the promotion ladder.

Despite these perceptions, many sergeants seem satisfied with certain institutional features of the organisation generally, and more specifically, they retain a positive orientation towards their own job. The system of social technology - the arrangements made for staff appraisal and promotions - meet with modest approval, as does the network of intra-organisational communications. The hierarchical design of the organization itself is not seen as an

impediment to this, nor is it perceived to restrict unduly the degree and quality of consultation of lower managerial ranks. Further, rank, the defining feature of this hierarchical design, is recognized in its own right as an important basis of authority for senior ranks. As to their attitude to their daily working lot, most sergeants register a reasonably high level of job satisfaction, and are more likely to aspire towards further advancement than when they were constables.

CHAPTER FIVE

POWER IN THE POLICE ORGANISATION: SITUATING THE SERGEANT

In this chapter we begin to assess the significance of the general set of findings set out in the previous chapter for our understanding of the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy implementation process within police divisions, and in particular, of the crucial role of the sergeant within this process. In order to do so, we must return to the model of power relations developed in chapter three for the specific purpose of generating understanding of networks of influence and forms of collective mobilization within the police organization, and attempt to apply this model to the empirical findings. Within this framework, we attempt to provide a general theoretical analysis of the pattern of relations between ranks and to suggest how this pattern impinges on the role of uniform patrol sergeant. In turn, this exercise sets the agenda for the remainder of the thesis, which is concerned with the more detailed elaboration and refinement of our provisional hypotheses, an assessment of the responses of sergeants, and an analysis of the possibilities for reform.

A. PATTERNS OF RELATIONS BETWEEN RANKS

(1) A basic proposition

Further to our findings in the previous chapter in respect of relations of authority within the divisions and various cognate matters, the fundamental proposition which is advanced in this subsection is that within the police organisations under study, *the greater the distance between ranks within a relationship the lesser the tendency to rely upon normative relations and the greater the tendency to rely upon instrumental relations.* This proposition may be qualified in two ways. First, it is subject to a number of general exceptions, although, as is argued, this does not undermine the overall validity of its terms. Secondly, if we examine the various components of the proposition, it appears to be supported by a combination of direct and indirect arguments. That is, some of the factors which substantiate its terms are directly *distance-related*, focussing upon the propensity of instrumental relations to predominate and normative relations to be marginalized where the gulf in rank between the parties is great, while other are *rank-related*, focussing upon the parallel implications which flow from the elevated institutional status of the party to the relationship who is of senior rank. For the most part, the direct and indirect factors may be considered together, as providing a cumulative case in support of the general proposition. This is possible on account of the fact that, although analytically separable, as relationships characterized by a considerable distance between ranks are also

necessarily relationships in which the senior party is of high institutional status, these two sets of factors tend nevertheless to be empirically concurrent. However, since the converse proposition does not apply this empirical relationship does not always hold: that is, relationships in which the senior party is of high institutional status are *not* also necessarily relationships characterized by a considerable distance between ranks. To the extent that this is true (i.e. where the status of *both* parties to the relationship is relatively high) the two strands of argument may thus run against one another. Although not closely concerned with them in this chapter, we will examine these cases in due course and attempt to integrate them into our general understanding of inter-rank relations. (1)

With these provisos in mind, an attempt will be made to substantiate the general proposition, first, in terms of its positive dimension, through examining the relevant effects of distance between ranks, and secondly, in terms of its negative or inverse dimension, through examining the contrary implications of proximity between ranks.

If we consider the positive dimension, a number of arguments may be led in support of its first strand - the tendency to rely less on normative relations where the distance between the parties is greater. First, in line with the persuasive core of the two cultures thesis, in consequence of different formal role demands and expectations and of a declining, if still not necessarily

insubstantial, fund of shared or similar experience, supervisory ranks that are relatively distant from one another are less likely to be in independent agreement over work priorities and objectives. In other words, the degree of underlying normative unity, which provides an important foundation for normative relations in general, is likely to decrease in line with distance between ranks. This is borne out by the differences revealed in the previous chapter as between the priorities, problems, ideal attributes and management philosophies of different ranks, and by the corresponding trends evident in respect of patterns of understanding and allegiance between ranks. Further, if we attempt to locate these differences between supervisory ranks within the wider context provided by the two cultures thesis in its starkest form - concerning the relationship between the higher managerial ranks and the operational rank - our understanding of the nature of this divergence may be deepened. As will be recalled from our discussion in chapter two, endorsed by the findings presented in chapter four, the higher managerial ranks tend to be responsive to the demands of significant external groups and to focus on the implementation of the police mandate on a system-wide basis - emphasizing general, cumulative and measurable indices of competence and success. In contrast, and here also we rely not only upon the solid body of evidence from the existing literature but also the limited amount of data gathered in respect of officers of this status, operational officers at constable rank tend to adopt working values which are both more inward-looking - loyally defensive of the integrity and welfare of the peer group against a dangerous and unpredictable environment,

and more responsive to case-specific and pragmatic indices of competence and success.⁽²⁾ Within this broader framework, the role orientations peculiar to sergeants as revealed in the research may be seen to derive from their intermediate structural position. Susceptible to higher managerial demands but retaining an intimacy with operational ranks and relatively fresh memories of the pressures placed upon the latter group, the distinctive flavour of their set of underlying normative orientations may lie in a tendency to sympathise with aspects of both alternative perspectives and sets of aspirations, and a constant requirement to reconcile the demands of each within their mediating role.

If we focus more specifically upon the amenability of different types of inter-rank relationships to the development of a network of normative relations, our proposition about the significance of distance between ranks receives further backing. To a large extent, the generation of two types of normative relations - persuasion, and those elements of personal authority which are based upon personal ties - depends upon intimate personal contact of a type which is palpably more likely to develop between officers of adjacent ranks. In the case of relations of competent authority also, their strength tends to vary indirectly with the degree of distance between ranks.⁽³⁾ These conclusions as to the reduced currency of personal knowledge and occupational competence as bases of authority between more distant ranks are both supported by the findings presented in chapter four,⁽⁴⁾ but while the reasons for this in the former case may be self-evident, in the latter case they are more complex.

With regard to the basis upon which junior ranks may accord professional respect to their seniors, the key to understanding this rests upon the nature of the work experience and situation of the junior. To begin with, this leads to a tendency to emphasize the degree of competence of the senior officer in the work of more modest ranks as an important aspect of the former's occupational competence generally. Partly, this may be accounted for by the view, generally subscribed to amongst more junior ranks,⁽⁵⁾ that prior competence in a junior rank is necessary if one is to be a competent supervisor of junior ranks. Partly, also, it is due to the strong craft-based image of policework. This latter factor is significant in two respects, one epistemological and the other relating to the manner in which it colours lower participants' assessments of the relative worth of different types of work within the police organisation.

First, the contingent and situationally specific quality which is felt by lower ranks to attach to their own work leads them to doubt the value and plausibility of non-experientially based methods of attaining knowledge of work and judging the competence of workers within other occupational spheres, including the sphere of managerial work within their own organisation. Accordingly, as direct experience is in short supply in respect of the staple managerial work of senior ranks, competence in an area which is more easily accessible and in which judgement is endorsed by personal experience - namely operational work - tends to be used by members of junior ranks as a proxy for competence in more senior ranks:

" One thing about the police, you end up doubting anything that isn't in front of your nose - and even some things that are! You ask anyone in this shift about what they think of a certain lawyer, or a fiscal, or the Childrens Hearings' Reporter, or even a senior officer, and you'll always get a story about them, where they have come across them, or a colleague has. So you ask about the chief inspector, and you'll get a story about how he helped them with a couple of neds on the night-shift last week, or how they rated him as a cop or sergeant on the shift 10 years ago. That ends up being more important than how he does his job day-in, day-out, because at the end of the day cops don't really trust anyone else's judgement. They go on what they know, because usually that's all they've got to rely on. (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Secondly, and more directly, the craft-based image, by emphasizing the exigent and autonomous nature of the work within the junior ranks and stimulating the belief that the operational officer succeeds by her/his own endeavours, has tended to lead to the devaluation of managerial work - a sceptical attitude towards its status as an independent and valuable set of practices and competencies within the police⁽⁶⁾ - and a consequential greater concentration upon operational competence as the standard for testing officers of all ranks.

Nevertheless, the badge of operational experience, although a crucial asset, is not of itself deemed sufficient to warrant the attribution of professional authority by juniors to their seniors. The nature of the work experience of junior officers also tends to lead them to stress the importance of senior officers possessing an ability to put their practical experience and knowledge to practical use, by means of an appropriate display of continuing empathy with

the needs and difficulties of the work involved in the junior rank. In particular, what is sought is proper acknowledgement and appreciation of the distinct and autonomous basis in skill of the tasks of junior ranks and of the difficulties attendant upon these tasks, as reflected in the emphasis placed by sergeants and constables, when asked about ways of improving the communications and consultation network.⁽⁷⁾ upon the importance of senior officers maintaining regular contact with juniors and providing a supply of information adequate to their operational needs.

Now, the opportunities for senior officers to satisfy both of these sets of expectations - to demonstrate that they have rightfully earned their operational spurs and still deserve to wear them, and that they value and are prepared to protect the integrity and autonomy of the work of more junior ranks, tend to diminish as they become more distant in rank and the incidence of daily work contact becomes less frequent. Thus, 'there is no substitute for experience' remains an important motto and reference point in the decision whether to grant a senior officer professional authority, but the worth of such experience is qualified by the belief that it is 'only too easy for him to forget where he came from' and the continual requirement for evidence that amnesia has not in fact set in nor indifference taken hold, a requirement which, on the evidence of the previous chapter,⁽⁸⁾ becomes harder to meet as the relationship becomes more attenuated.

The basis for the attribution of professional respect to one's seniors, therefore, is limited and, within its own terms, precarious. It tends to be narrowly confined to matters bearing upon past experience and past displays of competence, yet it may ebb away in the face of evidence of having lost touch.

If we look at relations of competent authority from the opposite perspective,⁹ then, given the system of undifferentiated entry, and the ensuing fact that every senior officer will have had experience in all junior ranks, the criteria used by senior officers to decide whether to accord professional respect to their juniors will obviously have been honed from their own experiences in the ranks. While this provides a substantial basis from which to make judgments as to competence, it also tends to militate against the accordance of any great deal of authority to junior ranks, since that which makes senior officers feel competent to judge whether professional respect is due, also tends to make them less likely to defer to the judgement of their juniors. At one and the same time, experience makes the senior ready to judge whether respect is due and therefore attribute respect, but reluctant to build upon this attribution of respect and thereafter attribute authority. In this regard, the views of one chief inspector were typical of senior divisional officers' views generally:

" You ask about how difficult the sergeant's job is, and whether it's getting harder. Remember, we've all been through the mill. That's a good thing for the police, compared to the army or industry. It means that we can judge who the good sergeants and cops are, but it also means that we don't have to take any rubbish. Look at the experience of the senior officers here. Sergeants

are vital, but there's no way that they know their job better than we know their job." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

Thus, if we compare the opposite channels of professional respect between distant ranks, although the downward flow may be less precarious than the upward flow, it is also more narrowly confined, and if they are considered together, they represent an insubstantial basis for a strong reciprocal structure.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of institutional authority, which poses a still more complex challenge to our proposition than does competent authority, let us now turn to the second strand to the positive dimension within our proposition, which suggests a direct connection between distance between ranks and the status in the organisation of the senior party on the one hand, and readiness to rely on instrumental relations on the other. General backing for this proposition is to be found in chapter four, where it is reported that sanctions and - to a lesser extent - incentives take on a greater significance, just as more personalized bases of authority - personal knowledge and competent authority - become less relevant, as rank increases, and that the maintenance of discipline is a key organising theme in the role conceptions of senior officers. In part, this arises from the implausibility of the other more normative options discussed above. The territorial and functional scope of responsibilities of more senior officers, particularly those above inspector rank who do not work in synchronization with the shift system, creates constraints

of time and space which militate against the nurturance of the types of intimate contact required for the interpersonally focussed types of normative relations to flourish. However, there are other positive reasons why instrumental relations tend to be accentuated in relations between distant ranks.

In simple terms, the higher their rank, the more likely are officers to be able to gain access to and to deploy the resources through which instrumental strategies may be applied. Within the formal division of labour, senior officers hold most of the 'carrots' and wield most of the 'sticks'. They exert a considerable degree of control through the system of social technology - the staff appraisal and the promotion system - and may also channel influence through a number of more modest incentives, including the allocation of more desirable jobs within departments or the approval of transfers or secondments to other departments, and the capacity to set permissible levels of overtime. The most powerful 'stick' is that of the formal discipline system and the shadow cast by the explicit or implicit threat of its invocation, but again senior officers can enforce or threaten more subtle sanctions - undesirable transfers, unattractive working practices and standards such as fastidious paperwork demands and strict administrative time-limits and, relatedly, the creation of an uncongenial working environment where juniors fear to step out of line. In all cases, however, the formal disciplinary system, although comparatively rarely invoked, ⁽¹⁰⁾ provides a powerful if often subtly conveyed organising theme:

"If you look at the police on an everyday basis, the discipline code is not often talked about. But it is always there in the background. It is drummed in to you as a probationer, it's always a threat when you arrest someone who has a grudge, or you're caught off your shift, or if there's a cock-up and somebody has to carry the can. There's a lot of what you might call petty discipline in the police, but it always carries the reminder of the back-up powers... You always know that when push comes to shove, you have to accept these trivial things because you're in a no-win situation. It's a funny thing really, even most of the senior officers seem a bit embarrassed about it, there's something impersonal about it, no-one wants to be personally responsible for it. Sometimes I think that is why they have a separate Discipline Branch up at headquarters. But at the end of the day, no senior officer would be without it, and some of them play on it. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Finally, as regards the other subspecies of instrumental relations - control of allocation of key resources - senior officers tend to influence the distribution of resources required for operational policework and its effective management, including the deployment of manpower and the availability of vehicles.

Of course, it is arguable that the interconnectedness of the tasks of senior and junior ranks reduces the potential of these various instrumental capabilities in the hands of senior officers. Although it provides a clear demarcation of tasks in terms of responsibility for particular *persons* and *ranks*, the singularity of command relations between ranks in the line organization also creates an overlap in responsibility for *activities*. The sergeant is responsible for management and supervision of the practices of

the constable, inspectors are responsible for the management and supervision of the practices of the sergeant, and so on. Thus, formally speaking, the practices of all senior ranks are parasitic upon the practices of the main provider of police services - the constable - and a closely-knit and all encompassing form of task interdependence is thereby created. In turn, this might be seen to strengthen the instrumental position of junior ranks. The application of sanctions and the denial of key resources might undermine both the motivation and the capacity of more junior ranks to perform effectively, and mutual awareness of these strategic balancing factors might stay the hand of more senior ranks, making them less willing to use such measures lest the resulting poor performances of their juniors reflect badly upon their competence as managers.

Undeniably, the existence of this intercursive⁽¹⁾ dimension in instrumental relations between ranks does have a significant bearing upon the attitudes of seniors to instrumental strategies at their disposal. However, other countervailing considerations apply which help to sustain the attraction of the instrumental approach. Although operational success or failure inevitably reflects upwards, for those above sergeant rank, their competence or lack of it is only thereby illuminated indirectly, the relevant evidence having been refracted through one or a number of intermediate ranks. This provides the conditions whereby *strategies of displacement* - scapegoating, buck-passing and other less cynically motivated decisions to curtail the chain of responsibility at a more junior

rank - become possible. ⁽¹²⁾ The understanding and evaluation of particular events and the most appropriate distribution of responsibility for these events in terms of a complex, attenuated chain of command is an activity fraught with ambiguity and uncertainty, and the existence of this interpretative space provides opportunities for senior ranks to displace responsibility downwards, the plausibility and authority of their particular version of the applicable lines and directions of responsibility being forcefully endorsed by their position of formal ascendancy.

Many of these findings are reinforced when we consider the negative, or inverse dimension to our basic proposition, that the proximity of the ranks involved leads to a stronger accentuation of normative relations and a weaker reliance on instrumental relations. In advancing and illustrating this argument we will concentrate upon the relationship between sergeants and constables. This is particularly apt for two reasons: first, it is the most clearcut empirical test of the inverse dimension of our proposition, since not only are the ranks directly adjacent, but they are also the most junior, and therefore an analysis of this relationship should also strongly bear out the indirect status-related aspect of our proposition; secondly, this relationship is in any case a focal one for the purposes of the present study. This narrower perspective does not entail, however, that the effects of proximity between more senior management ranks - where distance-related arguments and status-related arguments are in opposition - will be neglected, as this network of relations is examined in chapter nine.

-

If we focus, then, on the sergeant-constable interface, we may note that the the preconditions of successful normative relations are markedly favourable and the resources necessary for successful instrumental relations are in notably short supply.

The degree of intimacy in the working context - of inevitable mutual exposure to judgement on issues relevant to the attribution of personal respect, trust and professional respect - entails that there is greater scope for the development of various forms of personal ties, of professional respect, and of discursive relations which enhance mutual persuasive capacities. Further, the degree of common experience of working conditions and the environment^t of work increases the possibility of independent normative unity on various matters. These arguments are consistent with and explanatory of our findings that sergeants tended to emphasize personal knowledge and expertise strongly in discussing the basis of their authority over junior ranks, that a relative majority of sergeants felt closest to the constable rank, and that an absolute majority of sergeants felt that constables understood their job at least fairly well. (13)

On the other hand, while sergeants may be in a position to dispense various "small favours"⁽¹⁴⁾ including indoor jobs, extended time to complete paperwork, flexible scheduling, unquestioned sick leave, overtime, sequential days off, lengthy work breaks in amenable environments, permanent partnerships, reliable partners, desirable beats, unobtrusive supervision, or in favourable

appraisals, and to exert the sanctions involved in the withdrawal of such benefits or in triggering disciplinary action, their powers over these matters are considerably less than those of their seniors. Further, since, as we noted in chapter four, ambition for advancement tends to be generally less pronounced in the lower ranks,⁽¹⁵⁾ many constables are not necessarily responsive to such instrumental strategies as sergeants can pursue in this field. While this conclusion is further underlined by the poor rating accorded to discipline as a basis of authority by sergeants, how is it to be reconciled with their relatively strong regard for incentives? The explanation for this lies in the fact that, when probed, sergeants' beliefs in the desirability of incentives tended to focus on the situation as it might ideally be rather than as it was. There was a general recognition that the existing powers available to sergeants meant that their capacity to satisfy and influence constables through improving their working conditions was restricted, as one sergeant put it, to the achievement of the 'minimum groan factor'. On this more detailed reading, therefore, the relative insignificance of sanctions and incentives alike emerges. Furthermore, in so far as incentives remain a reckonable part of the strategic arsenal of sergeants, as discussed in subsection 3 below, their use may in any case, and within certain limits, represent a form of instrumental power which is compatible with a generally normative approach.

The relative unattractiveness of instrumental strategies to sergeants as compared to their seniors is further reinforced when

the implications for their rank of the relationship between task interdependence and strategies of displacement within the line organization are discussed. As with all adjacent ranks there is a considerable overlap of responsibilities between sergeants and constables, but unlike other inter-rank relations the strategies of displacement are not available as an attractive choice to either party. There is no subordinate agent for constables to pass the buck to, while for the sergeants, being in the front line of the management enterprise, any allocation of responsibility to their juniors will normally directly reflect upon their own competence. When this is considered alongside the fact that, by contrast, sergeants and constables are susceptible to the enactment of these very strategies of displacement by third parties of senior rank, the strength and unusual qualities of the intercursive dimension in relations between these two ranks is apparent. Their task interdependence is non-assignable, and given the weight of instrumentally-backed demands made on them by other ranks, not least because these higher ranks do retain the capacity to assign responsibility, there develops a strong concurrence of objectives⁽¹⁶⁾ between sergeants and constables - an awareness that their ambitions are inextricably interwoven and their fates hang together. In turn, this provides a disincentive to the pursuit of instrumental relations and a stimulus to the pursuit of normative relations, not only in the immediate sense, already alluded to, that heavy-handed instrumentalism can damage the means and motivation of the other to act and co-operate in a manner which enhances one's own interrelated role achievements, but also in the sense that strategic

co-operation may, in the longer term, generate co-operative practices which feed upon themselves, continually bolstering and augmenting the conditions which make normative relations possible and desirable. The general dynamics of this process will again be more closely examined in subsection 3 below when we consider the self-propagating and mutually incompatible nature of normative and instrumental relations more specifically, while concrete illustrations of how the interests of sergeants and constables may run together in this manner are provided in chapter ten.

(2) The basic proposition: some counter-arguments.

Despite the cumulative weight of these arguments, there are a number of contrasting considerations which have to be taken into account in assessing the validity of our basic proposition.

In the first place, even as regards relations between the most distant divisional ranks, the undifferentiated system of entry within the police organization and the element of shared socialization flowing from this continue to offer at least residual foundations for a degree of independent normative unity, for the fostering of personal ties based upon more intimate working relationships in the past,⁽¹⁷⁾ and, as indicated already, for the mutual attribution of professional respect based upon the acknowledgement of the fact that colleagues must have undergone similar operational experience, and gained similar operational credentials. This is evident in the findings that distant ranks

continued to show some - albeit an ever-diminishing - degree of understanding of, support for and empathy for one another's tasks and responsibilities, and that although junior officers saw perceived expertise, and, in particular, personal knowledge as less significant bases of authority for their senior officers than for themselves, these qualities were still rated as fairly significant in absolute terms.⁽¹⁸⁾ It would be wrong, therefore, to conclude that the channels along which the more intimate types of normative relations between distant ranks may flow are entirely closed off.

Secondly, the evidence does not suggest that the significance of the particular subcategory of personal authority known as charismatic authority - a deference to the judgement of the other party on account of their outstanding qualities - diminishes in accordance with the status of the putative authority-holder or their distance in rank from the party offering judgement, and indeed it may increase. The cautious nature of this conclusion reflects the fact that no closed-ended question was directed specifically to this issue, since it was felt that the conceptual level of difficulty involved in giving expression to the complex and somewhat intangible idea of charismatic authority - something less intimate than personal ties, yet more personalized than mere rank and more remarkable than mere competent authority - precluded the possibility of articulating such a question in a manner which successfully communicated its underlying meaning. Instead, information about the idea of charisma and its referents is restricted to statements in subsequent more open-ended discussion of the nature of authority,

where more intimate communicative understandings could be more readily achieved. Nevertheless, such evidence as may be derived from this limited base indicates that members of senior ranks were perhaps more likely to be attributed charismatic qualities than their more junior colleagues.

The explanation for this lies in part in the fact that there exists a pervasive belief that trends towards uniformity have robbed the organization of its 'characters', those individuals who stamp their own personal style upon their work and upon their relations with colleagues. In turn, for many officers this is associated with a nostalgic yearning for past times, when such characters were supposedly more prevalent.⁽¹⁹⁾ Pursuit of this nostalgic theme inevitably directs attention to the higher ranks of the service who with their longer service are deemed to be generally more representative of this dying breed. And since many of these more detached figures are known only through the accounts of others, greater scope exists for the construction of reputations which, unrestrained by mundane personal knowledge, are at once enigmatic, caricatured and literally 'larger than life', containing the subtle mix of ineffability and extraordinariness through which a charismatic image may be formed. Some of these ideas are well expressed in the following quote:

"It's true that there are hardly any characters left - not like when I joined the service. Everyone is a number now, not a name. A few of the bosses are different, they still have their own style. Some of the stories you hear about J... who used to be divisional commander here. He did things his own way, but he got results. Everyone's too scared to stand out of line now,

and the job has definitely lost something as a result." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Thirdly, and most significantly, as is indicated by the cross-rank consensus as to the increasing importance of rank as a basis of authority as one ascends the hierarchy, ⁽²⁰⁾ institutional authority, which depends upon the socially established position accorded by rank and whose various aspects were outlined in chapter three, provides one form of normative power which varies directly with the status of its holder. Thus, the historical resilience of the hierarchical pattern of authority within the police organization, endows present incumbents with traditional authority in its various forms. As its senior representatives, senior officers benefit vicariously from the conservative approbation accorded to an institutional framework which has withstood the judgement of generations, and also from its taken-for-granted status which derives from its degree of embeddedness in historical practice and experience, and thus in conventional understandings.

"This job, the uniform, the ranks, even a lot of the procedures and ways of going about things, are full of tradition. A lot has changed, but a lot hasn't, and rank still pulls a lot of weight, as it rightly should. It comes naturally, you don't even think about it a lot of the time."
(inspector, Newtown Division)

The embeddedness of the institutional structure may also account for the reluctance amongst intermediate ranks to attribute responsibility to the hierarchical system of organisational design for problems of communication between themselves and higher ranks, despite the strong perception of these intermediate divisional ranks that inter-rank contacts and understandings are deficient in many

respects. ⁽²⁾ Another feature of this general strain of deference towards the existing institutional framework and its system of ranks, the problems that this framework generates notwithstanding, is the readiness of some officers to trace a connection between, on the one hand, the 'sacred' quality of the police institution in its external imagery - the perceived tendency of certain police audiences to acknowledge a tremendous, unfathomable power in the police institution, and on the other, the appropriate attitude of insiders towards those situated at the apex of that institution:

"A lot of people are basically still in awe of the police. In a sense, so are a lot of police officers. I don't mean so much in awe of other police officers. The police are the most cynical buggers imaginable about other policemen, but ... they've still this thing about the police force as a whole. Maybe, it's because we all get it when we join up, how wonderful the police is, how important it is to the fabric of society and all that. After a few months at the college, at least when I was there, they wanted you to think that the police were all avenging angels and the bosses were Gods. You see, we get the same propoganda as the public do, and didn't somebody once say that if you don't believe your own propoganda, no-one else will? In a way that feeling always sticks with you, and I think it is a good thing. I mean, if we don't believe that the police means something special... and there should be some respect for authority, then how can we expect anyone else too. (inspector, Newtown Division)

Further, their elevated status within the rank structure entails that senior officers also benefit from the respect accorded to the specifically bureaucratic properties of the organization. Not only is the system of hierarchy, of clear demarcation of responsibilities and of functional expertise generally perceived by officers of all ranks to provide certain benefits in terms of the

efficient integration of organisational endeavour, but it is also perceived to be peculiarly well adapted to an emergency service whose effective mobilization is often crucially dependent upon orders being clearly transmitted and unquestioningly obeyed. (22)

"You basically can't do without the rank structure here. You may not like the bosses all the time, but it couldn't work otherwise. If there's a big march in the city centre which has got out of hand you've got to be able to rely on the men to stay on, you've got to be able to rely on them pulling their weight and responding as one unit to commands." (Sergeant, City Division)

As regards a final subcategory of institutional authority relations, senior officers are seen to provide a crucial nexus between the division and the force generally on the one hand, and the ultimate legal and constitutional sources of police authority on the other. As the following quote illustrates, the significance of this, as indeed of the strands of institutional authority coloured by tradition and sanctity, is underpinned by factors which suggest a particularly close attunement of the attitudes of serving police officers generally with the ideas of legitimate command immanent in the history and present structure of organizational arrangements:

"A lot of the older men have seen national service, and even for those who haven't, I think it used to be the case anyway that the police would attract a type who felt that authority was important. The bosses are seen as the 'powers-that-be'."

Q. "Why is that?"

A. "Well it's just because they *are* the bosses. Also, they're our basic link with authority generally, the law, the courts, even the government. O.K. we're supposed to be independent, we are independent, but the government is answerable for law and order, and we are law and order. The bosses are the linkmen." (Inspector, Oldtown Division).

This quote also indicates that there may be some evidence of the contemporary erosion of institutional authority bases. This is a theme which we shall explore later, but for the moment we may assert that even if the absolute value of institutional authority is diminishing, our findings demonstrate that the relative importance attributed to it within the overall power base of the senior officer remains significant.

Patently, these three qualifications to our basic proposition cannot lightly be dismissed, but in measuring their significance we must recognise that an overall assessment of the relative importance of instrumental as against normative relations in respect of different inter-rank relations demands that we look not merely at the power sources in isolation, but at their interrelationship with one another. Of particular relevance in this respect, is an examination of the relationship of the general class of normative power sources to that of the general class of instrumental power sources within any particular set of inter-rank relations.

(3) Reinforcing the basic proposition: patterns of divergence between normative and instrumental relations

Certain features of each of the two sets of relations suggest that, considered as a class, each has a mutually reinforcing and self-perpetuating quality for any particular agent and his or her inter-rank relationships, and correspondingly, each tends to minimize the attractiveness or plausibility of resort to the other. This conclusion is significant in that it suggests that any general

preponderance of one set of relations over another which is revealed by looking at the potential of each individual power base in respect of a particular relationship separately, is reinforced when we look at these power bases in combination. A more comprehensive *systemic* analysis thus accentuates the conclusions to be drawn from simple aggregate analysis. Accordingly, despite the countervailing arguments presented above, the force of the general proposition is strongly underscored by consideration of this inverse dynamic between normative and instrumental power relations. For the moment, an outline sketch of this inverse dynamic will suffice to allow us to begin to examine the implications of our basic proposition for the role of uniform patrol sergeants. A more detailed treatment will follow in later chapters.

What is the basis of this additional dimension to our argument? On what grounds may it be contended that normative and instrumental relations, considered holistically, represent divergent and self-propagating patterns of power relations?

There is both a subjective and an objective element to this argument, and these aspects are in turn interrelated. Subjectively, the pursuit of either type of relations tends, from the standpoint of the instigator, to 'close off' the possibility of the pursuit of the other. Objectively, the possibility of successfully establishing a different sort of relationship becomes increasingly remote, the more one pattern of relations becomes entrenched.

If we approach this matter from the angle of normative relations, the nature of this inverse dynamic may be discerned from an examination of two social institutions which are fundamental to those more intimate types of power relations on which rests the normative side of the equation within our basic proposition, namely the institution of 'respect' and the institution of 'trust'.⁽²³⁾ Both 'respect' and 'trust' are heavily implicated in relations of personal authority and competent authority. Personal respect - the positive estimation of the non-work-related attributes of the other, and professional respect - the positive estimation of the work-related attributes of the other, provide constituent features of personal authority and competent authority respectively. In the case of trust, as well as providing an elementary medium and outcome of certain relations of personal respect and friendship, it may also figure in the accordance of professional respect by juniors to seniors, in that, as we have already argued, one element which contributes to the attribution of competent authority to senior officers is their recognition and competent understanding of the necessary element of autonomous expertise within junior ranks, and their ensuing willingness to trust juniors to exercise this discretion competently and in accordance with legitimate organizational objectives.

Respect and trust are overlapping features of social life, but neither may be entirely subsumed within the other. It is possible to respect someone without necessarily trusting them, as in the special case of personal authority known as charismatic authority -

where one's reverence of the qualities of the other need not exclude a degree of ambivalence as to the likelihood of their acting in a way which does not offend one's own interests, or even in the case of certain aspects of competent authority, where regard for certain professional qualities of the other might subsist notwithstanding the harbouring of doubts as to whether the other trusts one in the exercise of one's own professional responsibilities. Likewise, it is possible to trust someone without necessarily respecting them, as in certain types of affective relations and friendships, where the bond between two persons may not happily be described in terms of our conventional understanding of the concept of respect. Nevertheless, as evident from our preliminary discussion of the two concepts, there is also a considerable amount of common ground between their respective referential domains. Partly on account of this, and partly on account of other similarities between the two concepts, they tend to operate as self-propagating and mutually supportive social institutions.

The attribution of respect reveals and reinforces a certain susceptibility to being persuaded of certain qualities of the other which one esteems or deems worthy of consideration. In turn, the awareness of respected parties of the respect accorded to them, or at least, their awareness of patterns of behaviour and attitudes towards them on the part of the other party, the respecifier, which are not indifferent to their own actions and concerns, is likely to precipitate some measure of reciprocity on their part. This in turn will reinforce the orientation of the respecifier, and so on.

Respecter and respected may become participants in a spiral of mutual bonding, generating additional respect, trust and other interpersonal ties.

If we look more specifically at the institution of trust, we may note that the degree of reciprocity involved is even more pronounced. This is so because the qualities on the basis of which the judgement as to the trustworthiness of the other is made and on the basis of which one's own trustworthiness may be demonstrated - the confidence to trust and the ability to display one's trustworthiness being the complementary features of the trust relation - tend to be more specifically other-regarding, or *ad personam*, than in the case of respect. In order to understand why this is the case and why it is of relevance in explaining the reciprocal nature of trust, we need to examine the social significance of each of the twin features of the trust relation.

First, we may turn to Niklas Luhmann's analysis of the social implications of trusting others:

"Trust is associated with the reduction of complexity, and, more specifically, of that complexity which enters the world as a consequence of the freedom of other human beings. Trust functions so as to comprehend and reduce this complexity."⁽²⁴⁾

In other words, as writers such as Manning and Chatterton have noted in their analyses of relations between supervisors and operational officers,⁽²⁵⁾ to be in a position to believe reasonably that one can trust one's associates is of significant instrumental value, since

-

it means that one will be able successfully to harness the freedom of one's associates to the pursuit of one's own interests. Likewise, it may be concluded that there is a certain instrumental value in the demonstration of one's own trustworthiness, in that as a consequence one may be trusted to use one's discretion - for better or worse - without the restriction of instrumental forms of verification, sanctioning, and resource-deprivation being utilised by others.

Accordingly, any particular instance of the trust relation is likely to be initiated on a strategic basis, at least unilaterally and perhaps bilaterally, and such strategems may focus on one or both aspects of the trust relation. As there are *generally* applicable good reasons both for trusting and being trusted, *A*, the truster, and *B*, the trustee, may both perceive it to be to their benefit, first to enter into the relationship in the role accorded to each of them by the other as initiator, and secondly to attempt to attain the positions both of truster and trustee within the relationship, and thus to set up the trust relation as a genuinely reciprocal structure.

There is also a transformative potential to trust relations, a propensity for their operating criteria to be changed. Indeed, the trust relation provides the paradigm case of a power relation which may be constructed at least partly on the basis of an instrumental approach by one or both parties, but which develops to embrace both parties in a more comprehensively normative relationship. This

growth of a genuinely reciprocal structure of obligations from instrumental roots is eloquently depicted by Luhmann:

"the communication of interest in the display of trust, the presentation of self as trustworthy, the acceptance and reciprocation of trust are all efforts to intensify and generalize social relationships which prove, in long term relationships at least, to be both opportunity and constraint. Thus, an element of social control is built into relationships of trust. Trust accumulates as a kind of capital which opens up more opportunities of more extensive action but which must be continually used and tended and which commits the user to a trustworthy self presentation, from which he can only escape with great difficulty. One can win trust by means of deceitful self-presentation, but one can only maintain it and use it as continually available capital if one can continue deception. Appearance then turns unnoticed into reality, the qualities which were at first deceitful grow into habits, the advantages of trust serve as an instrument of obligation. Trust educates."⁽²⁶⁾

The educating process to which Luhmann refers is, by its nature, one which will consolidate the foundations of trust, and one which by placing a premium upon the cultivation of 'good impressions', is likely to stimulate the generation of mutual respect also.

Accordingly, in so far as relations are founded on or two key institutions of respect and trust, a self-perpetuating normative framework tends to develop. As indicated, this is partly a subjective matter, deriving from the self-propagating nature of the affective investment involved, a wish to remain tied to the relationships in question irrespective of instrumental gain. It is also partly an objective matter, the strategic 'capital' providing a continuing and perhaps accumulating legacy and, just as importantly, one which may be "reduced through disinvestment"⁽²⁷⁾ and which

cannot be alienated without disrupting the market in power relations. As Alvin Gouldner's well-known tale of the pathology of instrumental relations after the destruction of the 'indulgency pattern' in the gypsum mine tells us, the problems and limitations of a framework of predominantly instrumental relations are accentuated when the participants have the experience of a more prominently normative structure with which to contrast it. (28)

If we now turn more briefly to instrumental relations, we may note that, in the form that they typically assume within the police organisation, they too tend to be self-propagating and, correspondingly, to militate against the development of normative relations. Their emphasis upon indirect, episodic and occasionally surreptitious forms of monitoring of others, and upon the use of sanctions and incentives and of forms of resource deprivation which have a peremptory effect and so do not require the reasoned compliance of the other nor, consequently, the reasoned persuasion or the authoritative influence of the initiator, entails that within instrumental relations there is no premium upon the development by the initiator of a sympathetic understanding of the circumstances and aspirations of the other. Nor, likewise, is the course of action followed by the initiator likely to stimulate any more generous an attitude on the part of the actor who is subject to the instrumental strategy. Again, then, the exclusionary and self-perpetuating quality of this type of power has both a subjective basis - in terms of the attitudes it is likely to generate and the sentiments which it is likely to preclude, and an objective basis -

in terms of its reciprocal quality and the risks which this poses for anyone wishing to transform the basis of such a relationship.

Thus, dovetailing with the above considerations, commitment to an instrumental logic may be incompatible with the development of relations of trust and to a lesser extent, relations of respect. Limited knowledge of and concern with the interests and problems of the other leads to the absence of a secure basis for the institutions of respect and trust, and to developments of sentiments of indifference to the other's qualities. The resulting atmosphere of disrespect, distrust and mistrust is as corrosive of normative relations as the presence of respect and trust is reinforcing of them. Furthermore, while such a development, to a greater or lesser degree, is the unavoidable consequence of the promulgation of instrumental power relations within any bureaucratic setting, ⁽²⁹⁾ as we shall see in chapter seven, there are certain specific features of the police bureaucracy which tend to aggravate this tendency. For now, however, we may simply rest our case upon these strong general indicators of the divergent and mutually repellant properties of normative and instrumental relations.

Despite these powerful general tendencies, however, there are two specific features of the normative-instrumental relationship which qualify the inverse dynamic argument to a limited extent. First, unlike the more intimate bases of authority, reliance upon institutional authority is not obviously incompatible with the development of instrumental relations. The authoritative design and

allocative logic of the bureaucratic principle underpins the relevant power base in each case. The bureaucratic principle thus provides the bridgehead for a potent conjunction of symbolic and practical themes, the impersonality of institutional authority resonating with the strategic distance required in the enactment of instrumental relations. This combination of factors, which has caused many writers to draw a close analogy between police and military forms of organization and leadership⁽³⁰⁾, has traditionally provided a prevalent authoritative style⁽³¹⁾ for senior officers. Indeed, 'the military model' was the apt label applied to this style by one of our respondents:

"A lot of senior officers still rely on what I would call the military model. I saw it a lot when I was in the navy. They rely on the authority of the rank, they let the rank do the talking and don't get very involved. They keep their distance, except when it is a discipline matter or a big ceremony or something. A lot seem to think that it's all about bawling and shouting in the forces, and in the police too, but it isn't. If you have to bawl and shout, like some sergeants and inspectors I know, it's because the rank's not enough. It doesn't mean that the other type don't run a tight shift or they won't screw you if they have to, it's just that it's very low key, they let the rules do the talking and that makes it more effective."

Q. "Is it an arrogant attitude?"

A. "No, not really - well it is with some, but it's more just confidence. They're not concerned with what individual officers think of them, they don't need to be. Their authority is just accepted, all the more so because they believe in it so much themselves". (sergeant, Riverside Division)

However, the potential of this distant authoritarian, or military style should not be overstated. We have already documented the general significance of the institutional power base, but there is

evidence to suggest that this loses its cutting edge when its connection with the species of instrumental power relations is made too explicit. Thus, a more typical attitude among junior officers, rather than uncritical acceptance of the military model, is to stress the limited fruit that such an approach will bear. For them, the instrumental dimension remains to the fore, and reliance upon rank renders more conspicuous the marginal nature of other authoritative bases:

"No-one is denying that rank is important, it's got to be. But they can't just rest on their laurels. There's got to be more to it than that, and the discipline that comes with it. Rank will always get some respect, but it's not the way to get the best out of people, and if it's relied on all the time, then you're really just relying on intimidation." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Furthermore, as will be noted in the next chapter, just as recent trends have caused some erosion of the institutional power base generally, so too there is evidence to suggest that junior officers' disillusionment along the lines just expressed with the military model of leadership is becoming more widespread.

A second qualification to the incompatibility thesis concerns the utilization of incentives rather than sanctions within the instrumental domain - the 'carrot' rather than the 'stick'. If a senior officer's influence over the protection or realization of the interests of the junior officer is positive rather than negative - facilitative rather than preventive - then, given a positive response on the part of the junior officer to the control stratagem which triggers the facilitative action, the junior officer's

orientation to the senior officer thereafter is more likely to be consistent with the development of trust relations and relations of respect than if negative sanctions had been emphasised. Again, however, as with the cultivation of the military model, the scope of this approach to transcend its origins and bridge the gap between instrumental and normative themes may be limited. The use of incentives still presumes the invocation of the reciprocal manoeuvres of information maximization and control, and the cautious and strategic forms of self-presentation attendant upon such manoeuvres. It may also be indicative of, and be seen to indicate a general orientation on the part of the initiator which favours the construction of instrumental relations, including the preparedness to use other aspects of the instrumental package which are more potentially abrasive. The shape of the iron fist, rightly or wrongly, may be perceived beneath the velvet glove: (32)

" There's an old line in in the police that the bosses can do a lot more to you than for you. So when you do get something, you always wonder where the catch is. That might sound cynical, but it's the way things have always been. Nothing you get is ever treated as a right, you're always supposed to be bloody grateful for it, to be ready to do something extra in return. I recently heard of a chief super try to rally the troops by telling them how much police pay had gone up in the last few years, and how we should all be working harder because of it. Bloody cheek! It wasn't as if anyone ever told us we could slack when pay was bad, so why go on about it now its a bit better? Beware the boss bringing glad tidings!" (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

In conclusion, therefore, despite these partial exceptions, the basic argument as to the incompatibility of normative and

instrumental relations remains sound, and accordingly, this inverse dynamic powerfully underscores our proposition as to the relative preponderance of instrumental relations, as opposed to and at the expense of *normative* relations, the greater the distance between ranks.

B. SITUATING THE SERGEANT.

It will be recalled that in the previous chapter differences were identified between sergeants and other more senior promoted ranks within the division both as to the proper orientation of sergeants towards junior officers and, in turn, in their various conceptions of the proper orientation towards juniors which should be adopted within their own respective ranks. Sergeants in general favoured a more normative orientation for themselves, whereas more senior ranks in general placed a greater accent upon instrumental orientations both for sergeants and for themselves. We can now locate these findings within a general theoretical perspective which suggests that instrumental orientations tend to vary directly, and normative orientations to vary indirectly, with the distance in rank between parties to a relationship and the seniority of the party of higher rank, and further, that whichever set of orientations is preponderant within a relationship - instrumental or normative - tends to build on itself to the exclusion or marginalization of the other set. From this perspective, instrumental orientations are likely to be most pronounced between senior ranks and the operational rank, and it is thus that we can

begin to refine our understanding of the pressures and tensions attendant upon the role of the uniform patrol sergeant.

Poised between senior promoted ranks and the operational rank, sergeants are well placed to assess the destructive and counterproductive ramifications of this instrumental backdrop. They recognize that the striving for informational control and the disinformation strategies which this provokes may threaten the line of hierarchical authority for whose maintenance they have a crucial responsibility in their role as policy implementers, and relatedly, that this syndrome may be wasteful of organisational resources and may limit the capacity of the organization to generate and make available to the higher ranks types of knowledge which might beneficially inform overall planning and augment organisational performance. They recognize that consistent involvement in internecine struggle may divert attention and effort from wider objectives, and may demoralize and disillusion organisational participants, particularly lower participants who are most vulnerable to instrumental techniques. Further, their empathy with the predicaments of junior and senior constituencies, equally engulfed by this instrumental pattern, is underlined by their adjacency to inspectors and constable alike.

Accordingly, the institutional position of sergeants generally leads them to conclude that it would be in the interests of both groups - junior and senior officers - and of the organisation as a whole, that an intermediate group such as themselves should be on

sufficiently good terms with each group to be able to utilize their position as controllers of information and interpreters and moderators of organizational policies in order to convince that group of the good faith of the other and the legitimacy of their work commitments, or at least to mitigate the effects of continued mutual instrumentalism and distrust. In order to perform this positive mediating role in a persuasive manner and with confidence that their efforts vis-a-vis one party will not be undermined by the other party, sergeants must be able to earn the trust and respect of both groups and likewise be in a position to trust both groups. However, given the self-propagating nature of instrumental relations, which, as described above, has both a subjective and objective dimension, the prospects for such a subtle balancing act are not necessarily encouraging.

First, as regards the subjective dimension, given the myopia which instrumentalism may induce, a manifest display of trust relations by the sergeant in relation to one group is more likely to be interpreted by the other as evidence of a coalition between that former group and the sergeants against the interests of the latter group. Secondly, as regards the objective dimension, even if junior and senior ranks display a degree of awareness of the counterproductive implications of their present orientations, it is highly unlikely that both groups would *simultaneously* discard attitudes of suspicion in relation to one another. Whichever group were to contemplate such an initiative and to consider dispensing with all instrumental strategies in relation to the other, including

these strategies which involve the use of the sergeant as intermediary, is likely to be stopped short by its recognition that it might suffer in so far as these concessions may continue to be exploited in an instrumental manner by members of the other group. Fearing the possibility of a lack of reciprocity, both groups may thus be inclined to continue to adopt cautiously instrumental strategies, so foreclosing the possibility of a radical transformation to a more normative climate of relations.

Instrumental stalemate may therefore manifest itself as a problem of mutual lack of empathy, and/or as a prisoner's dilemma⁽³³⁾ - a propensity on the part of implicated parties to reject the course of action capable of achieving the best solution in order to foreclose the danger of achieving the worst. Together, these possibilities represent the foundational organisational dimension to what may be termed the *paradox of trust* - a paradox which states, with cruel irony, that the imperative to generate a framework of trust relations is most urgent in these very circumstances which are most impropitious to such a development. Given the degree of brokerage in their role, it is sergeants who are most closely engaged with and bound by this paradox. They occupy a privileged site from which to appreciate the symmetry of the orientations and strategic dilemmas of juniors and seniors, yet also, perhaps, to draw the wry or even rather poignant conclusion that parallel lines never meet.

In chapter ten, we consider how sergeants respond to this paradox of trust, and with what consequences for their capacity to perform their role as policy implementers and mediators and to contribute to organizational effectiveness and efficiency. Before then, however, we wish to develop our understanding of the configuration of factors which produces this complex predicament, in order to provide a more detailed assessment of the particular constraints within which sergeants operate in developing these responses.

Thus, in chapter six we consider the implications of recent externally and internally derived changes in policing and police organisation for our understanding of the above scenario. In chapter seven we examine in more detail the logic of the bureaucratic system of organization as it operates within police divisions, and in particular, the ways in which and the extent to which it contributes to patterns of instrumentalism. In chapter eight we take account of a body of evidence which may run against the grain of the developing thesis, namely the emergence of new normative attitudes within senior ranks, and the impact of these new perspectives upon the above complex of factors is assessed. Finally, in chapter nine we analyse whether the inspector, who fills an intermediary role within the police division of equal significance to that of the sergeant, performs this role in such a manner as to loosen or tighten the grip of the paradox of trust as it confronts the sergeant.

CHAPTER SIX

RECENT CHANGES IN POLICE ORGANISATION

A. A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The aim of this chapter is to identify and explain various recent changes in the organisation of policework and, in turn, to assess the effects of these changes upon the role of the uniform patrol sergeant, in particular the pressures and tensions identified within this role in the previous chapter. The model set out below (Model 1) provides an elementary framework within which this diachronic perspective is developed. Its form and substance reflect an attempt to understand the nature and interrelationship of the various organisational and role change outlined in section B(8) of chapter four, and of other data relating to perceptions of organisational change referred to in that subsection.

Part A, which refers to changes in the socio-political context, provides a synopsis of the various detailed understandings of interviewees of all ranks of a broad range of factors which fall under the two overlapping general categories of external change identified in chapter four as having a significant bearing upon the role of the sergeant, namely the greater need to be sensitive to a diversity of external groups (A1 to A4) and the increasingly hostile and difficult working environment (A3 to A9).⁽¹⁾

Part B represents the focal point of the model, and the exposition of its elements and their ramifications for the sergeant provides the main thrust of the chapter. It details various changes within the police organization and, in parentheses, the roots of these changes within the wider socio-political context, as set out in Part A. For expository purposes, its elements may be placed in four overlapping subcategories. B1 to B3 relate to changes in the formal organization of policework, while B4 and B5 relate to changes in its task structure. Considered together, these two subcategories involve a network of references to all four general types of internal change identified in chapter four - downgrading of supervisory status, increased administrative demands, technological change and the changing profile of new recruits - as well as referring to other changes and perceptions of change which emerged from the findings. B6 and B7 relate to changes in occupational culture, and focus more specifically upon the nature and implications of the changing profile of new recruits, as well as looking at the cumulative effects of the organisational and task changes already considered upon the occupational perspectives of operational officers. Finally, B8 to B11 relate to changes in the political and legal relationship of policing to its environment. Accordingly, these changes are closely associated with the two general categories of external change and, furthermore, this set of changes connects back to and reinforces some of the internal changes already referred to. Thus the various strands of Part A and Part B, and within Part B, are tightly interwoven and, as we shall

see, this is mirrored in the mutually reinforcing pattern of implications which such changes have for the role of the sergeant.

Model 1

The Changing Context of the Role of Sergeant

(A) Changes in the Socio-Political Context. ⁽²⁾

- A1 Growth in institutions of mass media and greater access to controversial data concerning policing (ALL B).
- A2 Growth of more informed and articulate interest groups with aims which challenge conventional assumptions concerning policing (B1, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽³⁾
- A3 Increased external pressure to account for activities (B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁴⁾
- A4 Uncertain governmental/political commitment to the status and ends of policing (B3, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁵⁾
- A5 Increased volume of crime (B1, B2, B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁶⁾
- A6 Changes in the organization of crime (B2, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁷⁾
- A7 Changing patterns of crime, reflecting developments in the criminal law and changes in the social habits of various populations (B6, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁸⁾
- A8 Changing nature of police/public communications and encounters (B4, B5, B6, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽⁹⁾
- A9 Growth of social groups, who, as a result of social and economic factors, become marginalized from mainstream political processes and engage in disruptive forms of social protest more or less particularly focussed against the police as the most visible and tangible manifestation of state power (B6, B7, B8, B9, B10, B11). ⁽¹⁰⁾

(B) Changes in the Police Organization

(i) *changes in formal organization*

- B1 Increases in manpower, in the size of forces, and in the stipulation of uniform procedures and practices between and within these forces .
- B2 Internal specialization and strategic innovations.
- B3 Changing patterns of recruitment and selection.

(ii) *changes in task structure*

- B4 Increase in technologically assisted policing.
- B5 Development of reactive, "fire-brigade" policing.

(iii) *changes in occupational culture*

- B6 Changes in occupational culture reflecting changing nature and organization of policing.
- B7 Changes in occupational culture reflecting changing social values and social environment generally.

(iv) *changes in the political and legal relationship of policing to its environment*

- B8 Greater readiness to assume a high public profile.
- B9 Increased internal pressure to account for activities.
- B10 Increased commitment to internal reform as an ongoing strategy rather than as an expedient and/or a non-recurring need.
- B11 A more formal and comprehensive structure of legal powers.

-

Before we proceed to a detailed examination of this model, a few words are necessary about its advantages and limitations as an explanatory tool. To begin with, it does not attempt to stake a firm position within the general debate between "orthodox" and "revisionist" versions of British police history.⁽¹¹⁾ In so far as it may be subsumed under a wider historical perspective, it sits more easily within the synthetic approach which is persuasively argued for by Reiner,⁽¹²⁾ recognizing the value both of the orthodox emphasis upon the capacity of police institutions to accommodate a variety of external pressures and reconstitute themselves such as to retain a modicum of popular legitimacy, and of the revisionist emphasis upon the tenuous nature of this accommodation, and its propensity to exclude certain interests at the expense of those of more powerful social groupings. That such apparently contrasting interpretations may nevertheless to some extent be integrated within a single perspective reflects the fact that policing itself appears heavily implicated in two quite distinct and contrasting, yet inextricable, social tasks. As Marenin has observed, police institutions are involved in the simultaneous protection of "general order" and of "specific order",⁽¹³⁾ their coercive potential and mandate to preserve or re-establish the *status quo* representing the capacity of the state not only "to guarantee public tranquility and safety" in the interests of all but also "to promote [those] particular interests" in whose favour the *status quo* is skewed.⁽¹⁴⁾ On the one hand, therefore, the developments enumerated in Part A - the growth of new technologies of information dissemination and of social control, the expanding and changing profile of officially

recognized deviance, the growth of a more pluralistic social order and of groups which lie beyond the margins of that "overlapping consensus"⁽¹⁵⁾ which represents a dominant, if loose coalition of interests within this pluralistic order,⁽¹⁶⁾ etc. - may be viewed as typical of any technologically advanced, highly differentiated society, and the various elements in Part B may be seen as functionally necessary responses. On the other hand, the same socio-political pressures and tensions may be seen as located within the crucible of class conflict or other fundamental opposition within an inegalitarian social framework, and the organizational responses be read as more or less direct and subtle attempts to shore up existing social arrangements and the interests that they selectively serve, attempts which crystallize the views of disadvantaged groups of the police as 'the most tangible manifestation of state power' and which tend to lock these two groups into a 'vicious circle' of increasing mutual conflict and alienation.⁽¹⁷⁾

To the extent, therefore, that policing possesses a janus-faced quality, any analysis of the changing nature of police institutions is bound to reflect this duality, and the model presented above is no exception. Its primary purpose, however, as guided by the aims of the research, is at once more modest and more specific. It is not concerned with the *longue durée* of the history of the 'new' police, but with a more restricted historical period spanning the service of present incumbents of managerial ranks. Further, it is not concerned to provide a panoramic perspective of the various

lines of mutual causality connecting police organisations to their environment, but with patterns of influence as they flow in one direction only, tracing the organizational implications of social change. Yet this emphasis upon organisational changes as the phenomena to be explained, rather than as themselves explicative of external changes, does not mean that we should fall into the trap of environmental determinism. As Manning argues, "the organization is a processor of signs, not of stimuli".⁽¹⁸⁾ It is not the passive recipient of incoming data but instead encodes and actively interprets such data in terms of the various meaning systems of organisational members. Accordingly, it is important to be aware that, while environmental pressures do indeed shape organisational practice, they do so only after being refracted through a semiotic grid supplied by the existing cultural orientations of insiders. Our model attempts to reflect this complex process, in that its basic ingredients, as well as the material for its elaboration, are supplied through a "double hermeneutic"⁽¹⁹⁾. That is, its terms reflect not only the researcher's understanding of the process of change, but also, and more centrally, the understandings of organisational actors themselves. Whether responded to through the institutionalization of new organizational structures and practices (see especially B1. to B5), or received as a continuous flow of 'signs' which shape and are reshaped by extant organization norms in a more incremental manner(see especially B6 to B11), the sociological significance of environmental pressures lies mainly in their significance to the human agents who must deal with these pressures. In the discussion that follows, the value of this

emphasis upon the actor's frame of reference will hopefully be demonstrated.

B. THE ELEMENTS OF CHANGE CONSIDERED

(1) Changes in formal organisation.

The increasing size of forces and greater standardization of procedures and policing styles between and within forces (B1) are developments which have been ongoing both in Scotland and in England and Wales since the middle of the 19th century and which were given renewed momentum by the Report of the Royal Commission on the Police in 1962, in particular through its recommendations of an increased role for central government as regards the structure and administration of local forces.⁽²⁰⁾ For its part, in line with the trend in England and Wales, the authorised establishment of the Scottish police virtually doubled between 1945 and the time of the research (for which the end of 1985 provides a convenient statistical point of reference).⁽²¹⁾

To look more closely at changes in force manpower, if we take the end of 1967 - in which year a sergeant of average service within our sample would have joined the police - as a more meaningful baseline for historical comparison with the research period, we may note various trends which have encouraged a perception amongst many respondents that the sergeant rank is now closer to the base of the managerial pyramid, and is generally less important in status.

These include changing inter-rank ratios, absolute increases in numbers at all supervisory ranks, and increases in the size of forces in the relevant areas. To begin with, modest increases throughout the Scottish police may be observed over the relevant time-span in the ratio of sergeants to all ranks, in the ratio of other promoted ranks to the sergeant rank, and in the ratio of all promoted ranks to the constable rank, with the relevant ratios for our particular research forces - neither of which was founded until 1975 - being in line with national averages at the time of the research.⁽²²⁾ In short, sergeants are now proportionately better represented within a hierarchical structure in which the relative strength of more senior promoted ranks has increased to an even greater extent. And if we move from relative to absolute figures, the authorised establishment of the sergeant rank has increased by 407, and of all other promoted ranks by 371, during the research period.⁽²³⁾ Further, comments of various respondents with long service suggest that the perception that their force and division is 'top heavy' and that rank is becoming a debased currency, has been reinforced by the creation of larger forces through two series of amalgamations; first, the amalgamation of various small burgh forces with their surrounding county forces in the late 1960s; and secondly, the more-radical reorganisation in 1975 to align police forces with the new regional structure of local government, which has produced the present system of 8 Scottish forces:

"I joined Coatbridge burgh force, and then went into the county, before they invented Force A and I was shunted in there. It's like night and day, you're moving from a force with less than 100 men, to one with less than 1000, to one with half the police in the country. Rank was a prized

possession in the old burgh, you could plot years ahead who would get the next sergeant's job, or at least who should get it. It was...recognized as a personal achievement. Now there's so many promotions, it's so impersonal and no-one really knows or cares." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

In general terms, the impact upon sergeants of this complex of changes and perceptions of change can be viewed under three headings. In the first place, the more modest organisational position of sergeants and the increase in numbers at this rank may erode their position in terms of institutional authority. The words of one sergeant develop the theme of the previous respondent and echo the sentiments of many other colleagues:

"When I joined the force, the inspector was God, and the sergeant was something just below that. Now there is nothing special about the rank, most of the status has gone." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Secondly, their decline in status may entail that sergeants' influence over the allocation of material resources and the disposal of benefits and sanctions - capacities which are intimately linked to their ability to enact instrumental relations in a successful manner - are diluted. In the words of an earlier respondent, 'the minimum groan factor' may come increasingly to reflect the limits of sergeants' instrumental ambitions. Thirdly, with specific reference to the implications of recent amalgamations, given that the general practice amongst officers within Scottish forces has traditionally been, and continues to be, to remain within the one force throughout their police careers and so may be held as a virtually constant factor,⁽²⁴⁾ the increase in the size of forces and the practice of moving officers between divisions in the one force has

led to a net diminution of the fund of shared and similar experiences between ranks which contributes to personal and competent authority:

"It used to be that any new sergeant would know most of the men on the shift, he would have worked with them at some point, or he would know someone who worked with them. Okay, you could get problems with over-familiarity, but now it's the complete opposite. You get someone in here who has come from, say Kilmarnock, and it's his first job as sergeant. The cops won't know him from Adam, and they're bound to want to test his mettle a few times before he is accepted." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Another sergeant who had had his mettle tested and lived to tell the tale, expressed similar reservation:

"These two men we just passed, I get on with them okay now, but when I came here at first from the East, they were a pair of chancers. My first nightshift, I caught them drinking. I don't think it was much, but it was enough to get them thrown out of the job. I think they were testing me. They were more or less saying, you are a new sergeant, if you have a fuck-up on your first nightshift here, the bosses will be on top of you, and if you turn us in, none of the men will ever trust you. I knew that and they knew that.

Q: "So what did you do?"

A. "I gave them the biggest rollicking ever, told them I knew what they were up to, and said that, if they ever tried it again, they would be out before their feet could touch the ground. Basically, I threatened them, and it worked. They even came up to apologize to me the next day. But if I hadn't done that, I would have never got their respect. The thing is, these things are more likely to happen when the men are strangers, and with a big force like A, that's often the case." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

As suggested, a close corollary of increased size is increased stipulation of common procedures between and within forces, not only in that each development is partially explicable in terms of the

gradual assumption of greater influence by central government, (25) but also in the sense that the increased promulgation of standard operating procedures is symbiotically related to the traits of hierarchy and continuity within the general process of bureaucratization: that is, a degree of standardization is necessary to resolve problems of co-ordination and control within large units characterized by an extended hierarchical chain.

The significance of increased standardization is twofold. First, as noted in chapter three, (26) standardization and bureaucratization generally help to constitute and to refine a stable hierarchical order for the pursuit of instrumental power relations. However, as further noted, while the availability of an arsenal of rules as potential media of instrumental relations is one thing, the extent and manner of its use is quite another. The nature and strength of the instrumental dynamic will also depend upon various other pressures, internal and external, which bear upon actors in a position to make use of bureaucratic methods and, accordingly, discussion of the general implications of the bureaucratization process will be postponed until these additional external and internal pressures are brought into the reckoning in subsection 4 (B9) and chapter seven below.

Secondly, standardization contributes to the general theme of uniformity, a notion which on account of other features of the police organisation such as common dress, common rituals and common experience, strikes a powerful symbolic note within police culture

generally, albeit one which exists in some tension with various factors already discussed which contribute towards internal division, encourage the autonomy of sub-units, or accord value to individual traits and skills.⁽²⁷⁾ Uniformity, therefore, does not have uniformly positive connotations within the police organization. In the present context too, its implications are negative, in that, for some respondents, it feeds into the more impersonal image attaching to the sergeant rank as a result of increases in force size, and so reinforces the sense of erosion of competent and personal authority:

" It's not just the fact that we all get lost in the bigger force which takes away the sergeant's clout, it's that we're all supposed to do things the same way. The sergeant is more and more just a clerk, and he has to worry about the same forms and procedures whether he's working here or in Oban. We're all becoming numbers - faceless men."
(sergeant, Riverside Division)

If we turn to internal specialization and strategic innovations within the organization (B2), while the overall trend in the Scottish police between 1967 and 1985 has shown a marginal increase in the proportion of police officers available for general operational duties,⁽²⁸⁾ at least on paper,⁽²⁹⁾ the manner in which specialist departments have developed in practice has nevertheless exacerbated some of the divisive tendencies identified above. To begin with, since regionalization in 1975, partly to counter problems of integration within the new larger forces, there has been greater lateral movement between departments and specialisms within forces. No longer is it possible, as it was in certain Scottish forces previously,⁽³⁰⁾ to pursue a career exclusively

within C. I. D. or the Traffic Department after a probationary period spent on general uniform duties. While the comments of many respondents suggest that this policy has improved the quality of understanding and relations between departments, ⁽³¹⁾ one unintended consequence has been to cast doubt upon the competent authority of some officers who are promoted from a specialist department to a position of rank within general uniform duties. Harmony between departments may have been purchased at the cost of disharmony within the uniform branch:

"There are sergeants and inspectors, and even chief inspectors and superintendents in this force who are like fish out of water. It was a good thing getting rid of the old C. I. D. mafia in the city, and the Traffic mafia in the county, but the guys on the street have to live with the fall-out." (Inspector, Oldtown Division)

Secondly, notwithstanding the decrease in the overall ratio between specialist and general duties, in the view of some respondents the opprobrium attached to specialization and specialists generally has increased. Partly, this is because specialization is more likely to be combined with physical distance from the operational 'front-line' in a large, territorially diverse force, thus reinforcing the sense of a gulf in experience between different members of the same force. This is particularly so as regards staff at force headquarters, labelled pejoratively as 'cowards' castle' by operational officers in Force A - a sanctuary to which officers retreat if, in the words of one respondent, "they can't stand the heat out in the streets". Accordingly, anyone who 'comes down from the castle' can expect a baptism of fire:

"There are so many specialist department nowadays that the old moan that police officers are

promoted into positions of incompetence is even truer today. We get shiny-nosed kids who have been working in an office at headquarters coming out as sergeants, but what do they know about the real world?" (sergeant, Newtown Division)

This quote also illustrates the fear of being 'swamped' by specialists, and alerts us to a second, apparently paradoxical reason why specialization tends to be regarded negatively by some officers despite the decrease in the ratio of specialists to generalists. The paradox may be resolved by noting that any proportionate decrease in the absolute number of specialists has not been matched by a decrease in the number of specialist departments and initiatives. While economies of scale allowed in the larger regional forces have removed the need for duplication of specialist efforts between various smaller territorial units which were previously independent forces with their own discrete requirements and capacity, and thus has helped to control the relative strength of specialist departments *in toto*, these regional forces have nevertheless spawned many of their own initiatives. This they have done partly in response to changing and increasingly diverse public demand, and partly because of the tendency - recognized in the Weberian model of bureaucracy through its inclusion of expertise as a significant variable - for larger organizations in general to make specific provision for particular tasks. This general tendency holds both on account of the likelihood of larger organizations possessing proportionately greater 'slack' in terms of human resources and, more negatively, on account of the absence of any other plausible means on their part to secure, co-ordinate and

control the pursuit of *all* aspects of their mandate. Within the divisions and forces under study, this burgeoning of specialisms is evident in various forms, whether through the institution of new departments (e.g. Female and Child Units), or through new units and specialisms within existing departments (e.g. 'target' teams within the Drugs Squad, traffic management specialists within the Traffic Department, Community Project Officers within the Community Involvement Branch), or through special initiatives which require only temporary institutional recognition (e.g. anti-robbery squads, anti-burglary squads, teams charged with managing the implementation of new forms of information technology). Whatever the benefits of these and various other innovations, their diversity and visibility undoubtedly contributes to a fear amongst some mainstream operational staff that the 'tail is increasingly wagging the dog', or, as one respondent observed graphically, "the shape of the force is beginning to look more like a toby jug than a pyramid". For such officers, therefore, their awareness of a specialist background on the part of supervisory officers not only signals an empathy gap but also taps a more general 'siege mentality', thus rendering it more difficult for such supervisory officers to convince their charges of their loyalty to a common cause and to generate trust and respect from them.

"I had been so long in communications at force headquarters before I came here, that I know that some officers - not just constables, felt that I wasn't up to it, or that my loyalties lay elsewhere. Basically that was a lot of rubbish but some people took a bit of convincing." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

This trend towards the erosion of normative relations has been reinforced by the operation of the third factor of organisational change (B3). Changing patterns of recruitment and selection within our host forces during the service of our respondents have been similar to those which affected all other forces within Great Britain, and for the same reasons. The tone of the period following the Royal Commission on Policing of 1962 was of a gradual diminuendo in terms of the commitment of the state to the maintenance or the expansion of the living standards of police officers. At the same time, a growing crescendo of criticism and controversy highlighted features of policework - its often mundane nature, its sometimes hostile and squalid environment, its proximity to the slippery edges of corruption, the intractable nature of the war against crime - which set it in an unattractive light from the perspective of the potential recruit.⁽³²⁾ The cumulative effect of these developments was not only to diminish the morale of existing staff,⁽³³⁾ but also to reduce the capacity of police forces to attract new entrants. In turn, this has led to a belief, widely subscribed to within our research forces, that the period immediately prior to the setting up of the ameliorative Edmund-Davies Committee in 1976 constituted a nadir in terms of the quality of recruits:

"Good officers were deserting in droves and some of the new lot should never have got in. It got so bad that they tried desperate measures to stem the flow. For example, lots were leaving to become cab-drivers, so... the Chief Constable sent a request asking that officers should not be allowed to sit 'the knowledge' test until they had actually turned in their warrant cards and resigned. But they couldn't really stop the trend and you can identify a type of officer today who got in round about that time who is absolutely useless and brings great discredit to the police

service." (sergeant, Riverbank Division)

In 1979, with the accelerated implementation by the incoming Conservative government of the Edmund-Davies recommendations on pay,³⁴ the salary structure improved. Since then, the educational standards of new recruits in Scottish forces in general have risen markedly.³⁵ Together with the earlier introduction of initiatives such as the Accelerated Promotion Programme and the Graduate Entry Scheme,³⁶ these changes have signalled an increasing reliance upon formal educational qualifications in the recruitment and promotion policies of the Scottish police. If a broad perspective is taken, this trend may be viewed as part of a wider development in which a practice and image of police 'professionalism' has been assiduously cultivated by certain influential groups in recent years, the significance of which will be assessed in chapter eight. Of more immediate relevance, the emergence, on the one hand, of a group of officers who have achieved significantly higher educational standards than most of their older colleagues, and the retention, on the other hand, of a group of officers who are widely perceived to fall below a minimum threshold of competence, represent two divergent tendencies which have in common the potential to offend the sensibilities of that large group of officers of modest rank who value their job first and foremost for its craft-based qualities:

"I worked out in the west-end for a long time before I became a sergeant. You got some real dossers, but you also got some really switched-on guys, fellows with degrees from uni', although some of them weren't good police either. Don't get me wrong, policemen have always come from all walks of life, but it used to be that they had a bit more in common. When I joined, most of the

men with a bit of service were men who had had a trade when they joined, older men with a bit of experience of other work. It helped make them good practical coppers. I think a shift gelled better then because of that." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Accordingly, in the view of some officers, recruitment patterns in recent years have conspired to produce an operational rank marked by a wider range of social backgrounds, initial orientations and work commitments than was previously the case. In turn, these factors may be less conducive to the accomplishment of a high level of cohesion and normative consensus within a shift. From the point of view of sergeants, although too close a solidarity among juniors may carry with it the danger of operational ranks being closed against supervisors, a shift which lacks cohesion on account of the disparity of occupational perspectives of its members may prove just as difficult to control and motivate:

"There's a secret in staying on top of a shift. You don't want a bunch of bloody commandos. At the same time, you want guys who will work together and trust each other...You don't want factions. It sounds simple, but it's a difficult balance to get." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Furthermore, as sergeants may themselves belong to one of the new groups - that of well-qualified, upwardly-mobile officers, they may encounter problems of factionalism not only as third party mediators but on a personal basis also. Hence the views of one accelerated promotion sergeant:

"I've been here for a year now, and I suppose it has been harder for me to make my mark. There is definitely a thing against A.P. sergeants, and not just amongst the cops. The thing is, I've got as much service as the other sergeant here, but he did not come through the A.P. scheme and I think

it is the label that sticks. At the end of the day, though, it is up to you to prove yourself, although it's probably that bit harder because of your background.

I had a reunion with some of the others that were on my A.P. scheme recently and I came away thinking things could be worse. One of the guys was having a terrible time. His boss was a shocker - one of the old school who didn't believe in education. He seemed to be going out of his way to make life difficult for him. You'd think you would get problems with some of the cops, green cheese or whatever. But you would think the bosses would know better. He probably failed the A.P. exam in his own time. You find out, these guys are the worst." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

(2) Changes in task structure

Much has been written about the new wave of technology in policing since the 1960s (B4) and of how this has dovetailed with changes in the basic pattern of operational policing (B5).⁽³⁷⁾ In particular, commentators have been concerned to document and assess the implications of the introduction of mobile 'panda' patrols in conjunction with personal radio and car radio systems as a means of providing fast responses to a pattern of public demand increasingly determined by the use of the telephone to relay complaints. Replacing foot patrol as the dominant mode of general ground coverage, and the whistle and the flasher system as the dominant mode of intra-shift communications, the combination of mobile patrol and personal and car radios in a new 'fire-brigade' style of policing first achieved general prominence with the introduction of Unit Beat policing as the main form of operational patrol throughout British forces in the late 1960 and early 1970s. While this

particular system, with its emphasis upon the integration of mobile patrols, area constables and a detective officer to provide a generic policing service in a particular locality,⁽³⁹⁾ has been largely superseded - it is retained in something like its original form in only one sub-division of the four divisions investigated⁽³⁹⁾ - the underlying technological imperatives, and the basic 'fire-brigade' style, remain in place and indeed have undergone further development. Thus, the greater accent upon '999' calls in conjunction with an internal radio communications network has brought about a more centralized system of incident management, with station-based controllers at the hub, responsible for allocating work to officers on the street. And this drift towards centralized co-ordination of police responses has reached its apogee in the introduction of computerized Command and Control systems in a number of forces, including, at the time of the research,⁽⁴⁰⁾ Force A, which was one of the pioneers in this field, having had such a system *in situ* since its inception in 1975.⁽⁴¹⁾ The major characteristic of this and other Command and Control systems is the creation of a central information bank in which are logged all '999' calls to the force together with constantly updated information as to the availability and position of resources throughout the force, which data is then utilized by communications room staff to deploy resources to particular incidents, either directly, or through divisional and sub-divisional controllers.

The main focus of research in this area has been upon the ramifications for police-public relations and for police

effectiveness generally of the new task structure wrought through these technological developments,⁽⁴²⁾ and also upon how the accent upon police technology has further contributed to the developing image of police professionalism.⁽⁴³⁾ Our concern here is rather to assess the implications of these developments for the uniform patrol sergeant in the light of the role demands and pressures identified earlier. For most sergeants, as indeed for most other respondents, the initiation of many of these changes predated their attainment of a promoted rank. Nevertheless, the views of respondents remain pertinent, as many had had operational experience of a technologically less sophisticated régime, and as many can speak to the intensification of some of the developments described above as their service progressed.

Most fundamentally, the personal radio and the growing co-ordination of police response from a central source has increased the control potential of sergeants over their constables, and also of more senior officers over their sergeants. On the one hand, as many more incidents are 'created' in the control room rather than in the street encounters of operational officers, sergeants have a greater capacity to monitor whether and how such incidents are dealt with. Whereas under the previous fixed points system, the sergeant's contact with members of the shift was for the most part restricted to pre-arranged meetings at a police box or other suitable location, now he or she can be in continuous contact through the personal radio. Thus most patrol sergeants, whether themselves on the streets or in the station performing

-

administrative tasks (or being interviewed), keep their personal radio switched on for long periods during a shift. On the other hand, more senior officers also appreciate that lines of communications have improved. They, too, may tune into the personal radio system to carry out their own monitoring, or more frequently, they may check the incidents which have been logged in the control room and investigate whether they have been satisfactorily 'completed'. With this improved access to communications and records pertinent to operational activity and its supervision by sergeants, they are better placed to hold sergeants to account both indirectly, in terms of the fruits of their labours - the results achieved by the junior officers for whom they are responsible, and directly, in terms of the available evidence of the efforts of sergeants themselves to achieve satisfactory results in particular cases. Furthermore, apart from this increased *capacity*, senior officers are also increasingly *inclined* to hold sergeants accountable in the ways described, since, like sergeants themselves, they believe that sergeants have a greater capacity to exert control under the newer system.

However, the apparent symmetry of this set of relationships is illusory. Despite the objective increase in control capacity in various supervisory relationships down the hierarchical line, sergeants and their seniors differ in their views as to the extent to which sergeants might justifiably be held to greater account within the new communications framework. Many sergeants believe that their senior officers overestimate the control potential of

sergeants within the new system. They believe that their senior officers do not fully appreciate a range of impediments to effective supervisory control which are themselves part and parcel of the changing technology and task structure; that the control of sergeants is itself curtailed by the centralizing tendency, in particular the vesting of effective powers of incident deployment in station-based controllers rather than sergeants themselves; that, notwithstanding more effective monitoring techniques, the instant response imperative within the new system has increased public demand to such an extent that sergeants simply do not have the time to supervise all incidents adequately, nor do constables always have the time to "stay on top of their own workload";⁴⁴ that the new system has precipitated an undue reliance upon the personal radio by operational officers, reducing their capacity to handle incidents competently on an individual basis, and has thus further increased the pressure on sergeants to intervene actively in particular incidents to the detriment of their overall supervisory capacity; and finally, that indirect radio control is in any case no substitute, but merely a surrogate for personal monitoring. Further, related to this last point, some sergeants also express the belief that their senior officers "read too much into" their own indirect control capacity through the radio system and paper records, a point which will be returned to in the next chapter.

Some of these differences in perception are brought out in the following two exchanges, the first with a chief inspector and the second with a sergeant:

"It's definitely a more dangerous world out there now and the cop has to make quick decisions. At the same time, with the personal radio, and the instant typing in of reports on computers, we've got a lot more information over what he's doing. The personal radio is a godsend to the cop, but maybe it encourages him to rely on his sergeant more when he's in trouble. Maybe it's discouraging him from accepting responsibility. It certainly means that the sergeant has more control over incidents. He can tell when the critical things are happening and be there quick if he has to.....

When I was a sergeant, I saw that as a mixed blessing. At least you know what's going on, but you have to watch that the men don't become too dependent. On the whole, I prefer it to the system when I was a young cop. Then the sergeant sent you out and he really didn't have a lot of control. The only contact was any meetings you arranged beforehand, or if something turned up you might try to get him at his box. I think, the way things are going, sergeants have to accept more responsibility with the control they have now. I certainly expect them to. If a cop has made a botch up, or got himself into trouble, the first question I'll ask is where was the sergeant?"

Q. "Might it not be difficult for the sergeant to get to those incidents, though? It's the controller who allocates the calls, and so the sergeant doesn't have direct control."

A. "A good sergeant should be clued in. A good sergeant should have a good relationship with the controller, and always be ready to respond to a problem. That's his job". (chief inspector, Newtown Division).

"The bosses are definitely more on top of you now. Everything is more centralized. You feel suffocated sometimes.

Q. "But does the handling of incidents from the centre and the radio system not help you too, give you more control over the men and what they're doing on the shift?"

A. "Makes them more dependent on you more like! I suppose it's some help, but we're just so much busier, plus the bloody controller knows more about what's going on than us half the time. I think the bosses only understand half the story." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

To summarize, one consequence of the modified task structure is that the system of internal transmission of information both upwards and downwards from the sergeant has become more transparent. And given the evidence of a mismatch in perceptions between sergeants and their senior officers as to the extent to which the clearing of the channel downwards from sergeants has expedited their control over junior officers, senior officers are encouraged to use the greater control opportunities available to them within this altered information system in an instrumental manner in order to agitate for performance standards that they deem satisfactory.

(3) Changes in Occupational Culture

In this subsection, changes in occupational culture which flow from the changes in the nature of policing and of police organization described in the previous two sections (B6) and from more general changes in social values and the social environment of policing (B7) are considered. In general terms, whereas the changes in technology and task structure accentuate the instrumental dimension in relations between sergeants and senior officers, and so underline the significance of the intercursive - and so potentially normative - aspect of relations between sergeants and their juniors, the changes analysed in this subsection, like some of the elements of formal organizational change (B1 to B3), speak to a countervailing tendency towards instrumentalism between sergeants and their juniors also.

Under B6, two types of change underscoring this tendency may be identified. In the first place, the development, or more significantly, the perception amongst officers of lower rank within the uniform branch of the development of a more 'top-heavy' management structure and of a greater accent upon specialization (discussed under B1 and B2 above) affects the sense of status of officers of constable rank just as it affects the sense of status of sergeants themselves. For uniform constables, the sense of being at the base of a very high pyramid is exacerbated by various other structural and cultural features of the police organisation which were comprehensively documented in an earlier study of an English force by Mervyn Jones⁽⁴⁵⁾ and which were corroborated in the present study by observations in the field and by the comments of various respondents. These features include the unattractive shifts and relatively low pay of junior ranks, 'manning-up' practices which use the uniform shift strength as a reserve pool of labour for other, and implicitly more important specialist tasks, a system of advancement which emphasizes the importance of specialist experience, the use of transfers - or 'sideway shunts' - to uniform patrol as an informal punishment for incompetence or deviance in a specialist task, together with an entrenched set of attitudes which reinforces these organisational characteristics and declares the relative insignificance of patrol work.⁽⁴⁶⁾ To some extent, this has been recognized and responded to in many forces, including those researched, and, in particular, various 'community policing' initiatives have been sponsored not only as a means of improving relations with various sections of the public but also as a means of

improving the standing of the uniform constable within the force. (47) The difficulty of dislodging the deeply embedded attitudes and practices described above through such innovations is well illustrated in the following exchange:

"The whole thing about status, it's even worse if you're a cop. You feel like a pigmy sometimes. You really are at the bottom of the heap, and lots of people won't let you forget it...

They've changed things in this sub-division recently, now we've got area constables just like the unit. The theory is great, no more aimless patrol, more cover during the day when we need it and when witnesses and that are in, no more being shunted from your beat everyday, a chance to get to know your area. At the end of the day though, I don't think it's making much difference. You see, basically there's a lot of crap jobs in the police, delivering summonses and witness citations, kids crossings, dealing with the local loonies who call the police everyday... You can't wave a magic wand and make it go away. Job redesign can't turn us all into f...ing fighter-pilots, and if you divide the men up into cars and foot-patrol, and you put most of the footmen out during the day when the crappy jobs can be done, then they're bound to get them on their plate. It just makes the men more cynical.

Q: " But you yourself were saying how a normal three shift system, with the junior men being vulnerable to movement from day-to-day, itself bred cynicism. Isn't there some recognition that this is a genuine effort to improve the beatman's lot?

A: " Maybe for some of the boys, and maybe it'll be better when things settle down. But remember, cops don't like change either..."

Q: " You mean the bosses can't win?

A: " No, it isn't just that. I don't think the bosses really try to win. Changing the job description is just a drop in the ocean. You've still got the same promotion system. You've still got the same attitudes. You've still got the thing about C.I.D. being better - although a lot of individuals in C.I.D. are fine - you've still got the experienced cop going into an appraisal and instead of being praised for being dedicated to his job, being made to feel there's something wrong with him if he doesn't have his exams, or if

he doesn't want to be a C.I.D. aide or something fancy." (sergeant, City Division)

While this comment reveals a significant empathy amongst sergeants for the lot of constables, the sense of inferiority which the above complex of factors generate can lead constables to vent their frustration and jealousies towards promoted ranks in an indiscriminate fashion. The fact of advancement, however modest, may be a reminder of their own impoverished standing within the organization, and may provoke feelings of resentment sufficiently generalized to embrace sergeants:

"Before I was promoted there were a lot of guys on my shift, good lads mind you, who had this irrational thing about 'all bosses'. All bosses are the same, they're all suckers-up, they're not real policemen, they're not to be trusted - even when they knew it bloody well wasn't true about some of their own bosses. You couldn't have asked for better sergeants or a better inspector where I was...

I think it's a new thing. It used to be that men joined as cops and were happy to stay there. There was a comradeship, and if anyone made it further, well, good luck to them! Now, there's more of an edge, more of a sense of being left behind. Even if you're the least ambitious cop in the world, like I was, it can get to you. You end up either blaming the system or playing the system." (constable, Riverside Division)

A second type of cultural movement under B6 flows not from changes in the formal organization, but from changes in the task structure (B5). It has been well-documented, and is again corroborated by the present research, that the development of 'fire-

'brigade' policing has enhanced the "action orientation" of many uniform patrol officers.⁽⁴⁸⁾ This has occurred both because the growth of mobile patrols and the personal radio network has accentuated the contrast between the exceptional and the routine - between the critical incident requiring a quick and co-ordinated response in unpredictable and dangerous, but often also exciting and morale-reinforcing circumstances on the one hand, and the mundane day-to-day diet of paperwork, parking tickets, errands and quiet patrol time on the other - and because the more transparent system of supervision has in many cases led to a greater premium being placed upon concrete 'results' which attract widespread approbation in organizational terms, namely crime arrests. Thus, many claim, Reiner's "new centurion"⁽⁴⁹⁾ has become a more typical constabulary specimen, encouraged to play 'the numbers game' in a series of frequently abrasive encounters with members of the public, and armed with a moral code which, in emphasizing absolutes at the expense of the greyer shades of value judgment, sustains and is sustained by the strategic imperatives of his or her chosen frame of reference.

It is this tendency to adopt a binary moral code which allows us to forge a causal connection between the action orientation of 'fire-brigade' policing on the one hand, and a strain of instrumentalism in sergeant/constable relations on the other. Just as some commentators have argued that a strong moral code and a cynical world-view are but two sides of the one coin in the

relations of police officers to the public, so too in respect of internal relations, as has already been noted in our discussion of institutional authority relations, *ad personam* sentiments of cynicism tend to sit in close, if uneasy juxtaposition with strong affirmations of policework as a moral crusade. "Cynicism is the Janus face of commitment"⁽⁵⁰⁾ in the sense that endorsement of a strong, inflexible moral code invites disillusionment with the conduct of the many who are bound to transgress its terms - members of the public, fellow officers, and perhaps even one's self.⁽⁵¹⁾ Further, since it is a defining characteristic of a cynical outlook that it involves a tendency to doubt *a priori* the sincerity of the motives of others, disillusionment in one area of experience may lead to a more generally suspicious orientation in ones interpersonal dealings. Thus, in discussion with one sergeant who had had long experience in an area of policework where the action orientation was particularly strongly to the fore and where the moral fallibility of others was consistently exposed, just such a transposition of attitudes from an external to an internal constituency was vividly recounted, and its implications summed up graphically as follows:

When I was in X squad [specialist CID Squad], someone suggested that we get somebody to design a special tie for us with our own emblem. My answer to that was, 'No bloody chance. You couldn't possibly design a tie wide enough to show 60 knives going into the one back.' That's how many officers there were in that squad, and that was not counting all these bastards out there who are trying to get back at you as well." (sergeant, Riverside Division).

- If this perspective is applied specifically to sergeant-constable relations, Brown's observation of an American force that "the moralistic tone in supervisor-patrolman relationships is a mirror image of the moralistic attitude patrolmen frequently display towards citizens"⁽⁵²⁾ strikes a chord within the research forces. For a number of sergeants and constables alike, their experience of the moral viscissitudes involved in life in the operational fast-lane is sufficiently fresh for the ambivalent conjunction of attitudes discussed above, although tempered by a number of other factors,⁽⁵³⁾ to figure in their mutual assessments:

"The police is a terrible place for putting blame on people. It's not just the bosses looking for scapegoats, it runs deeper. Anything goes wrong, it's got to be somebody's fault. When I was a cop, I remember my car got a bit of a scrape, dead gen., somebody had reversed into it when we were out at a call. No trace when we got out, nothing we could do. Our sergeant backed our story all the way with the chief inspector. Just as well, he was a suspicious bugger. But then when it came down to it, the serg. was a just as bad. It was a case of, 'right lads, the heat's off, now tell me what *really* happened.' Suspicion gets to be absolutely engrained in you in the police."
(sergeant, Riverside Division)

If we turn to these changes in occupational culture which derive from external developments rather than modifications in organisational and task design (B7), in discussion respondents mentioned a number of interrelated factors which they deemed influential in the modification of the occupational perspectives of police officers during the period of their service. More specifically, a loose pattern is discernible in the perceptions of

respondents as to the emergence of a new set of problems with which contemporary police officers are required to deal in the course of their work, and to which, it was felt, their responses differed according to age, experience and other related indicators within the police organisation - most relevant of which for present purposes is that of rank. On the one hand, such external social developments as the growth of so-called "crimes without victims",⁽⁵⁴⁾ changing conceptions of acceptable leisure activity and permissible behaviour in public and semi-public places, and the increase in reported crime amongst the middle classes - in particular their visibility as a major class of offenders within the area of road traffic law,⁽⁵⁵⁾ - are seen to have provided developments which have challenged traditional understandings of deviance within the police occupational culture and demanded new responses. On the other hand, the substance of such responses is generally thought to vary not only between generations and ranks, but also, and underlying these general variations, in line with changes in the social and occupational backgrounds of newer officers, including, as well as the educational changes referred to earlier (B3), their more variegated class-base, their greater affluence, and their less restrictive working hours and residential stipulations early in service.

A number of areas of mutually recognized difference in world-view flow from this changing structure of attitudes. In the first place, in many cases younger officers are defined by their older

colleagues and define themselves as more 'liberal' as regards the toleration or endorsement of technically deviant forms of activity. This can give rise to mutual suspicion, and to criticism of the normative stance of the other group. Indeed, amongst those more senior in service and rank, it may lead to the conclusion, pregnant with negative implications for the accomplishment of normative relations, that one's younger colleague shares a greater affinity with certain outside groups than with fellow organization members. An apt example of this process of reasoning, and of the material conditions underpinning it, is provided by an inspector in Oldtown Division :

"Some of these young guys are really worrying. You see, there's this disco in the town, we've had no end of trouble with, especially on a Thursday night. They're drunk, they're shouting in the streets till all hours. They're bloody cheeky whenever you approach them, and we know for definite that there are drugs being circulated in the place. Well, I could hardly believe it! One of my sergeants told me that two of the young officers on the other shift were hanging about with one of the groups which was causing trouble at the disco. This wasn't just a one-off thing, and one of the times my sergeant approached the group, they were actually there, in the background. We had a quick word with their inspector, who no doubt has sorted it out, but I found the whole thing beyond belief. How stupid can you get? They didn't even seem to realise there was something wrong or dangerous in what they were doing. If I had tried a trick like that when I joined, I would have been out on my ear before my feet could touch the ground".

However, it would be misleading to suggest that younger officers are always seen to err on the side of indulgence. As is evident from accounts of a number of flashpoints which have required

high profile and high risk police responses, lack of empathy is instead often the substance of the charge levelled by senior officers against their junior colleagues. An obvious case in point is the miners' strike of 1984-85, and one of the Newtown sergeants spoke feelingly about the potential conflict within the organization concerning appropriate strategies in dealing with the strikers and of the need to resolve it :

"You will gather from what I have said that I don't rate the inspector much. In fact, one of the few times I've seen him earn his money was before the first big picket at Y pit last year. The last thing he said to the boys was, 'remember, they are just working men like you or me, they are not criminals, and I don't want anyone treating them like they were'. That's about the only piece of common-sense he has ever come out with and it was worth saying, because some of the young boys were treating it as if they were out fighting neds on a Saturday night. They didn't seem to appreciate the difference....

The Chief Inspector was good during the miners' strike too. He used to be a miner down in Ayrshire himself and he's very proud of his roots. He might be a pain in the arse about it at times and he's certainly not the best chief inspector in the world, but he understands ordinary working men and knows what makes them tick. That's more than can be said for a lot of the young lads".

Nor is the complaint of lack of empathy restricted to behaviour at incidents such as those requiring a collective response. It is often perceived as a more general trait, linked to the new affluence of young police officers and their consequent ignorance of the social milieux inhabited by many of the sections of the public with which they are most frequently in contact.

"Some of those boys don't know they're living. When I was a cop, and my wife was stuck at home because one of the weans had just been born, I

remember coming off from working 12 hours on one Bank Holiday Monday. It was seven o'clock when I got home and I remember having to go out with two lemonade bottles to the local shop to have enough for a loaf of bread and two pints of milk for the next morning. None of the boys on my shift would believe me if I told them that now. They would just piss themselves...."

Q. "Does that worry you?"

A. "It does, it can't be good. Look where we work. It's just half a mile from Area X [good residential area], but it could be a million miles away. Half of our lads live in Area X. How are they going to understand the punter who's on the dole? What sympathy are they going to have for the boy with no money who robs the gas meter, or the boy who gets shouting drunk on a Friday night because that's the only time he has any money. It can't be a good trend. Maybe it's because they're young, and they'll learn discretion, but I doubt it. I think we've got a bit of a new breed in the police now." (sergeant, Riverside Division).

In this case, again, the younger officer, partly on account of age, but partly also for deeper structural reasons, is being criticised for being 'illiberal', for adopting an inflexible and myopic orientation towards deviant trends. In general, therefore, it may be concluded that patterned differences in attitudes to rule infraction which reflect changing social values are not represented in a neat division between officers who would distinguish between different forms and occasions of criminality and deviance and would countenance the use of informed discretion to avoid a legalistic response in some circumstances, and those who would not, but rather represents a much more deeply-layered and uneven division between officers who would make different types of distinctions and use discretion in different types of circumstances on the basis of differing sets of background allegiances.

For our purposes, however, although the objective differences are important in that they narrow the domain of underlying normative unity, the perceptions of difference are perhaps more important. Thus, while it has been demonstrated that the charge of 'liberalism' directed by senior officers towards their more junior colleagues is not adequate to account for their differences over questions of rule infraction, the term retains a strong currency within the descriptive and interpretive lexicon of officers more senior in service in relation to their juniors, and has wide implications for the overall profile of normative and instrumental relations between different ranks.

In order to appreciate these wider implications, it is necessary to examine more closely the cultural meaning of this form of labelling within the police organization. The liberal/illiberal divide is but one of a number of *thematic oppositions* current within the discourse of our respondents. In a general sense, the idea of binary opposition within cultural forms has a strong lineage within sociology and social anthropology,⁽⁵⁵⁾ being seen to provide a convenient ordering device for observers and participants alike in their attempts to make sense of variety within and between cultural settings in terms of an elementary scheme of classification. In the particular domain of the sociology of policework, a more specific manifestation of this notion is to be found in the idea of "sorting", by which, the Iannis claim, "individuals classify themselves and each other according to a set of culturally defined

labels".⁽⁵⁷⁾ The sorting process resonates not only with the general characteristics of binary thinking but also with many of the features of police occupational culture discussed earlier. It has been argued that ideas of uniformity, social isolation, close task interdependence, strong *esprit de corps* and defensive closing of ranks, as well as a tendency to issue value judgments in terms of a binary moral code, are important ingredients in the ideational make-up of police officers. Both individually and cumulatively, these notions speak to the importance of the distinction between insiders and outsiders, between 'us' and 'them', whether the boundary be struck at the level of the immediate workgroup shift, sub-division, division or organisation as a whole. 'Sorting', therefore, is a cultural process by which meanings are sifted and allegiances are identified. It is an economical means, closely patterned upon certain underlying conditions of policework, whereby a complex reality is harnessed within a dichotomous frame of reference in order both that problems of cognitive understanding be resolved, and that normative preferences be matched with group membership. As such, it is a process which, while ambitious and creative, is also crudely distortive. It tends in some cases, as with the examples drawn from the 'liberal' theme, to impose a false consistency of perspective, and in others to exaggerate subtle differences into polar oppositions. Further, in its most expansive mode, as revealed in the understandings and articulations of some of our respondents, it appears to unfold through a process of lateral reference or "convergence",⁽⁵⁸⁾ whereby thematic oppositions operating within

different referential domains are linked together. The binary form remains axiomatic, but through chains of signification disparate theses and their corresponding antitheses are connected and assembled together, each providing a wider context within which the others are understood, and the overall effect being one of amplification both of the ideational differences postulated in each discrete thematic opposition, and of the differences between the groups with which these themes or labels are associated.

Other and more extended examples of the linkage of thematic oppositions will be considered later, but for the moment, we are concerned with how the liberal/illiberal thematic opposition, whose reference is outwith the organisation, is linked to and used to articulate a distinction in internal attitudes. Here, as exemplified in the following two comments, the notion of liberalism shades into ideas suggesting a heterodox attitude to the themes of order and authority as they affect the police.

"Some of these young lads just don't seem to have their priorities right. I tell you, I find it hard to tell some of them from the do-gooder liberals you meet in social work. They have the same attitudes. Respect for authority is missing too. They seem to forget they are in a disciplined organization. The standards are all wrong." (sergeant, Oldtown Division).

"During an assessment I got talking to one of the younger lads about his impressions of the job generally. He couldn't see why it couldn't be like any other big firm, without the ranks and all that. Just couldn't see it. That was half his trouble. Looking down his appraisals form, and listening to what his sergeant had to say, you could see a lack of something. Discipline, punctuality, a strong attitude to those he was dealing with on the street, they were all missing.

All the same thing really, he might still develop it, but he just lacked that X factor that makes a good policeman. (inspector, Oldtown Division)

Thus, the symbolic connection between a 'liberal' external attitude and an 'undisciplined' internal attitude amplifies the effect of the thematic opposition connoted by each, to the detriment of normative relations between those who 'sort' and those who are 'sorted' into either pejorative category.

Furthermore, quite apart from any linkage with the liberal/illiberal divide, considered on its own terms the perceptions of those senior in service of younger officers' increasing ambivalence towards the claims of institutional authority does appear to contain a kernel of truth, as does the older officers' explanation of this shift in attitudes in terms of the changes in occupational and social background enumerated earlier.

First, two older officers :

"The big difference with today's recruits is that they lack discipline when they come in. They don't get it in the family or the school, nor is there any National Service like I did. There's not the same respect for authority. They don't seem to realise that there are times they have to jump when somebody says 'jump' in this service. That's the only way we get the nasty jobs done, or can get things moving when there's an emergency." (inspector, Oldtown Division).

"The whole thing between ranks is much, much slacker than it was. It's slipped away over the years. It's a more attractive job now. Better pay, better conditions, the young lads are on easy street, they want in because it's a well-paid job, not a vocation. There's not so much respect for

what it stands for, so the respect for the rank isn't there so much any more either." (sergeant, Newtown Division).

And now two younger officers :

"I really like the job, but I find the discipline really hard to get used to. I was at Uni' before this, and some of the attitudes towards authority in here are unreal. It's still the stone-age as far as that is concerned." (constable, Oldtown Division).

"I think the respect for rank goes a bit too far. There's too much touching of the forelock. It's not the heavy discipline so much. It's the things which never get said, the sheer distance between you and the bosses. Maybe you need it, it's a hard one... We were brought up in a different world. A lot of the young cops are more prepared to think for themselves. On the whole, I think that is a good thing." (sergeant, City Division).

Both the new ambivalence about institutional authority and the perceptions of officers more senior in service as to this creeping ambivalence - perceptions which are sharpened by the posited connection of this matter to other divisive issues - have implications for normative relations. On the one hand, the general scope for institutional authority is reduced. On the other, so important for those more senior officers is institutional authority and its various rationales that lack of respect for these may be treated by the senior as *per se* indicative of professional incompetence on the part of the junior. The position of the sergeant relative to this changing network of attitudes is complex. He or she may share the ambivalence of the newer recruits, and even if a defender of the older virtues, will be required to mediate between

ranks whose relations have themselves been blighted by the declining strength of institutional authority relations.

(4) Changes in the political and legal relationship of policing to its environment

(i) political changes

B8 to B10 refer to a set of interrelated developments in the relationship between the police organisation and its political environment which has a variety of roots in the social and political developments outlined in Part A of Model One. The processes analysed here tend to be of even more recent origin, to be more fluid in nature, and to have less easily identifiable internal implications than the changes already discussed, and this is reflected in the rather general or allusive comments which were received ^{from} respondents on these matters. Accordingly, it is more difficult to attempt a freeze-frame analysis as a sound basis from which inferences about changes in the role of the sergeant may be made than it was in the case of the earlier features. With this cautionary remark in mind, the three sets of changes may be examined in turn.

The greater readiness to assume a higher public profile (B8) refers to a well-documented set of developments taking place at a variety of institutional levels which reflects a greater propensity on the part of individuals or groups within the police organisation

to take initiatives in particular debates or activities directly or indirectly relevant to policing. In relation to the balance of normative and instrumental relations between ranks, this movement has a number of conflicting implications.

At the macro-level, the period from the mid-1970s has witnessed an increase in public interventions by chief constables and the various officers' associations.⁽⁵⁹⁾ For some officers, this wider "politicization of the police"⁽⁶⁰⁾ has been internally significant in that the sheer visibility of various official pronouncements tends to underline the commitments which they contain and thus reinforces both the normative cohesion amongst those who share such commitments and the sense of internal division between this group and other internal constituencies who may have different or divided loyalties. Thus, for example, in the case of a more active and visible Police Federation, the public theme of solidarity over pay, conditions, and, increasingly, certain matters of policy, may enhance normative relations among federated ranks, but possibly at the cost of alienating more senior ranks.

" I always feel a bit uneasy when strong statements are made from the Federation's annual conference about pay, or time wasted in court. Usually the bosses would be right behind us, but I don't feel it is our place to go public on some of these things. Who knows, we could be disturbing delicate negotiations, or putting our foot in it. The other thing is, it breeds a little bit of a trade union mentality. It can encourage the ones who are a bit bolshie and that's not good for morale. Once we forget that we all have to pull together we are lost. (chief inspector, Riverside Division)

Public statements by chief constables on a host of matters such

as new legislation, public order incidents, community policing, juvenile crime, police use of firearms, the nature and extent of the 'drugs problem' or complaints against the police, may similarly either sow the seeds of internal controversy or strengthen the bonds of internal solidarity:

"Now Sir Robert Mark was a master, he could have been the prime minister, or at least the prime minister's PR man. But I think it has got a bit out of hand. When you hear Alderson or Anderton, or even Newman, speaking 'for the police', it can begin to grate a bit. Alderson was the worst with that stuff he spouted to the Scarman inquiry. You feel like getting up and shouting, 'he doesn't speak for anyone any more', but, of course, that's not the way most of us do it. If we were all like him, then policing really would become a political football. But I expect, in fact I know, it pisses off the bosses as well, and when someone like Alderson comes this real softly-softly approach, it makes some of the men think, 'are all our bosses like that?' (inspector, Oldtown Division).

While these views should not be discounted, in that public statements by authorized bodies undoubtedly contribute to the general cultural ambience within which instrumental and normative relations are enacted within the police organisation, respondents generally placed greater emphasis upon the internal implications of the increased public profile of organisational members at the micro-level of involvement with external agencies. What is at issue here is not so much public pronouncements as public activities, the various forms of proactive involvement with external bodies which have been increasingly encouraged in the 1980s under the rubric of community policing and multi-agency policing initiatives. (51)

Individual officers at sergeant and constable rank, as well as more senior divisional ranks, are called upon more and more to establish working relationships with groups represented in organizations such as Community Councils, Tenants Associations, Rotary Clubs, Crime Prevention Panels, Social Work Departments, and primary and secondary schools. For sergeants and their seniors, the strategies adopted in such relationships may greatly influence perceptions amongst their juniors as to the allegiances of supervisory officers in respect of what may be central operational creeds. How, for reasons similar to those already outlined in respect of the macro-level of involvement, such initiatives may either augment or erode the normative capacity of supervisory officers are respectively illustrated in the following two quotes:

"Our sergeant, I don't agree with him about everything by any means, but we do see eye to eye a lot when we are dealing with outside agencies, and it is important to know that. We have trouble with some of the local schools, and some of the teachers have funny views about when we should go into the school and when not. I can think of some sergeants who would be a bit timid here, but not X. He just says that if it is a crime matter, we go in, and that's all there is to it. If we get a tip-off about thieving, or even drugs, and it leads us to a school, then we just carry out our duties as normal, there is nothing sacred about it being a school. X gets our respect for that attitude." (constable, Oldtown Division)

"When I was a cop, my inspector used to insist that he and the beatman went along to Tenants Association meetings. He would even rearrange his roster for it. It got to the stage that the groups were treating us as their own personal policemen, never mind everyone else in the area, and if the inspector couldn't make it, they would wonder why. A lot of the men didn't like that, he was so eager to find out what they wanted, it was as if he did not trust his own judgement, or more importantly, ours. He wasn't well liked by everyone."

(sergeant, Riverside Division)

In sum, it is suggested that this expansion in public debate and position-taking on issues of concern both to fellow organizational members and to outsiders may reinforce internal normative agreement and mutual respect by harmonizing with previous understandings of the nature of shared commitments, or alternatively, if it reveals differences in outlook and priorities, it may have the opposite effect. Indeed, for some, as the last quote indicates, internal dissensus is seen to be generally the more likely consequence of the new proactive initiatives as it is felt that the very fact of being subjected to external influences in a systematic fashion is likely to influence the views and severely test the loyalties of police representatives in liaison arrangements. One sergeant expressed the dangers of co-option thus:

"For a long time the community involvement people have had the reputation of being the hobby bobbies, more or less social workers within the police. It's not just them though, so much of the time of some of the higher-ups is spent hobnobbing with the council, or community groups, that the boys end up wondering what their true colours are". (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Finally, quite apart from the substance of what is conveyed, for some respondents the very fact of 'going public' on issues of concern to police officers is seen as a potentially harmful trend. The explanation of these fears lies in the centrality of trust to normative relations within the police, and to one feature of trust not as yet explored, namely the significance of confidentiality to its development and maintenance. As Reiss has argued, "secrets are integral to trust since a condition of trust is the capacity to keep

secrets". (62) In the context of policing, as well as the defensive secrecy of the workgroup, the organisation as a whole provides a wider, but equally significant, perimeter of confidentiality. Maintaining an inscrutable facade before external constituencies is seen by some as a general imperative in order to avoid ill-informed criticism and to retain an image of confident and competent orientation to the organisational mandate, and thus both to frustrate hostile external groups searching for signs of internal vulnerability and to reassure more friendly and supportive external groups. From such a perspective, the sharing of sensitive views, concerns or data with outside groups may be seen as reason in itself to doubt the trustworthiness of the messenger, regardless of the message:

"There was a sergeant at my last place who was so involved with one of the community councils that he even went along on his evenings off, or got them to rearrange their meetings so he could attend. He was going along with crime statistics breakdowns, the lot. That goes against the grain for a lot of us. He may have meant well, but your normal police reaction is to be polite, but never get into details. You're leaving yourself hostage to fortune otherwise. I know some of the cops on the shift...put up the barriers with him a bit more than usual, felt he wasn't quite to be trusted. (sergeant, Newtown Division)

B8 shades into B9, in that concerns with the legitimacy of policing institutions help to stimulate both sets of developments. To some extent, the greater accent on internal accountability (B9) is the corollary of the commitment to a higher public profile, a more defensive manifestation of the same theme of increased politicization of the policing agenda. More specifically, a strong causal relationship may be discerned between the growing political

challenge to and controversy surrounding existing policing institutions in general (Part A generally) and increased external pressure for accountability in particular (A3) on the one hand, and increased internal pressure for accountability on the other. In turn, these internal pressures may lead to a greater concentration on bureaucratic mechanisms within the organization.

The nature and implications of these posited connections may be explored by reference to and by extension from arguments already present in the literature on the origins and development of modern police organisation, as well as in theoretical writings on general developmental tendencies in modern organisations. In tracing the growth of the new police along military-bureaucratic lines, many commentators have pointed to the attractions of the bureaucratic form not only in terms of its functional benefits, but also in terms of the politics of legitimacy.⁽⁶³⁾ The military-bureaucratic model provides a shield against external political pressures. The rationality claims implicit in such a model, the promise of a singular and coherent commitment to official, preordained ends, provides both protection against allegations of political interference and other forms of venality, as affirmed by Punch in his analysis of the organisational implications of corruption scandals,⁽⁶⁴⁾ and an argument against aspirations towards greater political involvement by outside groups. Complementing this line of analysis, a number of students of the bureaucratization process in general have pointed to the pervasive ideological allure of the bureaucratic form. For John Meyer and his associates, the

bureaucratic form embodies a number of "rational institutional myths"⁽⁶⁵⁾ in modern western societies. In particular, bureaucratic organizations are nurtured by and in turn help to sustain the key myth that bureaucracy and rationality are isomorphic, and that in this correspondence between institution and idea lies the promise of the most virtuous and effective organization of the public realm. Bureaucracy thus becomes a self-legitimizing and self-perpetuating institutional form. Its dynamic of growth depends not only upon any actual benefits derived from its claims to provide a rational machine for the pursuit of collective goods which is impervious to special pleading and wasteful interference from outside agencies, but also upon the high degree of receptiveness to these claims within the political and cultural environment generally.

If we run these arguments together, the bureaucratic form of the police organization may be understood in ideological terms not merely as the legacy of a past political accomplishment, but as a live resource which is continuously tapped in order to defend the organisation against ongoing offensives from two, sometimes related sources; from those who would impugn it as susceptible to undue political influence or other pressures which would divert it from its mandate, and from those who would argue for its greater accountability to or control by political institutions. Thus, in accounting for general bureaucratic drift within police organization, to the specific arguments already rehearsed under B1 concerning the consequential effects of the increased emphasis upon central co-ordination and larger forces - although, in this area

too, such emphases cannot be dissociated from cognate 'rational institutional myths' which affirm the principles of uniformity and universalism as well as the advantages of scale⁽⁶⁶⁾ - there may now be added a general argument as to the strength and dynamism of the bureaucratic model as an ideological buffer against external interference.

The effects of this externally induced pressure towards greater bureaucratization cannot be fully understood apart from a general examination of the means whereby bureaucratic mechanisms and instrumental means become interconnected in the internal relations of police organizations, which is the subject of chapter seven. For the moment, we may simply concentrate on one very direct strand within the overall network of causal influences, namely that increased external pressures concentrate the minds, and are perceived by the lower ranks to concentrate the minds of policy-makers within the organisation on the importance of the maintenance of a public image of internal control. The consequences of this reach into every corner of the organisation as officers of different ranks are required to play their part in a public display and ritual performance of monitoring of the quality and integrity of the work of other officers, or to have their own work similarly monitored. Paperwork controls, regular supervision, radio contacts, deference to rank in public, maintenance of the symbolic forms with which the idea of disciplined unity is associated such as smart dress and uniform appearance, all play their part in this ritual performance. For uniform sergeants, increasing involvement in the ideological

dimension of the technology of control provides the basis for what John Van Maanen has described as the practice of "institutional display and documentation". His observations, made in an American context, are equally relevant to the present research:

"Sergeants are expected by their superior officers to offer (among other things) tangible proof to the public that the police are internally accountable, closely supervised, and their activities are not undertaken in bad faith with larceny, malice or unabashed self-interest in mind. Sergeants are to be available to the public at large, thus displaying the organization's capacity to monitor performance of its members. While ritualizing occasions of performance appraisal serve this end to a small degree (that is, demonstrating that the organization 'carefully' judges its members in rational ways), it is the daily rounds made by sergeants that make most salient and visible the organization's promise to control the activities of its employees". (57)

This constant, and, in the view of many sergeants, increasing pressure to satisfy the demands of institutional display, is at the root of the logistical constraints within their job - the sense, documented in chapter four, that administrative demands detract from their capacity to pursue other important ends:

"So much of the sergeant's job now is about feeding other people's in-trays, meeting other people's time-tables. It's always us police that's got to jump, to have the reports to the P-F by such-and-such a date, to get the offence reports upstairs by such-and-such a date, to have a special occurrence report on some kids throwing stones in a street ready rightaway even though there was no further action, just in case the boss gets landed with some interfering local councillor. It's not just the time that it takes, it's the fact that you have to drop everything else, to disrupt everything else you're doing. Apparently nothing is more important than keeping our noses clean". (sergeant, Oldtown Division) (58)

Apart from the logistical pressures, other consequences for internal relations, and for the sergeant's capacity to influence internal relations, flow from the increasing concentration upon institutional display. Again, however, these are best understood in the context of a wider understanding of the relationship between bureaucratization and instrumentalism, and so discussion of them will also be held over until chapter seven.

Despite the strivings of police organisations to deflect pressure for greater external accountability by emphasizing internal control mechanisms, public debate over the adequacy of existing accountability arrangements, as indicated in chapter one, has continued to gained momentum. Just as police representatives have increasingly taken the initiative in some areas of public debate about policing (B8), the accountability issue has provided a flagship for the critical assaults of groups dissatisfied with policing standards, and has generated an agenda of dicussion which in this particular case has placed police representatives on the defensive. The questioning by various groups of the value of the procedural constraints placed on police officers in the exercise of individual powers, of the effectiveness of the complaints system, of the adequacy of the powers of the police authority within the tripartite system, and of the efficacy of accountability arrangements on a more local basis and in terms of the needs and concerns of particular minority groups, have all figured prominently on this agenda. As with the developments under B8, the increased

propensity of external groups to scrutinize police institutions, by placing the burden on these institutions to defend the *status quo*, forces the hand of police representatives and encourages the public laundering of matters previously unspoken or resolved internally. That this may be inconducive to the sustaining of normative consensus or relations of authority within the organisation, is tellingly and articulately argued in the following quote:

"Over the years we have had more and more people poking their nose in, civil liberties folk, politicians, woman's aid. Even you today. Okay, you seem a nice lad, but that's not the point. It takes us away from what we should be doing, it puts us on the defensive. I'm not saying we're above criticism, but why do people want to criticize the police? Why do you want to criticize the police, and don't tell me you don't? On balance, don't we do a good job? In that case, criticism is just destructive, it gives ammunition to those who want to attack us for their own reasons. People who basically support the police should be rallying behind us, not the anti-police lobby.

You see, it's a slippery slope, once we are on the defensive, and people stop trusting us, then everybody starts asking, why this, why that? Police officers themselves get a bit disillusioned, a bit unsure about what they are supposed to be achieving. The bosses constantly heap more rules and forms on our head, we know and they know it is only for show, but it goes on anyway. You get the sense of being beleaguered and betrayed both by the public and politicians and by your own bosses." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Just as B8 and B9 are closely connected, the same concerns and developments as underpin them have also precipitated the developments identified under B10. What it is intended to signify here is the growing belief amongst some members of the service, in particular the more senior ranks who are most susceptible to

organised external pressures, of the need continually to adjust the institutions, methods and objectives of the organization to suit an increasingly complex and ever-shifting agenda of social problems.

The following quote captures the gist of this *new reformism*.

"It's a new ball game nowadays. The police have always been able to adjust, ask any cop and the thing he's most proud of is his adaptability, his ability to cope. Now, we've got to broaden our horizons and show the public in general that we can accept criticism and be more flexible generally. That's how we'll survive."
(inspector, Oldtown Division)

The theme is one of a changing police in a changing society and, vaguely defined as it is, this emblem strikes at a central tenet within police occupational culture. As already recognized in our discussion of institutional authority, policing is a "profoundly old-fashioned" institution. Its commitment to the conservation of social order, its association with certain sanctified values and its long history of continuity of organisational form, all bespeak a traditionalism which stands in stark counterpoint to the new philosophy of change described above. Indeed, on the basis of views expressed by respondents, it would appear that this dichotomy between traditionalism and reformism provides another thematic opposition of growing significance, an important organising principle of cultural life within the police service.

It offers a rationale in terms of which positions in relation to substantive issues of controversy within the service may be grounded. To play the traditionalist card may be to strengthen certain conservative arguments in relation to some of the issues

discussed under B8 and B9, such as new initiatives in community policing and complaints against the police, whereas to play the reformist card may be to argue for a more flexible and receptive approach towards the views of external groups. Similarly, each approach may provide a powerful means of identifying certain types within the organisation. All in all, deep-rooted concerns about the rate and pervasiveness of change, opinions as regards certain substantive issues which regale the service, and feelings of alienation from a new breed of officer lacking similar work experiences and perspectives to the majority, or conversely, from an old breed unable or unwilling to cast aside entrenched views, may be combined and may reinforce one another under the rubrics of traditionalism and reformism:

"Why all this concern with change? Look, we're still the most popular group of workers of the lot, all the opinion polls say so. The people who want change in the force, who want to go along with every hare-brained scheme that's thrown at us, they've usually not come up the hard way, they don't understand how the system really works. They tried getting rid of some of our cars, but I bet you the ones who were behind that weren't getting rid of their own cars. I bet you they had never spent more than six months on the beat on foot at night. They don't understand, they think that the local councillor who is complaining about the lack of men walking about knows more about what the public want than guys with 20 years experience on the street. (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Further, the 'sorting' potential of this theme may be extended through its association with other oppositional themes. In particular, the clash between the *new managerialism* and the craft-based approach to policework is seen by many to mirror the

opposition between reformism and traditionalism, in that the focus of disagreement is again the desirability of reform, although here in an internal rather than an external context. As in our discussion of the liberal/illiberal dichotomy and associated ideas, the symbolic fusion of related forms of self-identification and labelling provides a powerful ordering framework allowing a number of interdependent, but not interchangeable, themes to be collapsed together.

This wider dimension will be discussed in chapter eight where the new managerialism is analysed more closely. For the moment, we may simply note that it further underscores the potential of the divisive cultural alignments organized around the traditionalist/reformist axis to challenge and erode the basis of normative relations between different groups, including seniors and juniors, and thus to render problematic the mediating function of the sergeant.

(ii) legal changes; the case of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980.

Of the various legal changes which had affected respondents during their service, the restructuring of individual police powers vis-a-vis members of the public which was achieved by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980, in particular the introduction of a new general power of detention prior to arrest, was viewed by them as having had by far and away the most significant consequences for the

role of the uniform sergeant. In order to understand why this is so, it is necessary to consider the aims and contents of the new statutory scheme in some detail.

As with the other developments considered earlier in this subsection, the roots of this legislative reform lay in the broad spectrum of factors considered in Part A of Model One. In particular, as with the more comprehensive treatment of police powers in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (P.A.C.E.), which applies in England and Wales,⁽⁷⁰⁾ the relevant sections of the Scottish Act encapsulate two objectives. In the first place, by extending police powers in encounters with individuals, they purport to aid the investigation of crime, and thus to provide one strategy to cope with the spiralling crime rate. In the second place, by formalizing police powers and building in procedural protections for the citizen they purport to eradicate uncertainty and ambiguity and to restrain police practice within legitimate parameters, and thus to improve police-public relations.⁽⁷¹⁾

As regards the first objective, ss. 1-4 of the 1980 Act give new powers to the police to detain, search and question persons other than those under arrest.⁽⁷²⁾ Thus, s1 empowers the police to make limited inquiries of suspects and potential witnesses at the scene of a crime. S2 introduces a new status of detention prior to arrest, allowing a suspect to be kept in a police station for up to six hours, and to be questioned and searched. S4 deals with the particular problem of persons suspected of carrying offensive

weapons, and empowers the police to search them without arresting them or detaining them in a police station. As regards the second objective, the Act, both by substantive and procedural means, attempts to instruct police officers much more closely as to the precise range and limits of their powers, and to constrain their actions within these limits. Substantively, precise restrictions have been set as to the extent of particular capacities, such as the absence of a power to compel suspects under ss 1 and 2 to explain the circumstances which have given rise to the police officer's suspicion, and the six hour detention limit itself under s2. Procedurally, the requirement *to give reasons* for the use of powers under ss 1,2 and 4, the requirement for *documentation* of the minutiae of detention under s2, the rights of s2 detainees, by virtue of s3, to have *intimation* of their detention sent to solicitors or friends, and, finally, the duty of the police to *inform detainees* both of their right of intimation to third parties and of their right to refuse to answer questions during detention, provide some contemporaneous protection for the citizen together with a range of information available to senior ranks, external parties, and, ultimately, to the courts, in their retrospective monitoring of the propriety of the actions of the operational officer.

Notwithstanding these provisions, it would appear both from the comments of respondents in the present study and from earlier research more closely concerned with the success of the Act in meeting its wider objectives⁽⁷³⁾ that neither of the underlying aims

has been satisfactorily met. If we focus on the centrepiece of the new package - the power of detention under s2 - in respect of the first objective many officers feel that the various procedural guarantees obstruct the creation of the atmosphere of intimacy necessary for useful information to be gleaned from a suspect and that they place the suspect 'too much on his guard'. They also feel that the shortness of the 6 hour limit places the investigating officers under time pressure, while its inflexibility may be exploited by the strategically aware suspect. Further, and quite apart from these detailed objections, much research evidence suggests that the general premiss underlying this first strategy, that greater police powers vis-a-vis suspects make for more effective crime, detection, is itself suspect.⁽⁷⁴⁾ Failure to attain the first objective, therefore, may be as much a failure of fundamental reasoning as one of detailed technique.

As to the second objective, again it would seem that the approach of the Act is flawed. First, the substantive controls are not foolproof. The element of ambiguity in the statutory language, particularly in respect of the use of the open-textured term 'reasonable' to qualify the suspicion required of the constable in order to detain under s2, opens up a significant space for discretionary interpretations. Discretion is further increased due to the fact that the powers of detention are enabling rather than compulsory. In respect of some areas of criminal activities, other specific, and in some cases more extensive powers to detain prior to arrest are statutorily enshrined.⁽⁷⁵⁾ More significantly, the Act,

despite its rationalizing thrust, does not render unlawful the previous common practice of asking suspects to attend a police station for questioning on an informal and voluntary basis, and in particular, does not deem inadmissible any evidence which is derived from such inquiries.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Hence, reflecting the benefits for police officers in some circumstances of proceeding by more informal means, one third of recorded attendances at Scottish police stations by persons 'helping the police with their inquiries' continued to be on a voluntary basis in the first three years of the Act's operation,⁽⁷⁷⁾ and this dual-pronged approach - the use of formal powers on some occasions and of informal negotiation of the citizen's consent on others - still prevailed during the course of the research in the divisions examined. Yet, as had been acknowledged in earlier case-law⁽⁷⁸⁾ and by the Thomsom Committee whose findings were influential in shaping the new legislation,⁽⁷⁹⁾ and has also been recognized by researchers investigating the operation of P.A.C.E.⁽⁸⁰⁾, 'consent' may be of dubious meaning and value in the weighted circumstances of police-public encounters, particularly inside the police station. The knowledge and power of the two parties may be so unequal that the voluntary compliance of the citizen amounts to no more than unwilling or ignorant acquiescence. Indeed, this inequality may be exacerbated by the availability of a statutory alternative in the background as a latent sanction - an additional encouragement for the citizen to proceed by more informal means in order to avoid the intimidating solemnity of the law, the protections that it offers notwithstanding. Paradoxically, the very powers introduced to

regularize police practice may instead be used as a resource to permit the continued use of irregular methods.

The perceived advantages of informality, together with occasional temptation to resort to somewhat Machiavellian methods to achieve this, are well expressed by one respondent:

"Sometimes all the paperwork gets to you, and you're always worried about the clock. Sometimes you would rather still use the old methods. When I was in the C.I.D. down in X, there were some guys who didn't have any qualms about it. I remember we were pulling in this ned one night, a right toerag, thick as two short planks. My mate was trying to tell him that he should just come down for questioning, it would be easier that way, otherwise we would have to use this nasty new Act. He was having none of it, but we pulled him in anyway. But when we got to the station, we still wanted to keep our options open, so my mate slapped a voluntary attendance form down in front of him, and asked him to sign it. "What does that mean?", he asked, so my mate told him that it meant he was being detained without his consent, and the stupid b... went ahead and signed it... That doesn't happen here, mind you, most of the men just grin and bear it." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Secondly, the procedural constraints are of limited effectiveness also. The absence of a requirement for the tape-recording of detention interviews from the final legislative package, and the delayed introduction of this as a matter of compulsory practice, ⁽²⁾ meant that during the research period a retrospectively analysed documentation record was the only mechanism for external monitoring of the legal propriety of performances under the Act, apart from the oral evidence of the parties involved. Moreover, the absence of effective fora in which citizens may have

their rights vindicated under the Act, apart from that of the criminal trial which, by definition, is more likely to take place where the initial grounds for detention are reasonable, and thus there is least cause for grievance and least likelihood of citizen rights being violated flagrantly and/or unjustifiably, further weakens the hand of the citizen.⁽⁸²⁾ Finally, and dovetailing with this factor, developments in case-law under the Act have suggested that procedural irregularities do not necessarily vitiate the entire detention procedure⁽⁸³⁾ and so, even if such matters are brought before an appropriate court, there is no guarantee that the procedural protections will be fully endorsed.

Therefore, analysed in terms of its external implications, the new power of detention provides neither an incisive new tool for operational police officers nor comprehensive procedural protection for citizens. However, despite its limitations in terms of *external* accountability, the framework of regulation set up, in both its substantive and its procedural aspects, provides the basis for a more effective structure of *internal* controls.

Substantively, the new rules, although they stand as an incomplete set of instructions as regards the area of practice to which they refer, nevertheless provide a significant springboard for techniques of internal influence. While little or no guidance is provided in force orders or in divisional memoranda, the open-ended nature of the 'reasonable suspicion' test allows much scope for retrospective challenge of operational judgements by supervisory

officers on a more informal case-by-case basis. Although some commentators have chosen to emphasize the autonomous decision-making power granted to operational officers where legal powers have this open-ended quality,⁸⁴ this has tended to be in areas where such a quality attaches to the definition of a particular offence, as with many public order offences, and thus to a decision which, within limits, signals effective "closure"⁸⁵ of an operational process. By contrast, in the context under discussion the quality of discretion attaches to a power exercisable at an earlier stage of an operational process, relevant only as a means to an end - as the opening gambit in the police negotiation of an incident. In such circumstances, discretion is more likely to be perceived as a double-edged sword by the decision-maker. While he or she still has considerable latitude vis-a-vis the citizen, he or she may feel hemmed in by the need to make a difficult assessment of the strategic consequences of the initial decision, consequences which may be visited either upon the officer himself or herself, or other, perhaps senior, colleagues, at the later stage where effective closure is attempted:

" People sometimes talk as if we have all these vague powers, and we gaily go about choosing who gets done and who doesn't. It's not like that with the new Act, it's not like doing someone for a breach [of the peace] where if you're sensible, you more or less know you are well covered. You never know until afterwards whether you should have used a voluntary, or a section two, or an arrest. If it's something serious and it gets passed to the C.I.D., you can be sure that they will be complaining to the bosses if they think you've used a section two where a voluntary would have done." (constable, Oldtown Division)

Procedurally, the emphasis within the statutory scheme upon the dissemination of information provides a more transparent context for internal control techniques to flourish. In procedural terms, a structure of communicative rules and techniques has been devised whereby direct observation of certain key activities is required by supervisory officers and, following Lord Advocate's guidelines, documentation of a range greater than that which is statutorily required must be provided concerning key activities under the new Act, and related activities. (86) Except in those areas geographically divorced from the main divisional units, an officer of supervisory rank (usually a duty officer at sergeant rank - or station sergeant) was required to endorse the detention of a suspect person under s2 in each of the Divisions researched. As regards documentation, not only have official forms been introduced to monitor the circumstances and progress of s2 detention procedures, but also to record alternative methods of retaining suspects and other interested parties in the police station, namely arrest and voluntary attendance. These rules do not resolve all problems of informational uncertainty. The requirement for an increased range and detail of documentation does not rule out the possibility of lying or providing contentious interpretations within paper records. Nevertheless, the new procedural rules enhance the visibility of the relevant processes from the perspective of senior management.

It is through looking at the relationship between the external and internal implications of the new statutory rules that their

effect upon relations between ranks, and upon the uniform sergeant in particular, may be assessed. In particular, regard must be had to the interaction between three factors; first, the ambivalence of operational officers as to the value of the new detention power; secondly, the relative impotence of the accompanying system of citizen protection and external accountability generally; and thirdly, its encouragement of a stronger régime of internal controls. In order fully to appreciate this configuration of factors, however, something must first be said about the general manner in which legal rules are perceived by rule-users within the police organization.

The debate in recent years over the impact of rules upon individual police behaviour is but a microcosm of the more general debate between structuralists and culturalists which was assessed in chapter two. Just as structuralists emphasize the potential efficacy, and in many cases the present inefficacy, of external legal controls as means to regulate the police organisation as whole, and just as culturalists are more sceptical about such claims, there is a corresponding divergence of perspective at the level of individual action. The culturalist perspective stresses the importance of rules as resources facilitating good police work, or as mere presentational devices - as tools whereby action undertaken for other means can be rationalized under a cloak of legality.⁽⁸⁷⁾ Structuralists, on the other hand, have argued that carefully crafted rules can effectively constrain police action,⁽⁸⁸⁾ and further, concerned to challenge the "hermeneutics of suspicion"

'⁸⁹' which pervades much of the literature in this area and which refuses to accept the claims of researched subjects on their own terms, some have been prepared to accept the view, heavily endorsed by the present research, that certain legal rules may actually be internalized as normative guides to action by police officers, either because of general respect for the law or because of agreement with the particular values that it crystallizes.^{'90} As with the wider debate, an approach which attempts to integrate the perspectives of both camps would seem to be more compelling. Such an attempt has been made by Smith, with his tripartite classification of working rules, inhibitory rules and presentational rules.^{'91} However, despite his insistence that working rules - those which actually become guiding principles of conduct - may in some circumstances be constrained by the effect of inhibitory rules and may also be influenced by the normative claims which underpin legal rules, his more general emphasis upon the importance of other, more pragmatic, operational imperatives in the generation of working rules and his consequent consignment of the other types of rules and influences to secondary status, has led to the accusation by those of a more structuralist bent that, in the final analysis, he, too, succumbs to "radical scepticism".^{'92} In so far as this claim is justified, it would seem to be because his focus upon different types of rules rather than the different *social functions* of rules - and he himself is prepared to acknowledge that the latter approach would encapsulate his aims more precisely '⁸⁹' - leaves him insufficient conceptual space to do full justice to the diversity of

uses to which rules might be put and to the interrelationship between these uses.

A more satisfactory integrative approach would be to separate for analytical purposes the four functions accorded by organizational members to law (as to other external or organisational rules), which appear from the above discussion - as a *resource* in pursuit of one's own strategic ends, as a sanction-backed *inhibition* placed upon one (whether directly, and so involving external legal sanctions, or indirectly - as mediated through the commands and expectations of more senior officers - and so involving internal disciplinary sanctions)⁽⁹⁴⁾, as *norm* or ideational guide, and as *ideology* or presentational gloss. This allow us to acknowledge that a single rule might simultaneously perform more than one such function. That is, the various functions of rules may to some extent and in some circumstances be compatible with one another. In turn, three significant consequences flow from this *partial compatibility thesis*, all of which are backed up by evidence from the research.

First, just as the application of a particular rule or set of rules on any given occasion may perform more than one function, so too, there is no necessary reason why these functions be viewed as incompatible from the perspective of an organisational member required to follow a rule and/or wishing to apply a rule. Thus the value of a rule may be affirmed as resource, norm and ideology:

"The other week, we locked up two housebreakers on the one nightshift. That's what the job's all

about, that gave me great satisfaction. Not only was it a job well done, but it also means that two neds are kept off the streets for a while, and it shows the decent members of the public in the area that we are doing a good job." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

The law is our tool of trade, so to speak. Even more so than the baton or the uniform. But like them, it should be relied on only sparingly. The cops who don't realise this are no good, what they forget is that our clout depends upon being seen as an officer of the law, rather than an officer who uses the law." (sergeant, City Division)

Or, as resource and ideology:

"The breach of the peace charge is the cop's biggest weapon. He'll use it at demos, pub fights, domestics. Basically, it means what you want it to mean, but the public need to know that we are not just an occupying army keeping the streets clear, but constables using the powers that the law gives us (sergeant, Riverside Division):

Or, to take a final example, as norm and inhibition:

" There's a lot of complaints from Woman's Aid and groups like that about domestics. They think we should lock up every man after an argument at home. It has called untold hassle, and the pressure is on to do something with domestics now, it isn't so easy to write them off, and you certainly can't if there has been any sign of violence. But at the end of the day, we don't always have the power to do anything. The law says that we need corroborative evidence, so you can't just take the word of the wife. You have to explain that to them sometimes, that the police are just as constrained by the law as Joe Public is. And that's usually a good thing. Is anyone really suggesting that the prisons should be full of men on the say-so of their wives? That would be totally out of order." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

In the second place, however, one of the consequences of the capacity to combine a multiplicity of rationales for rule use within

the one action is that, as it follows that there will exist no independent behavioural evidence of each of these rationales, interpretation of the proper motivation or range of motivations of the rule-user may be difficult. Accordingly, within a climate of relations which has instrumental undertones and where trust is in scant supply, the rule-user may not be accorded the benefit of the doubt by others with whom he is involved in such relations, and on occasions there may be unfairly attributed to the former only the more instrumentally-orientated motivations for rule use. This is illuminated in the following contrast between the self-perception of one sergeant, and the perception held of him by one of his constables:

"There's maybe some in this job who will turn a blind eye. I'm not one of them. For me, a ned gets what's coming to him. I believe in the law and believe in applying it, that's why I joined the police." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

"Everything sergeant X does is for himself, to impress the boss or the local kirk or something, he's a great churchman. He's out to show what a great guy he is, he thinks that if he's a stickler for detail, goes by the rule-book, and comes down hard on everything, then one day someone will notice and make him an inspector." (constable, Newtown Division)

Thirdly, quite apart from the question of distorted perceptions, we should also be aware that there are real limits to the extent to which the various motivations underpinning rule-use may dovetail with one another. Compatibility is only ever partial. In particular, other normative or instrumental commitments may on occasion pull against a normative commitment to law. As regards clashes between different normative concerns, the oft-quoted "Dirty

Harry dilemma',⁽³⁵⁾ whereby the officer has to measure the value of obedience to rules - particularly rules such as those contained in the 1980 Act which place procedural constraints upon encounters with suspects - against the possibility that full compliance might allow those presumed guilty to escape, offers one common example. Or, to take a rather different case described by one respondent, a collision of norms is also evident where a beat officer's liberal attitude to the use of semi-public spaces by local youths is at odds with views, expressed by older members of the community and relayed to the officer in the form of instructions by seniors, that legal powers or their threat should be used to disperse such groups from the environs of private property. Alternatively, to take a common example of a clash between commitment to law and other instrumental concerns, too squeamish an approach to legal niceties may stop an officer from maximizing his or her individual 'count' of arrests, and so be seen to reduce his or her chances of advancement.

The response of the officer to these and other dilemmas may be a grudging and minimal acquiescence to legal rules sufficient to meet inhibitory demands or to produce the necessary presentational gloss, or even full avoidance masked by lies or selective accounting.⁽³⁶⁾ Just as important, particularly where the problem is one of conflict between normative demands, officers have to devise mechanisms for resolving or coping with the moral tensions that arise. As an initial step, these tend to involve an attempt to distinguish between more or less important forms of fealty to law and legal institutions and more or less culpable forms of law

infraction. This theme may be elaborated in a number of ways, each of which has to cope with the difficulty involved in setting up the above distinction in a manner which is sufficiently rigorous to remain faithful to certain moral and intellectual premisses, and which may this be rationalized as something more virtuous and more measured than mere short-term expediency. One popular way in which this is achieved is to eschew or to treat perfunctorily the task of specifying precise boundary criteria but to retain the sense of a meaningful distinction by emphasizing the severity of the sanctions to be visited upon those who seriously transgress.

"Anyone who gets into trouble, but does so for the right reasons, will always get my backing. We are all a bit eager sometimes, and it can be easy to get carried away. But there are limits. I hate a bully or a thief. They are bad enough outside the service, but in here they are ten times worse. They are the ones who get us all tarred with the same brush. They can do an unbelievable amount of damage. I would be down on them like a ton of bricks." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Another, often complementary, method which is chosen involves specifying the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate law infraction more distinctly in terms of the nature of the legal sources.

"I think our common-law powers are more important here. Statutes are made to get round, but the common-law powers which we all learn at the college are treated more seriously. It's the same with crimes. The common-law crimes are the important ones, while, in my opinion, some of the statutory ones are just rubbish. They should not be crimes at all. That goes for policemen as well as punters. Remember, we are only human as well." (sergeant, City Division).

Even in a jurisdiction such as Scotland, where most major crimes do still lack statutory foundations, the rationalization involved in this latter type of distinction appears crude. It is in obvious conflict with many of the practices and other ideas of the officers interviewed, particularly in the area of drugs offences, which although statutorily based, attract as much opprobrium as many common law crimes. However, provided the practical context is suitable, as in the area of law covered by the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, where statutory and common-law powers and constraints overlap and where the constraints built into the new statutory regime may be unpopular for other reasons, widespread acknowledgement of the potential significance of this source-based distinction can reinforce the sense of the different moral relevance of the two forms of law.

Bearing these three points in mind, what are the implications of the partial compatibility thesis - still viewed in general terms - for relations between ranks? Although there appeared to be some common recognition of the legal mandate as an ideal justifying the police institution across the ranks of the divisions researched, commitment to this ideal was uneven, and agreement was even more precarious as regards attitudes to the various other functions of law. Operational ranks, for reasons already discussed, are inclined to value law highly as a resource, and on occasion to be impatient of its inhibitory and ideological functions, as well as its categorical moral implications.. More senior ranks, being locked into a wider range of objectives, and having more direct links with

-

consumer groups whose submissions typically underline the importance of an ethos of legality as a firm plank of external legitimacy, are likely both to be more keenly appreciative of the possibility of incidents demonstrating lack of respect for law generating negative repercussions for the image of external propriety, and to be more strongly and consistently subjected to influences which suggest the moral impropriety of rule infraction. Both the ideological and normative functions of law thus tend to be accorded a higher priority by them.

The degree of conflict between junior and senior ranks over the uses of law is, however, generally mitigated by a number of factors. First, the previous operational experience of senior ranks, reinforced by their continuing contact with juniors in the here and now, allows them a degree of empathy with the dilemmas of more junior ranks. Secondly, the awareness of junior ranks that law is externally promulgated, and that senior officers are not directly responsible for the ideological pressures and material inhibitions which it places on them, and indeed that, as regards the ideological pressures in particular, senior officers themselves are unenviably exposed to external demands, to some extent diverts the frustrations which are felt by junior officers away from their own seniors. Thirdly, there is the forementioned element of cross-rank ideational commitment to law, and - just as importantly, the common perception of cross-rank ideational commitment to law, in the inner justification of the basic integrity of the police officer's world-view. Accordingly, although there is a tension endemic in the

different approaches of junior and senior ranks to legality due to their different immediate concerns and work priorities, this often remains a manageable tension. Both general sectors of the organisation may struggle to advance their definition of the proper attitude to legal phenomena, but the ultimate legitimacy of the position of the other will be respected and the need will be recognised for a balance to be struck somewhere on the middle range of a continuum between an unqualified instrumentalism on the one hand - a narrow, strategic commitment to law as a resource - and subservience to externally and internally defined concerns with rigorous attentiveness to the rule of law on the other:

" This chief inspector I used to work with..., his line was always that too much knowledge of the law can be a dangerous thing for cops. It can mean that you're too busy looking over your shoulder to act with any sureness in a situation. I would buy that. It doesn't mean you don't have respect for the law, we've all got that. It's just that if you come across a fight in the street and you know as much law as counsel in a high court case, it's not really in your favour. You know too many treacherous loopholes. You're better to go in with a clear understanding of your general powers, in the hope that as long as you act with good faith, then, even if you don't get a conviction at the end of the day, you'll be backed up by the bosses" (inspector, Oldtown Division)

Further, this internal accommodation over principles of legality is possible without the orientation of the organization degenerating into that of a 'mock bureaucracy', concerned merely with presenting an acceptable facade to the outside world. The presentational and inhibitory functions of law do have real internal effects, and furthermore, the moral attitude towards legality which

attracts a degree of shared commitment within the organisation also overlaps in important respects with that of various sections of the public.

However, depending as it does upon a subtle combination of factors, the accomodating structure of relationships described above is always delicately balanced. It does not invariably avoid or resolve the tensions referred to. In particular areas of the law, the overall effect of the partial compatibility thesis may be to reinforce differences rather than to underline the overlapping consensus between ranks. The comments of respondents suggest that the new statutory framework of detention provides one such legal framework whose internal consequences are divisive. To begin with, as has already been argued, the new powers provide a context in which other subcultural imperatives amongst the operational ranks pull against a commitment to the fine detail of the rules, which in turn may be denigrated as mere statutory minutiae:

"The Act is the worst sort of red tape, regulations for the sake of it. The thing is, there's a type of villain out there who knows that, and he knows how to make things difficult for you, purely for his own devices. I don't think the bosses appreciate that." (constable, Oldtown Division)

Further, the lack of precisely grounded and comprehensively effective mechanisms of external control within the new régime challenges the powerful implicit or explicit understanding between junior and senior officers that the latter are constrained to act upon a pedantic interpretation of legality due to the day-to-day

practicalities of managing relationships with critical and vigilant external groups, whether this be the courts with their power to inhibit deviant police action through retrospective sanctions, or other interest groups with their capacity to impose political pressure where the appearance of conformity to legal norms is not properly maintained. In the absence of a strong argument based upon such external constraints, other candidates emerge as possible explanations for the stance of senior officers. One possibility lies in the sheer scope of the new Act to consolidate measures of internal control, and, moreover, to do so not merely in respect of one discrete area of substantive criminal law, but in respect of the procedures which accompany a wide range of police encounters with suspected persons. As suggested earlier, the law in this area may be a resource of limited value to an external audience in inhibiting operational ranks, but it is of much greater value to an internal audience in so constraining these same ranks.

This idea of a 'hidden agenda' of internal control is to some extent supported by the views of some senior officers. For example:

"For all its faults, the new Act keeps the men on their toes. It makes them more accountable to the sergeants and to us." (inspector, Riverside Division)

But the motivations of other senior officers appear more complex than this. While the internal control opportunities are not necessarily discounted, for them, the new measures also provide an opportunity to affirm their normative commitment to the law:

"The new detention powers and the forms are a good thing. The men might moan, but after all, in today's world, that's how we've got to operate, there's no room anymore for the Ways and Means Act, and if filling in a few forms gives the men hassle, well, all to the good. It makes them think before they act, and it allows us to monitor the situation better." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

"The new Act is just something to get on with. We don't decide the law, that's up to the politicians. There's no room in the police for us saying that this is a good law or a bad one, we've just got to respect them all. All these forms do is provide an additional check that the rules are being followed" (superintendent, Newtown Division)

To reiterate a prevailing theme of this chapter, however, even if the 'hidden agenda' argument is too narrow and simplistic, provided that it is subscribed to by junior officers it will have real consequences for their relations with senior officers. And indeed for some junior officers, the starkness of the contrast between their sense of the relative impotence of the new measures as an external instrumental tool on the one hand, and as a well-honed internal instrumental tool on the other, is enough for them to draw cynical conclusions. The absence of the theme of incisive external control, in that it remains one of the main rationales for the differing legal perspectives of senior and junior officers, inevitably draws into question the sense of a shared code of norms which grants *recognition* to the sacrosanct nature of the legal mandate. Variations of degree in commitment to this normative perspective which *always* existed between senior and junior ranks, but which otherwise would have been more likely to be conveniently obscured or legitimized by accounts which explained them in terms of

the differing exigencies of the immediate work situation of the respective groups, are thrown into sharper perspective by the introduction of considerations which detract from the plausibility of the plea of exigent circumstances. To draw upon another aspect of the partial compatibility thesis, the complex and multi-layered motivations for rule use and application on the part of senior officers tend, in the jaundiced perceptions of some junior officers, to be telescoped into a single instrumental strategy to take full advantage of the new internal regulatory opportunities.

"Section two, when it came in, was sold as something which gave us more power. Does it hell, it just gives the gaffers more power over us. That's what it's all about. It brings it home to you that sometimes our biggest struggle is against our own bosses." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"Right from the off you knew it wasn't going to change our dealings with the punters, but it would make it more difficult to get the bosses off our backs." (constable, Newtown Division)

And even if the reaction of other junior officers is more subtle than a bare accusation of instrumental opportunism, the fact that the tenuous equilibrium in mutual orientations towards the law has been disturbed on account of the above complex of factors, means that these alternative responses are hardly likely to be any more constructive. In a more exactly imposed legal regime, junior officers who remain more sensitive to the moral 'high-ground' may resent the sense of guilt visited upon them by senior officers from their assumed position of superiority. They may feel the attitude of their seniors to be overly judgemental, yet their own continued

subscription to the same basic moral paradigm underlying the rule of law may ensure that their sense of moral self-esteem will suffer. This is underlined by the resilience of one aspect of the moral paradigm explained earlier, the need to condemn unreservedly those who do cross the vaguely defined threshold between condonable irregularities and subversions of the rule of law. The Oldtown constable who suggested that "we are all reprobates now", was not simply offering an ironic comment on the impossibility of crossing the procedural minefield unscathed, but was also mirroring the sentiments of many of his colleagues as to the impossibility of escaping at least vestigial feelings of moral failure in being unable to reconcile entirely one's instrumental concerns with respect for the rule of law, despite the fact that such a reconciliation might prove extremely difficult, if not impossible.

Also, and notwithstanding the above sentiments, some junior officers may only be able to make sense of the realization of moral discord by surmising the existence of a greater degree of moral solidarity between senior ranks and outside groups than other internal groups.

"Some say it was a conspiracy among the politicians and the anti-police lobby to do down the police. Sometimes, I think it was a conspiracy between them and our bosses to do us down. That's going a bit far, but you know what I mean."
(sergeant, Riverside Division)

Finally, quite apart from the charges of instrumental opportunism, moral self-righteousness and misplaced normative

allegiance, the stance, or perceived stance, of senior officers may well be taken as evidence of operational naivety, of an inability to comprehend the profundity of the practical policing problems of junior officers and the seriousness of the need to qualify acceptance of the legal mandate decisively. Although here cast as a *fool* rather than a *knave*, the reputation of the senior officer may still suffer:

"When the Act came in, there was no chance to digest it, but we were expected to change 100 years' procedures overnight. Judging by the lack of preparation, and the lack of support when we did start using them, some of the bosses seemed to have no appreciation that this was actually affecting the whole way we had to approach a crime." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

In a nutshell, all these arguments speak to the propensity of this new development in police powers to wreak a destructive influence upon normative relations within the organization. These negative consequences may become manifest in the erosion, first, of the shared normative commitments which results from shared allegiance to the substantive content of laws; secondly, of those aspects of institutional authority which are derived from a faithfulness to the legal order generally with its elements of tradition, rationality and constitutional legitimacy; and, thirdly, of those aspects of professional authority which are derived from the similarity of one's own reading as to the contextually appropriate limits of law to that of significant others within the organization.

The implications of all this for uniform patrol sergeants are twofold. Firstly, they may be caught between two factions whose normative relations are less sound on three counts, thus rendering their role as mediator and facilitator of harmonious relations between such groups more problematic. Secondly, and more immediately, conflicting influences will be at work concerning their own perspectives and priorities on the issues raised. On the one hand, their intimacy with the problems and requirements of the constable rank encourages a desire for the rules to be utilized in a manner appropriate to operational requirements, and so to allow a certain discretionary rein to the expert judgements of the craft specialist, even if such judgements sit uneasily with the general principles underlying the legislation. On the other hand, although uniform patrol sergeants are not so closely implicated in the new network of reporting relationships as their station sergeant colleagues, their general supervisory responsibilities necessarily involve them in demanding strict allegiance to the formal categories and procedures laid down. As both sympathiser with operational problems and agent of a new instrumental régime, the sergeant is placed on the horns of a dilemma.

"The new Act is a real bugger. It's not just the forms. You see, I've noticed it makes the men too cautious. - Where they used to arrest someone, they'll now use Section Two. They will worry that they don't have enough evidence to arrest. And that's just because the new power exists - it was never a problem before. But I've got to think about it more seriously as well, with one eye on how it is going to look upstairs. You are trying to encourage the cop to use his initiative and get a few collars, but at the same time you're having to do a doublethink on everything that comes in. It just about sums up our job." (sergeant,

Oldtown Division)

C. THE DOUBLE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE PARADOX OF TRUST

The catalogue of changes described and analysed in the previous section permits us to embellish our understanding of the organisational dimension of the paradox of trust as it confronts the uniform patrol sergeant. In introducing this idea in chapter five, we adopted a macroscopic perspective, concentrating upon the importance of the general instrumental backdrop to inter-rank relations within divisions. This, it was argued, entails that sergeants are confronted with certain objective difficulties in their attempts to construct some form of organizationally functional *modus vivendi* between mutually alienated juniors and seniors. Much of the evidence presented in this chapter reinforces this state of affairs.

In addition, however, this evidence allows us to develop a complementary microscopic perspective. Many of the changes documented, especially those concerned with erosion of status, the development of a more impersonal occupational culture in general, the increasingly fissiparous nature of the occupational culture of the lower ranks in particular, and the increases in senior ranks' capacity to monitor and in their incentive to control lower participants as a result of technological, political and legal changes, have worked to the detriment of the instrumental and normative capabilities of sergeants in their relations with junior

and senior ranks alike. Thus, we may speak of the *double institutionalization* of the paradox of trust. Not only is the organization more resistant to change, but, due to the increasing instrumental demands made of them and the declining instrumental and normative resources available to them, the capacity of sergeants to tackle such an ambitious piece of social engineering is itself diminished. Put simply, the thrust of organizational change has been both to make the job of sergeants more difficult and to leave them less well equipped to do it.

CHAPTER SEVEN

PATTERNS OF INSTRUMENTALISM IN THE DIVISIONAL ORGANISATION

A. PEERING THROUGH THE CELL BARS

In chapter five it was suggested that the climate of instrumental relations between junior and senior ranks which creates the paradox of trust for the uniform patrol sergeant appears to exhibit all the attributes of the classical prisoner's dilemma, and the factors highlighted in chapter six give further credence to this view. If various features of force and divisional organisation as a whole which are conducive to instrumental relations have been strengthened in recent years, and if the resources available to sergeants to ameliorate this situation by performing a positive mediating role and promoting the interests of juniors and seniors alike have at the same time decreased and are perceived to have decreased, then the awareness of juniors and seniors of the risks and dangers of adopting non-instrumental initiatives vis-a-vis one another may be seen to be heightened still further.

Yet does this not smack of unwarranted structural fatalism? Does not this heightened awareness represent a double-edged sword? An increasingly instrumental culture within intra-organisational relations might place in starker perspective the penalties invited

-

in the absence of strategies of defensive self-preservation, but by the same token, might it not also concentrate minds, individually and collectively, upon the absurdity and self-defeating nature of the overall trend? In other words, rather than signalling the need for further retrenchment of positions, is it not as likely to stimulate a more general understanding of the problem as redolent of the prisoner's dilemma, and so activate the search for a solution which will get everyone out of jail?

After all, if it is conceded that sergeants perform a difficult buffer role in attempting to respond to demands both from above and below - and the research suggests that there is some appreciation of this amongst both junior and senior ranks⁽¹⁾ - what is to stop members of junior and senior ranks alike developing a deeper appreciation of this predicament and concluding that is not only in the interests of sergeants, but also their own, that sergeants develop relations of mutual trust and respect with the other group sufficiently to enable them to offer useful protection and support for the position of their own group? Pursuing the thread of this argument a little further, if the divided loyalties and different priorities and perspectives of the sergeant are seen by other ranks to derive from nothing more sinister than their different structural position and set of formal roles within the organisation, why should they not draw the same conclusion in respect of other ranks? That is, should they not also concede that the practices of these other ranks which appear to operate to the detriment of their own immediate interests are themselves also unlikely to be malevolently

intended, but are similarly the product of the peculiar demands of the formal position of those who hold such ranks, and of the myopia which affects all distant ranks and roles within a multi-tiered, multi-functional bureaucracy?⁽²⁾ And, in the light of this, might they not also appreciate that instrumental strategies directed against their own rank by distant ranks are merely reciprocal with their own instrumental strategies directed against them, locked into a spiral of mutual reinforcement, neither constituency shouldering exclusive responsibility for nor gaining from this conflict?

And if these points are conceded, should not organisational dissensus be viewed from within in a different light generally? Apart from marginal cases where individual deviance or underperformance is concerned, do not all conflicts within the organization then simply consist of problems of co-ordination, and of modes of alienation and struggles born of mutual misunderstanding and underestimation of the nature of the predicament involved for members of each particular rank in responding to these co-ordination problems? If this string of hypotheses is followed through to its logical conclusion, then the structural problems which we have identified may be seen to collapse like a house of cards. Coming full circle, an appreciation of the predicament of the sergeant leads, through a parallel appreciation of the predicament of other ranks, to the removal of the very conditions which give rise to the sergeant's predicament.

-

In this chapter, and in the following two, the attempt is made to demonstrate why, at least in its most comprehensive terms, this thought experiment fails both as a description of events and as a plausible prescription. It is argued that the *rapprochement* which it adumbrates has neither come about in the divisions researched, nor is it likely to come about under prevailing conditions. In chapters eight and nine two specific features of the cultural and structural complex of intra-organisational relations which bear upon this question are dealt with - the impact of new managerial philosophies and the particular role of the inspector. In the present chapter, certain more general flaws in the above set of propositions are identified, and it is contended that a more rounded representation and assessment of the source and nature of conflict and dissensus within the police organisation reveals the logic of instrumentalism to be extremely resilient, albeit self-defeating. This involves elaborating upon the very broad picture of the self-propagating nature of instrumental relations within bureaucratic organisations in general which was sketched in chapter five, and showing how certain more specific structural and cultural features of police bureaucracy may exacerbate these tendencies.

B.. POLICE BUREAUCRACY IN CONTEXT

In that earlier discussion in chapter five, it was suggested that the unequal division of instrumentally significant resources and the elongated chain of command which is characteristic of any hierarchically organized bureaucracy provides a general impetus

towards the development of instrumental relations. However, this development need be viewed neither as inexorable nor as entirely pathological. Rather, it is argued, the extent to which a bureaucracy generates mutual alienation of its members situated in different functional units and at different levels of formal authority, and fails to deliver in terms of organisational objectives, depends upon the extent to which and manner in which that bureaucracy, in its particular form and context of operation, departs from the assumptions of the 'machine' model of hierarchical organization. For this reason, although few would subscribe to this model without qualification,⁽³⁾ it is vital to consider and to offer a critique of its terms in some detail.

The mechanistic metaphor, it will be recalled, suggests that the organisation is made up of a number of cogs or parts whose exclusive function is to perform a task which contributes to the purpose or purposes for which the machine was designed, such a purpose or purposes being capable of rigorous definition. In its pure form, this model, or metaphor, of organization, defines out all but the most cosmetic forms of disorder and disequilibrium. From time to time, the connecting mechanisms may need to be lubricated and fine-tuning of the individual parts may be required. Or, translated into social terms, the sheer size and formal complexity of the bureaucratic machine may lead to co-ordination problems and to mutual failure amongst the internal constituents to appreciate the nature and the strengths of the imperatives attaching to the formal roles of others. By the same token, however, the machine can

always right itself. The bureaucratic structure might create co-ordination and communication problems, particularly where, as with police organisations, there has been a historical drift towards increase in size and scale of activity⁽⁴⁾. However, through its commitment to a continuous, impersonal, rule-based mode of action and of self-regulation, and its vesting of considerable executive power, and thus, of instrumental capability, in the higher echelons, it also retains the ideational and material capacity to resolve these problems. It is upon this complacent assumption that problems of internal conflict may be avoided or resolved through an internally-generated, incremental learning process, that the plausibility of the thought experiment conducted above depends.

Basically, the machine model fails as a sociologically adequate account of the workings of bureaucracies in general and the police bureaucracy in particular for two reasons. In the first place, it fails to take account of individual 'deviance' in its widest sense - the intrusion of behavioural patterns which are at odds with organisational aims and objectives. The parts cannot be assumed to be functional for the machine as a whole. Secondly, it does not countenance the possibility that the objectives, or functions, of the machine itself may not be definitively settled. They may be contentious and incapable of precise formulation. It is by examining how these two problems tend to unfold and interweave in the context of the police bureaucracy that we may demonstrate the extent to which it encourages a dysfunctional instrumentalism.

(1) Individual deviance

Since all forms of bureaucratically organized collective endeavour involve a group of individuals in the pursuit of a set of objectives defined independently of, and thus in a manner not necessarily identical to or compatible with, the aims and objectives of each individual, an endemic problem for bureaucracies is to guard against the intrusion of these individual concerns into the patterns of conduct within the organization. As many students of organisational behaviour in a variety of settings have shown, the commitment of members to organisational goals and methods can never be taken for granted.⁽⁵⁾ However, this need not necessarily defeat the logic of bureaucratic methods, since non-conformity is precisely one of the problems that the bureaucratic form is designed and equipped to deal with. To that extent, the assumptions about social behaviour which are built into the bureaucratic idea are more sophisticated than those which underwrite the machine model in its crudest form. To that extent also, the bureaucratic form may, under certain conditions, provide a working illustration of why instrumental techniques might be necessary and beneficial, and of how they might be confined within manageable dimensions and need not proliferate into all spheres of organizational relations.

As suggested in chapter three, the fact of human agency implies a diversity of values and perspectives - a world where "ends collide"⁽⁶⁾ - and so normative consensus can only ever be a precarious and partial accomplishment. Normative techniques must be

supplemented by instrumental techniques in the form of bureaucratically constituted resource controls, incentives and sanctions in order to underwrite the capacity of the organization to co-ordinate and control collective effort. Of course, for the very reason that resort to such techniques is necessary, it cannot be entirely successful. Just as some individual aspirations and objectives are impervious to normative techniques, so too they cannot be entirely eliminated by instrumental techniques. As noted in chapter five, resource controls merely provides a power of veto, ensuring that agents will not do certain things, but not that they *will* do others. Moreover, strategies of providing material incentives or sanctions to encourage certain actions depend for their success, first, upon the verifiability of the actions in question, and secondly, upon the value which the agent places upon the opportunities and benefits provided or denied through the scheme of incentives and sanctions as against the value which he or she places upon those other individual ends whose pursuit will entail the sacrifice of the former set of opportunities and benefits. In short, if and to the extent that agents can avoid effective monitoring of their conduct, or believe that the opportunity costs which are incurred in failing to respond to the sticks and carrots of the instrumental strategist are less than those which are incurred in the abandonment of other individual interests, then instrumental forms of control will not prevail. Further, to the extent that the instrumental resources of the organisational hierarchy are strengthened to provide more effective information controls and to weight the utilitarian calculations of lower

participants more favourably towards the demands of the hierarchy, and to the extent that their own responsibilities may be capable of avoidance or downwards displacement within an extended 'line' organization, then not only is this likely to set in train a vicious cycle of instrumentalism, but it also places in stark perspective the problem of the fidelity to collective interests of members of the higher echelons themselves. The pessimism of writers such as Weber and Michels as to the enervating effect of the 'iron cage' of bureaucracy on even the most dynamic of social movements,⁽⁷⁾ the lament of disillusioned Marxist revolutionaries such as Burnham and Rizzi in the face of 'the bureaucratization of the world',⁽⁸⁾ and the example of centralized state régimes of every ideological stripe in consolidating the position of the bureaucratic elite at the expense of the collective interests that they are charged to pursue, bear powerful witness to this last point.

Nevertheless, extreme examples notwithstanding, it needs to be stressed that the problems of bureaucratically constituted forms of instrumentalism when confronted with individual interests which are at odds with organizational objectives, are of variable extent. If the general substructure of normative consensus is sufficiently substantial, if other normative power techniques are sufficiently successful, and if a modest package of instrumental techniques moderately applied is sufficient to contain outstanding problems of individual non-conformity within acceptable limits, then instrumentalism may be confined to an indispensable but subordinate role. In such circumstances the incubation of collective commitment

-

within the incremental learning model suggested above might survive the disengagement of a minority of organisational members.

However, certain features of its social organisation which have already been encountered suggest that policework provides an impropitious setting for such a balancing act. The changes referred to in the previous chapter have eroded the baseline of normative consensus and have undermined the plausibility of many normative control techniques. The low visibility of the regions within which much street-level policework unfolds together with the defensive solidarity of the operational workgroup pose objective difficulties for senior officers in the enactment of instrumental strategies. Further, as also attested in the previous chapter, the complex of social factors which creates a propensity towards cynicism amongst police officers has an internal as well as an external dimension, and so encourages the interpretation of internal division in terms of the self-interest of the other party, even where justification for this may be lacking. Finally, in so far as these objective difficulties and divisive perspectives encourage the greater consolidation and use of instrumental power techniques within the attenuated chain of command, they are also likely to encourage the secondary dysfunctions referred to above - the vicious cycle of mutual alienation and the disengagement of senior officers from organisational interests.

Examples could be given of how the spectre of non-conformity haunts the police organization in the ways described, but these

would neither be particularly neat nor particularly illuminating. This is because in practice the problem of individual deviance - the intrusion of non-organisational ends and commitments - is inextricably interwoven with the second fundamental problem which confronts police bureaucracy, namely the indeterminacy of the organisational objectives themselves. In the first place, the underlying, objective limitations of bureaucratic methods of control which make the issue of individual conformity to collective ends such a pressing one, are exacerbated by the problems of control which flow from the fact of indeterminacy. In the second place, at the level of mutual attitudes and practices, in many cases it is difficult to disentangle non-organisational objectives on the one hand, and merely contested conceptions of organisational objectives on the other, in accounting for the motivations of particular officers who take advantage of the loopholes or imbalances of instrumental control strategies, and indeed, in some cases motives may be mixed. Furthermore, as we shall see, the strength of the perceptions of organisational members as to the propensity of colleagues to pursue individual interests to the detriment of the collective good helps to divert attention from, and so to obscure understanding of, the problem of indeterminacy, and thus underlines the instrumental implications of the latter. Accordingly, we must develop the second, and even more significant, element of our critique of the mechanistic model, before the practical implications of the various features of the problem already discussed can be fully appreciated.

(2) Organizational Objectives

(1) The problem of indeterminacy

As suggested, the capacity of bureaucratic techniques within the police organisation to maximise the advantages of instrumentalism and to minimise its disadvantages also depends upon the extent to which a second assumption of the machine model, namely that the purposes of collective endeavour are clear and uncontentious, is borne out in practice. As has frequently been noted, such an assumption is untenable.⁽⁹⁾ The objectives of the police are highly indeterminate.

Thus, if we adapt the authoritative modern statement of the objectives of the British police contained in the report of the 1962 Royal Commission on the Police to the particular demands of policing in Scotland, we are presented with the following list:

(1) The maintenance of law and order and the protection of persons and property.

(2) The prevention of crime

(3) The detection of criminals.

(4) Controlling of road traffic and advising local authorities on traffic questions.

(5) Carrying out certain duties on behalf of government departments.

(6) Befriending of anyone who needs help and being available at any time to cope with minor or major emergencies.⁽¹⁰⁾

Basically, the problem of indeterminacy has two dimensions, and it is only by assessing the various facets of each of these cumulatively that it is possible to appreciate how far the police mandate departs from the ideal vision of the machine model. In the first place, as with many large-scale collective enterprises,⁽¹¹⁾ the mandate of the police is couched in general terms, and is thus vulnerable to the charge of *semantic imprecision*. None of the above aims specifies exhaustively the conditions of its own fulfilment.⁽¹²⁾ This vagueness applies with particular force to the non law-directed goals, numbers one, four, five and six. However, even goals two and three, which enjoy the ostensible advantage of being defined exclusively by reference to the detailed framework of the criminal law, are not immune from this failing. As an external referent, or interpretive aid, the framework of criminal law, despite its rule-based character, is no model of clarity or precision. Particularly in the area of public order offences, the rules of criminal law tend to be open-textured and overlapping.⁽¹³⁾

Secondly, the police mandate is *utopian* in nature. Rising recorded crime levels, the submerged iceberg of unrecorded crime, and declining clear-up rates are testimony to the fact that the first three goals, even if considered separately, are merely ideal aspirations.⁽¹⁴⁾ Further, if considered collectively, these difficulties are exacerbated. Although most of the goals are to some extent mutually reinforcing, the pursuit of all goals, or even of any two goals, is incapable of being simultaneously optimized in the one set of practices. For example, although the pursuit of

"social service" goals under heading six, by increasing the popularity of and public confidence in the police, may lead to higher levels of reporting of criminal information and, thus, to an improved rate of crime detection under heading three, many would argue that, at least from a short-term perspective, if an element of resources utilized in pursuit of goal number six were to be diverted to the direct pursuit of goal number three, the level of achievement of goal number three would exceed that which would indirectly arise from the deployment of that same element of resources in pursuit of the original goal.⁽¹⁶⁾ More generally, there is very little correspondence between the mainstream police practices devoted to general crime prevention in the first place, to traffic management and control in the second place, and, finally, to administrative support of other state agencies in respect of such matters as licensing and immigration control. Separate provision is required for these separate activities. Finally, in some situations, the problem may be one not merely of non-correspondence but of actual incompatibility between goals.⁽¹⁷⁾ Action in pursuit of one goal may be directly detrimental to action in pursuit of another. For instance, to pursue a tough line on speeding and drunk driving may be conducive to the achievement of goals three and four but may also, through the resentment it arouses, be to the detriment of the achievement of goals one and two. Or, consider the dilemma which faced the proponents of the notorious Swamp 81 strategy in Brixton in 1981, or which faced police forces throughout Britain during the coal dispute of 1984-85. In both cases the pursuit of a law-directed goal at a time and place of gathering social tension and

against a background of mutual suspicion or hostility - in the first case a concerted effort aimed at the detection of burglars and robbers through street surveillance and stop and search, and in the second place the prevention of public order offences in the context of mass picketing - placed the maintenance of law and order in immediate jeopardy.⁽¹⁸⁾

To the extent that such conflicts arise, the impossible nature of the police mandate is implicit in its very terms. Quite apart from this intrinsic tension, however, there are other factors which contribute to the problem of utopianism, in both its individual and collective dimensions. To begin with, there is the "information dependent"⁽¹⁹⁾ nature of much policework, particularly as regards the first three goals. As research on detection patterns and patrolling activities demonstrates,⁽²⁰⁾ the police are frequently obliged to rely upon the assistance of citizens in detecting crime or identifying trouble-spots, and on many occasions, and for a number of reasons,⁽²¹⁾ such assistance may not be forthcoming. There is then the problem of finite resources. Policing does not operate in a social vacuum, and must compete with other public services for scarce resources. Finally, quite apart from competition for scarce resources, police objectives may come into more direct conflict with other worthwhile individual or social values, and this too places limitations on the extent to which the former may be pursued.

- In order to appreciate this last point, it may be noted that, if analysed in terms of their wider consequences, policing activities may affect the level and quality of three different types of benefits. In the first place, policing is involved in the protection of certain *welfare rights*, or what are alternatively known as passive or recipient rights.⁽²²⁾ This is the class of individual rights which consist of "entitlements to goods",⁽²³⁾ and policing is commonly involved in the protection of the particular 'goods' of life, physical integrity and property against specific attempts at encroachment. In the second place, there is the category of *option rights*, or active rights.⁽²⁴⁾ This is the class of rights "which correspond to spheres of individual sovereignty,...in which the individual is morally free to act upon the basis of his own choice".⁽²⁵⁾ Thus, in defending the forementioned welfare rights, the police must also demonstrate respect for such option rights as freedom from arbitrary search, arrest and detention, freedom of expression, the individual right of freedom of movement and the collective rights of public assembly and procession. Further, where the context is such that there is conflict within the class of option rights which prevents the full vindication of different right-claims, as when the right to work is opposed to the right to picket or the rights of assembly and procession of different groups threaten to interfere with one another,⁽²⁶⁾ or where the enforcement of rights might impinge upon other wider social benefits (see below), the police may be required to arbitrate between these competing claims. In the third place, policing is also implicated in the provision of *public goods*.⁽²⁷⁾

Unlike individual or collective rights, public goods possess the characteristics of non-excludability and indivisibility.⁽²⁸⁾ They are goods whose distribution and enjoyment is "not subject to voluntary control by anyone other than each potential beneficiary controlling his share of the benefits."⁽²⁹⁾ In the pursuit of goal number one in particular, the enterprise of policing is closely involved in the provision of the public good of a safe, tranquil, orderly and predictable public environment in which to live, work and play. In this context too, however, police objectives can run against other reckonable social benefits. Too zealous a pursuit of this public good can again encroach upon the aforementioned set of option rights, and also upon other other public goods which might flow from these option rights, such as that of an an educated, tolerant and self-critical society.

The constraints which flow from the requirement that police objectives do not impinge too greatly upon other social benefits within this complex triangle of interlocking values are more or less institutionalized. In the more institutionalized sense, the most significant legal constraints upon policework are designed to protect those option rights and related public goods which would otherwise be endangered by the police pursuit of welfare rights and of the related public good of order maintenance. Restrictions on police powers of stop, search, detention and arrest, and upon the admissability of certain types of evidence, together with the normal civil and criminal liability of police officers, provide the relevant constraints here.⁽³⁰⁾ Police officers are also constrained

by law in dealing with the public order implications of those situations where the option rights of different groups clash.⁽³¹⁾

More informally, the boundaries within which the pursuit of police objectives is deemed suitable is subject to ongoing debate. Thus, for some, policing should be governed by the "market"⁽³²⁾ of individual demand, or, if market forces are deemed to be an unreliable guide to individual needs and an insufficient instruction to the service-suppliers,⁽³³⁾ should still nevertheless - through a public rather than a private decision-making process - be pitched at the level of the individual client, concerned with the "minimal" protection of welfare rights.⁽³⁴⁾ For others, the aim is to "penetrate"⁽³⁵⁾ the community on a proactive basis.⁽³⁶⁾ The most important distinction of principle between these two positions, and the public and political attitudes which endorse them, concerns whether and to what extent the pursuit of the public good of order maintenance should be viewed as a simple by-product of the staple preventative and detective work carried out for the protection of welfare rights, or as an end in itself, with the police involved not merely in cosmetic and episodic forms of order maintenance but in the systematic promotion of a more stable social order generally. On the one hand, from a minimalist perspective, if assiduously and independently pursued, the public good of enhanced social stability may be bought at too high a cost in terms of infringement of option rights, declining legitimacy amongst groups whose option rights are most likely to be infringed, and - in consequence of a less co-operative attitude towards the police within such groups, less

effective protection of core welfare rights.⁽³⁷⁾ Furthermore, recalling Marenin's argument, despite its theoretically indivisible nature, in practice the public good of social stability may not have uniformly beneficial consequences. The "voluntary" capacity of individuals to take advantage of or satisfaction from the fruits of social stability may itself vary depending upon the other systematic inequalities of opportunity and resources. On the other hand, from a communitarian perspective, the police are seen as well equipped to take a leading role in the dispelling of criminogenic conditions and the fostering of solidarity within communities, and thus of advancing the public good of social stability by such means and to such an extent that police practice need no longer be so concentrated within adversarial contexts, and so need not involve such a sharp confrontation between option rights and welfare rights.⁽³⁸⁾

In summary therefore, the inevitable encroachment of policing upon wider social values compromises the ability of the police to achieve their own mandate, and thus underlines the problem of utopianism, in two respects. First, it accounts for the legal constraints upon policework. Secondly, and more generally, it provides a constraining context within which the debate about overall policing styles unfolds and imposes a formidably complex set of obstacles which have to be overcome and side-constraints which have to be respected in the generation of feasible and legitimate policy options.

If we pull these threads together, we can see how the police organization is confronted with an "impossible mandate",⁽³⁹⁾ a vague and lofty set of aspirations beyond the reach of the mundane realities of policework. But how, precisely, in contradicting the consensually-orientated assumptions of the machine model, does this fundamental problem of indeterminacy strengthen the connection between bureaucracy and instrumentalism in the police organization?

(ii) Harnessing the indeterminate mandate: The external dimension.

In the first place, the indeterminate mandate provides an explanatory focus in accounting for the external, political pressures on the police. The unavoidable gulf between the official claims of police organisations and their actual achievements inevitably raises questions as to their effectiveness and legitimacy. If individual goals can only be selectively enforced, if the balance between goals must be struck in a sub-optimal manner, and if the pursuit of police goals may be at the expense of other social benefits, then difficult and contentious choices are required to be made as to whose demands are to be satisfied, which spheres of organisational activity are to be given priority, and which other individual and public interests are expendable in the pursuit of police objectives. Further, if, as is the case in Britain, (particularly as regards the first two of these issues) the police themselves are allowed considerable latitude in resolving such matters, then it is upon them that the weight of public scrutiny will rest and with them that the burden of political responsibility

-

will ultimately be seen to lie. In this sense, the indeterminate mandate provides a structural fault-line running through the various changes in the socio-political context of policing and tending towards the greater embroilment of police institutions in political controversy, as set out in Part A of Model One in the previous chapter. Further, as these external changes in turn have been responsible for precipitating the various organisational changes also documented in the previous chapter (see Part B of Model One), there appears to be a general causal connection between the root problem of indeterminacy on the one hand, and the various more immediate pressures towards instrumentalization which have flowed from these organisational changes on the other. More pertinently for present purposes, since we are concerned here with the general propensity of the bureaucratic form of police organization to encourage an instrumental pattern of exchanges between ranks rather than with incremental historical movements within this broad pattern, the root problem of indeterminacy illuminates our understanding of the relationship between the pressure for increased external accountability (A3 of Model One), the pressure for increased internal accountability (B9), and the greater concentration upon bureaucratic forms and techniques in general. As argued in the previous chapter, the bureaucratic form, through its symbolic promise of disciplined and dedicated performance coordinated towards a set of pre-given ends, acts as an ideological buffer against charges of partiality and against claims for greater external political control. Since it is the very sociological fact of indeterminacy which entails that the police will be constantly

vulnerable to these external charges and ambitions, it is, accordingly, on account of this same root problem that so much importance rests upon the ideological functions of bureaucracy.

But this externally induced pressure upon organizational members to nurture the 'rational myths' of bureaucracy and to participate in the drama of bureaucratic striving need not of itself provide an irresistible impetus towards instrumentalism within the organization. Admittedly, as noted, an elaborate play of 'institutional display and documentation' can be time-consuming, and by adding to the logistical constraints upon sergeants and other managerial ranks can distract them from other educational, interpersonal and negotiating activities which may encourage normative relations. Nevertheless, as with the legal pressures discussed earlier,⁴⁰ if the pressures towards bureaucratization were to be seen primarily as externally stimulated, and senior officers were seen to be bound to absorb these external pressures and as striving to minimize the internal problems which they might generate, then the frustrations and resentments of lower participants who bear the brunt of such pressures would be as likely to be directed at the 'culpable' external agencies as at their own superiors.

However, this is to reckon without a second means by which the problem of indeterminacy percolates through into the thoughts and actions of the bureaucratic elite within the police. *Not only does it provide the impetus behind external pressures for conformity to*

strict bureaucratic rule, but it also both encourages and confounds senior officers in their own efforts at internal control. It is these internal implications, in combination with the external pressures, and also with the problems associated with the spectre of individual deviance, which set in train the cycle which, against the assumptions of the machine model, links bureaucracy and instrumentalism in a powerful self-propagating dynamic. Let us begin to trace this explanatory sequence by examining these internal implications, and in particular, how the simultaneous encouragement and frustration of internal bureaucratic techniques flows from the indeterminacy of the mandate and so involves the police organisation in a paradox of control.

(iii) The paradox of control

Despite its attractions in the face of the impossible mandate, the bureaucratic facade can never be proof against the problems posed by this mandate. The promise and the appearance of impartial dedication to a public mission cannot entirely thwart the challenge of those who contest the police interpretation of their vague manifesto, nor answer the claims of those who feel their interests sacrificed in the chasm between achievement and utopian aspiration, nor silence the criticisms of those who feel victims of the inevitable conflict between police objectives and other individual and public goods. As suggested by the answers set out in chapter four in respect of their perceived problems and priorities, senior officers feel inundated by the sheer volume and diversity of

external demands made of them. This sense of constraint, and how it affects relations not only between the organisational élite and external constituencies but also within the organisational élite, is well captured by one chief inspector:

"As you climb up the ranks in this job, you always think that you'll get more scope at the next rank, more freedom to try out your own ideas, but it never seems to work out like that. There are just new types of pressures. I mean I still think if I was in the chief super's job, I'd have a bit more scope, but if you think about it I'm probably just making the same mistake again. Take these crime figures, the force figures which were just published last week. You can bet that there will be all sorts of people all over the city, scrutinising them, ready to pick holes in them. The rape crisis people will be looking at the sex crime figures, the people at the rehabilitation units will be looking at the drug figures, ratepayers associations will be shouting about housebreakings and vandalism, all the local politicians will be wanting to put their oar in about something. At the same time we have to work out our priorities from all that lot. We're bouncing off all that lot, reacting to criticism, trying to work out where we are overall, because they are all real grievances. They have all got a perfect right to put their case, although you get the feeling that some abuse it. There are always a hundred people telling you how to do your job, but as long as it is policework, then they have a right to, and it is your job to, try to find the right balance between them all. It is bloody impossible, but you've got to try. At the same time the boss is on your back about the same set of figures, but he's only really doing that because an even bigger set of people are on his back about them too." (chief inspector, City Division) -

Thus, however valuable such an exercise might be, the external pressures which flow from the indeterminate mandate cannot simply be absorbed by an elaborate routine of ideological shadow-boxing. To satisfy their various public audiences, the police must do more

than simply advertise themselves as a body compliant with a bureaucratic structure of rules and confidently orientated towards their mandate. They must also produce results in keeping with such an orientation.⁽⁴¹⁾ Or, to adapt our discussion of the multi-functional nature of rules in the previous chapter, in order to meet external demands the bureaucratic apparatus requires to be utilized not only as a presentational device but also as a resource which will maximize performance across the whole range of police objectives. And if we add to these special external pressures the other considerations in favour of deploying a bureaucratic apparatus - the need to co-ordinate a wide range of activities in routine and emergency situations and to minimize deviant behaviour - its importance as a concrete regulatory mechanism as well as a symbolic front is strongly underlined. Bearing these points in mind, how, then, is the bureaucratic apparatus of the police (both generally, and in the divisions researched in particular) deployed for regulatory purposes, and with what degree of success in meeting the problems posed by the indeterminate mandate?

In the divisions researched, senior officers utilized the bureaucratic resources available to them in order to apply two main general types of *regulatory mechanism*, each with its own methodology of direction and control.⁽⁴²⁾ These were, respectively, the mechanism of *bureaucratic rules* and the mechanism of *output standards*.

- The former is a composite category. It embraces a number of different sub-categories of rules which are elsewhere analysed separately for the purposes of assessing their potential for effecting organisational reform.⁽⁴³⁾ For the moment the differences between these sub-categories are less important than the fact that, if considered as an integrated structure, they encapsulate the bureaucratic method in its purest form. Together, they provide a formal system for the breaking down of tasks into easily definable elements and for specifying the methods, procedures, precepts, and accounting relationships applicable to the conduct of such tasks. They thus provide the vehicle through which are articulated the definitive bureaucratic principles of hierarchy, continuity, impersonality and expertise. Output standards, on the other hand, are less directly modelled on the bureaucratic apparatus itself, although they still depend for their successful operationalization on the power resources and the capacity for co-ordination and reflexive monitoring of activity made available through this apparatus. Output standards entail the designation of certain dimensions of police practice and the consequences which flow from such practice as crucial, and the development and use of appropriate output criteria and targets to measure performance levels along these crucial dimensions. Although, as we shall see, the two types of regulatory mechanism are closely interrelated, the most salient difference between the two lies in the fact that in the case of output standards, unlike bureaucratic rules, it is not the degree of fidelity to formally sanctioned organisational procedures which is important, but rather the measurable impact of the performance of

the task in question upon the policing environment and the use of "responsibility accounting"⁴⁴ to hold a member or members liable for this external effect.

Just as the underlying bureaucratic principle appears to be functional for many of the needs of the police organization, so too with these particular regulatory mechanisms. One major set of reasons why they are favoured has to do with the diversity of police functions and practice, together with problems of information gathering, and its subsequent assimilation and interpretation. Given the breadth of responsibilities of senior officers, together with the dispersed nature of operational policework, reliance upon personal supervisory control and the individually nuanced judgements which flow from this method of control is both undesirable and impracticable. Emphasis must, therefore, be placed upon the production of performance criteria which are pitched at a level appropriate to the indirect technologies of information-gathering which are utilized - allowing the information to be sifted and relayed in an economical manner - and which generate indices of achievement which are sufficiently precise and general in nature to allow consistent interpretation and comparative judgement. A set of *intermediate* standards are required which will move beyond the wilderness of particular instances and permit manageable and generalizable judgements yet which - unlike the mandate statement itself - do not inhabit a plane so rarified as to provoke insuperable problems in the attempt to interpret and evaluate concrete practices in their light. Both bureaucratic rules, through

their stipulation of common and precise courses of action, and output standards, through the efforts of those who generate them to provide performance indicators which direct and judge activities in accordance with general criteria, appear to be geared to this intermediate level.

This is not, however, to suggest that as regulatory mechanisms bureaucratic rules and output standards are deemed by senior officers to be ideal. Indeed, it will be an important part of our explanation for the reliance of senior officers on a package of such measures that, considered in isolation, individual measures are seen to be deficient. Nevertheless, bearing in mind the general point that, on balance, both types of regulatory mechanisms are viewed as useful conceptual and practical tools of the senior officer's trade, to what extent is this faith justified? Are the methodologies which they endorse objectively capable of responding to the problems generated by the indeterminate mandate?

The short answer is that, despite their attractions, both types of mechanism are fatally flawed as means of directing and controlling police practice in terms of the indeterminate mandate. *The nub of the problem is that as the mandate is itself indeterminate - both impossible and imprecise, then control methodologies geared to the achievement of the mandate cannot cure this defect and, considered as a whole, will reflect this indeterminacy, and, accordingly, will provide for a level and quality of performance which itself is unsatisfactory in terms of*

-

the mandate and bears no precise relationship thereto. This proposition entails more than the banal truism that if a set of objectives is impossible to define closely or to achieve, then no amount of secondary regulatory mechanisms can entirely remedy this. Further, and more crucially, it entails that there is no meaningful sense in which *a state of optimal achievement* in respect of the aspirations contained in such a mandate can be attained or identified. This is because, as a matter of logic, a highly indeterminate objectives set such as that available for the police cannot supply its own metric of relative achievement.

Why is this so ? In the first place, if we look at those individual goals which are utopian in nature - numbers one to three - they have a nonlinear quality.⁴⁵ Because much of policing consists of the provision of services to different individuals in different situations - and in particular the securing of their various welfare rights - different units of policing activity and achievement cannot be assumed to have the same value. Therefore, unlike, for example, a manufacturing organization geared to produce a standard product, the level of attainment, or degree of effectiveness, in relation to a given objective cannot be assumed to be a linear function of the aggregate amount of units produced in its pursuit. In other words, qualitatively different units of achievement, because incommensurable, cannot be scaled along a standard quantitative measure. Furthermore, the individualized service orientation together with the primarily demand-led nature of policing entails that criteria of non-performance are as much a

-

problem as levels of performance. By what criteria should some goal-directed tasks be accorded priority over others, and the rights and interests of some clients be subordinated to those of others? The bald statement of a utopian aspiration lacks the sophistication to deal with either of these problems of non-linearity, and thus can provide no fixed standard of relative achievement.

In the second place, the imprecision of each individual objective also confounds attempts at performance optimization. Performance standards are parasitic upon the objective to be achieved, and if this is imprecise then the performance standards will reproduce rather than cure this deficiency. Finally, in the third place, if we consider the goals collectively, the problems of non-correspondence and incompatibility between goals require difficult choices to be made which are not legislated for in the mandate itself. It contains no statement or generative principle of hierarchical order, and thus no criteria of value which specify the relative priority of the various goals.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Since such tensions and difficult choices between objectives are not restricted to circumstances where a certain threshold of achievement of individual objectives has already been achieved, but are instead endemic within policing, then again the absence of the necessary principles of selection within the mandate itself blights the attempt to impose some order of priority even as regards sub-optimal performance targets.

It is this complex of problems which creates what we might term the *paradox of control*. It is impossible wholly to satisfy all aspirations contained in the police mandate, whether considered individually, or even more tellingly, considered collectively. This creates a strong pressure to regulate and control police performance in a manner which secures optimal achievement in respect of the mandate. However, the inevitable dependence of the mechanisms for direction and control upon the indeterminate manifesto itself entails that the former cannot supply the relevant criteria of optimization. In other words, because the machine has no clearly or realistically defined ultimate purpose, its chief operators can never be sure how well they are doing, and lack the definitive means to guide and hold accountable those under their charge in terms of standards of good performance. Let us look at these problems in more detail by examining and analysing both bureaucratic rules and output standards more closely.

As regards bureaucratic rules, while their efficiency and economy as means of utilising predominantly indirect methods of monitoring a wide range of organisational activities cannot be doubted, their relevance and appropriateness as indices of overall effectiveness may be. Accordingly, while their insistence upon strict obedience to rules and procedures may be indispensable to the specification and control of certain detailed aspects of practice and to the achievement of a certain level of general co-ordination of activity, the pertinence of bureaucratic rules to the broader task of the directed pursuit of the mandate as a whole is more dubious. The

nature of this problem of relevance differs, depending upon whether we are dealing with internally focused or externally focused rules within a bureaucratic framework.

Internally focused rules are rules which relate to intra-organisational relations - those aspects of policing not directly concerned with encounters with the public. As contained in such documents as force and divisional standing orders, memoranda and circulars, they cover a vast array of standard operating procedures, as well as the rules of hierarchical design, communicative rules, social technology rules (training and staff appraisal systems) which directly and indirectly facilitate the implementation of these procedures, and the sanctioning procedures which aid their enforcement. They include service regulations, rules about the use and availability of equipment and supplies, rules about inside duty in divisional offices, welfare rules, and the various documentary or communicative rules which provide for the recording of activities prescribed both by these other internally focused rules and by externally focused rules. However, despite this impressively integrated system, as all force objectives are externally focused, the relationship of internally focussed bureaucratic rules to them can at best be of an instrumental nature, one of means to ends.

Externally focused bureaucratic rules are of a different order. Referring to encounters with the public, these are contained in the criminal law and the law of police powers, and in various internally derived rules which further regulate the procedural as opposed to

the substantive aspects of dealings with the public, whether falling under a criminal or a non-criminal classification. Within our research divisions, examples include the force rules stipulating the necessity of informing a senior detective officer in the case of a sudden death occurring in circumstances not entirely free of suspicion or of informing and calling to the scene a uniform inspector in the case of a major fire. They also include divisional rules concerning the wearing of hats in police vehicles, the nature and purpose of follow-up calls on victims of housebreakings, and the procedures to be followed in liaising with the owners of alarm systems who have been responsible for persistent user or system faults, or which regulate the means for providing other external agencies, including social workers, Procurators-Fiscal, and Reporters to Childrens Hearings, with suitable records of certain police encounters with members of the public.

Again, the relationship of these externally focused bureaucratic rules to force objectives is not such as to provide a solution to the problem of the identification of appropriate criteria for deciding the relative priority to be accorded to particular actions under a given mandate. Indeed, as in the case of the internally focussed bureaucratic rules, their very existence and purported control function *presupposes* a solution to the problem of indeterminacy in question. The set of internal rules provides an infrastructure of techniques and regulations, the implementation of which would doubtless be necessary to lay the practical foundations for the achievement of any conceivable mandate in a large-scale

functionally diverse organization, whereas the set of external rules provides an equally indispensable system of detailed elaborations of the procedures to follow at the point of implementation of any conceivable mandate. In both cases, however, the relevant systems of rules provide resources and control devices to be drawn on as necessary when particular operational practices directed to particular organizational objectives are being pursued, rather than principles of selection which dictate which practices and objective should be pursued.

Turning to output standards, it should be noted that in recent years, and to varying degrees, a number of forces have adopted the technique of Policing by Objectives (PBO),⁴⁷ which involves, *inter alia*, the systematic specification, pursuit and appraisal of measurable objectives, and which therefore entails the establishment of output standards on a formal and precise footing.⁴⁸ Some of the objections to output standards detailed below are general in nature, but others may have to be reconsidered in the light of such developments, and this matter is dealt with in the final chapter. However, at the time of the research, in neither of the forces and none of the divisions under study had PBO techniques been introduced to any significant extent.⁴⁹ Output standards were of a more informal status, but nevertheless retained an important currency within the various divisional organisations.

These informal standards were of both a quantitative and a qualitative nature. General and particular crime rates and clear-up

rates, and the incidence of traffic accidents, provide examples within the former category. As indicated by senior officers, for reasons that will emerge in due course, standards within the latter category tended to focus - although not exclusively - upon more or less direct indicators of public satisfaction with the adequacy of police actions and results in certain contexts. This would include the degree of satisfaction/dissatisfaction with the speed and effectiveness with which police officers handle specific or general complaints, and the degree of fear of crime and satisfaction with the extent of police patrolling presence within a neighbourhood. It also included the degree of satisfaction with the propriety of police actions and probity of police officers, whether at a general level, concentrating on such factors as the level of approval, however calculated, of the general outward manner and demeanour of officers working within the community, or in the context of specific encounters with members of the public, the degree of respect shown by officers in these encounters and the absence of physical abuse, psychological abuse or other abuse of legal authority on their part.

In that they purport to be direct measures of organisational effectiveness, these output standards provide a less obvious manifestation of the paradox of control than do bureaucratic methods. However, in the last analysis, in the case of output methods too, and irrespective of their degree of formality and precision, the paradox remains unresolved. Since there exists no *logical* method of rendering organisational objectives or the appropriate balance between them determinate with the materials

may be gauged. As regards the problem of imprecision, simply counting the number of incidents successfully resolved in relation to, say, the oft-used charge of breach of the peace in Scots law, does not render the problem of the precise underlying meaning or purpose of such an open-textured category of offence any less intractable. (50)

Qualitative control standards are constructed or drawn upon by many senior divisional officers, and indeed in some cases endorsed by more junior officers, as ways of overcoming some of the limitations of quantitative measures and, in particular, of viewing the police mandate and their achievements in relation to it in more holistic terms. Sometimes the level of ambition expressed in this respect is fairly modest. Thus, for example, some officers perceive the degree to which the public express satisfaction with their efforts in achieving goal six - the general service function - as being indicative not only of their degree of success in respect of that goal but also as providing a 'rule of thumb' as to the ensuing degree of likelihood of the public co-operating with the police in the achievement of other objectives. The cluster of attitudes from which this perspective is forged is well represented in the following quote:

"Okay, when the wee old woman wants you to unblock her pipes, it pisses you off sometimes. But often you're the only one she trusts. She looks up to the police, you can't let her down. If I hear about any of my men trying to fob some old dear off, I'll be down on them like a ton of bricks. You've got to look on that sort of thing as an investment. She could be the one that helps you clear up a big housebreaking the next week."

presently available, the indices in question can only refer to partial features of the mandate which are themselves unrelated to and insensitive to any notion of optimal balance between the parts. Thus, even if the profound methodological problems relating to the validity of the tools and methods used by organisational members as conducive to the proper measurement of that which they set out to measure are put to one side for the moment (or, in the case of PBO techniques, to some extent resolved), there remains the more basic problem of whether that which they set out to measure is itself meaningfully and measurably related to the overall mandate.

To begin with, we may illustrate this point with reference to the quantitative output standards. These appear to be directly related to individual objectives, and although they allow comparisons of relative aggregate achievement (between different areas and time-periods), for reasons which flow directly from our critique of the nonlinearity and imprecision of police objectives, they must be seen as inadequate. As regards the problem of nonlinearity, as with the mandate itself, the use of crime rates and clear-up rates as performance indicators fails to establish a sensitive standard which is capable of distinguishing between, and of specifying the relative value and priority to be accorded to, different types or instances of police action in relation to the general objective in question - for example, between offence groups, or between more or less serious incidents and more or less significant client demands - and so of constructing an objective and independent benchmark against which the above *relative* achievements

(Sergeant, City Division)

To take a second example, high standards of propriety and probity in police behaviour, together with a climate of favourable public perceptions of these standards, are seen to provide a sensitive indicator of success. In terms of principle, the boundaries of propriety and probity are recognized by most senior officers as coterminous with the threshold beyond which the pursuit of police objectives must give way to those option rights with which such objectives inevitably run into conflict. Propriety and probity, therefore, although they do not, in and of themselves, provide a positive barometer of organisational success, speak to the significance of side-constraints in the pursuit of the mandate. And quite apart from being treated as a worthwhile aspiration in its own right, it is its additional pragmatic attractions which, for some, help to elevate the theme of probity and propriety to the status of a more direct index of successful orientation to organizational purpose. Probity and propriety are deemed to have positive consequences for the attainment of the crime control and order maintenance objectives, as the projection of an image of restraint is felt to increase the degree of respect and esteem in which policing institutions are held and the preparedness of various constituencies to accept their jurisdiction and to empathize with and help with their various tasks.⁽⁵⁾ The following comment, emanating from a discussion of contexts in which the values in question tend to be disregarded, illustrates this point:

"There's still this thing with league tables in the police. You can see it with the Support Unit, we call them the body snatchers. Even in a rough place like this they can do a tremendous amount of

damage. You spend a long time in a place building up a relationship. They come in and spoil it all in two hours on a Saturday night. You build up a bit of a relationship with the local people, more of them start coming forward, they are not so scared to report things. The police are not such bad bastards after all. Then it all breaks down. The Support Unit comes in with the macho attitude and suddenly all hell breaks loose... They are a law unto themselves, they don't stick by the rules... The local boys get tarred with the same brush, and you can see the ranks closing again."

Q: How do you account for the Support Unit's attitude?

A: Partly it's their bosses, and the numbers mentality. Of course, a lot of the types they attract to the unit are right into it anyway, they don't need any encouraging. Another thing is that they're right in and out again. They don't see the effect that it has. This is what is really vital about community policing, or whatever you want to call it. You have to live with what you did yesterday. Policing isn't just about having a barney at closing time. There's a lot more to it than that, and what you do in one area of policework can affect what you are capable of doing in another area, especially when it affects the view the public have of the force as a whole."
(sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Essentially, the 'rules of thumb' discussed above are posited only as rough guides - as sensitizing mechanisms - by officers who are less than sanguine about the prospects of discovering a more definitive barometer of optimal performance in relation to organizational objectives. However, other officers adopt a rather more ambitious form of qualitative output standard, whose plausibility appears to depend upon a commitment to a broad public service role and a belief that they, as police officers, possess inordinately developed 'social antennae'. At this less modest level, police distillations of public perceptions of the values that policework should pursue and protect are seen as effective

surrogates for the elusive equation which would strike the optimal balance between each of the individual goals. On this view, since police objectives may be defined as services to the general public rather than to any special constituency, any questions of priority and incompatibility between these objectives may only be resolved by that general public, as the sole clientele. The wishes of the clientele are to some extent registered in the form of market information, since policework is for the most part demand led and is therefore subject to consumer sovereignty. To the extent that market forces cannot answer all questions about optimal police performance in relation to the mandate, however, the gaps must be filled in through the judgement of police officers themselves. Here, algebra and economics are for the most part subordinated to intuition and sensitive evaluation. The discovery of the proper balance is, in the final analysis, an impressionistic rather than a scientific process, and is dependent upon the privileged perspective of police officers born of their specialist experience and the intimacy of their daily contact with the needs and demands of various public constituencies.

That this is a powerfully held view at least within the higher echelons of the police force, is indicated by the words of James Anderton, ex-Chief Constable of Greater Manchester, in the following contribution to the debate on the ends and accountability of the police:

"Real accountability has little to do with police committees, county councils or even parliament.

It is a matter which lies directly between the police and all the people they serve."⁽⁵²⁾

The direct nature of the relationship does not exclude utilization of various other intermediate and indirect indicators and criteria of value, but it does entail that the definitive judgement of the police officer is more than the sum of their various parts (and, in the context of the accountability debate, involves more than can be provided through any external political body in which such criteria might conceivably be decided and monitored). Thus, divining the community's wishes and finding the proper balance within the mandate will involve weighing up the various supposedly client-centred qualitative criteria together with a number of others. Insider perceptions of the level of customer satisfaction with the effectiveness, efficiency and propriety with which the various objectives are pursued, are taken into account alongside police officers' own direct observations about levels of public and private safety and the overall general stability of the environment within which the routines of civil society unfold in a particular neighbourhood. The following two views, developed along lines similar to the Anderton approach, epitomise the reasoning of some, particularly more senior, officers within the divisions researched:

"I know it sounds a bit grand, but I think of policing as more of an art than a science. There's so much more involved in it than other jobs. You have to paint your own canvass, draw on all your experience, listen to everyone, and make up you own mind. When all's said and done - within the limits of the rules, of course - we're the only ones qualified to decide what's best". (inspector, Oldtown Division)

"At the end of the day, we're here to serve the public and if we lose sight of that for one moment we're done for. I could go out onto D... Road right now and cause a riot in ten minutes. I could book all the drivers for everything under the sun and bring the traffic to a standstill in no time at all. I could book people for dropping litter, I could do all sorts, but what would I be achieving? When I came into this job at first, I thought everything was black and white. I would have booked anything that moved, including my granny. Then one day I learned, it is not as simple as that, that's not really what the public wants. I see our job as oiling the wheels of society. The public want to feel safe in their houses. They want to feel safe to walk about at night, that's what it's all about. They want us to do, a decent job, but without really intruding. We're like referees, we should be there in the background, but without putting our oar in too often. You see, they really don't want too much to do with us, they don't really like us but they can respect us. They don't mind us giving the neds a hard time, as long as we don't give Joe Punter a hard time as well. If we can show them a bit of respect, and a bit of genuine interest in their problems, then that can go a long way. At the end of the day, it's all about creating the right impression." (chief inspector, Riverside Division)

Despite the forceful expression of views such as this, the problem of indeterminacy is not resolved by the introduction of qualitative measures to complement the quantitative output controls outlined earlier. As with the quantitative controls, the problem is partly one of accuracy of measurement. However, this should not be permitted to mask the fact that, as a matter of principle, the qualitative output controls are unable to resolve the problem of indeterminacy. In particular, the attempt to use 'public opinion', and organisational perceptions thereof as a surrogate for a definitive mandate, is flawed.⁽⁵³⁾ However well-developed are the

social antennae of police officers, evidence suggests, unsurprisingly, that police and public perceptions of policing priorities are not identical. ⁽⁵⁴⁾ In any event, public opinion is not a homogeneous phenomenon. And if it is conceded that the impossibly exacting standard of universal consensus is unavailable, and the idea of majoritarianism is invoked instead, so diverse is the policing mandate, and so many different types of interest does it impinge upon, that it is implausible to expect stable majority support in all areas of police endeavour. Furthermore, if, as argued earlier, the police mission is as concerned with individual rights as with generalized public goods, an unqualified majoritarianism is an unsatisfactory basis on which found police action. Indeed, as a massive body of evidence demonstrates, many of the most deep-rooted public controversies surrounding the police, and many of the most serious challenges to their legitimacy, flow from these situations where majoritarian concerns are permitted to trump minority rights. ⁽⁵⁵⁾

(3) Chasing the impossible mandate

How does the paradox of control as elaborated above help to stimulate the cycle of instrumental relations within the divisional organization? The answer to this lies in a second apparently paradoxical fact. The failure of the two regulatory mechanisms, either independently or collectively, to provide a satisfactory purchase upon the overall mandate, tends not to discourage, but rather to encourage their excessive proliferation. In turn, this

leads to a sense of regulatory overkill among the junior ranks, a feeling of being swamped by control devices and a tendency to react in a defensive, instrumental manner.

How might we account for this? After all, would one not expect the experience of the inability of the set of bureaucratic rules and output standards to orient organisational performance towards a definitive version of the mandate resolved of its internal tensions and cured of its vagueness and utopian pretensions, to lead senior officers to a more modest appraisal or reappraisal of the value of these mechanisms? Would one not expect them to conclude that there exists a ceiling to the utility of the two general regulatory mechanisms beyond which further reliance upon them might be subject to the law of diminishing returns? Nevertheless, there are a number of possible reasons why, despite these strong caveats, senior officers continue to chase the impossible mandate.

In the first place, it might be that the imposition of a formidable range of regulatory mechanisms is quite consistent with an awareness of the fact that such a strategy can never fully succeed on its own terms, and that it is fated to reflect the tensions and inordinate demands implicit in the indeterminate mandate itself. 'Impossibilism' might simply be a strategic device - the setting of harsh or unrealistic standards being rationalised as a means of ensuring that actual performance is optimized. As one senior officer put it:

"It's the Jock Wallace motto. 'SS' Ask for 150%
and you might just get 100% effort. It's the only

way to keep the cops on their toes." (Chief
Inspector, Oldtown Division)

However, a strategy of impossibilism would be bound to be at least partially counterproductive. The attempt to achieve the impossible, however powerful a motivator it might be, to some extent involves both its perpetrators and those who are bound to endeavour to give effect to it in what is a waste of time and resources. Furthermore, use of the device of regulatory saturation in order to maximise the power capacity inherent in one's role is none other than 'management by fear', an example of the pursuit of instrumental relations *par excellence*, and one which is likely to invite the reciprocation of instrumental behaviour by the other party.

In any event, and perhaps because of these unattractive implications, there appeared to be very few unqualified adherents of the Jock Wallace management philosophy within the research forces. To the extent that strains of this approach were evident, they appeared to be coupled with a less than fulsome awareness of the objective limitations of reliance on bureaucratic rules and output standards. In other words, even where some support was expressed for a draconian régime of instrumentally-backed controls simply 'to keep the cops on their toes', it tended to dovetail with an underappreciation of the problems involved in such an approach.

More generally, this underappreciation of the problems involved in their use, appeared to provide a more plausible explanation for

the sustained faith of senior officers in the two general sets of regulatory mechanisms. But why should senior officers misconstrue or fail to fully appreciate the root cause of the limitations of the *methodologies* of direction and control available to them?

In a general sense, the sense of constraint referred to earlier - of being inundated by a variety of external pressures - appears to play its part here. The problems involved in meeting diverse and sometimes irreconcilable external demands do not disappear just because the mechanisms available to cope with these demands are not fully up to the task. 'More of the same' might appear the obvious option simply because the problems remain pressing, and no alternative coping strategies seem to be available. Further, the sense of being inundated by demands encourages management "by the seat of the pants",⁽⁵⁷⁾ the adoption of a predominantly reactive profile within which little time presents itself or is put aside for more considered reflection on one's work. This can lead to a "failure to focus"⁽⁵⁸⁾ on the underlying nature and problems of the managerial role, and thus to a failure to explore alternative possibilities:

"you seem to spend your whole time reacting to things in this job, just keeping things going as best you can. I went to one of these management courses where they kept asking us when did we take time to think about our job overall or how well we were doing it. Answer - when we are on management courses!" (superintendent, Oldtown Division)

However, if such myopic, and perhaps wishful thinking is to flourish, more is required than the negative pressures alluded to above. In addition, a context of ideas and experience which positively encourages such thinking is necessary. Such a context, it is argued, is supplied through certain features of the two general types of regulatory mechanism and of the environment in which they operate, which have not as yet been fully explored.

If, for convenience of exposition, we return first to the output standards, given their generic inability to resolve the problem of indeterminacy and to identify and procure optimal levels of performance, why are they nevertheless persisted with enthusiastically? Together with, on the one hand, their enduring attraction as intermediate devices of control well adapted to an environment in which the monitoring of performance performance must be mainly indirect, and on the other, the negative factors cited above, a significant reason lies in the disproportionate emphasis placed upon *measurement problems* within the community of senior managers when contemplating output standards.

The measurement of police effectiveness is notoriously problematical.⁽⁵⁹⁾ One problem is that of assessing measured outputs in their wider social context. How does one isolate police inputs, and relate them in a linear fashion to outputs? Many variables influence levels of crime and public order, and it is difficult to control for these other influences when endeavouring to assess police impact separately.⁽⁶⁰⁾ More generally, the actual process of

generating such output measures in the first place also raises difficulties. How is one to ensure accurate and tangible measures? Quantification of crime-levels and detection rates does not guarantee accurate measurement on account, *inter alia*, of the dark figure of unreported crime and the volatile nature of reporting trends, while other barometers of effectiveness, such as levels of public order, simply defy attempts at quantification. (51)

Nevertheless, in the case of both qualitative and quantitative controls standards, the question of principle - the problem of indeterminacy - remains logically prior to the problem of measurement, and indeed, in the case of the problem of generating accurate and tangible forms of measurement, the difficulties and uncertainties involved flow directly from the difficulties and uncertainties of the indeterminate mandate itself. Yet despite this, and indeed partly on account of the close connections between the two issues, the problem of measurement tends to obscure the deeper question of principle.

In the case of quantitative standards, it was the 'problem of numbers' that provided the most immediate form in which the difficulty of relating such standards to the definitive pursuit of the mandate tended to manifest itself to the more senior officers within the divisions. Apart from the fact that it provided a tangible and well-rehearsed issue with which to grapple, another reason for concentration on the numbers' problem in this context lay - and lies generally - in its association with an image of neutral

expertise. As Hall and others have argued, statistics and statistically informed arguments perform a significant ideological function. They seem to ground otherwise free-floating impressions in the "incontrovertible soil...of *hard facts*",⁽⁶²⁾ and thus underline the sense of authority experienced and conveyed by their users. Accordingly, while it has been observed that senior police officers are not slow to resort to more impressionistic judgements when the circumstances so demand, where quantification of an issue is possible a more statistical form of *discourse* holds strong attractions.⁽⁶³⁾ As with the élites of other institutions similarly sensitive to problems of control and legitimacy, if a numerical element is seen to be involved in the identification and conceptualization of a problem, the key to its solution may be deemed to lie in calculations which rest upon more precise measurement of the issues at stake, rather than, as is part and parcel of the problem of indeterminacy and its solution, in recognizing the need for value judgements to be made between incommensurable goods and aspirations. This tendency for analysis of the value and deficiencies of quantitative standards to be short-circuited, and not to move beyond the numbers question, is well illustrated in the following exchange, in which the respondent appears to fall into the same trap as those whom he criticizes:

"I remember my old boss in 'F' Division used to go on about it being the biggest division in the force and worst from a policing point of view because it had most crime reported. Go and see his depute, and he would tell you it was the best division in the force because the big crime figures meant that the boys on the street were doing their job, sniffing about, getting involved in things and generally discovering what was going on. Don't tell me statistics don't lie after

that. One was drawing one set of conclusions and the other a completely different set on the same set of figures.

Q: Was either drawing the correct conclusion?

A: No, there was something in what both of them said. But you need to look at the clear-up rates, area returns, even beat returns, before you get the full picture of what the figures mean and get the answer to where the crime-fighting priorities in a division should lie." (inspector, Riverside Division)

In the case of the qualitative standards - resort to which, as indicated, is in part due to the attempt to confront the mandate from a more holistic perspective and the absence of any convenient statistical register to support these broader judgements - the issue of measurement again provides a more immediate frame of reference. Just as with the quantitative standards, methodological and measurement questions tend to move centre-stage. Consider, for example, the following comments of a senior officer on the problems of measuring public opinion:

"We're here to reflect public opinion. It's not always easy. Depending upon what meeting you attend, or what papers you read, or what visitors knock on the door, you get a different view.

Q: You're saying it's not easy. Is it not actually impossible? Is there really any such thing as a recognizable mainstream public opinion when it comes to policing?

A: I think there is. It's easy for things like murder. At other times it's harder to find. Different people want different things but there is always a balance to be found if you keep your ear to the ground and try to please as many people as you can while offending as few people as you can. That's what policing by consent is. It's hard to gauge it, and even harder for the men to achieve it, but I don't think it's impossible. (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

Thus, both the qualitative and the quantitative output standards throw up problems of measurement of sufficient intensity and complexity to dominate the agenda of those who would use them. Preoccupation with the generation of accurate and tangible measures for particular standards masks the problem of the validity of these standards, of whether they themselves are precisely and meaningfully related to some overall sense of purpose and of whether levels of achievement in terms of these standards constitute precise and meaningful contributions to the achievement of that optimally balanced sense of purpose. In this respect, the following remark, mistaking the problem of validity for one of accuracy, is typical and apposite.

"The problem in this job is that we never know how well we are actually doing. We're not like Marks & Spencers, you know, its not just a question of looking at the cash you've got in the bank at the end of the day. It makes it very difficult... *You know what your job is supposed to be but you never know how well you are doing it.*" [emphasis added] (chief inspector, City Division)

The implications of this type of attitude are clear. If it is merely the measurement tools which these various output standards embrace which are seen as skewed or crude or otherwise incomplete or defective, and the logical impossibility of these ever providing a definitive series of directions towards and index of success in relation to an indefinite mandate is not appreciated, then the most obvious response, rather than to re-examine the indeterminate core, is to embrace and develop these tools as a more comprehensive package. That is, it may be felt that the shortcomings of each

considered individually may be capable of mitigation or rectification if blended with the others:

"You hear a lot of moaning at the amount of information which is thrown at us in this job. But for my rank, information is at a premium. For me to do my job right I've got to look at everything. I've got to look at the crime and offence figures, the arrest rates for different offences over time and between different shifts, the complaints made against us, and just as important - though you never hear about it - the letters of commendation that the police get from members of the public. I've got to look at the attitudes of the public to us, right down to the different schemes and areas. I've got to listen to all the representative bodies. It's only by pulling that lot together and seeing the trends that I can hope to keep this place on course and ensure that we do a good job. (superintendent, Riverside Division)

If we switch focus to the bureaucratic rules, for all their benefits as techniques of detailed co-ordination and control, as regards the overall mandate, they are, as we have seen, merely means to an end. In these wider terms, their value as a policy guide can be no greater than that of the mandate itself, and their import necessarily reflects the uncertainties, tensions and implausibilities of the latter. Nevertheless, as with the output standards, there is a propensity for such rules to retain their precious currency in the eyes of senior ranks despite their ultimate limitations in terms of the mandate, and their tendency to echo, and thus perhaps exacerbate, its deficiencies.

In part, this may be a manifestation of the myopic and wishful thinking referred to earlier. Bureaucratic rules may be valued as

ends in themselves. Rather than being seen as impotent before the problem of indeterminacy, the existence and continuous promulgation of rules may to some extent provide a sense of security in the face of the uncertainties and tensions which indeterminacy induces. By regarding the various interlocking chains of bureaucratic rules as sufficient unto themselves, these wider problems may be made less unpalatable, and indeed the belief may be nurtured that the existence and operation of this set of regulatory mechanisms is in itself indicative that the mandate is in fact being comprehensively, competently and confidently pursued.

A second factor contributing to the continuing attractiveness of bureaucratic rules is that the uncertainties and tensions of the impossible mandate, as well as presenting problems of principle at the systemic level, also throw up a continuous flow of detailed problems to which bureaucratic rules may be viewed as solutions, or at least as coping mechanisms. More closely rationalized procedures and more systematic dissemination of best practice in respect of these activities which are predictable and feasible, and more vigorously regulated reporting relationships and more detailed forms of documentation in respect of these activities which may reflect tensions within the mandate, or between police objectives and other social goods, may be promulgated and pursued in response to these manifold problems, so stimulating "a problem-organization-problem-more-organization cycle of bureaucratic growth". (54)

It is by reference to these two currents of development, that we may appreciate Manning's depiction of the lop-sided nature of the development of the forms of police organization:

"Historically, it has been easier to create internal rules of ever increasing specificity than to create working rules or policies meant to govern conduct in the community. There is a profound lack of guidance supplied and specific rules bearing on the doing of policework are absent... The complexity of internal rules stands in ironic contrast to the paucity of written standards and clearly articulated policies for assessing adequate performance of the role when in contact with the public." (ES)

Further, the loyalty of senior officers to bureaucratic rules is not incompatible with their reliance upon output standards. Rather, a number of considerations encourage them to perceive a neat symbiosis between the two types of mechanism, and to favour the pursuit of both without mutual prejudice. In part, this is in consequence of the general limitations of both types of standard. As each is obdurately pursued as a package not merely despite, but *because of* the limitations of its various *constituent* elements, and as the underlying dynamic is the same in both cases, namely the search for a sense of direction and control in pursuit of the impossible mandate, then the 'more of the same' philosophy - the urge to intensify existing measures rather than to examine their underlying soundness - will encourage a sense that the application of the two packages in combination is bound to produce a network of control which is at once larger and no less integrated, and thus more effective, than if either package was pursued at the expense of the

other. Thus, on the one hand, the fact that the indiscriminate character of the set of bureaucratic rules - their inability to provide a sense of overall priority and balance to which their various particular instruments are directed - merely mirrors and reinforces the similar lack of ultimate direction within the set of output standards, entails that their application as an integrated network will in practice reinforce the propensity of each package to transcribe problems of policy choice and priority onto the domain of everyday operational activity. On the other hand, however, just because the necessary principles of selection have been left out of both sides of the equation, this may give rise to a perception of spurious correspondence between the two which cloaks these dysfunctional effects:

Q: When you talked about your problems and your priorities you suggested that it was very important to enforce the standing orders as much as possible, but that it was also important that you got concrete results, in terms of arrests, clear-ups, keeping the streets and the housing estates clear at night, etc., Some of the sergeants and constables I have spoken to would say that you can't have the best of both worlds. What would you say to that?

A: "I don't see a huge problem. Nobody's perfect but the point is that the standing orders are usually a help, not a hindrance. They tell you how to do things. It's not as if they're all up in noddyland, and real policing is about something else. These rules are the result of years of experience. They help you get results."
(inspector, Newtown Division)

" you get bookworms in this job, and then you get the action-men who say forget the rules. They're both right, and they're both wrong. You can no more police by the book than you can ignore it completely... The book isn't perfect, but the other way is to do what public opinion demands... or what you think it wants, and keep the streets safe whatever way you can. But public opinion

isn't perfect either. I reckon that the only way is to pull the two together, listen to what the public wants but always keep your Bible by your side too. Usually you'll find that you can respect both." (inspector, Oldtown Division)

"a good policeman is one who follows the rules and achieves results. That's not being naive, that's being professional. (inspector, Oldtown Division)

Apart from this general sense of correspondence, the belief amongst some senior officers as to the mutually reinforcing characteristics of the two types of regulatory mechanism is reinforced by their perception of certain more specific connections between particular types of rule-following on the one hand and the achievement of organizational goals and the satisfaction of output measures on the other. Thus, if we examine the externally focused bureaucratic rules, and in particular the procedural rules of law, the requirement of procedural correctness in law is a condition of success in translating crime detections into convictions in court, and thus of direct instrumental significance in maximizing the quantitative output standard represented in clear-up rates. A close correspondence is also perceived to exist between these legal and associated bureaucratic rules and another output standard, namely the qualitative standard represented by adherence to forms of practice which do not overreach the boundaries of propriety and encroach upon other individual and public goods, and which are seen accordingly as providing symbolic affirmation of the beneficence of policing institutions. This follows from our earlier point that the law relating to police powers represents the most significant

institutional manifestation of the boundaries between policing values and other social values.

If we draw these themes together, the intimacy of referential association between, on the one hand, procedural correctness, and on the other, both the successful negotiation of the 'legal obstacle-course' and the achievement of high standards of propriety, is such that the first may be seen as a convenient proxy for the other two. (66) The unfolding of this chain of signification is illustrated in the following comment:

"You get a few moans from some of the men about paperwork and sticking to deadlines. We have our own rules about getting police reports and other stuff out to the Fiscal by a certain date. Down in the bar we've got screeds of these forms for accused persons. In the inquiry room, you'll have seen the preliminary Sudden Death Reports which the cop has to fill in before passing onto the Inquiry Branch itself for processing. All of these things are necessary. The job would fall apart if we didn't have them now. And it's not just for keeping ourselves right or for keeping us, the bosses, happy. It's about doing what you're paid to do, serving the public... and trying to make sure neds get locked up. You see, if we keep ourselves right in here, then the rest automatically falls into place, it means we're doing our job for the public. There's no conflict between the two, and anyone who suggests there is is just a lazy bastard looking for an excuse!"
(superintendent, Riverside Division)

The superintendent's closing salvo also exemplifies how individual deviance - the pursuit of non-organizational objectives - may be invoked alongside measurement problems in explaining the difficulties encountered in implementing control standards

- satisfactorily. Of course, as argued earlier, this is not to deny that the control problem involved in suppressing non-organisational interests is a genuine one, and one which is accentuated by particular features of the police organisation. However, as with measurement problems, its very accessibility as a rationale for the limited effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms means that it is disproportionately relied upon to the neglect of the more fundamental problem of indeterminacy. Thus, it may occupy the foreground even in those cases where the problem is one of genuine divergence of interpretation over the meaning of organisational objectives or genuine difficulty in giving effect to the range of these. Consider the differences in outlook expressed in the following two comments by an inspector and a constable respectively:

"It's only human nature. The men on the street have a lot of freedom, they're not under constant supervision. Some are bound to abuse it, and that is why we have try every way we can to keep on top of things. It doesn't make us bastards, just realists." (inspector, Newtown Division)

"What gets me is that is that you're treated like a naughty schoolboy. Part of my job, as I see it, is getting in with the local shopkeepers and businessmen. That means that I've got to hang about their shops once in a while, get to know them, get wee snippets of information. Now, if I was sitting having a cup of tea and the chief inspector happened to go past in his car and saw me, do you think he would let it pass? Would he hell! There would be questions, and if he happened to be the type of boss who didn't agree with that way of doing things, he would have me down as a dosser, there would be no thought that I was maybe just trying to do the job my way..." (constable, Riverside Division)

In summary then, although regulatory mechanisms directed towards the pursuit of an indeterminate mandate cannot cure defects in the latter and are thus bound to produce results which do not satisfy any meaningful sense of optimal performance, the preoccupation of senior officers with the measurement problems inherent in output standards and with the efficient, orderly and expedient properties of bureaucratic rules, their tendency to read a false or exaggerated integrity into the relationship between these two types of regulatory mechanism, and finally, their emphasis upon the subversive potential of non-organizational interests, tend to obscure the deep structure of the problem of indeterminacy. Instead, the green light is signalled for the more intensive application of the existing régime of control. In consequence, this leads to the problem of *regulatory overkill*. Junior officers find it difficult to cope with the sheer volume of regulatory mechanisms imposed upon them, with the exacting standards which many of these demand, and also with the fact that they tend to reflect aspirations which are in some tension with one another.

Further, two additional features of the problem of regulatory overkill as it is experienced by junior officers tend to reinforce the feelings of frustration and alienation that it generates. First, since many regulatory mechanisms cannot boast strong normative foundations in law, feelings of oppression in the face of excessive administrative demands in many cases remain unmitigated by any sense of common commitment to the normative values

underpinning such demands.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The 'Dirty Harry' problem may involve a genuine moral dilemma, but many other administratively imposed dilemmas are seen by the lower ranks as of a meaner and more petty calibre. Nor, in the second place, are such administratively imposed dilemmas perceived as by any means exclusively externally generated. In the case, say, of a road traffic accident inquiry form, junior officers may carp at the fact that the time taken to complete it satisfactorily is at the expense of other more pressing operational duties. Yet there may be some consolation in their appreciating that much of the data required is for external purposes, being necessary to satisfy the demands of external agencies charged with collating statistics on accident trends. Thus, the exercise may be construed as part of the drama of bureaucratic striving referred to earlier, an unspoken agreement between the ranks to provide sufficient 'institutional display' to appease powerful external groups. However, because the mandate chasing activities of their senior officers cause them to generate many regulatory mechanisms and administrative demands of their own which bear no obvious relationship to external pressures, such a consolation is often not available to junior officers. In such circumstances, senior officers may be held responsible for the gratuitous imposition of additional red tape. They, rather than outsiders, may be viewed as the 'mean and petty bureaucrats', and they, rather than outsiders, may be the focus of resentment.

Thus, the complaints of junior officers as regards the problem of regulatory overkill may take a number of forms. One criticism may be that output standards are in conflict with one another:

"It's impossible in this job. You never know whether you're coming or going. Take these Project Cops we've got up in scheme X. They've been here since the Community Projects started. But at one time there were four of them, now there are only two. There's no denying it, people felt a lot better up there when we were doing a lot of foot patrols. The thing is, I don't really know whether we were preventing much crime or catching a lot more neds. You see up there there's nothing to steal, nothing worth breaking into anybody's house for, except, that is, for copper boilers. That's our biggest crime. People break into empty houses for them, because that's the only thing of any value. You still get ... stabbings and serious assaults up there, because in a place like that you'll still get a fair percentage of nutters who'll have a go at each other whether you're about or not. So, you see, you're not really getting any more or less crime up there now that we've only got two men on the project.

Q: Why were the numbers on the project reduced?

A: I was just coming to that. Where the extra men were put when they came off the project was the town centre... We were getting a lot of complaints from there, from the shopkeepers about broken windows mostly. Now, that was something we could do something about and we did do something about. By putting a foot man on there at nights we cut it out completely. But this is where you can't win in this job. While we're getting the town centre sorted out with our extra man from the project onto the shift, there are all sorts of complaints in scheme X that there are no men on the beat any longer. The local councillor complains to the gaffer and he tells us to put extra cover there. When you try to say anything about it he just comes back at you and says that we have a man extra from what we used to have, and that we should be able to manage without him because we coped for years. But that's the whole bloody point, we didn't cope, and we know damn fine that if we neglect the town centre we'll get trouble down there again, and then the boss will be on our backs about that too. Look, I'm not saying that the people down in scheme X are all wasters and not worth bothering about, there are

-

some good people down there and they are entitled to a decent life too. If it's going to make people feel better we should be prepared to show the flag, even though as I've just been saying it doesn't make much damn difference to the pattern of crime in the area. It's just that we can't be in two places at once, and sometimes I don't think the gaffers really appreciate it". (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Another criticism may be that a particular output standard is particularly onerously applied, in light of the plethora of other regulatory mechanisms which have to be contended with.

"Don't let anyone tell you any different, you still get bodycounts in the force. All you need is a wee word from the boss about the crime figures for the month rubbing up the inspector, and, bingo, suddenly you can be out looking for pissers, or going round the carparks. All right, you can have a choice out there on the street, depending on what sort of punter you're dealing with and whether there are witnesses and all that, but at the end of the day you have to deliver something, and that is what the men are thinking about half the time. You don't have a lot of choice in the matter, especially when you are trying to do everything else that is demanded and trying to keep your nose clean at the same time. Take inspector X that's just come down here. He was up at Y sub-division for years before..., some of the stories you hear about him! I think a lot lived in fear of him. One of the boys was telling me that he used to have a sweep on the nightshift over who was going to be the first to bring in a ned. Half the young lads would be falling over themselves to bring the first one in. Okay, if you ask him about it he would say that it was just a laugh, something to keep them on their toes and add a bit of interest to the proceedings, but I know his type. It wouldn't seem that bloody funny to the twenty-year-old being shouted at that it wasn't worth anybody's while drawing his name out of the hat because he couldn't catch a cold in the Arctic. You see, he would half mean it, because that's the only way his type knows. He was there to trip the cops up and keep them on their toes, using whatever means at his disposal... It means the cop on the street loses his sense of

independent judgement, he's always looking over his shoulder, thinking about what the top brass will make of it." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Or a tension between bureaucratic rules and output standards may cause operational dilemmas.

"There's so many forms in this job nowadays, you can't cope with them all, you have to make a choice as to where your priorities lie. Take one example, right, we've got a licensing branch in this division, which is headed up by what used to be known as the Pub sergeant, for exactly the reasons that you're thinking! A few years back, they brought in this form for the cops to record every time they went into a public house. The idea was that the Licensing Branch could build up a picture of what the pub was like so that they could make recommendations to the next Licensing Board. Well, of course, as a result of this cops either stopped going into pubs, or if they did, they did it off their own bat and kept quiet about it. And that wasn't because they were bevying, it was because they couldn't be bothered filling in another form! I mean, I'm always on at them to submit their reports to the PF, or their juveniles, or anything else that's really important. Hand on heart, I can't go on at them the same way to submit these forms. Okay, licensing is a police function... we've got a legal duty to advise the licensing board, but it isn't really the street cop's job, and no-one can tell me that it's more important than catching crooks. There are so many forms, and rules and procedures, you've got to try to show a bit of discretion. If you don't something is bound to give, and the cops will just ignore some of the crap that's thrown at them." (sergeant, Riverside Division)

Or, as illustrated by these two final comments from a sergeant and constable respectively, complaints may focus upon the most general dimension of the problem of regulatory overkill - the sheer range of

regulatory mechanisms which are applied and the overall sense of constraint to which this gives rise:

"It really is a paper mountain now, this job. You need a form to fill in a form. When they started the daily briefing here last year, they said that it would mean less shuffling and shifting of paper for us sergeants, because the men would be mustering here rather than at their boxes and so we wouldn't need to act as postmen anymore. Well, it doesn't seem to make any difference, we're still bogged down, and so are the men. You see more of them in here writing now that they don't use their boxes so much, and the amount of time which is lost on it is frightening. They don't have time to do their jobs any more. And when they do go out, because it is the city centre they're being treated as tourist guides and getting asked to do all the shitty jobs of the day. They're getting diverted to do all sorts of crap when they've probably got a whole number of set complaints and errands to attend to. You get so many of the snobs as well, being the city centre, that if you are a bit short with them it's a letter of complaint to the chief and it's all hell to pay. And of course, because I've got so much on my plate, I can't get out there as often as I would like to stop these situations arising with some of the younger cops. The thing is, we're always in the wrong, as far as the bosses are concerned. They'll always find some way to trip you up, and it's because you have to spend so much time avoiding the obstacles they throw at you, that you end up slipping up over something."
(sergeant, City Division)

"Tango, Julia, Foxtrot, you must have heard that on your travels. It means The Job's Fucked nowadays. That's my motto. The days when you got any leeway, any choice in what you do, are gone. The job's fucked because no-one, including the bosses, will let us cops on the street do it."
(constable, Oldtown Division)

(4) A machine which runs off course

The manner in which defects in the machine model as it applies to the police bureaucracy encourage instrumental patterns of action thus becomes apparent. To begin with, certain generic defects within the hardware, highlighted by certain particular features of the social organisation of policework, entail that the objective possibility of non-organisational ends being pursued is accentuated, and this in turn increases the possibility of organisational conflict and the consequent generation of instrumental relations. Further, a second and more profound flaw in the operation of the machine model, the lack of a determinate set of objectives to which the machine can be effectively programmed, entails that the police are confronted with an impossible mandate and an implausible set of public expectations. As they reflect the tensions and contradictions within the mandate, the control and co-ordination devices used by senior officers to achieve optimal performance themselves set up formidable standards which cannot all be satisfactorily realized. However, senior police officers tend to interpret past and present deficiencies, not in terms of the excessive and insufficiently precise ambition of the overall enterprise, but in terms of more modest measurement difficulties and of the vulnerability of the police organisation to the other (and for them much more perceptible) defect in the machine model, namely the intrusion of non-organisational interests of lower participants. These factors, underpinned and reinforced by the persistent and

pressing nature of the external demands upon senior officers, the fact that there are no alternative solutions within their gift, the continuing functional and symbolic allure of bureaucratic rules, and the perceived strong compatibility of these rules with output standards, lead to a continuing emphasis on a wide range of regulatory mechanisms. In turn, this produces regulatory overkill, sergeants and constables believing their jobs to be mortgaged to an unrealistic set of demands and an unnecessary excess of rules, procedures, standards and checks aimed to monitor their achievements in relation to these demands. Accordingly, a spiral of unrealistic demands and unfulfilled expectations is set in motion. An instrumental orientation is encouraged both on the part of senior officers attempting to finesse their formal and informal control standards and obtain satisfaction in terms of organisational performance from a workforce some of whom they view as recalcitrant, undermotivated and inefficient, and on the part of junior officers attempting to defend their own conceptions of feasible and competent performance against these attitudes and strategies.

C. REINFORCING THE INSTRUMENTAL CLIMATE: THE EMPATHY GAP

Just as the thought experiment which provided the springboard for the substantive inquiry undertaken in the previous section was premised, *inter alia*, upon a high level of general commitment amongst all ranks to the ends of policing, it is important to note that the critique offered above does not undermine this particular

premiss. Of course, the problem of non-conformity plays its part, but its greatest significance does not lie in a claim that the objective tendency towards self-interested behaviour is any greater in the police organisation than elsewhere, but rather in the various ways in which this problem and the perceptions associated with it relate to the wider problem of indeterminacy. Thus, underlining its powerful and self-propagating nature, the dysfunctional cycle of police bureaucracy and its attendant instrumental dynamic may be seen to unfold *despite* the best intentions of many organizational participants.

In this final section, we identify a number of cultural themes which dovetail with the above structural factors to reinforce further the instrumental dynamic. Again, however, a key characteristic of this secondary dynamic is its imperviousness to the good intentions of individual organisational actors. The divisions and mutually instrumental orientations described in this section are not - *contra* the crude version of the two cultures thesis set out in chapter two - a direct function of radically divergent cultural experiences and life-worlds, nor, consequently, of strongly opposed normative orientations. Instead, it is an ironic theme running through this section that the instrumental dynamic is nurtured despite the fabric of common or similar experience joining senior to junior ranks and instilling in both a sense of commitment to collective, organisational ends, and indeed, that in some respects this very cultural overlap may even contribute to the spiral of instrumentalism.

If we look more generally at the contents of this section, whereas the arguments in the previous section trace the manner in which the operation of the police bureaucratic machine gives rise to a *feasibility gap* between senior and junior divisional staff in terms of their respective conceptions of the performances which that machine will bear, the purpose of the arguments which follow is to demonstrate how a number of cultural factors and processes widen the perceptual gulf. From this broader perspective, it is argued, the feasibility gap may be viewed as only one, albeit fundamental, aspect of a more general *empathy gap* between the ranks - an inability or unwillingness on the part of members of either of the two major constituencies to draw upon their experience and wider knowledge and thus to project themselves fully into the role of members of the other constituency, and a consequent propensity to consolidate instrumental patterns of relations at the expense of normative patterns.

(1) **Dinosaurs and high-flyers.**

As indicated, any attempt to ground a cultural dynamic alongside the foredescribed structural dynamic in accounting for patterns of instrumentalism within divisional organisation must begin by acknowledging the arguments which were levelled against the crude version of the two cultures thesis in chapter two. In particular, it must explain why, despite senior officers' previous experience in junior ranks, they may nevertheless find themselves seriously at odds with junior ranks as regards the role demands of

the latter group. Part of the answer, as elaborated in the previous section, lies in the preoccupation of senior officers with a different set of internal and external pressures in their present roles, and their consequent tendency to shape these priorities and their sense of what is necessary and feasible in pursuit of these priorities, in terms of these background pressures. Indeed, these were factors which were acknowledged by all ranks to some extent when asked whether, and if so, why the more senior divisional officers were 'out of touch' with operational needs. (52) However, if we turn to the other factors which were invoked to explain the process of cultural distancing, these concerned not the demands implicit in senior officers' present roles, but rather doubts over the continuing utility of their experience in previous roles. These answers, upon which we concentrate here, are noteworthy not only in their substance but also in terms of the degree of disagreement between the two major constituencies which they reveal. Thus, the element of cross-rank consensus available in respect of the role-related arguments disappears in respect of the experience-related answers. For junior managerial ranks, and sergeants in particular, it will be recalled, the experience-related factors were the most significant in explaining disparities of perspective between them and senior divisional officers, whereas for senior divisional officers, in vivid contrast, they were accorded no significance whatever.

As regards the substance of the relevant charges, two distinct forms of malaise were identified by junior officers. On the one

hand, it was argued that although many senior officers might have spent a considerable amount of time at each of the earlier operational staging posts in the course of their journey through the ranks, the social environments in which they honed their operational skills had altered markedly, so rendering the lessons culled from their experience at least partially obsolescent. On the other hand, it was argued that while their operational knowledge might be fresher than that of the 'dinosaurs', the understanding of the 'high-flyers' - those officers who had risen more quickly through the ranks - of the nature of the problems experienced in the operational ranks in a contemporary context was seriously curtailed on account of the restricted duration and depth of their experience.

How, if at all, does this contrast in perceptions contribute to the empathy gap between senior and junior ranks? To begin with, to the extent that the views of junior officers are justified, they speak to a palpable gulf in perceptions as to the nature of operational work, and one which, as the evidence suggests, is hardened by the failure of senior officers to make any concessions as to the possible fallibility of their own rarified perspectives on operational matters. Of course, it may be that the accounts of junior officers exaggerate the problem, and the neat manner in which they sweep aside the value of these two distinct operational profiles with the one dismissive brush, despite the fact that the patterns which they exhibit are in fact mirror opposites, reinforces this caveat. Nevertheless, *ex facie*, there would appear to be a kernel of truth in their observations, and this is underlined by the

fact that the wholesale dismissal of such a possibility by senior officers would appear to be motivated by factors and to proceed through forms of justification which distort their own perceptions.

In the case of the dinosaurs, the pattern of their career and their ensuing sense of having 'come up the hard way', together with their awareness of the general significance of operational experience in bolstering their professional authority⁽⁶³⁾, suggests that their sense of occupational self-esteem will probably have continued to be defined to a large extent in terms of the possession of operational craft skills, and that they will be disinclined to devalue this cultural capital by suggesting that the experiences and the skills upon which it is based are outmoded. Further, since senior officers with long service are less likely to have been physically mobile during the process of their advancement than the high-flyers,⁽⁷⁰⁾ and are more likely to have had lengthy operational experience in the setting of their present managerial role, there is a tendency for the element of physical continuity and familiarity of work environment to mask its cultural discontinuity. As illustrations of these points, consider the following two quotes of officers from Newtown division, the first from a sergeant concerning his superintendent, and the second from that same superintendent concerning his sergeants generally:

"This place is definitely the pressure cooker in this division, has been for years. But the superintendent doesn't understand this. He's got this famous line about how you could police X with a sergeant and two men on a Friday night. It used to be done when he was a sergeant, but that was over 20 years ago now. The place is five times bigger now than it was then. Its like Apache

territory out there on a Friday night now. But he's got this romantic idea that he could still go out there and run the show, and that because we can't we're not real men or something like that. But I'm telling you, if he went out with only his two men tonight, he would get f...ing scalped!"
(sergeant, Newtown Division)

Q: "In the last analysis though, do you not think that the range of day-to-day problems experienced by today's sergeant is greater than in your day, but that the powers available to him have decreased and that, accordingly, he requires a greater degree of institutional support?"

A: "Things have changed. Some old problems disappear, some new ones appear. It is certainly not an easy job nowadays, but it wasn't in my day either. At the end of the day, though, it's all down to your own personality. I don't mind listening to a sergeant's grievances, but they have to take responsibility when all's said and done, and a lot nowadays just aren't prepared to do so. When I was made burgh sergeant at X all these years ago I was the youngest sergeant in the county, and also the proudest. I wasn't the best then, but within a few years I was, because I was always prepared to take responsibility. You see it has nothing to do with whether you can allocate overtime or what not. It comes down to your ability to impose yourself on the men and gain their respect. You'll never change that, but too many are ready to pass the buck nowadays."
(superintendent, Newtown Division)

For the high-flyers, too, cultural discontinuity may be masked by territorial continuity. However, for them, this line of reasoning is at once less marked with pitfalls than in the case of the dinosaurs, yet also less attractive. Their comparatively short career span entails that the dangers of cultural lag are less obvious, but also that the cultural capital gained through past experience is less potentially impressive, and less likely to provide solid grounds for rejecting the contention that they are out of touch with operational needs. And this last point is further reinforced if, as is likely to be the case with officers who are

marked out early in their career as capable of attaining senior rank, such prior experience as they have is unusually disparate in terms of function and location. Thus, faced with their own comparative operational inexperience, high flyers are required to find other justifications for asserting that they nevertheless remain in touch with the demands of operational work.

These justifications tend to centre round the idea of uniformity. We have already discussed the deep-rooted cultural significance of this theme within the police organisation, and have indicated that its connotations are often negative.⁽⁷⁾ In the present context, however, it is invoked in a positive manner. In particular, the aspect of uniformity accentuated by the upwardly mobile is that represented by common rules and procedures, for it is the availability and applicability of these which allows high-flyers to dismiss their relative operational inexperience as a serious impediment to grasping the realities and working imperatives of operational practice in a particular time and place:

"Yes, I've been all over the place in this job. I've been in X [rural area], then 3 different Y [city] divisions, and now back out here. But it really doesn't bother me, it doesn't make a lot of difference. Force Standing Orders apply wherever you are. The rules are the same, and that is everybody's Bible nowadays."

Q: "But surely that is not entirely true. Is it not the case that there is a large section of the Force Standing Orders which deals with one half of the force - the city and town areas - and another section which is applicable to the rural areas?"

A: "You'll still get people talking about that, but really it is insignificant. For all intents and purposes it is the same. Okay, we don't have inquiry branches out here like they do in the city

and so we have different procedures for the cops dealing with things like Sudden Deaths. But that is just a procedural thing. It doesn't cause a problem for me. You just look it up in the book and you know what to do. There's a lot of people still want there to be a big difference, for their own reasons. Regionalization is the best thing that ever happened though. You can go anywhere and pick up the pieces of the job right away. If that's not progress, what is?" (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

The image projected here is of the staples of operational policework as consisting of activities which, contextual nuances notwithstanding, are basically reducible to a number of universal precepts. As such, these activities may be subsumed under general rules, and so - completing the cycle of self-justification - are best understood and applied by those who best understand the relevant rules - none other than the high-flyers themselves.

Thus, both dinosaurs and high-flyers tend to harness vocabularies of justification and of explanation which are available within the organizational culture ⁽⁷²⁾ in such a manner as to deny to themselves and others the possibility that their operational experience is deficient in ways that diminish their understanding of contemporary operational practice. Nevertheless, just as these rationales are overly dismissive of the genuine difficulties of 'staying in touch', so too, as indicated, the labels initially applied by junior officers are also too pat. Those junior officers who endorse such labels most forcefully tend to deny the real value of senior officers' past experience or of their superior knowledge of the overall framework of rules and

rationalities governing policework. In turn, this tends to confirm these junior officers' sense of the inviolability of their own perceptions of the demands of operational work, and also to reinforce their view that the main impediment to their performing their roles effectively is an ignorant, intrusive and intransigent managerial corps. This mixture of defensive arrogance and bad faith - absolving oneself of responsibility for one's actions by attributing causal efficacy to impermeable external forces - renders them less likely to engage in the forms of self-appraisal, and display the flexibility of attitude, necessary if the perceptual gulf is ever to be bridged:

"Every one of the bosses is out of touch to some extent, and some of them were never in touch, if the truth be told. It doesn't make our job any easier. It's not just that they are no help to us, most of the time they are a positive bloody hindrance." (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

Thus, in reaching diametrically opposed substantive conclusions as to the significance of past operational experience for present understanding of operational roles, senior divisional officers on the one hand, and certain junior officers on the other, tend to reinforce their sense of mutual cultural distance. In this divisive climate, neither the considerable operational knowledge of senior officers nor the objective limits of such knowledge is broadly appreciated across ranks. The middle ground tends to be excluded and on both sides of the empathy gap a process of retrenchment is encouraged.

(2) Communicating across the gap.

Just as the empathy gap is widened by the general misperceptions reported above, it is further stretched on account of a number of more specific features of the flow of information between senior and junior ranks at divisional level.

(i) *Mushroom-cultivation*

In the first place, let us examine the process of 'mushroom cultivation'. 'Mushroom' is a term used by a number of junior officers in the divisions researched to describe their senior officers, and more particularly, to convey how certain operational requirements of policework influence the manner in which they deem it appropriate that their seniors be treated.

"We call the bosses mushrooms round here, because that's how we've got to treat them - keep them in the dark and feed them full of shit!" (sergeant, Riverside division)

The strategy here is one of concealment. This may be instrumentally motivated. Thus the officer may wish to mask "easing behaviour"⁽⁷³⁾ - the avoidance of mundane work duties. Equally, concealment may be a defensive device, a response to regulatory overkill. In either case the low visibility of policework offers many cloaking mechanisms, including failing to record an incident on paper, cultivating public contacts who do not have strong loyalties to other organisational members, pretending that there is

interference on one's personal radio, and affecting to be out of the neighbourhood when a call comes over to perform an undesirable task. Such examples of individual deviance or defensive instrumentalism and the communicative context within which they unfold are parasitic upon features of police bureaucracy discussed earlier, and so are explicable in these terms, merely confirming how processes of instrumentalism can self-perpetuate.

However, the techniques of mushroom cultivation need not necessarily be pursued in exclusively instrumental terms. Thus, the defensively instrumental desire for 'breathing space' from the tight network of regulatory mechanisms may shade into a more idealistic wish to honour what is perceived to be the most effective forms of pursuit of the police mandate. Because the senior officer is so out of touch or so stretched by the demands of external audiences, it is argued by some junior officers, then provided they do what is minimally required to feed and sustain these misconceived or unrealistic expectations and so encourage senior officers to relax their vigilance, this will permit maximum scope to pursue what are deemed to be the most practicable methods to achieve organisational objectives. Furthermore, within this more positive vein, far from being the product of any particular animus directed against senior officers, mushroom-cultivation may be associated with what Chatterton describes as "the myth of protecting the higher ups"⁽⁷⁴⁾ - the desire to protect senior officers from embarrassment before internal and external audiences by avoiding too many public

laundryings of the tensions, conflicts and corner-cuttings which are the inevitable lot of those charged with applying the impossible mandate on the streets. In turn, the roots of such protective impulses may lie in any one or any combination of the significant residual normative bonds between juniors and seniors - personal ties, overlapping experience and forms of socialization, recognition and respect for inalienable craft skills, or institutional authority.

Yet, the effect of even the less instrumentally-motivated cloaking practices may be to stretch the gulf in understanding between ranks in such a way as to undermine these residual normative links. This perverse consequence is well illustrated in the following quote, in which we return to the subject of our 'dinosaur' superintendent from Newtown:

"He really is seriously out of touch, but everyone just goes along with it. It's as if he was some kind of bloody talisman or something. Nobody wants to tell him what's really going on out there. Everybody's got a soft spot for him, but it can all backfire. I'll give you a for instance. Our sergeant out here, he'll come and go with us a bit about time off. If one of us wants away early off early-shift or whatever, he's usually going to let us. It makes sense. He knows that we will pay it back. He knows that we'll come in early for briefings, or that if held back half an hour, or get called out when we're having our meal, we're going to go along with it. We're not going to be claiming overtime every two minutes. The police service needs that bit of give and take nowadays to survive. Gone are the days when you just treated the cops like shite, where you just applied the rules for the sake of it, even though there was no need for it. Plus you have to remember that overtime is in short supply nowadays. If the bosses don't show a bit of flexibility, then they are going to be pushed for bodies when it really matters.

Of course, old X doesn't realise this. He comes from a different era where discipline was stricter and you just wrote your own overtime. He's in charge of personnel in the division, and he has a strict rule that all time-off has to be cleared through the ranks. Basically he's saying that you have to have a really good reason, and know about it in advance, or you are not on. Now, my sergeant just ignores this. He gave me a couple of hours off at the end of my shift a couple of months ago because I was playing in a big bowls match at the local club. Old X happened to phone up for me at the station while I was away, and the sergeant told him that I was out at a locus and couldn't be reached. I don't know if he was suspicious or what but he tried to get me personally later on, and that is when he sussed that I wasn't bloody there. He was livid, the sergeant got chewed up for that one.

That's what comes of trying to handle him with kid gloves. He makes the rules, but they bear no relationship to reality. People pretend to go along with them, then it all blows up, and what started off with the best intentions ends up causing bitterness and resentment.

Q: If that's the case, and officers realise it, why don't they challenge the official practice rather than pretending to accept it?

A: For the sake of an easy life mostly. He's the man in power, and often it's easier to pull the wool over his eyes than to upset the apple-cart. But with someone like X, it's more than that. There's still a bit of a deferential attitude to his sort in the police. Cops with my service, I've got 28 years, have got a soft spot for bosses like X. We go back a long way, and because he's got the rank and experience, he'll get a lot of automatic respect, he's going to get less challenged than some of the others. Everyone goes along with it including some of the other bosses who are a bit more clued up. Of course, if you think about it, you're just building up problems for yourself, because gradually, he turns into a complete fucking ostrich, and you just can't afford to take half of what he says seriously. Then, as I said, the lid gets blown off every now and then people fall-out. Also you've got to think what the younger cop makes of it. He doesn't go back such a long way, he doesn't understand the background. He just thinks that there's this old codger from the stone-age who's giving him hassle for no reason." (constable, Newtown Division)

Thus if the soil is not carefully tendered, mushroom-cultivation is a strategy which can rebound upon junior officers, exacerbating inter-rank conflict and eroding mutual empathy. Even if successfully executed, its long-term effect may be merely to embed the feasibility gap more deeply.

(ii) Stretching credibility: the paradox of partial insight

If we look beyond strategies of outright concealment, which are in many circumstances impracticable or unsuccessfully executed, there are other and more subtle ways in which the communicative process can distort mutual understandings between ranks. In particular, what we are here concerned with are those situations where officers are known by their juniors or seniors to be implicated in a certain incident or activity, yet where direct access to the particular manner of such involvement and/or the motives underpinning it are not available to these internal audiences. For our purposes, the key issues which arise in such situations concern how the missing elements in the knowledge and understanding of the internal audience are supplied, how the actions of the implicated party are consequently evaluated, and the general implications which this process holds for the pattern of attitudes and relations between ranks.

The most significant source of data in filling in the gaps in the record will usually be the account of the implicated party himself or herself, and accordingly, a number of writers have

rightly focused upon the accounting process as a key strategic context within inter-rank relations.⁽⁷⁵⁾ In particular, attention has been primarily directed towards the upward channel of communication and to the importance of creative accounting for lower participants as a shield against "'within-the-job' trouble"⁽⁷⁶⁾. However, when audience reactions are considered, then such creative accounting - whether directed upwards or downwards - may be seen to have dysfunctional consequences for relations between ranks. While skilfully created accounts may indeed be sufficiently sanitized and plausibly explicatory of known circumstances (or in the case of more senior officers, sufficiently protected by their status and available instrumental power resources) to prevent a definitive and effective judgement being levelled against their authors, they may nevertheless be received in suspicious and sceptical vein and so generate a credibility gap. To some extent indeed, as with the process of mushroom cultivation, the distancing effects of the accounting process may appear to be an unremarkable consequence of the train of factors tending towards instrumentalism already discussed in the previous section. It is surely only to be expected in a social milieu already characterized by the ascendancy of instrumental relations, that various narratives of conscientious striving, of competent virtue and of affirmation of officially recognized norms, might be viewed with a jaundiced eye, and might simply add to the copious fund of "cynical knowledge"⁽⁷⁷⁾ which circulates throughout the police organisation. Again however, the accounting process cannot be viewed as merely epiphenomenal. It has its own logic, and can generate its own instrumental consequences.

In particular, certain specific characteristics of the accounting process and of the cultural context within which it unfolds entail that even where the reasons for imposing particular glosses upon actions or events are not, or not entirely, self-serving, but instead relate to those genuine difficulties, deprivations and dilemmas which are inherent in the jobs of all ranks, or to the desire to win support for initiatives inspired by a genuine commitment to collective ends, such glosses may nevertheless be viewed cynically. They may still be taken with an unnecessary pinch of salt which obscures the flavour of the reporter's experience, tending to underrate the severity of the problems encountered and/or the level of credit due for the solutions attempted.

The factors that help produce these skewed interpretations are three. First, there is the availability within the discourse of organizational members of particular frameworks of interpretation and vocabularies of explanation which tend to nurture cynical understandings. Secondly, there is the overlapping nature of the sub-cultures of policing referred to in the introduction to this section - the fact that the framework of ideas, norms, and practical knowledges in terms of which the police organisation operates is neither entirely homogeneous nor characterized by sharp internal discontinuities. A third factor is merely an inevitable consequence of the type of credibility gap with which we are concerned. The very fact that accounts, although viewed sceptically, are often not open to confident and comprehensive rejection, tends to preclude these candid confrontations which would be required in order that

-

differences be fully exposed and resolved. As a result, conflicts over the meaning and credibility of an account tend simply to consolidate the mutual perceptions which underlie that conflict. The terms of their eventual 'stand-off' merely reaffirms the original positions of the antagonists. As applicable to the divisions researched, these arguments, and in particular the first two propositions, may be expounded and illustrated by reference, first, to ways in which the accounts of their seniors may typically be interpreted by junior officers, and secondly, to ways in which the accounts of their juniors may likewise typically be interpreted by senior officers.

If we focus first on the rhetoric of senior officers, an appropriate and highly significant example of our general thesis can be found in the field of 'community policing'. Within the divisions researched, through the cultural grids available to police officers the idea of community policing was seen to possess a janus-faced quality. On the one hand, it epitomized the pioneering vigour of a reformist world-view and its enthusiasm to sponsor, and, if necessary, to rediscover 'new ideas'. On the other hand, it gazed back towards the virtues of the *ancien régime*. It drew upon the symbols of a 'golden age', when, according to traditionalist yore, uniform patrol officers were not merely anonymous bureaucratic functionaries with a limited remit,⁽⁷⁸⁾ but rather were 'community policemen' in their own right, possessed of independent social status and charged with performing a generic service role which, by modifying the cutting edge of relations with the local population,

was generally more conducive to consensual policing than the approach of their specialist brethren.

It is this duality of reference which underlies the propensity of junior officers to interpret the actions and statements of their seniors in respect of community policing philosophies and initiatives in an unduly cynical light. In referring inwards to a world of commendable operational practice, but also outwards towards a world of impression management in the face of disparate external demands, the bifurcated theme of community policing locks into the more general, and extremely potent traditionalist/reformist thematic opposition⁽⁷⁹⁾. In turn, it tends to be viewed by junior officers in terms of the broader sense of division in orientation which is supplied through this thematic opposition - between, on the one hand, these officers (predominantly junior ranks) primarily concerned with the pursuit and preservation of good operational practice, and on the other, these officers (predominantly senior ranks) who tend to become preoccupied with the modish desires and caprices of external audiences beyond the acceptable limits of genuine normative overlap or minimal appeasement. For junior officers who adopt this dual focus, the vivid contrast between the mundane yet respectable traditions of community policing and the proselytizing of their senior officers on the subject, may crystallize a sense that the acceptable limits have here been transgressed. While much of the impetus behind the new wave of community policing appears to lie in the wish of senior ranks to meet the challenge, and to be seen to meet the challenge, of a

volatile set of pressures within the policing environment in an innovative fashion, much of the content of such initiatives can, in the opinion of junior ranking officers, be no more than a rehash of past practice, a fact of which, it is thought, senior officers, given their lengthy experience (however unsuited such experience may be to the understanding of more recent operational developments), ought to be at least as appreciative of as the junior ranks themselves.

Accordingly, the view adopted by junior officers as to the motivations of senior officers in this area tends to rest upon a false dichotomy. There develops an attitude that any attempt to repackage community policing - even where, as in the case of the "beat ideology" discussed by Mervyn Jones⁽²⁰⁾, it explicitly draws upon traditional practice - can represent little more than a calculated or ignorant attempt to 're-invent the wheel' for reasons of public impression management, and in particular, indicates neither a measured appreciation of the earlier model nor a serious endeavour to learn new operational lessons from old practice. The alternative possibility, that senior officers, in their attempts to grapple with the obstinate problems of legitimacy and effectiveness which are rooted in the indeterminate mandate, may genuinely wish to cultivate *both* good impressions *and* good practice, and that they have sought properly to digest the experiences of the past to this end, tend to be excluded by the dichotomous frame of reference. An illustration of just how the attitudes of senior officers on this subject tend to be interpreted in a distorted and uncharitable

light through this fractured perceptual filter may be provided by comparing the following two viewpoints:

"I think community involvement is very important, although some of the cops have been a bit wary of the new department, although I think that we are winning them over now. A lot of it is absolutely necessary with the Childrens Hearings System. Plus in today's force with all the other pressures on our time, you need a focus for involvement with community groups."

Q: "A lot of the cops seem to be a bit cynical about it though, they seem to think that it is a case of re-inventing the wheel, and that it is mainly for public consumption."

A: "That's where they are wrong. Okay, we all remember the good old days, remember I spent 7 years on the beat myself. But you can't do it like that any more. Since I came into this post I've come to realize that there are a lot of different groups out there wanting our attention, want their views listened to, want to feel part of the same community as the police. The department is the only way of doing that. You see, it is not just a question of good intentions. The cop on the beat might be full of good intentions, but he has got too many other demands on his time. That's why we brought the department in, and that's why we brought back more area constables. Yes, I suppose in one sense it is a public relations exercise, but public relations is the key to good policing. It's not an extra, but a vital part of what we do. It just doesn't exist naturally - the Met could tell you that - you have to work at it. That's why community policing isn't just an optional extra - an advertising gimmick, because we would be nothing without the support of the public." (chief superintendent, Newtown Division)

"You know, it's just amazing. I've been in this force for 29 years now. I've always done the same job, always conducted myself in the same way, always got on with the public. It's never really got me all that far, but it has been the way I saw the job. Now, in the last year or two, the gaffers have turned round and said that that's the way they want the job done. Suddenly, I'm the perfect policeman, I'm not kidding you, when they go on about good community relations, chatting to people in the streets, going into the youth clubs, showing a bit of concern, that's the way I've always done it. Basically, you see, it's just a

huge public relations exercise, they're doing this to please the local councillors, or because someone has said something in parliament about getting more cops back on the beat. So the gaffers just spout this stuff out. The thing is, half of them don't really know what they're talking about, they probably do think they are saying something new because they've never had to try proper community policing themselves, or if they have, they've forgotten. Basically though, all that stuff that we're getting now is just for public show. We don't need a big glossy new department for it, we just need cops with a bit of experience and the right attitudes." (sergeant, Newtown Division)

Thus, in accounting for community relations initiatives, it is difficult for senior officers to dispel the suspicion amongst their juniors that the worth of these strategies is being calculated in primarily ideological terms and that within their "discursive manoeuvres"⁽²¹⁾ insufficient cognisance is being paid to the 'real history' of community policing, and to its actual relevance to everyday operational demands. Further, their culpability in the eyes of those who view them in this light is aggravated by the fact that their previous experience suggests that, in this case at least, they 'should have known better'

Even in the absence of a theme such as community policing, with its powerful sense of dual reference, the thematic opposition represented by the traditionalist/reformist divide is sufficiently strong to allow other activities and accounts of senior officers to be cast in an unfavourable light. In particular, the credibility of senior officers may be stretched where an approach deemed reformist, and so as calculated to impress influential internal or

external groups, is seen to be harnessed to strategies of displacement, which, as we have noted, tend themselves to be seen by those at the receiving end to confirm the instrumental orientations of their perpetrators. And, further, provided the context is such that even dinosaurs or high-flyers cannot be exculpated on grounds of ignorance, the impression of self-interested activity on the part of their senior officers thus gathered by a junior audience may again be heightened by a belief amongst these juniors that their superiors have betrayed the lessons of their own operational experience. Once more, the net result may be that other reasons for action based on a genuine commitment to the advancement of collective purposes, may be obscured. These various points are brought out in the following two quotes;

"The job is full of these bloody fly-by-nights now. I've had more bosses down here than I care to remember. That's not just the chief inspector either, but the inspector too. The thing is, they all want to put their stamp on the place and leave their mark. It helps them up the ladder but it won't do me much bloody use. Most of the things like moving the foot men between the shopping centre and the scheme have been tried before. You've no idea how often the bloody wheel is re-invented in this job. Partly its our fault. We always muddle through, we make it work. Joe Public and the bosses expect things of us, and we have to deliver somehow. If we made a noise about it, it would be our fault, you can be sure of that. The finger never gets pointed at them, because they are never here long enough to get fingered. They're off causing bloody havoc somewhere else and we're left to clear up the mess. Then some new wonderboy comes along and he wants to stick his oar in and so you have to pander to him while trying to smooth over the cock-ups left over from before. I'm telling you, its such a big force now that there's no way these characters are ever going to get pulled up about the mess they leave short of some complete balls-up which embarrasses the top brass. The only thing you can be certain of now from day to day is

that you're the one that will carry the can every time". (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

"When I worked in X division the superintendent introduced all sorts of changes off his own bat. He started sending out warning letters to some first-time shoplifters, he cut down the number of vehicles in the sub-division. That was okay for him, he was blowing with the wind, he was pleasing the fiscals, and with the cars, he was just staying one step ahead of what the chief was going to do anyway; he even said that to my inspector! Okay, at the end of the day that makes him look good. He's the man with the bright ideas, but when he gets his pat on the back and gets made up to chief super, we're the ones who have to live with the bright ideas.

Q: But what was wrong with these ideas?

A: They don't bloody work. We had the cars because we needed them, not because the men were joy-riding. And it's one thing for the fiscal to drop a case, but when we start doing that ourselves, that can demoralise the men. He should have known that too, he was a cop for long enough himself. (sergeant, Riverside Division)

If we turn now to the process of accounting as it flows up the hierachy, the general dynamics behind the emergence of the credibiity gap are similar to those described above. However, at a more detailed level, there are differences in the discursive forms in which these accounts are provided and received, and in the ways in which their reception is influenced by the fabric of shared experience and understanding which connects the audience to the account-giver so as to encourage cynical evaluations.

To begin with, whereas the accounts of senior officers' activities which are available to internal audiences tend not to be solely directed towards their own junior officers (i.e. they are often also intended or available for public consumption and/or for

the consumption of their own senior officers), to refer to general programmes and policies, and to be relatively uninhibited by the threat of internal instrumental sanction, this is not the case with the internal accounts typically provided by members of more junior ranks. By contrast, they tend to be exclusively designed for their own senior officers, to refer to specific actions or incidents, and to be strongly overshadowed by the threat of internal instrumental sanction. They tend thus to take the form of defensive narratives, or "good stories"⁽⁸²⁾:

"There are certain old favourites in this division, and in fact you see them coming up in other divisions as well. Any time a police car gets bumped or written off, and there is no-one else involved, you might come across this brown dog. There always seems to be this line in the Occurrence Report about a brown dog running in front of the path of the car. I thought it was supposed to be cats who had nine lives. This bloody brown dog has had more than that." (chief inspector, Oldtown Division)

"You saw what happened last Saturday afternoon. Nobody was to be seen for an hour and a half. They were all mysteriously tied up with calls or their radios were on the blink. What's the betting that it will be the same next Wednesday when the next big [football] game is on the tele... The faulty radio is the best story in the book, because it actually happens so often!" (sergeant, Oldtown Division)

In respect of these and other more or less stylized good stories, there may be traces of a Gouldneresque 'pattern of indulgency' - a tacit recognition on both sides of the internal divide that the rules may sometimes be transgressed with impunity. However, in the context of the 'bottom-up' accounting in the police organization such resolutions are seldom entirely consensual, and

rarely without instrumental undertones or consequences. One significant reason for this is that although senior officers may share sufficient understanding of the practical context and the discourse of operational police work to appreciate what is signified by 'brown dogs' or by conspicuous silences over the radio on a Saturday afternoon, on account of the factors discussed earlier they may not be sufficiently 'in touch' with the contemporary problems of policing in the area or sufficiently empathetic with the lot of their junior officers to be prepared to accept without serious demur the motives and justifications used by junior officers to account for these actions. Periodical car accidents may be perceived by operational officers as an unavoidable occupational hazard - a function both of job stress and the sheer quantity of miles covered on the road - while for their seniors, although this explanation may be acknowledged to such extent, the incidence of accidents may be such as is indicative of a degree of avoidable error which is only tolerated at its present level because of problems of verification. Similarly, taking time off to watch important sporting events may be seen as justifiable easing behaviour by junior officers - a perquisite to compensate for other less congenial aspects of the job, while by their superiors it may be seen, at best, as an unearned privilege for which junior officers should be grateful and which may be unilaterally withdrawn if abused, and at worse, as an indolent indulgence which, again, continues only because of the informational problems associated with monitoring its ban.

Thus, in some instances the mutual attitudes struck with regard to a particular account are only partly explicable in terms of an indulgency pattern, while in others they are so greatly at variance with one another that one can no longer meaningfully talk in these terms at all. Instead, where it is solely the problems of verification derived from the existence of the information gap which cause senior officers to acquiesce in the accounts of their juniors, despite deep scepticism over their contents and equally profound cynicism as to the real motives underpinning the acts shielded by such accounts, the encounter in question may be viewed as a purely instrumental stand-off.

Of course, one should not be blind to the fact that the proximate responsibility for such a stand-off need not necessarily lie, or lie exclusively with the senior officer, and his or her deficient understanding of the tribulations of operational work. On some occasions the motivations of the account-giver will be entirely related or, as in the case of some forms of easing behaviour, partly related to ends which cannot plausibly be construed as consistent with organisational interests. Indeed, each of the good stories discussed above, might well be used as cover for acts of individual deviance. However, this should not in turn obscure the fact that, as with the example of divergent understandings cited below, there are other occasions of instrumental stand-off where, while the availability of an explanation in terms of individual deviance fuels the suspicions of

the senior officer, such suspicions may be without objective foundation:

"It's got worse since we have had Command and Control. The VHF vehicles are controlled directly from Force Headquarters. UHF is still coming from our controller, but remember that he is getting 999 calls passed down from Force Headquarters as well. It all adds up to this huge pressure to keep things moving. If you get a logjam anywhere in the system, then there is always someone who is going to start complaining. It means you are always being asked to accept new calls, and update and complete old calls. For the sake of peace and quiet, and to keep people off your back, you can end up accepting calls even when you have a backlog. At other times, you know that you are coming to a busy patch and that you are going to get things thrown at you, so you pretend you are still at the previous call so that you get a bit of breathing space and so that you will miss a bit of the deluge when it comes."

Q: "Is that not a somewhat self-defeating exercise? Unless you make it clear that you can't cope, is this overload not going to continue indefinitely?"

A: "Maybe, but there is no alternative. The system is all geared up that way. You just get singled out as not being able to cope if you start complaining. The bosses won't listen to you, they would just jump on you." (constable, Riverside Division)

"Since we have had the new radios and all that, people think that it makes it easier for us to contact the cops. The sergeant and I would agree that we actually have less control now... The cops can just make it up. It's a charter for lazy bastards, and believe me there are plenty in this job. The whole system depends on accurate information. It's our only point of contact, and I'm not exaggerating when I say that it can be the cop's lifeline sometime. So I have got no sympathy for a cop who is holding things back." (inspector, Riverside Division)

In all cases, wherever they may be placed on the continuum between indulgency and purely instrumental stand-off, we can see how

- the accounting process may reinforce the credibility gap. The low visibility of operational policework creates significant problems of verification. Yet the prior operational experience of senior officers is such that they operate in accordance with a cultural and symbolic register which is pitched closely enough to that of their juniors to convince them that in many cases they can fill the information gap by inferential reasoning. However, their experience and consequent understanding is not sufficiently in tune for this confidence to be fully justified in all cases, and so the accounts of their juniors may be viewed with undue scepticism and their motives treated uncharitably. Further, as illustrated by the last example in which the strategems of the junior officer designed to cope with pressure of work over the radio were seen in the eyes of the senior officer merely as unjustifiable avoidance measures, the combination of general awareness of an organisational problem and insufficient comprehension of its structural roots can result in the individualization of the problem, and this is especially so in a cultural climate where, as noted earlier, the theme of individual deviance already has a strong currency. In turn, the availability of this theme as part of the vocabulary of explanation of senior officers engaged in 'filling in' the credibility gaps in their juniors' accounts, reinforces the tendency for analysis of accounts to be truncated and for the deep structural factors which provide the objective basis for disharmony to remain obscured in the eyes of participants.

In summary, it is not difficult to see how the accounting process in both its upward and downward trajectories, rather than providing a window of opportunity for the feasibility gap and the empathy gap generally to be tackled, instead fosters an additional credibility gap and so reinforces the very sentiments, prejudices and instrumental orientations associated with the perceptual gulf between junior and senior ranks in the first instance. More specifically, what might be termed *the paradox of partial insight* provides the operating logic of this process. The degree of cultural and experiential overlap between different segments of the organization is such that one group, aided by an appropriate and available vocabulary of explanation, is able to demystify the nature of its exchanges with the other sufficiently to be sceptical of certain stock practices and accounts, but not sufficiently to be able to focus squarely upon the structural tensions which would explain why the other group might feel compelled to resort to creative accounts or discursive manoeuvres in the first place. Additionally, as a final perverse twist, partial insights tend to lead to stalemate and stand-off. They are unlikely to provide their recipients with the informational armoury which is necessary, and in the case of senior officers, sufficient, to provoke the confrontations which would permit perceived discrepancies and conflicts to be fully explored. Because partial, such insights are likely to remain partial.