Socialization into Conflict

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Summary

The religious schools in Northern Ireland are permeated by many of the symbols, beliefs, attitudes and values of the community which they serve, to the exclusion of those of the other religion. Many questions can be put to Protestant school boys which would be unrealistic if asked in Catholic schools and vice versa. The fault lines of the political system in Northern Ireland run deeply into the rising generation. What is responsible for such division?

After a brief review of the literature and methods of studying political socialization among children and young people, this thesis reviews the political history of education in Northern Ireland and raises some of the educational issues which have divided the adult population of Ulster.

The central part of the thesis is concerned with the analysis of replies given by 3,000 Ulster schoolboys to questions about politics and society asked during a time of disorder. In particular, attitudes to Government and discord are examined in the light of school, social, religious, and national structures and beliefs, and are discussed in the context of divisive educational issues.

The aggregate pattern of influences upon schoolboys' political attitudes is assessed towards the end of the thesis with regard to the relative importance of school and community influences upon political learning. Finally, the relevance of survey findings for the future of educational and political life in Northern Ireland is assessed.

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James L. Russell

Chapter I

Civic Learning

> As soon as the gun-smoke clears and the street battles
> cease for a moment, the propaganda war takes over.
> Veneers of prejudice are as carefully applied as a sur-
> geon grafting new skin. Gradually the skin becomes
> thick enough to withstand any cry for humanity, any
> appeal to reason.
>
> Alf McCreary, Belfast Telegraph, 20 June, 1971

The aim of this study is to investigate some of the basic civic attitudes of schoolboys who have lived through violent years in Northern Ireland. The two main attitudes to be investigated are: emotional affect towards Government just before direct rule was announced from Westminster; and attitudes towards political disorder. These two basic attitudes will be investigated separately for Protestants and Catholics against their social background and other social and political attitudes they possess. Although Protestants and Catholics share much in common, there is much that divides them, and part of this investigation will be to pin-point to what extent there are real differences between the communities.

Civic attitudes are to be studied but 'civic education' is not a broad enough term to describe how such attitudes are acquired. Civic education can emanate from any source, including school, and involves the deliberate teaching of political information, values and behaviour. The term 'civics' refers to school-classes which are designed to increase loyalty to, or knowledge of, the political counterpart of the community the school serves. Civic attitudes, in their broadest sense, are learned through a process which many political scientists have labelled "political socialization". In the International

Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences political socialization is defined

as encompassing -

> ... all political learning, formal and informal, deliber-
> ate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, in-
> cluding not only explicitly political learning but also
> nominally non-political learning that affects political
> behaviour, such as the learning of politically relevant
> social attitudes and the acquisition of politically
> relevant personality characteristics. 1

The term 'political socialization' began to appear in the Ameri-

can political science literature in the early 1960s.[2] Several books

have been written on the political socialization of children;[3] a

series of articles reporting findings on high school seniors and their

parents;[4] some papers focusing on specific groups such as urban blacks

and poor whites;[5] others examine specific topics in child socializa-

tion.[6] Three introductory textbooks on the subject have been produced[7]

and several anthologies.[8] British studies began with Almond and

Verba's 'Civic Culture'.[9] British studies include such topics as party

identification, political interest,[10] role aspirations and attitudinal

patterns,[11] cognition of political figures,[12] support for nation and

government,[13] and the influence of Modern Studies upon political atti-

tudes.[14]

Studies of political learning in children leave little doubt

that before adolescence children have cognitions and feelings about

political objects. Several studies have shown that children have

extremely favourable views of the political world and political

cynicism does not develop until Secondary school. Yet such cynicism

as did develop was not, in most cases, sufficient to induce the child,

or young person, to turn with anger against his Government. Some

groupings of children diverge from this pattern; American blacks and

poor whites become less positive towards Government as they grow older

and their support depends more upon specific rewards than upon any emotional ties they may have with Government. How do schoolboys in Northern Ireland who have newly arrived upon the political scene during the last few violent years of the old Stormont regime view their Government? Survey findings may help us understand what adult communities teach their children and youth just before the collapse of a regime.

As to who, or what, has greatest influence upon children's political attitudes there is much disagreement. Most studies see parents as most important in transmitting basic political values to their children, but Jennings et al found little correspondence between the political views of high school seniors and their parents except on very general values, such as party identification.[15] Hess and Torney hold that school is much more important in political socialization than the home,[16] but the Michigan group found that high school civics courses had little influence upon civic attitudes except among blacks.[17] Langton sees home, peer group, and school playing different, but complementary, roles in socializing political efficiency.[18] In Northern Ireland, are school classes in civics, history, geography, literature, and religious instruction the cause or a symptom of community conflict? Would a merger of Protestant and Catholic schools create common political attitudes?

Political socialization is best thought of as a learning process which continues throughout life. The importance of studying the process in schoolboys is that they are likely to learn the values of community uncritically due to little prior, or extra-community, knowledge and because early learning takes place when fundamental personality characteristics are being formed. Learning occurs through anticipation, imitation, and identification. Anticipatory socialization

refers to the acquisition of attitudes and values about adult roles, and the gathering of specific information, that cannot be applied until later life. For instance, a very young boy in Belfast may not be able to build 'man-sized' barricades, but may anticipate the day when he will be able to do so. Imitation involves copying, or modelling the behaviour of relevant others. If six year old boys cannot shoot bullets they may lob stones at soldiers. Identification includes not only behaving in a similar manner to relevant others, but feeling the same values attached to the behaviour. In this way social values are internalized to the extent that they appear right, moral and just. One ten-year-old Catholic boy in Northern Ireland doubtless believed it would be just to ...

> Put Police out. British Army out. Free
> the enterniees. tell ted Heath to get lost,
> make a United Ireland, let the IRA in... put
> Protistince out ...
> (uncorrected spelling)

As did the ten-year-old Protestant boy who wrote ...

> Dump all Cathics in Irish sea and stop the
> troubles and shoot the IRA
> (uncorrected spelling)

Objections to studying how children acquire specific political cognitions, attitudes and behaviours have often rested upon a narrow conception of politics, i.e. political participation or voting. One such objection is that children have a pre-political personality which is formed in the general culture of the community and only later generalized to politics. It is assumed that children learn first about very general values which are later expressed politically. The sequence of learning is stressed insofar as it may affect what is learned, but there is no evidence to suggest that children of eight or nine are not

learning general values and specific political lessons at the same time. Evidence from this survey suggests that very young school children are learning about politics: not simply how to comply with political laws, but who their political enemies are and what they must do to overthrow, or destroy, them. Classifying political enemies as 'dogs' or 'vermin' puts them into a sub-human group to which one does not have to justify one's behaviour in attempts to contain, or destroy, them. A multi-causal explanation of political behaviour is suggested: children are acquiring specific political attitudes whilst personality is in formation.

To other objectors, children are not in a 'state of readiness' to take part in the political process, and the study of their political development is postponed to late adolescence. But political decisions are still taken somewhere by someone. Children must learn, at least, to comply with what they do not fully understand, and learning to support decision makers they know little about is certainly a vital part of civic learning. In Northern Ireland children of seven and eight are learning the outward actions, at least, of unconstitutional politics.

> Kill the British. Hung Faulkner and Heath and give a United Ireland. (9-year old Catholic)
> (uncorrected spelling)

> Not let the Cathlicks across the border and shout them if they come. (9-year old Protestant)
> (uncorrected spelling)

From very early in their school life such boys can join the junior sections of movements engaged in the major conflicts of the day and of the century. Perhaps in a country divided as Northern Ireland is about the nature and boundaries of the State the 'readiness' for learning about

politics and political action is reached at a much earlier age than where people only <u>disagree</u> over politics.

Another objection to studying political learning in children is that one cannot assume that adult orientations towards political authority are greatly affected by childhood experiences. There are, however, no longitudinal studies to show that this is not the case. But one cannot state <u>precisely</u> what effect childhood learning will have for the political future. Political socialization studies do not endeavour to deal precisely with this question; nor do they propose that childhood learning completely determines the political attitudes of adults. But the attitudes acquired by a young person may be influential upon his later behaviour and this is especially the case where, as in Northern Ireland, opposing groups are stable for long periods of time.

Students of politics are interested in the effects of governing for the whole population, including children. Political systems, because of different structures, laws, and distributions of authority, tend to produce specific political attitudes. These are communicated to children, and it is necessary to examine the 'fit' between adult and child attitudes at specific periods in the life of a regime to understand the effectiveness of vertical, or inter-generational, socialization. In Northern Ireland children hear of Government from their parents, some of whom have been actively engaged in political disorder. How early in life do they acquire violent political outlooks?

In a peaceful polity it is relatively easy to side-step questions about the influence of childhood experience upon the political future. But where disorder is so widespread that few, if any, have escaped its influence, some assumptions <u>must</u> be made about the possible effects for children and their future development. One must consider

the conditions under which schoolboys have learned to accept and engage in political disorders in order to vary such influences, where possible, in the hope of reducing, or eliminating, future violence. Others may wish to understand which influences are more likely to increase disorder in order to escalate violence.

Where disorder has occurred at fairly regular intervals, as it has in Ulster, this is good reason for assuming that childhood learning, if violent, is generalized to adult political behaviour. Alternatively one may say that the major political lessons one acquires in Ulster are learned in childhood. The Ulster boy of five throwing a stone may anticipate a ten-year-old with a petrol bomb or a teenager with a gun. The enemy remains the same, only the weapons become more deadly. A longitudinal study of such a boy would involve contact with his family directly, or through his school. In Ulster, at the present, such a study could involve dangers and difficulties. In the absence of such studies we must rely, to a great extent, upon comparisons between adult and schoolboy studies. In what follows numerous comparisons will be made between schoolboys in this study and adults in the Strathclyde Loyalty Survey.[19]

A particular way of regarding political socialization can open and foreclose many lines of enquiry. In the socialization literature there are a number of basic models. A 'content' model of socialization pays attention to what is being learned. The main content studied here are political affect to Government and attitudes to political discord. These are specific political attitudes. From time to time other social and political attitudes will be examined with reference to their bearing upon the basic attitudes investigated herein.

An 'agents' model draws attention to by whom political lessons

are taught.   For instance, does belonging to the Junior Orange Asso-
ciation or playing gaelic games appear to increase or decrease violent
outlooks upon the political world.   The apparent influence of various
agents, including the school, will be investigated throughout the study.

A 'developmental' model of political socialization alerts us to
when political learning takes place.   When do political concepts form?
Do they follow any particular order in forming?   These questions will
be taken up when political cognitions are investigated in connection
with affect towards Government.

A 'circumstances' model proposes to examine the conditions under
which learning takes place.   For instance, does a high level of poli-
tical disorder in a district appear to increase violence acceptance in
schoolboys?   Does living close to the Border make a Protestant more
'loyal' than his co-religionists far from it?   And does living in a
Protestant town make a Catholic boy any less violent in his political
views?

A 'consequences' model is concerned with what effect political
socialization has for the future of the whole political system.   Will
the lessons learned during years of political violence in Northern Ire-
land result in an even more unstable system of Government and a con-
tinual recourse to disorder in pursuit of political goals?   Or will
children and young people be so sickened of violence and lack of rules
that a prolonged period of peaceful co-existence will emerge?

At different places in this investigation various models of poli-
tical socialization will be employed.   The developmental model has been
employed extensively elsewhere,[20] and will only be referred to briefly
in connection with cognitions of Government (Chapter IV).   Whilst in-
vestigating differences and similarities between respondents according

to the content of their political attitudes (Chapter IV), attention will be paid to the agents most likely to influence such outlooks (Chapters V, VI, VII and IX); the circumstances under which they are learned (Chapter VIII); the aggregate pattern of influences (Chapter XI); and the possible consequences for the future (Chapter XII). This is a political study of political socialization and little attention will be specifically devoted to the personality factors which may influence political behaviour,[21] but some time will be spent looking at other social and political attitudes which are associated with the basic attitudes examined herein (Chapter X). Moreover, in the circumstances of Northern Ireland, there are few things from school sports to job aspirations that cannot be linked directly or indirectly to political circumstances.

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Footnotes - Chapter I

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10.   P.R. Abramson, "The Political Socialization of the English School-
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15.   See Jennings and Niemi, op cit., (Introduction: Footnote 4).

16.   See Hess and Torney, op. cit., (Chapter I: footnote 3).

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21.   For a study of this the reader is referred to Morris Fraser,
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           1973), see Appendix IV.

Chapter II

Some Aspects of the Political History of Education
in Northern Ireland

The context for this investigation is the whole history of Northern

Ireland, including violent events up to the day Direct Rule was announced

from Westminster, and influences precursive to the setting up of the

State. The school is only one agent in political socialization and

other influences may prove more important in shaping the civic orienta-

tions of schoolboys in Northern Ireland. Yet, since so much has been

said and written about what schools can and cannot accomplish in civic

education this chapter has been devoted to highlighting some of the poli-

tical history of education in Northern Ireland and to discussing some of

the educational debates arising therefrom.

Underlying tensions exist between Church and State in education

which arise from differences in ideology, psychology, and Church-State

structures. In traditional European society education was primarily a

function of the Church. Exceptions to this general rule could be found

in some Italian cities and German free cities, but, in the main, educa-

tion was the prerogative of the rich and those intended for the Church.

Because of the persisting likelihood of conflict between an extra-

territorial Church and the State the prospect for Church-State conflict

was relatively high in the middle ages.

This general pattern was upset by the Protestant Reformation, the

emergence of the nation state, and the development of a scientific cul-

ture.[1] Where Protestantism gained control over education it passed

into Protestant, community, or private hands. Where the religious

struggle ended in a stalemate dual school systems developed. Where the Catholic counter-reformation succeeded renewed control over education was exercised. Rulers endeavoured to bring education under public control to keep pace with new technological developments and to reduce conflict, especially religious conflict, within their territories. Increased industrialization and the emergence of radical political movements further challenged religious control over education. In many European countries the Catholic Church went more and more upon the defensive to maintain its own system of schools.

In Sixteenth Century England state and church worked together towards a common allegiance in politics and religion. Religious instruction was a prime agent in civic education. Church and state relationships remained close in England until the early Nineteenth Century when the need for alliance in education began to diminish. The Industrial Revolution was creating a need for studies beyond the oversight of the clergy and differences in religious belief were no longer raising accusations of heresy and disloyalty. As James Murphy writes, "... experience had shown that differences in religious belief, though still capable of arousing considerable suspicion and hostility in many quarters, need no longer lead to disaffection and civil strife."[2] The State was now confronted with several large churches in Scotland, Ireland and Wales and pressure against State endowment of any one religion was growing.

In the American colonies the break with the Crown in 1776 provided an opportunity for dissenters to create a state of religious equality.[3] In the First Amendment to the new federal constitution church and state were officially separated. In some of the new states of the Union there were disestablishments with the birth of the new nation and in others disestablishment came during the next fifty years. But

establishment remained a feature in some states until 1934 when the Supreme Court ruled that the federal separation must apply to all individual states.

Four types of relationships between Church and State have been observed:[4] (1) 'Public Confessionalism' exists where the state confesses religious beliefs and provides for their propagation. (2) 'Non-sectarian Christianity' can be observed where there is neutrality between Christian believers. Such a 'common Christianity' state may take two forms: (a) where all denominations are equally endowed by the state; (b) where the voluntary principle is in operation with equality between all churches but no state connection with any. (3) The 'neutral' state recognises the rights of believers and non-believers and extends no preference to either. (4) The 'secular' state breaks all connections between law and religion and propagates itw own secular morality.

Inasmuch as the Catholic Church had a special position in the Constitution, Eire practised public confessionalism. Here, Protestant parents, who are a small minority, anxiously watched the growing controversy over the Department of Education's proposals for community schools. In effect, the community schools were felt to be essentially Catholic in character and were unacceptable to many Protestant parents who prefer to have their children educated in a school of their own denomination. England tends towards non-sectarian Christianity whilst the U.S.S.R. provides an example of a secular state.

These generalizations are not watertight and different approaches to church-state relationships have been practised by the same state at different times of its history and by different parts of one state. The rights of non-believers are protected in Northern Ireland in that their children need not attend classes for religious instruction. Believers

are also protected in that special provisions safeguarding religion have been built into Northern Ireland laws. Others may hold that inter-denominational Protestantism is practised in Ulster providing County schools for Protestant children. Alternatively, County schools are open to all, but the degree of open-ness depends very much upon their acceptability to all concerned. It will be the aim of the rest of this chapter to discuss the political history of education in Northern Ireland in order to highlight some of the modern educational debates upon which survey materials may shed some light.

Before 1831 children receiving education in the North of Ireland generally attended small single-teacher schools run by the local churches, or by individuals, providing elementary and, to a lesser degree, secondary education. The Kildare Place Society 'for the promoting of the education of the poor in Ireland' had been founded in 1811. The Society received grants from parliament for the assistance of local schools and wished to give "the same advantages to all classes of professing Christians without interfering with the peculiar religious opinions of any."[5] To begin with the Society's schools were attended by children of all denominations, but its method of reading the bible "without note or comment" was not acceptable to Catholic priests, who felt that this was an inadequate way of giving religious instruction. To the Catholic Church literary and religious instruction must be combined. Also simply reading the Scriptures without comment left their interpretation open to error which, to Catholics, only the teaching of the Catholic Church could remove.

Yet some Catholics, under the old Dublin regime, continued to agitate for a national system of education. In September, 1831, the Government announced its intention of withdrawing support from the

Kildare Place Society and assuming direct responsibility for Primary education. The programme involved giving "the people of Ireland the advantages of a combined literary and separate religious education." The Board of Commissioners which was set up was instructed to safeguard the religion of the pupils. Religious instruction in the National Schools was to be given in separate groups, with the consent of parents, by priests, ministers, and those recognised by the various denominations. Both Protestant and Catholic opinion was dissatisfied. Many Protestants expressed a wish for a wider use of the scriptures and Catholics found separate religious instruction short of their ideal of "literary and religious instruction universally combined". Yet the programme was adopted with the main parts of the new education structure being: (1) voluntary schools established by the churches, giving religious instruction according to the desires of the management, with the state paying the salaries of most teachers; (2) 'Model Schools' built and maintained by the state in which six or more children, with the consent of their parents, could receive separate religious instruction with a teacher provided to give this during school hours. Thus religious convictions and desires for integrated education separated the school children under the old Dublin regime.

The educational structure for which the new Government of Northern Ireland assumed responsibility in 1921 had previously been administered by three separate bodies dealing respectively with elementary, secondary, and technical education. The Commissioners of National Education, the most important of these, were concerned with elementary education. The Commissioners, from public funds, provided help in the building of schools, made payment to teachers, and stimulated the production of textbooks. Although the Commissioners' influence in

education had steadily increased in financing and generally directing
the system they remained auxiliaries to the churches which undertook
the bulk of instruction of the young. The growth of denominational
schools resulted in much overlapping in elementary education and many
of the schools were badly designed and poorly equipped. The Inter-
mediate (Secondary) Education Board mainly distributed public monies
on the results of written examinations to outstanding pupils. But
the Board had little control over the schools such children attended,
and in 1921 there was no official control over the age, qualifications,
or conditions of service of the teachers, or the suitability of school
premises. The other main part of the educational structure inherited
from the Dublin regime was technical instruction which, by 1921, was
operating on relatively modern lines.

The new Government of Northern Ireland was confronted with struc-
tures and conflicting principles of education from which it endeavoured
to create an educational service which would be up to modern standards
and realize the support of its citizens. On the other hand, perhaps
the members of the Government knew quite well that no state system of
education could possibly bring about agreement in all religious groups
operating voluntary schools.

When the task of the new Stormont Government is viewed against
the spirit of the times its efforts to create a universally acceptable
system of state education appears even more impossible. Protestants
had mobilised themselves against Home Rule which, to many, meant "Rome
Rule" and Catholics, with United Ireland aspirations, had supported the
Home Rule Bill through the desire for an autonomous Ireland and through
fear of becoming a permanent minority in a new Northern state. Like
the Nationalist MPs who refused to take their seats in the Northern

parliament, many Catholic school managers and teachers refused to recognise the Northern Ministry of Education. Their policy of non-co-operation was based, primarily, upon the belief that the Partition of Ireland would either not take place, or would not last more than a few years. The boycotting of the Ulster Ministry was also partly encouraged by the delay in transferring educational authority to the North; by the doles sent from Dublin to non-co-operating Northern Catholic teachers; and by the willingness of the Dublin government to set up examination centres in Northern Ireland for Catholic schools not presenting candidates for examinations set by the Ulster ministry of Education. When, in the autumn of 1922, the Dublin authorities withdrew their doles to non-co-operating teachers in the North the non-co-operation campaign collapsed and teachers and school managers sought aid from the new Northern Ireland ministry of Education. But, by standing out against the Ulster ministry of education and government Catholic school managers had placed themselves in a weak position regarding future educational policies.

Before the transfer of educational services from Dublin took place in 1922 the new government of Northern Ireland set up the Lynn Committee[6] to "... enquire and report on the existing organisation and administration of the educational services in Northern Ireland, and to make such recommendations as may be considered necessary for the proper co-ordination and effective carrying out of these services." The Interim Report of the Lynn Committee is the first basis of legislation for education in Northern Ireland. Professor Akenson writes, in Education and Enmity: The Control of Schooling in Northern Ireland 1920-50:[7]

> In all probability the refusal of the Roman Catholic authorities to join the Lynn committee was the single most important determinant of the educational history of Northern Ireland from 1920 to the present day. By refusing to sit they surrendered their last shred of influence at the very time when the basic character

of Ulster's educational development was being deter-
mined. From the recommendations made by the Lynn
committee emerged the principles of the 1923 London-
derry Act, and that Act was the foundation of all
later developments. The refusal of the Catholic
religious authorities to exert their influence upon
the Lynn committee and subsequently upon the London-
derry Act was especially unfortunate because, des-
pite the civil war that was raging in Northern Ire-
land, the Unionist government was making a determined
effort to govern in a non-sectarian manner, an attempt
which was abandoned in the mid-1920s. Although the
Lynn committee claimed to have kept in mind Catholic
interests, its recommendations were inevitably framed
according to Protestant educational assumptions.

In proposing the establishment of local education authorities the

Lynn committee assumed that there was "a general desire in the six coun-

ties that the local administration of education should be extended and

strengthened." Many national schools could only afford minimal facili-

ties and, the committee estimated that, in expanding Belfast, at least

12,000 children of school age were without school places. The Lynn

committee may have based some of their proposals upon a misunderstanding

regarding the demand for local control of education. The Catholic need

appeared to be one for increased financial support from local education

authorities for schools which could no longer carry on unaided. Protes-

tants, on the other hand, desired both local involvement in education and

aid to schools through local rates.

In order to weld the elements of the old system into a new uni-

fied educational structure the 1923 Education Act constituted each

County and County Borough as the responsible education authority for the

area. Between the Counties, County Boroughs, and the schools were

imposed regional education committees (two or more for each county) with

supervisory powers over the schools in their areas. Provisions were

made for the transfer of schools under voluntary management and for the

establishment of statutory committees for each voluntary elementary

school, whereby four members of the committees were nominated by the former manager and two by the education committee. A school accepting this form of control was able to obtain greater financial assistance from public funds than schools remaining under the management of an individual or private committee. Four classes of schools emerged:

(1) Provided school: built and completely maintained by the local education authority and the ministry of education

(2) Transferred schools: transferred to civic management by former managers; completely maintained by the local education authority and the ministry of education

(3) Four-and-Two Schools: management committee made up of four representatives of the managers or trustees and two from the regional education committee; complete payment of salaries of teachers, one half of all heating, lighting, cleaning and repair from the local rates; a capital expenditure grant from the local education authority "if they think fit"; a capital grant from the ministry of education at the ministry's discretion

(4) Independent schools: completely independent of local control; teachers salaries from the ministry of education; nothing for capital expenditures; usually receiving one half of the cost of heating, lighting and cleaning from the local rates.

The Lynn committee recommended that religious instruction should be given in State aided schools. As Akenson suggests, "The plain fact was that the Lynn report favoured granting similar religious rights to two distinct classes of schools, but proposed to finance fully only the Protestant schools".[8] The Education Act (1923) however attempted to avoid the thorny problem of religious instruction in normal school hours. Section 26 of the Act stipulated that "... the education authority shall not provide religious instruction in any such public elementary school", and section 66(3) required that the religious denomination of a teacher must not be taken into account by the education authorities when making an appointment. Ministers of religion and/or acceptable laymen

(generally schoolteachers) were to have free access to teach the children religion, outwith compulsory school hours, if the parents so desired, but any child could be excused from attending such school classes. In contrast, four-and-two school committees and the managers of independent schools had the right to appoint teachers without prohibitions on the introduction of religious considerations. In provided and transferred schools religious education was to become an appendage to compulsory secular education. The main reasons for this were said to be keeping open the possibility of common education for all children and fear of contravening the Constitution which forbade the endowment, out of public funds, of any religion. Akenson comments:

> Clearly, Lord Londonderry (Minister of Education) was trying to navigate between two dangerous shoals. On the one side he was striving to avoid clashing with the judicial committee of the United Kingdom privy council which could declare portions of his act invalid if they ran counter to the religious endowment clause of the government of Ireland act; hence a phrase was included prohibiting the local education authorities from providing denominational religious instruction in the schools they controlled. On the other side Londonderry was trying to avoid the politically fatal charge that the new category of schools, those controlled by the local civic authorities, would be secular or Godless institutions. In the actual event Londonderry was to escape difficulties with the United Kingdom legal authorities but to run foul of the Protestant denominations. 9

In his pamphlet on Catholic Schools - A Survey of a Northern Ireland Problem, J.J. Campbell refers to the inducements which were built into the 1923 Education Act in order to bring about the transfer of schools to local education authorities:

> The "inducements" were in effect to take overall financial responsibility for transferred schools; to provide some financial support from the local authorities 'if they think fit', for the building and equipment of voluntary schools under the control of an approved committee; and nothing at all for the building and equipment of voluntary schools under the control of a manager.

As an official spokesman of the Ministry of Education wrote later, "financial pressure made irresistably for transfer". 10

By 1924, however, local education authorities had provided only two new schools. Ten schools had been transferred and 1,984 were still voluntary. The Protestant and Catholic Churches would not accept the secularization of the compulsory educational system. Catholics had not co-operated with the Lynn committee and it was generally believed that they would have little interest in State schools. As the Very Revd., William Corkey said in his book, An Episode in the History of Protestant Ulster, 1923-47, [11] "But the Protestant Churches knew that the Roman Catholic Church would never permit her children to enter such schools". The Act, it was widely believed, had been planned by those who knew perfectly well that the Catholics would stand out. The Northern Ireland 1923 Education Act contrasts starkly with the Education (Scotland) Act of 1918 where the Government openly approved the principle of denominational schools. This involved giving specific safeguards about the belief and character of the teachers to be appointed, and about the control of religious instruction by the churches. With a few exceptions the solution was approved by the Scottish people.

Protestants had opposed Home Rule for Ireland with a view to protecting religion and the Protestant culture. They had believed that these vital interests were secured by the provisions of the 1920 Government of Ireland Act. Now they feared that the new Education Act required them to transfer a sacred trust. They felt that the new system of education was to the detriment of the Protestant community in that it altered a fundamental principle of education which included religious instruction; had taken away safeguards for appointing suitable teachers; and removed the liberty of an education authority to appoint teachers who

were qualified and willing to give religious instruction. They feared the transferred Protestant schools might come under Catholic management in Nationalist areas where Catholic teachers and principals might be set over Protestant pupils. On the other hand, Catholics, being a minority in Northern Ireland, feared that their schools would come under Protestant education committees with Protestant principals and teachers in charge of Catholic pupils. But, more important, the secularization of the State system denied their principle of "literary and religious education universally combined."

Catholics stood apart from the educational system and the 1923 Act caused an uproar among Protestants. After the Act was passed a delegate meeting of the Church of Ireland (Protestant) and the Presbyterian Church unanimously declared against it, arguing that churches which transferred their schools to the state were entitled to representation on the management committees of such schools; that teachers should be of the same denomination, as far as possible, as the children attending the school; and advised school managers not to transfer their schools at the time. The Methodist church joined in the resolution of the meeting which was sent to the Prime Minister. In the controversy between the Government and the Churches the latter were supported by the Orange Order. During negotiations with the Minister of Education the churches discovered that the principle of moral education the Minister had in mind was "instruction in civics and ethics and good citizenship". The churches proclaimed, however, that the real strength of Ulster lay in Bible teaching. Yet the Government refused to move replying that to do so would contravene the Constitution which prohibited the endowment of any religion. The Protestant churches, advised by counsel that there was no reason in the Government of Ireland Act,

or elsewhere, for the Government's policy in education, confronted the candidates for the 1925 election with the implications of the 1923 Education Act and required their reactions to it.

Under pressure from the United Education Committee of the three main Protestant churches (Church of Ireland, Presbyterian and Methodist) and the Orange Order, the Government passed an amending Act in 1925 deleting the offending sections. By simply removing such sections the local education committees were allowed to provide for bible instruction in their schools, but this was no guarantee that such instruction would be given. The Minister of Education continued in the view that education authorities could not provide and pay for religious instruction as defined in the 1923 Act, but advised that they could adopt a programme of 'simple bible instruction' which teachers could be required to give as part of the ordinary school course. This did not assure the Protestant managers that teachers would be provided by the education authorities to give such instruction. This fear was greatest in Nationalist (Catholic) areas where it was felt that should Catholics form a majority on education committees they would not provide bible instruction. Catholics, on the other hand, thought that 'simple bible instruction' was insufficient as a means of realizing christian character in their children thus finding little pleasure in the 1925 Amendment.

When explaining the 1925 amendment act in Parliament Lord Londonderry appeared to give the impression that the act had changed almost nothing. He asserted that although certain prohibitions regarding the provision of religious education by the local education authorities and the choosing of teachers had been removed the prohibitions regarding the endowment of religion in the Government of Ireland Act remained. Thus the local education authorities and those choosing teachers were

restricted by the Government of Ireland Act. Nevertheless, the amending act seemed to be accepted by the United Education Committee of the Protestant Church. The Education Committee's acceptance of the amendment was based, however, not simply upon the act itself, but upon a truce between Lord Londonderry and themselves. The compromise allowed: (1) local education committees to require that a "programme of simple Bible instruction" be given in provided or transferred schools in the period set apart on the timetable for religious instruction; (2) the Bible instruction was not to be peculiar to any particular religious denomination; (3) the period set apart on the timetable for Bible instruction was not to be included within the hours of compulsory school attendance; (4) teachers were not compelled to give religious instruction if the school managers used the period for religious instruction for specific denominational teaching.

That education committees could require teachers to give religious instruction seemed to permit a double standard in Ulster education. Alternatively, this may be an incidental consequence of other things. All the transferred and provided schools were Protestant schools and religious instruction was general Protestant instruction. All the teachers salaries and all educational expenses of such schools were paid for by local and central government authorities. Nevertheless the attorney-general of Northern Ireland certified the legality of the 1925 Act and raised no objections to the interpretation of the act agreed between the ministry and the Protestant Education Committee. Neither did the United Kingdom government intervene although the amendment act and its interpretation appeared to contravene the Government of Ireland Act of 1920.

The amending act of 1925 did make the education system more

palatable to Protestants and the transfer of some of their schools began. By 1930 440 schools had been transferred and 33 new schools provided. Outside the state system remained 1,420 schools, many of them under Protestant control. As the events of the next few years were to show Protestants transferring their schools to the state would require a more positive provision for the giving of religious instruction in the schools. Although the amending act allowed regions and county boroughs to require that teachers give Bible instruction it did not compel the committees to impose this regulation. Thus, managers of schools transferring to local control usually insisted on the inclusion in the deeds of transfer of a clause binding the regional education committee to see that Bible was taught daily. Most education committees were able to reach agreements with transferring schools, but trouble arose when the Armagh regional education committee refused to insert in the deeds of schools seeking transfer a clause requiring daily Bible instruction. The position regarding Bible instruction in transferred Protestant schools and the "preferential treatment of Catholics was put by the Reverend William Corkey in a statement to the Belfast Synod of the Presbyterian Church in 1928:

> We cannot be expected to view with equanimity the
> working of an Act which strips the Protestant cause
> of over half a million pounds' worth of property and
> takes away from the Protestant Churches all associ-
> ation with education, and at the same time endows
> the Church of Rome and entrenches her clergy more
> firmly than ever in the educational system of our
> country. 12

The Protestants, however, were able - like the Catholics - to maintain complete control of their own schools if they were willing to pay the same price of finding their own funds for many educational expenses.

Prior to the 1929 General Election Protestant clerics mounted a

campaign to secure statutory requirements for the provision of reli-

gious instruction in the state schools. The United Education Com-

mittee of the Protestant Churches declared that "it is only the fee-

ling that the Protestant cause was in grave peril that has compelled

them to lay their case before the public on the eve of the General

Election". The General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church in Ire-

land urged the Government

> ... to make it incumbent on every education authority
> in Northern Ireland, in every instance where the parents
> of not less than ten pupils attending a provided or
> transferred school shall signify in writing their de-
> sire to have religious instruction given to their chil-
> dren, to adopt a Programme of simple Bible Instruction
> to be given by the teachers in that school in the period
> set apart in the time-table for religious instruction,
> always providing that such a programme shall not include
> instruction according to the tenets of any particular
> religious denomination 13

The Prime Minister, having secured information regarding the atti-

tudes of candidate selection committees in the constituencies, realized

that the Government's recent policy on education would be divisive of

the Unionist Party. To end the dispute he issued the statement:

> The Joint Committee of the Protestant Churches and
> the Loyal Orange Institution aim at obtaining -
> Firstly, security for the permanence of Bible Teach-
> ing in all provided and transferred schools, and
> secondly, that scholars shall not have imposed upon
> them teachers whose principles are out of harmony
> with the principles of their parents (i.e. of same
> religion - ed.). To secure these two ends the
> Government is pledged by the declaration of the Minis-
> ter of Education and confirmed by me. 14

The 1930 Education Act laid down that Bible instruction of an un-

denominational character should be given in transferred and provided

schools; that such instruction should be given by the teachers; that

the previous managers of transferred schools and their successors in

office should have authority to nominate not less than half the members

of local school management committees which were given important rights in the appointment of teachers; that the Minister of Education should appoint representatives of the transferrors to serve on the County and County Borough Education Committees; and that Government grants amounting to 50 per cent of the approved cost should be available for the replacement, extension and repair of voluntary schools.

The 1930 Amendment Act safeguarded the Protestant religion in the state schools. By the outbreak of the Second World War 489 schools had been transferred to the local education authorities which had themselves provided 166. State schools had come to be recognised as Protestant schools staffed by Protestant teachers for Protestant pupils. The Protestant character of the state was reflected in the state schools. That bible instruction was undenominational was only satisfying to Protestant denominations and not even to all such, since some of the evangelical sects and small churches saw school bible instruction as a weak version of their own vision of Christianity. To Catholics, however, simple bible instruction was inter-denominational Protestant religious instruction since it concerned only one source of divine revelation, i.e. the bible. Not even bible instruction from a Catholic translation proved capable of bringing Catholics into the state school system since this neglected the teaching of the Catholic church as another source of revelation. Also, the state schools relegated bible instruction to specific periods. This was not pleasing to all Protestants, some of whom desired a more universal use of the scriptures. To Catholics, separation of school life into secular and religious categories was fundamentally unacceptable.

The addition to the amending bill of 1930 regarding the 50 per cent grant of the approved cost of replacement, extension and repair

of voluntary schools deserves some comment. The Canon law required Catholic schools therefore only denominational schools were acceptable to the Catholic bishops. Their position was weak vis-a-vis the Ministry of Education and Government due to Catholic non-co-operation during the early years of the Northern Ireland state. When Joe Devlin, Nationalist MP, took his seat in Parliament the end of Catholic isolationism seemed in sight. When the Protestant clergy began to agitate in 1928-29 the Catholic bishops must have decided that the time was ripe to enter the educational debates within Northern Ireland.

The Catholic bishops stated that no state funds were available for the erection or equipment of new Catholic schools, nor were they able to expand their existing schools with state aid, except on conditions they were unable to accept. They further declared that any educational amendment further favouring the Protestant clergy, without giving some satisfaction to Catholics, would be "... an outrage on justice and decency...."[15]

The first demand that the Catholic bishops and educators made was probably that full financial support should be afforded to their schools on the grounds that provided and transferred schools were actually Protestant schools. The first demand was backed up with the threat that if the 1930 amendment was passed without concession to Catholics, legal action would be taken regarding the endowment of religion in state schools which the Constitution prohibited. The Catholic bishops, in fact, retreated from this position when the threat of legal action was dropped with the suggestion that the school committees management system, approved by the state, could be modified to fit with Catholic Church principles. In this case, the committees could attend to the purely secular side of education with Church managers controlling

all matters referring to religion and morals.

The Catholic bishops' position was supported by a campaign of Catholic laymen, politicians, journalists, priests - leading to the compromise position that an additional clause should be added to the education bill providing for 50 per cent grants for the construction and expansion of voluntary schools. The Catholic Church authorities thus accepted the 1930 Education Act.

Although the education authorities were hampered in developing a unified educational structure by religious and political conflicts they were not entirely unsuccessful in expanding and improving the system. By 1939 they had provided places in state schools for 48,000 children and had reconstructed many of the schools transferred to them. Many voluntary schools were rebuilt and extended with grants from the ministry. Scholarships were given to children to attend secondary schools who could not otherwise have done so, and the secondary school system was remodelled with the number of Grammar school children greatly increasing.[16]

The next major educational controversy involving a religious principle was sparked off in 1944 when the Northern Ireland Government published a White Paper[17] on proposed post-war educational legislation. In this the Government stated its intention of introducing a 'conscience clause' to protect the position of teachers in the County schools since such provision was necessary to comply with the Government of Ireland Act of 1920, section 5. (Endowment of religion prohibition.). The Protestants feared, on this occasion, that they had been misled in 1930 and that what guarantees they had regarding religious instruction in schools could be lost if education authorities could not take suitability or willingness to give bible instruction into account when making

an appointment. This could lead, it was felt by many, to schools being without teachers who were willing to give religious instruction, or to bible instruction being given to Protestant children by Catholics or Communists.

The Education Act (1947) denied education committees the right to take account of the willingness or ability to give religious instruction into account when appointing teachers. Nor were teachers to suffer any loss of promotion or other advantages through not giving religious instruction. However the Act made it compulsory for Primary and Secondary schools to provide undenominational religious instruction and a collective act of worship. Consequently, there had to be provisions for education committees to appoint additional teachers to give religious instruction if none of the other appointees were suitable or willing. The Protestant Churches argued that this involved taking religion into account anyhow and the educational authorities may as well make sure of the religious instruction question when making any appointments.

Public grants to voluntary schools, a thorny subject almost anywhere, but especially so in Northern Ireland, aroused widespread debate in 1947. It was proposed that if voluntary schools agreed to the appointment of Four and Two Committees (i.e. one-third of members appointed by the local education authority)they would receive a 65 per cent grant for buildings and equipment and that local education authorities should assume full responsibility for the heating, lighting, cleaning and repairs. Those remaining entirely voluntary would receive only 50 per cent of such expenditure. The voluntary schools could not keep up with the post-war educational building programme even with 50 per cent grants for certain items. At the same time many Catholic

school managers felt that education committees would discriminate against them if they accepted representation from them on their committees. The Catholic bishops declared, "We reject them because we fear that these committees are but an instalment to the complete transfer of our schools...."[18] Assurances that Four and Two Committees left the final decisions in their hands as previously produced the response that if this was the case there was little to be gained by the new committees and the grant may as well be given to the voluntary managers. The Government, facing the dilemma, agreed to provide 65 per cent of the capital and running costs of voluntary schools. This led, among Protestants, to considerable agitation about "Rome on the Rates". Protestants felt that they had transferred millions of pounds' worth of property to the state without financial compensation and that Catholics, who had maintained their voluntary status, not only kept their schools, but received huge grants from the Government to run them. Catholics, on the other hand, could argue that the Protestant churches had been well compensated for their property by the inclusion of simple bible instruction as a compulsory part of education in the County schools, (i.e. compulsory in the sense that it must be given to those whose parents desire it).

The Education Act of 1947 laid new responsibilities upon local education bodies which were too wide to be carried out by small regional committees. The County Education Authority lost its power to set up a number of smaller regional committees. The reforms in the Act were mainly educational which led to changes in the structures to carry them out. The Act recognised that children were entitled to an education suited to their age, capabilities and aptitudes. It prescribed three stages of education - primary, secondary, and further education -

and imposed on local education authorities the duty of assuring effec-
tive education through these stages in each area. Children up to the
age of 11-plus were to attend elementary schools. Secondary schools
of different kinds were to be provided for older children according
to ability. A new system of secondary schools had to be created -
secondary intermediate schools - to train children beyond the age
of 11-plus for whom Grammar school training was thought unsuited.
Secondary schools, by virtue of their size and resources, could not
be scattered around the countryside as much as primary schools, thus
arguing for greater centralization and consistency in standards in the
educational system. Technical Secondary schools usually did not take
children until the age of 13-plus. Hence, some children left Primary
schools at 11-plus and continued from Intermediate to Technical schools
at 13-plus. The Government of the day did not endeavour to reconstruct
the secondary school system on comprehensive lines. Had it done so,
many with vested interests in voluntary / grammar schools would have ob-
jected and probably withdrawn to fully self-supporting positions. The
Government did, however, encourage experiments in secondary school or-
ganization to reduce the importance of selection at 11-plus. Schools
in certain areas were encouraged to reorganise themselves on a non-
selective basis and non-selective schools were proposed for new housing
areas. Some Intermediate schools introduced academic courses leading
to the G.C.E. examination and achieved results which cast doubt upon
the method of selection at 11-plus.

The Education Act of 1947 has been kept under review and a major
amendment was introduced in 1968 which made provision for a new cate-
gory of schools - maintained schools. Such schools are voluntary
primary, secondary (intermediate), and special schools managed by

statutory committees consisting of not less than six members, of whom two-thirds represent the former managers, and one-third the local education authority. Maintained schools qualify for a grant of 80 per cent towards the cost of approved building and alterations instead of the previous 65 per cent grant. The local education authority is also responsible for the maintenance and equipment of such schools. The 80 per cent building grant is also payable to voluntary Grammar schools which accept that one-third of their board of governors be appointed by the Minister of Education.

Catholic reactions to the Maintained schools and 80 per cent grant varied. They were seen by the Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, Dr William Philbin, as "an invasion of the established system of Catholic school management." The Catholic Primate of all Ireland, Cardinal William Conway, found some of the proposals of the White Paper preceding the Act very acceptable, but was concerned over the powers the Act intended giving the local education authorities, commenting that, "If they treat us unfairly in such matters as housing, as many of them do, may they not do the same with our schools."

The Bill, when published, contained the concession that schools accepting "maintained" status would be free to revert to the purely voluntary system if former managers gave two years' notice of change, and made appropriate repayments to offset additional assistance they had received. The Catholic bishops agreed to give the new system a "... fair trial ... in the interests of harmony and goodwill." The Irish National Teachers' Organisation were satisfied that the position of Catholic schools could be safeguarded by the central Government and supported the proposals for reform.

Table II.1: Primary and Secondary Schools and Pupils by Management
Type : January 1971

Type of School	Number	Pupils
County		
Primary	624	111,004
Secondary	118	58,829
Maintained Voluntary		
Primary	382	69,683
Secondary (Intermediate only)	79	34,848
Voluntary		
Primary	210	31,372
Secondary (mainly Grammar)	68	42,992

Source: Northern Ireland Educational Statistics (H.M.S.O.
Dec., 1971) p.15.

The population of Northern Ireland consists of approximately 63
per cent Protestants, 35 per cent Catholics and two per cent either not
Christian, or not willing to state their religion. Under the age of
fifteen years, however, the religious populations are more evenly
balanced: 57 per cent Protestant and 43 per cent Catholic. (Northern
Ireland Census 1961). This presents the problem of Protestants being
eventually outbred in Northern Ireland, but the higher Catholic emi-
gration rate has kept Protestants in a firm majority since the begin-
ning of the regime.

One of the most enduring, widespread, and topical disputes
arising from the political history of education in Northern Ireland
concerns educating Protestants and Catholics in the same schools.
Integrated, non-religious education, the stated policy of the first
education bill in Northern Ireland, is not a Catholic-Protestant di-
vide alone, since many Protestants hold firmly that their children

should be educated by those who wish to maintain a Protestant tradition as the dominant way of life in Ulster. And not all Catholics proclaim themselves against allowing their children to attend the same schools as Protestants. But as one Catholic couple said, "We would like to send our children to integrated schools but some of the Protestants are against us and the children might suffer." The issue, however, is emotionally explosive, and is capable of arousing people with little experience of Northern Ireland to make sweeping and absolute statements about the presumed evils of segregated education.

The most common arguments for integrated education have been those from economy, effectiveness, and ecumenism. The economic debate generally hinges on the unnecessary costs to taxpayers through the duplication of schools. The argument may sometimes be a genuine economic debate about the optimum size of schools, but it often contains overtones about "Rome on the Rates". Some reply that it is difficult to see what real saving would be effected by abolishing denominational schools. The total number of children requiring education would remain the same no matter which schools they attended: there would be no saving in teachers' salaries; nor would there be great cut-backs in building costs since the building price is calculated by the number likely to be on the roll: so much per square foot per child. Catholics, arguing against the "Rome on the Rates" accusation reply that they are also taxpayers and, as such, along with others, support education. It is hard to deny however, that a school with a common campus and many shared educational facilities would avoid some duplication in subjects which require the most expensive equipment and offer fewest opportunities for "preaching" e.g. physics.

The argument against denomination schools from effectiveness is sometimes linked to the shortage of teachers in some schools leading to overcrowding and lowering of standards. Against this the voluntarists of different religions have replied that abolishing their schools would not change the number of pupils requiring education or the number of teachers prepared to give it. If the pupil/staff ratio in the best staffed schools were to apply all round more teachers would be required.

Arguments for mixed religious schools from ecumenism have ranged from seeing integration as a cure for all social ills to being helpful in creating better understanding between religious communities. But so few in Northern Ireland have experienced integrated education. David Watson writes:

> We started school at nine o'clock when the master
> blew his whistle. The Catholics went off to a
> different room for religion and we had to go to
> our own room. But that was all, because after
> this we used to share desks and play together and
> go home. 19

But he was one of a small minority in Northern Ireland. The Loyalty adult survey found that while attendance at mixed schools in Northern Ireland tended to reduce extreme views it does so to only a very limited extent.[20] Those attending technical schools experience integrated education after years of separate schooling, and some attending university in Northern Ireland comment on the tendency for religious/political groupings to polarize.

The more extreme case against segregated education is illustrated in a section of Orangeism: A New Historical Appreciation:

> Education will always be a thorny problem in the Province,
> for no single thing has contributed more to disharmony
> among the people. The Roman Catholic policy of strict
> educational apartheid has produced a ghetto mentality
> among her people to give them a prescribed outlook on

life generally and community life particularly. No-
where is discrimination more apparent and its effect
more obvious. No study of Irish history can begin
until this primary fact is appreciated. 21

Elsewhere, disorder in Northern Ireland has been ascribed to

segregated education:

... The Provisionals have all been brought up in
schools where a United Ireland is regarded as the
only natural solution and forget that Protestants
have been brought up in schools where a United Ire-
land is regarded as highly unnatural, unnatural
enough to shoot and burn about. They did it in the
1920s and the 1930s and again in 1969.... 22

The faith that keeping children and young people of different reli-

gions in separate educational establishments is a major cause of commun-

ity divisions in Northern Ireland is widely preached. Integrated educa-

tion has been advocated by such bodies as the Ulster Teachers Union

(mainly Protestant), the Irish National Teachers' Organisation (I.N.T.O)

(mainly Catholic), The National Council of Civil Liberties, and the Nor-

thern Ireland Civil Rights Association. Underlying some arguments that

integrated education will heal community divisions is the belief that

bigotry is bred in the schools. Another assumption is that simply sepa-

rating children at an early age will be a divisive factor in community

relations whether or not the schools manifestly inculcate suspicions

about the 'others'.

Some educationalists maintain that teachers should

start knowing the social experience of their children and reflect this

back to them as something valid and significant for their development.[23]

Many of the seven year old children I interviewed during pilot studies

had a clear grasp of the emotive symbolism that makes attacking politi-

cal enemies justifiable. I found it hard to believe that the ma-

jority of teachers I met explicitly reflected this back to the school-

boys.   Barrit and Carter write:

> ... Obviously there is no way of drawing up a fair
> account; but on balance it is very likely that the
> teaching profession, composed of educated and reason-
> able men and women, is an influence against bitter-
> ness rather than a stimulant of it.... 24

The separation of children at an early age occurs where Protes-
tants and Catholics have lived and played together before school age.
But in a great many cases going to separate schools is simply a continu-
ation of the only life many children have already experienced on segre-
gated housing estates and city streets.   Moreover, such separation as
does exist is intended to create differences between persons thought
important to the communities and/or churches concerned.   Whether simply
attending one religion schools creates embittered community relations
which would not otherwise have existed is difficult to investigate.

The largest survey of this problem was conducted by Andrew M.
Greely and Peter H. Rossi in The Education of Catholic Americans.   One
of the questions they studied was that Catholic schools "... restrict
interaction between Catholics and adults of other religious faiths,
that they lead Catholics to non-involvement in community activities,
that they develop rigid and intolerant attitudes...."   Their findings
from a large nation-wide survey of American Catholics revealed that:

> We could find no evidence that the products of such
> a separate system were less involved in community ac-
> tivities, less likely to have friends from other reli-
> gious groups, more intolerant in their attitudes, or
> less likely to achieve either occupationally or academi-
> cally.   On the contrary we found they were slightly
> more successful in the world of study and work and,
> after the breaking point of college, much more toler-
> ant....
> ...There is no trace of divisive influence.   Catholic-
> school Catholics are just as likely to be interested
> in community affairs and to have non-Catholic visitors,
> friends, neighbours and co-workers as are public school
> Catholics....

> ... Are Catholic school Catholics more rigid and in-
> tolerant than those (Catholics) who did not go to
> Catholic schools? The answer once again is negative.
> Catholic-school Catholics are actually more tolerant
> with regard to civil liberties and are no more anti-
> Negro, anti-Semitic, or anti-Protestant. 25

One of the less extreme views of the results of integrated educa-
tion is that it would not heal all the major divisions in society, but
would help alleviate some of them. One writer suggests that, "It is
easy for those of us who have had the advantage of a liberal education
and tolerant home background to claim that schools have little to do
with overcoming prejudice. How are those who live in segregated back
streets, who attend segregated schools, and live separate lives to over-
come their blind bigotry if the schools do not attempt?"[26] It is fur-
ther suggested that integration at community and employment level is
much harder than at school. "Desegregate the schools, however, and
people on both sides will more readily question segregation in jobs and
houses."[27]

Whether the segregation of schools is seen as a major cause of
bitterness in Northern Ireland or as a feature which, if removed, would
ease community relations, does not diminish the obstacles one has to
face in school integration. One's faith in the results of integrated
education, however, gives a perspective upon the obstacles. One diffi-
culty on the way to an integrated system involves appointing numbers of
Catholic teachers to County schools. This could involve changes in the
constitutions of school management committees which have important rights
in the appointment of teachers. Perhaps some amended legislation would
be necessary to ensure that a sufficient number of Catholic teachers
were transferred. On the other hand, would the Catholic Church accept
an influx of Protestants to their schools if this involved a lowering

of the "religious atmosphere".

In their pamphlet Educational Administration in Northern Ireland

the Irish National Teachers' Organisation suggest that before integrated

education could be attempted:

> There would need to be a substantial period of impar-
> tial central and local administration before Catholic
> teachers would consider such a change. Their appre-
> hensions about the possibility of partisan administra-
> tion are supported by experience in the field of Further
> Education. This is one area where a system of integra-
> ted education operates, yet only two of the 32 principals
> are Catholics and both of these teachers were appointed
> by regional education committees. 28

Even if these obstacles could be overcome school teachers them-

selves are products of a segregated educational system. Although many

secondary teachers probably shared a common education with those of

another religion at university, most teachers who went from school to

education colleges were completely segregated. (Protestants and

Catholics attend separate Colleges of Education in Ulster). Membership

of teachers' unions also serve to separate schoolteachers in a divided

country. About a quarter of teachers in Northern Ireland belong to the

Irish National Teachers' Organisation. It is an all-Ireland body with

headquarters in Dublin. It has a predominantly Catholic membership and

is associated mainly with the voluntary primary schools. A second quar-

ter belongs to the Ulster Teachers' Union. They formed a breakaway

from the INTO and are entirely Protestant. Their slogan - "An Ulster

Union for Ulster Teachers." The Union is associated mainly with the

County primary schools. The National Association of Schoolmasters and

the Union of Women Teachers have a joint agreement on matters of common

interest. They constitute about one-quarter of teachers in Ulster and

have an integrated membership. The remainder of teachers belong to

smaller bodies such as The Assistant Masters' Association, the Association

of Assistant Mistresses, the Association of Head Teachers in Secondary Schools, and to no union. Among the smaller bodies there is some association across religious lines and some segregation. The sectarian picture of teachers' unions is broadly one of about half the teachers in Ulster who have some experience of accommodation with the "other" religion in school matters; the other half, in Primary schools, may have gone from school to teachers' training colleges and segregated teachers' unions. Any attempts to integrate education in Ulster would have to consider the separate experience of schoolteachers who would be required to make the system work.

The compliance of parents must be presumed before a system of integrated education could function since they, under the influence of whatever guidance they value, must make the final decision. Would Protestant parents want their children to come under the discipline of Catholic nuns and Christian Brothers? Would Catholic parents feel at ease if their children had to listen td the views of an avowed Orangeman? Probably a central issue to be struck in any state attempt to integrate education would be the rights of parents. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, article 26, number 3- signed by the United Kingdom - declares:

> Parents have a prior right to choose
> the kind of education that shall be
> given to their children.

The Catholic Church insists that it is the duty of Catholic parents to ensure a continuation of Catholic education for their children of school-age. A Catholic seeking integrated education may find himself stigmatised (by the Church) as less than a good Catholic. Protestants, whilst not under the same institutionalised pressure to build church schools,

may be unhappy if integrated education were introduced tomorrow.

Two inter-related problems involved in integrated education in Ulster are the voluntary school tradition and suitable compensation for voluntary schools taken over by the state. Voluntary Grammar schools, both Protestant and Catholic, have a long tradition in Ulster. Such schools are strong, have influential middle class backing, and cannot be ignored as a small minority of schools. About three-quarters of the 45,000 grammar school places in Northern Ireland are still in voluntary schools. Such schools with extensive properties in buildings and land would doubtless demand massive compensation from the state if integrated education involved their demise.

Integrated education would be beset by the problem of transporting, or "bussing", pupils from their neighbourhood religious school to the integrated school of another area. Two-way traffic would be necessary if only to make room for one another. Given the community nature of many schools in segregated housing estates should the community school be destroyed to make way for integrated education? And would the "bussing" of pupils in Ulster cause political reactions similar to those in America?

The first Government of Northern Ireland indicated that they wanted to keep Protestants and Catholics together in the schools. To accomplish this end they introduced a non-religious scheme of education which failed abyssmally because the churches opposed the "secularization" of the system, and wanted a programme of Christian education in the schools which would satisfy them that they were promoting the essentials of the Christian faith. The two main problems concerning what is essential in Christian education, which split Catholics and Protestants, concern (1) non-denominational bible teaching and (2) the separation of

religion and secular subjects in the school curriculum. The crux of the problem of non-denominational bible teaching is that one denomination (the Catholic Church) regards its own particular teaching as essential, and bible teaching insufficient, for the realization of Christian character. The Protestant Churches have generally been able to agree to some form of common school Christianity based upon bible instruction. Protestant agreement has not been total, but disagreements have been kept within school limits so long as no denomination sought to impose their particular tenets upon children of another faith, or none. Because the Protestants have a more or less "common Christianity" syllabus for the schools the Catholic Church has been regarded as standing outside the State system due to its insistence upon teaching its own particular tenets.

The Catholic position appears to be the more complicated one regarding religious education in schools. The theological basis for the Catholic position regarding the importance of their own teaching rests on the belief that Christianity is a continuing revelation expressed, mainly, through the Catholic Church. The Canon Law reads:

> Parents have a most serious duty to secure a fully Catholic education for their children in all that concerns the instruction of their minds, the training of their wills to virtue, their bodily welfare and the preparation of their life as citizens.
>
> All the Faithful shall be so educated from childhood, that not only shall nothing contrary to the Catholic religion and good morals be taught them, but religious and moral education shall have the principal place....
>
> Catholic pupils are not to frequent non-Catholic schools or neutral schools or schools that are open also to non-Catholics. Only the Ordinary of the place where the school is situated is competent to determine, according to the instructions of the Apostolic See, in what circumstances it may be tolerated for Catholics to attend such schools and what safeguards are to be prescribed against the danger of perversion.... 29

The Canon Law introduces another legislature whose effect is real and visible upon the behaviour of some citizens. The conflict between the law of the land and Church goes back to the Two Swords of Pope Gelasius I. This doctrine implied a dual organization and control of human society in the interests of two classes of values: spiritual and temporal. Between the representatives of these classes, the clergy and the civil officials, co-operation was more likely where the Church was as universal as the Empire. But in a country where political and religious divisions follow similar lines, the flags honoured by religious congregations, and their schools, raise the question: whose country is this? Thus, spiritual interests reinforce temporal conflict in Northern Ireland.

The Second Vatican Council affirmed the duty of Catholic parents to send their children to Catholic schools, when and where possible, e.g. not mandatory for salvation. In his booklet Catholic Schools, Cardinal Conway quotes an extract from a pastoral letter issued by Cardinal Fringe of Cologne (generally regarded as a liberal bishop) some time after the council:

> The Catholic school gives to teachers possibilities of
> upbringing that only a Church school is able to give.
> Here Catholic children are brought up by Catholic tea-
> chers in the spirit of the Catholic faith. Here the
> children receive not only a grounding in the catechism,
> but the whole atmosphere of the school can convey the
> stamp of faith.... If you have children that are to be
> enrolled in school during these weeks, then enroll them
> in a Catholic school.... Don't be led astray into trans-
> ferring your children from the Catholic school to another
> type of school, just because here and there the school
> building is nicer or the way there a bit shorter. 30

The position of the Catholic priest in the Catholic school system is to act for the Catholic Church. This is part of his priestly minis-
try. Thus, for Catholic schools to become state schools, using a

"common Christianity" syllabus, they would have to disregard many teachings peculiar to themselves which they regard as essential for the religious and moral development.of children. Catholics must be denominational to be Catholics whilst Protestants can be inter-Protestant-denominational in their teachings and remain true to the essentials of the faith. This only underlies that the divisions set up at the Protestant Reformation are still clearly visible in modern schools. But to this it may be replied that in integrated State schools children could be divided into denominational groups for religious instruction with as many ministers, priests, pastors and missionaries as there were churches and mission halls represented in the school. Such a provision, however, stumbles over another basic question which separates Protestants and Catholics - the division of the school day into divine and profane categories.

Protestants have never been entirely happy about the separation of religious and secular subjects in the school curriculum, but have managed to preserve a Reformed Front in school religious education. So much of the history and literature of Northern Ireland concerns religion that it has been a difficult subject to contain in classes specially designed for it. In one sense all education in Ulster is religious education since the congregations are almost entirely of one faith and culture. In another sense, secular subjects are sometimes taught in a non-religious atmosphere in so far as God and the Church do not figure largely in mathematics lessons. Nevertheless, due to the prominence given to religion in Ulster schools the religious interpretation of all subjects is indirectly encouraged. Whilst Protestants can pay lip service to the ideal of separate religious and secular instruction Catholics do not accept the principle of separation. The Catholic school is

thought of as a continuation of the Catholic home and Catholic Church,
where each school creates its own atmosphere in imperceptible ways
which permeate the entire school day. Cardinal Conway wrote:

> Probably the most important factor in preserving
> this "religious atmosphere" of the school is the
> attitude towards religion of the teachers. Their
> faith, or unfaith, will breathe into the air of
> the school. 31

Probably many Catholics simply do not believe that County schools
actually contain religious instruction to classes specially designed
for it. And Protestants may believe that Catholics say a "Hail Mary"
after each calculation or sentence. Until Protestants and Catholics
can find some areas of agreement on this basic question, integrated
education, which supports Christian ideals, is unlikely.

One question that is being asked with increasing anxiety is
whether or not the principle of combined literary and religious educa-
tion is being carried out effectively in Catholic schools. In other
words, are Catholic schools really effective in promoting the Catholic
faith among those who attend them? A Report by the Catholic Renewal
Movement in England and Wales suggests, among other things, that expo-
sure to education in some Catholic schools can weaken faith and dull
moral awareness. It also says that Catholic schools demand docility
rather than inquiry, and conformity rather than creativity.[32] One
writer suggests that the Catholic school is the major way by which a
Catholic parish legitimises itself. Any failure at the school level
reflects itself at the parish level where Catholics are failing in their
function as a worshipping community.[33] A similar vein can be found in
Greely and Rossi where they find the success of the Catholic school in
promoting the Catholic faith largely dependent upon the religious back-

ground of the pupils. They write:

> In answer to the question, "Have Catholic schools
> worked?" we might respond that they have worked
> very well for those who would already be part of
> the religious elite; they have not worked so well
> for those whose religious backgrounds were less in-
> tense, and, apparently, Catholics who have not atten-
> ded them have not been appreciably harmed by non-
> attendance. 34

The separate education of some Catholics and Protestants is meant

to continue religious differences thought important since the Protestant

Reformation. Separate schools for Protestants and Catholics may not

have been very successful in educating better Christians. On the other

hand, separate education may be useful in promoting differences in

approach to the events of 1690 and 1916 in Ireland. This is a plaus-

ible presumption. If the communities in Ulster can elect representatives

who will pass legislation making way for integrated education this will be

some indication that political differences are being brought within a

system of generally acknowledged rules. In such an event integrated

education may be unnecessary to heal divisions between adult communities

which are co-operating over a basic problem. This may be a suggestion

that integrated education has been a "red-herring" to draw the atten-

tion of the observer away from the political level where discord exists.

Many may follow this "holy grail" in the hope of community harmony.

Others may be satisfied that so many have blamed segregated education

for political divisions thus diverting attack from the central decision

makers.

The greater the State management in a school the greater the fin-

ancial assistance the school receives from public funds. Reciprocally,

if a school expects higher financial assistance from the state it must

also be prepared for fuller state representation upon its management

committee. Many Protestants have resented State support for Catholic

schools, in particular, on a number of counts; they (the Protestants)

have transferred their own schools to public control without financial

compensation and now see public aid to Catholic, and other voluntary,

schools climbing still higher; they have sought to safeguard the Pro-

testant faith through the County schools, and have come under attack

on numerous occasions for this, whilst the Catholic faith is taught

freely in the Catholic schools; they resent the payment of salaries

to priests, Christian Brothers and nuns, who teach in school, seeing

this as an endowment, out of public funds, to the Catholic Church,

amounting, according to some, to a theft of taxpayers money; they fear

the Catholic teachers do not inculcate loyalty to the State, but teach

Republicanism which, according to some, amounts to treason. Some Pro-

testants suggest that since State schools are for all, all should attend,

and failure to do so is to sabotage the duly constituted Government.

School voluntarists have replied that public schools are for

those who might be satisfied with the subject matter they teach and the

way they teach it. Catholics, in particular, have argued that if, for

the sake of unity, their schools are to be disregarded, the state has

no right to claim to be a democracy and that the liberty of even poli-

tical parties will soon be forbidden. They also claim that by teaching

love of God and neighbour their instruction is unifying and not divisive.

Probably the most fundamental thrust of their argument is that education

primarily belongs to the family and not to the State. Thus, when

voluntary schools ask for State aid their demands are just since they

undertake the literary and scientific instruction of the children of

taxpayers.

Those who are involved in the voluntary schools of Ulster, either

as teachers or parents, are in great need of assistance from public monies to keep up with post-war educational expansion. The expansion and expenditure has occurred in two waves. The first in the late '40s following the Butler Education Act; the second from the late '60s onwards following the great increase in Secondary education. Catholics, in particular, fear that the increase in public representation that goes with increased state aid will involve an increase in Protestant power. For instance, the Northern Ireland Education Acts provided that the powers and duties of a local education authority should be exercised through an education committee constituted in accordance with a scheme approved by the Ministry of Education. Catholics formed, as one would expect, a minority of the total membership of such education committees. One particular anxiety arising from this was that local education committees would discriminate against the Catholic community in the appointments of non-teaching staff. Civil rights workers alleged, in 1969, that out of 77 persons employed in a salaried capacity in one local education committee headquarters only one was a Catholic.[35] The Protestant imbalance in local education authorities also aroused the fear that the Association of Education Committees in Ulster, which had considerable influence in educational policy, would be very disproportionately Protestant. "The total number of representatives appointed for the year 1968/9 was 62, of whom three were Catholics."[36] Other Catholic anxieties in school management included Central Committee appointments to the Inspectorate, which have been disproportionately Protestant, and prohibitions in the use of certain school history texts which may be thought valuable by Catholic educators.

The chairman of the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutions indicated that he thought the mixing of Protestants and

Catholics in the same schools insufficient as an educational ideal in Northern Ireland. "... the non-sectarian, non-selective and co-educational nature of further education could be one of the most effective weapons available for forging a new and integrated society in Ulster."[37] Non-selective education means comprehensive schooling: a merging of Grammar and Intermediate (Secondary Modern) Schools.

The major difference between the 1944 Education Act in England and Wales and the 1947 Education Act in Northern Ireland was fee paying in Grammar schools in Ulster. Children who failed the 11-plus could attend Grammar school if their parents could afford the fees. The voluntary Grammar school received assistance from public funds if 80 per cent of places were reserved for those receiving state scholarships. The remaining 20 per cent could be available for non-scholarship children whose parents could afford the fees.

The main cause of the difference between the 1944 and 1947 Education Acts was that whilst in England and Wales a large majority of existing Secondary schools were maintained by the State, in Ulster only nine out of 75 were in this position. The Northern Ireland Government could either build a tri-partite system - primary, intermediate, grammar - themselves, or work with the already existing Grammar schools and create new Secondary Intermediate schools. They opted for the second policy giving a 65 per cent grant to voluntary Grammar schools for certain purposes, paying the teachers' salaries, and allowing them to obtain the remaining finance from government scholarships and fees payed directly by parents.

The circumstances availing in the 1940s were against a policy of comprehensive education. But the subject continued to be raised from

time to time.   In 1964 a White Paper on Educational Development in

Northern Ireland (Cmd. 470) examined the arguments for and against

comprehensive education and concluded:

> ... even if the Government took full powers to recons-
> truct the secondary school system on comprehensive
> lines irrespective of established interests or opinions,
> the actual size and location of many existing school
> premises would present formidable difficulties.
>   Such a proposal would moreover be certain to arouse
> strong opposition. Some voluntary grammar schools
> might, indeed, claim the right to secede from the
> grant aided educational system and to operate as indepen-
> dent schools wholly dependent on fees, which would of
> course have to be very much higher than they are now.
> This would set up a social cleavage within the Northern
> Ireland educational system such as it has never known
> before.
>   Given, therefore, the facts of the existing situa-
> tion and the disruption, expense, restriction of paren-
> tal choice and ill-feeling which would be caused by an
> imposed system of comprehensive schools, the Government
> is satisfied that it would be wrong to make a complete
> change in the pattern of secondary education established
> under the 1947 Act. 38

In 1973, a Report of the Advisory Council for Education in Northern Ire-

land on the Reorganisation of Secondary Education recommended (with

three members dissenting) that the Minister of State make now a declara-

tion of intent to eliminate selection at 11-plus as soon as possible

through the restructuring of the educational system,[39] and the minister

responsible for education, Mr. William Van Straubenzee, promised to

consult with those most concerned.

One argument against selection at the age of 11-plus has been

from equality.   The middle-class child who fails to clamber over the

selection fence at 11-plus is often to be seen entering the Grammar

school course, through his parents' payments, despite his lack of ability

and aptitude for the studies to be pursued.   It is also contended that

the separation of children into different types of schools at 11-plus

causes a social class division in society. This can lead, it is sometimes thought, to viewing society in terms of two-class-conflict rather than seeing persons of all social status engaged in a co-operative effort for the improvement of life in general. Also, working class boys are frequently thought of as being more socially violent. Recently, newspapers have devoted many columns to violence in schools and to disorder in school playgrounds. It has also been suggested that many teachers in secondary modern schools in working class areas see their function as the containment of the violence of the future unemployed. Comprehensive education has been urged on the grounds that mixing by social class would reduce violent tendencies in some children as well as creating job aspirations among those who find little employment incentive in their homes.

Perhaps one reason why comprehensive education is difficult to implement in Northern Ireland is because religious issues have repeatedly clouded social class disputes and rendered them of secondary importance. One cannot read the political history of education in Ulster without being impressed by the number of occasions, and the intensity of feeling, with which religious/political issues have divided educators since the foundation of the Northern State. Schools that differ by religion are supported by segregated churches and housing estates and by a whole complex of non-reciprocated values within separate communities. One purpose of later chapters will be to investigate school and community influences and the possible effect they may have upon schoolboy civic learning. The school does not exist in an academic campus: neither does its pupils come and go from its confines, and attend to its lessons, without following community trails.

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22. "Provo Policy", Fortnight, Dec 15 1971.

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24. Barrit and Carter, op. cit., p. 92.

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27. Ibid.

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Chapter III

Fieldwork: Strategies and Hazards

> ... Northern Ireland has suffered from an overdose
> of snap judgements reached by so called experts at
> the price of a 50 pence taxi ride around a few of
> the trouble spots of Belfast... 1

My first-hand experience of Northern Ireland and its peoples began in 1956 and is not limited to Belfast during the troubles.   Thus most of my memories of Northern Ireland are pleasant ones.   After having lived cheek by jowl with a few Antrim lads for almost three years, and having married a girl from the County Down about fourteen years ago, I begin to feel some of the Ulster arguments without being driven to take sides.   For the past ten years I have spent some time each year in the Province and for the last three years my visits have become more extensive.   During fieldwork I visited and stayed for quite some time in a number of major Provincial towns and covered the surrounding rural areas, thus building upon my experience of Ulster and its ways.   My memories of Ulster are many and varied: peacetime and war; gladness and sorrow; hope and disillusionment.   In this I have partially learned to appreciate the depths of the feelings in Ulster as well as beginning to understand some of the arguments.

The first part of fieldwork was conducted in August 1970 when three hundred boys and girls and young people were interviewed in small groups using open-ended techniques.   The purpose of such interviews was to establish what sort of questions about civic learning could best be asked.   In the light of their answers, and questions which arose from more formal testing, the questionnaires were revised five times.   Out

of some 200 questions tested, 80 were selected for the Secondary School

Survey and 60 for the Primary School Survey. The major Secondary

school investigation commenced early in 1971 and continued until after

the Easter vacation. The Primary school survey began in November 1971

when questions were tested among different age groups to discover when

a child could handle the concept of Government and a paper-and-pencil

questionnaire. The major survey (upon which this investigation is

based) involved formal questionnaire interviews with three thousand

boys (almost equal numbers of Catholics and Protestants). A total of

972 interviews were in Grammar schools, 946 in Secondary Intermediate

schools (Secondary Modern), and 1,116 in Primary schools. The sample

was designed so that respondents should be drawn from areas experien-

cing different disorder levels; changing religious proportions in

school-catchment zones; town size should vary quite considerably; and

children should reside East and West of the River Bann (the prosperous

and less well developed areas of Ulster); near to and far from the Bor-

der.

Only boys were interviewed in the major administrations, partly

because of time and financial problems, and partly because of the basic

variables chosen for intestigation. For instance, most studies have

revealed few differences by sex as far as evaluations of Government are

concerned, and boys were thought to be more violence-prone than girls.[*]

In the Secondary school fieldwork an equal number of Grammar and

Intermediate schools were chosen in order to uncover differences which

might exist between Grammar schoolboys and others. The Secondary school

years selected were First and Fourth. The Primary School years chosen

[*] Additional reasons for concentrating upon boys only are given in
     Appendix I.

were primary Four and primary Six. Certain school years had to be selected because it was impossible to cover every school year within the time available. Spreading the sampling framework over eight years allows time for political development. Including the Fourth year in some Secondary schools almost certainly involved interviewing some boys who were actively engaged, whatever their motivations, in violence.

In all, children from approximately forty schools completed a questionnaire. From the beginning of the first pilot study, through preliminary testing, to the end of the major Primary Survey, approximately 3,800 children and young people were contacted. Whilst this is not a scientifically random sample it is much more representative of schoolboys in Ulster than American samples have been of children there. Not only is the sample size proportionately much larger, but an effort was also made to include middle and working class boys from districts which had experienced different levels of disorder and economic development. (See Appendix I.).

The general background to the survey was one of increasing violence and tension: a time when jokes about the 'troubles' became fewer and more unpopular. The first pilot studies began around the time when Protestants were attacking soldiers on the Shankill Road (late 1970). Schoolboys stoning the soldiers made use of the wind which blew tear gas in the opposite direction providing a screen for their activities and an irritant to unprotected soldiers. The major Secondary school Survey was conducted when riots were erupting frequently on the Falls Road (Catholic) and observers, like myself, were frequently detained for questioning by local vigilantes. In March 1971 three Scottish soldiers were found shot in a lonely lane outside Belfast. If this had not been so tragic it would have been amusing listening to the rumours and counter-

rumours which circulated in both communities. Halfway through the Secondary school survey the Prime Minister resigned and was replaced by Brian Faulkner. Towards the end of this part of fieldwork rioting broke out in East Belfast where the army opened fire upon a number of people marching through a police cordon. Four, including a twelve year old boy, were admitted to hospital. Thus, during the first survey both 'Government' and 'Disorder' were highly salient issues. But these were quiet days compared to the post-internment atmosphere.

Between the Primary and Secondary school surveys bombing of shops and Government property rose sharply as did the number of arms searches and shootings. But the major event, between surveys, was the introduction of Internment without trial. There was a violent reaction in Nationalist areas and in some streets people began to leave their homes at a more noticeable rate than before, some burning them as they left, lest they be occupied by those of the other religion who were fleeing for similar reasons. After internment was introduced, Belfast suffered extensive rioting and by night ten deaths occurred. Disorder spread throughout Northern Ireland that night to such places as Newry, Strabane and Derry. Few areas, if any, were completely unaffected as the two communities drifted further apart.

By the time the Primary school preliminary tests had begun in November 1971 the Campaign of Civil Disobedience was having widespread effect, some bombings of the civilian population had occurred, the Long Kesh (later known as the Maze Prison) internment camp had been opened, the members of the disbanded USC (or B Specials) had pledged themselves as a third force (unofficial) for the defence of Ulster, and the Border was being more tightly secured. After a certain stage of subjection to bombings and shootings violent events are not easily remembered

individually but each fades into a general background of violent colours. Except where one has been personally involved, either directly or through the involvement of a person known, the individual explosions are muffled into a general dull rumble of catastrophy. Thus it was during the Primary School Survey. People became more sceptical about the political situation and all efforts to bring the troubles to an end; school-teachers who had been fairly liberal a year before now became more hardened; it became much more difficult to talk to people. As one man on the Falls Road told me, "Six months ago we would have told you about this or that happening. Now we're out to get them before they get us .... I believe it's wrong to kill ... and we'll pray for forgiveness ... but that's how it is." Thus, during the Primary School Survey only the big events stand out in my mind such as 'Bloody Sunday' when 13 men were shot dead in Londonderry during a Civil Rights Rally. The next day many shops were closed, barricades were set up again in places where they had been earlier dismantled, and a number of schools shut down. The Prime Minister spoke of the period as one of "... mounting hysteria and un-reason surrounding us on every side." In the midst of such "unreason" the Vanguard Loyalists continued holding semi-military rallies in various parts of the Province. Their leader, William Craig, declared that they were determined to preserve their British tradition and way of life and "God help those who get in our way for we mean business". Before the end of the Primary School Survey the bombings had spread to England where the army barracks at Aldershot were partly blown up. The Official IRA claimed responsibility. By the end of February violence turned to political assassinations when the Minister of State was shot in Armagh. In March, two large explosions in Belfast killed a number of civilians. Parked cars were being used as booby traps and one

could feel 'entirely safe' in few places, if any, in the Province. Speculation was rife regarding the imposition of Direct Rule from Westminster and interviewing continued in the Primary schools right up to the day when Westminster Rule was <u>announced</u> as imminent. Since this introduced a new Government for Ulster the Surveys were wound up. The Primary children interviewed lived through a disaster period when politics and violence were very salient to their civic learning.

As a frequent visitor to Northern Ireland I agree with Barry White where he writes, "There's one thing to be said for living in Northern Ireland. You really get to know yourself. Every week, every day, every hour of the day, your innermost emotions and beliefs are being forced out into the open and tested against the latest enormity, whether it's death, destruction, betrayal, brutality, dishonesty, arrogance or what have you...."[2] Only one Provincial town in which fieldwork was conducted completely escaped physical violence, and even there one tended to quake a bit when passing a line of cars parked outside the town hall. Being stopped in City streets and asked to identify oneself became quite common during tense periods. Some questioners were more thorough than others. Thus, on one occasion, I was detained on the Falls Road until a few telephone calls could be made to "clear me". But such questioning was always preferable to being surrounded by a noisy gang of teenagers during a riot. It was only by appearing calm in such a situation that I managed to continue on my way with little trouble. Observers from outside Eire and the United Kingdom may be regarded as neutral, but a Scotsman in Ulster was expected to take sides: either side according to the circumstances. Even within the precincts of a school one could not feel completely removed from the violence. For instance, during the early part of fieldwork, I was asked to help the teachers

search a school for a bomb. Bomb scares were taken more seriously

later. On another occasion I alighted from a bus behind a schoolboy

(approximately 15 years old) who proceeded to hijack the bus by threat-

ening the driver with a gun. The bus was later burned and used as a

barricade. Soon afterwards parents began entering the schools in order

to get their children behind the barricades before the rumoured attack

began. Nor was it unusual to be questioned by soldiers before entering

a school especially when carrying a bag full of questionnaires, or to

find soldiers searching the school during survey work. But such events,

within some schools, became regular occurrences for headmasters and

schoolteachers in some parts of the Province. These personal exper-

iences, however, helped me to see beyond the percentages on the computer

printout into some of the feelings of Ulster people.

During the civil disturbances in Northern Ireland doctors in the

Student Health Centre of Queen's University, Belfast, were worried by the

marked increase in the incidence of mental illness among the staff and

students.[3] Some schoolteachers I spoke to complained of nervous trou-

bles and others of the difficulty of keeping a balanced view of affairs.

Others spoke of the need for some institution to help them avoid being

pulled into extreme views. There was a tendency among teachers, more

marked than earlier, to speak in terms of "our people". But this was

a fairly general pattern among people who tried to take a rational view

of events. After passing through a period of 'gut' reaction and of

being 'sucked into' the discord a time of clearer thinking returned.

After a prolonged period in the 'field' I found myself passing through

much the same phases. But the children I was interviewing live there

all the time. The great majority of them seem to be taking the troubles

in their stride and many appear to be enjoying them. Appearances,

however, may conceal deep emotional uncertainty. But, perhaps to many children in Northern Ireland, an explosion produces no more effect upon them than does the one o'clock gun upon children in Edinburgh.

Due to the speed with which I endeavoured to carry out these surveys there was no time to first approach a school principal by mail, wait for a reply, and then visit him on an approved date. Instead, I relied upon having good sponsorship for the surveys and upon friendship networks. By these methods I could arrive in, for example, a Provincial town, and visit all the school principals in two days. Having the sponsorship of the Community Relations Commission helped, I believe, in gaining confidence. From the first school visited I relied upon the advice of the first headmaster interviewed who generally supplied me with enough introductions to get round another few schools. After two or three days of setting up times for questionnaire interviews in the schools, the actual interviewing could be carried out within another five or six days. This generally involved staying in the Provincial town over the weekend, thus providing more qualitative experience.

Receiving permission from a school principal to carry out field-work in his/her school presented fewer difficulties than I had anticipated. The general pattern was ease of access to schools, school classes, and smaller groups, and immense co-operation from most school principals and teachers. There were a number of cases, however, when a number of objections were made to this kind of research being carried out in schools.

The most frequent objection encountered from principals was that parents may not wish their children to answer political questions. Although no effort was made to connect individual boys with their families

It was pointed out, on a number of occasions, that some parents would not appreciate this, feeling that there was a "sinister" motive behind the surveys. That this happened was borne out on a number of occasions when parents later approached the school principal concerned. One head-master had to face a deputation of parents. Most of their complaints could be dealt with fairly easily by the headmaster as they were based upon misconceptions which could be quickly cleared up. One parental complaint arose out of a boy's tale that he had been locked in a room and told that what took place was a secret. Whilst there was no question of locking boys in a schoolroom they had been told that any information they imparted could be a secret if they so wished. Thus, it is essential that the schoolmaster be fully briefed regarding procedure, and the nature of the questions, in order to be equipped to deal with any complaints which may arise later. This not only protects the interviewer and the princi-pal, but makes it all the more likely that the principal will trust the interviewer and leave him/her alone to carry out the administrations.

Another objection raised by school principals was that some of the questions I was using could be destructive of community relations in Northern Ireland. In other words, it was suggested that the options available in certain survey questions could influence boys to consider courses of action which, otherwise, would never have been entertained. Whilst I seriously doubted the plausibility of this complaint it had to be taken seriously by pointing out that "peaceful" as well as "violent" options were available in a number of set responses: with the environ-ment of the school to influence them boys could be induced to choose the peaceful course of action. In all, only one school approached refused to co-operate through fear of parental reaction, and three on the grounds that the survey could embitter community relations.

Once access had been gained to school classes, and smaller groups, the initial suspicions of schoolboys had to be overcome. Most schoolboys in Ulster feel that you have to "watch out" for other people or that it "depends" upon to whom one is talking. The "depends" usually means the religion of the other person. Thus, boys had to be persuaded that they could answer some incriminating questions without fear of repercussions. For instance, they were requested not to put their names on the questionnaires; to see that they were handed back in a random manner; tied in a bundle before their eyes. They were assured that on no account would the answers be shown to their headmasters and teachers. But, once this fear was dealt with, it was necessary to explain what would happen to answers since many boys did not see the point of taking part in the investigation. Others had to be persuaded that the survey was not the same as the census due to trouble over the 1971 Northern Ireland Census over which many, including some Catholic priests, had refused to co-operate with the State. The final, and by far the most effective ways of persuading the boys to take the questionnaire seriously was to tell them approximately how many boys they were representing and that an equal number of the other religion would be taking part. This last piece of information probably led to greater participation in order not to "let the side down", but also, on many occasions, to efforts to discover the religion of the interviewer.

One has to live for some time in Ulster to discover some of the more ingenious techniques for discovering "which foot someone digs with" (his religion). Not only are questions asked which can reveal this, but failure to answer other questions, can be a pointer, as can responses to certain statements. This hazard had to be dealt with on several occasions during fieldwork. Many schoolboys felt that they

could 'tell' just by looking and had no need to descend to the more ob-
vious techniques of which Glasgow soccer team I supported. A study of
whether or not a person's religion could be identified by looking at his
face revealed that, whilst neither religion was very successful in this,
Catholics scored significantly above chance.[4] Since few are treated as
impartial in Northern Ireland the degree of trust one receives depends
to a great extent upon knowledge, not only of the traditions and theolo-
gies of different religions, but also the local manner of expressing
them.

As indicated earlier the only two serious interruptions of ques-
tionnaire administration were when the school was cleared during a bomb
scare and when parents entered the school classrooms in order to get
their children behind the barricades. On only a very few occasions
did schoolteachers attempt to walk among the school desks whilst the
pupils were answering questions. Most of them probably believed they
were helping in this way lest a boy find any difficulties. Neverthe-
less, simply telling the boys that all responses were given in secret
was generally enough to have the desired effect of causing such teachers
to come to the front of the room. On the great majority of cases no
teacher was present whilst the boys were filling in the questionnaire.
Since one question concerned what boys felt about British soldiers it
was uncomfortable to have a soldier, who was on guard outside the
school, standing beside an open window whilst the responses were being
read. (One option was "Soldiers want to hurt people like me".).

The schools in Northern Ireland have generally been regarded by
schoolteachers at least, as 'havens of peace' where children may be shel-
tered from the troubles and lead 'normal' lives in the midst of a dis-
tracted world. Thus, the political situation is rarely, if ever,

discussed in many Ulster schools. Being confronted with a question-
naire dealing mainly with political questions caused much excitement
among boys, especially in the lower fourth form of some Intermediate
schools in the more troubled areas. Many of these boys were almost
certainly engaged in confrontations with the security forces. Others,
who had been engaged in a school-strike after "Bloody Sunday" only a
few days before interviews, tried to discover my reactions to their
strike. When excitement rose during interviews it was difficult to
suppress vocal answers to some questions. The threat that all question-
naires would be destroyed was sufficient to quieten most boys. One
question, however, and the answers it received, made it quite obvious
that the vocal response was no guide to how every boy felt. The ques-
tion regarding what they would do if a riot broke out near their homes
contained a 'join in' option. This generally received a vocal response
which led me, at the time, to believe that every boy in Ulster was a
rioter. Looking at the written answers later, however, revealed that
the vocal response was a poor guide to written answers.

One emotional hazard an interviewer must face when administering
a questionnaire of a social nature is the tension emanating from the
class when community relations questions are put. Even reading out
the question, 'I wouldn't mind if my sister or brother became a Catho-
lic/Protestant. Do you agree or disagree?' produced a feeling of revul-
sion in most classes which the interviewer could quite surely feel.
After having administered a particular questionnaire on some two-hundred
occasions one would expect to be insulated emotionally against class re-
actions. Asking some questions in a violent atmosphere never became
easy.

The open-ended pilot interviews were more interesting than the

more formal parts of the surveys. In early pilot work both boys and girls were interviewed between the ages of seven and seventeen. I had known for years that Ulster adults were extremely argumentative. In September 1970 I found children and adolescents following a similar pattern. Heated arguments rather than discussions were the order of the day even among some of the younger children. Now even the level of argument appears to have died out somewhat as people either become thoroughly disinterested in politics or take up hard and fast positions which are only stated, but not open for debate. Although many of the small group interviews began very slowly the initiative was frequently taken out of the interviewer's hands as a religious and/or political argument developed between the various shades of Orange or Green. It was revealing to allow the course of events to follow their own momentum until eventually it floundered on whether one was for or against the Border, the Government, or the Link with Britain. As one boy said, "Some people are kicking the Constitution in Northern Ireland, not to make it work better /protest/ but to wreck it altogether." /disorder/. And another joined in, "Aye, but they don't know how tough it really is". Talking about the riots, a fourteen-year-old Catholic girl in Belfast gave her idea of what caused them, "Some boys riot just to burn off the excess energy they can't use on recreation grounds or in employment or in other things". Those on the other side of a riot were almost always seen as the enemy against which one was defending the people, "People on the other side of a riot are rubbishy, rotten animals, who think stupidly". To one 17-year-old Protestant boy democracy meant, "being forceful in carrying out the majority will", while to another boy in the same group it meant, "being fair". A 13-year-old boy thought that a citizen was "someone who could bring himself to report crimes to the police", whilst another young lad said he was "someone who drives around Belfast with a

a gun beside him". The authority of the Government was not rated very highly among boys and girls of both religions in late 1970. Protestants felt that the Government had little impact upon their daily lives and that it was not very important to do everything a Government said, especially if they banned a Protestant parade. A 13-year-old Catholic boy felt _then_ that "Stormont will need Westminster to get them out of this mess", and that the "soldiers were all Protestants now". A 10-year-old Protextant boy expressed how he would influence the Government, "I'd hit them in the face and burn the Ormeau bakery and keep the trouble running". One nine-year-old boy revealed severe political-conflict imagery in his dream life where he saw MPs "falling off a mountain with a dagger stuck in their backs and then drowning in the River Laggan".

It was particularly difficult during this stage of fieldwork to avoid being caught up in the current political myths which cropped up again and again in almost every group of children. The hard and fast positions witnessed in adults was beginning to form in seven-year-old children who referred to "Proddy Dogs" and "Micks" with a suspicion and horror which indicated how deeply socialization patterns had been laid. It seems unlikely that the schools are responsible for producing such working conceptions of differences between religions at the age of seven. Such children have been exposed to seven years of family influence but only two years of school socialization. Considering that schools are, in the main, religious congregations, they are in a weak position to overcome, if indeed they should try to, community divisions. Furthermore, if schools attempt to avoid conflict subjects, as many of them profess to do, what influence can they have in offsetting conflict socialization in the communities.

Another aspect of pilot interviewing which caused some distress

was that some children told stories that perhaps had a factual basis regarding the possession of arms and the activities of older members of their families. One seven-year-old boy was quite adamant that his big brother had "a lot of guns and ammunition in his room". Working in an area where the army suspected a 15-year-old boy of three political murders discouraged many questions I would have liked to have followed up. In fact, a study involving children of the same family in different classes and schools was abandoned through fear of uncovering too much information for my own good.

After leaving schools during the major surveys some preliminary work was carried out on the answers to certain questions. A preliminary scanning revealed that the majority of boys had taken the questions seriously. But there were a few jokers. For instance one boy came from "Tangmagallohooaybumphry" who wanted to be a clergyman and live in a "tree". He liked Northern Ireland because of the good chances one had of becoming a clergyman, but disliked it because there were too few trees. Answers which had to be taken more seriously were those where boys proclaimed their fathers were members of the IRA (perhaps some of them are now members themselves). This gave rise to fears that question-answer information would be passed on at home. Even if the boys had been joking would the fathers see it that way? It is no exaggeration that I lived in fear of having the questionnaires stolen when I attempted to move them to Scotland. My fears were unrealised. Perhaps they were completely groundless. But how many people in Northern Ireland live "nervously" because of "possibilities".

Leaving a school in a segregated housing estate, or city area, and entering the home of a family that shared the religion of the school, presented on most occasions a smooth progression through similar emotive symbols. For instance, within a County or Protestant school one may

see a Union Jack, a picture of the Queen, and a copy of the King James Version of the Scriptures. In a Protestant home, or community, such colours and objects persist with occasional variations such as biblical texts, pictures of "King Billy", and Certificates regarding membership of various Protestant lodges. Again, leaving a Catholic school, and entering a Catholic home, or community, is a relatively even process in symbolism. Within the school one may find pictures of "Our Lord" of the "Sacred Heart" variety (never found in Protestant schools) or those of "Our Lady" a crucifix as distinguished from the simple cross sometimes found in Protestant schools; religious statues; pictures of the present Pope and probably one of Cardinal Conway, Catholic Primate of all Ireland. Within the Catholic community and Catholic homes such emotive symbolism continues with perhaps greater emphasis upon Irish political symbols and Irish heroes. Briefly, moving from religious schools to the community which the school serves involves a continuity of symbolic socialization.

Just the opposite occurs as one moves from the religious schools into the homes and community of persons of the other religion. If one understands the symbolism the effect can be frightening. One passes, for instance, from a "Catholic atmosphere" within a school to the outright Protestant symbols of say, Sandy Row in Belfast, where the pavements, flags, gable-endings, public-house decorations, and shop windows co-operate to portray the emotive symbolism of a Protestant Ulster. Again, one may interview in a school in the Shankill Road (Belfast) and walk (if one dares) straight into the Falls Road (Catholic) with its Catholic and United Ireland symbolism in white lettering on house-ends, the pictures of Irish heroes in public houses, and Catholic church collection boxes on shop counters, some of which contain, among other things,

Irish newspapers which one could not have purchased in the Protestant area only a few hundred yards away. Briefly, moving from the schools of one community into another community involves dramatic discontinuities in symbolic socialization. Bluntly put, the symbols of the other community are hated and feared.

Taking into account: (1) the greater polarization of communities over the years of open hostilities; (2) the greater emphasis upon emotive symbolism during disorders; (3) and the fact that schoolboys try to avoid crossing the territory (if indeed they need consider this) of another religion in their journeys to and from school, and elsewhere, suggests that schoolboys experience few discontinuities in emotive symbols.

The school is penetrated by many of the symbols peculiar to their community, to the exclusion of those of another religion. The symbolic experience between school and community is relatively smooth compared to that between schools of different religion. Many questions can be put to Protestants which would be unrealistically asked in Catholic schools and vice versa. The content of emotive socialization conflicts between religions. Who is responsible for such conflict? Are the chief socializing culprits or heroes of division to be found within the religious school or community?

My total experience of life in Northern Ireland has brought me closer to the feelings of the people there. This does not mean, however, that knowledge of disorder in other countries cannot give insights into Ulster affairs. But what direct experience of life in Ulster (the field) over a prolonged period can do is to allow one to escape the accusation of pontificating after a few days in Belfast or

Derry at the worst of times (armchair philosophy or highly skewed experience). But if I have noticed the psychological effects upon me during the period of fieldwork how much more must the people of Ulster feel the strain of conflict. And how much more so must impressionable children be affected. Many of the younger children in the sample (eight years old) have spent half their lives amidst the disorders.

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Chapter III - Footnotes

1. W.K. Fitzsimmons, reported in Belfast Telegraph, Nov 11 1971,
        "Too many 'Blinkered Experts' on Ulster".

2. Belfast Telegraph, Oct 21 1971, "How Far do you go to Extract
        Information?", Barry White.

3. Belfast Telegraph, Mar 3 1972, "The nervous troubles that are worry-
        ing the doctors at Queens", Chichester.

4. Nicholas D. Ross, The Identification From Faces of Religious Affili-
        ations in a Sectarian Social Milieu: An Introductory
        Survey" B.A. dissertation, Queen's University, Belfast,
        1971.

Chapter IV Basic Attitudes: Affect to Government and Disorder Approval.

The two basic attitudes to be investigated are located at different levels of political life. The first, affect to Government, is concerned with the day to day authority of the state. The second, disorder approval, is concerned with the unwritten constitutional assumptions of Ulster people - Protestant Ulster and United Ireland - and the means by which they should be maintained, or attained. In Northern Ireland political life has been continued for 50 years at the level of Government at the same time as discord and disorder over the nature and boundaries of the State.

(a)   Affect Towards Government

Government is the set of institutions making a legal claim to promulgate decisions binding upon all who live within a territory. To most people the term government applies to the group of people who occupy the most important positions within such institutions. To many children, especially the younger ones, Government is a person, or persons, exercising authority over an area wider than that under the control of parents and schoolteachers. Just how extensive this area may be varies from child to child: some have accurate perceptions of the territory their government rules; others have fanciful notions that their government rules the world.

Affect is the emotion one feels towards any person or object. Thus affect towards government is the emotional

experience one has when thinking about government. In particular, it is likely to be the feeling one has when anticipating the reactions of government towards oneself. Such affect may be positive or negative: one may love or hate a government; be pleasantly disposed towards it or disinterested; feel that its intentions are benevolent or malevolent.

Before we begin to study affect towards government, we must know whether or not the boys in the sample have a conception of 'government' and, if so, what form this perception takes.

The earliest pilot work in 1970 convinced me that children of eight years of age in Northern Ireland have a grasp of the concept of government. At seven there is some hesitancy. Pretesting for the Primary school survey revealed that by the age of eight 95 per cent of the children could differentiate between the public and private sectors of life. At age seven (primary three) only 45 per cent managed to differentiate between persons who worked for Government and those who didn't. Thus the major Primary survey began with eight year olds.

During the Primary Survey (1972) the boys were confronted with a list of six occupations[1] and asked to choose those who worked for the Government with the following results:

Table IV:1   Ability to assign those who work for Government to
             the Public Sector of Life: Primary Boys

	Protestant %	Catholic %
Public	96	92
Private	2	3
No answer	2	5

Thus it is with confidence that we can proceed to ask boys how they think and feel about Government. Earlier studies have revealed that younger children think of government in terms of persons.[2] Thus it may be wasteful of time and resources trying to teach a given political concept until a child has reached the appropriate developmental level. On the other hand, if schools wish to have a maximum of influence in political thinking, they should begin helping the child to orient himself towards political concepts as soon as they begin to form. Child perceptions of government have previously been found to begin with a few figures of high governmental authority. As the child develops his attention turns to other, more abstract, aspects of government as he becomes aware of its group and institutional character. The boys in Northern Ireland were offered the choice of either selecting one of the ideas of Government given in the questionnaire or supplying their own. Their perceptions of Government (whether personal or institutional) are reflected in the following table:

Table IV:2 . Perceptions of Government

	Primary %	Secondary first year %	Secondary fourth year %
Protestants			
Personal	66	55	46
Institutional	32	41	47
Other	-	2	3
No answer	2	2	4
Catholics			
Personal	64	50	41
Institutional	31	44	49
Other	2	3	6
No answer	3	3	4

Findings in Ulster bear out what is common in other research in child political socialization: children begin with personalised conceptions of government and later revise these in favour of more institutionalised outlooks. The older boys in Northern Ireland were much more likely to think of Government in terms of Parliament while the younger boys were more prone to identify Government with the Prime Minister and the Queen.

Having established that almost all the boys in the sample have a grasp of the concept-government-and that this concept changes in well defined ways over time, it is possible to now consider the first basic variable in this investigation - affect towards government.

Most early studies of childrens' affect towards government revealed that children think of government as benevolent. Greenstein summarized his findings regarding American childrens' feelings about political authority as follows:

> The New Haven findings may be summarized as follows:
> (1) children are at least as likely as adults to
> perceive high political roles as being important;
> (2) they seem to be more sympathetic to individual
> political leaders (and, in general, to politics)
> than are adults; (3) in at least some cases their
> actual images of political leaders are qualitatively
> different from the images one would expect adults to
> hold, especially in the emphasis on benignness; and
> (4) most important, the widespread adult political
> cynicism and distrust do not seem to have developed
> by eighth grade (age 13).[3]

Easton and Dennis, whose work is based upon a sample of 12,000 white American children from not too severely depressed urban areas, comment:

> When the child emerges from his state of political
> innocence, therefore, he finds himself a part of a
> going political concern which he ordinarily adopts
> immediately as a source of nurture and protection.
> His early experience of government is analogous to
> his early experience of the family in that it involves
> an initial context of highly acceptable dependancy.
> Against this strongly positive affective background
> the child devises and later revises his cognitive
> image of government.[4]

In some of the earliest American studies of childrens' affect towards government the youngest children idealise government and are attached to it in highly positive emotional ways. Such studies note, that, with age, there is a tendency for this highly positive image to drop-off. For instance, Greenstein, referring to childrens' views of the President, comments that the older children in his sample showed a "rather complicated pattern of de-idealization with age, depending upon the facet of the

Presidential image referred to by the child."; and Easton and
Dennis suggest that the reasons why a child's affect towards
government becomes less positive with age are because he sees
government more in terms of institutions than persons, and
cannot invest the same emotional feelings upon his revised
conception of government, and also that his ways of expressing
sentiments may be undergoing a transformation.

But some American children are not so positive towards
government. In a study of the children in the Appalachian
region of the United States their attitudes towards government
were less favourably inclined than among white children elsewhere.[5]
Here also the childrens' views were more static and did not
develop considerably with age. Edward S. Greenberg found that
most of the American children in his sample rated government
highly on paternalism-benevolence early in life, but that this
declined across the grades especially among blacks with the most
accurate perceptions of race relations. Those black children who
did not see race relations clearly had a higher rating of govern-
ment performance than others.[6] This last finding has relevance
for Northern Ireland since whether one conceives of it as one
nation or two will probably have consequences for one's view of
government. A recent American study of the long-range effects
of the Vietnam War reveals diminuation of respect for the Presidency
among school-age children. Out of 2,677 children in grades three
through eight less than 25 per cent said they would support a
President during war-time if they felt his policies were wrong.[7]
Research in Britain concerning affect for government has, until
recently, led one to believe that positive emotional feeling was

at least as high as elsewhere.[8]   But Dennis et al found that of

the children in a cross-national sample in England, West Germany,

Italy and the United States, the English children were lowest in

positive affect for government.[9]   Thus there is some evidence

that children's views of government are not so benevolent as

first supposed.   Alternatively governments may have become more

malevolent since the early studies were carried out.   In a

country where large sections of the adult population have been

opposed to government (rent-strikes, participation in banned

parades, disorders) we might expect children to have malevolent

views of political authorities.

All the boys in this investigation lived under the

Stormont government.   Interviewing came to an end the day before

the suspension of Stormont was announced.   The Northern Ireland

Government received more administrative and legislative independence

than any other part of the United Kingdom.   The Government of

Ireland Act, 1920, states that the supreme authority of Westminster

is unaffected by the creation of Stormont.   Until Westminster

suspended the Northern Ireland Government in 1972, British

Cabinet Ministers had no executive power in any of the powers

transferred to Stormont.

In Northern Ireland how a person feels about government

can generally be gauged by applying the rule: if the Protestants

like it the Catholics won't and vice versa.   Although there are

some exceptions to this rule it can be applied widely because

the community is split at so many levels.   Thus no government

can be popular for long because it is difficult to do anything

for everyone at the same time.   Or, in other words, fair
distribution of collective goods does not necessarily improve
the capability of the government to govern.   Unionist governments
were criticized by Unionists for appeasing Catholics in reforms,
disbanding the 'B' Specials, and not being tough enough in law
enforcement.   And Unionist governments have also been attacked
by Catholics basically because they are seen to rule a territory
artificially designed to keep them in power perpetually, and
because they must inevitably rule in the interests of Protestants.
A government which is thought to be distributing collective goods
fairly may be attacked by Protestants because this may mean that
Catholics will stay in Ulster and finally vote Ulster into a
United Ireland.   It is also attacked by Catholics for not
introducing social and political reforms quickly enough.   To
Protestants a government may go "too far and too fast" in reforms
whilst to Catholics what it offers is always "too little and too
late".   What is of particular interest in this context is how
adult evaluations of government were transmitted to schoolboys
during a particularly turbulent time in the history of Northern
Ireland.   A time when the security forces of Ulster could not
enforce the law and political leaders were in exceedingly
precarious positions.   One may say that this was not an ideal
time to investigate affect towards government.   Alternatively,
it is of immense interest to know how the youthful population
was reacting to political authority at a time when the momentum
of events was leading to its collapse, or suspension.

Most of the studies of childrens' affect for government
have been based upon scales of infallibility, leadership qualities,

power, and benevolence. Of all the items used to tap 'affect' benevolence is the most affect laden and has mainly been operationalized in terms of "would want to help me if I needed it".

This measure of affect has been adjusted in two ways in this study. First, the emphasis on the individual child has been diluted. The item, 'wants to help people like me' has been substituted to allow the boy reflect community feelings more directly. Second, most affect scales using the 'help me' item have ranged from 'would always want to help', to 'would never want to help', or 'would not usually want to help'. Pilot testing in Northern Ireland soon revealed that this negative statement towards government was not sufficient to encompass all attitudes. Thus the more extreme case of 'wants to hurt people like me' was introduced. The question takes the following form:

Here are some things people sometimes say about the Government of Northern Ireland. TICK the ONE that comes closest to telling about the Government of Northern Ireland

1	2	3	4
The Government always wants to help people like me	The Government sometimes wants to help people like me	The Government never wants to help people like me	The Government wants to hurt people like me

Options 1 and 2 represent positive affect to government. Item 1 will be regarded as the 'benevolent' view of government and will be represented by POSITIVE in capitals, in the tables that follow. Item 2 will be represented by "positive" in small

letters.   Items 3 and 4 will be regarded as <u>negative affect</u>
to government.   Item 4 reveals 'malevolent' feelings about
government and will be represented by <u>NEGATIVE</u> in capitals, in
the tables.   Item 3 will be represented by "negative".

The major reason for not collapsing 1 and 2, and 3 and
4, into positive and negative categories respectively, is because
Protestant boys generally separate over options 1 and 2 and only
a minority of them are negative to government.

Table IV:3   Affect towards Government

	Protestants	Catholics
Grammar Schools	(N=477)	(N=503)
	%	%
1. POSITIVE	37	16
2. positive	55	49
3. negative	6 *30*	25 *125*
4. NEGATIVE	2	8 *o/C*
No answer	0	2 D.I. = 27% [10]
G/d D.I. = 13%		D.I. = 6%

	Protestants	Catholics
Intermediate Schools	(N=478)	(N=474)
1. POSITIVE	30	18
2. positive	49	45
3. negative	15	23
4. NEGATIVE	5	11
No answer	1	3 D.I. = 16%
1/P D.I. = 31%		D.I. = 17%

	Protestants	Catholics
Primary Schools	(N=561)	(N=548)
1. POSITIVE	64	33
2. positive	30	34
3. negative	2	17
4. NEGATIVE	1	12
No answer	3	4 D.I. = 31%
Grammar/Primary	Grammar/Primary	
D.I. = 30%	D.I. = 23%	

Only approximately two per cent of the boys gave no answer to this question. This indicates that opinions were well formed on the issue presented to them and that little hesitancy existed about expressing such feelings. This is typical of Ulster adults, adolescents and children. Few boys asked any questions during the administration of this question. One reason for this may be that it was preceded by four questions, in the same form, regarding affect for policemen, soldiers, prime minister and Queen.

Since there are few guidelines regarding childrens' affect for government in Northern Ireland one could take adult regime outlooks as one indicator of how children will respond to political questions. The adult Loyalty survey (1968) found that, 'among Protestants, supporters of the Constitution outnumber overt opponents by a majority of seven to one. Catholics, by contrast, are divided into three almost equal groups-supporters, don't knows, and opponents. Only one third are prepared to explicitly endorse the Constitution.[11] Although support for the Constitution and affect for government are not analagous in all countries there is a case in Northern Ireland for expecting attitudes to the Constitution to be a rough indicator of how a person feels about government. On the other hand there are some upholders of the Constitution whose attitudes to government are far from strongly positive. But using the adult finding as a general guide line one might hypothesize that Protestants will be more likely than Catholics to see government in favourable terms.

As expected Protestants are more positive in their attitudes to government than Catholics (D.I. = 25%). Protestant children are more prone to take up the extremely positive position. Catholics are more negative in outlook, yet a majority did have favourable attitudes to government. There are more divisions within Catholic opinion in this issue than among Protestants. Yet it is noteworthy that in Feb-March,1971,64 per cent of Catholic schoolboys recorded positive affect towards the Stormont government, and that in the few months before the announcement of the suspension of the government, 67 per cent of Catholic Primary boys were positively oriented towards it, with 33 per cent recording the most ideal affect. This leads one to suspect that Protestant and Catholic boys may have very different reasons for recording positive affect. This will be investigated in a later chapter.

It might have been hypothesized that differences between Catholics and Protestants regarding government would have been greatest in the Intermediate schools which contain higher proportions of the working class than either Primary, or Grammar, schools. But boys of different religions in the Intermediate schools are closer together in their feelings about government than is observable elsewhere. This is caused mainly by 20 per cent of Protestant Intermediate boys being negatively oriented to government. This reflects the tendency, sometimes observable, of the adult Protestant working class to see the official Unionist Party as a middle, and upper, class institution. Although there is some working

class solidarity between religions at the level of government
manual workers divide more clearly by religion in their views
of the nature and boundaries of Northern Ireland.

The socialization of affect towards government in
Northern Ireland varies by religion and school-type.   There is
much more 'negative' affect than is found in other studies.
It will be the purpose of the chapters which follow to investigate
the agents and conditions associated with different levels of
affect.

(b)   Political Disorder

Political discord occurs when political disputes
cannot be settled within a set of commonly acknowledged rules,
such as the Constitution.   Thus, discord may involve disputes
about the nature and boundaries of the State as has been the
case in Northern Ireland.   Political disorder occurs when such
discord is expressed physically in a manner that could involve
bloodshed and death.   There are, of course, other forms of
disorder such as rent-strikes and taking part in banned pro-
cessions, but violent illegal activity is here taken as the
fairest expression of disorder.   In what follows disorder will
always refer to political disorder except where it is clearly
stated that this is not the case.

The Irish have had a violent political history.
When Irishmen have not been serving in foreign regiments they
have often been engaged in violence at home.   The State of

Northern Ireland was established violently. Force, and the threat of force, was sufficient to ensure that the Protestant population in Northern Ireland would have political institutions to match their own particular way of life. The Catholics in Northern Ireland retained their memories of the Plantations of the seventeenth Century by English and Scots Loyalists and continued to demand distinctive territory and political institutions to fit their own community desires. Two mutually exclusive goals existed within one State. How these goals were expressed violently in the 1920s is told and retold, often at great length, to the present younger generation. Those who were young men during the I.R.A. campaign of the 1950s are fathers now who rear their sons in the memory of violent activities. School history cannot ignore political violence in any genuine attempt to teach the history of Northern Ireland. History is enacted year by year as men solemnly parade through the towns of Ulster to remember 1690 and violence takes a prominent place in Irish poems and songs. But the children and young people of Northern Ireland no longer need historical reminders of political violence; nor do they need the violent emotive symbolism expressed in the re-acting of past conflict; the past is now fused with the present; the violent historical tradition is now part and parcel of the every-day lives of many Ulster youngsters.

The 3,000 children upon which this study is based live in areas which have, since 1969, experienced different levels of disorders Some of the boys are drawn from districts which have seen widespread disorder; others live in the more peaceful areas

peripheral to the most violent spots; others in Provincial
towns and rural areas.

Even the riot-torn areas are relatively peaceful for
long periods of time. One can, for instance, walk through the
centre of a riot area without seeing any trace of trouble apart
from the devastation to shops and houses caused during dis-
orders. One can walk up and down among the maze of tiny
terraced streets near the peace-line in Belfast without being
aware that anyone is paying very much attention to the
presence of a stranger. Women go on shopping, children
playing, and men working, lounging at street corners, or
drinking, as though nothing unusual had taken place. They
have learned to live with the disorder. But the underlying
unease is never far from consciousness; trouble may break out
at any moment and one may be at the centre of disorder. This
sort of situation creates a nervous strain one learns to live
with. Being anxious and fearful are normal reactions, and
perhaps getting used to living with danger whilst still a child
is a splendid preparation for a life time in a country where
disputes are settled with guns rather than around a conference
table.

In the Provincial towns the general atmosphere is more
relaxed. It is easier to talk to people, especially further
to the West. Explosions are rare, but the sombre threat of
violence always hangs in the background as a warning against
taking the peace too much for granted. No matter where one goes
in Northern Ireland, everyone has heard of the disorder,

discussed it, in many cases suffered from it, either directly or indirectly, and in almost every case taken a decided stance regarding it. The political violence affects everyone - adults and children.

At the end of a three-day visit to Northern Ireland, Mr. Harold Wilson said "One of the most serious aspects is the effect on children - those who have been pressed or duped by one side or the other to take part in street fights or riots. One hates to think what this will mean for their future development or attitude."[12] The Minister of Education in Northern Ireland said he believed that the most evil and irreparable violence which was taking place was registering in the minds of children. He asked:

> Is there anything more evil than the poisoning of a young mind, the deprivation of a young spirit? Childhood is a very short time, it is a time of exploration, discovery and wonder; it should be free of cares and fear or hatred, but for many children in Northern Ireland today much of the joy of youth has been blotted out. To them the adult world must appear to be a place of barricades and bombs, anger and noise, foul language and a terrible hatred between men.[13]

A secondary headmaster in a 'hard' area in Belfast, commenting upon some of the effects of the disorder, reported that: "In the age range 11 to 14 there has been a greater number of instances of unwarranted lack of civility or even aggression towards other pupils or a teacher."[14] According to a child psychologist the disorder has resulted in two types of reactions among children: "(1) emotional weeping, wildly aggressive behaviour accompanied by uncontrolled laughing and frequent

nightmares; (2) chronic anxiety with traumatic reaction to battle like noises and situations."[15]

On the other hand Belfast reacted to the riots of 1969-70 with a drop of almost 50 per cent in the suicide rate and a decrease in depressive illness. One consultant psychiatrist points out that people in Belfast had more chance to unleash aggressive feelings instead of "bottling them up". He also found that most of the anxiety was a normal reaction in the circumstances. The most interesting feature of this report was that the decrease in depressive illness was more significant in riot areas and least in the relatively peaceful peripheral districts.[16] Two psychiatrists,[17] at least, have pointed out that the more extreme behavioural pattern in children have occurred mainly among those with a history of psychiatric illness. For instance, many of the sounds in the disorder have acted as a trigger which sets off the process by which an epileptic suffers from a fit and/or blackout. However, most of the children, on the surface at least, appear fairly happy with the violent situation; many seem to enjoy the chance of playing violent games 'for real'. There is little evidence that seeing a riot or even taking part in one makes a boy less likely to want to do so again. In fact, such evidence as does exist points in the opposite direction: boys who have seen the hard consequences of disorder are ready to take part when it breaks out again.[18]

Children in Northern Ireland, despite the effects it may have upon their personality, are "socialized into conflict"[19]

from a very early age.   A Belfast boy of 12 years of age wrote:

> I listen quietly, is that another one?
> A loud terrifying bang, somewhere near.
> But the question is, how near,
> They come closer every night.
> A sudden burst of fire, where's that?
> Maybe the factory or the barracks,
> I wonder........................[20]

Even the children who have never experienced disorder themselves

have seen it on television or read about it in the newspapers

which often carry a heavy quota of pictures taken during and

after violent events.   The supervisor of childrens' television

(BBC) emphasises that great care is taken to avoid showing

children actions which they might imitate--like using knives

or ropes.   "I think that the main danger of too much violence

on television is not that it may lead to aggressive behaviour

in certain individuals, although it can do this, but that it

may become accepted as something ordinary and unremarkable."[21]

In Northern Ireland the vast majority of boys interviewed said

that they usually watched disorder in Ulster on television.

Parents in relatively trouble free areas realise that their

children are not living through the violence completely

unscathed.   Some parents have great difficulty in explaining

the disorder to their children.   Parental reactions to this

problem vary from sheltering the children from violence to being

completely honest about how they see it.   One child psychiatrist

advised that "Children see things in black and white and that

is how parents should explain it.   It may seem naive to adults

but it is the way children see things."[22]   If many of the

parents follow this advice the "black and white" of the

explanations may become orange and green.   If the schools

endeavour to present a different picture their efforts will

probably be superseded by earlier and more informal learning

experiences.

The games small children play have been affected by the political disorders. Child welfare workers have watched children of four and five building tiny barricades and throwing toy wooden bricks like petrol bombs. Nursery play-cubes, the size of tea-chests, have been used like armoured cars, each child sitting in a cube with his head protruding through a hole in the top and firing imaginary machine-guns.[23] But when the games become too 'life-like' the children are in danger from the security forces which have mistaken plastic models of the Thompson sub-machine gun for the genuine article. As one soldier put it, "A child getting one of those for Christmas could get a stockingful of trouble."[24] Plato thought the games children played so important in the formation of civic character to have them constantly supervised by State nurses who were to "have an eye to the decorum or indecorum of their behaviour."[25] In Northern Ireland the games boys play are to a certain extent divisive. Cricket being an English game, is played by few Catholics, whilst Gaelic football and hurley, being Irish games, are played by few Protestants. Even when boys play the same games the Catholic and Protestant teams always play against one another. And some of the 'games' are violently divisive when stoning Catholics, Protestants or British soldiers, becomes the clear goal in view.

Children in Northern Ireland need not find their fighting heroes on the cinema screen. Their hero galleries can be full of men whom they have personally known. One of the most recent heroes—Joe McCann, the Che Guevara of the I.R.A.— was active in the Republican movement from the early 1960's.

In the Lower Falls, stories are still told of his deeds during the Battle of the Falls in July 1970. It was the first stand-up fight against the troops in Ireland since 1916. Slowly the security net closed around McCann until in 1972, he was killed in Belfast. Like many other local man killed during the disorders he will hang in the child portrait gallery and provide some of the ideals they may try to emulate. Children first begin to imitate their heroes and later are able to identify with them when they get the 'feel' of the values for which they stood. The boy internalises what he believes to have been the values of his hero. So many Irish heroes have been men of violence. So many Scots-Ulster heroes have been men who shouted, 'No Surrender'.

Although religious and political leaders of various shades of opinion have justified the political violence in Northern Ireland there are other influentials who have condemned it.

The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, Mr. Brian Faulkner:

> I can only describe this kind of work as the
> actions of sub-human animals. I cannot conceive
> of any person with a Christian outlook involving
> himself in this kind of activity.[26]

The ex-Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, Mr. Jack Lynch:

> No Irishman with the least claim to ideals or
> principles, no Irishman with the least shred of
> Christianity or sanity can justify or condone
> the maiming or killing of innocent people - and
> I am including in this all those who have died
> by violence or have been injured or disfigured
> for life in recent incidents.[26]

The Catholic Bishop of Down and Connor, Most Rev. Dr. Philbin:

> The outrages make it clear that we are experiencing
> a conspiracy or a number of conspiracies against the
> whole of our society. To any of those responsible
> who have not entirely subordinated the teaching of
> Christ to evil councils, I say again what I have
> said repeatedly: give up those organisations and
> reject those leaders who are instigating deeds
> which fly in the face of all that Christ has
> taught us. Only evil can come of evil deeds.[26]

The Protestant Bishop of Down and Dromore, The Rt.Rev.George A. Quin:

> How long must innocent people suffer and the lives
> of so many be jeopardised by these sub-human activists?
> The time has come for everyone in our City and Province
> with any semblance of decency and humanity to unite
> to condemn these further outrages affecting the lives
> of innocent men, women and children.[26]

There is no lack of condemnation of the disorder from men in responsible political and religious positions in Ireland.

But the violence continues and also has its justifiers in political and religious life. Father Desmond Wilson of Belfast writes:

> When the Ulster Covenant was being signed in 1912 to
> demonstrate the willingness of the people here to
> oppose Home Rule even, if necessary, by force of
> arms, the Protestant Churches gave the project their
> blessing and Protestant clergymen were among the first
> to sign.
> To say that the use of force is against the principles
> or practice of Christians would be hypocritical. They
> have used force and continue to use force. Whether
> they call this legitimate force or violence there
> comes a time when Christians admit that only force can
> solve their problems. Whether they are right in this
> or wrong is a very important matter, but as a matter
> of fact, this is what they believe.[27]

After the imposition of direct rule from Westminster Mr. Brian Faulkner conceded that "to rebel against the Mother Parliament would be a contradiction in terms for Unionists, and would be totally unjustified unless the Government in London were clearly trying to sell Ulster down the river and put it out of the United Kingdom".[28]

On the other hand, the I.R.A. campaign of violence has been justified on the grounds that all other attempts to achieve justice in Ireland have failed and resort to arms is the only way to avoid constant political repression.[29] People in Northern Ireland seek peace with justice; but finding justice involves disorder since what one side is seen as gaining is almost inevitably seen by the other as a loss. Children and young people also operate the twin desires of adults. They want peace--yet many who say that this is their chief desire-- also approve the culturally accepted virtue of fighting for political goals. In this way the political system in Northern Ireland could be said to be 'persisting'; cultural norms, attitudes and behaviours are being effectively handed on to the rising generation. If the system is to 'change' to one where violence is eschewed as a means of realizing political ends, some new, powerful, factor will have to come into operation. The results of violence have not in the past caused Ulster people to turn from disorder. Part of the burden of this study is to investigate under what conditions violence is most likely to occur. Perhaps by doing this we shall also see what conditions are most conducive to peaceful politics.

Children, especially in the most troubled areas, have been drawn directly into the violence in two ways. They have felt the effects of the disorder in their daily lives and they have actively taken part in the violence. They began to feel the effects of the disorders in August, 1969, when many fled with their parents from their homes to Army camps in Eire or to

quieter areas of Northern Ireland.   Since then the population
movement within Belfast has been continued, with Protestant and
Catholics moving into 'safer' regions of the City, often flying
from homes surrounded by those of the opposite religion.   One
result of such population disturbance has been that the "mixed
areas" which were formerly thought of as "buffer zones guaranteeing
stability have become segregated areas.[30]   The children have
also had to evacuate many of their schools frequently due to
bomb scares and have sometimes been unable to return to school
after lunch because of terrorist v army gunfire.   At times
their parents have removed the younger children from school
due to rumours of impending trouble.

Both the British army and the I.R.A. have been
accused of using children as a cover for their activities.
Bomb planters it was alleged used children as a shield from
Army gunfire,[31] and the Army in Londonderry was accused of
using children going to school as a cover for troops repairing
the perimeter fencing at an Army post.[32]

Boys, below the age of 15, have been arrested by
the Army in Ulster.   'They were suspected of offences relating
to riotous behaviour, disorderly behaviour, breach of the peace
or malicious damage.'[33]   It has been alleged that the Army have
taken children between the ages of nine and fifteen from their
beds on dawn raids and driven them away in armoured cars for
interrogation without the presence of parents.   It has also been
alleged that many of them were kept without food for 12 hours.[34]

Mr. Jack Lynch described the practice of arresting and interrogating children as 'heartsickening' and 'intolerable'.[35]

Children have witnessed killings: a 13 year-old boy told the Widgery Tribunal that he saw two men shot dead on 'Bloody Sunday';[36] they have been injured: a six-year-old Belfast boy received a leg injury after a bomb he picked up unwittingly went off;[37] they have suffered the extreme penalty of death: five hours after a Protestant boy was shot dead near the Belfast peaceline in May, 1972, two Catholic boys were shot from a passing car as they played near their home in the Springfield area of the City;[38] they are very familiar with the results of violent death: approximately 500 children attended the funeral of a friend in Derry in September, 1971, after a 14-year-old schoolgirl had been shot dead during rioting in the City.[39]

The majority of the boys in this sample have not been directly subjected to violence. But a sizeable minority have and the others have seen and heard of their experiences and have sought to identify with them on many occasions. One example of this may be that many schoolchildren went on 'strike' from school during one or more of the days following 'Bloody Sunday' in Londonderry. Children in relatively peaceful towns in Northern Ireland thus identified with those in the more troubled areas. What is crucial regarding subjection to violence and identification with it is the conditions of learning that a violent atmosphere creates.

Many of the peaceful ideals of the community may be withdrawn from current circulation for a prolonged period and bitterness and recrimination may become the prime motivations. Children learning about politics under such conditions are, to some extent, bereft of the support they might otherwise have received in the pursuit of peaceful activities. Thus peaceful reinforcement is partly withdrawn from them and violent reinforcement takes its place. Under such severe learning conditions some peaceful attitudes may well be extinguished altogether. Comparisons between life in some parts of Ulster and occupied Europe during World War II are not unrealistic. This is not to say who are Germans and who are natives, but merely that the physical presence of troops and firing on the ground is such as to resemble the Continent between 1940-44.

But Ulster children have not only been exposed to disorder: they have also contributed to it. A nine-year-old boy told a reporter 'You tie your cheese-wire between the two lamp posts about six feet up. There's always a soldier standing on the back of a land-rover. Even with their search lights he can't see the wire in the dark. It's just at the right height to catch his throat. Then we throw stones.'[40] Four boys playing truant aged nine to twelve volunteered the information, 'We don't like places like school. We're scarin' the Army instead. We're makin' monkeys out of them. Boom, boom, boom! Shooting at a stage-coach. Wells Fargo. Bang! Bang!'[41] This illustrates the mixed television and real-life violence in childrens' minds. One nine-year-old Protestant

boy wrote that if Bernadette Devlin came up his road 'we would go over to her and shoot her dead and kill her baby.' A ten-year-old Catholic boy wrote that if the Rev. Ian Paisley came to his town he would, '...stoned him and he got into the car and drive away and I got tacks and I bursted all the tyres and burned the car...'[42]. Children who may not have taken part in disorder anticipate doing so if the occasion arises.

Stoning the British Army is probably the mildest form of violence in which schoolboys participate. This is not limited to Catholic areas only. I have spent hours on the Shankill Road watching schoolboys stoning soldiers. It has been alleged that children stone those of the other religion from their school bus while passing through certain parts of Belfast.[43] A deadlier way of delivering a stone is to hit it with a hurley stick so that it flies hard and low and gets under a soldier's guard. Many Catholic children in Northern Ireland are very adept at handling a hurley stick. Children have also hurtled bottles filled with paint at patrolling Saracen armoured cars so that they can be more easily identified in the darkened streets of West Belfast. This activity, it has been alleged, has been the work of some six-year-old boys.[44] Further up the arms escalation ladder is throwing bombs of various types. The Army has alleged that eight-year-old children threw nail bombs at them when they were patrolling the Markets area of Belfast. This was denied by the childrens' mothers.[45] A corporal who rides in a jeep as marksman is reported as saying, "If we could shoot a few of these rioters

the trouble would be over in no time.   But how can you shoot a kid of 12 or 13, even if he is about to toss a gelignite bomb at you.'[46]   Another Army spokesman was reported as saying that a boy about eight threw acid at troops during trouble in Belfast.   'We watched him creep from literally behind his mother's skirts and toss the bottle at us.   He then dashed back to the protection of his mother.   How do you deal with that sort of thing?'[47]

Children, too, it has been alleged, are engaged in violence directed at property.   An eye witness claims that a boy aged about 12 planted a bomb which wrecked a shop in Belfast.   The witness said he saw him run from a waiting car and leave a parcel outside the shop, then run back to the car which was driven away by an adult.[48]

Boys of 13 and 14 years have been sent for trial on arms charges.   A 13-year-old boy was accused of possessing a .455 revolver, two rounds of .45 ammunition and nine rounds of .303 ammunition.[49]   A boy a year older, appeared in a Belfast court with adults charged with possessing two guns.[50]   Children, it is claimed, act as gun carriers to the person who will do the actual shooting and they are used to lure soldiers into areas where they will be easy targets.[51]   Two 16-year-old boys were accused of murdering a witness the night before he was to give evidence.   The jury returned an open verdict.[52]

Youthful violence in Northern Ireland has been

organised at gang level.   Fifteen policeman and 13 civilians
were injured as the Tartan Gangs of Belfast tried to take
control of an area of the City one weekend.   Tartan Gang
members launched attacks on shops, public-houses and other
premises.[53]   This raised the whole question of the collective
violence of youth and the link between generalised hooliganism
and political violence.   Whatever one may think of the Tartan
Gangs in Belfast, in the Ulster context, they have been recruited
into para-military organisations and have as much political point
as many youths in the last days of the Weimar Republic.

The foregoing paragraphs have tried to present only
a selection of cases in which boys have been involved in the
disorders in Ulster.   Many other incidents have been reported,
countless others have not reached print, or have gone undetected.
After having been subjected to certain conditions for a prolonged
period boys begin to take on the coloration of their environment.
Bettleheim's study of prisoners of war illustrates that when
they gave up all hope of escape they learned to copy the behaviour
of the Gestapo guards and treat new prisoners with the same
severity they had experienced.[54]   Do Protestant children imitate
thei r beliefs about the severity of the IRA?   Do Catholic
children imitate what they picture about the cruelty of British
soldiers?   For instance, a child in Northern Ireland sold to
me a news-sheet (in certain circumstances it is unwise to refuse
to purchase) with a picture of a huge British soldier beating
the life out of a very small, innocent looking girl.   Above
the drawing was the caption - SAVAGERY.[55]   In another part of
Ulster a child asked me to purchase a news-letter containing a

strip cartoon depicting the savagery the Protestant Loyalists would mete out to the IRA.[56] Do such schoolboys (only the younger ones sell news-sheets) internalize the violence of what they see as real life situations. Alternatively many comic 'heroes' have come to life in Ulster and 'Desperate Dan' no longer only swaggers down a Cowboy strip.

There is little doubt that children in Northern Ireland learn about political disorder at an early age; suffer from the effects of it; and, to some extent, engage in it. But to stop there would be to misrepresent the youth of Ulster. There is a sizeable minority who reject violence even to obtain the most basic of political values; who would not join a riot or even go near one if such disorder broke out; and the large majority of boys are opposed to social vandalism. And many of such boys live in some of the worst hit areas of Belfast.   Dr. Simms, Primate of the Church of Ireland,,said the youth of the Church deserved special mention for the vigorous and imaginative way in which they had made efforts to combat frustration to foster new interests in life, and to bring practical remedies in desperate situations.   Not only was their rejection of violence 'a mighty influence for good', but their concern for education helped the situation in a positive way.[57]

Children in the worst hit areas have skipped beside the wrecked buildings; used the barricades as tennis nets and often enjoyed the excitement of disorderly days. Speaking of

the violence one psychiatrist comments: 'Anxiety and fear are normal reactions to stress'. 'It really would be abnormal if people were not anxious and frightened in areas like the Ardoyne and Ballymurphy. But that is a long way from mental illness'.[58]

The Belfast Telegraph carried out a study of persons who had lived through the troubles of the 1920's. One such person felt that the current unrest was not quite comparable with the stirring days of the '20s and doubted greatly whether they would have a permanent warping effect upon children. He said: 'I cannot imagine that I have carried a deleterious residue into maturity. I have no recollection of any nervous disorder affecting me, and most of the other people of my generation seem to have proved as hardy—or insensitive, if you wish.'[59]

One Belfast headmaster affirms that the '...violence and the riots have made many boys confirmed pacifists.'[60] Most studies of violence among schoolchildren in Northern Ireland have been impressionistic, or based on small samples or on evidence taken from a skew sample e.g. those who have sought help from a psychiatrist. Some headmasters have asked boys to write prayers for Northern Ireland and find the majority praying for peace. Others have requested pupils to outline their major desires for Ulster and have found the ending of the disorders to be a majority choice. Some of these small, localised surveys have suffered from the deficiency that the boys could not be certain of anonymity. Schoolteachers know the 'best'

writers in the class.   Asking boys to write prayers for Ulster

sets them in a religious atmosphere which will be reflected

in their answers.   When children express their 'wishes' for

Northern Ireland it is of interest to discover how they would

like to go about achieving such desires.   This investigation,

too, found the majority of boys in favour of peace, but many

of them went on to say that this should be achieved by bringing

back the 'B' Specials, or by sending the Protestants back to

where they came from.   Peace was not unconditional and the

means for achieving it were often violent.

In this investigation it was thought realistic to

confront the boys with socially approved goals asking how they

should be attained.   An abstract question - "Do you think

that people have a right to fight for basic political values" -

would have been confusing.   But using language which frequently

crops up in Ulster makes questions more understandable and answers

more likely.   Also, it was thought unrealistic to put the same

questions about disorder to all the boys since Protestants and

Catholics seldom fight for the same political goals.   The

questions were:

To Protestants: "Do you think that people have a right to _fight_
                   in order to keep Ulster Protestant?"

To Catholics: "Do you think that people have a right to _fight_
                 in order to bring about a United Ireland?"

At each administration of these questions it was clearly pointed

out that _fighting_ meant bloodshed, injury, with the possibility of

death. Boys who answered 'yes' to these questions are regarded as endorsing, but not necessarily ready to take part in political disorder _for these goals._ Boys answering 'no' to these questions are regarded as rejecting disorder _for these goals._ In the tables that follow those accepting disorder will be represented by "Violent" and it should be clearly understood that this means approval of disorder. The boys rejecting violence _for these goals_ will be represented in the tables as "Peaceful" although one cannot be certain that they will reject disorder for _all goals._ They do, however, reject the use of disorder over the most basic of political issues in Northern Ireland. Nevertheless, one is on safer ground when concentration is focussed upon those who accept disorder _for these goals_ in any consideration of the agents and conditions most associated with disorder in Northern Ireland.

Table IV:4   Attitudes to Discord

	Protestants %	Catholics %
GRAMMAR		
Violent	54	52
Peaceful	43	45
No answer	3	3
	D.I. = 24%	D.I. + 12%
INTERMEDIATE		
Violent	77	64
Peaceful	19	34
No answer	4	2
	D.I. = 28%	D.I. = 4%
PRIMARY		
Violent	51	60
Peaceful	47	37
No answer	2	3
	Grammar/Primary D.I. = 4%	Grammar/Primary D.I. = 10%

Only three per cent of the boys failed to answer this serious question about the nature of political discord.   This is an indication of certainty and frankness in replying.   On no occasion that I can recall, did any boy have to query the meaning of these questions.

Approximately 60 per cent of all the boys endorsed the

use of violence for political ends. This indicates that
socialization into violent political discord is widespread and
effective. It is also noteworthy that approximately 37 per
cent reject the violent expression of political discord for
these goals. This indicates that socialization into disorder
is far from totally successful. That only 37 per cent reject
violence for these goals suggests that permanent political peace,
without changes in the most basic political attitudes and
structures, is unlikely.

The differences between Catholics and Protestants on
this issue are small reaching only 15 per cent in the Intermediate
Schools. Thus political violence is found necessary, or valued
widely, in both Protestant and Catholic communities. But there
are differences within religions by school type. Although the
Protestant Intermediate boys are clearly the most violent in the
sample all boys attending Intermediate schools are more likely
to endorse the use of political violence than their Primary
School or Grammar School co-religionists. This is an
indication that boys in different school-types come under the
influence of dissimilar agents and conditions of socialization.

It is noticeable that the Protestant and Catholic
positions on disorder varies between the two samples. The
Secondary survey (early 1971) found the Protestants most ready
to approve violence. The Primary survey (early 1972) found the
position reversed with the Catholic boys going ahead by a small
margin (D.I. = 10%). This probably reflects their response to
the post internment atmosphere in the Catholic community. If

this is so, then the older Catholic boys will have become more violent in political outlook as will the Secondary Protestant boys under the influence of loyalist para-military organisations.

The findings of these schoolboy surveys vary, especially among Catholics where they vary considerably, from the responses to the Strathclyde Loyalty adult survey (1968) when 52 per cent of Protestant and only 13 per cent of Catholic adults approved violence for political purposes.[61]   Insofar as the samples can be compared the Protestants have moved up a little further towards total acceptance of violence to keep Ulster Protestant.   But the Catholics have jumped up from a small minority approving violence in 1968 to three-fifths in 1971-72.   Probably the events of 1969-70 resocialized many adults, especially Catholics, away from the more peaceful out-looks of the '60s.   Perhaps Catholic rejection of violence in 1968 was based upon the assumption that it wouldn't work, and would only cause worse trouble.   By 1970-71, one might think that violence would work and/or that it was a necessary tactic in a situation where worse could happen without it.   The violent tradition, never far from one's mind, even in peaceful days in Ulster, thus reasserted itself among the adults and was laid afresh in a new generation.   If, in fact, violent events tend to increase the propensity to approve political violence among children, adolescents, and adults, then it may be hypothesized that boys living under the most violent learning conditions will be more prone to approve of disorder than those living in the quieter areas of Ulster.   This, and other related hypotheses, will be investigated in subsequent chapters.

There is no simple rule by which one can predict attitudes to the unwritten constitutions of Ulster from affect to Government and _vice versa_. Early in 1973 the Orange Order of Ireland broke the 50 year alliance with the official Unionist Party. It urged people to support election candidates who opposed the White Paper which the official Unionist Party had accepted. In so doing the Order demonstrated that Protestant Rule in Ulster was more important than Union with the rest of the United Kingdom. The White Paper was said to contain the 'seeds of destruction of Ulster'.[62] Thus one of Northern Ireland's unwritten constitutions - Protestant Ulster (shorthand for fully democratic government - was accepted in spite of the Government of the day (Westminster) and the ruling party of all Ulster Governments (Unionists).

Neither is it any simpler to predict attitudes to the other constitution - a United Ireland - from affect to Government. The Unionist Governments of Northern Ireland persisted for 50 years despite the widespread Catholic acceptance of a United Ireland concept. Although Catholics said repeatedly that the Unionist Government of Ulster was illegal since it was not representative of the whole people of Ireland, or of the people of the nine County Ulster, they, nevertheless, complied with a sufficient amount of its regulations, extractions and distributions, to allow the Government to rule.

Table IV: 5   Affect to Government by Discord Attitudes

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Violent %	Peaceful %	Violent %	Peaceful %
PRIMARY				
POSITIVE	60	71	24	50
positive	36	26	35	35
negative	3	1	23	9
NEGATIVE	1	1	18	5
no answer	-	1	-	1
INTERMEDIATE				
POSITIVE	27	43	13	26
positive	51	45	43	50
negative	16	9	29	13
NEGATIVE	5	2	13	7
no answer	1	1	2	4
GRAMMAR				
POSITIVE	32	41	11	24
positive	57	54	47	52
negative	8	3	30	20
NEGATIVE	2	1	11	3
no answer	1	1	1	1

By combining attitudes to Government and to discord
(see Table IV:5) it becomes clear that boys who reject disorder
for these political goals are more positive to government.   This
is seen most clearly among Catholics.   Among Protestants

however, so few are negative to government that one must consider
levels of positive affect to note the different positions taken
up by boys who accept and reject violence for a Protestant
Ulster. Here the disorderly boys are everywhere less inclined
to take the most benevolent view of government (...will always
want to help....). This suggests that higher positive affect
to government, among both Protestants and Catholics, is associated
with more peaceful politics. On the other hand, one must also
note, that the majority of boys who accept violent political
relations are positive to government. This is most remarkable
among Catholic boys where the majority of those accepting
violence for a United Ireland are still positive to the
government of Northern Ireland. Thus, whilst positive affect
to Government is associated with more peaceful politics in the
majority of cases, one cannot be certain that disorder
acceptance generally leads to negative affect to government.

Probably the best way of viewing affect to government
and illegal political activity is that they concern different
levels of political life. Attack and counter-attack may proceed
at the level of the constitution--the nature and boundaries of
the state--whilst day-to-day government is allowed to continue
to rule over the disputants. The disputants accept a minimal
level of civic life (government) as a necessary condition of
life until the wider issue (the Constitution) is resolved.

Chapter IV - Footnotes

1. The six occupations employed were: policeman, baker, soldier, butcher, judge, grocer. Greatest hesitancy occured over the public v private nature of the judge's role.

2. Hess and Torney, op.cit., (fn.3/Introduction).

3. Greenstein, op.cit., (fn.3/Introduction.) p.42.

4. Easton and Dennis, op.cit., (fn.3/Introduction) p.137.

5. Dean Jaros et al, op.cit., (fn.5/Introduction).

6. Greenberg, op.cit., (fn.5/Introduction).

7. "War and America's Children", San Francisco Examiner, October 10th, 1971.

8. Almond and Verba, op.cit., (fn.9/Introduction).

9. Jack Dennis et al., (fn.13/Introduction).

10. D.I. = difference index. The difference index ranges from 0 when the proportions are identical in the groups being compared to 100 when no one in one group shares an opinion or attitude with someone in another group. The lower the index the greater the similarity between the groups being compared, and the higher the index, the greater the difference.

11. Richard Rose, op.cit., (fn.19/Introduction).

12. Belfast Telegraph, Nov., 19th, 1971. "Ulster situation is desperate - Wilson".

13. "Most Evil is being done to Young-Long". Belfast Telegraph, 7th Oct.p 1971.

14. "The Children who live with the Riots" Michael Murphy, Belfast Telegrap h, April 8th, 1971.

15. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb., 4th, 1972. "The Effect of Ulster War on Kids".

16. "Mental illness and the troubles", John McPhilemy, Belfast Telegraph, Sept., 30th, 1971.

17. Dr. Morris Fraser and Dr. Alex Lyons.

18. James L. Russell, "Childrens' Attitudes towards Political Change and Conflict", Community Forum, Vol.2, No.2, 1972. (Northern Ireland Community Relations Commission).

19. See Richard Rose, Governing without Consensus, op.cit., Chapter XI.

20. "Peter's Poem", Belfast Telegraph, Oct. 15th, 1971.

21. "Now", edited by Betty Lowry, Belfast Telegraph, Sept. 22nd, 1971.

22. Roberta Wallace quotes Dr. Morris Fraser, "Mummy - why are they fighting?", Belfast Telegraph, Aug.13, 1971.

23. "Barricades and Bombs at Playtime", Gibb McGall, Daily Mail, March 23rd, 1971.

24. "Toys may get your children shot", Belfast Telegraph, Dec., 3rd, 1971.

25. The Laws, Plato, Book VII, para. 794. (Everyman's Library Edition) 1966.

26. Belfast Telegraph, Sept. 6th, 1971.   Four leaders express their condemnation of violence in Northern Ireland. Community Relations Commission Advert.

27. "It's untrue to say use of force is un-Christian", letter to editor, Belfast Telegraph, Jan. 7th, 1972.

28. "When we would have the moral right to rebel - Faulkner", Belfast Telegraph, June 5th, 1972.

29. "The I.R.A. Justified", An Phoblacht Iml.3 Uimh.6 Meitheamh 1972.

30. Flight A report on population movement in Belfast during August 1971, Community Relations Commission Research Unit, CROP (5).

31. "Bombers Use Kids as Cover", Belfast Telegraph, May,24th,1972.

32. "Army using children as a Cover - Teacher", Belfast Telegraph, Sept. 14th, 1971.

33. "29 young people arrested by army", Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 10th, 1971.

34. "Doctor deplores arrest of Children", letter, Irish News, Dec. 17th, 1971.

35. "Arrests of children sickening - Lynch", Belfast Telegraph, Dec. 10th, 1971.

36. "I saw two men shot dead - Newry boy tells the Widgery Tribunal", Belfast Telegraph, March, 14th, 1971.

37. "Boy (6) injured by Pipe bomb", Belfast Telegraph, June, 2nd, 1972.

38. Belfast Telegraph Reporters, Belfast Telegraph, May,19th, 1972.

39. "500 children at Derry funeral", Belfast Telegraph, Sept. 8th, 1971.

40. Alain Cass, "Ulster - The Violent Playground", Scottish Daily Express, Dec. 9th, 1971.

41. John Beilporn, "Children of Ulster", The Montreal Star, Dec. 24th, 1971.

42. Both direct quotations from semi-projective techniques used during the Primary School Survey, 1972.

43. "Women force 'stone throw' bus to stop", Belfast Telegraph May 18th, 1972.

44. "Now 'chicken' game goes psychadelic", Sunday News, March, 26th, 1972.

45. "Mothers scoff at child bomb reports", Belfast Telegraph, Oct. 11th, 1971.

46. "Fighting a foe they can't kill", The Montreal Star, Sept. 29th, 1971.

47. The Guardian, Feb. 7th, 1972.

48. "Boy of 12 planted Co-op bomb", Belfast Telegraph, Oct. 1, 1971.

49. "Boy (13) for trial on arms charge", Belfast Telegraph, March, 8th, 1972.

50. "Schoolboy (14) with two men on guns charge", Belfast Telegraph, March 22nd, 1972.

51. "Soldier shot in Belfast ambush bled to death", Belfast Telegraph, July, 22nd, 1971.

52. "16-year-old boy shot busman witness", Belfast Telegraph, May 16th, 1972.

53. "Weekend of mob rule and death", Belfast Telegraph, May, 1st, 1972.

54. Bruno Bettelheim, "Individual and Mass Behaviour in Extreme Situations", in E.E. Maccoby et al, Readings in Social Psychology, 3rd ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1958).

55. An Fírinne (The Truth) No.17, (Seasus Burns and Charles Hughes Sinn Fein. Cumann).

56. "Bill and Benn, the IRA Men", Loyalist News, Jan. 8th, 1972.

57. "Synod hears praise for young", Belfast Telegraph, May, 16th, 1972.

58. "Mental Illness and the Troubles", John McPhilemy quoting Dr. Alex Lyons, Belfast Telegraph, Sept., 30th, 1971.

59. "The Ulster of my Youth", John Rooks, Belfast Telegraph, July, 5th, 1971.

60. "The Children who live with the riots", Michael Murphy,
    Belfast Telegraph, April 8th, 1971.

61. Richard Rose, Governing without Consensus, pp.192-93.

62. "Government White Paper" Loyal Orange Institution of
    Ireland.   Advertisement, Belfast Telegraph, May 2nd, 1973.

Chapter V   School Influences.

Children are not only instructed in vocational skills,
but are also taught the cultural norms, and expectations of the
society of which they are becoming adult members.   This
includes political expectations and behaviours.

Two reasons why greater emphasis has been placed upon
formal education in this century may be that technological
understanding is seen as a vehicle of national economic develop-
ment and because new nations, in particular see education as a
prime tool in nation building.   Generally speaking, the newer
the nation the greater the emphasis given to formal instruction
in 'civics'.

The Soviet Union and the United States are examples
of societies in which education is consciously directed to
political ends.   In the U.S.S.R. the schools offer a communistic
view of national and international affairs, teach love of the
motherland, and are responsible for developing an outlook
emphasising comradeship, collective action and loyalty to the
Party.   The education system in the U.S.S.R. aims at "the
formation of behaviour, character, and traits of personality
necessary to the Soviet State".[1]   The U.S.A. has long used
civic instruction in the schools to increase loyalty towards
America.   Whilst the integrative-consensual model (melting-pot)
still predominates in America it has been broadened to include
communism and democracy, international relations, world citizenry,
and comparative politics.   In England, as representative of

of older nations, there are still relatively few schools giving
instruction in 'civics' or government. Nevertheless, the
teaching of history, emphasising acceptable national traits,
helps young people adjust to adult life. Such teaching
emphasises the political community and constitution thus re-
inforcing love of country and form of government. English
education also anticipates the roles children are expected to
play in adult life through the different emphasis given to
participation in public affairs in the segregated school systems.

Older nations have less need to emphasise loyalty in
the curriculum. Loyalty has been built up over the centuries
and parents pass such attitudes to their children because they
generally cannot conceive of doing anything else. Northern
Ireland presents the problem of parts of two older nations being
ruled by one new state. The problem is further complicated by
the presence of a sizeable minority withholding allegiance to the
new state and passing on such attitudes to their children.
Moreover, two sets of schools are organised along lines broadly
paralleling differences about the Constitution and the Nation
and there is no agreement whether all schools should, or could,
teach the same political values.

The aims of civic education in the schools, whether
imparted through history, moral and religious instruction, or
'civics', are knowledge of government, constitution and nation;
acquaintance with what government expects of citizens and what
activities citizens should expect of government; and loyalty
towards government, constitution and nation. The content of

such knowledge and attitudes depends largely upon the definition
of citizenship in the country concerned and upon the roles
children can anticipate in adult life. Thus, in one country,
a citizen is a rational-activist who blends the right of
participation in politics with concern for the whole nation;
elsewhere, the citizen is someone who works hard and knows
and loves Marxian dialectics; or he may be someone who,
whilst sharing equality of loyalty with all, emphasises
inequality of public service and knows how to 'keep his place'
and look up to his 'betters'. In Northern Ireland there is
no agreed definition of 'citizen'. Before the Queen's Silver
Wedding anniversary in 1972 all the schools in Northern
Ireland received a circular from the Ministry of Education:

> Her Majesty the Queen has expressed a wish that all
> schools and colleges will take a holiday on November
> twentieth. The Ministry is confident that effect
> will be given to Her Majesty's gracious wish by
> schools and colleges in Northern Ireland.

Although some Catholic schools decided to close others were
undecided. The headmaster of one school is reported as saying,
"We are looking for some sort of agreement with other schools.
The majority seem to be in favour of opening but no final decision
has been taken."[2] Although many Protestants have rated Catholics
as second class citizens the indecision of Catholic schools over
their action on the Queen's Silver Wedding anniversary causes
many Protestants to wonder whether Catholics are citizens at all.
Such indecision in Protestant eyes amounts to disloyalty and
exclusion from the State. Catholics in Northern Ireland certainly
support the government more for material than symbolic reasons.[3]
Thus, different citizenship patterns emerge by nationality and
religion. These differences occur outwith the schools. Perhaps

Catholic schools, staffed by Catholics, cannot or will not teach the same civic values as Protestants and cannot prepare pupils for roles in society which have previously been closed to Catholics. For instance, it took 50 years of Unionist government in Northern Ireland before a Catholic was admitted to the Cabinet. Protestants, on the other hand, may have difficulty in preparing their children for anything but a dominant role in Ulster politics.

The values and beliefs that young people have by the time they leave school may be less a function of what they were taught in school than of what they were like before they came to school, or of what happens outside the confines of the school. Parental influence is always likely to be strong especially when very basic values are concerned and the apparent effectiveness of the school in socializing values may depend, to a great extent, upon the 'fit' between school teaching and other socializing agents. Where the school builds on pre-existing predispositions to accept the content of civic instruction they appear to be successful in creating the attitudes they set out to create. But success is only minimal. Where the parents have induced predispositions hostile to the content of school civics the attitudes the school wishes to create becomes more difficult to attain. Should they work against the parents or serve the community of which the parents form a part? Thus effectiveness of school civic instruction relies heavily upon the congruence of political learning experiences. Schools in Northern Ireland, endeavouring to increase allegiance to the State may be besett with ultra-loyal attitudes on one hand and rebellious predispositions on

the other.   If this is the case then the schools will be
particularly ineffective agents of civic learning if full
allegiance is the definition of citizen employed.

        In this chapter political learning in the schools will
be investigated under the headings: (1) the formal curriculum
and the teachers;   (2) the social atmosphere of the schools;
(3) the length of exposure to school influences and educational
aspirations.

(1)   The Curriculum and the Teachers.

        (a)   Civics

        At Secondary school level research findings on the
association between civics courses and political learning have
been mixed.   Edgar Litt found that civics courses had little
impact upon students' attitudes towards political participation.[4]
Langton and Jennings found... "...not one single case out of
the ten examined in which the civics curriculum was significantly
associated with students' political orientations".[5]   But when
white and black students were analysed separately, the blacks
who had taken one or more civics course were found to have more
political knowledge, and ideological sophistication, a greater
sense of political efficacy, and a higher level of civic
tolerance, than those who had taken no courses.   The explanation
offered for the different response between blacks and whites to
civics courses was that for the whites such courses provide
reduntant information whilst for the blacks they produced new
perspectives.   Mercer, reporting on the responses of 2,400

Scottish secondary school pupils concluded that, "The influence
of Modern Studies on the development of higher feelings of political
efficacy among our adolescent population attending secondary
schools is a myth".[6]   A French study noted negative relation-
ships between civic instruction and political attitudes.
French pupils in the Village in the Vancluse learned from civic
textbooks that the French government was simply the concrete
manifestation of the state, which was the political personality
of the Nation. Whilst they had no difficulty in accepting
loyalty to the French Nation, they were taught outside of school,
to think of government as made up of "weak, selfish, stupid,
ambitious men" and that it was the "duty of citizens not to
cooperate with these men, as the civics books would have people
do, but rather to hinder them, to prevent them in every
possible way from increasing their power over individuals and
over families".[7]

     Civic education in Northern Ireland is given mainly
through history and religious education. There are, however,
a number of schools where 'civics' is recognised as a subject
on the curriculum. This often takes the form of 'Inter-
national Studies', 'British Constitution', 'Current Events',
and 'Modern Studies'. There are very real difficulties
associated with teaching politics in the Ulster schools.
If the subject is approached in a traditional manner emphasing
political structures rather than political interaction pupils
may soon lose interest finding few links between what they are
taught and the dynamic political processes at work in their
society. If, on the other hand, the teacher becomes involved
in teaching current politics he runs the risk of providing his

own solutions rather than approaching the subject in a neutral
manner. (Are there any neutrals in Ulster?) Also there is a
tendency in Northern Ireland schools to avoid politics altogether
because this involves violence. If the schools are to be
'...a haven of security and normality' as a report from the
Ministry of Education[8] suggests they have been, then politics
must be avoided or prohibited.

Only nine per cent of the boys I saw in the Grammar
schools were said to receive specific civic education. Only
one Primary headmaster emphasised that civic instruction was
given regularly to his children. Approximately one quarter
of the boys in the Intermediate schools received formal 'civics'
in their school curriculum thus presenting a good basis for the
investigation of the possible effects of 'civics' upon political
attitudes.

Since previous research about the effectiveness of
civics courses upon political attitudes seems inconclusive,
or negative, one might hypothesise that no differences in
civic outlooks will occur between boys in Secondary Intermediate
schools who do, and do not, receive civics classes. Alter-
natively, bearing in mind the Langton and Jennings finding upon
the possible effects of civics courses upon American blacks[9]
one might wish to hypothesize that Catholics who take civics
courses will meet with less redundant material than Protestants
and become more positive towards the political system in
Northern Ireland. Alternatively, if what Catholics are taught
about civics is incongruent with community views of political

processes then 'civics' may have little, no, or a negative
effect.

In fact, receiving formal instruction in 'civics'
has few effects for Intermediate schoolboys in Northern Ireland.
The difference index only rises to 11 per cent between Catholic
boys regarding discord with the boys receiving 'civics' being
readist to reject the use of violence for a United Ireland.
Ironically, Protestants who receive civics courses are slightly
more violent in outlook. Among both Protestants and Catholics
'civics' makes no difference to how a boy feels about government.

Civic studies which are incongruent with the on-going
political life of a country are unlikely to influence the
political attitudes of those undergoing instruction. In-
congruence may take the form of being unrelated: in the
words of Professor Crick, "...to teach the Constitution is like
teaching elementary anatomy or biology instead of the nature
of sexuality."[10] Incongruence between 'civics' and politics
may take the form of direct conflict as witnessed in the children
of The Village in the Vancluse: teaching British Constitution
to the sons of Republicans may encourage them to join the IRA.

Efforts have been made recently to bring Ulster courses
in 'civics' into line with actual political developments. The
"Ulster in Your Hands"[12] simulation endeavours to put pupils
into political situations and, using the materials provided,
asks them to choose which decisions they would make. The
General Studies project presents facts about basic political

problems like the Constitution, but includes divergent attitudes
for discussion.[13]   Perhaps these methods, and others like
them, will bring about greater congruence between school 'civics'
and politics.   This may result in more disorder as the political
games resulted in some boys building barricades as the only
feasible option.   Commenting on the General Studies projects
one teacher reported that not a single pupil altered previously
held opinions through using them.   "On reflection it seems to me
that this is really to be expected because it will only be
through experience that attitudes will be changed and there is
absolutely nothing in their experience at this moment to give them
any reason to question their own attitudes."[14]

(b) School History and Historical Interests

School courses in National history tend to select
episodes of the past that emphasise national glory.   Where
discord exists about such basic political values as the nation,
various aspects of history will be stressed depending upon the
prevailing community view of past and present.   A country may
have two glorious pasts when groups within one country have
different nationalistic aspirations, different ancestors,
different anniversaries, different national heroes and battles.
Even if history is not consciously used for political purposes,
as a school subject, one cannot avoid political values in the
study of how one's state developed, in providing past insights
into current political affairs, and in tracing the growth of
democratic or other political practices.

In some Communist countries the political use of school
history is clearly acknowledged where, "The study of modern
history plays a very important part in the education of the young
Soviet patriots, ready selflessly to defend its achievements...
it is of great importance in the formation of the Communist world
outlook among pupils."[15]   In America, "The study of the nations
past is considered by many and with good reason, one of the
best means of reinforcing national unity and of instilling love
of country and patriotic devotion."[16]   After extensive research
in Canada it was claimed that history teaching, in particular,
is leading young English and French-speaking Canadians to have
two entirely different sets of national values.[17]   The content
of secondary school teaching of history in England is generally
dominated by political history with great emphasis on the
development of government, especially in the last 150 years.
Traces of the older colonial outlooks are still visible:
many primary school histories give the impression that South
African history began with the European settlement and admit
white supremacy.[18]

In 1926 the government of the Irish Free State announced
that its educational policy was "the strengthening of the
national fibre by giving the language, history, music and traditions
of Ireland their natural place in the life of the schools."[19]
John Magee comments:

> It is understandable that a new state, itself the
> creation of the physical force tradition and the
> Gaelic cultural revival, should want to emphasise
> its national identity and to inculcate a respect
> for the history and tradition of the people.   In
> practice, however, the policy had a restrictive and
> illiberal tendency.   "In the primary schools only

Irish history was taught, and, although in the
secondary schools the programme was widened to
include some aspects of the history of Western
Europe, Britain with whom Ireland had been linked for
so long was deemed not to exist at all.   The text-
books used in Irish history were impregnated with a
spirit of exaggerated nationalism, with its stress
on war and hatred of the enemy.[20]

Under the influence of the report of a study group set up by

Comh Comhairle Fianna Fail to examine the teaching of history

in the schools of Eire a wider view of history teaching was

encouraged.   A new curriculum for primary education (1969)

warned the history teacher that:

The history of his own country has a special appeal
for the child and it is rich in examples of the high-
mindedness of his forebears.   But to limit his
knowledge to examples taken exclusively from the
activities of his own people is to give him an
unbalanced view of reality and a distorted vision
of history.   Local and national pride is certainly
to be cultivated but whenever the belief is fostered
that any national struggle is consistently a war
between the forces of good and evil the child is left
open to the saddening experience of subsequent
disillusionment.[21]

Yet as recently as 1972 Dr. Conner Cruise O'Brien, speaking

in Dail (23-2-72) asked if schools in Eire were responsible for

turning out "little IRA men".   He said, "...some of our teachers

and some of our schools are producing in the guise of patriot-

ism a narrow, fanatical form of nationalism which makes a

target of a particular country and people."[22]   School history

in Eire, emphasising a 32 county United Ireland and referring to

Northern Ireland as the "six Counties", has probably reinforced

negative feelings towards Britain and sympathy for the "suppressed"

Irish in the "lost" Counties of Ulster.

If school history in Eire involves models of a United

Ireland suggesting the abolition of the Border, one might expect

school history in Northern Ireland to present "defence" and "subversion" models according to Nationality. When 1,000 children in Londonderry, Northern Ireland, were asked to name the country in which their City was situated 67 per cent of Catholics replied "Ireland" and 63 per cent of Protestants "Northern Ireland". The leader of the project team asserted that such findings"...revealed attitudes which may well have been formed in the history classroom".[23] Commenting on the Ulster 71 Exhibition in Belfast which was said to be non-political Barry White said, "If so, it will be the first non-political event in Northern Ireland for at least 300 years. Just to tell the history of the place is political--why else would Irish history be expunged from the ordinary school curriculum?"[24] Writing of how the schooldays of children in Northern Ireland could separate them from each other Barrit and Carter stated that:

> As a broad generalization, the non-Catholic schools teach English history, as being a well-established discipline with good text-books, which tells children about their own country (which is the United Kingdom). Irish history is therefore taught as incidental to English history. Catholic schools are more likely to teach Irish history in its own right, and to treat it as the story of heroism in maintaining national feeling under foreign rule.[25]

The courses prescribed by the Ministry of Education for the Junior and Senior Certificate examinations placed an emphasis upon British and modern European history and the textbooks in general use had their Irish history compressed into one or two chapters. John Magee comments: "The impression generally was that Ulster children could be educated as if they were living in Chelmsford or Bristol or Haverford West."[26] Examinations made it imperative that pupils should study British history. Knowledge of Irish

history could widen a student's choice of questions, but was insufficient to pass an examination. Some schools, however, have widened the scope of teaching to include Irish history without significant British connections. Many Secondary Intermediate schools teach history in the context of the pupils own local environment and BBC programmes have introduced school students to aspects of Irish history otherwise largely ignored.[27] There is some evidence, however, that history has been regarded as the most boring and irrelevant subject in the school curriculum.[28] Thus both confined and more open versions of national history may have little effect upon students' basic political attitudes. Professor Gibson, however, emphasises the importance of teaching Irish history in Ulster's schools in order to understand the position of the Province:

> This means, I suspect, amongst other things, that we need to incorporate into our curriculum and teaching programmes as honest and as objective an appreciation of Irish history in its political, religious, economic and social aspects as it is humanly possible to devise.[29]

Implicit in the question of school history and political learning is the assumption of effective transfer of historical learning to political attitudes. In this investigation the problem was approached in three different ways. The first involved asking history teachers and/or principals which national history was mainly taught. Replies could be coded as 'mainly British', 'mainly Irish', 'both British and Irish fairly evenly mixed', 'some other sort of history', and 'no history taught'. The second question about national history was put to the pupils themselves. The same broad categories

were used. A third question, not so closely related to school
teaching, involved asking whether or not the boys were interested
in history and, if so, which national history mainly interested
them.

There are wide differences between Protestants and
Catholics regarding the teachers' view of the history curriculum.
(Table V:1) For instance, 75 per cent of Protestant primary
boys were said to receive instruction mainly in British history
to only 44 per cent of Catholic primary boys. Twenty-one per
cent of Catholic Grammar boys were given instruction mainly in
Irish history whilst no Protestant boys were said to receive this
emphasis.

Table V:1   Main content of history course as seen by Teacher

	Protestant %	Catholic %	
Primary			
British	75	44	
British/Irish	25	36	
None	-	20	D.I. = 31%
Secondary Intermediate			
British	35	20	
Irish	-	-	
British/Irish	49	55	
Other	6	3	
None	10	22	D.I. = 18%
Grammar			
British	41	24	
Irish	-	21	
British/Irish	19	3	
Other	15	38	
None	25	14	D.I. = 44%

The school history curriculum as seen by pupils and teachers are not necessarily the same. The attention a boy gives to different aspects of his school history lesson may be a function of his interests. These, in turn, may lead him to believe that the main emphasis of his school history course is rather different that that intended by the teacher. Historical interests may have been acquired outside the school from books not generally used in the class-room and from traditions, poetry, songs, and political and religious pamphlets portraying discordant versions of specific events. Many of these informal channels of historical information may have a greater impact upon a boy's attitudes than school history, especially if they are harmonious with many well established features of the community to which he belongs. Historical interests may also inculcate enthusiasms and prejudices which will remain long after the school history lesson is forgotton and its impact considerably diminished.

Table V:2   Comparisons of two views of history lessons and
historical interests.

PRIMARY PROTESTANTS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	75	—	25	—	—
Pupils view %	2	30	7	28	28	5
Pupils interest %	14	40	10	—	20	16

PRIMARY CATHOLICS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	44	—	36	—	20
Pupils view %	2	9	28	25	19	17
Pupils interest %	6	11	47	—	14	22

INTERMEDIATE PROTESTANTS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	35	—	49	6	10
Pupils view %	4	25	6	41	6	18
Pupils interest %	4	32	27	—	1	35

INTERMEDIATE CATHOLICS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	20	—	55	3	22
Pupils view %	7	16	14	25	11	26
Pupils interest %	3	10	56	—	2	28

GRAMMAR PROTESTANTS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	41	—	19	15	25
Pupils view %	1	34	2	22	12	28
Pupils interest %	2	43	20	—	3	31

GRAMMAR CATHOLICS

	No answer	British	Irish	Mixed	Other	None
Teachers view %	—	24	21	3	38	14
Pupils view %	2	7	20	16	35	20
Pupils interest %	2	18	54	—	5	20

The Primary pupils view of his history lessons and his historical interests are closer together than are the teachers view of the lesson and his (the pupils) idea of it. This suggests that influences outside the school have an important bearing upon how a Primary schoolboy sees his history lessons. Alternatively, one could suggest that teachers may think they are teaching one type of history, but that pupils find it biased in another direction. If this is so, then historical interests, this time the teachers, may be more important in history lessons than is, or can be, formally acknowledged. In the Secondary schools the pupils and teachers' views of the history courses are much closer together. The largest difference between pupil and teacher views of history courses appears in the Catholic Intermediate schools where 55 per cent were said to receive a balanced British/Irish course whereas only 25 per cent of boys thought this was the case. Even if the Secondary pupils have a more accurate perception of the content of their school history lessons their historical interests are not determined by school teaching. (See Table V:2)

How the teacher sees the history lesson.

It might be hypothesized that the teaching of British history would raise the level of positive feeling for the Stormont Government among both Protestants and Catholics since the Government was committed to maintaining the link with Britain and a 'British way of life'. Among Protestant boys in Primary and Intermediate schools those said to receive instruction mainly in British history are slightly more likely to record strong positive feelings about Government (...will always want to help...) when compared to those receiving a mixture of British/Irish history. But the overall positive affect to Government is similar for both these history groups. There are virtually no differences between Grammar Protestant boys in groups receiving different historical emphases or who take no school history courses. Among Catholics, affect towards Government is slightly more positive among Intermediate school boys who take a mixed British/Irish course compared to those who take a mainly British course.

It might also be hypothesized that teaching mainly Irish history to Catholic boys will be associated with low positive, and higher negative, affect to Government. This is not borne out.

If school history courses are effective in raising loyalty to government one might hypothesize that those students taking no history classes would be more hostile, or at least, less positive, in their outlook upon Government than those who study history at school. This relationship is borne out among Catholic Secondary schoolboys who are more likely to be hostile to Government if they

take no history courses.   (Table V:3)   Among Protestants,

Intermediate schoolboys are only 10 per cent more likely to be

negative to Government where they lack a history course.

Table V:3   Percentage having Negative Affect towards Government
among Secondary School Catholics.

	Takes History Class	No History Class
Intermediate	29	53
Grammar	29	43

If we accept that schoolteachers and principals give

a realistic assessment of what is taught in school history classes

we are in a position to ask and answer a number of questions.   For

instance, does the Catholic teacher who teaches mainly Irish history

have any influence in undermining the authority of government of

Northern Ireland?   The answer must be 'no'.   Do history teachers,

in general, appear to have undermined the Government of Northern

Ireland?   Again the answer must be 'no' since boys without history

lessons are more negative to Government.   And finally, does

teaching British history increase positive affect to government?

Among Protestants - 'perhaps' - but only at the most benevolent

(...always wants to help...) level.   And among Catholics, teaching

the mixed British/Irish course is associated with higher positive

affect to government than is the British course.

It could be hypothesized that teaching schoolboys mainly

British history would make them less likely to favour violent political

solutions since recent British history has involved constitutional

methods of opposition. This relationship may be true for Protestant boys in all schools if they are compared only to those said to receive a mixed British/Irish course. The differences between the two groups are, however, slight.

Only in the Catholic Primary and Grammar Schools were some pupils said to receive courses mainly in Irish history. Such pupils, it might be hypothesized, will be more likely to favour disorder since Ireland has a tradition of violent politics. This relationship does not hold since there are few differences on this question between Catholic pupils said to receive Irish as against other forms of history.

Where boys receive no history courses at school one might expect disorder to be more fully endorsed since such boys have not been instructed in the sometimes peaceful politics of other nations and could be, thus, most open to violent suggestions from the larger community. This may be true for some Catholics. Among those without history courses 75 per cent in the Primary schools, and 80 per cent in the Intermediate schools, favoured political violence for a United Ireland.

The arresting figures emerging concern Catholic history teachers. Those teaching mainly Irish history cannot be blamed for raising the levels of disorder approval in Northern Ireland since (1) Catholic boys said to receive mainly Irish history are no more violent in political outlook than other boys studying history and (2) Catholic boys without history courses are the most disorderly Catholics.

How the Schoolboy sees the History Lesson.

One might hypothesize that schoolboys who saw a predominantly British content in their history lessons would give higher positive feelings to government than those perceiving a different emphasis. This is not borne out. Among history groups in the Catholic Intermediate schools, boys who believe that their teacher passes on mainly Irish history are highest in negative feelings for government. (44 per cent negative). However, boys in these schools who reply that they receive no history lesson are just as negative. Catholic history teachers who give the impression that they teach mainly Irish history may have done something to undermine the authority of the Stormont Government. Alternatively, schoolboys may be interpreting their history lessons in the light of popular community views. This is rendered more plausible by the fact that Catholic Intermediate schoolboys without history lessons are just as negative to government as those professing to see an Irish bias in the history class.

Catholic boys in Primary and Intermediate schools who think they receive a British history course are the least violent. For instance, only 33 per cent of Catholic Primary boys in the British category favoured violent politics against 72 per cent who believed their teacher taught Irish history. Seeing an Irish/British content of history lesson may have consequences for political violence among Protestants since, among Primary schoolboys, those feeling they received this mixture were 65 per cent in favour of political fighting to approximately 45 per cent of those who thought they received

purely British or another sort of history at school. Although
only 30 Protestant Intermediate schoolboys saw Irish as the
main burden of their history lessons, all but one of them
favoured violence to keep Ulster Protestant. Among Catholic
boys in Primary and Intermediate schools those seeing Irish
as their central historical curricular concern are clearly the
most violent in political outlook. (72 per cent violent).

Have Catholic teachers who give the impression that
they teach mainly British history been responsible for raising
disorder approval levels? The answer must be 'no' since
Catholic boys who feel they receive mainly British history are
among the least in favour of violence for a United Ireland.
Have Catholic teachers who give the impression that they teach
mainly Irish history been responsible for raising disorder levels?
The answer may be 'yes' in the Catholic Primary and Intermediate
schools. Alternatively, views of school history may be affected
by burning outside issues which may be more potent in encouraging
disorder for a United Ireland. Have Protestant teachers, who
give the impression that they teach a mixed British/Irish history
course, rather than a British, been responsible for increased
disorder for a Protestant Ulster? In the Primary schools the
answer may be 'yes'. Alternatively, the pupil's perceptions
of his school course may not be very accurate at the Primary
level and he may be imputing to his teacher the British/Ulster
emphasis of his community.

Historical Interests.

Schoolboy interest in British history and a heightened positive affect for government appears among Catholic boys in Primary and, to a lesser extent, in Intermediate schools. In the Catholic Primary schools boys showing an interest in British national history are 81 per cent positive in their view of government with 59 per cent being highly positive. In the Protestant Primary schools interest in British history and highest possible affect for government go together where 69 per cent of boys record that 'government would always want to help people like them' and 28 per cent that 'government would sometimes want to help people like them.' Primary Catholic children who are interested mainly in Irish history are 20 per cent lower in positive affect to government than those interested mainly in British history. In the Catholic Intermediate schools, boys most interested in Irish history display highest negative affect to government where 40 per cent are negative compared to 22 per cent of those interested in British history and 30 per cent of those not interested in history. The Protestant Intermediate schoolboys with no historical interest reveal lowest Protestant affect for government. (27 per cent hostile).

Protestants with different historical interests, or none, within each school type, reveal striking similarities regarding political violence. Among Catholic groups the differences are larger. (See Table V:3a) Between the groups interested in Irish and British history the difference indexes are 30 per cent in Primary and Intermediate schools and 20 per cent in Grammar schools with those interested in Irish history being most committed to political violence.

Table V:3a Interest in History and Discord

	Protestants				Catholics			
	British	Irish	Other	Not Interested	British	Irish	Other	Not Interested
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Primary								
Violent	59	53	47	50	44	74	43	52
Peaceful	41	45	53	46	54	25	55	47
N.A.	-	2	3	4	2	1	2	1
Intermediate								
Violent	77	79	-	78	44	73	-	55
Peaceful	22	19	-	17	56	25	-	43
N.A.	1	2	-	5	-	2	-	2
Grammar								
Violent	57	56	-	50	40	60	-	48
Peaceful	40	43	-	46	57	39	-	49
N.A.	3	1	-	4	3	1	-	3

In general, the pupils who receive history of any type within their curriculum are better disposed towards government than those lacking it. Thus, whatever the particular dangers of teaching history in Ulster schools may be, it is less dangerous for government than omitting the subject altogether. An increased interest in British history in the Protestant Primary schools seems associated with very high levels of positive affect to government. This, however, may be due more to the influence of parents than teachers. The Catholic history teachers who openly admit that Irish history is mainly taught in their schools may be helping to increase co-operation between communities in Northern Ireland

by off-setting the more divisive community interpretations of

history.   Interest in Irish history, which is open to community

influence, is particularly associated with lower positive affect

to government and increased disorder approval for a United

Ireland.   Teaching Irish history in the Catholic schools

appears to be on the side of restraint.

(c)
Irish Language.

In the Catholic Primary and Intermediate schools surveyed, approximately 40 per cent of boys received instruction in Irish language compared to 70 per cent in the Grammar schools. If the Irish language is closely associated with a United Ireland we might expect Catholic boys receiving such instruction to have low positive affect for a government that stood for partition and, also, to be readier than others to endorse the use of violence in ending the Border. In the Strathclyde adult sample (1968) 39 per cent of Catholics had been taught the Irish language at school, 29 per cent of whom still endorsed the Northern Ireland Constitution. There was "...only a very slight tendency to favour illegal demonstrations among Catholics taught Irish." Richard Rose comments that, "This finding is striking, inasmuch as Irish language classes can be recruiting grounds for the IRA and other Republican groups."[30]

In the schoolboy surveys striking differences regarding affect to government only appear in the Primary schools (D.I.19%) where those receiving Irish language are much more hostile to political authority. But in each school type those having Irish language in their curriculum are more violent in political outlook although the difference in the Grammar schools, where the greatest numbers study Irish, is small (D.I. 7%). In Primary and Intermediate schools the differences are larger (D.I. 20%). Approximately 70 per cent of Primary schoolboys, and 75 per cent of Intermediate schoolboys, who had classes in Irish at school, approved of violence for a United Ireland. (See Table V:4)

Table V:4   Political Discord and Irish Language
             (Catholics only).

	Takes classes in Irish	No classes in Irish	
	%	%	
Primary			
Violent	69	53	
Peaceful	25	46	
No answer	6	1	D.I. - 21%
Intermediate			
Violent	75	56	
Peaceful	25	42	
No answer	-	2	D.I. - 19%
Grammar			
Violent	55	48	
Peaceful	43	49	
No answer	2	3	D.I. - 7%

It is possible to suggest that, especially in the
Primary and Intermediate schools, teaching Irish language may
have some effect in making it more likely that a boy will
endorse violence in order to achieve a United Ireland.   If this
is so, then one must also consider that other influences either
in Grammar schools, or in the backgrounds of Grammar school
children and young people, make it unlikely that there will be
associations between Irish language and violence in political
discord.

Irish language is not only a major educational
difference between Catholics and Protestants, but it is a
difference associated with disorder.   That these differences

should exist in some Catholic schools gives credence to the belief that 'Irish language classes can be recruiting grounds for the IRA and other Republican groups'. That Catholic adults who were taught Irish at school are only slightly more rebellious in political outlook than those Catholics receiving no such instruction suggests that recruits through this means are lost as they grow older. This may be because the language is not in current use in Northern Ireland and interest in it wanes, or because the Gaelic revival is disassociated from violence among many adults. Alternatively, many Catholic adults may have revised their beliefs about political violence since 1968. Perhaps if Protestant children were taught Irish language Catholics would not associate it with violence. Where the language is taught as part of a national heritage special emphasis could be laid upon the peaceful restoration of Gaelic culture. Alternatively, if the Irish language is taught to foster Republicanism, some success has been achieved.

(d) Respect for Teachers

The schoolteacher's influence is not confined to the
formal curriculum, but straddles the classroom, school, and
community. As one of the first extra-familial authorities
the child meets,the schoolteacher receives a lot of respect,
especially from the youngest children. School-beginners also
see older children deferring to the teacher and may have heard
him/her mentioned with respect in the larger community. School-
teachers therefore have several large bases of respect. When
330 school-leavers were asked how they rated teachers it was
found that, 'Children rate a teacher's ability to teach more
highly than personal qualities. They like teachers who,
among other things, are kind, friendly helpful and fair.
They dislike teachers who, among other things, use sarcasm,
have favourites, and fail to provide for the needs of individual
pupils."[31]

The question investigated in connection with respect
for teachers is whether or not such respect, or disrespect,
is generalized to political attitudes. When Primary and
Secondary students in East Africa were asked who had taught
them the most about being a good citizen of their country-parents
and relations, political leaders, religious leaders, or teachers-
they overwhelmingly chose their teachers.[32] In this case it
is extremely likely that respect for a teacher and
political authority would go together. But in a country
where teachers have to take an oath of allegiance before
being allowed to teach in State recognized schools, and where

discord exists in politics, one cannot be so certain that teacher and political respect will follow similar lines; The opposite may be the case. For instance, a Primary teacher in Northern Ireland was described in his death notices as a staff officer of the Official IRA.[33] It is unlikely that teacher respect, in this case, would generalize to respect for the Stormont government.

In the schools in Ulster respect for teachers is very high. Only a small minority say that it is not very, or not at all, important to do whatever a teacher says; Seventy-three per cent of the Primary boys felt that it was very important to do whatever a teacher said, and 46 per cent felt this way in the Secondary schools; But different levels of respect towards teacher and government is obvious; When exactly the same question regarding respect was focussed upon government, the following results were obtained

	Protestants					Catholics				
Respect level	Great	Lot	Little	None	NA	Great	Lot	Little	None	NA
PRIMARY										
Teacher %	73	16	3	7	1	61	21	5	11	2
Government %	66	20	5	8	2	28	22	13	32	5
SECONDARY										
Teacher %	46	39	7	7	1	44	38	9	8	1
Government %	48	32	10	9	1	25	36	20	18	1

The difference indexes between teacher and government respect levels reach only seven per cent in the Protestant schools

where something could be made of school to polity attitude
transference. On the other hand, the difference indexes
between school and polity respect are high for Catholic
schoolboys (33% for Primary and 22% for Secondary boys).
In the Catholic schools there is little evidence of transference
of attitudes from one authority to another. Dawson and
Prewitt suggest that one major reason why teachers operate
effectively as conveyers of consensus values is that they
are the "products of the same political socialization for
which they serve as agents."[34] They may equally well operate
as conveyers of discordant values where they are the products
of conflicting socialization patterns.

It might be hypothesized that high respect for
teachers will positively correlate with benevolent affect
for government and peaceful political discord. Also, that
low respect for teachers will tend to go with hostility to
government and political violence. There are, however,
few differences on these political variables between boys who
have great or, a lot of, respect for teachers. The most
obvious characteristic about teacher respect levels is to be
found among the minority of boys with little, or no, respect
for teachers. They are, among both Protestants and Catholics,
the most likely to render hostile affect to government. In
almost every case there is a general rise in the tendency to
be violent in political outlooks from great respect to the
little, or no, respect categories. (See Table V.6) Whatever
their school, boys may be influenced in rejecting disorder by
teachers whom they respect.

Table V:6   Respect for Teacher and Political Discord

	Protestants				Catholics			
	Great	Lot	Little	None	Great	Lot	Little	None
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
PRIMARY								
Violent	47	50	87	72	58	54	72	86
Peaceful	51	45	13	24	41	43	28	14
No answer	2	5	-	4	1	3	-	-
INTERMEDIATE								
Violent	71	78	89	92	56	61	78	84
Peaceful	24	18	8	8	43	37	20	14
No answer	5	4	3	-	1	2	2	2
GRAMMAR								
Violent	51	51	77	78	50	52	58	85
Peaceful	48	45	23	17	47	45	35	15
No answer	1	4	-	5	3	3	7	-

The reason why rebellious and ultra-loyal political attitudes should appear with greater frequency among boys with little or no respect for teachers are probably best known to the teachers themselves.   One headmaster felt quite sure which boys would engage in rioting based on his knowledge of their disorderly school behaviour.   Such boys tend to come from disadvantaged home backgrounds.   Although they are in a minority in any school they are disproportionately violent in political outlook.   This may be a function of a very general social violence.   The hooligan hypothesis of disorder in Ulster may hold for these boys.   This will be followed up in another section when peer groups are considered.

(e)   Lay or Religious Teachers.

The schoolteacher may influence the political attitudes of schoolboys by the social system he attempts to establish in the classroom and school.   Schools are often said to be more or less 'democratic' or 'authoritarian' depending upon how much freedom to participate in school decisions and discipline is emphasised.   In Northern Ireland the Christian Brothers have a reputation for strict discipline as well as hospitality. Also, many of such teachers have been trained in

Eire hence the charge of being 'seedbeds of Republicanism' has been leveled at the CBS Schools in particular.   Whilst it might be hypothesized that a Catholic boy educated in a school with a religious head and part religious staff (religious schools) may be more in favour of a United Ireland than Catholics in lay schools it must also be borne in mind that religious schools may be more effective in restraining violence.

In this sample, half of the Catholic Primary, one third of the Intermediate, and all the Grammar boys attended religious schools.   Two of the Grammar schools were not CBS, but had a priest in charge and some priests on the staff. As far as affect towards government is concerned differences between boys attending lay and religious schools are slight. There are few differences regarding violence in the Primary schools, but Catholic Intermediate schoolboys attending CB schools are more likely to endorse violence for a United Ireland than those attending lay Catholic Intermediate schools. (74 per cent approved violence in religious schools to 58 per

cent in lay schools). It is only fair to point out, however, that half the boys in religious Intermediate schools in the sample were drawn from an area experiencing disorder at first hand. Thus their higher approval of violence may be more a function of community disorder than Christian Brother influence. When all the Catholic Secondary schoolboys are split between lay and religious schools virtually no differences occur regarding emotional feelings for government or attitudes to discord. Thus, whilst religious leadership in a school may not promote violence it may not be able to restrain it.

(2)   The Social Atmosphere of the School

(a)   Social Structure

Children find their place in society through interacting with the people immediately around them and by noting how their most immediate group reacts to other groups in society. Going to a Grammar or Secondary Modern (Intermediate) school introduces the schoolboy to a group from which fairly well defined behaviours are expected. Belonging to a Grammar or Intermediate school, high or low stream groupings, may pre-dispose children to act in specific ways which are related to the expectations of the larger society. Thus, the structures of educational institutions are related to political attitudes. For instance, Abramson found a relationship between non-selection at the age of eleven and a low sense of political efficacy.[35]

Selection on the basis of ability may fit children
to fill certain roles in the social system, but it may also
create a sense of failure in individual children.   One
'failure' said, "When I failed (the 11+) it was terrible.
My parents tried not to show me they were disappointed, but
I knew they were.   I think they assumed an inferiority
complex straightaway."   Another was 'shattered' by the
results of the examination: "I always wanted to teach, even
in Primary school days.   I used to play at teaching and
I was very conscious of the fact that I had failed the
eleven plus."[36]   On the other hand, one first year High school-
boy said he never really worried about the 11+ because everyone
went to the same school even if into different classes."[37]

Because Grammar schoolboys are the most likely to
have a middle class background and to anticipate filling
leading roles in society it might be hypothesized that they
will be more positive to government and less likely to endorse
disorder than Intermediate schoolboys.   In fact, higher positive
affect among Grammar boys is only evident among Protestants.
(See Table IV:3)   Solidarity between Catholic Grammar and
Intermediate boys regarding government may be explained as a
function of the views of the larger Catholic community at the
time the Secondary sample was collected.   Whether a Catholic
supported the S.D.L.P. or either branch of the IRA he was likely
to hold roughly similar views of the Stormont Government.   In
the case of Protestants, however, political disputes created two
major groups in early 1971.   The Democratic Unionist Party (which
was predominantly lower middle and working class) and the Unionist
Party.   Protestant variation to government by school type may

therefore be partly explained as a function of school structure
reflecting social class differences.

The expectation that Grammar school boys would have
less violent views of political opposition than Intermediate
boys is borne out for both Protestants and Catholics.   Whilst
only half of the Grammar boys endorsed disorder this was
thought right by 77 per cent of Protestants and 64 per cent of
Catholics in Intermediate schools. (See Table IV:4)   This
may be explained as a function of the 'rougher' background of
many Intermediate boys, but it may also be partly the result
of a sense of 'institutionalized failure'.   Such boys may
realize that their adult occupational positions are already
fixed in lower income brackets.   Feeling they have less to
lose by the effects of disorder may make it all the more
likely that they will engage in it.

(b) Streaming

A boy's future position in the social system may be effected at school, not only by the type of school he attends, but also by his placement within a school stream. One Ulster teacher stressed that the abolition of the 11-plus did not necessarily mean the end of social and economic segregation and that, 'the pressures of the educational system could enforce divisions between Grammar and Secondary Modern streams of a single school which were just as watertight as those between separate schools."[38] Moreover, divisions into school streams also takes place in Primary schools although it is more difficult to detect at this level.

Much research on the effects of streaming has concentrated upon attainments. For instance, Svensson found that whilst streaming has no effect upon the attainment of more able pupils, it tends to lower the attainments of the less able.[39] Research findings indicate that streaming tends to be 'self-confirming'. Whereas the attainments of pupils placed in upper streams improved, that of those placed in lower streams deteriorated.[40]

Two aspects of streaming are investigated in this study: (1) the possible effects of the existence of streaming in a school year upon political attitudes; (2) differences between ability groups in political orientations. Schools with modified streaming were generally those which, by early 1971, had abolished streaming in the first year of Secondary school. Dividing boys by whether or not there was streaming in their school year produced the following:

	Protestants		Catholics	
	Streamed N	Unstreamed N	Streamed N	Unstreamed N
Intermediate	389	89	303	171
Grammar	377	77	320	183

There are few differences of note between boys in streamed and unstreamed school years regarding either affect to Government or disorder. One exception can be found in the Catholic Intermediate schools where boys in the unstreamed years are more violent in political outlook. (See Table V: 7) These findings suggest, that in most cases, streaming, or its absence in a school year, is irrelevant for political attitudes.

Table V:7   Attitudes to Discord in Catholic Intermediate School Years

	Streamed %	Unstreamed %
Violent	56	77
Peaceful	41	23
No answer	3	— D.I. = 21%

On the other hand, in some school years, mixing boys of different abilities in one classroom may have the unintended consequences of raising the level of political disorder. This may be because mixing with boys of higher capabilities has destroyed the self-image of some of the lower ability boys.

The second aspect of streaming investigated herein is differences between ability groups in political attitudes. Harvey and Harvey, testing the utility of intelligence as a predictor variable in political socialization among 393 American high school

students found, among other things, that more intelligent students
were less likely to hold Militaristic, Anti-Communist, or Super
Patriotic attitudes.   Also, the more intelligent students were
less likely to manifest authoritarian predispositions.   Sense
of Relevance of Government and Sense of Citizen Duty were
significantly positively correlated with intelligence.   Dis-
cussing the implications of their findings they suggest that:

> Manipulation of intelligence may provide a more
> direct approach to broadening individual political
> skills than the manipulation of S.E.S. or economic
> well being <u>alone</u>.   Politically underdeveloped
> individuals (or groups of individuals or nations)
> are probably more easily politicized through
> increases in the level of education, for example,
> than through increase in income.[41]

It is not my purpose to enter the heredity-environment
controversy about intelligence or to question the methods by
which boys have been placed in different schools, or in different
streams in the same school.   I will assume that there are
intelligence differences between boys in upper and lower streams
in school years and investigate what differences if any, appear
between them in political attitudes.

Where streaming was said to exist in a Secondary school
classes were interviewed from near the top and near the bottom,
or the top and bottom classes of the school year.   Where
streaming was said to have been abolished any two classes in
an unstreamed year were chosen.

It is hypothesized that the boys in the upper classes
in each school year will reveal higher positive affect for
government and be more peaceful in politics than boys in the

lower streams.   This relationship is borne out in most cases.
As far as affect for government is concerned, in almost every
case there is an association between higher streams and
positive affect.   (See table V:8)   These relationships are,
however, much weaker in the Grammar than in the Intermediate
schools.   In three out of four I.Q. comparison groups in the
Intermediate schools, the boys in the upper streams reveal
higher positive affect to government.   The one exception to
this is found in Catholic Intermediate first years where the
higher streams are more negative to government (D.I. = 34%).
This is caused by 40 per cent of the boys in the higher streams
in Catholic Intermediate first years being negatively oriented
to government.   Variations in attitudes to political discord
between ability groups show that, out of the groups compared,
in five cases out of eight, the higher ability groups are
more likely to favour peaceful political means.   (See Table
V:9)   In two of the three remaining cases where they are less
likely to favour violence than the lower streams the differences
are small, but in one case the difference rises to 20 per cent
where first year Catholic Intermediate boys in higher streams
are more in favour of violence.

Table V:8   Affect to Government and Intelligence

	Protestants				Catholics			
	Upper 4th	Lower 4th	Upper 1st	Lower 1st	Upper 4th	Lower 4th	Upper 1st	Lower 1st
INTERMEDIATE	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
POSITIVE	29	21	43	33	13	18	8	27
positive	53	47	49	38	55	33	49	43
negative	15	20	8	20	24	23	38	10
NEGATIVE	3	7	-	9	6	19	2	17
no answer	-	5	-	-	2	7	3	3
	D.I.= 14%		D.I.= 21%		D.I.= 23%		D.I.= 34%	
GRAMMAR								
POSITIVE	34	38	40	30	8	11	14	21
positive	58	54	56	54	49	43	63	53
negative	5	4	4	14	31	32	21	15
NEGATIVE	1	2	-	1	9	13	2	11
no answer	2	2	-	1	3	1	-	-
	D.I.= 5%		D.I.= 12%		D.I.= 8%		D.I.= 16%	

Table Vı 9   Political Discord and Intelligence

	Protestants				Catholics			
	Upper 4th	Lower 4th	Upper 1st	Lower 1st	Upper 4th	Lower 4th	Upper 1st	Lower 1st
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
INTERMEDIATE								
Violent	83	75	69	75	52	63	66	46
Peaceful	16	12	31	25	45	31	34	54
no answer	1	3	-	-	3	6	-	-
	D.I.= 7%		D.I.= 6%		D.I.= 13%		D.I.= 20%	
GRAMMAR								
Violent	48	65	52	47	50	56	42	57
Peaceful	47	31	45	51	44	41	58	43
No answer	5	4	3	2	6	3	-	-
	D.I.= 17%		D.I.= 6%		D.I.= 6%		D.I.= 15%	

In most of the intelligence groups compared there is an association between higher streams and both positive affect for government and peaceful political attitudes.   The major exception is in the Catholic Intermediate first year where the higher stream boys were much more negative to government and ready to endorse disorder than lower stream boys.   Controlling for area reveals that two-thirds of the lower first year live in some of the most peaceful areas of Ulster where Catholic boys are both more positive to government and least likely to endorse disorder.   Thus this reversal of trends between intelligence and political attitudes may be partly explained as a function of the local political environment.

It seems likely that reduction of violence and higher positive affect to government among higher stream boys is related to greater political sophistication. As noted elsewhere, "..the more able boys tend to have a more institutionalized view of government and the lower I.Q. lads see it in more personal terms."[42] One can invest more hatred upon persons than institutions like government since persons are so much more easily identifiable. Thus, increased levels of education may give greater understanding of institutions, and some of the associated difficulties, making it less likely that boys will hold extreme views of politics or engage in extreme actions. On the other hand, whilst education may help a boy appreciate the good a government does it may also make him a better detector of any political moves likely to set him at a disadvantage.

(c)   Social Class Composition of the School

The social class composition of schools probably have some influence upon political attitudes. Proponents and opponents of comprehensive schooling stress that the social class composition of the school may have consequences for social attitudes. A political socialization study carried out in the Caribbean found that working class students who attended mixed social class schools seemed to be 'resocialized in the direction of higher class political norms.'[43]

In this investigation the social class of a boy was based upon his father's occupation. Skilled and unskilled manual

workers were assigned to the working class whilst others,
including routine white collar workers, were categorized as
middle class. The social class composition of the school was
obtained by the headmaster's calculations (based on this method
of social class categorization) and upon the social class of
what was said to be a representative sample of pupils. In the
Protestant Grammar schools 22 per cent of boys attended mixed
social class schools whilst in the Catholic Intermediate schools
this was true of 37 per cent of boys.

It might be hypothesized, following the Caribbean
finding,[44] that both working and middle class boys attending
mixed social class schools will seem to be resocialized in the
direction of the political norms of the other social class. As
far as affect to government is concerned there is some slight
evidence of resocialization in the Catholic schools, but none
among Protestants. Catholic middle class boys who attend
mixed social class schools are less positive to government than
the middle class norm. And Catholic working class boys attending
heterogeneous class schools seem to move away from working
class positions regarding government. Among Protestants there
is a slight indication of resocialization regarding disorder
where both working and middle class boys in heterogeneous class
schools tend to leave the position of their social class and move
towards one another. In the Catholic mixed social class schools
middle class attitudes to violence remain unchanged whilst working
class boys seem to become much less violent. (Difference Index
between Catholic working class and working class boys in mixed
schools is 13 per cent).

Table V: 10   Attitudes to Discord among Catholic boys in
               the Working Class compared to those of Working
               Class Boys in mixed Social Class Schools

	Working Class	Working Class boys in mixed schools	
	%	%	
Violent	65	53	
Peaceful	34	47	
No answer	1	-	D.I. = 13%

Working class boys may become less disorderly and more
positive to government through heterogeneous class schooling,
but at the expense of middle class boys becoming less positive
and more disorderly. Only in the Catholic mixed social class
schools is it possible to say that working class political
disorder approval diminishes without increasing rebellion in
the middle classes. Whilst comprehensive schooling among
Protestants has nothing to lose as far as basic political
attitudes are concerned it may, among Catholics, cause some
rejection of disorder.

(3)   Length of Education.

Social science theories emphasise that education

liberalizes.   Studies by V.O. Key, and Almond and Verba found

that education promoted political participation.[45]   S.M.Lipset

writes:

> Education presumably broadens a man's outlook,
> enables him to understand the need for norms of
> tolerance, restrains him from adhering to extreme
> doctrines, and increases his capacity to make
> rational electoral choices.[46]

But knowing that a person is educated does not increase

one's chance of predicting which opinions he will hold.   As

Richard Rose points out:

> In a society in which a regime lacks full legitimacy,
> it is uncertain what the political consequences of
> further education might be.   Insofar as educational
> values favour the regime or lead people to jobs
> which give them a stake in the system, then it could
> increase support for the Constitution and for peace-
> ful forms of political action.   Yet, insofar as it
> increases understanding, it might lead Catholics or
> Protestants to the conclusion that only by refusing
> compliance with basic political laws could they
> attain desired ends.[47]

The Loyalty Survey divided respondents into three groups:

those with the minimum education required by law;   those with

secondary education between the ages of 16 and 18;   and those

with higher education at University, Teacher Training College,

or similar institutions.   Among Protestants with further

education, 30 per cent endorsed political violence as against

49 per cent with secondary education, and 57 per cent with

minimum education.   No Catholics with further education endorsed

the use of violence to Republican ends.[48]

In this investigation two methods are used in relation
to length of education.   The first, school-year, may be confusing
age with education.   Nevertheless boys in 4th year of Secondary
school have been exposed to nine or ten years of education
whilst boys in primary four to only four years of school education.
The second measure of length of education used was educational
aspirations.   One can ask adults about the total length of their
education, but this is not possible with children still under-
going education.   One can ask, however, about their educational
aspirations and take this as an imperfect indicator of likely
length of education.   Educational aspirations are likely to
have consequences for anticipatory socialization.   The boys
wishing to leave school at 15/16 are more likely to drift further
from the teacher's point of view as they prepare themselves for
an adult world in which many beliefs held by their teachers are
not highly valued.   Those expressing a desire to continue
education after the minimal age are more likely to come closer to
the more liberal viewpoint of many of their teachers.

(a)   School year

Dividing the sample by school year produces the following
figures:

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary 4	Primary 6	Primary 4	Primary 6
Primary	305	256	265	283
	First	Fourth	First	Fourth
Intermediate	234	244	266	208
Grammar	238	239	287	216

If length of exposure to education liberalizes one might hypothesize that the longer the education a boy has undergone the less likelihood there will be of his holding extreme views of government. Reciprocally, the less education a boy has experienced the more likely it will be that he will see government as either extremely benevolent or extremely malevolent. In fact, extremely benevolent views of government (government always wants to help people like me) drop off steadily, for both Catholics and Protestants, from primary four to fourth year Secondary school. Seventy-one per cent of Protestant boys in primary four felt Government was extremely benevolent to 58 per cent in primary six; 36 per cent in first year and 30 per cent in fourth year of Secondary school. Among Catholics the drop in extreme benevolence is from 47 per cent in primary four to 22 per cent in primary six; 21 per cent in first and 12 per cent in fourth year Secondary school. Protestant numbers taking a malevolent view of government (government wants to hurt people like me) are too small to take into consideration, but Catholic malevolent views of government do not support the hypothesis that extreme views tend to vanish with increased exposure to education. The percentages having a malevolent view of government in Catholic schools are the same in Primary four as in fourth year Grammar school. (Table V:11) Whilst increased exposure to education is associated with a decrease in the propensity to take the most extremely positive views of government much exposure does not also increase the likelihood that Catholics will renounce extremely negative affect. Education may make a government less of a love object without giving some boys any reason to stop hating it.

Table V:11   School Year and Affect to Government

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary Four %	Primary Six %	Primary Four %	Primary Six %
PRIMARY				
POSITIVE	71	58	47	22
positive	25	38	31	39
negative	3	2	10	24
NEGATIVE	1	1	11	14
no answer	-	1	1	1
	First Year %	Fourth Year %	First Year %	Fourth Year %
INTERMEDIATE				
POSITIVE	36	25	20	15
positive	48	50	45	46
negative	12	18	23	24
NEGATIVE	4	5	10	12
no answer	-	2	2	3
GRAMMAR				
POSITIVE	37	36	22	9
positive	54	56	51	47
negative	7	5	21	31
NEGATIVE	2	2	5	11
no answer	-	1	1	2

If length of exposure to education liberalizes then it might be hypothesized that boys in fourth year of Secondary school will be less prone to approve of disorder than boys in primary four. Alternatively, increased political sophistication may lead a boy to conclude that some political goals will only be reached through violence. In the Protestant schools the picture is clearest. Increased exposure to education of a certain type (Primary and Intermediate) is associated with rising levels of disorder approval. (See Table V:12) Grammar schools in both religions are unaffected between first and fourth year and contain the violence approval level around 50 per cent. In the Catholic schools violence approval rises from primary four to primary six and then decreases from first year to fourth year in Intermediate schools.

Table V:12   School Year and Discord

	Protestant		Catholic	
	Primary Four %	Primary Six %	Primary Four %	Primary Six %
PRIMARY				
Violent	34	72	51	71
Peaceful	65	27	48	29
No answer	1	1	1	-
	First Year %	Fourth Year %	First Year %	Fourth Year %
INTERMEDIATE				
Violent	74	80	69	58
Peaceful	25	14	30	39
No answer	1	6	1	3
GRAMMAR				
Violent	52	55	52	53
Peaceful	46	41	47	42
No answer	2	4	1	5

(b)   Educational aspirations

The second measure involving length of education involved asking the boys about their educational aspirations which reflect intended length of exposure to educational influences. This question was <u>not</u> put to boys in primary four since preliminary testing revealed that as many as 50 per cent of them did

not attempt to answer this question.   Boys in Primary six showed little hesitation in choosing which category fitted their educational aspirations.   Dividing the sample in this way produced the following:

PROTESTANTS

	leave 15/16	C.S.E.	'O'	'A'	Teach	Univ.	Other	N.A.
Primary six	139	4	18	35	5	40	10	1
Intermediate	236	25	70	69	8	34	32	4
Grammar	22	-	40	97	19	276	18	5

CATHOLICS

	leave 15/16	C.S.E.	'O'	'A'	Teach	Univ.	Other	N.A.
Primary six	135	10	8	30	12	58	21	2
Intermediate	225	32	59	67	13	41	25	12
Grammar	20	1	31	66	41	317	23	4

In what follows boys will be compared in three categories: (1) those wishing to leave school at 15/16;   (2) those intending taking either 'O' or 'A' Levels, or both: (3) those desiring a University education.

It might be hypothesized that higher educational aspirations will correlate positively with better expectations of governmental treatment.   This relationship is borne out in a number of cases (see Table V: 13)   Protestant boys in Intermediate schools are more positively oriented to government as their educational aspirations rise, but the increase is not striking.   Catholic children in Primary schools become more positive to government as they anticipate a higher education, but there is little variation by educational aspiration in Catholic Intermediate schools.   In the Catholic Grammar schools

positive affect to government falls off slightly (10%) between
boys wishing to take 'O' and/or 'A' levels and those wishing to
go on to University. Thus the relationship between educational
aspirations and affect for government is inconclusive.

Table V:13   Educational Aspirations and percentage having
              Positive affect to government.

	Protestant			Catholic		
	15/16	'O'/'A'	Univ.	15/16	'O'/'A'	Univ.
Primary six	95	100	97	55	75	72
Intermediate	73	87	82	61	61	66
Grammar	86	87	94	50	77	66

Higher education, we might expect, will be positively
related to more peaceful attitudes to political discord.   Or
alternatively, that educational aspirations and violence will
be positively related due to frustration with peaceful politics.
In Primary and Intermediate schools there are few differences
to be witnessed in attitudes to discord among those with different
educational aspirations.   In the Grammar schools some differences
are worth noting.   For instance, among Protestant Grammar school-
boys violence approval rises from 41 per cent among those wishing
to leave school as soon as possible; to 63 per cent among those
who aspired to 'O'/'A' level examinations and then falls off to
50 per cent among those desiring a University education. Among
Catholic Grammar boys wishing to leave at 15/16, 65 per cent
approve of disorder to 59 per cent of those aspiring to 'O'/'A'
levels, and 50 per cent of those wishing to go to University.
Thus rejection of violence and higher educational aspirations are

positively related only among Catholic Grammar schoolboys.

Only half of the Protestant and Catholic Grammar boys desiring

University education endorse disorder.   Alternatively, one could

say that as many as half of them approve of peaceful political

life.

Table V: 14   Educational Aspirations and Percentages approving
               Disorder

	Protestants			Catholics		
	15/16	'O'/'A'	Univ.	15/16	'O'/'A'	Univ.
Primary six	75	69	70	67	70	74
Intermediate	78	74	76	63	62	66
Grammar	41	63	50	65	59	50

Summary of Affect

In order to summarize the possible influence of educational characteristics upon affect to government two criteria have been used: (1) the characteristic concerned must involve at least ten per cent of the pupils in the school type e.g. ten per cent of Catholic Grammar boys; (2) the characteristic must be associated with a difference index of ten per cent or more from the distribution of affect within the school type concerned. For instance, the distribution of affect for Catholic Primary schools is:

	%
POSITIVE	33
positive	34
negative	17
NEGATIVE	12
N.A.	4

and the distribution of affect for Catholic Primary pupils who think it 'not at all important' to obey a teacher is:

	%
POSITIVE	17
positive	14
negative	28
NEGATIVE	41
N.A.	-

The difference index between the whole Catholic Primary group and those with no respect for a teacher is thus 41 per cent. A difference index of ten per cent or more from the total distribution may signify D.I.'s of 20 per cent from other groups. Where increases (+) or decreases (-) in positive affect to government only concern affect at the 'benevolent' (government always wants to help...) level a (B) has been included in the following table.

CHARACTERISTIC

	PRIMARY		INTERMEDIATE		GRAMMAR	
	Prot. %	Cath. %	Prot. %	Cath. %	Prot. %	Cath. %
Obedience to Teacher						
Fairly important	12-(B)					
Not at all important		41-	27-	21-		
Not very important				13-		
Irish language		11-				
History taught (teacher)						
British/Irish	12-(B)					
British						14+(B)
Irish						11+
None			12-	18-		
Pupil's perception of history taught						
Irish		12-(B)		20-		13+
British/Irish						20+(B)
None		14+(B)				
Interest in history						
Irish	15-(B)	12-(B)				
British		26+(B)		15+(B)		
School stream						
lower fourth year			10-	12-		13-
upper first year			13+	20-(B)		14+
lower first year			12-	15+		
Primary Four		14+(B)				
Primary Six		15-(B)				

Respect for schoolteachers seems important in the Primary and Intermediate schools. The minority with little or no respect for a teacher are also less positive in their views of government. In this minority there is probably a generalization of disrespect between authorities.

Within the Catholic Grammar schools, boys who receive mainly Irish history in their curriculum are more positive to government than most Grammar Catholics. Receiving British history also involves Catholic Grammar boys in increases in positive affect to government at the most benevolent level. It is, in fact, the Catholic Grammar boys with 'other' and 'no' history courses who are more negative to government. Catholic Grammar teachers who report giving history courses in Irish or British history have not undermined positive affect to government.

In thd Intermediate schools of both religions those without history courses are less positive to government, as are Catholics who feel the main burden of their history lesson is Irish history. But Catholic boys who have an interest in British history reveal increases in positive affect at the benevolent level. Thus, as far as government is concerned, one of the most dangerous things to do in Intermediate schools is to omit to teach history to some boys. Giving, or doing nothing to remove, the impression that Irish history is the main burden of history lessons may influence some Catholic Intermediate boys to render negative affect. Trying to interest some Catholic boys in British history may improve outlooks upon government.

History characteristics in the Primary schools only concern increases and decreases in positive affect at the benevolent level. But only in those schools is Irish language associated with decreases in positive affect. Irish language may build allegiance to an all-Irish government. Civic education may be regarded as quite successful if it develops the loyalties of the community.

Boys in the lower streams of fourth year seem particularly associated with decreases in positive affect to government. Perhaps such boys provide recruits for the para-military organizations of Ulster.

Summary of Discord Attitudes

In this summary the same two criteria will be used as for affect. Beside figures in the following table a (+) represents an increase in disorder approval whilst a (-) means a decrease in violence approval.

CHARACTERISTIC	PRIMARY		INTERMEDIATE		GRAMMAR	
	Prot. %	Cath. %	Prot. %	Cath. %	Prot. %	Cath. %
Obedience to teacher						
Not at all important		26+	14+	20+		
Not very important				14+		
Irish language		11+		11+		
No history classes		15+	12-	17+		
Pupil's perception of history taught						
British/Irish	14+					
British		26-*		12-		
Irish		15+				
Interest in history						
British		18-		22-		12-
Irish		15+				
Other		18-				
Not interested		10-				
Primary four	18-	11-				
Primary six	21+	11+				
School stream						
upper first			12-			12-
lower first				20-		
unstreamed first				13+		
upper fourth				11-		
lower fourth					12+	
Educational aspiration						
'O' Levels				10-		
Religious head/part staff				10+		

*Characteristic only contains nine per cent of school-type

The importance of lack of respect for a schoolteacher, as with affect, seems an important predictor of attitudes to discord. Those with little or no respect are readiest to endorse political disorder. Approval of disorder within school and in the streets of Ulster seem strongly associated.

British history among Catholics is associated with decreases in violence approval. Is this due to an appreciation of British history in particular or to some understanding of a more peaceful polity than Northern Ireland? Particularly in the Primary schools Irish history is associated with increases in disorder acceptance. Catholic boys without history classes, however, are just as likely to approve of violence. This may indicate that historical interests outwith the school have a deeper and more enduring effect upon political attitudes.

In the Catholic Primary and Intermediate schools Irish language is associated with increases in violence in politics. The Gaelic revival and the physical force tradition still seem to be united in the minds of many boys.

In both religions boys in primary four reject violence to a greater extent than their older co-religionists in primary six. Perhaps the upsurge of violence acceptance in Irish politics begins around the age of eight and accelerates quickly thereafter.

In most cases the upper streams in school years are more likely to reject disorder. In Catholic Intermediate schools, however, the lower first year are readiest to reject violence and the boys in unstreamed first year most likely to accept disorder.

Chapter V: Footnotes

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29. "Teach the history of Ireland-Professor" Belfast Telegraph, 5th January 1973.

30. Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, p.338.

31. Joan Maizels, "How School-Leavers Rate Teachers", New Society, 24th September 1970.

32. East African Education and Citizenship Project, (East African Institute of Social Research) see Koff and Van der Muhll.

33. "Crossmaglen Teacher in IRA", Ulster Gazette, 3rd February 1972.

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Chapter VI   <u>Family and Social Class</u>

(a)   Family

The importance of family in child socialization stems
from its unique position in the social system.   It has a near
monopoly of access to children during their formative years
before entering school when children experience a prolonged
dependence upon parents based on affective relationships.
The child identifies with the family, immitates its actions,
and accumulates its values.   The family carries out explicit
socialization through example and teaching.   A less direct
form occurs within the family as the child's personality
develops which will have consequences for social action.   By
identifying with the family in its social interactions the child
learns who he is in relation to the larger society.

Families introduce their children to the polity through
the exchange of loyalty and compliance for leadership and
decisions beneficial to society and to the family.   At the very
minimum the family knows that leaders exist and obey their
decisions most of the time.   Where there is agreement regarding
basic political goals loyalty and compliance can be taken for
granted.   Where loyalty is in short supply attempts must be made
to buy it or else achieve compliance through rewards and force.
Where splits in the polity exist over such basic matters as the
nature and boundaries of the state parents introduce their
children to the concepts of loyalty and compliance in conflicting
ways.   For instance, those fully supporting the existing regime
may find it necessary to inculcate ultra-loyalist attitudes in

their children in order to reduce tension within the family
and to ensure the continuance of the regime.   Those who desire
basic changes may find it necessary to pass on rebel attitudes
to their children in order to reduce familial tension and to
gain the approval of the national and religious community.
Such parents may inculcate the minimum of consent to leadership
to continue the material welfare of the family whilst relying
upon community and religion to supply their emotional needs.
This is not to suggest that the children of Republicans will
never vote for Ian Paisley but it is unlikely.

         When basic political divisions are broadly paralleled
in community, economy and religion children are introduced, by
the family of origin, to social conflict.   The greater the area
over which discord extends the greater the number of points there
will be in the social system at which disorder can occur.   "Flash-
points" exist, not only in the physical geography of Ulster where
Catholic and Protestant areas meet, but in the everyday life of
the society.   Such "flash-points" are also "blind-spots" for a
great many people in Ulster.   This is the function of holding
very firmly to one set of supporting attitudes distinctive to a
particular community to the exclusion of those held by another
community.   Into these intensely dazzling and blinding orientations
children in Ulster are socialized by many parents as they experience
interchanges with the larger society.   The current disorder
serves to harden existing differences and another generation
of rebels and Ultra-loyalists is produced.

         A number of studies have investigated the association

between the political attitudes and behaviours of individuals
and those of their parents.   Hyman, reporting on research
findings in Western nations, saw a very clear relationship
between parents and their children in political attitudes and
behaviours.   Such correspondence was particularly strong
in American political party identification.[1]   According to one
study, voters who had parents who did not vote, or who did not
make their party preference known, were less likely to develop a
party identification of their own than those who could say which
party their parents supported at elections.[2]   Generally speaking,
surveys indicate that children overwhelmingly follow their parents
in voting.   This is particularly true when both parents were
known to vote consistently for the same political party.   Butler
and Stokes found that British sons and daughters were equally
susceptible to the influence of parents' party preferences in
their voting habits, but that this influence disappears more
quickly when the parents voting patterns were inconsistent with
those of the social class of the family.[3]   Jennings and Niemi
found that the transfer of religious and political values from
parents to children was less obvious, and in many cases non-
existent, in the less specific issues than in the more concrete
and widely discussed topics.[4]   Other studies have concentrated
upon the possible influence of family structure upon political
attitudes.   For instance, children in families without a father
tend to be more authoritarian, less interested in politics, and
have a lower sense of political efficacy than those in families
with both parents present.[5]   Relationships have also been
traced between the nature of the decision making process within
the family and the sense of political competence.[6]

There are two main areas of concern regarding the family and the polity in political socialization. The first is the effectiveness of transfer of political lessons from parents to children. Due to the need for complete secrecy of response in the surveys it was impossible to link up individual attitudes with those of parents. Such an attempt would not only have broken faith with the boys but could have led to unpleasant confrontations with some parents due to the nature of some of the basic questions. The only question related to specific political attitudes within families involved asking the boys about their families' feelings of political competence. The second main issue about family and polity in political socialization is about the generalization of non-political lessons learned within the family to the polity. Such generalization depends, to a great extent, upon the congruence of family and political structures.[7] In a primitive society with a relatively undifferentiated political structure the transfer of attitudes from family to polity is likely due to the similarity of response necessary in both social sub-systems. But in highly differentiated societies with cultural heterogeneity, institutionalized arrangements for decision making, and political rules which differ vastly from family rules, the generalization of family responses to the polity becomes less likely. In Ulster there are a number of forces working for and against such generalization. Whilst there is cultural heterogeneity, special agencies for resolving conflicts, and the penetration of security forces, there are areas which, in times of disorder in particular, are very localised political territories. Within such areas there is generally religious, social class, and national

homogeneity.   Also there are extended family contacts, little

contact with outsiders, and a high degree of familiarity with local

leaders.   In times of disorder these localised areas may become

the only polity that concerns those engaged in disorder.   Hence,

generalization from family attitudes to polity becomes likely.

For instance, high respect for the authority of parents may

easily generalise to respect for local political leaders.   On

the other hand, respect for the government and family may differ

greatly due to the greater number of different experiences

reaching the individual from government and family.

Parents have been blamed for much of the disorder in

Ulster.   The government, the media and the army have labelled

lack of parental control as largely contributive to the "troubles".

For instance, the Secretary of State, Mr. Whitelaw, saw lack of

parental control behind an incident in Armagh in which a soldier

was killed after children stoned an army vehicle[8] and the

leaderwriter of the Belfast Telegraph wrote, 'It is natural to

blame the children.   Yet it is the parents who bear the

greatest guilt.....Unless all the parents of Northern Ireland

assert themselves firmly and quickly this Province is not going

to be fit for children.'[9]   The children themselves are quick to

find fault with their parents.   When the 'Youth in Derry' survey

asked the question, 'To what extent can parents and adults be

held responsible for the trouble in Londonderry?' 26 per cent

replies 'very much' and 32 per cent 'quite a lot'.[10]   A long-

term follow-up Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development of

411 boys confirmed the hypothesis that delinquent boys either

failed to learn how to conform to the rules of society, or were

taught how not to conform in their home environment.[11]   Thus,
home socialization experiences are probably partly to blame for
youthful involvement in disorder.   But many feel that parents can
do very little to prevent their children being dragged into
violence.   One letter-writer to the editor asserts that 'Decent
Catholic parents must stand by while their children are sucked
into the war-machine and brain-washed into hating, bombing and
shooting.'[12]   And Morris Fraser thinks that it is precisely
because parents are anxious and upset about the troubles that
some children need psychiatric care: "No child was 'dis-
turbed' in isolation;   each problem, on examination proved to
be that of a disturbed family."[13]   Not only may children have
to disobey their parents in order to take part in the current
unrest, but anxiety behavioural cues which parents transmit to
children may make it all the more likely that children will
find a release for their tensions in rioting and stoning.
Parents are probably neither wholly to blame nor are they
innocent of socializing their children into conflict.   An
American study, conducted shortly after the assassination of
President Kennedy found that the more emotionally involved the
parents were the more likely it was that they would explain the
assassination to their children.[14]   Few parents in Ulster are
emotionally uninvolved and few can, or will, completely avoid
discussing the disorders before their children.   And parents
are themselves products of much the same socializing processes
as the children.   Although many parents have not experienced
the intensity of disorder, as children, as is currently present,
they lived their youth in a land never far removed from strife
and the threat of violence.   Parents and children alike are
pulled by the same perpetual conflicts which exist in almost

every Ulster man or woman. Try though they may many parents in
Northern Ireland find it hard to disengage entirely from some
sort of justification of violence in politics. Past grievances
are gathered up into present conflicts as parents and children are
drawn into the same battlefield in which their fathers and grand-
fathers fought fifty years ago.

Father and Prime Minister Characteristics

Family socialization provides children with their initial
value screen through which the wider society is perceived. This has
the effect of highlighting some aspects of social life and filtering
out others. For instance, if deference to parents is highly valued
within the family it may be more easily approved and observed in the
polity. According to Greenstein the idealization of political leaders
'may be an extension of, or a reaction to, orientations to the child's
parents'.[15] Easton and Dennis found that children's mean ratings of
father and various political authorities on a number of qualities like
power and benevolence, started high with the younger children, but
that the mean ratings for the political authorities fell over the grades
whilst the father ratings remained high.[16] In order to test whether
or not children in Northern Ireland generalized their views of fathers
to political authorities, they were asked to choose, from a list
of characteristics provided, which qualities a father and a
Prime Minister should possess. The list of qualities presented
was - strong, kind, patient, wise, God-fearing, and good - and
these were presented two times in clearly separate parts of the
questionnaires. The boys were not asked to list the qualities
they thought their fathers and Prime Minister actually possessed,
but which qualities they thought they should have. This may

encompass culturally approved characteristics and allows the
boys to choose some of their ideal qualities in both cases.
Alternatively, a Prime Minister is not an idealized figure but a
real human being with specific qualities including association
with political parties and policies.   Considerations of his
current popularity/unpopularity will doubtless influence the
choice of characteristics.

Anyone wishing to build a Prime Minister's image among
Ulster's schoolboys would do well to concentrate upon the
characteristics of wisdom or intelligence, patience, and,
particularly among primary school children, kindness.   In the
secondary schools wisdom and patience take precedence over the
other qualities listed, but wisdom is far ahead among both
Protestants and Catholics.   Among Protestants 72 per cent chose
this quality and 69 per cent of Catholics.   In the primary
schools wisdom is the most frequent choice among Protestants
(68 per cent), whilst kindness is most frequently chosen by the
younger Catholic boys.   A God-fearing Prime Minister is chosen
least frequently among both Protestants and Catholics.   A kind
and patient father is most frequently desired among secondary
school boys whilst in the primary schools the most frequent choices
are 'kind' and 'strong'.   Again, God-fearing is the most in-
frequently chosen characteristic for fathers.

In order to investigate whether or not boys generalized
from the qualities they thought a father should have to those a
Prime Minister should possess the characteristics listed for both

Table VI:1   Order of Frequency of Choice of Prime Minister
              and Father Characteristics

PROTESTANTS

SECONDARY*	Prime Minister	%	Father	%
	wise	72	kind	62
	patient	44	patient	62
	strong	39	wise	53
	good	24	good	47
	God-fearing	20	strong	44
	kind	19	God-fearing	25

PRIMARY				
	wise	68	kind	64
	kind	53	strong	59
	good	48	wise	55
	strong	38	good	44
	patient	26	patient	21
	God-fearing	11	God-fearing	8

CATHOLICS

SECONDARY*				
	wise	69	kind	67
	patient	49	patient	64
	good	35	good	53
	kind	32	wise	51
	strong	30	strong	40
	God-fearing	20	God-fearing	34

PRIMARY				
	kind	57	kind	61
	wise	55	strong	53
	good	44	good	45
	patient	24	wise	40
	strong	21	patient	17
	God-fearing	12	God-fearing	12

*For the remainder of this study Intermediate and Grammar
 schoolboys have been collapsed into one 'Secondary' category.
 The Secondary Sample has also been weighted to make it more
 representative of Secondary schoolboys in Northern Ireland.
 (See Appendix II   )

were combined.   Remembering the Easton and Dennis[17] finding

it might be hypothesized that primary school children will

reveal greater correspondence between the father and Prime

Minister characteristics than the boys in the secondary schools.

Table VI: 2   Percentage of those who chose a characteristic
               for Father who also chose the same characteristic
               for Prime Minister

	Protestant %	Catholic %	Difference %
PRIMARY			
Strong	51	28	+23
Kind	63	68	-5
Patient	50	44	+6
Wise	86	76	+10
God-fearing	60	37	+23
Good	66	59	+7
SECONDARY			
Strong	58	46	+12
Kind	26	40	-14
Patient	56	62	-6
Wise	86	85	+1
God-fearing	54	46	+8
Good	42	48	-6

Whilst the Secondary school boys are less likely to

generalise from father to prime minister qualities than the Primary

pupils the difference overall is not striking (see Table VI: 2).

Only on the characteristic of 'kindness' are the differences between

the older and younger boys obvious where younger boys are more

likely to choose a kind father and prime minister combined.

The quality most frequently combined for father and prime minister is, as expected, wisdom.   Among Protestants 86 per cent of both Primary and Secondary schoolboys who chose this characteristic for father also chose it for prime minister.

Two major points that emerge are the degree of generalization from family to polity and the order of choice of ideal types of father and political leader.   In Ulster the most generalizable characteristic is wisdom followed by kindness and goodness among Primary schoolboys.   This suggests that in the Primary schools politics may be taught in familial terms to a much greater extent than in the Secondary schools.   Emphasising the qualities of wisdom, kindness and goodness will provide linkage points between family and polity for younger children and thus help lay the foundations of political legitimacy.   In the Secondary schools, endeavouring to teach the politics of 'national family' may not prove so productive of good feelings towards the political system since older boys link up the polity and family much less frequently.   However, stressing the use of wisdom within family decision making processes and within the state may underline already existing sympathies and create political allegiance to the government of the day.   The other point of note concerns the order of choice of characteristics for prime minister and father.   In every case wisdom is preferred to strength in a prime minister by approximately 30 per cent.   This may emphasize the underlying desire for peaceful politics in most children and young people.   In the case of father, strength is put before wisdom among primary school Protestants and Catholics, but even here it should be noted that kindness leads over strength in every group.   Neither in terms of generalization from faily to

polity, nor in the order of choice of characteristics, does strength take precedence over the pacific qualities. But when 'wise' men and 'kind' fathers disagree over basic political issues 'strength' may win the day.

Respect for Parents and Government

Another way of testing whether or not there is any generalization of attitudes from the family to the polity is to compare the levels of respect directed towards these separate groups. One head-master in Northern Ireland maintained that loss of respect towards any authority figure, or group, would result in an all-round loss of respect for authority. Alternatively, one may say that only because certain authority figures, like parents, themselves show little respect towards government are they able to keep the respect of their children who may belong to a Junior Branch of the I.R.A.

To test whether there is any possible link between respect for authority within the family and polity the boys were asked how important they felt it was that obedience should be given to parents and to the government of Northern Ireland. One might hypothesize that there will be a closer correspondence between levels of respect to parents and to government among Protestants than among Catholics who will render lower respect to government. If this is the case, then generalization of respect from family to polity among Protestants depends, not upon all-round respect level to any authority, but upon an .

identification of interests between family and government.   Catholics

on the other hand, may be less likely to find that the vital

interests of their families are shared by the government.

        Protestants are twice as likely as Catholics to say

that it is very important to do whatever government commands.

Secondary school Catholics are twice as likely as Secondary

school Protestants to say that it is not very, or not at all

important, to do whatever government says, and among Primary

schoolboys, Catholics are three to four times more likely than

Protestants to take this view.   The respect a Protestant boy

gives to his family and government bears closer correspondence

(D.I. = 15%) than that between these authority groups for

Catholics (D.I. = 45%).   If there had not been such a wide

difference of respect levels to family and polity among Catholic

boys one could have assumed that respect does generalise from

one authority to another without an identity of interests being

apparent to the boys.   But because Catholic boys of the same

age as Protestants clearly distinguish between government and

parents in the respect they render to each it is more likely that

all the boys respond to government out of a sense of identity

of interests or the lack of it.   Thus, even the youngest boys

in the sample (seven and eight years of age) are probably aware

when the two authority groups share a community of interests,

and when this is not so obvious, and respond accordingly.

Alternatively, whilst there may be a relationship between respect

for parents and government the aggregate impact is not great

enough to tip the scales for Catholic boys (Table VI: 3).

Table VI: 3   a) Importance of doing whatever parents say

	Very important	fairly important	not very important	not at all important	N.A.
SECONDARY					
Protestants %	62	33	2	1	2
Catholics %	66	29	2	2	1
PRIMARY					
Protestants %	81	14	1	3	1
Catholics %	73	19	3	3	2

b) Importance of doing whatever government says

	Very important	fairly important	not very important	not at all important	N.A.
SECONDARY					
Protestants %	48	32	10	9	1
Catholics %	25	36	20	18	1
PRIMARY					
Protestants %	66	20	5	8	1
Catholics %	28	22	13	32	5

Difference Indexes between Family and Government

	Protestant	Catholic
Primary	15%	45%
Secondary	16%	45%

A very small minority of boys in the sample revealed low respect for teachers, but they were much more negative to government and ready to approve political disorder than boys with higher regard for teachers. Thus, there may be a similar feature to be observed among the minority of boys who give little or no respect to parents. Such boys are found mainly in the Secondary schools. It might be hypothesized therefore that boys revealing low respect for parents will also be more

negatively oriented to government and violent in political
outlook than boys in higher family respect levels.

In fact, there is a fairly general rise in negative
feelings towards government from those with high respect to
those with low respect for parents.   For example, 60 per cent
of Catholic Primary boys saying it was 'not at all' important
to do what parents said were negatively oriented to government
compared to only 28 per cent of boys who found it very important
to obey parents.   This finding is repeated with minor variations
among all boys.   (see Table VI: 4).   Endorsement of violence
in politics increases, in three of the four groups considered,
as respect for parents decreases.   Although Protestant respect
for parents may generalize to government, disrespect for
parents, no matter what one's religion, is associated with
negative affect for government and disorder approval.

Table VI:4   Respect for Parents and Affect to Government

Importance of doing whatever a parent says.....	Very important %	Fairly important %	Not very important %	Not at all important %
PRIMARY PROTESTANT				
POSITIVE	67	52	40	59
positive	29	39	60	18
negative	1	5	-	23
NEGATIVE	1	1	-	-
No answer	2	3	-	-
PRIMARY CATHOLIC				
POSITIVE	35	25	56	30
positive	36	39	6	7
negative	18	16	19	13
NEGATIVE	10	16	19	47
no answer	1	4	-	3
SECONDARY PROTESTANT				
POSITIVE	38	24	31	7
positive	48	60	42	58
negative	11	13	22	7
NEGATIVE	3	2	5	28
no answer	-	1	-	-
SECONDARY CATHOLIC				
POSITIVE	20	11	16	9
positive	47	50	27	22
negative	24	24	30	24
NEGATIVE	7	12	26	39
no answer	2	3	1	6

Dominance within the family

One aspect of family structure and family relation-
ships which may be related to political socialization is the
dominance of either mother or father within the family.   The
'status envy' theory of socialization posits that the child's
envy of persons who control resources which he himself would
like to control leads him to identify with the controller and
to imitate his or her behaviour.   Thus, where the mother
controls the resources valued by the child, such as pocket-
money and time-allocation, the child may identify more with the
mother than father.   Hess and Torney found that in mother
dominated families the boys were lower in political interest
and efficacy, participation in political discussion and activities,
than where fathers were dominant.[18]   Children who saw their
father as dominant tended to be more informed and interested in
political matters.   Langton's findings from a survey of
elementary American school children confirmed that boys in
mother dominated families had a lower sense of political
efficacy and were less interested in politics than those in
father dominated families.[19]   Harold Jackson in The Two Irelands
writes of the constant need some men in Ulster have of asserting
their masculinity:

> Often this takes the form of excessive drinking and
> gambling.   Pilot studies of the effects of long-time
> unemployment have suggested that it even saps virility
> in the strictly physical sense and this too, may well
> have set up considerable stresses.   The result of it
> all has been a growing incidence of vandalism and blind
> destruction of public property - walls defaced, telephone
> kiosks destroyed - and a growing inclination to combat
> authority in the most flagrant way possible.   This was
> one way to show that masculinity was still potent.
> Allied to the political grievances already simmering
> away it is evident why the riots that eventually broke
> out took the form they did.[20]

In Northern Ireland it might by hypothesized that where mothers are dominant within the family, boys would be less politically concerned than where 'father was boss'. Thus, such boys should give fewer answers to political questions. Also, since extreme political attitudes probably go with higher involvement in politics we might expect boys in mother dominated families to be more moderate in affect for government and probably less likely to approve of fighting for political ends. Boys in father dominated families, as opposed to those where both parents were equal, or mother was dominant, may be expected to be either more highly positive or negative to government, and more in agreement with violence. Alternatively, bearing in mind the extent to which women in Ulster have been drawn into the current disorder perhaps one should not expect to find wide differences between boys with different domination systems within their families.

In order to test these hypotheses the children were asked about the 'boss in your family'. The majority of Primary schoolboys thought of father as the dominant figure in their family (57 per cent Protestants: 48 per cent Catholics). Approximately one quarter replied that there was an equality of influence and only a small minority felt that mother was in control (eight per cent Protestants: 15 per cent Catholics). Among Secondary schoolboys approximately one third felt that father was 'boss' and 40 per cent that both were equal. Only nine per cent replied that mother was dominant.

Boys in mother dominated families are no less ready to answer political questions than others. There are few differences

in affect to government between boys in mother or father dominated
families.   In only one case out of four is there any difference
in attitudes to discord between boys in mother and father
dominated families where the difference is the opposite to that
hypothesized.   In the Protestant Primary schools 61 per cent in
mother dominated families approved violence to only 50 per cent
in father dominated families.

Family dominance patterns in Northern Ireland seem
unrelated to political attitudes.   This could suggest that the
whole adult population - male and female - are equally involved/
uninvolved in political conflict.   Equally, it could suggest
that schoolboys are uninfluenced by their parents in their political
views.

Influence within the Family

Sharing in family decisions has been seen as having
some influence upon civic outlooks.   For instance, Almond and
Verba found that adults who remember consistently being able to
express themselves in family decisions tended to score highest
in feelings of political competence.[21]   And being allowed to
take part in family decisions probably also indicates that
parents are not authoritarian in their control of young people.
Maccoby, Mathews and Morton found that rebellion against parents
was least likely to take place among youths who reported that
parents had 'about average amount of say' regarding their
activities.[22]   If taking part in family decisions both increases
feelings of how one could handle a political problem and reduces

the likelihood of rebellion against parents we might expect to find Ulster boys with 'some say' in family decisions less extreme and more peaceful in political outlooks. Those with no say in family decisions may be both more extreme and violent in political outlooks due to lack of training in compromises and feelings of rebellion against authoritarian parents.

To test the effect of taking part in family decisions the boys were split into two groups: those who said they had 'some say' in family decisions and those who reported having 'no say'. Approximately 55 per cent of the Primary schoolboys reported having some say in family decisions and approximately 35 per cent 'no say'. A relatively high percentage of Primary boys (11 per cent) did not answer this question indicating some degree of uncertainty. Approximately 80 per cent of Secondary schoolboys said they had some influence when the family was deciding to do something together.

Virtually no differences appear between boys with 'some' or 'no' say in family decisions regarding affect to government and attitudes to political discord. One minor exception to this general rule is found among secondary school Protestants where boys with 'no say' in family decisions are ten per cent more negative to government than others in their group. In Northern Ireland at least, participation in the family decision making process has little or no influence upon basic political attitudes.

People like my family and Government

This section on family and polity has been taken up
almost entirely with family structures, and relationships, and
the possible effects these might have for political attitudes.
Here we investigate specific political attitudes within the
family.   Studies of political efficacy have generally con-
centrated upon what causes it in individuals.   Here we look
at how the boys see the levels of political efficacy among
families like their own and what possible effects this may have
for affect and disorder.   It might be hypothesized that a child
reared in an atmosphere of high political efficacy may not only
be more positive to government, but also less likely to resort
to violence in politics.   Reciprocally, a boy whose family
feels they can seldom, or never, influence the government may
display a high degree of hostility and violence in political views.

To test for this the boys were asked if people like
their family could usually, sometimes, seldom, or never, get the
government to do what they wanted.   Approximately half of the
Catholic boys of all ages felt that people like their family
could 'never' get government to do what they wanted.   Sur-
prisingly, 43 per cent of Primary school Protestants felt this
way too, and 60 per cent of Secondary school Protestants replied
that people like their family could 'seldom' or 'never' influence
the government in their direction.   On balance, Protestant boys
recorded higher political efficacy among people like them than
Catholics (D.I.'s: Primary - 14%; Secondary - 23%) but over-
all the feeling that government could be influenced was not
great.

Although Catholic positive affect to government is lower than that found among Protestants, higher feelings of political efficacy among people like oneself does appear associated with positive affect to government in both religions. This is most obvious in the very positive position (government always wants to help people like me). Among Protestants 72 per cent of secondary and 62 per cent of primary schoolboys who record that their family can usually influence government are also very positive to government. Among Catholics, approximately 45 per cent recording the highest efficacy position to their family are extremely positive to government. Thus, as one would expect, giving people confidence in themselves to influence their political environment is associated with increases in their positive affect towards that environment. Unfortunately such boys are in a minority in both religions. In three cases out of four low political efficacy associated with family goes with greater negative feelings towards government. (See table VI:5) Only in the Catholic secondary schools is there a clear progression in violence approval from high to low political efficacy categories. This rise is from 45 per cent approving disorder, among those feeling highly efficacious to 69 per cent of those who say that government will never do what people like them want.

Table VI: 5　Perception of family's political influence and
　　　　　Affect to Government

People like my family can........	Usually %	Sometimes %	Seldom %	Never %	get the government to do what they want
		Protestants			
Primary					
POSITIVE	72	63	58	64	
positive	23	32	41	29	
negative	2	1	1	4	
NEGATIVE	1	0	0	2	
no answer	2	4	-	1	
Secondary					
POSITIVE	62	37	26	27	
positive	24	56	61	42	
negative	8	5	10	23	
NEGATIVE	5	2	3	7	
no answer	-	-	-	1	
		Catholics			
Primary					
POSITIVE	48	38	28	29	
positive	30	27	41	36	
negative	6	13	21	20	
NEGATIVE	9	10	8	15	
no answer	7	12	2	-	
Secondary					
POSITIVE	43	20	16	14	
positive	21	51	57	40	
negative	18	21	19	30	
NEGATIVE	18	3	6	13	
no answer	-	5	2	3	

Summary

Boys are most likely to link up their ideals of families and politics in terms of 'wisdom'. That this should be the most generalizable quality among pupils in both primary and secondary schools is some indication that, although the children and young people have been subjected to, and sometimes taken part in, civil disorders, their basic desires are that wise counsels should prevail in Ulster. This is further strengthened by the fact that, in the order of precedence given to prime minister and father, qualities, the peaceful attributes come before strength. That a 'God-fearing' father or prime minister comes so low in their order of choice indicates that the specifically religious element within family and polity is not highly valued. Thus, although the majority of boys approve violence in politics, they may be basically peaceful in desiring a wise, secular, leadership. This may be too facile an interpretation. Wisdom, in the minds of many boys, may not be a peaceful characteristic. Many boys who desired wise fathers and prime ministers also endorsed disorder. Also, many of them, especially Protestants, when asked what they would do if they were prime minister, insisted on taking a very strong 'law and order' position. Thus it may be thought wise to 'bash a Republican' because that is the only sort of language he understands, or deserves, or to try to bomb the Orangemen into submission because otherwise they will not give 'an inch'. In a land where past disorders are relevant in present disputes there comes a time when many people declare that the only 'sensible' thing to do is fight. When wise men disagree and seek mutually exclusive goals then the content of their choice, rather than their virtue, is of importance.

Catholics and Protestants differ so much in their levels of respect to government that little may be made of the generalization thesis which holds that high respect for any authority will spill over to respect for other authorities. Whilst both Protestants and Catholics show high respect for parents the Catholics obviously see the family and the government in very different lights. Yet among the small minority of boys who are disrespectful to parents (approximately five per cent) there is a definite increase in both negative affect for government and disorder approval. Thus the 'all-round respect' thesis may be correct if we look only at the disrespectful boys. Here one would expect that boys who feel it 'not very' important to obey parents would be the most likely to get out of their home environment and roam the streets. Also it seems likely that they may provide reasons for civil disobedience to other more respectful boys. That they are such a small minority may make them more easily identifiable to social workers and law enforcement officers (if any can contact their families), but they may have an importance greater than their number suggests in inciting other boys to take part in disorders. Further research could profitably examine whether such boys are more likely than others to be the leaders of peer groups, more ready to riot, and engage in social vandalism. That the 'disrespectful' boys are more likely to approve disorder than others is some slight indication that parents are partially successful in restraining youthful violence. In other words, those who will listen to their parents are a little more peaceful. Alternatively, because parents may advocate restraint, boys may become more disrespectful of them finding their views totally un-realistic in a situation which may require them to become junior

members of organizations committed to forwarding political aims through physical force.

Whether father or mother is the dominant figure in family life or whether or not boys feel they can influence family decisions has little relevance for political attitudes. This may indicate, on one hand, that women are as violent in outlook as men when it comes to political goals, and on the other, that most boys find few points of resemblance between what they can achieve within the family and political life in Ulster. But how boys think about the potential influence of people like their families does appear to influence their political viewpoint. Thus the policy of giving people confidence in their abilities to influence their political environment may increase positive affect to government and lower propensities to violence. But if the ability to influence government is confined to people like their own families (same social class and religion) the increased influence of one group may be seen as decreasing the power of another. Only if all types of children can conceive, together, of increased influence over the political environment can an all-round, voluntary, decrease in violent outlook and negative feelings be anticipated.

Using a method similar to that described in the summary of chapter four reveals very few family influences which may be associated with either affect to government or discord. This is because, although large differences do exist between many characteristics described in this chapter, the majority of them involve less than ten per cent of a particular school type. The

following table shows the characteristics in this chapter which
(1) involve more than ten per cent of boys within a school type
and (2) which are associated with differences from the distribution
for affect or discord attitudes of ten per cent or more.   A (+)
indicates an increase in positive affect and an increase in
disorder acceptance and a (-) the reverse.

CHARACTERISTIC	Protestants		Catholics	
	Primary %	Secondary %	Primary %	Secondary %
(1) Affect				
Fairly important to obey parents	12-			
Family political efficacy				
High			18+	
medium low				12-
very low		15-		
(2) Discord				
Fairly important to obey parents	17-			

(b) Social Class

In the interchanges between the family and the economy
of labour and assets for wages and consumer goods families develop
and convey economic life-styles.   The family does much more than
simply shape the consumer behaviour of children; it also teaches
them to anticipate certain economic roles by directing their
attention towards types of occupation thought appropriate for them
and neglecting others because they are thought inappropriate or

unobtainable. Even though a child has no explicit class
consciousness, his parents social class will directly or
indirectly affect his attitudes and opportunities to have a
wide range of experiences near and away from his home.

In order to test the possible effects of social
class upon basic political attitudes the boys were asked to write
out either the name of their father's occupation or, failing
this, to give a brief description of his present job or (where
unemployed) last employment. Later in the questionnaire
they were offered a choice of basic socio-economic groups and
asked to indicate to which their father belonged. Skilled and
unskilled manual workers have been coded as 'working-class' and
all others (including routine white collar workers) as 'middle
class'. Where boys gave no answer to the earlier question
regarding father's occupation or, where the response was
unreadable, their later choice of occupational category was
used when assigning them to a particular social class.

Question 40.   Put a tick in the box beside the one that comes
closest to telling what your father does, or did.

MARK ONE BOX ONLY

He works in a labouring job.   He uses his hands
and arms and body a lot.   The job does not take
long to learn....................................... [1/]

He works with his hands in a job that takes a
long time to learn..like a carpenter, an
electrician, a plumber, a machinist or something
like that... [2/]

He works in an office or a shop or something else
like that and usually wears a uniform or shirt and
tie to work.. [3/]

He works in an office as a manager.............. [4/]

He is like a lawyer, doctor or teacher.   He has
a degree and special training for his job........ [5/]

He owns a business, factory or shop............. [6/]

He owns or rents a farm and has one or two men
working for him.................................... [7/]

He owns or rents a small farm and works on
it by himself...................................... [8/]

Table VI:6   Socio-economic group and Social Class

		WORKING CLASS		MIDDLE CLASS				Farmer	
	N.A.	Manual Unskilled	Manual Skilled	Routine White Collar	Manag- erial	Profess- ional	Business	Large	Small
PRIMARY									
Protestant %	2	23	35	18	6	8	4	2	2
Catholic %	5	23	31	15	7	7	7	2	3
SECONDARY								Farmer	
Protestant %	1	17	26	19	8	8	6	±5	
Catholic %	4	25	28	13	4	6	8	12	

Earlier child socialization studies have suggested that

where samples have included children from less favourable economic

backgrounds attitudes to government have been less positive.[23]

Because middle class children have been found to have more favourable

attitudes to government we might also expect them to be more

opposed to the use of violence for political change. On the

other hand, although the Loyalty Survey found the degree of

class awareness relatively high by Anglo-American standards

such perceptions of class differences were not generalized to

regime politics.

> .....The difference between middle-class and working-
> class Protestants in support for the Constitution is
> four per cent and three per cent in endorsement of an
> Ultra position. Similarly, among Catholics, there
> is only a two per cent difference across classes in
> support for the Constitution, and a five per cent
> difference in readiness to demonstrate against the
> regime. The differences between religions is much
> larger. Within the middle-class, Protestants and
> Catholics differ by 36 percentage points in their
> readiness to support the Constitution, and manual
> workers differ by 30 percentage points. In refusal
> to comply with basic political laws, about half of
> each class group is ready to endorse extra-
> constitutional actions against others who share
> class but not regime outlooks. It is particularly
> noteworthy that there is no consistent tendency for
> middle-class Ulster people to be readiest to endorse
> the Constitution and refrain from extra-constitutional
> politics, notwithstanding their relative advantage
> in terms of status.[24]

It might be hypothesized that differences within

religions between social classes regarding affect to government

will be smaller than those between religions. Also that

differences between religions in the same social class will be

greater than differences between social classes in the same

religion as far as feelings for government are concerned. One

might also expect those who belong to the working class to be

more extreme in affect to government, either negatively or

positively, and readiest to endorse disorder in politics.

The difference indexes between religions regarding

affect to government are 31 per cent in the Primary schools and

22 per cent in the Secondary schools. Within religions social

class differences are only in the region of ten per cent.

Within the middle class, Protestants and Catholics differ by

32 per cent in Primary schools and 25 per cent in the Secondary.

And within the working class, religions differ by 37 per cent in

Primary, and 17 per cent in Secondary schools. Thus religion

is more important than social class in predicting attitudes

to the government of Northern Ireland before direct rule was

announced. The relatively low difference index of 17 per

cent between working class Protestants and Catholics in the

Secondary schools is mainly caused by working class boys in

both religions bunching into the moderately positive category

(government sometimes wants to help people like me: 54 per

cent Protestants; 47 per cent Catholics). The lowering of

positive affect to government among Protestant working class boys

in 1971 may have been caused by the efforts made by Ian

Paisley's Democratic Unionist Party to woo Unionists from the

traditional Unionist Party. (Table VI: 7)

Working-class boys do not differ greatly in their

views of government, from middle class boys, but they are

slightly more violent in political outlook in three cases out

of four. In one case, the Protestant Secondary schools,

the difference between social classes is 19 per cent where

78 per cent of working-class boys favoured violent political

solutions. (Table VI: 8)

Table VI: 7   Social Class and Affect to Government

| | PROTESTANTS | | CATHOLICS | |
	Working Class %	Middle Class %	Working Class %	Middle Class %
Primary				
POSITIVE	68	60	31	38
positive	28	35	34	36
negative	3	2	19	15
NEGATIVE	1	1	15	8
no answer	0	2 D.I.= 9%	1	3 D.I.= 11%
Secondary				
POSITIVE	27	37	17	18
positive	54	50	47	45
negative	13	10	21	28
NEGATIVE	5	2	12	7
no answer	1	1 D.I.= 10%	3	2 D.I. = 8%

D.I.s <u>between</u> religions <u>within</u> social classes

	Working Class	Middle Class
Primary	37%	32%
Secondary	17%	25%

Table VI: 8 Social Class and Discord

	PROTESTANT		CATHOLICS	
	Working Class %	Middle Class %	Working Class %	Middle Class %
Primary				
Violent	53	47	62	60
Peaceful	45	51	37	38
No answer	2	2 D.I.= 6%	1	2 D.I.= 2%
Secondary				
Violent	78	60	65	56
Peaceful	18	37	34	40
No answer	4	3 D.I.= 19%	1	4 D.I. = 9%

Within the social classes socio-economic groupings make little or no difference to how a schoolboy feels about government. In most cases the sons of professional people are least likely to endorse disorder, but in the weeks after 'Bloody Sunday' the sons of professional Catholics may have joined the ranks of the more violent. For instance, on the morning after 'Bloody Sunday' the ten year son of a Catholic professional person wrote, "I would give the Catholics a better say in the country, release all men interned, and send away all the paratroopers who murdered 13 people in Derry on 30th January."

Although there are some indications that having a greater stake in the social system is associated with more peaceful political attitudes there are other signs that such attitudes may quickly change under the influence of adverse

current events.   Whenever one of the 'bogeymen' [25] of the Catholic

community (e.g. British soldiers) goes into action against

Catholics the level of violence approval for a United Ireland

may rise quickly even among those whom one would expect to be

most pacific.

Career Aspiration

As work is a central feature of life for most people

so career prospects are probably a central interest for many

boys, especially those attending Secondary schools.   Since

the type of work anticipated by boys will have a great influence

upon their adult life-style we might expect career aspirations

to have some influence upon youthful political outlooks.   On

the other hand, research has shown that there is a 'tendency

for those who make unrealistic career patterns to hold un-

favourable attitudes towards the Nation, the Administration,

and the System of Laws'. [26]   If this is so, then working class

boys making middle class career choices may be more negative to

government and violent in opposition thus producing few differences

between boys with different types of career aspirations.

To test the possible effects of career aspirations

upon political attitudes the boys in the Secondary schools were

asked to write the name of the career, or job, they wished to

follow when they left school, college or university.   These

answers were later coded as working or middle class career

aspirations.   Fifty-eight per cent of Protestant boys and 50

per cent of Catholics had career aspirations which could
be coded as middle class. Among Protestants career
aspirations may be expressed politically to a greater extent
than among Catholics. The Protestant boys holding a middle
class career aspiration were both more positive to government
(D.I. = 15%) and less likely to accept violence (D.I. = 17%)
than Protestant boys with working class ambitions. Among
Catholics differences were smaller. Boys with working class
ambitions were slightly more negative to government (D.I. = 12%)
and more prone to approve violence in politics (D.I. = 8%).

Summary

Religion is a much better guide to how a boy will feel
about government than social class. But religious differences
within social classes is a better predictor of affect than is
religion on its own. In three cases out of four the difference
indexes between religions within social classes are greater than
those between religions alone:-

Affect for Government

	Differences between Religions	Differences between religions within social classes.	
		Working class	Middle class
Primary	31%	37%	32%
Secondary	21%	17%	25%

The only noteworthy difference between boys of different
social classes is in the Protestant Secondary schools where the

working class boys were much more committed to physical force in politics (D.I. = 19%). Generally speaking, social class alone is a weak predictor of political attitudes.

Within the middle class the sons of professional people are most pacific in political attitudes, but this pattern may be upset by the perception of threat towards one's community. The boys with middle class career aspirations are more peaceful than those anticipating working class jobs. Thus something may be said in favour of teachers and career advisors who place middle class careers before schoolboys. Since it is obvious that many working class boys hope to be upwardly socially mobile one can only hope that the economy can accommodate them.

Chapter VI ; FOOTNOTES

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25. Term used by Morris Fraser (Ref: Chapter I; fn.21)
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Chapter VII   National Community and Religion

(A)   National Community

The family introduces the child to the diffuse affective relationships of the community through participation in community activities and in adhering to and making community patterns. In return, the community gives the family a certain standing, supports it, encourages its continuance, and gives it an identity. In a society where community and polity are identical the question of identity may not be a serious community concern. But in a society with a variety of communities giving separate identities there may be considerable strain in preserving an identity consistent with living in different communities. When the communities within society are so clearly separate in group patterns that one must adhere to one or the other, they approach the point of separation at the political level. When it is clear that the separate communities desire distinctive political counterparts community identity becomes a national identity. In a seriously fractured society like Ulster children learn their national identity, not from the legal state, but through interchanges with their national community. Thus families introduce children to the community and nation to which they belong. This is not to suggest that such children cannot switch allegiance in later life, but predispositions are created in childhood regarding community which, in a seriously fractured society, are very difficult to entirely renounce.

American research in the development of patriotism

suggests that the schools reinforce the early attachment of the
child to the Nation.[1] Earlier identification with a national
community may be seen as an extension of identity with the
family. This is clearly believed by many national leaders who
use familial terms such as 'homeland', 'fatherland' and 'birth-
right', when attempting to raise national feelings. Research
also indicates that children probably learn their first political
lessons about the most stable and enduring political character-
istics[2] which must be, in many cases, national consciousness.

Children of six and seven years of age develop very
positive feelings about their nation, but early development of
the national concept does not appear to be attached to any
identifiable national object such as a national figure, flag,
or map. For instance, a child may be able to say "I am
Irish" without being able to give a reason for the identity.
Four stages in the way attachment to the nation develops have
been suggested: first, children have a positive 'we' concept
about their nation which is present before any tangible national
object can be discovered in their thought habits; second,
national symbols, such as flags, become crucial points of focus
for attachment; then the national concept begins to have
cognitive substance when children begin to think of their
nation as being better than others in terms of 'democracy' and
'freedom'; and finally, older children begin to see their
nation as part of a system of nations like the United Nations.[3]

Although Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom
it had distinct community characteristics which mark it off from

Britain and divides its inhabitants. Both the United Kingdom
and Eire claim the right to rule Northern Ireland
and children can expect to automatically qualify as citizens
of both. This does not mean, however, that they have a choice
of national identity. In the vast majority of cases they will
accept, without question, the nationality of their parents and
probably retain it throughout their entire lives. Children
in Ulster reveal little hesitancy when asked about their
nationality. Responses such as 'British', 'Irish' and
'Ulster' spring easily to their lips illustrating the importance
they attach to such identities. A small minority choose the
double identity of British and Irish. This may be because
their parents are able to keep up a fairly constant connection
with Britain, or because of a mixed marriage, or because they
are combining a legal and emotional answer to the question.

Rather than formally define Irish Nationalism, Owen
Dudley Edwards[4] presented a series of affective historical
pictures all containing something thought by Irishmen to be
distinctively Irish. And this is probably how children are
attached to their particular nation: through a series of
highly charged emotional images which are implanted in the
child's mind early in life and frequently called into service
by repetition until they cannot remember a time when they did
not possess such affective images. That such pictures have
the power of arresting rational thought increases their value
as national diets. For instance, long before Bernadette Devlin
attended that 'madly Republican grammar school' she had learned
from her father '...Ireland's story, told by an Irishman, with

an Irishman's feelings.'[5]   And many young Protestant lads learn

from their fathers that the Good Man is King Billy who rides a

White Horse that is kept in the Orange Hall up Sandy Row.[6]   But

whichever national identity a boy in Ulster possesses it will

lead him into discord, not only with others who do not share his

emotional committment, but sometimes within himself as he seeks

to harmonise conflicting regime outlooks.   For instance, what

a British Parliament approves will not always please an Ulster

Protestant conscience nor will obedience to British made laws

always prove easy to Irish nationalists.   National identity

will thus have an important influence upon other political

attitudes.   One might hypothesize, for instance, that Catholic

boys who identify most strongly with Ireland will be most

likely to hold low positive feelings towards government and

be readiest to endorse violence for a United Ireland.

Reciprocally, Catholics who identify with Britain might be

most likely to see government in a favourable light and favour

peaceful political solutions.   Among Protestant boys, those

who feel themselves most strongly British might be highest in

regard for government and most prepared to fight for a

Protestant Ulster if they see such a State dependent upon the

British connection.   Alternatively, extreme views of government

and political opposition might be found among Protestants who

feel that Ulster is their 'homeland'.

          In order to test these hypotheses the boys were asked,

first, about their national identity, and then about strength

of this identity.   Among Protestants approximately one quarter '

of boys chose a British national identity and approximately half

found it easier to identify with Ulster.   Among Catholics

approximately 70 per cent of all boys identified themselves as

Irish.   Only ten per cent of Catholic boys felt themselves

to be British and nine per cent took the Ulster identity which

may be because they were thinking in terms of a nine, rather

than a six county Province.   (Ulster is one of the four ancient

Provinces of Ireland whilst Northern Ireland, often referred to

as Ulster, is a smaller region although part of the old Province

of Ulster).   (See Table VII: 1)

Only in the Primary schools do Catholic boys who

identify with Ireland reveal lower positive affect to government

than their co-religionists.   Primary school Catholics are 35

per cent negatively oriented to government when they identify

with Ireland compared to only 15 per cent of those who identify

themselves as British.   In both Primary and Secondary schools

Catholics identifying with Ireland are more in favour of a

violent removal of the Border.   For instance, 71 per cent of

Irish identifiers in Catholic Primary schools favoured violent

political solutions to only 26 per cent of British identifiers.

(See Table VII: 2)   As hypothesized, Protestant boys who

identify with Ulster as their 'homeland' are more ready to

fight for a Protestant land than other co-religionists.   For

example, 80 per cent of 'Ulster' boys in the Secondary schools

approved disorder to only 62 per cent identifying themselves

as British.   (See Table VII: 2)   Although the quarter of
                who
Protestant boys/identify with Britain are less violent in

outlook than their 'Ulster' co-religionists they are, especially

in the Secondary schools, readier to think in terms of disorder

Table VII: 1   National Identities

	British	Irish	Ulster	Sometimes/Sometimes British /Irish	N.A.
Primary					
Protestant %	25	14	51	9	2
Catholic %	11	69	9	9	2 D.I. = 55½%
Secondary					
Protestant %	30	11	48	8	3
Catholic %	8	75	8	8	1 D.I. = 64%

Table VII: 2   National Identities and Discord

	PROTESTANTS				CATHOLICS			
	British %	Irish %	Ulster %	British/ Irish %	British %	Irish %	Ulster %	British/ Irish %
Primary								
Violent	43	35	60	46	26	71	44	36
Peaceful	51	64	40	54	52	29	56	64
No answer	6	1	-	-	2	-	-	-
Secondary								
Violent	62	50	80	54	28	68	47	42
Peaceful	35	49	18	39	69	30	50	54
No answer	3	1	2	7	3	2	3	4

than those Protestant boys who identify themselves as Irish or
who have a mixed British/Irish National identity.

Strength of National Identity

Protestants who identify with Britain split evenly
between strong and ordinary identifiers. Among 'Ulster'
Protestants those who feel 'strongly Ulster' outnumber those
who feel 'just Ulster' by two to one. Also, approximately
twice as many Irish identifiers feel strongly about their
nationality to those who just accept it. Catholics who
identify strongly with Ireland are only slightly more negative
to government than other co-religionists. They are more
ready to endorse violence for a United Ireland than ordinary
Irish identifiers (D.I.'s: Secondary - 15%; Primary - 20%).
(See Table VII: 3) Protestant boys who identify strongly
with Britain are no more positive to government than ordinary
British identifiers nor are they, in the primary schools, any
more ready to endorse the use of political force. In the
secondary schools, however, Protestants who feel strongly
attached to their British identity are 20 per cent more likely
to approve the use of force in upholding a Protestant Ulster
than boys who feel 'just British'. Protestant boys who
identify strongly with Ulster are not more positive to government
than ordinary 'Ulster' children. But there is a tendency for
the ordinary Ulster identifiers among Protestants to render more
extreme positive affect to government. For instance, 36 per
cent of ordinary Primary school identifiers were extremely
positive to government compared to 20 per cent of strong

Protestant 'Ulster' boys.' Protestant boys who feel strongly
attached to their Ulster identity are, however, the most ready
among Protestants, to approve political violence. They are,
in fact, 20 per cent more likely to approve of disorder than
ordinary Ulster Protestants. (See Table VII: 3)

Table VII: 3 Strength of National Identity and Discord

	PROTESTANTS				CATHOLICS	
	Strongly British %	Just British %	Strongly Ulster %	Just Ulster %	Strongly Irish %	Just Irish %
Primary						
Violent	42	43	66	44	76	56
Peaceful	52	57	32	56	23	41
No answer	6	3	2	-	1	3
Secondary						
Violent	73	51	86	67	72	59
Peaceful	25	46	11	32	25	40
No answer	2	3	3	1	3	1

Scope of Community Identification

Boys in Ulster claiming an Irish nationality are
legally separated by the Border from others sharing this political
community. Boys claiming to be British are separated geographically
by water from others having this nationality. That so many boys
identify with Ulster indicates that Northern Ireland is, to many,

separated emotionally from both the Republic and Britain and is very much a nation in its own right. It is also possible that Catholic and Protestant boys within Ulster will feel a greater community of interests with each other than with co-religionists in either Britain or the Republic.

Gerry Fitt, Catholic leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party and Westminster M.P. for West Belfast has been quoted as claiming to have more in common with Belfast Protestants than Catholics from West Mayo.[7] The Strathclyde adult sample (1968) found that more than two-thirds of Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland think that Ulstermen of the opposite religion are about the same as themselves. The adult survey also revealed that 66 per cent of Protestants felt their co-religionists in England to be much different from themselves and that a plurality of Catholics felt this way about their co-religionists in the Republic.[8]

To measure the extent of community identifications, boys were asked whether they thought people in Eggland and in the Republic were much different or about the same as themselves. In the case of younger children the Republic was also referred to as 'across the Border' and 'the South' to facilitate understanding. Elsewhere both Protestants and Catholics were asked similar questions about those of the 'other' religion in Northern Ireland. Such questions produced the following distributions:

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Primary %	Secondary %	Adults[9] %	Primary %	Secondary %	Adults[9] %

Would you say
that people in
England are much
different or
about the same
as you?

	Primary	Secondary	Adults	Primary	Secondary	Adults
Different	35	43	66	58	58	63
about same	64	56	29	40	41	30
N.A.	1	1	5	2	1	7

Would you say
that people in
the Republic
are much
different or
about the same
as you?

	Primary	Secondary	Adults	Primary	Secondary	Adults
Different	71	68	46	35	30	48
about same	27	30	45	62	68	44
N.A.	2	2	9	3	2	7

Would you say
that Protestant/
Catholic Children
in Northern
Ireland are much
different or
about the same
as you?

	Primary	Secondary	Adults	Primary	Secondary	Adults
Different	56	45	28	47	41	14
about same	43	52	67	49	57	81
N.A.	1	3	4	4	2	4

When the two school samples are compared with the Strathclyde
adult sample (1968)[10] a fairly general trend appears in most cases.
As far as fellow feelings with English people among Protestants
are concerned this appears to drop off as one moves up the age

ladder. For instance, 64 per cent of Primary boys felt much
the same as people in England, to 56 per cent of Secondary
Protestants, and only 29 per cent of adults. A trend is seen
most clearly regarding identification with persons of the other
religion. This starts off low among Primary children and
climbs through the Secondary schools to highest identification
among adults. This could be interpreted in two ways at least.
Greater numbers identifying with members of the other religion
could be a function of age. That is, as children mature
they discover that they have more in common with persons of
another religion than they were led to believe in their early
lives. Alternatively, this trend could be a function of the
level of community tensions at the times when the three samples
were collected (Adult/1968; Secondary/early 1971; Primary/
early 1972). Interpreted this way the trends witnessed in
feelings about members of the other religion represents a
decisive worsening of community relations. The figures in
the 'Republic' question could mean, for Protestants, that over
the last few years, relations with people in the 'South' have
been on the decline, whilst among Catholics, identification
with people in the Republic has become stronger since the onset
of disorder. Among Protestants this approach means that
identification with English people has increased rapidly over
the last few years whilst for Catholics it has not been much
affected. The most plausible explanation is that which can
be applied most frequently to the data: that the increase in
disorder over the years has caused greater separation between
religions and higher identification with either people in Eire
or England. This model can be applied in five out of six

cases. Other models - that age leads to greater understanding and either more or less association with others - can be applied less frequently.

One might wish to hypothesize that since Protestants value the British connection (probably more so in 1971-72 than in 1973), those who say they feel much the same as people in England will be most positive to government (which upheld the Union) and readiest to approve of violence to continue a 'British way of life'. Catholics (who are sometimes regarded as Republicans to a man) who feel most like people in the Republic, may be expected to be more negative to government in Northern Ireland and readiest to endorse violence to take the Border out of Ireland. Since many Protestants regard all Catholics as a threat to the Constitution of Northern Ireland those who feel different to Catholic boys may be expected to be most positive to government and more inclined to accept violence than their co-religionists who feel much the same as Catholics. Catholics who feel much the same as Protestant boys in Northern Ireland may be expected to be more positive to government and less violent in political outlook than their co-religionists who feel that Protestants are a different sort of people altogether.

Protestants who feel much the same as people in England are not much more positive to government in Northern Ireland than their co-religionists who do not share their feelings. There are virtually no differences regarding dis-order between Protestant Primary schoolboys by these characteristics,

but, in the Protestant Secondary schools, contrary to what was hypothesized, boys who feel different to people in England are readiest to approve of violence (D.I. = 13%). On the other hand, Primary school Catholics who feel similar to people in England are both more positive to government and less inclined to accept disorder than their other age-group co-religionists. There are few differences in affect to government between Catholics who feel about the same or different to people in Eire. Those Catholics most closely associated with people in the Republic are only slightly readier to approve violence for a United Ireland. But Protestants who feel much the same as people across the Border are less likely to endorse violence, especially in the Secondary schools, than other Protestant boys. Among Protestants who feel estranged from, or close to, Catholics, few differences appear regarding affect and, in the Primary schools, over disorder. But Protestant Secondary schoolboys who feel different to Catholics are much readier than their age-group co-religionists to accept violence (D.I. = 31%). As hypothesized, Catholics who say they feel much the same as Protestants are much more positive to government and less violent in political outlook than their more estranged co-religionists. (See Tables VII: 4, 5, 6, 7)

Table VII: 4 Feelings towards People in England and Discord

	PROTESTANTS		CATHOLICS	
	Different %	About same %	Different %	About same %
Primary				
Violent	49	52	70	46
Peaceful	51	45	29	50
No answer	-	3 D.I.= 6%	1	4 D.I. = 24%
Secondary				
Violent	76	63	64	55
Peaceful	21	33	35	41
No answer	3	4 D.I.= 13%	1	4 D.I. = 9%

Table VII: 5 Feelings towards people in Eire and Discord

	PROTESTANTS		CATHOLICS	
	Different %	About same %	Different %	About same %
Primary				
Violent	56	41	51	67
Peaceful	44	58	48	33
No answer	-	1 D.I.= 15%	1	- D.I. = 15%
Secondary				
Violent	78	48	57	62
Peaceful	19	48	42	35
No answer	3	4 D.I.= 30%	1	3 D.I. = 7%

Table VII: 6 Feelings towards children/young people in the other religion in Ulster and Discord

| | PROTESTANTS | | CATHOLICS | |
	Different %	About same %	Different %	About same %
Primary				
Violent	54	48	75	48
Peaceful	45	50	24	52
No answer	1	2 D.I. = 6%	1	- D.I. = 28%
Secondary				
Violent	85	54	72	52
Peaceful	13	43	25	46
No answer	2	3 D.I. = 31%	3	2 D.I. = 21%

Table VII: 7 Feelings towards children/young people in the other religion in Ulster and Affect to Government

| | PROTESTANTS | | CATHOLICS | |
	Different %	About same %	Different %	About same %
Primary				
POSITIVE	65	65	20	47
positive	31	31	38	33
negative	2	3	23	12
NEGATIVE	2	-	19	7
no answer	-	1 D.I. = 2%	-	1 D.I. = 27½%
Secondary				
POSITIVE	29	35	13	21
positive	50	53	39	51
negative	16	8	29	20
NEGATIVE	4	3	17	5
no answer	1	1 D.I. = 9%	2	3 D.I. = 21%

Summary: National Community

Using the same methodology as applied in the summary
of chapter five reveals no important characteristics associated
with affect to government among Primary school Protestants.
Secondary Protestant schoolboys who identify themselves as
British, and strongly British, are most positive to government
whilst Protestant strong Ulster identifiers have much more
negative feelings about government.   Such findings may be
encouraging for those seeking parity between Ulster and the
rest of the United Kingdom.   That Ulster identifiers thought
less highly of government may be an indication that Protestants
are only extremely positive to governments that uphold an 18th
Century 'British way of life'.

Catholic Primary schoolboys who feel strongly
Irish, that people in England, and Protestants, are different
to them, reveal decreases in positive affect for government.
On the other hand, those who feel that Protestants, and people
in England, are much the same as themselves are more positively
orientated to government.   It may be encouraging to governments
in Northern Ireland that Catholic boys who appear to be more
integrated in the life of the Province are also most allegiant
to government.

The Protestants and Catholics who identify strongly
with Ulster or Ireland respectively are the most committed to
violence in politics.   The minority of Catholic boys who
identify with Britain, and Protestants who identify with Ireland,
are among the least violent.   Identifying strongly with separate

national communities within one state is likely to lead to violence for distinctive political treatment for the community. Reciprocally, identifying with the national community thought incongruent with one's general life pattern possibly leads to individual tension but also to a reduction of collective violence.

Protestant boys who feel the same as people in Eire, and to Catholics in Ulster, are less committed to violence than their co-religionists. Catholics, who feel that Protestants are different, are readier to endorse violence for a United Ireland. And, especially in the Primary schools, Catholics who identify with Protestants and people in England are less violent in political outlook. Sympathetic understanding between religions and nations may reduce the likelihood of violence whilst contact and understanding alone may increase it.

CHARACTERISTIC	PROTESTANT		CATHOLIC	
	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
(1) AFFECT				
National identity				
British	12+			
Strongly British	14+			
Strongly Ulster	13-			
Strongly Irish			11-	
Difference/similarity				
English different			12-	
English much the same			13+	
Protestants different			17-	12-
Protestants much the same			14+	

CHARACTERISTIC	PROTESTANT PRIMARY	PROTESTANT SECONDARY	CATHOLIC PRIMARY	CATHOLIC SECONDARY
(2) DISORDER				
National identity				
Irish	17-	21-		
Strongly Irish			16+	12+
Ulster		12+		
Strongly Ulster	15+	18+		
British				32-
Just British		18-		
Difference/similarity				
People in Eire much the same	11-	20-		
People in England much the same			14-	
Catholics much the same		15-		
Catholics different		17+		
Protestants much the same			15-	
Protestants different			15+	12+

(B) Religion

General value systems specify the standards persons should attempt to live up to and such precepts are usually expressed by institutions which render approval to those who conform with their basic teachings. The family, although the smallest unit for preserving the value-system, is probably the most effective due to the prolonged affective dependency of children during which the foundations of the system is laid. Such systems refer to what 'ought to be' and involve beliefs

and symbols concerning ultimate meaning. When value systems include beliefs regarding the 'supernatural' they may be referred to as 'religions'.[11]

Whilst the inhabitants of a country may experience conflict at the religious level there is generally some fundamental agreement about the most basic religious values. For instance, many common Christian concepts unite Protestants and Catholics whilst some very basic values divide them at a very comprehensive level, e.g. the source of divine authority. More often, however, religious communities are drawn into politics through social, economic and political issues rather than through specifically, 'other-worldly' beliefs. When this occurs the religion is of tremendous importance as a reference group in a conflict situation and generally serves to embitter secular discord.

Research has found religious phenomena to be linked to many social attitudes and behaviours.[12] For instance, Lenski found that Jewish respondents were most critical of the current operation of the American political system. They were followed by Negro Protestants, then by White Catholics, whilst white Protestants were the least critical of all. When such findings were controlled by social class no appreciable differences appeared.[13] Butler and Stokes found in Britain that the ties of religion to party are 'still plainly visible in the older segments of the electorate.'[14] Religion, in Ulster, is still the most reliable guide to regime outlooks. Knowing which 'foot a man digs with' (his religion) is a better indicator

of his attitudes towards the Constitution than knowing his social

class or whether he is an urban or rural dweller.

The importance of religion to people in Ulster was

revealed in the survey of adults carried out by the Opinion

Research Centre in 1968/69 which showed that belief in God was

much more common in Northern Ireland than in Britain. Eighty-

six per cent of the Ulster sample agreed with the statement,

'I am certain there is a God', compared with 50 per cent in

Britain. Seventy-four per cent of Northern Ireland respondents

felt it wa s 'very important' that their country should be

Christian compared to 48 per cent of British adults.[15] One

aspect of the importance of religion in Ulster is the natural-

ness with which people identify themselves as either Protestants

or Catholics. Such identification does not depend upon

regularity of church attendance or firmness of Christian

belief. As Louis Gardner points out:

> An individual's doubts about the veracity of
> specific Articles or Confessions, therefore, have
> made little difference to his own idea of his
> status. Yeats provided a good example of
> this, as did Bernard Shaw, who described himself
> alternately and without sense of inconsistency
> as a non-believer and an Irish Protestant.
> Again, when an Irishman declares himself a
> Protestant agnostic, although his statement
> may provoke a smile, it is easy to understand
> what he means. He is in effect offering a
> card of identity with some of the print missing,
> but which is still legible enough to tell us
> who and what he is: a man who knows he can
> change his opinions but not his natural stripes.[16]

Gerry Fitt, on the other hand, spoke of religious communities

as being 'unnatural'.:

> Little wonder that those who have struggled
> throughout the years to remove religious factors
> from politics have felt so frustrated when the

political framework within which they have
been forced to work has been loaded to
preserve these unnatural community antagonisms.
The granting of an official state blessing on
the institutions created 50 years ago only
served to freeze and fossilise all political
attitudes and political development in terms
of the 18th century.[17]

Much disagreement about religious communities

arises out of a confusion of 'religion' and 'belief'.

According to the Bishop of Connor, Dr. Butler, 'There are

thousands of people walking the streets of Belfast who are

quite content to think themselves Christian and to wear

Protestant and Catholic labels round their necks, but who have

lost touch with God.' He called the war in Ulster a

'religious war', but said that 'the strife was due to a war

of religion, but not one of dogma or belief.'[18] Religious

beliefs are expressed in social life in differences regarding

marital and sexual behaviour, but identification with a

religious community, whilst not totally devoid of theology,

is primarily concerned with social, economic, and political

patterns which make a particular way of life acceptable to

identifiers. As far as the great majority of people are

concerned one is either born a Protestant or a Catholic

and such a distinction could almost have genetic force. The

importance of religious identification is overwhelmingly

important for political socialization in a country where many

of the most basic and enduring disputes are interwoven with

communities defined by their religious labels.

Earlier child political socilization studies provide

few guidelines for such research in Northern Ireland. In the

largest American studies of political learning in children

Hess and Torney found few mean differences between Protestants

and Catholics in general political orientations. They did

find some connections between religion and party affiliation

and political candidate choice, but this also reflected the

views of their parents and thus diminishes the importance of

the religious finding since children generally tend to follow

their parents in party identification especially when both

parents consistently vote for the same party. This does

indicate, however, the importance of the family in both

political and religious socialization. Easton and Dennis

who are more concerned with political affect, using the same

data, found that religious affiliation did not make any marked

difference to idealization of political authorities.[19] In

Ulster, however, where a psychiatrist can speak of the

children being in danger of becoming another 'generation of

bigots'[20] religious and political differences are socialized

early in life. For instance, a three-year-old Protestant

child rejected a green crayon with the comment, "I don't want

that colouring crayon. It's a fenian (Catholic) one.'[21]

'No Pope Here', 'Not an Inch', 'God save the Queen' and 'Remember

1690', are wall signs that Protestant children may see every

day just as some young Catholic children may read, 'Join your

local brance of the Junior IRA', or see in large white letters

on a gable-end 'PARAS-CHILD MURDERERS-KEEP OUT.' Even some

nursery rhymes underline the discord:

> If I had a penny
> Do you know what I would do?
> I would buy a rope
> and hang the pope
> and let King Billy through[22]

And the first nursery rhyme Bernadette Devlin remembers

learning was:

> Where is the flag of England?
> Where is she to be found?
> Wherever there's blood and plunder
> They're under the British ground[23]

In order to test how the boys in the sample saw the

nature of the religious discord in Ulster they were asked to

say whether they thought Protestants and Catholics in Northern

Ireland disagreed most about God and the Church or Northern

Ireland. 'Northern Ireland' in the question was used to stand

for any secular discord. In the light of many adult's views

of the discord it might be hypothesized that most boys will

also view it in social, economic and political terms rather

than as a holy war over dogma and belief. It may be further

hypothesized that those boys who see the discord in secular

terms will be more likely to favour violent political solutions.

If this is so it will be a further indication that religion as

belief and dogma is of less importance in disorder than other

aspects of the conflict.

Approximately 65 per cent of boys saw the discord in

Northern Ireland in secular terms. There were, however, few

differences of note regarding attitudes to discord between boys

who saw the conflict differently. Catholics Primary school

children who felt that the 'war' was over religion, as such,

were more extremely positive to government (...always wants to

help...) than their co-religionists in Primary and Secondary

schools who thought in terms of secular discord. Believing

that discord in Ulster is caused by specifically supernatural disputes may help to promote, or prevent the loss of, good feelings towards secular authorities such as government.

Since religion in Ulster involves political discord one might expect that those most influenced by their religion would be most likely to hold extreme views of political authority and be most ready to approve of disorder. Alternatively, it might be hypothesized that the influence of one's Church and beliefs exercises constraint upon disorderly and extreme political tendencies. In order to test the effects of involvement in religion, three independent variables were used: (a) Church-attendance, (b) religious conservatism (c) strength of religious identification (which measures more than simply religious involvement).

(a) Church Attendance.

Political differences have been noted between persons who attend church more and less frequently. Almond and Verba found that '...conservative voters who attend church every week or more frequently in Britain, Germany, Italy and Mexico are more opposed to inter-party marriage than those attending church less frequently, or not at all.'[24] This suggests that frequent church attendance in some groups increases a sense of partisanship. But due to a wide variety of motives for church attendance, it is a very imperfect measure of involvement in religion. For instance, in a survey of sixth form Protestants in Northern Ireland (1968) only 36 per cent of boys who attended church gave positive reasons for doing so.[25]

Frequency of church attendance in Ulster is much higher than in Britain.[26] Bleakley found 95 per cent of country and 70 per cent of Belfast young people attending church on Sunday 'nearly always.'[27] Barrit and Carter refer to a survey of Queens University Belfast undergraduates in which 61 per cent claimed they had attended church the previous Sunday.[28] Greer recorded that 65 per cent of sixth form Protestant boys in Ulster attended church regularly (weekly, fortnightly or monthly).[29] The Strathclyde Loyalty Survey found that 66 per cent of adults in Northern Ireland attended church weekly or more often (46 per cent Protestants: 95 per cent Catholics), but that frequency of attendance had little affect upon some of their most basic political outlooks.[30] This suggests, for Protestants at least, that the sense of belonging to a community defined by religious labels is more important for regime outlooks than the frequency with which one attends a particular Protestant denomination.

Insofar as adult and schoolboy attitudes can be compared one might hypothesize that frequency of church attendance will have little or no influence upon affect to government or political discord. In order to test this, the boys were asked how often they attended Church or Mass. Protestant boys were allowed to include attendance at Sunday School, Bible Class or Confirmation classes as Church attendance. Catholic boys were curtailed in their answers to attendance at Mass during an 'ordinary week' which was defined as one without a Day of Obligation. These qualifications were not printed on the questionnaire to avoid confusion, but were slowly and

carefully explained to each school group interviewed. The
secrecy of response probably reduced the need to lie about
frequency of attendance.

An overwhelming majority of Catholic boys attended
Mass either weekly or more often (over 90 per cent).
Approximately one quarter of Protestant boys attended church
more than once a week and approximately 45 per cent once a
week. Only eight per cent of Protestant boys proclaimed that
they never attended church and about 15 per cent attended
'sometimes' (less than once a month). Frequency of church
attendance makes little or no difference, among Catholics or
Protestants of any age, to how they feel about government
or to their attitudes to discord. Any qualifications to this
would include that Catholic Secondary boys who attend more
than once a week are slightly less violent in outlook than
weekly attenders (D.I. = 9%) and that Protestants who never
attend church are slightly more negative to government than
other Protestants. Among both adults and schoolboys,
frequency of church attendance has virtually no influence upon
the most basic political attitudes. This suggests that the
churches are unable, or do not attempt, to influence the
political attitudes of those most frequently within their reach.
Schoolboys who regularly frequent Church do not differ greatly
in their political attitudes from other co-religionists in
Ulster.

(b) Religious Conservatism

Religious conservatism, as a measure of involvement
in a religion, is taken here to mean 'adherence to fundamental
and traditional ways of thinking about one's faith as opposed
to modernistor liberal outlooks.'   The Loyalty Survey found
that three-quarters of Ulster adults believed that the miracles
of the bible happened just as the bible describes them.[31]
Sixth form Protestant boys in Ulster were only slightly more
likely than English boys to believe that the Old and New
Testaments were inspired (approximately 40% in Ulster believed,
34% Don't Know, and 22% didn't believe).[32]   Lenski, however,
found that intellectual assent to the prescribed doctrines
of one's faith or church was irrelevant for most aspects of
secular life.   He suggests that religious orthodoxy leads to
a compartmentalization of life in the religious and secular
sphere.[33]   Thus, many extremely orthodox people are 'other-
wordly' in outlook; are mainly preoccupied by their religion
and accept the political powers that be as ordained of God.
On the other hand, it has been suggested that conservative
doctrinal beliefs might indicate '...general ideological
rigidity in thinking about problems and hence lead to Ultraism
among Protestants, and rebellion among Catholics.'[34]

In order to tese these ideas, boys were asked how
important they thought it was to believe all that the Church/
Bible teaches.   Over 80 per cent of primary boys felt that
it was 'very important' to believe all the Church/Bible teaches
and 12 per cent that this was 'fairly important'.   Since so
few boys took up other positions it only makes sense to compare

these two groups in the Primary schools. In the Secondary schools 45 per cent of Protestants and 67 per cent of Catholics took up the extremely conservative view (very important to believe) whilst 34 per cent of Protestants and 25 per cent of Catholics thought it 'fairly important' to have complete faith in the Church or Bible. Only six per cent of Secondary school Catholics and 17 per cent of Protestants found it either 'not very' or 'not at all' important to believe in this conservative fashion.

Generally speaking, degrees of religious conservatism are irrelevant as predictors of either affect for government or attitudes to discord. Two exceptions are found among Protestants. Primary school Protestants who believe completely in all the Bible teaches are more positive to government (D.I. between 'very' and 'fairly important' groups = 22%). Among Secondary school Protestants the ten per cent who find it 'not at all important to believe all the Bible teaches are much less violent in political outlook than the most conservative group. (D.I. = 20%). The most general conclusion that one may draw from such findings, however, is that those who most completely accept the guidance of the Catholic Church or the Bible do not differ greatly in their political outlooks from others of the same religion in Northern Ireland. As with church attendance, this is another indication that religiously defined discord in Ulster is fought on secular battlefields.

(c) Strength of Religious Identification

In countries where religious and secular aspects of life are thoroughly intertwined, strength of identification with a religion signifies more than simply strength of beliefs about the supernatural. Whilst a strong inward commitment to a particular religion may signify that a set of beliefs will greatly influence behaviour, the specifically theological aspects of religion for a strong Catholic or Protestant may be of less importance for political attitudes (as with church attendance and religious conservatism) than identification with a community best known by its religious colours. For instance, in Northern Ireland, there may be atheists who think they are strong Protestants and Marxists who would describe themselves as strong Catholics.

Research has revealed that Ulster adults and adolescents have stronger Christian beliefs than comparable persons in Britain.[35] The Loyalty Survey found that 42 per cent of adults identified strongly with their particular religion (45% Protestants- 38½ Catholics).[36] Apter notes that the effects of mixing politics and religion are such '...that they strengthen the authority in the State and weaken the flexibility of the society.'[37] When religious communities compete for political authority the religious stratification of society is strengthened, the religious parts become more inflexible, but the authority of the State is weakened. Thus, where religion and politics are divisive one might hypothesize that those who identify most strongly with their religious community will be most likely to hold either extremely negative

or positive views of authority and be readiest to approve

disorder to either uphold or destroy the political regime.

Alternatively, if strength of religion involves specifically

theological components strong identifiers may be restrained

in their political attitudes due to otherwordliness and

obedience because '...the powers that be are ordained of

God.'[38]

There are similarities between primary schoolboys

and between Secondary schoolboys of both religions regarding

their strength of religious identification.   In the Primary

schools the boys are more likely to identify themselves as

either strong Protestants or Catholics (approximately 70 per

cent) whereas in the Secondary schools more than half say

they are 'average' in religious strength whilst only approxi-

mately 40 per cent are strong in commitment. (See table VII: 8)

Table VII: 8   Strength of Religious Identification

	Strong	Average	Neither	No answer	
PRIMARY					
Protestants %	70	20	10	-	
Catholics %	73	18	5	4	D.I. - 7%
SECONDARY					
Protestants %	41	50	6	3	
Catholics %	38	57	3	2	D.I. - 7%

Whilst strength of identification with a religion, or

with a religious community, makes little difference to affect

to government among Protestants the Catholic boys who identify

strongly with their faith are inclined to be more negative to

government than average identifiers (D.I.'s: Primary - 11%;

Secondary - 15%). There are larger differences, however, between

strong and average identifiers regarding political discord. In

every case the strong identifiers are readier to approve any

means either to keep Ulster Protestant or to remove the Border.

(See Table VII: 9) For instance, 86 per cent of 'strong'

Protestants in the Secondary schools approve disorder to 60

per cent of 'average' strength Protestants; 70 per cent of

more committed Secondary Catholic schoolboys believe that

violence is justifiable to only 54 per cent of 'average' Catholics.

It is of interest that so many of the boys who feel neither strong

or average religionists are so pacific in outlook, but not very

important since so few of them exist. As expected, the question

least likely to measure specifically supernatural content is most

likely to be a predictor of political attitudes.

Table VII: 9   Strength of Religious Identification and Discord

| | PROTESTANTS | | | CATHOLICS | | |
	Strong %	Average %	Neither %	Strong %	Average %	Neither %
Primary						
Violent	56	42	27	64	58	24
Peaceful	41	57	73	36	42	72
No answer	3	1	-	-	-	4
Secondary						
Violent	86	60	35	70	54	70
Peaceful	14	38	62	27	44	30
No answer	-	2	3	3	2	-

To investigate the political consequences of negative

aspects of involvement in religious communities such as

estrangement and perceived hostility three questions were used.
The first, to measure estrangement between religious communities,
simply asked the boys to indicate whether or not they were
friendly with any children or young people in the other religion.
The second question, to measure perceived hostility, asked if
the boys thought that all the members of the other religion
wanted to destroy the Protestant/Catholic religion. It was
emphasised at every administration of the questionnaire that
one was referring to all the members of the other religion.
Thus, replies in the affirmative indicates that boys perceived
total hostility from the other religious community. The third
question, put to Secondary boys only involved asking them whether
or not they felt that persons of their religion were discriminated
against.

(d)   Estrangement

Professor J. Ernest Davey wrote that '...Irishmen
have, on the whole, never learned to differ with friendship or
tolerance...'[39]   In Ulster, people who differ politically may
never find friends who differ from them until it is too late to
agree, and tolerance may be in short supply because some goals
are mutually exclusive. But although Protestants and Catholic
school-children attend different school systems, social friend-
ships are common across such divides, but often do not develop
until divisive ideas are well formulated in the minds of
companions. But Protestant and Catholic are not the only
names of importance in Ulster. In smaller towns and country
districts much more intricate relationships exist and
religious boundaries become blurred below the political level.
Even thought the present troubles have polarized the communities

to a greater extent than perhaps ever before the extent of inter-
dependence between religions in many districts continues. For
instance, when one of the quieter Provincial towns was bombed
for the first time, the primary reaction of those interviewed
by television reporters was to emphasise the good community
relations and to blame outsiders for their trouble.

One would expect that those having friends across
religious boundaries would be more tolerant than those who do
not. Greely and Rossi, however, found that American Catholics
with less contact with others outside their religion tend to
be more tolerant than those with greater numbers of friends
outside the Catholic faith. They compare two groups:
(1) Catholics who attended Catholic schools who found more
than half their friends among Catholics at the age of seventeen;
(2) Catholics without Catholic school education who had half,
or less than half, their friends Catholics at the same age.
Whilst they find group (2) more involved in the larger American
community they find group (1) more tolerant towards the demands
for civil liberties for others. They suggest that the emotional
well-being provided by the religious ghetto (group 1) makes for
a more relaxed and tolerant attitude towards others.[40] Applied
to Ulster this may mean that boys lacking friends in the other
religion will be more pacific in political opposition. But any
comparisons between the Greely and Rossi sample and this one
must be qualified in a number of ways. (1) Greely and Rossi
rely upon the recall of Catholic adults regarding their friend-
ship patterns at the age of seventeen- (2) the American sample
consisted of Catholic adults who had attended Catholic and

State schools; (3) the Greely and Rossi sample was drawn from a political community where there is comparitively widespread agreement regarding the nature and boundaries of the State; (4) American political divisions do not follow religious lines to the same extent as they do in Ulster. Taking into account the different political circumstances in America and Ulster one might hypothesize that those boys who have no friends across religious lines will be more extreme in their views of government since they have little chance of understanding how boys in the other religion feel about political authority. Also, that those without friends of the other faith will be readiest to approve fighting for political goals since they have not been exposed to the political aspirations of 'others' in an atmosphere of friendship.

Approximately half the Primary and three-fifths of Secondary schoolboys in both religions indicated that they had friends in the other religion. Perhaps cross-religions friendships were still developing among the Primary schoolboys. Alternatively, perhaps such development had been arrested by escalating violence. Among Protestants political differences between those with and without Catholic friends are small except among Secondary schoolboys regarding discord. Here 86 per cent of those without Catholic friends approved of physical violence for a Protestant Ulster to only 58 per cent of those who had Catholic friends. (See Table VII: 10)

Table VII: 10 Friendship Across Religious Lines and Discord

	PROTESTANTS		CATHOLICS	
	Has Catholic friend or friends	No Catholic friends	Has Protestant friend or friends	No Protestant friends
	(47%)	(52%)	(55%)	(41%)
Primary	%	%	%	%
Violent	46	54	50	77
Peaceful	49	45	50	22
No answer	5	1	-	1
	D.I. = 8%		D.I. = 28%	
	(58%)	(37%)	(66%)	(32%)
Secondary	%	%	%	%
Violent	58	86	53	75
Peaceful	39	13	44	23
No answer	3	1	3	2
	D.I. = 28%		D.I + 22%	

Among Catholics the differences between boys who know Protestants on a friendly basis and those who only 'know them' are much more striking. Catholics without Protestant friends are much more negative to government (D.I.s: Primary = 19%; Secondary = 22%) (See Table VII: 11) and violent in opposition (D.I.s: Primary = 28%; Secondary = 22%). Having friends in the 'other' religion may make it less likely that one will fight for goals denigrated by friends. On the other hand, people in Ulster expect their friends to stand up for their contrary ideals and fighting friends may become necessary at some stage since more than half of those with friends in the 'other' religion still endorsed political violence.

Table VII: 11   Friendship across Religion lines among Catholics and Affect.

Catholics Only

	Has Protestant friend or friends	No Protestant friends
	%	%
Primary		
POSITIVE	42	24
positive	35	34
negative	14	23
NEGATIVE	9	19
no answer	-	- D.I. = 19%
Secondary		
POSITIVE	20	12
positive	50	40
negative	22	27
NEGATIVE	5	20
no answer	3	1 D.I. = 20%

(e)   Perceived hostility

The O.R.C. survey of Ulster adults (1968-69) found that approximately one-quarter of respondents were not very strongly, or not, in favour of a closer relationship between the Catholic and Protestant churches or of moving towards the unity of all the Christian churches.[41]   The Loyalty Survey (1968) found that approximately three-fifths of Ulster adults felt that religion would always make a difference about the way people felt about one another in Northern Ireland, and 35 per cent thought that there would be no big changes in relations between Protestants and Catholics in the next ten years.[42]   Thus, even before the outbreak of violence in 1969, a considerable

proportion of Ulster people not only emphasized the perpetual divisiveness of religion but expressed approval of keeping apart on the level of institutional religion at least.

Barrit and Carter emphasise the importance of religious images in the relationship between the two major communities in Ulster.[43] Many Protestants believe that <u>all</u> Catholics see them as incapable of salvation outside of the Catholic church whilst official Catholic teaching expresses the importance of following conscience as the way to salvation for those who do not 'know the true church'. Many Catholics regard the fragmentation of Protestantism as a sign of heresy and the wrath of God and fail to understand the deep unity between many Protestants regarding the 'simple gospel' and the 'defense of liberty.' Never having experienced religious conflict in the Scottish Borders of my childhood, I found, during my earliest visits to Ulster in the 1950's, a zealous outlook upon religion which surprised me greatly. As Barrit and Carter suggest, 'It is probable that the conflict of Protestants and Catholics cause elements in both groups to hold extreme and narrow-minded views.'[44] During political conflict between religious communities people define themselves politically by their religious identity whilst at the same time their sense of belonging to a religious group is strengthened by the political discord. In the event of disorder, or civil war, political loyalties are defined in the simplest of terms. For example, William Craig, the leader of the Protestant Vanguard movement was reported as having warned that '...there could be civil war within the next six months and it could become an all out

Protestant versus Catholic conflict.'[45]   As disorder increases

the tendency to see all members of the other religious

community as having hostile intensions becomes more widespread.

      Morris Fraser suggests that in Ulster, stereotyped

images of the other religion proceed actual fear and hostility

aroused during open hostilities.   He writes:

> It is basically a question of timing--of what
> comes first.   A stereotype is born in a
> situation of economic competition--when there
> are not enough jobs to go round.   Exclusion
> of the minority group from employment is rational-
> ised by attributing to its members undesirable
> qualities.   Frustrated by this discrimination,
> the out-group finally takes to open demonstration
> against the majority, who then point to this
> behaviour as illustrative of the out-groups
> essential unworthiness.   The justice of their
> policy of exclusion is thus reinforced, and still
> more rigorous measures are instituted.   This, the
> perfect example of a self-fulfilling prophecy,
> has been enacted in miniature in the classroom;
> but also on a full scale in almost every plural
> society in the world.   First the stereotype -
> then the undesirable behaviour.[46]

Whether the stereo-type produces the hostility, or

actual institutions and events come before anger, it may be

hypothesized that schoolboys who see all the members of the other

religion as hostile will be more extreme in political outlooks.

Protestants may be more highly positive to the government of a

"Protestant Parliament" and hold themselves in readiness to

fight for a Protestant Ulster.   Catholics who have visions

of the Protestant population as a hostile army drawn up against

them may be expected to regard a Protestant government as having

malevolent intentions towards them and to highly approve of all

those who have taken up arms in the fight for Irish unity.

Approximately two-fifths of all boys agreed that **All** members of the other religion were hostile towards their faith/ way of life. Among Secondary school Protestants, those agreeing that every Catholic was a potential enemy, were more negative to government than co-religionists who did not share their battlefield view of Ulster life. (Those accepting the total hostility view of Catholics were 20 per cent negative to government compared to eight per cent of co-religionists). Also Catholic Primary schoolboys who view Protestants as totally arrayed against their faith/way of life are more hostile to government (D.I. = 16%). Attitudes to discord vary widely between boys who see the intentions of all the 'others' differently. (See Table VII: 12) For instance, 87 per cent of Secondary Protestant schoolboys who think all Catholics are hostile to them are also believers in physical violence to keep Ulster Protestant. And 82 per cent of Primary school Catholics who learn political lessons through a filter of complete hostility justify violence in pursuit of a United Ireland.

Table VII: 12 Some say that all Catholics/Protestants want to destroy the Protestant/Catholic Religion

| | PROTESTANTS | | CATHOLICS | |
	Agree %	Disagree %	Agree %	Dis. ree %
Primary Six				
Violent	69	57	82	57
Peaceful	25	42	18	43
No answer	6	1 D.E.=17% -		- D.I.= 25%
Secondary				
Violent	87	51	73	51
Peaceful	13	47	25	46
No answer	-	2 D.I.=36%	2	3 D.I.= 22%

Protestants who accept total Catholic hostility as
a fair description of the Ulster conflict may be more negative
to government which they perceive as being too fair to enemies.
Catholics on the other hand, may see government as part of the
total Protestant conspiracy against them.   Both Protestants
and Catholics, as one would expect, are readier to justify
violence in pursuit of their political goals when they see
political enemies bent, not only upon their defeat, but upon
the destruction of what they cherish.   Schoolboys in Ulster,
like many adults, build their political attitudes upon long
standing, though often well concealed, animosities.

(f)   Religious Discrimination.

Whatever the basis in fact, people in Ulster believe
that they are sometimes discriminated against because of their
religion.   Catholics complain of discrimination against them
because of their presumed attitudes to the Constitution of
Northern Ireland whilst some Protestants justify discriminating
against Catholics lest they outbreed the Protestants and vote
the Province into a United Ireland with all the horrors that
entails for many Protestants.   Protestants too, complain of
discrimination against them on the grounds of their religion
in housing, in areas controlled by Catholic local councils;
employment, by Catholic employers; and by the British Army
who "should know better than to try to push loyal citizens
about."   The meaning of the word - discrimination - is much
better understood in Catholic than in Protestant schools.
Numerous protestant pupils asked what the word meant, but
no Catholic ever raised such a query.

Approximately half of the Protestant Secondary boys

believed that Protestants were discriminated against as did

seven-tenths of Catholics about themselves.   Only one-tenth

of Catholics disagreed that forms of discrimation were

practiced against their co-religionists whilst one-fifth were

uncertain.   Approximately a quarter of the Secondary Protestants

disagreed with the idea that they were discriminated against

and another quarter were uncertain.   There are few differences

between Protestants regarding affect to government by these

views.   Catholics accepting that discrimination against them

exists on religious grounds are more negative to government

than many of their co-religionists who do not share their view.

For example, 37 per cent of those sensing discrimination are

negative to government compared to 22 per cent of their co-

religionists who do not feel disadvantaged because of their

church, school, district or name.   Those who either whinge

or lambast about discrimination are more violent in their

political relations.(See Table VII: 13)   For instance, 82

per cent of Protestants who complain of discrimination favour

disorder to only 53 per cent of those who do not sense

practiced disadvantages.   The small minority of Catholics who

do not feel discriminated against are well below the Catholic

figure for disorder approval.

Table VII: 13   Some people say that there is Discrimination against
                Protestants/Catholics in Northern Ireland and Discord

	PROTESTANTS			CATHOLICS		
	Agree %	Disagree %	D.K. %	Agree %	Disagree %	D.K. %
Secondary Only						
Violent	82	53	60	66	44	46
Peaceful	16	45	37	33	54	52
No answer	2	2	3	1	2	2
	(D.I. = 29%)			(D.I. = 22%)		

Among Catholics, acceptance of discrimination is general. Thus, those who sense discrimination are like most other Catholics in their political attitudes. It is the minority of Catholics who are uncertain of discrimination, who are the 'odd men out' in that they are more positive to government and less committed to political violence. This suggests that only a prolonged period of planned advantages to the Catholic community will remove the sense of discrimination. Among Protestants, however, the sense of discrimination is not so entrenched. Nevertheless, among the one-half of Protestant boys who did complain of discrimination, political violence is accepted by four-fifths of them. This suggests that when discrimination is felt by Protestants this has a greater effect upon political attitudes than among Catholics. Thus, a prolonged period of planned advantages to Catholics may provoke increased violence among Protestants.

(g) Deference to Religious Leadership

Whilst Protestants in Ulster may have high respect for their religious leaders they are not so deferential towards them as Catholics who are much more likely to agree that it is 'very important' to do whatever a priest tells them. The Loyalty Survey found 60 per cent of Catholic and 30 per cent of Protestant adults declaring that it was 'very important' to do whatever a priest/minister told them.[47] It has been suggested that one of the large differences between Catholics and Protestants, in this respect, is that Protestants are religious through inner motivations, Catholics because of social pressures. It is further suggested that such differences arise from internalised

motivations connected with the super-ego, or conscience in Protestants, while Catholics are more likely to project their conscience onto the priesthood.[48] This may have consequences for political attitudes since an internalized conscience may be more flexible thus finding it easier to accept the legitimacy of different value systems. Martin Seymour Lipset writes:

> Democracy requires a universalistic political belief system in the sense that it accepts various different ideologies as legitimate. And it must be assumed that religious value systems which are more universalistic, in the sense of placing less stress on being the only true church, will be more compatible with democracy than those which assume that they are the only truth. The latter belief, which is held much more strongly by the Catholic than by most other Christian churches, makes it difficult for the religious value system to help legitimate a political system which requires as part of its basic value system the belief that 'good' is served best through conflict among opposing beliefs.[49]

It has been further posited that due to a Catholic's extreme dependence upon the clergy because of the Catholic sacramental system, the authority, and ecclesiastical organization of the Church, he is predisposed to accept highly authoritarian political regimes.[50] Thus, Catholicism has been seen as hindering democracy by conditioning people to accept authoritarian regimes and in producing intolerant attitudes toward those who hold differing ideologies.

Important qualifications may be added to these generalizations. One is that Christian Democratic parties exist in traditionally Catholic countries which have repudiated political authoritarianism without having to challenge the theological authority of the Catholic Church. Also, it has been suggested that the Catholic Church just happens to exist

in some countries where democratic institutions have not
developed.[51]   More relevant for this study is the fact that
many Irish Catholics defied the authority of the Church in
order to join the I.R.A. and fight for nationalism, and that
many Ulster Catholics were very far from accepting the
legitimacy of the Ulster government.

John Whyte suggests in his study of Church-State
relations in Modern Eire that the State was very far from
being theocratic.   At the same time he notes that the Catholic
Church was not just another interest group, but occupied
a position regarding the State somewhere between the theocratic
and interest group position, a position which varied according
to the circumstances and nature of the problem concerned.[52]
Whilst the Catholic Church may have made less use of its privi-
leged position in the Eire Constitution than it could have,
there may be, however, many issues which failed to surface
because of this position.   If, however, these qualifications
are of minimal importance and the Catholic Church does produce
inflexible, intolerant minds predisposed to accept authoritarian
regimes these characterists should show up most clearly in those
Catholics who are most deferential to religious leaders.

A number of conflicting hypotheses regarding the
political attitudes of those most deferential to religious
leadership seems possible.   Priests are held in high respect
among children and adolescents in Ulster.[53]   Thus their
opinions may be followed closely especially by those who are
most deferential to them. Fahy found his sample of Ulster

priests to be Irish in national identification and critical of the constitutional position in Northern Ireland.[54]   Thus, the most deferential to priests may be most negative towards the government which upheld the Constitution and readiest to approve violence for a United Ireland.   Alternatively, the Catholic Church has officially preached obedience to the civil powers and condemned violence.   Or again, Richard Rose found that the readiness of Catholics to respect the direction of priests was unrelated to views about illegal political demonstrations.[55]   Among Protestants one might hypothesize that the most deferential to ministers of religion will be most dedicated to Protestantism and thus readiest to use force to uphold a Protestant Ulster and be positively orientated to a 'Protestant Parliament' and its government.   Alternatively, the most deferential Protestants may come under the influence of ministers of religion who demonstrate against violence and preach peaceful politics.   Such conflicting hypotheses are possible and realistic because religious leaders by no means speak with one voice even within the major communities.   If there is no connection between degrees of deference to religious leaders and political attitudes one may say that persons of similar deference levels are coming under the influence of differing political views or that deference to religious leadership is unimportant for political behaviour.

Primary schoolboys are more deferential to religious leaders than secondary school pupils in both religions.   Among Primary schoolboys 67 per cent of Protestants and 78 per cent
                                                                    do
of Catholics accepted that it was 'very important' to/whatever

a priest or minister of religion told them. Only 20 per cent of Primary schoolboys were less deferential and prepared to say that such obedience was just 'fairly important'. Among Secondary schoolboys 35 per cent of Protestants and 60 per cent of Catholics were very deferential to their ministers and priests (very important to obey) whilst approximately 30 per cent in both religions felt that obedience was only 'fairly important'. Only ten per cent of Catholic secondary school-boys thought obedience to a priest less than fairly important whilst among Protestant Secondary pupils 15 per cent found obedience to whatever a minister said 'not very' and 11 per cent 'not at all' important.

The Catholic Primary schoolboys who are most deferential to priests are more likely to endorse violence in politics (D.I. between most and less deferential group = 16%) Among the seven per cent of Secondary school Catholics who felt it was 'not very important' to obey priests there is an increase in negative affect to government. (They are 52 per cent negative compared to 33 per cent in the more deferential groups of Secondary school Catholics) On the one hand, some of the most deferential Catholic boys are more violent in outlook than other co-religionists, but some of the less deferential are more negative to government. Among Protestants, only the Primary schoolboys who are most deferential to ministers of religion are likely to render the most extreme positive affect to government. For instance, among those saying that it is 'very important' to do whatever a minister says, are 72 per cent who think government will

always want to help people like them compared to approximately
50 per cent in the less deferential categories.   Among
Protestant Secondary schoolboys, degrees of deference towards
a minister of religion makes virtually no difference to basic
political attitudes.

That some of the less deferential Catholic Primary
schoolboys are also less violent in political outlook than those
ready to follow the priest in all things may suggest that
priests are unsuccessful in restraining the violence in those
most prepared to listen to them.   Alternatively, it may
suggest that many boys believe their priests favour a violent
solution to Ireland's problems.   The Catholic Secondary
schoolboys who were less deferential to priests are also more
negative to government which may suggest an all-round loss of
respect for authority.   Alternatively it may indicate that
boys who are negative to government give less weight to the
views of priests who preach obedience to the Civil powers.
That Primary school Protestants who are less deferential to
ministers should be less enthusiastic about government may,
again, represent an all-round loss of respect for authorities.
The Protestants most deferential to ministers are much the
same in their views of discord as the bulk of their co-
religionists.   Thus Protestant ministers are no more successful
in restraining violence among those most ready to listen to
them than are Catholic priests.   Alternatively, Protestant
ministers may have raised passions which have found a violent
outlet.   Perhaps the only conclusions that can be drawn are
either that religious deference and political attitudes are

unrelated or that religious leaders speak with so many different voices in politics that it is, at the moment, impossible to test whether any general relationship exists.

Summary: Religion

Using the same methodology as that described in the summary of chapter five reveals the following:

(1) AFFECT

CHARACTERISTIC	PROTESTANT PRIMARY	SECONDARY	CATHOLIC PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Importance of obeying minister/priest				
fairly important	15-			
not at all important		13-		
Importance of believing all Church/Bible teaches				
fairly important	18-		14-	
not very important		13-		
No friends among Protestants			13-	13-
Discrimination against Catholics exists				
Uncertain				12+

(2) DISORDER

CHARACTERISTIC	PROTESTANT		CATHOLIC	
	PRIMARY	SECONDARY	PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Everyone in the other religion is hostile				
Agree	22+	19+	22+	13+
Disagree		19-		
Strength of Religion				
neither strong or average	26-			
strong		18+		
Friends in other religion				
Yes		11-	13-	
No		18+	17+	15+
Discrimination is practiced against Protestants/Catholics				
Yes		14+		
No		17-		
Uncertain				15-
Fairly important to obey a priest			13-	
Not very important to believe all Bible teaches		17-		

On general, positive measures of involvement in one's religion tell us very little about political attitudes. That the question about strength of religion (which measures more than doctrinal belief) differentiates the boys to a greater

extent than the other questions is some indication that
religion, as community, is more important in politics than
religion as doctrine. Neither how often a boy attends church
or how conservative he is regarding his faith predicts, to any
great extent, how he will react politically. On two occasions
this general rule is overturned. For instance, the Primary
boys who are less than very conservative about the Bible are
well below the Protestant primary distribution for positive
affect to government. The difference of 22 per cent between
these groups is not caused by extremely high positive affect
among the 'fundamentalists' but by low extreme affect in the
group not totally committed to believing all the Bible says.
Only 12 per cent of Primary Protestant boys belong to this
less fundamental group but they may represent a movement in
Primary schools away from thinking of government in the most
glowing terms. Thus loss of faith in the importance of the
Bible in one's life may be accompanied, among primary School
Protestants, with loss of faith in government. Loss of faith
in government, however, could be interpreted as a more
realistic view of politics coupled with a more critical approach
to the Scriptures and life in general. The second qualification
to the rule that specifically religious involvement makes little
difference to political attitudes is found among Secondary
Protestants. The minority feeling that total belief in the
Bible is 'not very important' are well below the Secondary
mean for violence approval. There are, however, only ten per
cent of Protestants Secondary boys in this belief grouping.
Nevertheless they are 17 percentage points below the mean for
violence approval which suggests that there may be connections
between more modest views of the Bible and peaceful politics.

Bolieving all that the Bible teaches does sometimes involve facing a very wrathful God.

When one considers the least likely measure of specifically religious involvement, strength of religious identification, one is confronted by large differences between those who confess themselves to be 'strong' and 'average' Protestants or Catholics. This further confirms the thesis that as one moves away from sepcifically religious phenomena to those that can be interpreted differently - as community identification - their importance increases for politics. Here 86 per cent of strong Protestants in Secondary schools approve violence to 60 per cent of the 'average' co-religionists. And 70 per cent of 'strong' secondary school Catholics approve fighting for a United Ireland to only 54 per cent of their more 'ordinary' brethren. Thus, being a 'strong' religionist in discord between religious communities does not increase one's respect for 'law and order' but makes one unafraid of 'illegalities' in order to attain political goals.

The more negative aspects of religious involvement, such as the absence of friends of a particular type because of religion, are much better indicators of affect and opposition than positive measures, such as church attendance. Although the presence or absence of friends in the other religion makes little difference to how younger Protestants feel about government there are important differences to be noted elsewhere. Catholics in primary and secondary schools, without Protestant friends are much more negative to government; Protestant

secondary schoolboys lacking Catholic friendship are much

more violent in political outlook as are Catholics in both

school ages who do not experience friendship across religious

lines. Total lack of friends in the other religion probably

makes it more likely that boys will believe the wildest rumours

they hear about Catholics and Protestants. Instruction as to

what Catholics and Protestants are really like may help to bridge

the gap, but only actual experience across the divide will

convince a boy that many of his fears were groundless. It may

be suggested however, that for many, such an experience will

only confirm one's worst suspicions and make attitudes to

the other religion even harder than before.

Whilst believing that all the members of the other

religion are determined to destroy one's own religious community

and/or faith does not make boys much more negative to government

it certainly gives them a more bloodthirsty view of politics.

In primary and secondary schools of both religions those

imagining themselves to face a totally hostile religious community

are, as one would expect, more committed to forwarding their own

political goals through physical force methods. In this way

rebellion is justified as means of preserving life, property

and liberty. And now we are not talking about a small minority,

but about half of the entire sample. Here one encounters some

of the most frightening statistics: violence in politics

approved by 87 per cent of Protestant Secondary pupils; 82 per

cent of Catholic Primary boys; 73 per cent of Catholic secondary

boys; and 69 per cent of Protestants in Primary schools. If

getting to know boys across religious lines reduces violent

tendencies in politics it may be because the myth of 'total
hostility' is wholly or partially removed. One must also bear
in mind that there is the other half of boys in all school
types who do not believe the 'total hostility' myth and that
half of such boys also believe in political violence. It
thus cannot be argued that feeling all the 'others' are
against 'us' is the cause of violence approval. But it may be
put with some force that it is of importance in increasing the
likelihood that boys will accept violence as part of their
lives and that any effort to remove the myth will probably
make constitutional methods of opposition more generally
acceptable.

Since the vast majority of Catholic Secondary school-
boys believe that discrimination is practised against people
like them, they are like most other Catholic boys in attitudes
to discord. Only the minority who are uncertain about dis-
crimination are both more positive to government and less
violent in politics than the majority. Protestants, however,
who sense they are discriminated against, are less like the
majority of their co-religionists, and record more approval of
violence in politics.

When negative and positive aspects of involvement
in religion and/or religious communities are compared, it is the
negative aspects that tell us much more about political attitudes.
This is an indication that religious wars in Ulster are more
'against' the 'others' than for the sake of a particular faith.
For instance, how often a person attends church is a poor

indicator of political views, whilst how he feels about the intentions of the 'others' divides boys <u>within</u> religions to a great extent. Again, how seriously one takes the teaching of the Church or the Bible tells us much less about a person's attitudes to disorders than does knowing that he has no friends in the other religion. Strength of involvement in religion, which could be interpreted as either doctrinal commitment or community feeling, is the only positive measure used which indicates more clearly which political attitudes a boy may have. Thus, as the Bishop of Connor maintained, '...the strife was due to a war of religion, but not one of dogma and belief.'[56] Catholic doctrines may be more difficult for a Protestant to accept because they are believed by Catholics rather than on account of their strangeness to a Protestant. Similarly, a Catholic may find it harder to accept the legitimacy of Protestant beliefs simply because they are believed by Protestants. Thus, ecumenism in Ulster is a difficult exercise because religious communities have political, economic and social differences. If a religion is despised because of the people who hold it, there seems little point in preaching across major religious divides until the people can begin to respect the legitimacy of each other's aims. And that day seems far distant when ultimate political goals cancel each other out.

Footnotes: Chapter VII

1.   Hess and Torney, op.cit., (Chapter I: fn.3) p.121

2.   R. LaVine, "Political Socialization and Cultural Change", in Old Societies and New States, Geertz, E., ed.

3.   Hess and Torney, op.cit., pp.30-37

4.   Edwards O.D. et al., Celtic Nationalism, (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968)

5.   Bernadette Devlin, Price of My Soul, (London: Pan, 1969) ch.II

6.   Joan Lingard, The Twelfth Day of July, (Hamish Hamilton: London) 1970, pp.9-10

7.   Alf McCreary, "Portraits of Ulstermen: Two-Gerry Fitt", Belfast Telegraph, October 11th, 1972.

8.   Richard Rose, Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., (Chapter I: fn.19) p.214

9.   ibid., p.214

10.   ibid., p.214

11.   Glock, C.Y., and Stark R., Religion and Tension in Society, (Rand McNally and Company: Chicago, 1965) chapter I

12.   See Gerhard Lenski, The Religious Factor, (New York: Anchor, 1963); Glock and Stark, ibid., David Martin, A Sociology of English Religion (London: Heinemann, 1967) and Michael Argyle, Religious Behaviour, (London: Routledge, 1958)

13.   Gerhard Lenski, ibid., p.173

14.   David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain, (Macmillan: London, 1969) p.134

15.   Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, (Independent Television Authority, 1970)

16.   Louis Gardiner, Resurgence of the Majority, (Ulster Vanguard Publications, 1971) p.6

17.   Fortnight, 9th July 1971

18.   Belfast Telegraph, 18th October 1971, "War of Religion - Not belief - Bishop."

19.   Easton and Dennis, op.cit., (Chapter I: fn.3)

20.   Belfast Telegraph, 22nd September 1972, "Prepare for the new 'generation of bigots'."

21. P.A.C.E., October, 1971, p.23

22. Robert Harbinson, No Surrender, (Faber, 1960) p.123

23. Price of My Soul., op.cit., p.39

24. Almond and Verba, Civic Culture, op.cit., (chapter I:
     fn.9) p.102

25. John Greer, A Questioning Generation, (A Report on Sixth
     Form Religion in Northern Ireland, prepared for the
     Northern Ireland Committee of the Church of Ireland Board
     of Education, 1972)

26. See A Questioning Generation, ibid., and Governing
     Without Consensus, op.cit., p.264

27. David Bleakley, Young Ulster and Religion in the Sixties,
     1964 (Published Privately)

28. The Gown, 20th November 1959

29. A Questioning Generation, op.cit., ch.2

30. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., p.264

31. ibid., p.261

32. See Cox, Edwin, Sixth Form Religion, (S.C.M. 1967) and
     A Questioning Generation, op.cit.

33. Lenski, G., The Religious Factor, op.cit.

34. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit. pp.261-62

35. See Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, op.cit.,
     and A Questioning Generation, op.cit.

36. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., p.495, Question 38a

37. Old Societies and New States, op.cit., p.59

38. The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, Chapter XIII:1

39. P.A.C.E. January 1972, p.2

40. The Education of Catholic Americans, A.M. Greely and
     P.H. Rossi, (Aldine Publishing Company: Chicago, 1966)
     pp.153-54

41. Religion in Britain and Northern Ireland, op.cit.,
     Appendix C.

42. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., pp.477-78,
     Questions 4 and 5c

43. See Barrit and Carter, op.cit., (
     chapter II.

44. ibid., p.25

45. Belfast Telegraph, 25th October, 1972, "Craig and Taylor Warn Again...."

46. Morris Fraser, Children in Conflict, (Seeker and Warburg, 1973) p.113-114

47. Governing Without Consensus, op.cit., p.479, Question 6c

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56. Belfast Telegraph, 18th October 1971, "War of Religion - Not Belief - Bishop."