

University of Strathclyde
Department of History

The Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912:
Public Service and the Scottish Civic Identity.

by

Irene Elizabeth Sweeney

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ABBREVIATIONS

The following abbreviations have been used in this thesis:

BT	- Board of Trade
G & SW	- Glasgow & South Western Railway Company
GLA	- Glasgow Landlords' Association (Ltd.)
HC	- House of Commons
HL	- House of Lords
ILP	- Independent Labour Party
LCC	- London County Council
MEA	- Municipal Employees' Association
PP	- Parliamentary Papers
SDF	- Social Democratic Federation
SLP	- Scottish Labour Party
STL	- Scottish Temperance League
SPBTA	- Scottish Permissive Bill & Temperance Association
SRA	- Strathclyde Regional Archives
SRO	- Scottish Record Office
UIL	- United Irish League
UP	- United Presbyterian Church
UF	- United Free Church

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The sources of information about Glasgow Town Council are disconcertingly abundant, and it has been possible for me to reflect only a segment of the copious documentation available. As the main repository for Glasgow's municipal records, Strathclyde Regional Archives was my principal base for research; indeed, at one point I almost seemed to take up permanent residence. I also spent a lot of time in various Departments of the Mitchell Library, making especial use of the Glasgow Room's resources. Without the courteous assistance of staff in these excellent civic establishments, this thesis could simply not have been written, and I owe them all an enormous debt of gratitude. I would also like to thank the staff of the Scottish Record Office, Strathclyde University Library, Glasgow University Library, Glasgow University Archives, and the Business Records Centre, Glasgow University. Dr. Mary McHugh, of the Glasgow Archdiocesan Archives, was particularly helpful in connection with some of my obscure queries about the city's Catholic municipal activists.

There are numerous individuals who have had to live with my sometimes wearisome obsession with municipal Glasgow, and I would particularly mention friends and erstwhile colleagues from the National and Local Government Officers' Association. They have only themselves to blame for setting me on such a course in the first place. Les Finimore, formerly NALGO's Senior District Officer for Scotland, is someone whose commitment to the public service remains an enduring source of inspiration. There are other, non-NALGO persons, such as the Graham family, who contributed enormously towards my understanding of architecture; that "distinctively political art", as Ruskin aptly described it. In this context, Ruskinite principles would appear to be as relevant to the new Glasgow as to the old. Robin Porter is to be thanked for elucidating some of the mysteries of Town Clerking, while Angela Mitchell helped me come to grips with the intricacies of word processing. I should also take this opportunity to thank Jeanne Lawrence, who unearthed the quotation which appears at the very beginning of this

thesis, and passed it on to me.

Above all, I must warmly acknowledge those long-suffering denizens of the Sweeney household, viz. my husband, Andy, and the cat population. Respectively, they displayed comforting qualities of comradeship and serene inscrutability during sometimes trying times. It should be added that it was Andy Sweeney, together with Dr. Gordon Jackson, who did the most to make something out of a hitherto computer illiterate.

I should finally refer to a tradition which has emerged among some contemporary Scottish historians writing about temperance, who have made a point of declaring their own family's attitude towards the Demon Drink. In accordance with this tradition, I have to admit that my mother's side of the family operated a licensed grocer's business in the Cowcaddens district prior to 1914, while round about the same time my father's parents were treading the boards of Glasgow's Music Halls. (Dora Sefton and Harry Carson were their stage names.) I do not know if the policies of Samuel Chisholm or other teetotal councillors meant anything to them, or whether they took an aggressively partisan stance in favour of the drinks' trade; hopefully, this descendant will not have done so during the course of the chronicles which follow.

University of Glasgow,
December, 1990

SUMMARY

The *Municipal Administration of Glasgow, 1833-1912*, examines the evolution of civic government in Scotland's major industrial city during a period of unprecedented urban development. The thesis is centred on the contribution of town councillors in determining a distinctly Scottish municipal identity, and the extent to which social, economic and political influences helped shape prevailing attitudes towards the public service. Biographical sources have been used to construct a collective profile of the 577 representatives who served on Glasgow Town Council during this time. However, attention is also focused on the municipal bureaucracy, especially the rôle of the Town Clerks.

The 1833 Burgh Reform Act redefined the civic entity of Glasgow, and removed the traditional burgess basis of authority. Yet it was not until 1846 that the Council was able to overcome numerous legal obstacles and extend its sphere of operations. Thereafter, municipal policy was directed towards a programme of city improvement, beginning with the spectacularly successful Loch Katrine water supply in 1855. The quality of urban life was a major civic preoccupation, and the importance of issues such as temperance reflected the concern of many councillors to present a more positive image for Glasgow.

The notion of "civic pride" took firm root during the 1850s, and the following decades represented a period of steady consolidation. During this time the Council expended considerable energy in attempting to extend the municipal boundaries, particularly as many outlying areas already benefited from Glasgow's public utilities. After several false starts, success was achieved in 1891, and the municipality underwent extensive administrative restructuring. Yet by the 1900s, the rise of Labour and the spectre of "municipal socialism" had called Glasgow's civic priorities into question. Despite the controversy, there was no significant reversal of the Council's long-held expansionist strategy, and territorial additions in 1912 enlarged the city substantially.

- 1 -

INTRODUCTION

"The Glasgow citizen does few things without the aid of the Corporation. He may live in a Corporation dwelling-house, but whether he does so or not, can cook his breakfast on a Corporation stove heated by Corporation gas, and make his tea with Corporation water. He can go to business by tramway, using the Corporation electric car, which travels at any speed up to twelve miles, and for $\frac{3}{4}$ d. per mile. His business may be assisted by the Corporation telephone, for which he pays £5 5s. a year, and when it grows dark he may switch on the Corporation electric light. His wife may engage her servants at a Corporation Registry, his children may use any of the eleven city play-grounds and their gymnastic appliances, but would probably prefer to take advantage of some of the thirteen public parks which make a green ring round Glasgow. In two of these they may, if their elders have not crowded the courses, play golf. The dreariness of the winter is made more tolerable by the Corporation Sunday Afternoon Concerts, and all the year round he may study one of the finest municipal art collections in Great Britain in the best art gallery that Great Britain affords. His sense of personal responsibility may be ministered by the thought that the various public markets, hospitals and most of the public halls are his; that on a thousand acres of his lands oats and turnips are growing; in his quarries the stone awaits the mason; and that in his Loch Katrine trout await the fisher. Should he become poor there is the Corporation Lodging House for shelter, and in the Corporation Family Home his children will be tended. Should he unfortunately take to drink, there is a place for him in the Home for Inebriates, and when these things cease to interest, there is prepared for him the Corporation graveyard."

From "Glasgow", in Alan J. Woodward (ed.), Scotland's Industrial Souvenir, (Derby, 1905), pages 23-24.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century, urbanisation had come to pose a perplexing worldwide challenge. At its best, city life seemed to exude enormous cultural and commercial vitality, but at its worst represented serious problems of social dislocation, due to the pressures arising from rapid industrialisation and population growth. These two polarities could often co-exist uncomfortably together, particularly in a cosmopolitan city like Glasgow, which was perceived in a global context as "one of the most characteristic of the great urban communities in the English-speaking world".¹ Because it so strikingly reflected multi-faceted qualities, Scotland's largest city was considered to be particularly worthy of study, and urban analysts - from home and abroad - referred repeatedly to the Glasgow example.² The relationship of the city to the municipality was a particular theme of their discussions: if the former seemed to generate a scarcely controllable dynamic of its own, then the latter symbolised a much more ordered approach to urban affairs, defining the limits of civic jurisdiction with legal exactitude. Of course, much depended on how effectively the city and municipality could be harnessed, but for Glasgow at least, some of the major problems of control had been overcome by the 1890s.

It helped enormously that Glasgow's civic roots stretched back over several centuries. The administration had been evolving towards a recognisably modern structure even before the

nineteenth century, although it was not until after the post-reform era of the 1830s that more fundamental change was possible. Contemporary commentators admired the continuities in Glasgow's civic development; as a "distinct and complete municipal organism" the Town Council had served as a stabilising factor during a period of unprecedented urban expansion, and was latterly to the fore in efforts to present the city's profile in a positive way.³ Glaswegians themselves were proud of their municipality, and its steady progress over the past century:⁴

No longer does [the Council] merely rule ... but it now renders services to the citizens which they cannot render to themselves or to each other, and exacts from them the performance of certain duties whose sanction is in the public interest of the community. And the general result seems, without exaggeration, to be that the modern City is reverting in importance to the City-state in classical antiquity.

There was no scarcity of similar tributes prior to 1914, and published works abounded on the city's rise to civic prominence.⁵ However, most of these tended to play down the personal and political dimension, concentrating instead on the technicalities involved in acquiring and administering the various public utilities. Such a bureaucratic approach was partly due to the Town Council's long-standing reliance on the expertise of its full-time officials - notably the Town Clerks - whose influence on the portrayal of Glasgow's civic history was profound.⁶ This is not to suggest that the city's councillors

were shadowy figures, who passed the bulk of their workload to public servants; on the contrary, purposeful and outspoken men had long been plentiful in the civic arena. Yet unlike Birmingham, there was no single dominating personality to compare with Joseph Chamberlain, and the success of Glasgow's municipal enterprise came to be attributed to collective rather than individual effort.⁷ In this context the phenomenon of "municipal socialism" was particularly relevant to Glasgow; indeed, the civic authority was latterly perceived as implementing much more "progressive" policies than its Birmingham equivalent.⁸ However, one of Glasgow's great ironies was that the individualist ethos was actually stronger than in Birmingham, largely because councillors traditionally did not adhere to an official party machine.

To fully understand civic government in Glasgow, it is essential to disentangle the personalities from the policies, in order to identify the precise nature of the municipal power-base. Accordingly, what follows in this thesis is not just an attempt to explain why Glasgow gained its reputation for civic excellence, but to examine the often complex motivations which prompted town councillors to develop the municipal infrastructure so comprehensively by the 1900s. There is nothing new about such an approach to the study of urban history, and E.P. Hennock's detailed examination of Birmingham and Leeds between 1835 and 1914 has provided a useful model on

which to base the Glasgow experience.⁹ Indeed, the copious amount of published material on municipal Birmingham has proved to be an important comparative source for Glasgow, as both cities were keen rivals during the decades immediately prior to the First World War, vying for the right to lay exclusive claim to the title of "Second City of the Empire".¹⁰

There were clearly enormous contrasts between Birmingham and Glasgow, not least because of their respectively English and Scottish orientation. Part of Glasgow's international appeal at the turn of the nineteenth century lay in the fact that it manifested uniquely Scottish characteristics, which had arisen from its burghal status under Scotland's separate legal and administrative system.¹¹ The basis of Glasgow's civic authority rested firmly on Scots law, and legal institutions were - and remain - notoriously slow to adapt to change. One of the major challenges of local government in Glasgow was the extent to which the municipal jurisdiction could be altered and refined, without encountering too many insurmountable legal obstacles. The law was a recurring preoccupation among town councillors, as it gave practical substance to their civic aspirations. One statute in particular - the 1833 Burgh Reform Act - shaped the Scottish municipal profile indelibly, and it is therefore appropriate that the struggles over this epoch-making legislation should form the opening section of this thesis.

References

1. Albert Shaw, Municipal Government in Great Britain, (London, 1895), page 70.
2. Glasgow's international reputation for civic excellence - with particular reference to the United States - is discussed at length in Bernard Aspinwall's Portable Utopia: Glasgow and the United States, 1820-1920, (Aberdeen, 1984), pages 151-184.
3. Shaw, op. cit., page 69.
4. James Hamilton Muir, Glasgow in 1901, (Glasgow and Edinburgh, 1901), pages 46-47.
5. Repeated reference will be made in this thesis to the many pre-1914 studies of municipal Glasgow; however, the two most comprehensive official accounts of the city's rise to civic prominence are Sir James Bell and James Paton, Glasgow: its Municipal Organisation and Administration, (Glasgow, 1896), and Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow: Its Evolution and Enterprises, (Glasgow, 1914).
6. See section 6 of this thesis, pages 495-568.
7. See the separate studies of Glasgow and Birmingham in Shaw, op. cit., pages 69-144 and 145-193. Hardly any of Glasgow's councillors are mentioned specifically by name, yet scarcely a page goes by in the Birmingham section without reference to "Mr. Chamberlain".
8. For a detailed analysis of "municipal socialism" in Glasgow, see Section 4 of this thesis, pages 426-467.
9. E.P. Hennock, Fit and Proper Persons: Ideal and Reality in Nineteenth Century Urban Government, (London, 1973).
10. See pages 167-168 and 426-428 of this thesis.
11. Shaw, op. cit., pages 72-77.

PART ONE - THE OLD ROYALTY AND THE NEW
MUNICIPAL ERA IN GLASGOW

- I. The Closed Municipal System and the Challenge of Reform Prior to 1833.
- II. The 1833 Burgh Reform Act in Glasgow: Continuity or Change?
- III. Municipal Politics and Priorities during the Post-Reform Era, 1833-46.

"The Old Lady, you know, is under sentence of death, and is to be executed on the fifth of November. There were a good many underhand tricks tried, and some Corporation cash expended, to obtain a year's reprieve for her, but it would not do. Jeffrey was determined that the witch should be burned as soon as possible, and so to the stake she must go."

¹The fate of the unreformed Town Council - alias the "Old Lady of Self-Election" - as depicted by the Scots Times, November 1833.

I. The Closed Municipal System and the Challenge of Reform Prior to 1833

Reform of the royal burghs was one of the priorities of the Whig Government after 1830, primarily because the abuses of the unreformed system had been an area of persistent complaint in Scotland since at least the 1780s.² The mode of election to the old town councils had been established prior to 1707, and opponents of reform liked to use the apparently sacred bond of Union with England as a reason for not changing the existing system. They claimed that the rights and privileges of the royal burghs had been guaranteed by the Act of Union, and it would be unconstitutional - and unpatriotic - to fundamentally change them.³

However, this argument masked a deeper reason for the lack of any meaningful attempt by Parliament to allow changes in the constitutions, or setts, of the royal burghs. In reality, the political control of Scotland was the major point at issue,

because the royal burghs had the long-established right to return members of Parliament, elected by the town council. Each of the sixty-six royal burghs had originally sent one member to the Scottish Parliament, but after 1707, with the exception of Edinburgh, they had combined together in groups to return a quota of fourteen MPs to the House of Commons. Edinburgh alone retained the right to individually return one member.⁴ Such a system of election meant that control of the town councils largely determined who was returned as Parliamentary representatives for the burghs, and up to the 1830s Scotland's MPs overwhelmingly favoured the Government interest.⁵ It therefore suited successive Tory administrations in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries not to open out Scottish municipal elections, despite increasing indications that change was necessary in order that many of the burgh authorities could keep pace with new social demands.

This concentration of power had originated in the Election Act of 1469, which was a move by the Scottish Parliament to regularise the composition of town councils, and ensure above all that the growing number of craftsmen could not come to dominate municipal government.⁶ The Scottish merchant class was in the ascendancy at the time, largely because the country was in a state of relative peace and trade was favourable.⁷ In order to maintain this position, it was crucial for the merchant guilds to retain their long-standing control of town

councils, and restrict the influence of the craft incorporations, with their monopolist approach to trade. By doing so, the guilds were able to establish a close relationship with the Crown and Parliament, both of which had cause to be grateful to the merchants for keeping Scotland in a state of economic buoyancy. In 1707, the Act of Union reaffirmed the position of the merchant class as an "unchallenged ruling oligarchy" in the town councils by eliminating any semblance of popular control from the elections and allowing the old council to nominate the new.⁸ This was the basis of the self-perpetuating system that prevailed until 1833, and which continued to consolidate the power of the merchants, despite the pleas of various trade and craft organisations throughout this period for a more equal rôle in municipal affairs.

As far as Glasgow was concerned, the constitution of the Town Council was first approved in 1605, and received the sanction of the Convention of Royal Burghs in 1611.⁹ Throughout the sixteenth century the composition of the Council had been the subject of a protracted dispute between the merchants and the craftsmen, with the latter claiming equal status with the former. Indeed, by 1604 craft burgesses outnumbered merchant burgesses in the city by 363 to 213, and the tone of their demands had become sufficiently strident to compel the Lord Provost and magistrates to find a solution to the problem.¹⁰ This took the form of a "Letter of Guildry"

the following year, which provided for the election of a Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener to the Council, representing the merchants and trades respectively.¹¹ Glasgow's burghal constitution was comparatively generous to the craftsmen, but stopped short of giving them equality with the merchants, so that despite periodic amendments prior to 1833, the merchants always had the edge in terms of numbers on the Council.¹² In addition, it was a requirement of the constitution that the Lord Provost had to be a member of the merchant rank, and that there should be one more merchant bailie than trades' bailie serving as magistrate.

The inferior status of the craftsmen continued to be a bone of contention up to the time of the Burgh Reform Act, but there was little that could be done to overturn the dominance of the merchants. The Convention of Royal Burghs, which regulated and approved burgh constitutions on behalf of the Government, was entirely composed of merchants, and was a bastion of resistance to change.¹³ It is scarcely surprising that Glasgow's trade burgesses were more amenable to burgh reform than the merchants, and that it was on the initiative of the Trades' House, representing the fourteen incorporated trades of the city, that the first open declaration of the need for reform was made by the Town Council in 1819.¹⁴

As has been seen, opponents of change used the Act of Union as a means of preserving the political status quo at a time when

Scotland was experiencing firstly the trauma of Jacobite rebellion, and then when attitudes were becoming increasingly polarised by the disrupting effects of the American and French Revolutions. Yet after 1707, the rigid application of the burgh constitutions - as decreed by the Convention of Royal Burghs - became an anachronism as mercantilist doctrines began to give way to the new laissez-faire philosophy, and commercial and industrial expansion shifted the population towards the growing urban centres. While many of the older burghs, particularly those in Fife and the east coast, diminished in importance, those in the west increased in status, including towns like Paisley, Greenock and Hamilton, which were not royal burghs. It seemed an irony to contemporaries that such centres did not have the power of returning an MP, while small Fifeshire burghs such as Anstruther, Crail, Kilrenny and Pittenweem could combine together for the election of a Parliamentary representative.

Glasgow itself was part of a grouping with Renfrew, Dumbarton and Rutherglen; an arrangement which caused one official of Glasgow Town Council - James Cleland - to comment caustically that, "Although the population of either of these conjoined Burghs does not exceed one-fortieth part of Glasgow, they are equal in their political franchises".¹⁵ The favoured treatment afforded to the smaller burghs by the Convention of Royal Burghs was deeply resented in larger towns and cities, which proportionately paid more in taxation, but had no

corresponding influence in the Convention's affairs. In 1829 Cleland pointed out that for every £100 levied in taxation by the Convention, Edinburgh and Glasgow paid the lion's share of £33 6s 8d and £27 5s 0d respectively, while fifty-five burghs paid a pound or less.¹⁶ Moreover, the smaller burghs regularly appealed to the Convention for financial help towards the provision and improvement of local amenities, and such was their combined strength in numbers that they invariably received assistance at the expense of the larger burghs.

Local taxation was a major cause for concern among those seeking reform of the royal burghs, largely because the various systems of assessment tended to be rooted in the distant past and were not generally appropriate for dealing with contemporary needs. The example of Glasgow was a good illustration of how far the old taxation system had become out of touch, with the Town Council compelled to use five very different methods of collecting revenue.¹⁷ These were the cess, or taxation levied by the Government via the Convention of Royal Burghs; the monies received from burgesses as a fee on entering their appropriate merchant guild or trade incorporation; petty customs duties on goods and provisions coming into the city across the burgh boundary; poor rates, principally for the upkeep of the Town's Hospital, or poor house; and an impost on ale or beer sold within the burgh, charged at 2d Scots per pint. The petty customs - or "ladle duties" as they were called in Glasgow -

were a particularly ancient legacy, dating from a time when transactions were conducted in kind rather than in cash.¹⁸ Glasgow's magistrates had been entitled to extract a "ladleful" of grain from every sack brought into the city, although the impost was later commuted to a money payment. By 1833 the ladle duties had been extended to cover commodities like dairy produce, butcher's meat, eggs, fish and potatoes; there was also a thriving contraband trade in these goods from outwith Glasgow.¹⁹

The money raised by this and other modes of assessment was not insignificant, although both the cess and the poor rates were used to provide for financial obligations on the city's behalf. Yet overall, the amounts which accrued from taxation did not realistically reflect the requirements of a growing industrial centre like Glasgow. The amount of cash raised from burgess entries, petty customs and the impost on ale and beer - that is, revenue which could be retained by the Council - totalled £2,670 in 1833.²⁰ There were, of course, other sources of revenue, including feu duty payments, fines from the burgh courts, and rents derived from cattle-grazing on Glasgow Green, so that the Council's total revenue in 1833 was £15,340. However, it had become apparent by this time that a more effective and uniform system of direct taxation was desirable, especially as the ladle duties were extremely unpopular, and were often cited by advocates of burgh reform as an example of

the ineptitude of the municipal system.²¹ The Council was not wholly to blame for this state of affairs, as it had no legal powers to initiate change without the approval of Parliament, and was reluctant to abandon any source of revenue, no matter how outdated. Indeed, it proved impossible to impose a general assessment in Glasgow until the 1900s, when the functions of the Town Council and the administratively separate Police Board were combined.

Although Glasgow's civic representatives clearly recognised the glaring financial problems arising from the perpetuation of the closed municipal system, they remained aloof when a group of reformers in Edinburgh took the first practical initiative in 1784 and established a rival "Convention" to that of the Convention of Royal Burghs.²² The alternative Convention attracted representatives from thirty-three of the royal burghs, and its main objectives were the annual election of magistrates by open poll of all resident burgesses, and a more stringent accounting of burgh funds.²³ It should be stressed that the movement was not immediately concerned with Parliamentary reform, despite the accusations of opponents that it was seeking some kind of back-door revolution.²⁴ The interests of the taxpayers and burgess groups were much more of a priority, particularly in relation to the trade incorporations, whose members considered that a burgess poll would favour the trades rather than the merchants, because of their superiority in

numbers. A municipal franchise in line with that of 1833 was not generally promoted at this time, and only became a viable option as a result of the precedent set by the adoption of Police Acts in several Scottish burghs, whereby police commissioners were elected by citizens meeting a specified property qualification.²⁵ Significantly, the Government was prepared to sanction relatively open elections for the ad hoc Police Boards, which had no say in the nomination of MPs, but doggedly refused to consider such a move for the town councils themselves.

Glasgow adopted its first Police Act in 1800. It was called an "epoch-making statute" because it allowed an element of community control over the election of representatives; in this instance, those who provided for policing, watching, paving, lighting, cleansing and sewerage.²⁶ The importance of the Glasgow Act lay in its concession to the notion that "rating and representation go hand in hand"; a criterion which was to endure in municipal government until the advent of manhood suffrage in 1918.²⁷ However, under Glasgow's pre-reform Council such a principle was politically untenable, and so the urgent necessity of effective police provision was met by the expedient of creating an additional administrative agency, with more flexibility in its scope for raising revenue. The short-term effect was that although members of the Town Council were appointed to the Police Boards in an ex-officio capacity, they

were substantially outnumbered by the elected commissioners, many of whom were political opponents of the magistrates and vocal advocates of burgh reform.²⁸ In the longer term, by the division of the city into wards with a franchise based on an assessed property rental of £10 and upwards, the Glasgow Police Act became a model for future civic organisation, and was an important bridge between the old burgh-dominated municipality and the open system which prevailed after 1833.²⁹

Despite its immediate usefulness in the sphere of law enforcement, the passing of the Glasgow Police Act was testimony that the period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars was not conducive to the direct pursuit of burgh reform. The Government refused to disentangle the financial demands of the reformers from what it saw as the politically destabilising effect of interfering with constitutional affairs; hence any call for municipal change, no matter how qualified, was construed as an attempt to undermine the authority of the state. By the 1790s the progress of the fledgling reform movement had been brought to an abrupt halt, with the result that there could be no effective action to resolve the mounting financial problems confronting various town councils. These had reached crisis point in some of the larger burghs, although notably not in Glasgow, whose Town Council prided itself on being a model of administrative efficiency. In contrast, Edinburgh's civic leadership was accumulating substantial public debt over the

financing of the city's New Town development, while Aberdeen - under grossly inept municipal management - was sliding towards insolvency.³⁰ The impact of the post-war economic slump only intensified the fears of the burgesses, particularly after 1817, when the magistrates of Aberdeen found that they could no longer guarantee payment to their creditors, and were ignominiously forced to declare the city bankrupt.³¹

In such an uncertain climate the cause of reform was rapidly rekindled, and in 1819 Glasgow Town Council reflected the changing mood among the municipalities by endorsing a statement from the city's Trades' House to the effect that the system of self-election was detrimental to the public interest.³² This was an important affirmation of principle from a burgh which had hitherto consciously distanced itself from the reform movement. In Glasgow, the divisive nature of the prevailing system was particularly identified as an obstacle to municipal progress; instead of nurturing "the respect for those in power which is so necessary for the good government of the community", it was fostering a dangerous spirit of "discontent and enmity".³³ The Council even went so far as to set up its own committee to consider what improvements could be made to the burgh constitution, generally with the aim of making the trade incorporations freer from merchant control.³⁴ Yet this identification with the reforming impulse was not to last, either in Glasgow or nationally. While the Tory Government was

initially embarrassed by the Aberdeen débâcle, and chastened by the subsequent strength of feeling in Scotland, it was able to regain enough composure by 1822 to push through long-overdue legislation for regulating burgh finances - minus any provision for change in the system of burgh election.³⁵ The rationale was that such a gesture would be sufficient to to allay the fears of the burgesses, and mute further demands for municipal reform.

Indeed, the Government's strategy met with some success, as Glasgow Town Council's "reform" committee did not actively pursue its original function until circumstances necessitated its revival in 1830.³⁶ Yet there was no lack of vocal critics of the closed electoral system within the city and elsewhere, and as the mood in favour of Parliamentary reform began to intensify, so too did the feeling that there was "a reforming spirit abroad among men" in relation to the municipalities.³⁷ The press, in particular, became an important vehicle for disseminating such sentiments, and in 1825 a new Glasgow periodical, the Scots Times, declared one of its immediate priorities to be Parliamentary and burgh reform.³⁸ The Scots Times later created its own symbol of the unreformed Town Council in the person of the "Old Lady of Self-Election", who was usually depicted as an aged harridan, fond of the good life and excessive tippling.³⁹ Of course, Glasgow's municipal leadership was by no means as inefficient and corrupt as in some

of the other large burgh councils in Scotland, but it inevitably became tainted by association under the unreformed system. It was therefore increasingly difficult during the 1820s for the Council to take major policy decisions without accusations from the Scots Times and other pro-reform journals that the magistrates were indulging in "hole-and-corner" dealings to promote "some interest quite independent of the public good".⁴⁰ Another tactic used by the press was to suggest that the councillors themselves were not personally to blame for excesses of mismanagement, but were under the spell of unscrupulous Council officials, anxious to cash in on expensive municipal undertakings. This was called "jobbing", and Glasgow's principal Town Clerk, James Reddie, and Superintendent of Public Works, James Cleland, were often openly attacked for alleged involvement in jobbing deals.⁴¹

Up to 1830, Glasgow's Town Council seemed to be uncomfortably on the defensive about its composition and constitution, yet did nothing after 1819 to initiate change. One important reason was that the leadership of the Merchants' House - described as "the citadel of the closed system" - was reluctant to cede power either to the craft incorporations, or to an electorate based upon a wider property franchise.⁴² Over time the Merchants' House had established an entrenched position in control of Glasgow's civic affairs, which was extremely difficult for outsiders to dislodge. The seat of

power in the Merchants' House was the Dean of Guild's Council, comprising twenty-four members elected via a leeting system by the Annual General Meeting, and twelve members directly nominated by the Dean himself.⁴³ Out of this total number, twelve members were selected to represent the merchants on the Town Council; an arrangement constituted by the 1605 Letter of Guildry to ensure that the majority of councillors were from the merchant ranks. The nominating system for the Dean of Guild's Council was complex, and undoubtedly open to manipulation; Tory members always predominated in the voting figures, although there was a sizeable number of Whig and other merchants among the rank-and-file.⁴⁴ In 1825 the hierarchical structure of the Merchants' House was bitterly attacked from the floor of its Annual General Meeting, with one dissident suggesting that the 800 or so ordinary members should be encouraged to participate more directly in municipal affairs, so that "... a sense of decency would arise, and the civic Magistracy would have to be more open".⁴⁵ He went on to state that fifteen formed the quorum of the Dean of Guild's Council, but only a bare majority of this number need take a decision. Thus, eight people could theoretically control of the proceedings of the House - and, indirectly, the Town Council itself.

Although the return of a Whig Government in 1830 was the catalyst which eventually brought an end to the closed municipal system in Glasgow, there were strong indications prior to this

time that the foundations of the unreformed Town Council were unsteady. For example, there was a widespread belief that the magistrates had made sweeping concessions in 1825 to the burgh of Dumbarton over the payment of harbour and river duties on the Clyde, in return for Dumbarton's support in the election of the MP for Clyde Burghs, Archibald Campbell of Blythswood.⁴⁶ Campbell was regarded as a notorious Government stooge by political opponents, and so it was in their interests to discredit him, but it was undeniably true that Glasgow Town Council had allowed Dumbarton to reap enormous benefits from the 1825 arrangement. The Scots Times made considerable mileage out of accusations that numerous "jobbers" had filled their pockets as a result of the deal; notably Council officials, rather than "sheep-like magistrates".⁴⁷ Whether or not the "Dumbarton Job" was a genuine error of judgment or blatant political manoeuvring, the episode made Glasgow councillors acutely aware that, as long as the closed system existed, they could do little to extricate themselves from the accusations of opponents. Thus, while the Council had the power to act on a number of important issues, it tended to hold back because it did not wish to become bogged down by personal and political wrangling. In effect, the activities of the Council were becoming circumscribed, at a time when the pace of urban development necessitated increased municipal involvement, including the extension of civic jurisdiction outwith the old burgh

boundaries. This was the issue that probably did most to push the Council firmly in the direction of reform, following another damaging confrontation with its political opponents.

The conflict centred upon the district of Blythswood, which had been under the ownership of the Campbell family from the seventeenth century. By the 1820s its lands were being profitably feued out for the construction of fashionable residences, many of which were to be occupied by Glasgow town councillors.⁴⁸ However, Blythswood remained outside the Glasgow burgh boundary, so that the city's arrangements under the 1800 Police Act did not apply, nor did the other Glasgow assessments, such as the cess or ladle duties. In 1829 the Town Council sought leave from Parliament to annex Blythswood, principally to enable the services of the Police Commissioners to be extended over the area. Despite Council assurances that there would be "no detriment" arising from the arrangement, the terms of the Blythswood annexation fostered a sense of outrage among numerous sectors of Glasgow's middle-classes, who considered that councillors were acting solely out of self-interest.⁴⁹ In particular, magistrates were accused of colluding with Archibald Campbell, the Clyde Burghs' MP who owned most of Blythswood, to improve the area at Glasgow's expense and boost property values. The Scots Times commented on the mood within the city in October 1829:⁵⁰

... nothing has excited so much indignation

in Glasgow for the last 20 years as the avowed intention of the magistrates to extend the Royalty over the Lands of Blythswood. Nothing is so common just now as the observation that the Old Lady is going down rapidly; and that nothing, certainly, can be more pitiable than the efforts of the Self-Elected, at present in office, to revive her in her dying struggles.

By March 1830, virtually every prominent local organisation had declared its opposition to annexation, including - surprisingly - Glasgow's merchants, who feared that the value of property owned by the Merchants' House would depreciate if the residential centre of the city shifted west.⁵¹ A petition, which collected some 13,000 signatures, was presented to Parliament, where there was intensive lobbying to defeat the Annexation Bill.⁵² This was partly successful, in that Blythswood did not yet become formally part of Glasgow, although police powers were extended over the district.⁵³ The immediate outcome of the Blythswood campaign was therefore a compromise rather than an outright victory for either side, but one longer-term effect was to seriously call into question the Town Council's hopes of annexing other districts outwith Glasgow, such as Anderston, Calton or Gorbals. It made administrative sense to include these districts under the jurisdiction of Glasgow, as the 1835 Royal Commission on the Scottish Burghs later indicated, but while the basis of popular representation on the Town Council remained non-existent, any decision about changing the city's boundaries was generally

regarded with extreme suspicion.

The Blythswood campaign also had the effect of giving greater substance to the burgh reform movement in Glasgow, which was set fully in motion following the death of George IV in June 1830, and the subsequent general election which brought the Whigs to power. As a symbol of the changing times, Archibald Campbell was opposed as candidate for the Clyde Burghs by Kirkman Finlay, a former MP and rigid Tory, who had gained notoriety for his involvement in the suppression of radical political activity after 1815.⁵⁴ Finlay - a powerful figure in Glasgow's Merchants' House - posed this time as a reformer, much to the confusion of the Town Council, which split over support for him.⁵⁵ Although Finlay stated that he would "not rashly tamper" with the existing form of Government, he also declared that it was "... absolutely absurd to say that no change should take place in a representation formed on the state of things two hundred years ago".⁵⁶ As a merchant, Finlay's change of heart was largely motivated by free trade principles rather than any keenness for reform per se, but the very fact of his standing against Campbell showed that a significant shift in political allegiances was taking place among the dominant power groups in Glasgow. Finlay lost the election, but narrowly, and reform agitation in Glasgow did not die down as a result of this setback.⁵⁷

Indeed, by the end of 1830 Parliamentary reform was the

major issue both locally and nationally, and Glasgow's Merchants' House and Town Council made a firm commitment to support "a safe, moderate and reasonable amelioration of the system".⁵⁸ One driving force at this time was James Ewing - the Dean of Guild and future Lord Provost - who was a prosperous West India merchant, a deeply committed Church of Scotland Evangelical, and a protégé of Kirkman Finlay.⁵⁹ Ewing dominated the Town Council from 1830 to 1832, until he was elected as one of the city's two MPs to the reformed Parliament. As leader of Glasgow's self-styled group of "Conservatives", he was determined that political reform should be introduced in accordance with British constitutional principles, and that the radical reform movement should not be allowed to seize the initiative. It was Ewing who drafted the Town Council's resolution in favour of reform on 3rd December 1830, which declared that:⁶⁰

... this Corporation contemplate with equal gratitude and satisfaction, the prospect of a proposition ... to extend the right of representation to the great towns of the empire - a boon which would be productive of the most important advantages to the commercial and manufacturing interests.

Under Ewing's leadership, the burgesses of Glasgow stood firmly by the Parliamentary Reform Bill, holding six special meetings of the Merchants' House and five of the Trades' House between December 1830 and June 1832 to support the Bill's progress.⁶¹ Fiona Montgomery has recently shown that the

population of Glasgow overwhelmingly shared this mood of reform, although the movement from 1830 was by no means harmonious or homogeneous.⁶² She also stresses that the involvement of the main reform organisations in the city - notably the Glasgow Reform Association and Glasgow Political Union - was more vocal than practical, and that "the agitation had arisen out of the city's established institutions", rather than from pressure from below.⁶³ Nevertheless, although much of the early running was clearly made by institutions like the Merchant's House, under the leadership of James Ewing, it is important not to underestimate the rôle of the more radical reform societies, especially in relation to the future municipal organisation of Glasgow. The Reform Association, which revolved around a wealthy group of Whig activists known as "the Clique", was a useful forum for those who had been previously excluded from the Town Council, and wanted a stake in the civic control of the city.⁶⁴ When the first elections were held under the Burgh Reform Act in November 1833, a sizeable number of former Reform Association supporters stood for office, and were overwhelmingly successful. Moreover, they were to be a lasting presence on the Town Council for many years to come, with men like Henry Dunlop, Robert Grahame, James Lumsden and William Mills all becoming Lord Provost.

When The Scottish Parliamentary Reform Bill eventually passed into law in July 1832, a major obstacle to the reform of

the royal burghs was overcome, as election of burgh MPs was now in the hands of the £10 householders. Francis Jeffrey, Lord Advocate for Scotland, gave notice in March 1833 that a Bill would be introduced to provide for the open election of the town councils, and such was the haste of the Government to implement the measure that it went straight to the Committee stage.⁶⁵ However, the Bill caused much concern among the burgess groups of Glasgow, because it was initially proposed to exclude direct representation of the merchants and the trades from the new Town Council. A serious problem of accountability was thus created, because the Bill allowed the elected Council complete control over affairs which were regarded as a legitimate sphere of burgess activity, including areas of financial administration.⁶⁶ Jeffrey resolutely dismissed the burgess pleas for direct representation, suspecting that it was a last-ditch effort to retain political influence, but the House of Lords responded positively to a deputation from Glasgow's Trades' House to amend the Bill.⁶⁷ The Lords' amendment allowed the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener ex-officio membership of large town councils like Edinburgh and Glasgow, and ensured that the burgess institutions retained full control of their properties and charities.

With this important proviso, the Burgh Reform Bill was passed in August 1833 much as Jeffrey had planned. Arrangements began to be made immediately for the first open election in

Glasgow, and the Burgh Commission Office in Edinburgh undertook to divide the city into municipal wards, and fix the appropriate number of councillors to be elected under the new régime.⁶⁸

II. The 1833 Burgh Reform Act in Glasgow: Continuity or Change?

The Burgh Commissioners' task was tackled during September and early October 1833, to prepare for the poll on the first Tuesday of November; thereafter this was the legally specified date for Scottish municipal elections until 1949, when polling-day was switched to May. Allocating the wards in the new municipality was by no means straightforward, largely because of uncertainty as to what actually constituted the geographical entity of Glasgow.⁶⁹ In 1833 no accurate and up-to-date map of the burgh existed; a deficiency which was not remedied until eight years later, when the Town Council commissioned an official survey of the boundaries.⁷⁰

There had been few such problems of definition before the unprecedented urban expansion of the nineteenth century, when the Town Council's jurisdiction was strictly confined to the territory of the royal burgh, or royalty. Indeed, from an early period in the city's history the Lord Provost, magistrates and Council officials had periodically "perambulated the marches"; a ceremonial occasion with a practical purpose, originally conducted in all royal burghs to maintain the boundaries and prevent encroachment on the town's common lands.⁷¹ However, from 1800 small territorial additions began to be made to the traditional area of the Glasgow royalty, although the extent of this outward expansion was restricted by existing laws governing

land tenure, the payment of the cess and other forms of taxation, and the preservation of exclusive trading privileges, which were jealously guarded by the burghess incorporations.⁷²

By the 1830s the problem of defining Glasgow had suddenly become more acute, because the city's newly established Parliamentary boundaries did not tally with those of the royalty, either traditional or expanded. (See Maps I and II, which form part of the Appendices to this thesis.) The municipality of Glasgow covered less than half the territory within the Parliamentary constituency - 2,160 acres as opposed to 5,672 in 1833 - with the remainder comprising the autonomous Burghs of Anderston and Calton, the Barony of Gorbals, plus substantial territory which had no municipal representation.⁷³ To compound the confusion, the extensive northern area of the royalty lay beyond the Parliamentary constituency, which meant that under the terms of the Burgh Reform Act its residents were ineligible to vote in Council elections, even though the lands were formally part of the burgh.⁷⁴ This was not an immediate source of grievance, as northern districts like Springburn and Cowlands were as yet scarcely developed, but by mid-century the impact of industrialisation had considerably strengthened local feeling in favour of extending civic rights. In the context of the future administration of Glasgow, the 1833 municipality was thus an unsatisfactory hybrid, conforming partly to the old burgh

boundaries, and partly to the new Parliamentary constituency. It is not surprising that references to the city between 1833 and 1846 can be confusing, and consequently must be treated with caution.

According to the requirements of the Burgh Reform Act, the Commissioners divided Glasgow into five electoral wards, each returning six councillors; a quota fixed to conform as closely as possible to the number of councillors under the former régime.⁷⁵ The sprawling shape of the royalty dictated the uneven contours of the wards; indeed, the Second Ward was made up of three apparently disconnected sections of the royalty, because the Parliamentary constituency cut directly across its northern end. The wards were known simply by their numbers, and it was not until the major municipal reorganisation of 1896 that they were allocated an official local name, to make the areas they covered more readily identifiable. The municipality was, of course, much smaller in 1833, and the number of those entitled to vote in Town Council elections totalled only 4,821 as opposed to 122,678 in 1896.⁷⁶ The anonymity of the ward designations was therefore probably not a problem to persons involved in municipal affairs during the 1830s, particularly as the more populous electoral districts - especially in terms of business occupancy - were concentrated around the traditional town centre of Glasgow Cross.

The first open election for Glasgow Town Council took place

on Tuesday, 5th November 1833. One important feature of the preliminary campaign, with long-term ramifications, was the establishment of loosely organised ward committees, which gave electors the opportunity to meet together and decide on suitable candidates to recommend as prospective councillors. Such meetings were held in each of the five wards in 1833 - most of them fairly rowdily, as the competing parties struggled for control of the proceedings.⁷⁷ A slate of candidates was eventually endorsed in all the wards, although this was not binding on voters. On the day of the election, the thirty Council positions were contested by sixty-four candidates, most of whom could be broadly identified as Liberal or Conservative supporters.⁷⁸ It should be stressed that these political designations were consciously used by the candidates; the terms "Whig" and "Tory" were regarded as an anachronism in Glasgow's municipal affairs, as they were too closely connected with the inadequacies of the self-elected system. There was no party machinery in the modern sense, but the rival camps in the 1833 election were well-organised and knew precisely their ideological objectives. The result showed, too, that voters were perfectly aware of their candidates' political preferences, as twenty-seven declared Liberal councillors were returned. Out of fourteen candidates standing from the unreformed Council, only four were returned, including one Liberal.⁷⁹

The future policy of the Town Council did not rank highly in

the list of candidates' priorities in 1833, as reform fever had tended to direct energies towards obliterating the old municipal order rather than shaping the programme of the new. When the Council assembled for the first time on 8th November, the opening business was to discuss whether to abolish the trappings that had symbolised the unreformed era, including the magistrates' cocked hats and gold chains which had been much lampooned in the radical press.⁸⁰ A more meaningful indicator of changed times was the election of a committed reformer, Robert Grahame, as Lord Provost. At seventy-four, Grahame was the Council's elder statesman, and represented a direct link with the early days of the reform movement in the 1780s.⁸¹ As a lawyer he had helped to defend Thomas Muir against accusations of sedition in 1793, and attempted to reprieve the Bonnymuir insurgent, James Wilson, from a treason charge following the "Radical War" of 1820. Along with Charles Tennant, a fellow reform activist, Grahame had been involved in the establishment of the vast St. Rollox chemical works, and was a very wealthy man by 1833. In his rôle as Lord Provost of the new municipal entity of Glasgow, Grahame thus exemplified two of Liberalism's most desirable traits - reforming zeal and formidable business acumen.

E.P. Hennock has pointed out in his analysis of Leeds Corporation during the 1830s that electoral reform did not substantially shift the municipal power base in socio-economic

terms, but rather created new opportunities for those who had previously been excluded because of politico-religious affiliations.⁸² Derek Fraser has subsequently reaffirmed this statement in more general terms, querying the notion that a "municipal revolution" occurred after the reforms of 1835 in England and Wales.⁸³ What happened was "not so much a change of system but a change of men", which meant that although opportunities for participation were substantially opened out, one social élite was generally replaced by another in control of the incorporated boroughs, while the functions of municipal government were not immediately altered.⁸⁴ Bearing in mind the different application of the reform legislation in Scottish royal burghs, where the £10 municipal franchise was less democratic than the broader household franchise south of the border, the English experience would conform with that of Glasgow, where the Council initially changed dramatically in political complexion, but not in social background. The example of Robert Grahame is again useful; although he was a long-standing political opponent of Kirkman Finlay and his Tory-Conservative allies, the social status of the two men was sufficiently compatible for Grahame's son to have married Finlay's daughter.⁸⁵

In this connection, what was the social background of Glasgow's reformed Town Council in 1833? The first municipal election resulted in a crushing victory for the Liberals and

their allies, yet out of twenty-seven declared Liberals returned to the Town Council, the overwhelming majority called themselves "merchants" or "manufacturers", or a combination of both.⁸⁶ Nineteen councillors can be identified in this category, over half of whom were directly connected with the textile trade, while the remaining eight included a wright, brewer, and ironmaster, plus two accountants and three writers (ie. lawyers) who happened to have other business interests. Most of this group were matriculated merchants - that is, members of the Merchants' House - although a number had overlapping membership of trade incorporations.⁸⁷ Ironically, one effect of open elections was to give the merchants proportionately more representation on the reformed Town Council than under the closed system, when the trade incorporations held a guaranteed number of seats. Messrs. Fleming, Gilmour, Lumsden, Mills and Muir, who were made Glasgow bailies in 1833, were all prominent members of the Merchants' House, and this merchant dominance was maintained throughout the period 1833 to 1846.

At the same time, the occupational categories represented on Glasgow Town Council covered a narrow range, and councillors coming from a professional background were, on the whole, a rarity. It is true that a number of councillors had originally trained as lawyers; James Dunlop of Tollcross was one example, although he preferred to immerse himself in the far more lucrative family concern of the Clyde Iron Company.⁸⁸

However, men like Dunlop, or Henry Brock - an accountant who later became the first manager of the Clydesdale Bank - were the sons and grandsons of Glasgow merchants, and so their place in the city's merchant community was already assured.⁸⁹ On the other hand, clergymen disdained to stand for Council office in Glasgow, despite the fervour of the religious debate during the 1830s and 1840s. In 1833 the idiosyncratic Sir Daniel K. Sandford, Professor of Greek at the University, was the only full-time academic known to have attempted to win a seat on the Town Council during the nineteenth century.⁹⁰ Unlike Edinburgh, Glasgow had no doctors or surgeons represented on the Town Council until 1846; a phenomenon which can be attributed to the fact that the Surgeons were one of the Incorporated Trades in Edinburgh, dating from a time when surgery had not yet achieved professional status, and when surgeons and barbers formed one occupational grouping.⁹¹ Like Glasgow, Edinburgh's Council was dominated by merchants, although not to the same extent as the more industrialised city of the west.⁹²

If the Burgh Reform Act did not substantially alter the socio-economic basis of representation on Glasgow Town Council, to what extent did the Council change in other directions? In particular, were the councillors elected in 1833 wholly different people from their counterparts of the earlier period? A comparison between the 1832 self-elected Council and that of 1833 is striking, though not particularly useful, because the

1833 election took place in the heady atmosphere of the immediate post-reform era, when voters generally rejected anything to do with the discredited régime of the past. As has been pointed out, only four representatives from the unreformed Council were returned in 1833; a result which would appear to indicate little confidence in the opinions or abilities of councillors nominated prior to this time. Yet if the list of representatives from the 1832 Town Council is compared with that of all councillors who took office between 1833 and 1846, a different pattern emerges. Out of the thirty-three representatives from the 1832 unreformed Council, including the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener, fourteen - or forty-two per cent. - returned to the Council Chambers after this time.⁹³ If the merchant representatives are examined alone, out of eighteen nominated in 1832, nine eventually returned after 1833. Nor do these figures take into account representatives from further back than 1832, like Archibald McLellan or William McLean, who eventually re-emerged as elected Glasgow councillors and survived as influential figures well into mid-century. Bearing in mind that open elections strengthened the position of the merchants, to the detriment of the trades, the record of the last self-elected councillors is not as bad as would first appear, and certainly indicates an element of continuity between the affairs of the old Town Council and the new.

Indeed, despite an auspicious beginning, the overwhelming

Liberal domination of the Town Council was a transient phenomenon, and the city's Conservatives speedily began to regain the initiative. It was as if the voters of 1833 had cautioned the old guard not to make assumptions about the loyalties of the new electorate, and that conscious efforts had to be made to win back support. The lesson was taken to heart, and although the Liberals remained unassailable in the First Ward - located in the city's East End - they could never really be sure of their ground elsewhere. From 1834 the westerly Fifth Ward consistently favoured the Conservatives, due partly to the district's powerful shipping interests, which were a particular source of Conservative strength. By November 1843, the Liberals managed to fully reassert themselves on the Council, but only because Conservative organisation had broken down over the Disruption of the Church of Scotland, and candidates temporarily withdrew from standing in local elections. (See Table 1.1.) Until 1843 the balance of municipal allegiances was often at a knife-edge, resulting in a dramatic situation after the 1837 elections when both sides were able to claim sixteen supporters out of the total thirty-two Council representatives.⁹⁴ A bitter wrangle ensued over the Lord Provostship in consequence of this electoral stalemate, with the emergence of two rival claimants for Glasgow's prime civic position. The protagonists resorted to obstructive tactics in the Council Chambers, and at times chaos was created in the city's administrative function,

Table 1.1: Political Allegiances of Glasgow Town Councillors, 1833-1846

	*Ward 1		Ward 2		Ward 3		Ward 4		Ward 5		+Total Lib. Con.
	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	Lib. Con.	
1833	6	0	5	1	6	0	4	2	6	0	27
1834	3	0	2	0	1	1	1	1	3	0	26
1835	2	0	3	0	1	1	2	0	0	2	24
1836	2	0	1	1	2	0	0	3	0	2	22
1837	2	0	2	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	16
1838	2	0	2	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	15
1839	2	0	4	0	1	1	0	2	0	2	15
1840	3	0	2	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	14
1841	2	0	3	0	1	1	2	0	0	2	15
1842	2	0	2	0	4	0	0	2	0	2	18
1843	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	24
1844	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	27
1845	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	30
Total	32	0	32	2	25	7	15	16	15	16	

* The Ward figures represent the number of councillors elected each year, plus the ex-officio Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener. Several councillors resigned or died mid-term, and so there were often additional vacancies, which are reflected in the totals above.

+ This represents the total number of councillors serving in a given year.

Source: Biographical Appendix to this Thesis.

as the legal validity of municipal decisions was called into question. The matter was inconclusively settled by a ruling of the House of Lords, and even then the declared "pretender" - John Fleming of Claremont - refused to give up the official seal and chains of office until the expiry of his rival's three year term as Provost.⁹⁵

The number of representatives entitled to stand for Glasgow Town Council remained relatively small between 1833 and 1846, with only ten councillors elected each year on a rotating basis. Opportunities for aspirants to achieve Council office were thus limited, with the result that the conduct of municipal affairs was often personal and highly competitive. Peter Mackenzie, a former journalist and radical activist, wrote disparagingly in 1868 of "bear garden scenes" in the Council Chambers during the 1830s, suggesting that the councillors of the immediate post-reform era were impetuous and unsophisticated in comparison with later counterparts.⁹⁶ In some respects he was correct, because the novelty of the electoral process inevitably stimulated public interest, and encouraged a number of Council candidates to play upon this apparent enthusiasm for openness and plain talking. Overt political rivalry was one aspect of the new approach to municipal affairs, although it should be added that the Liberal and Conservative groupings on Glasgow Town Council were broad alliances that were extremely fluid in composition. Policies and priorities often differed

within each group and, as Callum Brown has pointed out in his analysis of religion and the development of Glasgow between 1780 and 1914, voting on many issues, such as the religious debate within the Established Church or municipal improvement, could cut across party loyalties.⁹⁷ Henry Dunlop, the final victor in the 1837 Lord Provost controversy, was a declared Liberal and had been elected as such in 1833, but as a deeply committed Church of Scotland Evangelical he later allied himself unequivocally with the Evangelical-dominated Conservative group on the Council.⁹⁸

Any analysis of the composition of Glasgow Town Council between 1833 and 1846 must inevitably take into account the continuing influence of the burgh institutions, which under the terms of the Burgh Reform Act were entitled to nominate the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener as ex-officio councillors.⁹⁹ The two representatives were invariably Conservatives, showing that the traditional allegiances of leaders within the Merchants' and Trades' Houses did not change substantially after 1833. Their continuing presence on the Council also meant that they were in a pivotal position to hold the balance of power, especially during the period 1837 to 1842 when the Conservative-Evangelical alliance narrowly retained political control. Although the grip of the burgh institutions had thus been theoretically broken by the system of open election under the Burgh Reform Act, their influence

remained an important factor in Glasgow's civic affairs. The Act even went so far as to stipulate that any person elected as a councillor had to be formally entered as a burgess before he could take up his municipal duties.¹⁰⁰ Unless burgess-ship was hereditary, this meant the payment of appropriate entry fees and the possibility that an elected councillor could be excluded from office because he was not a qualified burgess. Such a ruling inevitably restricted the occupational categories represented on the Council, and ensured that councillors tended to be those relatively affluent citizens who could afford both the burgess fees and the £10 property qualification for electors.

Definitions of eligibility as to who could stand for Council office were open to considerable interpretation between 1833 and 1846, because the wording of the Burgh Reform Act was imprecise and ambiguous. One Glasgow councillor, exasperated with the flaws that periodically came to light, declared in 1837 that "... the Reform Act was the most wonderful legislation that had ever emanated from the hands of man. There appeared to be a hole in every clause of it".¹⁰¹ Thus, it was relatively easy for political opponents to use the law to query the credentials of Council candidates, in order to have them debarred from municipal office. Robert McGavin, an outspoken radical who represented the First Ward between 1833 and 1840, was the victim of one such attack by an organised group of Conservatives in

1837, although he was successfully able to refute the charge that he had made an error in reporting his residential status for the purposes of electoral registration.¹⁰² Political gamesmanship was fairly common in the period following the 1832 Reform Act, when the supporters of rival candidates would attempt to trip up their opponents by challenging dubious electoral qualifications, in an effort to disenfranchise voters and bolster their own candidate's chances of winning.¹⁰³ The use of this practice in relation to candidates rather than voters had even more mischievous implications, as it was a conscious attempt to spread confusion in the enemy camp, whether or not the original challenge was successful. At all events, the law was frequently used as a political weapon after 1832, and aspirants for office had to be sufficiently aware of the legal pitfalls, and have ready access to an astute lawyer - requirements that usually demanded money and connections.¹⁰⁴

The Burgh Reform Act also reinforced municipal exclusiveness because of the strict limitations on those it enfranchised. In some of the smaller royal burghs, such as Dornoch, Culross, West Anstruther and Kinghorn, there were not even enough £10 householders to supply the requisite number of councillors under the new legislation, so that the old system prevailed until sufficient people acquired the necessary property qualifications.¹⁰⁵ Such an anomaly had arisen because the Whig Government was determined not to allow a lower qualifying

criterion for municipal elections, on the grounds that householders would "soon claim to vote for members of Parliament", and it would be legally difficult to resist the pressures for change.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, the Act elevated the social position of town councillors, because although burgess-ship was stipulated as a prerequisite to assume municipal office, the right to stand as a councillor was restricted to those persons having the appropriate voting qualification. Not all Glasgow burgesses automatically fell into this latter category; in 1833, out of an estimated 800 members of the Merchants' House and 3,500 belonging to the trade incorporations, a substantial percentage did not have the municipal vote because of the lower value of property they owned or occupied.¹⁰⁷ Nor were all registered electors necessarily burgesses; the Glasgow Herald estimated in 1833 that some 1,500 voters in the forthcoming municipal elections did not belong to burgess institutions.¹⁰⁸

While non-burgesses could stand for Council elections, and become entered burgesses retrospectively should they be successful, the overwhelming majority of councillors between 1833 and 1846 were long-standing members of the Merchants' House or trade incorporations.¹⁰⁹ Several did not practice their original trade or craft, particularly those who were hereditary burgesses, but they nevertheless tended to retain a close connection with the burgess institutions. As the nineteenth

century wore on, the status of burgess-ship in Glasgow diminished considerably, especially after exclusive trading privileges were abolished in 1846. It should be borne in mind, however, that by the end of the century burgess-ship was still a legal requirement to become a town councillor, albeit on the basis of token enrolment.¹¹⁰ Moreover, the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener remained ex-officio councillors until local government reorganisation in 1975, although the extent of their influence was substantially scaled down due to the increased number of councillors elected as a result of boundary expansion.¹¹¹ Despite the hopes of reformers to remove all vestiges of the old system of self-election from municipal affairs, the power of the burgess institutions could not be expunged so conclusively, because of the power of vested interests and because the legal implications would have been too far-reaching.¹¹²

The Liberal councillors who assumed power in 1833 liked to pose as the champions of reform, branding their predecessors as reactionaries, who were out of touch with popular aspirations. Yet while the Town Council of 1832 had been Tory dominated, under the strong controlling influence of Lord Provost Ewing, its supporters could scarcely be called outmoded relics from an unenlightened past, because they commanded a solid basis of support in the city. This was clearly shown by their success in 1832 during the first general election under the Scottish Reform

Act, when James Ewing easily topped the poll out of six candidates.¹¹³ Ewing exemplified a number of the characteristics which were to recur in several prominent councillors elected after 1833: he was extremely rich, having made his fortune from the West India trade; he supported reform, but only in accordance with British constitutional principles; he had strong sympathies for free trade, and admired the economic philosophy of Sir Robert Peel; finally, he was a long-time associate of Thomas Chalmers, the driving force behind the Evangelical revival in the Church of Scotland during the 1820s and 1830s. Writing in the Reformer's Gazette, Peter Mackenzie identified a number of the Lord Provost's supporters as candidates in the 1833 municipal elections, in order to warn Liberals against mistakenly voting for them.¹¹⁴ As usual, Mackenzie did not mince his words, describing one aspiring councillor with Evangelical sympathies as "... a saint, and a very unfit man to be made a Councillor - He carried a musket during the Radical War and Plumped for Provost Ewing at the Election".¹¹⁵ (That is, he chose to vote only for Ewing as MP, rather than exercise his two votes.) The subject of Mackenzie's disdain was William Brown, who eventually returned to the Town Council in 1836, but the blacklist also included men like James Burns, James Campbell and John Leadbetter, who were all committed Evangelicals, and later helped to win the Town Council for the Conservatives between 1837 and 1842.

The links between Conservatism in Glasgow and the Evangelical revival are not easy to disentangle, although mutual identification of interests was most clearly marked in the decade prior to the Disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843.¹¹⁶ A heated religious debate had arisen during this time over the rôle of Church and State, with Evangelicals arguing that the Established Church was an integral part of the British constitutional framework, and a bulwark against the spread of heresy and idolatry, particularly Roman Catholicism. On the other hand, disestablishment was strongly favoured by the Voluntary movement, led by dissenting groups from the Church of Scotland, notably the Secession and Relief Churches. As the claims of the two groups became increasingly strident, so the theology began to blend with more material political notions; the Evangelicals supported the status quo as far as Church and constitution were concerned, while the Voluntaryists supported radical change. The political dimension was fundamental to the aims of both groups, who had to exert pressure in order that their ideas could carry sufficient weight inside Government and other influential circles. Moreover, the religious argument in Scotland was not parochial or insignificant in relation to the rest of the British Isles, because the general rôle of the Established Churches, particularly in Ireland, was being seriously called into question.¹¹⁷ In Scottish terms, this was broadly translated into Evangelical support for the

Conservatives as the party which claimed to preserve the integrity of the Established Churches, and safeguard the constitution. The Voluntaryists, on the other hand, tended towards Liberalism because they believed that, "Voluntaryism ... represented the extension of liberal principles into the religious world - promising to revive Christianity through the "free trade" dynamic".¹¹⁸

It is therefore not coincidental that Voluntaryists were solidly behind the Liberal alliance on Glasgow Town Council, while the Evangelicals broadly supported the Conservatives. Both groups became bitter rivals, and at the height of their animosity in the 1830s there appeared to be no organisation which could jointly contain them.¹¹⁹ This rivalry helps to explain why Liberal Evangelicals like Henry Dunlop temporarily threw in their lot with the Glasgow Conservatives, and why political tensions ran so high on the Town Council, only to subside in 1843 following the Disruption. It should be stressed, however, that not all councillors shared this zealotry, and that many considered their politics to be as important as their religious beliefs, if not more so. James Turner of Thrushgrove, the veteran of Glasgow radicalism, was a loyal member of the Established Church, but he was no Evangelical.¹²⁰ Similarly, James Lumsden - a Moderate member of the Church of Scotland, and one of the most astute political manipulators on the Town Council - was the object of attack by

Conservatives because of his personal ambitions and unswerving allegiance to Liberalism, not primarily because of his religious failings.¹²¹ John Leadbetter and James Campbell, two of Glasgow's leading Conservatives, had strong Evangelical sympathies, but could not bring themselves to join the Free Church in 1843 because it would have undermined their belief in the sanctity of Church and constitution, which they saw as a cornerstone of Conservative ideology.¹²²

Until the Evangelicals later made insurmountable demands over the issue of patronage in the Church of Scotland, thus precipitating the Disruption, the Conservative-Evangelical alliance on Glasgow Town Council was of considerable mutual benefit. Only four years after the famous Liberal victory of 1833, the apparently discredited opposition was able to claim the Lord Provostship and one year later became numerically the largest group on the Council. This did not signify a return to pre-reform practices; one reason being that Conservatives generally acknowledged the results of the reform legislation, another being that the Liberals had already effected a number of irreversible changes. In any case, the presence of Lord Provost Ewing and a small group of his Evangelical supporters on the last self-elected Council indicated that times were already beginning to change, and that the Tory monopoly was subtly altering to fit the new mood of reform. It is consequently too simplistic to suggest that the Burgh Reform Act had the effect

of severing all links with Glasgow's municipal past, and projected the city into a new civic era. This is an easy trap to fall into, particularly as the Liberal Town Council made several ostentatious gestures towards redefining Council practice, such as dispensing with some of the ornamental trappings of office, or discouraging municipal junketting. However, as E.P. Hennock commented about Leeds in the 1830s, municipal reform was intended to alter the basis of authority in local government, not primarily to alter the functions.¹²³ In the Glasgow context, the basis of authority changed insofar as councillors were openly elected, but even then some of the personalities from the past persisted in returning, to play an important part in municipal affairs.

III. Municipal Policies and Priorities during the Post-Reform Era, 1833-46

After the sweeping changes in representation following the 1833 municipal election, Glasgow's town councillors were acutely aware that "... every eye will be directed towards the working of the liberal system", and that much was expected of them.¹²⁴ Of course, there was little scope for immediate changes in the functions of the Council, even if this had been deemed desirable by the new régime. Municipal matters were generally guided by principles based on long-standing legal and financial obligations, such as the maintenance of the city's Churches or Grammar School, which could not be easily altered or abandoned.

Yet, if the functions of the reformed Town Council were to remain no different from the old, then at least efforts could be made to ensure that they were administered in a manner more suited to Liberal aspirations. One convenient method of achieving this was to root out officials who had been appointed during the unreformed era, and whose loyalties were therefore highly suspect. Such an exercise was not unique to Glasgow, and reflected conscious policy among Liberals to "... clear the roost from top to bottom - Town Clerks and all".¹²⁵ Nor was it simply a symbolic cleansing process, aimed at reinforcing the idea of a wholly new beginning in municipal affairs. Liberals were anxious to establish a power-base as extensive as their predecessors, and take full advantage of the privileges of

municipal patronage, including offices in the Council bureaucracy. The corruption entrenched in many of the pre-reform municipalities was supposedly the rationale behind this ruthlessly monopolist approach, although self-interest undoubtedly played a part. Joseph Parkes - one of the driving forces behind the English Municipal Corporations Act - put the Liberal position bluntly in 1835, with the demand that "... our supporters have a right to indulge these influences - it is human nature".¹²⁶

In Glasgow, two long-standing Council officials were perceived as being ripe for removal; one was James Cleland, Superintendent of Public Works since 1814, and the other was James Reddie, who had been appointed ten years earlier as principal Town Clerk. The office of City Chamberlain, the third senior position in the Council hierarchy, had become vacant in 1834 after the resignation of the previous incumbent, James Spreull. Cleland and Reddie had been caricatured in the radical press prior to 1833 as sinister puppet-masters, who were frequently involved in closed dealings over enterprises on behalf of the municipality. While this was clearly an exaggeration, it was true that both men were ambitious, and Cleland in particular had an intricate network of personal connections within the Town Council and leading institutions of the city.¹²⁷ He was a former Deacon Convener, being a member of the Incorporation of Wrights, and had also served as a town

councillor. Cleland had strong Conservative sympathies, to the extent that he was one of the main organisers of the celebration banquet for Sir Robert Peel, held in Glasgow after the Conservative leader had been installed as the University's Lord Rector in 1837.¹²⁸ Reddie was more circumspect about his politics, although his frequent clashes with Liberal councillors after 1833 showed that his leanings were decidedly in the same direction as Cleland.

The mechanism for getting rid of Cleland was one that would be probably classed as constructive dismissal under modern industrial relations legislation. The Council Committee on Public Offices had met early in 1834 to consider suitable action over the vacancy for the City Chamberlain, and how best to fill it. One particularly attractive solution was eventually decided upon, because it not only approved the principle of appointing a new Chamberlain, but had the effect of squeezing out Cleland and saving the Council money. The recommendation of the Committee concluded:¹²⁹

... that the duties attached to the office of Superintendent, and Assistant Superintendent, of Public Works, might with propriety and advantage, be united in the duties falling to be discharged by the Chamberlain. In this way a material saving may be effected of the funds of the Corporation without any detriment to the Public Service.

The recommendation was approved by a majority, and a new job description was drafted for the combined post. Cleland had

already firmly stated that he was not prepared to re-apply for his old job with added responsibilities, and perhaps, at the age of sixty-four and with other interests, he felt that the time was appropriate for him to go. The refusal of the Town Council to sanction any testimonial to Cleland, in recognition of his services, was further indication of the antipathy he could generate, although not all Liberals on the Council shared such negative feelings.¹³⁰ Cleland's successor was quickly appointed; he was John Strang, whose family ran a wine-importing business, but who had hitherto devoted himself to journalism and literary pursuits. Strang, too, was fortunate in his connections, being a self-confessed member of "the Clique" and a personal friend of James Lumsden, one of the central figures in the new Liberal-dominated Council.¹³¹ He was also brother-in-law of William Dixon, a wealthy colliery-owner and ironmaster, who had been elected Liberal councillor for the Fourth Ward in 1833.¹³²

The Council's efforts to remove James Reddie met with considerably more resistance from the Town Clerk, who was not prepared, like Cleland, to accept unsolicited early retirement. The device used by the Council to dispense with Reddie's services took the form of a challenge to past precedent, as if making a declaration of intent that it would be the new Council, and not the old, that dictated the future course of municipal policy. The case against Reddie revolved around his terms of

employment, and in particular whether the office of Town Clerk was a permanent or temporary appointment. In the pre-reform period, Town Clerks had been traditionally appointed on a year to year basis, although in reality - unless gross misdemeanours occurred - they held the job for life. This was a long-standing convention in the Scottish royal burghs until 1833, when reformed Town Councils like Glasgow began to press for a literal interpretation of the regulations, in order that they could establish a mechanism for terminating existing appointments and select candidates of their own choice.

The Liberal town councillors in Glasgow probably thought that they had the force of law on their side when they made the decision to annually appoint the Town Clerk, but they failed to take into account the closing of ranks among the Scottish legal fraternity when it saw one of its members in danger.¹³³ Reddie and his colleagues from the Town Clerk's Office immediately and successfully applied for a bill of suspension and interdict against the Town Council, which had the effect of maintaining the status quo until a hearing could take place in the Court of Session.¹³⁴ This ultimately never occurred; legal counsel advised against proceeding with the case, which was perhaps fortuitous, as similar cases brought before the Court by other burghs were given short shrift by the judges.¹³⁵ In 1837 an appeal to the House of Lords on behalf of the burghs determined a ruling in favour of the Town Clerks,

and a legal precedent was established that Town Clerks in Scotland - though not in England - were to be appointed for life.¹³⁶ As if to reinforce the point, Reddie remained principal Town Clerk of Glasgow until his death in 1852.

With the amalgamation of the positions of City Chamberlain and Superintendent of Public Works in 1834, Reddie and Strang became the two most important civil officers serving Glasgow Town Council. The office of City Chamberlain was directly accountable to the Council, and was of much more recent origin than the Town Clerkship, dating from 1755.¹³⁷ Originally the Chamberlain's remit had been largely financial, but in 1834 the duties had become wider-ranging, because of the merger with the post of Superintendent of Public Works. Areas of responsibility included the maintenance of the Council's books and the rendering of accounts; the superintendence of all Council heritages and properties, such as Glasgow Green; the upkeep of public offices and buildings, notably the City Chambers, City Gaol and Courthouse; and the protection and repair of the Established Churches in the city, of which ten were under the patronage of the Town Council, including the Cathedral.¹³⁸ Some of the more detailed practical work of the Chamberlain was delegated to his assistants, including the Council Officer and Accountant, although following on from the tradition established by James Cleland, the Chamberlain continued to produce "Vital Statistics" of the city's growth and development. Unlike the

Town Clerk, the City Chamberlain received a salary from the Council, which was fixed at £300 per annum in 1834. He had to undertake to devote the whole of his energies to the job, not engaging in trade or business, and he also had to provide substantial financial security to the Town Council. This was common practice at the time, as it helped to protect employers against the possibility of fraud, and ensured that applicants for jobs of responsibility were likely to be men of substance, and thus from the appropriate social background.

Glasgow's Town Clerks continued to wield considerable influence during the post-reform period, although their involvement in judicial work had diminished drastically since the 1820s, when the city's Sheriff Court began to deal with an increasing volume of business previously conducted by the Burgh Court.¹³⁹ By 1833 Glasgow had, in fact, four Town Clerks - two senior and two junior - and James Reddie was known as first Town Clerk to indicate his prime status. Their responsibilities lay in two areas; in one they were servants to the Council, writing the minutes of proceedings and dealing with correspondence and matters arising from meetings. They also acted as advisers, interpreting and invoking the law as directed. The other area of responsibility was more controversial, as it centred upon the statutory duties of the Town Clerks, including the conduct of municipal elections, the custody of public records, and their rôle as judicial assessors

to the Burgh Court. Here the Town Clerks refused to be regarded as servants of the Council, but considered themselves to be carrying out the due process of the law and therefore above the dictates of elected representatives. There was a hazy dividing line between being a servant of the Council and a servant of the law, and astute Town Clerks could sometimes exploit this by claiming to be acting on behalf of more vital national interests, should the situation arise where they were in conflict with the Town Council.¹⁴⁰ With typical Reddie hauteur, Glasgow's first Town Clerk unequivocally stated his opinion regarding such matters in 1843, after accusations that he was using political influence to override Council decisions. Dismissing the case against him, he claimed defiantly, "I never was guided, and never will be guided by the opinions and wishes of the Town Council, either individually or in their corporate capacity".¹⁴¹ This attitude was to characterise relations between Glasgow's councillors and Town Clerks for many decades to come, and was yet another lingering reminder that the reforms of 1833 had not been as fundamental as Liberal supporters would have preferred.

There was a handful of other Council officials who carried out functions deemed to be essential at the time, like the Collector of the Cess, or the City Gaoler, but their rôle - understandably - did not have the same public prestige or influence as the Town Clerk or City Chamberlain. There were

relatively few additions to the Council's establishment prior to the municipal reorganisation of 1846, although some changes were made to increase the efficiency of existing functions. For instance, it was agreed in 1838 to appoint a full-time Chamber Keeper, to ensure that the Council's offices were kept sufficiently clean, warm and comfortable, and - above all - that they were lockfast and secure when not in use.¹⁴² On the whole, however, the Town Council of the period was anxious not to appear to be improvident with money, especially in light of the cautionary example of Edinburgh, whose Council became bankrupt in 1833 after years of accumulating debt.¹⁴³ Liberals were particularly prone to practising economy, and one obvious way of demonstrating thrifty intentions was to cut staff and salaries. The merger of James Cleland's job with that of the City Chamberlain was, in one sense, a back-door dismissal, but it was seen to be wholly justified in financial terms. Following on from this, savings were made at the expense of other Council officers; the Governor of the City Gaol, for example, had his salary reduced in 1834 from £270 to £200 per annum, out of which he had to pay his clerk £52.¹⁴⁴ Much of this stringency was a reaction to the pre-reform period, when the old municipal oligarchies had been popularly depicted as self-indulgent and spendthrift. Significantly, a more generous approach to finance emerged when the Conservative-Evangelical alliance began to consolidate its position, after which time

memories of the past receded, and new statutory obligations compelled the Council to considerably expand its administration.

The range of municipal functions during the period 1833 to 1846 was apparent from the list of Council Standing Committees, which covered a variety of responsibilities, such as Finance and Landed Property; the Green, Public Markets and Tradesmen's Accounts; Churches, Church Yards and Clocks; Law Processes; Courthouse and Gaol; and the Grammar School.¹⁴⁵ The first group of Standing Committees had been instituted in 1790; an early indication of Council responses to financial and administrative pressures. The 1835-36 Royal Commission into the Municipal Corporations of Scotland analysed the extent of this authority in Glasgow, paying particular attention to areas requiring direct Council funding.¹⁴⁶ The most important centred upon the upkeep of the city Churches and the payment of ministers, Burgh Court obligations and the maintenance of penal institutions, and the day-to-day administration of the Town Council and its heritages. On the whole, Glasgow's rate of expenditure was considered to be reasonable by the Commissioners, although they did think that councillors indulged in too many "entertainments".¹⁴⁷

In addition to functions necessitating substantial expense, the Town Council was directly responsible for the public Grammar School of the city, and the Town's Hospital, or poor house. The Council contributed financially towards the running of the

school, although fees were paid by the pupils, but the Town's Hospital was intended to be self-financing by means of compulsory public assessment. There were relatively few directly employed officials to administer all this, and it was usual practice for duties connected with the municipality to be carried out by tacksmen, or lessees. The ordinary collectors of ladle-duties and other forms of taxation were employed in this way, retaining for remuneration a percentage of the monies due to the Council. Public facilities, like the wash-houses on Glasgow Green, were also operated by tacksmen.

The various religious, legal, administrative and charitable functions of the Town Council dated from the post-Reformation era, when the feudal superiority of the royalty was transferred to the Council from the religious hierarchy. Prior to industrialisation, when Glasgow's population was relatively small and the boundaries of the royalty were sufficient to contain the city, there had been no real pressure to expand the areas of municipal responsibility. However, changed economic circumstances from the eighteenth century generally demanded a new rôle for the Council, as the city and neighbouring suburbs attracted numerous incomers and the flow of commerce necessitated improvements to facilitate transportation. A controlling authority was found to be essential, and although the Town Council per se could not act in this capacity, its members could certainly play a prominent part. Additional

agencies with specified functions were thus created, administratively separate from the municipality. The Glasgow Police Board has already been cited as one example, where Council representatives served as ex-officio Police Commissioners from 1800. They were not in a position to control the affairs of the elected Police Boards, and interests often clashed, but the partial responsibility of the councillors in providing services like watching, lighting and cleansing was at least consciously acknowledged by law.

At the same time, because of the limited ability of the Council to raise cash, a variety of Trusts had to be established to oversee "Statute Labour" projects such as road-building, which included all interested parties and often extended in scope outwith the boundaries of the royalty.¹⁴⁸ For example, the Bridge Trust included magistrates from the burghs of Dumbarton, Rutherglen and Renfrew, plus representatives from the appropriate counties. Money for major construction projects, the deepening of the River, and improvement of harbour facilities, was initially raised by borrowing from whatever source was prepared to loan - the Trusts having the legal authority to make such transactions. The intention was that debts would be repaid by money raised through the imposition of tolls or tonnage duties, although - as the examples of Aberdeen and Edinburgh were to prove - good intentions were not always sufficient to stop Trusts and Town Councils from accumulating

debt. However, in Glasgow the commercial importance of efficiently administered Trusts was recognised early, and so financial crises were avoided. After 1833 there was some reorganisation of the functions of the various Trusts; for instance, Statute Labour responsibilities were taken out of the hands of the trustees in 1837, and transferred to the Police Board, while in 1840 the management of river affairs was considerably opened out after pressure from shipowners and ratepayers for a bigger voice in the River and Harbour Trust.¹⁴⁹

Despite such administrative changes, Council business between 1833 and 1846 was not substantially different from the pre-reform period, although the conduct of affairs was often given added drama by the continuing politico-religious rivalries among town councillors. Religion was understandably a contentious issue during the "Ten Years' Conflict" in the Church of Scotland, leading to the Disruption of 1843. Evangelicals in the Established Church were particularly anxious to use municipal influence to alter the system of patronage, hence their keen interest in returning sympathetic candidates at election time. Moreover, the Council had a voice in the proceedings of the General Assembly, through the burgh's traditional right to elect a representative Elder, and Evangelicals tried hard to ensure that their nominee held this position.¹⁵⁰ Ironically, the Evangelicals were sometimes

supported in their efforts by Voluntaryist councillors, not because of any mutual affection between the two groups, but because Voluntaryists were wholly committed to the disestablishment of the Church, and were prepared to support moves which would weaken its authority.¹⁵¹ As tensions heightened, there were latterly strong differences of opinion in the Council over the religious debate, which were to blur allegiances and undermine political unity. Thus, Voluntaryist councillors were often critical of Moderate Churchmen in the Liberal ranks, with many of the more radical elements - such as James Anderson and Alexander Hastie - distrustful of the influence of the closed group of "the Clique" on the Council.¹⁵² On the other hand, there were differences among Church of Scotland Evangelicals over the rôle of Church and State, with the more committed Conservatives refusing to join the Free Church in 1843.

Before the crisis of the Disruption, Evangelical influence was redirecting priorities within Glasgow Town Council, with long-term implications for the future. The sudden concern over the state of the city's clocks in 1839 was one example of the Evangelical desire to make an impression on the public consciousness, and also indicated a switch of policy from the Council's post-reform financial stringency. Glasgow's public clocks were located in the steeples of the city Churches, under municipal patronage, and so it was scarcely a good advertisement

for the religious credibility of councillors if they failed to keep the clocks accurate and in good working order. However, many of the existing clocks needed to be replaced; an expensive task, but ultimately worthwhile, as almost the entire community depended on the public clocks, and would not fail to notice the handsome new time-pieces commissioned by the Council, some with illuminated dials lit by gas.¹⁵³ At a more subtle level, councillors were probably aware of the importance of the clocks to employers, anxious to ensure that the city's growing mass of workers would be able to regulate their activities according to the precise hour of the day. At all events, new city clocks were purchased from 1839, and maintenance arrangements were confirmed two years later with a sole contractor, in an effort to keep the time throughout Glasgow uniform.¹⁵⁴

Another indicator of growing Evangelical influence at the municipal level was the Town Council's declaration of intent in 1839 over what it perceived as the linked problem of intemperance and Sabbath desecration. The initiative had first been taken by Henry Paul - one of the most capable Conservative-Evangelical councillors - who successfully moved that the Council should set up an ad hoc committee to examine the extent of excessive drinking in Glasgow, with a view to making recommendations.¹⁵⁵ There was remarkable unanimity of opinion among councillors on the need for action; Paul's motion was seconded by the Liberal Moderate, James Lumsden, while

radicals like James Turner of Thrushgrove also expressed support for the investigation. The Committee's Report appeared in September 1839 and, according to Callum Brown, "... set the aims of the temperance cause in the city for the next sixty years".¹⁵⁶ The Report identified widespread concern over the payment of wages on a Saturday, which was believed to encourage late-night carousing and debauchery, and rendered the imbibers unfit to service their spiritual needs on the Sabbath. Moreover, the law allowed for Sunday opening of licensed premises, except during the hours of divine service, so that the weekend spiral of drunkenness was able to continue through to the start of the working week. To counter the damaging effects of an apparently over-liberal licensing policy, the Town Council resolved to tighten its interpretation of the law, to ensure that licensed premises actually did close "at a reasonable hour" on Saturdays, and that places of business - especially shops - also shut early.

The Report of 1839 was more an affirmation by the Town Council that it was morally on the side of temperance than a practical framework for immediate action to tackle the root causes of the problem. Nevertheless, it was an important augury for the future, as temperance was to become a dominant issue in municipal affairs.¹⁵⁷ Housing was another area of public concern which fitted into this category, with tentative statements being made in the municipal context from the late

1830s. Of course, public health campaigners had long testified to the damaging effects of squalor and overcrowding in the slums of the Gallowgate, the Bridgegate and Saltmarket, although an appropriate means of effectively tackling the problem had so far eluded the civic and other authorities.¹⁵⁷ In 1839 Henry Paul stated the dilemma which confronted the Council:¹⁵⁸

... in my humble judgment, a better state of things will never be brought to take place, until the many loathsome hovels of the poor be entirely removed, and until a more free and properly ventilated atmosphere be introduced into their dwellings. How this can be best and most effectively accomplished, I shall not presume to determine, but it is assuredly a subject well entitled to the best consideration of those who feel an interest in the prosperity of our City ...

The Town Council did support some practical regulatory measures by setting aside small sums of money to demolish ruinous properties which would otherwise have constituted a public danger.¹⁵⁹ However, councillors at this time were generally not inclined to oversee any comprehensive programme of slum clearance as a more efficient alternative to private enterprise, and it was not until the 1860s that such an idea became a realistic - albeit contentious - proposition.¹⁶⁰

Indeed, the Council initially pinned its hopes on the operation of market forces in housing, to the extent that in 1845 it had enthusiastically supported moves by a number of prominent citizens to form a joint stock company, under the imposing name of the "Society for Improving the Dwellings of the

Working Classes in Glasgow", which aimed at erecting model residences on "several eligible sites".¹⁶¹ The Council's enthusiasm was scarcely surprising, given the lofty claims of the Society's Provisional Committee, which included no fewer than ten sitting councillors.¹⁶² The proposed Company actually formed part of a much grander plan for redeveloping the city centre, which was intended to appeal directly to Glasgow's businessmen and traders. The idea was to clear the slums, widen the streets to facilitate traffic, then build residences and commercial premises - the latter conveniently located in "the vicinity of the Exchange". Unfortunately for the promoters of the scheme, the companies were floated at a time when "Railway Mania" was at its height, and cash for other speculative ventures was thinly spread around. Although "a sure and large profit" was offered to investors in the Society's prospectus, and the Town Council considered buying a number of shares, the proposed company was not able to get off the ground.¹⁶³ By 1846 the Glasgow Herald was remarking that the city's housing problems were back to square one, with no immediate problem of solution: however, as will be subsequently explained, the general plans were never wholly abandoned.¹⁶⁴

While the proposed city improvement plan proved abortive, the Town Council was more meaningfully involved with two company enterprises supplying water and gas to the citizens of Glasgow. The Glasgow Water Company and the Glasgow Gas Light Company had

been established in 1806 and 1817 respectively. It was important for the Council to have a say in their management, in order to ensure that profits would not override the provision of services and that costs to consumers would remain as low as possible. A second water company, the Cranstonhill Waterworks, had been established in 1808 to compete with the existing concern, but by the 1830s both companies had not proved to be financially successful, and resolved to amalgamate.¹⁶⁵ This move met with bitter public opposition, because it was widely believed that competition was healthy, as it lowered prices and avoided monopoly control. The Town Council, as shareholders, initially withheld consent for the merger, although this occurred only after protracted debate in the City Chambers. However, the viability of both companies was at stake, with serious implications for the welfare of the community, and so the subject of merger was revived again in 1835, when the Council appointed a committee to negotiate with the water companies for a settlement favourable to all. Should this have proved impossible, the committee was empowered to apply to Parliament for authority to purchase the water undertakings, and have them vested in a body of public trustees.¹⁶⁶ The idea of public control was, of course, a last resort, and after further negotiations in 1838 the two companies were allowed to merge, with the strict proviso that prices had to be pegged. Nevertheless, the water supply continued to be a topic of

serious public concern, and arguments for public control resurfaced in 1845, not to abate.

Unlike the competing water interests in Glasgow, the Glasgow Gas Light Company originally had a monopoly. It was a thriving concern, expanding rapidly as a result of industrial demand from the 1820s, but its unchallenged status as sole supplier of the city's gas brought sustained criticism. In particular, it was alleged that the company was using creative accountancy to avoid the obligation to lower prices should dividends to shareholders rise above a legally-imposed ceiling of ten per cent.¹⁶⁷ The Town Council became directly involved when, in 1842, a rival gas company applied for incorporated status via Parliament. Among the promoters of the new company was James Lumsden, the leading Liberal councillor, who argued vigorously that competition would help consumers as it would lower prices.¹⁶⁸ As shareholders in the Glasgow Gas Light Company, the Council had a right to object to the establishment of a rival, but eventually chose not to exercise this prerogative. Some Conservatives were unhappy that Lumsden was able to steer Council support so smoothly in favour of the proposed Gas Bill, but as nobody on the Council voiced objections to the idea of competition, and evidence indicated that the existing company was misusing its profits, the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow was established in 1843.¹⁶⁹ Yet public control of gas remained a serious option for Glasgow Town Council, particularly after the successful

handling of the Loch Katrine water project during the 1850s. By this time, the high price of gas and allegations of mismanagement were causing considerable public resentment against the private gas companies, and a vocal "Cheap Gas Movement" had emerged in the city.

From 1840 priorities in the Town Council were directed towards the vexed question of boundary expansion, and the convolutions of the debate leading to the 1846 Extension Act will be described in detail in the next section of this thesis. The effects of the municipal reorganisation were to be much further reaching than in 1833; for instance, Police Board functions were united under overall municipal control, while the financial basis of Council administration was restructured. Above all, the territory of the municipality became coterminous with the Parliamentary constituency, giving Glasgow a clear geographical identity, and rendering the old burgh boundaries obsolete. Although political considerations played an important part, the 1846 reorganisation was a belated rationalisation of the municipal function, shaping the civic profile in a recognisably modern form. The urgency of political demands in 1833 meant that the Burgh Reform Act had really been a stop-gap measure, aimed at appeasing those excluded from the municipal power-base and offering them the appropriate mechanism for assuming control. The need for administrative reform was acknowledged with the establishment of the Royal Commission into

the Scottish Municipal Corporations, but not yet acted upon. The years between 1833 and 1846 thus represented a transition process, which cleared the way for Glasgow Town Council to shed some of its less relevant burghal obligations, and prepare itself to cope more maturely with growing urban pressures.

References

1. Quoted in John Strang, Glasgow and its Clubs: or, Glimpses of the Condition, Manners, Characters, and Oddities of the City, during the Past and Present Centuries, (Glasgow, 1864 edition; first published 1853), page 441. Strang was giving an account of the imaginary Sma' Weft Club, which featured in the Scots Times between 1829 and 1833. The Club met in a Saltmarket tavern to perform humorous sketches and lampoons against the city's establishment.
2. Royal burghs originally received certain privileges from the Crown, notably foreign trading rights, in return for levying a tax - or cess - on property owners. By the early nineteenth century the cess had become directly payable to the Government. Jurisdiction in royal burghs was carried out by the magistrates, or bailies, on behalf of the Crown. For a useful general background to Scotland's burghal history, see Craig Mair, Mercat Cross and Tolbooth: Understanding Scotland's Old Burghs, (Edinburgh, 1988), especially pages 11-14.
3. See Parliamentary Debates, vol. 40, (1st Series), 6th May 1819, for George Canning's argument along these lines in the House of Commons. Article XXI of the Act of Union ambiguously declared, "That the rights and privileges of the Royal Burghs of Scotland, as they now are, do remain entire after the Union and notwithstanding thereof", and this was used by opponents of reform as a reason for resisting municipal change. Quoted in James Cleland, The Rise and Progress of The City of Glasgow: Comprising an Account of its Public Buildings, Charitable Institutions, and Other Establishments till the Year 1820, (Glasgow, 1829), page 45.
4. Cleland, *ibid.*, page 43, gives a list of the burgh groupings in the unreformed Parliament.
5. Theodora Pagan, The Convention of the Royal Burghs of Scotland, (Glasgow, 1926), pages 94-95.
6. William Mackay Mackenzie, The Scottish Burghs, (Edinburgh, 1949), pages 121-122.
7. Jenny Wormald, Court, Kirk and Community: Scotland, 1470-1625, (London, 1981), page 46.
8. *Ibid.*, page 48.
9. See the Glasgow section of the Municipal Corporations (Scotland): Local Reports of the [Royal] Commissioners, Part II:

from Glasgow to Wigtown Inclusive, PP., 1836, XXIII, pages 3-5.

10. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 20-21.

11. The Letter of Guildry is reproduced in a volume published by the Merchants' House of Glasgow, View of the Merchants' House of Glasgow: Containing Historical Notices of its Origin, Constitution, and Property, and of the Charitable Foundations which it Administers, (Glasgow, 1866), pages 59-81.

12. Glasgow's burghal constitution is reproduced in Copy of the Acts of the Town Council of Glasgow, Concerning the Set of the Said City, (Glasgow, 1791), SRA D-TC 14.1.4, MP 4-1.

13. Pagan, op. cit., page 73.

14. Robert Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1809-1822, vol. X, (Glasgow, 1915), page 488. Glasgow's fourteen incorporated trades were the Bakers [Baxters], Barbers, Bonnet-makers and Dyers, Coopers, Cordiners, Fleshers, Gardeners, Hammermen, Maltmen, Masons, Skinners, Tailors, Weavers, and Wrights.

15. James Cleland, Annals of Glasgow: Comprising an Account of the Public Buildings, Charities, and the Rise and Progress of the City, (Glasgow, 1816), vol. I, page 48.

16. Cleland, The Rise and Progress of the City of Glasgow, op. cit., pages 46-47.

17. The five methods of taxation are described in detail in the Municipal Corporations (Scotland) - Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., pages 21-26.

18. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 33-34.

19. See Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 21st January 1834, pages 215-216, SRA C1.1.59, for a reference to problems in connection with the refusal of traders to pay the ladle duties.

20. The individual amounts were £141 15s 3d from burgess entries, £1,668 from petty customs, and £860 from the impost on ale and beer. See the Municipal Corporations (Scotland) - Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., pages 23-26.

21. Stanley Horsfall Turner, The History of Local Taxation in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1908), pages 143-144. Also, Peter Mackenzie, editor of the Reformers' Gazette, was a vocal critic of Glasgow's taxation system, believing it to be "unequally and capriciously" applied. See the Municipal Corporations

(Scotland) - Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., page 12.

22. The early burgh reform movement is described in detail in Henry W. Meikle, Scotland and the French Revolution, (Glasgow, 1912), pages 15-33, and Pagan, op. cit., pages 95-96. See also Robert Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1781-95, vol. VIII, (Glasgow, 1913), for the decisions of the Town Council not to support the burgh reform movement. For example, pages 160-161, where the Council agreed in April 1785, "... to authorise and appoint the [town] clerk in their name to write to the Lord Advocate for Scotland, Member of Parliament for this city, to oppose any application that shall be made to parliament for an alteration of the sett of the royal boroughs in Scotland ...".

23. William Ferguson, Scotland: 1689 to the Present, (Edinburgh, 1968), page 246.

24. Henry Cockburn, Memorials of His Times, (Edinburgh, 1856), page 320. Cockburn comments, "When the struggle began, and for many years afterwards, the reformers would have been content with such a relaxation of the existing system, as would have kept the political power of the Tory party nearly as safe as it was under self-election".

25. 39 and 40 George III, cap. 88, [1800], "An Act for Extending the Royalty of the City of Glasgow over certain adjacent Lands; for paving, lighting, and cleansing the Streets; for regulating the Police, and appointing Officers and Watchmen; for dividing the City into Wards, and appointing Commissioners; and for raising Funds, and giving certain Powers to the Magistrates and Council, and Town and Dean of Guild Courts, for the above and other purposes". Because town councils had no power of rating to provide for the much-needed improvements in policing, the Police Acts were a useful mechanism for overcoming the problem. However, see pages 92-124 of this thesis for a fuller discussion about the Police Boards.

26. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 113.

27. Ibid.

28. See page 96 of this thesis.

29. See section LXII of the Glasgow Police Act, as cited above.

30. For the background to events surrounding the financial problems of certain town councils, see the Report from the Select Committee into the Royal Burghs of Scotland, PP., 1819, VI, especially pages 9-20 (for Edinburgh) and pages 21-26 (for

Aberdeen). As a result of Aberdeen's bankruptcy, the Government grudgingly acquiesced in 1819 to a Parliamentary motion for the establishment of a Select Committee to investigate the Scottish royal burghs. The motion was moved by Lord Archibald Hamilton, MP for Lanarkshire, described by Henry Cockburn as "one of the very few active and independent Scotch members". See Cockburn, *op. cit.*, page 323.

31. *Ibid.*, page 4.

32. The text of the statement is reproduced in Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1809-1822, *op. cit.*, page 488.

33. *Ibid.*

34. *Ibid.*, pages 488-489.

35. 3 George IV, cap. 91, [1822], "An Act for regulating the mode of accounting for the Common Good and Revenues of the Royal Burghs of Scotland". By this Act, town councils were required to keep properly audited accounts, to be made available for annual inspection by the burgesses, and imposed restrictions on the contracting of debts and the alienation of property belonging to the common good. The Act - generally known as Sir William Rae's Act - was not repealed until 1900.

36. Robert Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1823-1833, vol. XI, (Glasgow 1916), page 401.

37. Quoted from John Galt, The Provost, (Oxford University Press edition, 1982; first published 1822), page 152. The Provost, like all good satires, is sufficiently close to reality to reveal much about the unreformed municipal system in Scotland. Indeed, Galt based many of the exploits of the novel's ambitious main character, Provost Pawkie, on the activities of the magistrates in his home town of Irvine. Lord Archibald Hamilton, in moving the successful motion for the institution of the Select Committee to investigate the royal burghs, said that the burgesses of Irvine had complained to him, "... that they had no more influence in the election of their own magistrates, than in electing an Emperor of Morocco". See Parliamentary Debates, volume 40, (1st Series), 6th May 1819.

38. Scots Times, 16th July 1825.

39. See *ibid.*, 17th October 1829, for "Noctes Sma' Weftianae", the regular satirical column dealing with the affairs of the Sma' Weft Club.

40. See the Scots Times, 30th March 1830, for an article, "Glasgow Burgh Jobbing Disgraceful to Parliament", where councillors and Council officials alike are accused of closed dealings over enterprises promoted on behalf of the municipality.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., 20th March 1830.
43. James Cleland in Annals of Glasgow, op. cit., vol. I, page 50, explains the intricacies of the election system in the Merchants' House.
44. See the Glasgow Herald, 1st November 1833, for the division of votes for the directorate of the Merchants' House, indicating "a clean sweep for the Conservatives" and total exclusion of "Liberal" contenders.
45. Scots Times, 15th October 1825.
46. Ibid., 24th April 1830.
47. Ibid., 27th April 1830.
48. See page 762 for the residential pattern of Glasgow's town councillors between 1841 and 1911. For the specific background to the development of Blythswood, see John R. Kellett, "Property Speculators and the Building of Glasgow, 1780-1830", in the Scottish Journal of Political Economy, vol. 8, October 1961, pages 219-221. The ubiquitous James Cleland was involved in the early stages of financing the venture. For some caustic comments about the Campbells of Blythswood, see Thomas Johnston, Our Scots Noble Families, (Glasgow, 1918), pages 12-18. Johnston accused the Campbell family of dubiously acquiring part of Glasgow's Common Good at knockdown prices, and then reaping a fortune as land values increased during the nineteenth century.
49. For the anti-annexationist point of view, see the outraged letter from "A Burgess", in the Scots Times, 31st October 1829. For pro-annexationist views, see the pamphlet, Remarks by Certain Feuars Favourable to the Annexation Bill, (Glasgow, 1830), SRA D-TC 14.1.5, MP 5-248.
50. Scots Times, 24th October 1829.
51. Ibid., 20th March 1830. See also J.M. Reid, The History of the Merchants' House of Glasgow, (Glasgow, n.d., but c 1950), page 38.

52. Scots Times, 20th April 1830.

53. The terms of the new arrangements for Blythswood are contained in Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1823-1833, op. cit., pages 677-678.

54. See Ferguson, op. cit., page 278, for an assessment of Finlay as an MP.

55. Scots Times, 7th August 1830.

56. Ibid., 24th August 1830.

57. Ibid. The voting was evenly split, with Rutherglen and Dumbarton supported Finlay, while Renfrew and Glasgow supported Campbell. However, Finlay was defeated on the casting vote of the Glasgow delegate, who held this privilege because the election meeting was being hosted by Glasgow Town Council. Finlay later pointed out that if his supporters within the various town councils were individually totalled together, he had actually obtained eighty-four councillors' votes to Campbell's thirty-five.

58. Scots Times, 16th October 1830. The speaker was the Dean of Guild, James Ewing, in an address to the Merchants' House.

59. Biographical information on Ewing is contained in Reid, op. cit., pages 39-40, and James Gurlay (ed.), The Provosts of Glasgow from 1609 to 1832, (Glasgow, 1942), pages 135-136. For a more jaundiced contemporary assessment, see Peter Mackenzie's remarks in the Reformers' Gazette, 6th and 13th October 1832. Although supported by the Scots Times as a Parliamentary candidate in Glasgow, Ewing was bitterly attacked by the radical Mackenzie, who was then Secretary to the Glasgow Political Union. Ewing's religious connections are discussed in Stewart J. Brown, Thomas Chalmers and the Godly Commonwealth in Scotland, (Oxford, 1982), pages 122-124. Ewing had been instrumental in obtaining the ministry of St. John's Parish Church for Thomas Chalmers in 1818, where the latter's controversial experiment in poor relief management was conducted.

[It should be noted that the term "Evangelical" in this thesis refers specifically to the Chalmersian wing of the Church of Scotland prior to the Disruption of 1843. The term "evangelical" - without the capital "e" - is used in a broader sense, to include Free Church and Voluntarist activists post-1843, as well as remaining supporters within the Established Church.]

60. Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, 1823-1833, op. cit., pages 404-405.

61. Fiona Montgomery, "Glasgow and the Struggle for Parliamentary Reform, 1830-1832", in the Scottish Historical Review, vol. LXI, 1982, pages 130-131.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., page 142.
64. See Strang, op. cit., pages 451-452, for a list of leading "Clique" activists.
65. Glasgow Herald, 29th March 1833.
66. George Crawford, A Sketch of the Rise and Progress of the Trades' House of Glasgow: Its Constitution, Funds, and Bye-Laws, (Glasgow, 1858), pages 111-112.
67. Ibid., pages 113-115. There was a tentative move to resolve the difficulty by extending the municipal franchise to all burgesses who did not qualify under the £10 property requirement, but this was dismissed by Jeffrey on the grounds that burgesses would obtain the vote too easily on payment of a "trifling fee", which would "put an end to anything like respectability in the municipal bodies". Quoted in Parliamentary Debates, volume 16, (3rd Series), 26th June 1833.
68. Glasgow Herald, 4th October 1833.
69. The term "municipality" has been used in this thesis to cover those areas of the city where electors had the right to vote for Glasgow town councillors from November 1833. The boundaries of Glasgow between 1832 to 1846 conformed to a variety of criteria; thus, there was the traditional royalty of Glasgow; the Parliamentary constituency; the Parish divisions, (population figures for the Census were based on these); the Police districts and wards; and the municipality, as defined by the Burgh Reform Act of 1833.
70. The decision is recorded in Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 17th June 1841, page 157, SRA C1.1.62.
71. F. Marian McNeill, The Silver Bough, Volume IV: The Local Festivals of Scotland, (Glasgow, 1968), pages 244-246; J. Cunnison and J.B.S. Gilfillan (eds.), The Third Statistical Account of Scotland: Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1958), pages 89-90; and Robert Renwick, Glasgow Memorials, (Glasgow, 1908), page 73. The perambulation of the burgh boundaries traditionally took place in May each year, although by the early nineteenth century the practice seems to have occurred only occasionally. The last recorded perambulation was held on 4th May 1841, taking from six o'clock in the morning until half past five in the evening, and

it was here that Council representatives became acutely aware of the need for an accurate and up-to-date map of the city. Until 1726, another ceremony - involving the entire community, and probably similar to the surviving Common Ridings of the Borders - took place at the end of June. It was stopped in Glasgow because of unruly behaviour among the crowds.

72. Cunnison and Gilfillan, *op. cit.*, page 43. The territory added under the Police Act of 1800 was legally deemed to be part of the royalty, with the proviso that the system of land tenure (ie. feudal superiority) remained unaltered.

73. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 26.

74. 3 and 4 William IV, cap. 76, [1833], "An Act to alter and amend the laws for the election of the Magistrates and Councils of the Royal Burghs of Scotland". See Section 1 of the Act. The area of the royalty that lay outwith the Parliamentary constituency included such areas as Possil, Sighthill, Cowlaers, Port Dundas and parts of Springburn. Reasons for their original exclusion were officially explained as to do with the good natural boundary afforded to the city by the Monklands and Forth and Clyde Canals, although another explanation may have been the need to preserve the Liberal-Whig majority in the County seat of Lanarkshire. See pages 125-126 of this thesis for a fuller explanation.

75. See the Glasgow Herald, 2nd September 1833, for the official announcement of the intention of the Commissioners.

76. Figures are quoted in *ibid.*, 28th October 1833, and Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 63.

77. See, for instance, the Glasgow Arcus, 31st October 1833, for a particularly lively meeting in the Fourth Ward, where there was a noisy dispute as to whether Robert Grahame (Liberal) or Henry Paul (Conservative) should take the Chair.

78. Peter Mackenzie identifies the political allegiances of municipal candidates in the Reformers' Gazette, 2nd November 1833, adding his own trenchant remarks about their character.

79. Voting figures appear in Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 6th November 1833, pages 100-103, SRA C1.1.59.

80. *Ibid.*, 8th November 1833, page 112.

81. John Tweed (publisher), Biographical sketches of the Hon. the Lord Provosts of Glasgow, 1833-1883, with Appendix, (Glasgow, 1883), pages 16 and 21.

82. Hennock, op. cit. page 185.
83. See the introduction to Derek Fraser (ed.), Municipal Reform and the Industrial City, (Leicester, 1982), page 2.
84. Ibid.
85. Tweed, op. cit., page 19.
86. See pages 684-725 for fuller details about the occupational background of Glasgow's town councillors.
87. For example, James Lumsden and Hugh Tennent were both matriculated merchants, but respectively belonged to the Incorporation of Hammermen and Incorporation of Maltmen.
88. John Oswald Mitchell, Old Glasgow Essays. (Glasgow, 1905), pages 338-342, has a biographical essay about Dunlop, originally used as his obituary in the Glasgow Herald, 23rd January 1893.
89. For information about Henry Brock, see C.W. Munn, Clydesdale Bank: the First One Hundred and Fifty Years, (Glasgow, 1988), pages 315-316.
90. For brief biographical notes on Sandford, see Strang, op. cit., page 455.
91. See R.H. Stevenson, The Chronicles of Edinburgh: from its Foundation in AD 617 to AD 1851, (Edinburgh, n.d., but c.1851), pages 257-258, and Tweed, op. cit., pages 43-45 of the Appendix. In both Edinburgh and Glasgow the surgeons and barbers belonged to the same trade Incorporation until the eighteenth century, when conflicts arose over the growing professional status of surgeons. In Glasgow, the surgeons eventually withdrew from the Incorporation, leaving it wholly under the control of the barbers, while in Edinburgh the reverse occurred, and the surgeons took the initiative. In 1778 the Edinburgh Incorporation was renamed the Royal College of Surgeons.
92. W.H. Marwick, "Municipal Politics in Victorian Edinburgh", from The Book of the Old Edinburgh Club, vol. XXXIII, part 1, 1969, page 37.
93. The four representatives from the 1832 Town Council re-elected in 1833 were James Campbell, William Gilmour, Henry Paul and John Small. The other ten from the 1832 Town Council who re-emerged between 1833 and 1846 were William Brown, Hugh Cogan, Robert Dalglish, James Hutchison, John Leadbetter, Archibald McLellan, William McLean, James Martin, John Neil and William Wilson.

94. See the Glasgow Herald, 13th November 1837, for an account of events leading up to the controversy, and the division of votes. Peter Mackenzie, in Old Reminiscences of Glasgow and the West of Scotland, (Glasgow, 1868), vol. III, pages 432-439, gives a retrospective analysis.
95. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 22nd August 1839, pages 146-155, and 6th November 1840, page 456, SRA C1.1.62.
96. Peter Mackenzie, op. cit., page 433.
97. Callum G. Brown, Religion and the Development of an Urban Society: Glasgow, 1780-1914, unpublished Ph.D Thesis, (University of Glasgow, 1981), page 217.
98. Dunlop stood as a Liberal candidate in 1841 for the Buteshire constituency, in a deliberate attempt to bring pressure on the Conservatives over the issue of patronage in the Church of Scotland, or "Non-Intrusionism" as it was more generally known. He was unsuccessful in the election, although he caused anxiety among the Conservative opposition who feared that their candidate would lose a hitherto safe seat. This is an example of Dunlop placing religious priorities above political allegiances, and indicates the rapidly growing division between Evangelical and Conservative interests. See I.G.C. Hutchison, A Political History of Scotland, 1832-1924: Parties, Elections and Issues, (Edinburgh, 1986), pages 24-25.
99. See Section XXII of the Burgh Reform Act, op. cit. Edinburgh, Aberdeen, Dundee and Perth also fell into this category.
100. Ibid., Section XIV.
101. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 17th November 1837. The councillor was the Dean of Guild, William Brown.
102. Ibid., 16th October 1837. Despite the challenge to his candidacy, McGavin stood for re-election in the First Ward and topped the poll.
103. See Hutchison, op. cit., pages 9-11, for examples of this practice. It would appear that Conservatives were more prone to challenging electoral qualifications via the law, although this was probably due to their superior organisation in the 1830s. Glasgow Conservatives, Hutchison observes, ran a particularly efficient electoral machine at this time.
104. Liberals also attempted to use the law against their opponents in the 1830s, as the example of the 1837 Lord Provost controversy reveals. This general recourse to the law was

popular partly because the Burgh Reform Act was a wholly new piece of legislation, and no precedents had yet been set over its provisions. With the establishment of these over time, they became accepted electoral practice, and the number of legal challenges subsided.

105. See Schedule F of the Burgh Reform Act, *op. cit.* Also William Mackay Mackenzie, *op. cit.*, page 185. There were nine out of the sixty-six royal burghs which fell into this category.

106. See Parliamentary Debates, volume 16, (3rd Series), 26th June 1833, for the comments of Francis Jeffrey, Lord Advocate for Scotland, in the Committee stage of the Burgh Reform Bill.

107. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 12th April 1833. According to the same source, the majority of merchants were non-resident within the municipality, and most were able to vote because of business qualifications. On the other hand, although most members of trade incorporations resided within the municipality, a sizeable section were excluded from the vote because they did not meet the appropriate property qualification.

108. *Ibid.* This figure is perhaps an under-estimation, as the number of voters in the forthcoming municipal elections had not been formally assessed in April 1833, and the Herald was making calculations on an assumed total of 4,000.

109. Out of the thirty-two councillors returned in 1833, sixteen had put themselves forward that year in the elections for the thirty-six Directors for the Merchants' House. Only James Campbell, the Conservative, was successful. See the list of candidates in the Glasgow Herald, 1st November 1833.

110. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 70. The authors here put a different interpretation on the burghship requirement of the Burgh Reform Act, suggesting that it entitled councillors to demand burgh entry, rather than compelled it. The wording of Section XIV of the Act does not bear out this interpretation, however.

111. Nevertheless, during the post-1945 period, Glasgow Corporation's ruling Labour administration began to lose ground to the rival Progressives, and by 1949 there was only a marginal difference in the number of councillors supporting either side. It was about this time that Labour revived a sustained, but unsuccessful, campaign to remove the Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener from their influential ex-officio positions.

112. Another reason for allowing the burgh institutions to retain a direct input into municipal affairs was because they held the feudal superiority over lands within the Glasgow

Parliamentary boundary. It was thought to be easier for the purposes of incorporating such lands into the city if the Town Council continued to work with the institutions, rather than sever all connections. Thus, the Merchants' House had superiority over the land upon which Glasgow's Necropolis was laid out in 1833, and the Trades' House was superior over an area immediately south of the River, known as Tradeston. The Necropolis was eventually added to the city in 1843.

113. The result was:

J. Ewing	3,214
J. Oswald	2,838
<hr/>	
Sir D.K. Sandford	2,168
J. Crawford	1,850
J. Douglas	1,340
J. Dixon	995

All candidates supported the principle of reform, and - with the exception of Ewing - professed unequivocally Liberal sentiments. Sandford later switched his allegiance to the Conservatives.

114. Reformers' Gazette, 2nd November 1833. Mackenzie's dislike of Ewing, apart from being party political, stemmed from Ewing's rôle in the Radical War of 1820, when he was foreman of the jury which condemned James Wilson to death.

115. Ibid.

116. For the political implications of the events leading to the Disruption, and an explanation of the relationship between Evangelicals and Voluntarists, see G.I.T. Machin, "The Disruption and British Politics, 1834-43", in Scottish Historical Review, vol. LI, 1972, pages 20-51. Also, Stewart J. Brown's biography of Thomas Chalmers, op. cit., lucidly manages to place Scottish Evangelicalism in its social, philosophical and ideological context.

117. Hutchison, op. cit., page 18.

118. Stewart J. Brown, op. cit., pages 221-222.

119. Ibid., page 222.

120. J. Smith, Recollections of James Turner, Esq. of Thrushgrove, (Glasgow, 1854), page 88.

121. David A. Teviotdale, Glasgow Parliamentary Constituency, 1832-46, unpublished B. Litt Thesis, (University of Glasgow),

1963, page 160.

122. James Maclehose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, (Glasgow, 1886), vol. I, pages 72 and 175.

123. Hennock, op. cit., page 186.

124. A quote from William Gilmour, made at the inaugural meeting of the reformed Town Council, 8th November 1833. See Tweed, op. cit., page 6.

125. Quoted in Asa Briggs, The Age of Improvement, 1783-1867, (London, 1959), page 276. The author of the remark was Joseph Parkes.

126. Quoted in G.B.A.M. Finlayson, "The Politics of Municipal Reform, 1835", in the English Historical Review, vol. LXXI, 1966, page 685. Although the article specifically relates to England and Wales, Whig-Liberal ideas about the administration of reformed local government were much the same in Scotland.

127. See the article, "James Cleland, LL.D (1770-1840): the Distinguished Statist", (no author credited), in the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce Journal, July 1971, pages 289-291.

128. See Cleland's detailed description of the occasion in his book, Description of the Banquet in Honour of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart., MP, Lord Rector of the University of Glasgow, 13th January 1837, (Glasgow, 1837). The banquet catered for 3,500, and diners included virtually everybody of any social significance in the west of Scotland who supported the Conservatives, including a number of Glasgow town councillors.

129. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 1st April 1834, page 322, and 8th April 1834, pages 326-328, SRA C1.1.59.

130. Ibid., 25th May 1834, page 381. Andrew McGeorge, a Liberal supporter, moved unsuccessfully for Cleland's testimonial.

131. See Tweed, op. cit., page 88. Strang and Lumsden visited Germany together in 1831. Strang was the author of the famous book of anecdotes, Glasgow and its Clubs, op. cit., where he wrote about the Crow Club, formed in 1832 to campaign for the return of James Oswald and James Crawford as MPs for the city. The Crow Club centred around "the Clique", or what Strang classed as a group of "old steady Whigs", and he named the most prominent leaders, including himself and James Lumsden.

132. Maclehose, op. cit., vol. I, page 105. Dixon was married

to Strang's sister.

133. For the original decision of the Town Council to pursue annual appointments, see Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 31st December 1833, pages 175-179, SRA C1.1.59.

134. *Ibid.*, 23rd January 1834, pages 198-202.

135. Glasgow Herald, 6th October 1834 and 1st January 1837. Legal opinion supported Town Clerks being appointed ad vitam aut culpam, (ie. for life or till fault), because no Town Council could legally operate without a Town Clerk. It was argued that if Councils were given the power to regularly terminate the appointment of their Town Clerks, this would result in a dangerously destabilising situation which would be against the public interest, particularly if it could be shown that councillors were behaving in an arbitrary and unreasonable fashion. It might also create the undesirable precedent that a Council could refuse to appoint a Town Clerk altogether.

136. See James D. Marwick, Observations on the Law and Practice in Regard to Municipal Elections and the Conduct of the Business of Town Councils and Commissioners of Police in Scotland, (Edinburgh, 1879), pages 347-350, for the legal background to the Lords' ruling. For the English dimension, see Finlayson, *op. cit.*, pages 685-686.

137. For a brief history of the post of City Chamberlain, see Maclehose, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pages 305-308.

138. For a complete job description, see Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 10th April 1834, pages 341-345. SRA C1.1.59.

139. See pages 501-503.

140. See Reddie's letter to the Town Council, dated 11th April 1843, where he explains what he believes to be his municipal responsibilities. Reproduced in the Glasgow Herald, 6th June 1843.

141. Quoted from *ibid.*

142. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 6th March 1838, pages 432-433, SRA C1.1.61.

143. See A.J. Youngson, The Making of Classical Edinburgh, 1750-1840, (Edinburgh, 1966), for the background to Edinburgh's bankruptcy. Also, Stevenson, *op. cit.*, pages 232-236.

144. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 17th April 1834, page 357, SRA C1.1.59.

145. The evolution of Glasgow Town Council's committee structure from 1790 is explained in Strathclyde Regional Archives, "Glasgow Corporation Committees, Trusts and Departments", SRA Administrative Notes, no. 13.

146. Municipal Corporations (Scotland) - Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., pages 9-11.

147. Ibid.

148. According to *ibid.*, pages 12-20, the Trusts in 1833 were: the River and Harbour Trust; Port Glasgow Harbour Trust; Lighthouse Trust; Bridge Trust; and Market Trust. There was also the Statute Labour Trust.

149. For the Statute Labour Trust, see Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 128; for the River and Harbour Trust, (or River Improvement Trust, as it was also known), see John F. Riddell, Clyde Navigation: a History of the Development and Deepening of the River Clyde, (Edinburgh, 1979), pages 113-115.

150. They had some success in this direction up to 1841 when an election took place for representative Elder, and the Evangelical Richard Kidston was narrowly defeated by Andrew Rankin, a nominee from outwith the Town Council. See Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 2nd April 1841, page 541, SRA C1.1.62.

151. Callum Brown, op. cit., pages 220-222.

152. Teviotdale, op. cit., pages 194-205, discusses the waning of the old "Burgher Aristocracy" in Glasgow, and changes in the city's industrial and commercial base, which contributed to the new mood among the younger generation.

153. See Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 23rd July 1840, pages 388-390, SRA C1.1.62, for an interim Report on the progress of replacing the public clocks.

154. *Ibid.*, 7th January 1841, pages 506-508.

155. See the Glasgow Herald, 23rd March 1838, for a report of Town Council discussions on Bailie Paul's motion.

156. Callum Brown, op. cit., page 224. The Report appears in Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 19th September 1839, pages 180-186, SRA C1.1.62.

157. See A.K. Chalmers (ed.), Public Health Administration in Glasgow: a Memorial Volume of the Writings of James Burn Russell, (Glasgow, 1905), pages 1-26, for an account of the early public health movement in Glasgow. For a more recent

- analysis, see Stephanie M. Blackenden, The Development of Public Health Administration in Glasgow, 1842-1872, unpublished Ph.D Thesis, (University of Edinburgh, 1976), especially pages 32-50.
158. Quoted in Chalmers, op. cit., page 8.
159. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 20th June 1839, page 114, SRA C1.1.62. The sum of money approved was £150.
160. See pages 294-330.
161. For the prospectus of the company, see the Glasgow Herald, 5th September 1845.
162. See *ibid.* The councillors were James Lumsden, James Anderson, William Brodie, Alexander Hastie, John Leadbetter, Andrew Liddell, David McKinlay, George Ord, John Wilson and John Whitehead.
163. Quoted in *ibid.*, 8th September 1845. See the prospectus of the Glasgow Improvement Joint Stock Company, which was a separate venture from the Society for Improving the Dwellings of the Working Classes, but had much the same personnel involved in its Provisional Committee.
164. *Ibid.*, 16th February 1846. See pages 297-300 of this thesis for later developments.
165. See pages 231-237.
166. See pages 232-235.
167. See Glasgow Town Council, First Report of the Commissioners for the Examination of the Glasgow Gas Light Company's Books and Accounts, (Glasgow, 1835), SRA D-TC 14.1.18, MP 18-215, for an account of the Gas Company's history and the background to the growing public concern over its financial arrangements.
168. James Lumsden's various business interests are listed in J.M. Reid, The History of Clydesdale Bank, 1838-1938, (Glasgow, 1938), pages 43-45.
169. Glasgow Herald, 17th March 1843. However, see page 396 of this thesis; two years later James Anderson and William Bankier were proposing the municipalisation of Glasgow's gas supply.

PART TWO - ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE: THE EXPANSION
OF GLASGOW'S MUNICIPAL BOUNDARIES

- I. 1846 and the Control of the Centralised Police Authority.
- II. The Municipality versus the Suburbs, 1846-80.
- III. The Creation of the "Greater Glasgow", 1880-1912.

"Behold how good a thing it is,
And how becoming well,
Together such as Brethren are
In unity to dwell."

¹Quoted by J.B. Fleming of Kelvinside in his submission to the Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888. Originally from the 133rd Psalm.

I. 1846 and the Control of the Centralised Police Authority

During the early 1840s, the most heated arguments within Glasgow Town Council - apart from religion - were generated by the seemingly non-contentious subject of municipal expansion. The principle was by no means a new one; the need to enlarge the royalty had been acknowledged by the Town Council in 1772, when tentative discussions had taken place to incorporate the municipally-owned lands of Ramshorn and Meadowflat, plus the Barony of Gorbals.² Between 1783 and 1800 there had been several unsuccessful attempts to extend the traditional burgh boundaries and confer powers on the civic authority for more effective police administration, including arrangements for cleansing, paving and street lighting.³ At this time policing and municipal expansion were closely linked considerations, to allow for magisterial jurisdiction to apply over the developing areas adjacent to the royalty. However, prior to 1800 the various proposals to promote a Police Bill for Glasgow had been thwarted, as residents tended to be wary about placing too much

power and money in the hands of self-elected town councillors, who were not directly accountable to the community.⁴ It was only after concerted public pressure that the matter was eventually resolved, with the passing of the first Glasgow Police Act in 1800. In addition to providing for the election of Police Commissioners, the Act authorised the municipal annexation of assorted outlying territories, including Ramshorn and Meadowflat, although not Gorbals.⁵

As long as Glasgow's burghal constitution remained firmly fixed during the pre-reform era, any major extension of the municipal boundaries - no matter how administratively desirable - was rendered politically inexpedient. The example of the abortive Blythswood annexation in 1830 showed how far the Town Council had become boxed into a corner over plans to extend the civic jurisdiction; Glaswegians remained highly sceptical about the motivations behind the project, while reformers argued that the proposed changes did not go far enough.⁶ At the same time, the vexed question of jurisdiction continued to pose problems in the unattached suburban areas. In lieu of any local agency of administration, county authority prevailed, but resources were thinly spread around, with no adequate mechanism for providing effective policing arrangements. Community leaders in some of the more populous districts surrounding the royalty were compelled to take matters into their own hands; the magistrates of Gorbals led the way in 1808 by successfully

promoting a local Police Act, and the textile manufacturing communities of Calton and Anderston became Burghs of Barony in 1817 and 1824 respectively, with powers to elect magistrates and appoint a burgh court.⁷ Shortly afterwards separate Police Acts were obtained for the two new municipalities. There was not the opportunity for any other areas to take advantage of local Police Acts, because until 1850 these could only be promoted by burgh magistrates, acting as the legally designated protectors of the peace.⁸

It has already been commented that the 1832 Reform Act had a confusing effect on the geographic identity of Glasgow.⁹ The Act created a constituency which corresponded to no existing administrative entity, while the municipality continued to adhere strictly to the confines of the royalty, as determined in 1800, even though this was a comparatively small area within the Parliamentary boundary. Five areas of jurisdiction attempted to co-exist within the constituency, under the authority of Lanark County, the burghs of Glasgow, Calton and Anderston, plus the Barony of Gorbals. The arrangement was generally recognised to be unsatisfactory, and the 1835-36 Royal Commission into the Scottish Municipal Corporations unequivocally recommended that a "junction" or amalgamation of the separate areas within the constituency should take place.¹⁰ According to the Commissioners, this was because Glasgow Town Council was in a financially flourishing condition which was likely to be

sustained, while the surrounding districts had next to no cash or assets, and no legal means of raising revenue outwith the Police Boards. Amalgamation also made sense because it streamlined the judicial and administrative machinery, removed "useless office bearers", and prevented "... many little local jealousies which were apt to arise between unconnected communities".¹¹ Particularly attractive to the Commissioners was the notion that a merger of the municipalities would eliminate wasteful expenditure and pool resources. The burghal identity of the smaller districts was given scant consideration when compared with the financial advantages of amalgamation; only Glasgow's anachronistic system of taxation seemed to remain an obstacle, but even then the Commissioners believed that there was room for flexibility.

Such views should have had a strong appeal to Glasgow's Liberal-dominated Town Council during the immediate post-reform period, as they reflected the prevailing penchant for financial stringency and efficient municipal administration. Moreover, the Glasgow Police Act was due for renewal in 1837, and so a suitable opportunity presented itself for the magistrates to undertake a radical overhaul of the legislation. Yet, when the discussions commenced, Lord Provost William Mills and the Glasgow bailies were decidedly reluctant to take any steps that would fundamentally alter the status quo. The civic leadership felt that there had not been sufficient time to assess the legal

implications of municipal expansion; general statements in praise of the principle were all very well, but there were complicating factors - such as land tenure, burgess privileges and local taxation - which meant that the process of obtaining an Extension Act would be lengthy and full of pitfalls.¹² Consultation was another area which required sensitive handling; Liberal councillors were anxious that there should be no element of compulsion in any proposed amalgamation, particularly as they had political allies on the Police Boards and in the neighbouring burghs, who would be unlikely to welcome Glasgow's aggrandizement at their expense. As a consequence of this caution, the Glasgow Police Act was renewed in 1837, but only for a limited term of five years.¹³ In the interim, the Town Council was given ample time to prepare the case for municipal merger, in collaboration with all the interested parties.

The Liberal strategy was not followed through. By the time the new Police Act became fully operational, the Liberals had lost their position of ascendancy within the Town Council, and the ruling Conservative-Evangelical alliance had adopted a wholly different approach towards municipal expansion. Whereas the Liberals favoured a wholesale amalgamation for reasons of financial and administrative efficiency, the new régime was wary about interfering too drastically with the existing burghal framework. However, this did not mean that Glasgow's civic leaders refused to acknowledge the need for change, as they were

acutely aware of the problems arising from the unco-ordinated arrangements governing jurisdiction within the Parliamentary constituency. Much more than the Liberals, the Conservatives attached an ideological as well as a practical importance to the need for better law enforcement.¹⁴ They perceived the police to be a key instrument of social control - "a bureaucracy of official morality", as one recent writer has commented - which required every possible assistance to conduct its affairs efficiently.¹⁵ The great Conservative hero in Glasgow was Sir Robert Peel, who, since his days as Chief Secretary for Ireland, had been convinced of the need for a system of preventative policing, vested in a centralised authority.¹⁶ Indeed, as has been exhaustively demonstrated by Stanley H. Palmer in his research into the origins of the Irish police, the creation of the Irish Constabulary served as the crucial prototype for the Peelite ideal.¹⁷ Many Liberals feared that such a notion smacked too much of continental spy systems, and would be yet another burden on the rates; nevertheless, Peel was able to further his aims by steering the Metropolitan Police Act through Parliament in 1829, establishing the London model as the basis of professional policing throughout mainland Britain.¹⁸

After the Conservatives had regained the political initiative on Glasgow Town Council, the broad debate on municipal expansion came to be overshadowed by the more specific objective of creating a centralised police authority within the

Parliamentary constituency. This was not simply a loyal response to the Peelite philosophy; by the late 1830s there was a growing sense of urgency throughout the United Kingdom that more meaningful efforts had to be made to enforce stricter police control, in both urban and rural communities.¹⁹ Glasgow and environs had contributed substantially to this climate of uncertainty, when a wave of strikes and industrial militancy created serious problems of public order during the summer of 1837, culminating in the murder of a blackleg cotton-spinner.²⁰ The Glasgow constabulary had been powerless to act during much of the unrest, because most of the cotton mills were located outside the royalty boundary. Appalled by the the threat to property and the rule of law, Archibald Alison, the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, maintained that the challenge of the unions could only be combatted by establishing a centralised system of police.²¹ Sheriff Alison, it should be added, belonged to that school of Edinburgh-trained lawyers, who - like James Reddie, Glasgow's Town Clerk - manifested a barely-concealed distaste for democratic tendencies.²² His crusade against the unions was therefore not welcomed by the predominantly Liberal cotton masters, especially as he blamed the Reform Act for fostering the spirit of sedition.²³ On the other hand, Conservative town councillors had some sympathy for the substance of Alison's argument, if not his provocative style.²⁴ This was an important consideration, as they had

taken on the responsibility of redrafting the Glasgow Police Act, under the guidance of the Town Clerks.

Enormous effort went into the preparation of the proposed new policing arrangements, which were eventually released to the public in September 1841.²⁵ Most of the legal work had been done by Angus Turner - one of the junior Town Clerks, and a protégé of James Reddie - in close liaison with Lord Provost James Campbell. The original Bill contained 269 clauses, and attempted to cover all contingencies relating to criminal and civil police administration. As expected, the main provision was to create a separate Board of Criminal Police, responsible for preventing crime and preserving the peace throughout the Parliamentary constituency. The Board's personnel was to comprise the magistrates of Calton, Anderston, Gorbals and Glasgow, plus Glasgow's Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener; Lanark County was represented by the Sheriff, Sheriffs Substitute and three Justices of the Peace. The four existing Police Boards were to be abolished and replaced with Local Boards, covering vastly extended police districts. Unlike the Criminal Board, the Local Boards were to be directly elected; the democratic process could be trusted to deal with the day-to-day administration of lighting, cleansing and statute labour, but not the crucial issue of law enforcement. The Bill also contained some measures which were undoubtedly ahead of their time, and reflected the strong Evangelical influence on

Glasgow's civic leadership. For example, one section on city improvements sought authorisation for the Town Council to impose an assessment to demolish buildings in the city centre, and open out the thoroughfares around the Trongate, while another section specified that public houses would be required to close all day on the Sabbath.²⁶

Initial reactions to the Bill from the Police Boards and suburban burghs were not as wholly negative as might be expected. When the Glasgow Police Commissioners debated the matter, one prominent Liberal - John Burnet - spoke up for the principle that "union was strength", although this was the minority opinion.²⁷ It was perhaps naïvely thought that the Bill would form the basis of a general discussion, and that once the various points of view had been put forward, there would be suitable amendments to reflect the consensus. However, Lord Provost Campbell and his allies showed a firm determination to yield as little as possible, especially to the politically-suspect Police Commissioners. In this respect, the Conservatives had cause for confidence, because they were at the height of their numerical strength within the Town Council, and Sir Robert Peel had won a clear majority of MPs in the recent general election. With every expectation that the Bill would be passed by Parliament, the Lord Provost and magistrates were not inclined to go through the motions of consultation, except to pick up on points of law which might ease the Bill's progress.

Community representatives were understandably outraged by this cavalier treatment, and Glasgow Police Board took immediate steps to initiate an alternative Bill.²⁸ The Town Council responded by obtaining an interim interdict, forbidding the Police Commissioners from using public funds to promote a measure that was legally the preserve of the Glasgow magistrates.²⁹

A bitter propaganda war ensued, with the Lord Provost conducting a highly personal campaign to discredit the Police Commissioners.³⁰ For their part, the Bill's opponents were able to rally substantial public support; the Glasgow Spirit Dealers' Association was a particular ally, as were the city's pawnbrokers, who feared the intensification of police surveillance under the proposed Criminal Board.³¹ Glasgow's Liberal town councillors posed as the champions of the people against the Bill, making particular mileage out of the likely cost of the restructured policing arrangements and improvement schemes.³² Despite this mounting clamour, Lord Provost Campbell doggedly pushed on, and by April 1842 the Bill had reached the Committee stage of the House of Commons. It was there that the Town Council's seemingly unstoppable progress was brought to an abrupt halt. After three days of presenting evidence, the promoters were advised that the provisions relating to the criminal police were unsatisfactory, and that the Bill should be withdrawn.³³ The basis of this surprising

request was that a local Police Act, subject to periodic renewal, was not the best mechanism for providing stability in Glasgow's policing arrangements. Specifically what the Government had in mind remains unclear, although the implications were that a Metropolitan-style system, under direct Home Office control, was being considered.³⁴ At all events, more time was needed for the Government to mature its ideas about Glasgow, and so - somewhat sheepishly - the Town Council delegation returned home.

The débâcle over the Police Bill may have partly influenced Glasgow voters to return more Liberal councillors in the elections of 1842, with the result that the Conservatives lost their majority and municipal strategy was reversed over the proposed police authority. The Conservatives fought a rearguard action in an effort not to bury the idea, and Lord Provost Campbell took it upon himself - with the aid of Town Clerk Reddie - to independently promote a revised Bill. Because the new Council had delegated authority to the Police Commissioners to draft the official Bill, Campbell and Reddie claimed that councillors had abdicated responsibility, and that the Lord Provost and Town Clerk were legitimately in their rights to reassert magisterial control.³⁵ Understandably, this as was seen as dubious logic, and yet another example of Reddie acting in the interests of the establishment rather than the elected representatives.³⁶ Campbell was censured by the Council for

his behaviour, although he refused to apologise.³⁷ The Liberals came out well from the affair in public eyes, especially their energetic leader, James Lumsden, who eventually succeeded Campbell as Lord Provost in November 1843. With the collapse of the Conservative-Evangelical alliance following the Disruption of the Church of Scotland, the field became clear for the Liberals to promote their own ideas on municipal extension. However, it was imperative that in the interim a new Police Act should be obtained for the city, as the existing legislation was due to expire, and so Parliamentary sanction was speedily granted for a measure that went part of the way towards securing a more co-ordinated system of police in the Glasgow area.³⁸

Yet despite the so-called "co-operating clauses", which extended the authority of the assorted police forces to all parts of the constituency, the 1843 Glasgow Police Act was still a short-term solution to policing problems and did not provide for municipal merger. In March of that year - at the same time as James Campbell was being called to account over his unilateral decision to promote a separate Police Bill - Glasgow Town Council took the opportunity to formally redefine its policy. Emphatically rejecting the option of a separate Criminal Board of Police, councillors resolved that "every exertion" should be used to bring about wholesale amalgamation.³⁹ This statement of intent was a necessary reiteration of Liberal objectives, as it theoretically laid to

rest any lingering Conservative ideas about police control; however, it made no recommendations as to the future structure of the enlarged municipality. Although there was an obvious wish to avoid pre-empting discussion, the new Liberal régime was still trying to grasp the nettle of how to deal with the proposed restructuring of the police administration. For instance, should there be a separate Board for the whole of Glasgow within the Parliamentary constituency, or should police powers become subject to direct municipal control? Initially, the Liberal majority on the Town Council did not seem disposed to undermine the authority of the existing Police Commissioners, but latterly supported moves for their complete abolition. This reversal of attitude was ultimately the key towards eventually achieving the Extension Act, although prior to this time there were other obstacles to overcome before the 1843 statement of intent could be fulfilled.

These obstacles fell into two broad categories. Firstly, the other municipal authorities within the Parliamentary constituency blew hot and cold over the idea of assimilation into Glasgow, being favourable sometimes, but unwilling at others, claiming that burghal independence would be in the best interests of their respective communities. The predatory tendencies manifested by Lord Provost Campbell in 1841 and 1842 had an unsettling effect on suburban residents, who saw advantages in the Glasgow connection, but feared the likely

burden of taxation. Anderston was particularly fickle, but this was because the local Council had designs on the developing district of Woodside, which belonged to no municipal authority and was fairly extensive.⁴⁰ Not only were the lands of increasing value in feuing terms, but if attached to the existing burgh of Anderston, would make a municipality of sizeable proportions and enough to thwart Glasgow's hopes of spreading west. Yet, realistically, such grandiose hopes of rivalling Glasgow were slim because - unlike their wealthy neighbour - the suburban burghs had little cash or assets. Moreover, Gorbals was legally tied to Glasgow Town Council, because the latter was feudal superior over the Barony, retaining the right to nominate the Chief Magistrate.⁴¹ Unless the Government could be persuaded to alter the basis of civic authority, the burghs were caught between the ideal of asserting independence in defiance of Glasgow's expansionist aims, and the more practical problem of not immediately having the wherewithal to do so.

The second obstacle to amalgamation was the burgess institutions in Glasgow, and their concern to preserve traditional trading rights within the royalty. The Liberal Town Council, comprising good free traders, was anxious that such anachronistic symbols of the mercantilist past should be abolished, and even the Conservatives - those who were left in Glasgow after the trauma of the Disruption - were uneasy about

their continuation. When a Bill was introduced in 1845 by Duncan McNeill, the Lord Advocate, to abolish exclusive trading privileges in all Scottish burghs, the Merchants' House did not oppose the principle, although it was concerned about the likely loss of revenue if traders no longer had a major incentive to join burgh institutions.⁴² However, opposition to the Bill was half-hearted, particularly as it was seen that the prospect of municipal expansion was becoming an increasing probability by the beginning of 1846. Burgh privileges did not apply outside the royalty, so that even if they were retained within the extended burgh, there would be a fringe of free trade activity surrounding the old city. Such a consideration had caused Blythswood to be excluded from the Glasgow municipality in 1830, but by 1846 times had changed, and the old protectionism had become irrelevant. When the Bill to abolish exclusive privileges was eventually ratified in May 1846, one obstacle to the municipal expansion was conclusively removed, although by this time such formalities scarcely seemed to matter.⁴³

Indeed, before the enactment of the exclusive privileges legislation, both the Lord Advocate and the suburban burghs had been wooed and won over to the idea of municipal merger. This had occurred despite attempts by Anderston during 1844 and 1845 to annex Woodside, and another proposal by Calton to combine with the rapidly expanding textile village of Bridgeton. As regards Calton and Bridgeton, Glasgow Town Council's first

concern was expansion rather than the creation of new municipal entities, but failing this option it was prepared to accept a merger of the two districts.⁴⁴ However, the Council felt duty bound to challenge what it perceived as Anderston's presumptuous attempts at aggrandizement, as did the Glasgow Police Commissioners. Towards the end of 1844, correspondence - expressing the barest of civility - began to flow between John Burnet, Clerk to the Commissioners, and John Houldsworth, Provost of Anderston, where the latter responded tartly to accusations of unreasonableness and impetuosity. In one instance he wrote, with a tone of deliberately exaggerated self-righteousness:⁴⁵

... finding that the Commissioners of Glasgow have neither last year, when the opportunity was before them, nor even this year, attempted to give their protection to [Woodside] ... the Burgh of Anderston ... have decided to go forward with a Bill to annex these Lands ... In making these arrangements I never conceived it necessary to give notice to the Town Council or Commissioners of Police for Glasgow, seeing that we were not interfering with either Board in the slightest degree, but merely supplying protection to those who wished it ...

Whether or not the burgh of Anderston's reasons for annexing Woodside were altruistic, and there were dark hints from Lord Provost Lumsden that "there was a bit of a job in this matter", the Bill went ahead, and was heard by a Parliamentary Select Committee, headed by Sir George Strickland, in April 1845.⁴⁶ In order that Glasgow Town Council and the Police Board could

more successfully challenge Anderston by putting forward positive proposals of their own, a rival Bill was promoted, with the intention of extending police powers over Woodside and other municipally non-aligned districts. This was a stop-gap measure, which was designed not to prejudice the Council's over-riding aim for wholesale amalgamation. However, before the two Bills were presented before the Select Committee, the case for the merger of Calton and Bridgeton was heard, and after three days of protracted discussion was declared to be "not proved".⁴⁷ This judgment meant that the deputations from Anderston and Glasgow were forced to withdraw their respective Bills, because the gist of the debate within the Committee made it clear that only a general merger of all the districts within the constituency would be acceptable, and that any other proposal was a waste of time and public money. The Lord Advocate restated this view direct to the Glasgow delegation, and further added - according to the formal report made afterwards to the Glasgow Police Board - that the police should be managed by "two, or at most, three Commissioners, who should not be subject to popular appointment or control".⁴⁸ Such sentiments immediately shocked the Glaswegians, but the Lord Advocate had perhaps played a clever negotiating move, because the seeds of the abolition of the Police Commissioners were sown, and the Town Council's attitude towards police control rapidly began to alter.

After the demise of the ill-fated Police Bills, the subject was not formally discussed in any depth by the Town Council until after the municipal elections of 1845. A Committee, comprising Town Council representatives along with other interested parties, had been appointed to consider the possibility of amalgamation, and the joint meeting - according to its minutes - resolved:⁴⁹

... that it is advisable that the municipality should be extended over the whole Parliamentary district, and that a Town Council should be elected by the £10 electors, the Council electing the Magistrates; also that the whole Municipal and Police powers necessary for the extended Burgh should be vested in the Magistrates and Council ...

A list of proposed arrangements for the new Glasgow municipality followed, including the division of the city into sixteen wards, each returning three councillors on a rotating basis; the appointment of a separate Police and Statute Labour Committee, administratively independent of the Town Council, but exclusively selected from Council representatives; and the abolition of petty customs within the royalty, including the notorious ladle duties. To compensate for this loss of revenue, it was proposed to transfer an amount not exceeding £1,500 out of the police rates to the city's Common Good. Although the sum was not substantial, radical opponents argued that such a measure would be the slippery slope to more burdensome local taxation. There was a particular fear that £1,500 would not satisfy municipal requirements, and that eventually more money

would have to be forthcoming from the police rates⁵⁰.

Nevertheless, the resolution of the joint meeting seemed to indicate the green light for the amalgamation of the separate components within the burgh, subject to the sanction of the Lord Advocate. His demands over police control were partially met by the stipulation that the Police and Statute Labour Committee should be appointed from the Town Council rather than directly elected; meaning, theoretically, that disruptive or subversive elements could be excluded by the supposedly responsible majority. Moreover, a problem which had been particularly worrying the Lord Advocate was also resolved by the new proposals, whereby the Chief Superintendent of Police was to be appointed by the magistrates only, and not - according to existing practice - by the whole assorted body of Police Commissioners.

However, it is a matter of speculation as to whether the minutes of the joint meeting were drafted by a particularly crafty Town Clerk, or whether the representatives of the various bodies did not put forward a true reflection of their members' feelings, or simply whether there was a genuine misunderstanding, because the reality was far different from the bald statement of general agreement which was eventually acted upon by the Town Council. Contrary to their reported stance, the elected Police Commissioners of Glasgow were not prepared to go forward with the plans for extension, and immediately

petitioned the Lord Advocate against it, while the Gorbals Police Commissioners virtually came to blows over the report of the joint meeting.⁵¹ Meanwhile, the Lord Advocate was making increasingly friendly gestures in support of the Bill, as long as strict assurances could be made over police control, and that the appointment of the Chief Superintendent of Police was vested in as small a group as practically possible.⁵²

It is pertinent at this stage to ask why, after years of apparent stalemate, the mechanism for expanding the municipal boundaries of Glasgow was beginning to function so briskly. Reasons are varied, and include important administrative, financial and ideological considerations. Firstly, the Parliamentary Select Committee in rejecting the claims of Calton and Bridgeton for a merger in 1845, had once again emphasised that such a proposal was not expedient in the long term, because it meant that police powers would not be conclusively vested in any one authority.⁵³ It was also made quite clear that the to-ing and fro-ing of deputations from the Glasgow area to promote or oppose successive Police Bills had begun to try the patience of Parliament, which was now determined to see the matter resolved in manner that would give permanent stability to the operation of police in the locality. Furthermore, the previous exercises had been costly, both in time and money, with Bailie John Whitehead - one of the leading figures behind the movement for municipal expansion - estimating in 1846 that

Glasgow Town Council had spent some £3,000 annually on assorted Police Bills over the past decade.⁵⁴ By the 1840s, public expenditure had become a hotly-debated municipal topic, and was a certain vote-loser if the Council's leadership was seen to be repeatedly squandering cash.

Amalgamation had also become a more realistic prospect as a result of the sudden demise of the once powerful and well-organised Conservative caucus in Glasgow. Accordingly, as long as there had been a significant Conservative presence on the Town Council up to 1843, there was an influential body of opinion likely to challenge Liberal attempts to change the structure of the municipality, and undermine the predominantly burgess basis of authority. However, once the Conservatives had been compelled to withdraw from active involvement in municipal affairs, the field was clear for the Liberals to give the Town Council a more solid unity of purpose towards achieving amalgamation. This is not to suggest that all participants in the Liberal alliance were happy about the proposed abolition of the Police Commissioners; James Turner of Thrushgrove, for example, chaired a public meeting held under the auspices of Glasgow Police Board in March 1846, which overwhelmingly agreed to campaign against the new Police Bill, although he personally did not express the same violent opposition as some of his radical colleagues.⁵⁵ Yet, in general, indications pointed towards growing unanimity between the Liberal Town Council and

Conservative Lord Advocate, principally because the latter could no longer use close political allies like James Campbell as a lever for bringing about a separate Metropolitan-style police authority in Glasgow. He was therefore prepared to compromise, to ensure that the police were placed under the control of an indirectly elected authority, which would be considerably more exclusive in composition than the Police Commissioners.

The extent of radical influence within the Police Boards is a subject which does not appear to have been methodically researched, yet it was an important factor towards understanding political developments in and around Glasgow during the early 1840s.⁵⁶ That there was a significant radical presence among the Police Commissioners is undoubted, although how far the radicals were able to direct affairs is a complex question, which must remain outwith the scope of this thesis. Certainly, for the likes of Archibald Alison, it was not so much the precise quantification of the radical presence that was disturbing, as the fact that the existing administrative framework had become structured in such a way as to allow the radicals a position of advantage.⁵⁷ This was not an unnatural development, given the more democratic basis of representation which had traditionally prevailed on the Police Boards. For instance, in Glasgow, Gorbals and Anderston, the £10 property qualification had long been the general criterion for voting, and in Calton - where the value of property was substantially

lower - all ratepayers could theoretically participate in Police Board elections.⁵⁸ To compensate for such apparent generosity, the qualifications to stand as a Police Commissioner tended to be stricter; the £10 rule applied in Calton, while in Glasgow - up to 1837 - a sliding-scale of property values governed the eligibility of candidates, according to locality.⁵⁹ Moreover, aspiring Police Commissioners could only represent the ward where they actually lived; in 1833 no such requirement had been invoked for municipal elections, and would have been considerably resented by the substantial body of Glasgow town councillors who chose to live outwith the royalty boundary.⁶⁰ Thus, as far as Glasgow was concerned, individuals with homes in the wealthy West End were prohibited from standing as Police Board candidates in less salubrious districts like the Bridgegate or Gallowgate.

Ironically, one effect of this geographically restricted representation was that the Glasgow Police Commissioners more accurately reflected the social profile of the electorate. This was no accident, as part of the rationale behind the original Glasgow Police Act had been to ensure that local candidates would come forward as Commissioners, with an intimate knowledge of their home district.⁶¹ Of course, at this time residential patterns were less polarised between the "old" and "new" town, and there was consequently confidence that the Police Board would be composed of eminently respectable members of the

community. However, as the middle-class exodus from the city centre began to gather pace, the power-base within the Police Board gradually began to alter. Local representatives continued to come forward, but not necessarily from Glasgow's social élites. By the 1840s, shopkeepers, small traders and professionals predominated on the Police Board, in contrast with the Town Council, where merchants and manufacturers were still numerically the largest group.⁶² Latterly there was virtually no overlap in membership between the two bodies, and it was only after the Extension Act of 1846 that erstwhile Police Commissioners began to make an impact on municipal affairs.⁶³

During the early 1840s, as has been seen, James Campbell and others carefully cultivated the image of the Police Boards as inefficient and politically subversive. Indeed, there were repeated claims from Glasgow's Police Commissioners that the city's press - of various allegiances - was running a deliberate and sustained campaign against them.⁶⁴ As far as the first point at issue was concerned, the evidence indicates that the accusations of inefficiency were unfair and largely untrue. Archibald Alison, in one of his more mellow moods, described the Glasgow police as "very adequate" and "very admirable", while Calton's Commissioners have been credited with pioneering innovative public health measures, which greatly influenced the drafting of Glasgow's Police Act in 1843.⁶⁵ Indeed, Calton's Police Superintendent, James Smart, eventually became the Chief

of the extended Glasgow Police in 1848.⁶⁶ The problem of police control in the Parliamentary constituency was not so much that each individual unit had its shortcomings - although, curiously enough, the Calton police did not possess a fire engine - but that they would be far more effective working together.⁶⁷ On the second point, however, the allegations of political subversion need to be looked at in more detail. This is not because they were substantially valid, but because definitions of what actually constituted subversion were at the time open to considerable interpretation.

The Chartist presence on Glasgow Police Board was certainly not numerically strong. Nevertheless, prior to the municipal reorganisation of 1846, three of the principal spokesmen for the Commissioners were George Ross, William C. Pattison and James Moir, who had all been leading members of the Chartist Universal Suffrage Central Committee for Scotland, until its collapse in 1842.⁶⁸ As Alexander Wilson has pointed out in his history of Scottish Chartism, although the success of the movement seemed to receive a body blow at this time due to personal differences and lack of funds, it was "slumbering" rather than dead up to 1848.⁶⁹ Thus, individual Chartists directed their energies away from overtly political campaigns to broader spheres of public activity, including the Police Boards. Messrs. Ross, Pattison and Moir demonstrated exemplary behaviour while serving as Glasgow Commissioners, in strict accordance with the

principle that their cause could best be served by demonstrating a capacity for hard work and efficient organisation.⁷⁰ Such dedication and self-control probably made them appear all the more menacing, although on at least one occasion George Ross lapsed into an uncharacteristic outburst of temper at a Police Board meeting. Strenuously objecting to an account for forty pounds spent by the Board on wine "to drink Her Majesty's health", he ostentatiously tore the offending document into shreds.⁷¹ As will be presently elucidated, Ross's outspoken pro-temperance views were at variance with the majority of his fellow Commissioners, who had no hesitation in censuring him.

While the Chartist proclivities of certain Police Board members were worrying to the Government and Glasgow's civic rulers, they were by no means perceived as the only threat. The Board's attitude to certain matters of morality was also viewed as deeply suspect, largely because by 1842 at least six out of the thirty-five elected Commissioners held drinks' licences, while two others - the Irish-born John O'Neil and Patrick Scanlan - were pawnbrokers to trade.⁷² O'Neil will feature elsewhere in this thesis as an influential figure in Glasgow's Roman Catholic community; a circumstance which was scarcely likely to endear him to evangelicals.⁷³ However, in addition to the doubts about his religious convictions, the spirit shop and the pledge shop were generally regarded as dual instruments of the Devil, and it was thought dangerously irresponsible to

allow their continued presence on the Police Board.⁷⁴ Accordingly, in 1843 Henry Home Drummond led Parliamentary efforts to amend the Glasgow Police Bill by banning publicans and pawnbrokers from standing as Commissioners, although the Bill was subsequently modified, to the effect that only the smaller retail spirit dealers were rendered ineligible for office.⁷⁵ There was no corresponding provision for pawnbrokers, although for the first time in Scotland the trade was required to be licensed.⁷⁶ Such measures were wholly in keeping with the Town Council's efforts to tighten the interpretation of the law on licensing and Sabbath desecration, in order to maintain moral standards in the community. Yet, despite the undoubted need to impose stricter controls on Glasgow's all too thriving drink and pawnbroking businesses, the Police Board bitterly opposed the attempts to circumscribe its membership.⁷⁷ In the event, the new law did little to dent the representation of spirit dealers and pawnbrokers among the Commissioners; a factor which could not fail to go unnoticed by the city's powerful evangelical interests.

The desire to see off dubious elements from Glasgow's Police Board must also have had an appeal to Whiggishly-inclined Liberals like James Lumsden, as there was no love lost between the "Clique" faction and Chartist activists ever since the latter had teamed up with the Conservatives during the 1841 general election, in an attempt to oust the city's Liberal

MPs.⁷⁸ Moreover, while the Liberals strongly disagreed with Archibald Alison over certain ideological matters, notably free trade, many remained uncomfortably aware of the validity of his pleas for stricter police control, particularly in the wake of the industrial unrest of 1837. Glasgow's textile manufacturers had closed ranks at the time, and the combined efforts of leading figures in the trade undoubtedly had an impact in shaping extension strategy, particularly as Messrs. Bankier, Dunlop, Houldsworth, McNaught and McPhail were all to the fore in municipal affairs in and around Glasgow.⁷⁹

However, the debate over the proposed Extension Act went much deeper than personal confrontations within the locality, as was shown by the long-standing determination of the Lord Advocate to centralise Glasgow's police control. Implicitly, public order was no longer to be the preserve of a directly elected body, with the possibility that radical sympathisers might be appointed to crucial positions of authority, like the Chief Superintendent of Police.⁸⁰ There was also concern because of the lack of continuity in such arrangements; the Police Boards were believed to be especially vulnerable to the arbitrary behaviour of Commissioners who - like Glasgow Town Council over the James Cleland affair in 1834 - could contrive to remove existing officers and replace them with others of a more congenial disposition. Such a precedent had been established in 1842, when the Clerk to the Commissioners, James

Inglis, was suspended and then dismissed for alleged professional incompetence.⁸¹ The Commissioners made something of a show of this exercise, in an effort to emphasise to the public that the Police Board had more control over its officials than the Town Council. John Burnet - the successor to Inglis - was a loyal supporter of the Board, whose outstanding abilities eventually over-rode the not unjustifiable charge of being a political placeman.⁸²

Only Glasgow Police Board seemed to be fully alerted to the ideological implications of the 1846 Extension Bill, although it should be stressed that the Commissioners did not oppose the principle of municipal amalgamation, but supported the view that an enlarged Police Board, retaining full powers, should operate in tandem with the Town Council.⁸³ Some Commissioners also nursed hopes that any new Board could be wholly elected on the basis of household suffrage, although this was scarcely realistic; the 1846 Act had the effect of disenfranchising Calton voters below £10 and regularised the basis of electoral qualifications, so that no dangerous precedents could be set for the lowering of qualifications generally.⁸⁴ On the other hand, Gorbals Police Board was divided over the matter, with some members believing that it would be worthwhile to join forces with Glasgow in order that Gorbalonians could participate fully and equally in Town Council affairs, and shed their Cinderella status as vassals of the royalty.⁸⁵ Indeed, a

public relations machine appeared to be in operation during the early months of 1846, which suggested that the majority of citizens were unequivocally in favour of amalgamation. William C. Pattison, as reported by the Glasgow Herald in March of that year, had to set the record straight:⁸⁶

Whatever might be said to the contrary, he found that the Calton people, paying rents from £2 [sic] to £5, were generally opposed to the measure, because it would have the effect of disenfranchising them; and he believed not one of them would sacrifice his vote for the sake of the small sum he had to pay [in Police assessment] ... The large mass of working men were willing to pay their share in the management of these rates; but the Town Council, instead of going onward ... were retrograding, because by the measure they proposed to throw not only the constituencies of the suburban districts overboard, but to deprive likewise from three to four thousand of the present Police electors in the city of their suffrages ...

Despite the merits of this argument, the case was already lost. When the Glasgow Police Commissioners resolved to formally oppose the Extension Bill, Lord Provost Lumsden emulated his Conservative predecessor and obtained an interim interdict against them.⁸⁷ The Bill thus proceeded through Parliament with relative ease, to be ratified in July 1846 as the Glasgow Municipal, Police and Statute Labour Act.⁸⁸ Its provisions were not substantially different from those outlined in November 1845, with the constituency divided into sixteen wards, each returning three councillors. The now defunct Police Boards were replaced by the Town Council's Police and Statute

Labour Committee, composed of the Lord Provost, eight magistrates, Dean of Guild, Deacon Convener, plus eighteen councillors. In accordance with Government demands, the power to appoint the Chief Superintendent of Police was vested solely in the Lord Provost, magistrates and Sheriff of Lanarkshire. The old police offices in the outlying burghs were retained, and the enlarged city was divided into five police districts, under the charge of an Assistant Superintendent. Police affairs were kept administratively separate from those of the Town Council, and neither the Town Clerk nor the City Chamberlain were eligible to hold office. Apart from some minor amendments, criminal policing arrangements were fixed for nearly fifty years, and it was not until 1895 that all the separate entities under the Council's trusteeship were united under the blanket authority of the Corporation of the City of Glasgow.⁸⁹

It is worth adding an important footnote to the story of Glasgow's first major boundary expansion. Early in 1847 the new Lord Provost, Alexander Hastie, along with the magistrates and Sheriff of Lanarkshire appointed the Chief Superintendent of Police for the extended municipality; he was William Henry Pearce, a County Inspector from the Irish Constabulary.⁹⁰ In March the following year, Pearce had the professional misfortune to be confronted with one of the most notorious civil disturbances in Glasgow's history, when a demonstration in protest against unemployment and rising food prices developed

into a full-scale riot.⁹¹ Three men died as a result of gunshot wounds, inflicted - somewhat indiscriminately - by ex-soldiers who had been brought in to help restore order. The so-called Glasgow "Bread Riots" made an enormous and lasting impression on the public consciousness. A few retrospective accounts luridly evoked the spectre of anarchy, but at the time it was generally recognised that the loss of life and damage to property could have been avoided had the police exercised firmer control.⁹² Pearce personally shouldered the blame and tendered his resignation, voicing concern about the crisis of public confidence in Glasgow's policing arrangements.⁹³ His replacement was Henry Miller, a former Superintendent of the City of Glasgow Police, and thus - ironically - an original appointee of the Police Board.

The matter was not laid to rest by Pearce's abrupt departure. Many Glaswegians felt that he had been made a scapegoat for inadequacies higher up the line, and that the Lord Provost - as Chief Magistrate - should at least acknowledge his own failure of responsibility, if not failure of nerve. Feelings ran particularly high in the East End of the city, where the worst of the rioting had occurred, and where Hastie held his municipal seat. Not that the Lord Provost had been devoting much of his time to civic duties; since the general election of 1847 he was almost wholly pre-occupied with Parliamentary affairs as one of Glasgow's two Liberal MPs.

Thus, after the Riot Act was read during the recent disturbances, it was the Senior Magistrate, Robert Stewart, who found himself in the stressful position of being caught amidst a terrified mob, an anxious police force, and the inconsistent musket shots of the army pensioners.

During 1848 there were moves within the Town Council to force Hastie's resignation, and although these were unsuccessful, the general feeling among councillors was that the Lord Provost should stand down in the forthcoming municipal elections.⁹⁴ Hastie initially gave the impression that he was willing to acquiesce, but then changed his mind, claiming that he was bowing to public pressure to stay on.⁹⁵ James Moir - active Chartist and former Police Commissioner - immediately put himself forward as a rival candidate, claiming to represent the true interests of East Enders. The ensuing election came to symbolise a popular confrontation between the old Police Boards and the new municipality, and Hastie was ignominiously - if narrowly - defeated.⁹⁶ For Moir it was only the start of a lengthy career as a town councillor, and he went on to become one of Glasgow's best-known municipal figures of the nineteenth century.

II. The Municipality versus the Suburbs, 1846-80

When the Glasgow municipality was redefined in 1846 to correspond with the existing Parliamentary boundary, it appeared that the territorial limits of Town Council jurisdiction had been established for some time to come. The Boundary Commissioners who had originally fixed the parameters of the constituency in 1832 had consciously taken into account the need for the city to spread outwards and, with this in mind, explained their rationale for creating the specifically political entity of Glasgow:⁹⁷

This boundary includes all that ought to be considered as Glasgow and suburbs thereof, with the exception of part of the village of Partick, on the west of the Kelvin, and some manufactories on the north of the Canal, which have been left out, because, had they been included, the Kelvin and Canal must have been lost as boundaries, and none so good could have been found. A large portion of open ground is contained within these limits, which appears necessary to be attached to so rapidly an increasing town.

Superficially, by 1846 there still seemed to be ample room to accommodate the expanding population, as the majority of Glaswegians continued to cluster together in the heart of the old royalty. Outwith the traditional confines of the city, the recently annexed areas of Anderston, Calton and Gorbals had, over time, attracted a mass of new inhabitants, but they too were usually concentrated in certain parts of the locality, focused around the central Main Street. The outer fringes of

the municipality were largely undeveloped: village communities existed in areas like Parkhead and Camlachie; the vast estate of Golfhill, belonging to the Dennistoun family, covered much of north-east Glasgow; Kelvingrove was a pleasantly wooded area located in the former burgh of Anderston. Yet within twenty-five years the flexibility apparently afforded in 1832 had disappeared, as a building boom voraciously swallowed up the open ground inside and outside the city limits, and the population of Glasgow continued to expand.⁹⁸ The Town Council was forced to examine the feasibility of extending its sphere of municipal influence, and this threat of encroachment prompted a bitter response from many outlying communities, who jealously guarded their independence and feared the likely financial demands of the spreading city.

The clash between the two main interest groups was to last until the 1890s, when the first large-scale annexation since 1846 eventually took place. Even then Glasgow's territorial ambitions had not been fully realised, and it took a further major expansion in 1912 to finally absorb the "Ring of Burghs" that surrounded the city.⁹⁹ The Town Council expended a great deal of money, energy and professional expertise in bringing about the creation of the Greater Glasgow between 1868 and 1912, and often, by its dogged pursuit of the smaller communities, caused itself more problems than it resolved. In 1869, when the Council had embarked on its initial, lurching steps towards

municipal expansion, one councillor summed up the prevailing attitude among his colleagues, which was to profoundly irritate anti-amalgamationists for many years ahead. These areas were not, he said, "like a lady", to be wooed and won; rather, they were "... in the position of children to a father, for the city of Glasgow had been father to them all, and with very few exceptions, all they had, and all they were, they were indebted for to Glasgow".¹⁰⁰ With this paternalistic aim in view, the city set out to bring its wayward offspring fully into the family fold. As will be seen from the following account of the amalgamation struggles, the Town Council faced mixed fortunes before it achieved success, which were compounded by the ambiguous political motivations of some of the main protagonists, and its own lack of judgment as how best to approach the negotiations with its neighbours.

Apart from the autonomous burghs of Rutherglen and Pollokshaws, all the areas adjacent to Glasgow in 1846 were subject to county administration. It was generally recognised that the provision of county services in certain populous places was inadequate, and that to provide for local requirements the rating system had to be extended to a greater proportion of the community.¹⁰¹ This applied particularly to districts in the vicinity of Glasgow, which served the commercial and administrative needs of the growing city, and which in turn themselves began to grow. The village of Partick and the area

"north of the Canal" mentioned by the Boundary Commissioners in 1832 were two early examples of Glasgow's burgeoning satellites, as was Govan on the south bank of the Clyde, which had once been a weaving community, famous for its salmon fishing.¹⁰² Shipbuilding was the great growth industry as far as Govan and Partick were concerned, with the establishment of major yards by firms like Tod and McGregor in Partick, and Robert Napier and Sons in Govan.¹⁰³ The rural character of the former villages changed rapidly, as an influx of shipyard workers settled near to their places of employment. Similar developments took place north of the Forth and Clyde Canal, in a district bordering the River Kelvin on its eastern banks. The area was variously known as the Dry Dock, Kelvin Dock, or Maryhill, and had become a centre of industrial activity from the 1790s with the opening of a graving dock for the repair and construction of small vessels. During the 1850s the population increased considerably, due to building works connected with the Dumbarton and Helensburgh Railway, and operations in the district for supplying Glasgow with water from Loch Katrine.¹⁰⁴

The communities of Partick, Govan and Maryhill were mixed, with incomers from various backgrounds as well as long-established residents. In Partick, for example, the tendency was for the proletarian element to settle in the vicinity of the old village, near to the bleach works, grain

mills and shipyards on the banks of the Clyde, while wealthier inhabitants bought property further north, from estate owners who were developing their lands for feuing purposes. Accordingly, in the 1850s the owner of the Dowanhill Estate - Thomas Lucas Paterson - divided his lands into separate zones for feuing: one, to the north, was for middle-class villas and terraces; the other, to the south, was for working-class tenements.¹⁰⁵ While an attempt was thus made to exercise an early form of planning control, it did not necessarily follow that the classes could be kept so rigidly apart. The village of Partick retained a number of genteel inhabitants who, along with their northern neighbours, worried increasingly about the boisterous behaviour of the resident workforce. For example, in his reminiscences, James Napier recorded a picturesque description of one incident, which was thought to be a great turning point in the progress of local administration in the district. In 1843, apparently:¹⁰⁶

... a stout, semi-Irishman, during a drunken spree, went through the village challenging any Irishman in it to fight. Upon this a band of Irishmen, armed with shillalahs [sic], turned out and literally took possession of the town, threatening and striking every person they met.

An application for assistance was immediately made to the Sheriff of Lanarkshire - the ubiquitous Archibald Alison - and police were temporarily drafted in from the nearby burgh of Anderston to patrol the village. The disturbance was quickly

quelled, but in its wake serious questions began to be asked about the effectiveness of county administration in so rapidly developing a community.

Problems of law enforcement were also becoming glaringly apparent in Govan and Maryhill, to the alarm of local property owners. There was cause for concern not only about the turbulent behaviour of the working-classes - with the Irish in particular branded as hell-raisers - but the inadequate state of road maintenance, lighting, drainage and cleansing came under close scrutiny.¹⁰⁷ The spectre of fever and disease, so prevalent in the wynds and closes at the heart of Glasgow, began to stalk the outlying communities, and was variously attributed to the open drains and ditches which were allowed to accumulate stagnant waste, or to the grossly overcrowded living conditions of the incoming workforce.¹⁰⁸ Proprietors and householders sometimes took matters into their own hands, and established ad hoc committees to provide for rudimentary local services, such as street lamps. A voluntary subscription was usually levied - a "combination for self-protection" - to fend off the likes of the marauding "ruffians" of Main Street, Maryhill, who were apparently fond of assaulting pedestrians after dark, in the dimly-lit thoroughfare.¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, there was little that the county authorities could do of a permanent nature to assist, as resources were strictly limited. Nor could the districts seek traditional burghal status as Calton, Anderston

and Pollokshaws had done. From 1833 it had become a Government principle not to encourage the questionable municipal practices belonging to the pre-reform era, and so - apart from a few exceptional cases, such as the large towns of Paisley and Falkirk - no new burghs were created in Scotland.¹¹⁰ On the other hand, the need for a formal mechanism to administer essential services and raise revenue had become a matter of priority, and so by 1850 the Government was forced to act.

The procedure eventually adopted by Parliament to establish a more efficient form of local government in populous places was contained in the General Police (Scotland) Act of 1850. This provided a cheap and easy method for setting up elected authorities, known as Police Burghs, in communities with a population of 1,200 or more.¹¹¹ Petitioners did not require to seek Parliamentary sanction to achieve burghal status for their locality, and thus saved time, effort and expense. Instead, the Sheriff of the county was given powers to decide on the merits of each case and, having found that the area met the legal criteria, defined the boundaries. Under the 1850 Act there was no right of appeal against the Sheriff's decision, on the grounds that, as the judicial authority for the county, he was dealing with an area already under county control, and not interfering with another legally-constituted administrative unit. It is important to stress this point, as it was to become a bone of contention between Glasgow Town Council and the Police

Burgh of Crosshill during the 1870s. Under no circumstances could a Sheriff make a ruling for an area outwith the county sphere of influence. Thus, the reason that Kinning Park always remained separate from Govan was that the former lay in Renfrewshire while the latter was in Lanarkshire. Never the twain could meet, unless a private Bill was promoted in Parliament, and Kinning Park took the cheaper option in 1871 by opting for Police Burgh status.¹¹²

The powers granted by the statute of 1850, and the much more comprehensive measure of 1862 known as the "Lindsay Act", were wide-ranging and broadly resembled those of the Police and Statute Labour Committee in Glasgow.¹¹³ Until 1900, Police Burghs were not permitted the civic paraphernalia afforded to traditional municipalities; elected representatives were Commissioners rather than councillors, and there was a Chief Magistrate rather than a Provost. As purely statutory bodies, Police Burghs had no Common Good, and had to raise all their funds from local assessment. They had clearly defined responsibilities towards the policing and maintenance of the district, and the Commissioners could impose penalties for public misdemeanours, such as keeping pigs near a main thoroughfare or running a disorderly house.¹¹⁴ All this was bound to appeal to the sorely-pressed proprietors of Partick, Govan and Maryhill, who were determined to sweep pigs, middens, shebeens and local rowdies off the streets. A golden

opportunity had been provided to restore order in the community, and Partick was the first to take advantage of the Police Act by achieving burgh status in July 1852. All male householders of £10 rental or upwards were given the right to vote for Commissioners, as in Glasgow municipal elections.¹¹⁵ Maryhill followed this example in May 1856, and Govan in May 1864. All the districts were well over the specified population minimum - lowered to 700 in 1862 - and covered a substantial territorial expanse. On the whole, the creation of the three Police Burghs was welcomed, and if Glasgow town councillors were already casting covetous eyes over their neighbours' lands, they so far managed to keep their desires to themselves.

Yet, shortly after Govan launched itself as a virtually autonomous police authority, the movement was set in motion to incorporate the surrounding districts into Glasgow. A major catalyst was the purchase in 1864 of the Glasgow College grounds by the Union Railway Company, and the subsequent removal of the University to the lands of Gilmorehill, which at that time lay within the eastern boundary of the burgh of Partick. Traditionally, the Town Council and the University were closely connected; the magistrates acted as patrons, providing numerous academic bursaries, while the University was exempt from the burden of city taxes.¹¹⁶ Both institutions were anxious to maintain these links after 1864, as they gave prestige to the Council and affirmed the privileged position of the University.

However, the new location of Gilmorehill seriously upset the status quo; there had apparently been no suitable alternative site within the city, and so the authorities were forced to go elsewhere. Not that they showed particular reluctance, because Gilmorehill - as its name suggests - was well above the city's smoke and pollution, and directly beside the sylvan showpiece of the West End Park. The University's Principal, the Rev. Dr. Thomas Barclay, bluntly stated that the prime reason for the College's shift was because it had been previously surrounded "... by a population in its character unsuitable to a seat of learning".¹¹⁷ While this was a back-handed compliment to the residents of Partick, Principal Barclay went on to argue that it would be appropriate if Gilmorehill was transferred to the jurisdiction of Glasgow Town Council in order to identify the University firmly with the city and, more crucially, to continue the long-standing arrangement whereby the University was exempt from taxation. The logical step was thus for the Council to promote a Bill in Parliament to annex part of Partick.

Meanwhile, other considerations were causing the Town Council to cast its net wider than the lands of Gilmorehill. The 1860s were a busy decade of municipal activity in Glasgow, with the establishment of the City Improvement Trust and the grand project to clear the slums from the city centre.¹¹⁸ One question that began to be increasingly asked around this time was where the dispossessed slum dwellers were likely to go, and

whether the suburban burghs would gain substantially in population at the city's expense.¹¹⁹ What this more specifically meant was that the poor would be forced to seek alternative housing within Glasgow, and thus hasten the exodus of the middle classes to southerly and westerly areas outwith the municipal boundary. In rating terms Glasgow would lose out drastically, while new slum areas would emerge to replace those in the process of City Improvement restructuring. As if this prospect was not daunting enough to the civic leadership, there were also fears that the Commissioners and county authorities would be unable to cope with the sudden influx of city migrants, leading to exacerbated problems of public health and law enforcement.¹²⁰ It was consequently felt that only the Glasgow Police - which had been given wide-ranging powers under various statutes during the 1860s, and was building up a reputation for efficiency - could coalesce the various outside agencies and offer adequate protection to the community.¹²¹

While it is probable that the Town Council would have taken steps to expand Glasgow's municipal boundaries during the 1860s, if only to resolve the anomalous position of the University, an opportunity presented itself in 1868 to take advantage of a move to extend the Parliamentary boundaries. The Second Reform Bill had made its stormy progress through Parliament the previous year, and early in 1868 the corresponding Bill was introduced for Scotland. Glasgow's two Liberal MPs - Robert Dalglish and

William Graham - attempted to resist moves by the Conservative Government to apply some of the procedures north of the border as had already been agreed for England and Wales, especially the arrangement whereby the number of MPs for major cities was to be increased to three, yet electors would still be required to vote for not more than two candidates.¹²² Critics condemned this as a ploy to give Conservatives a representative base in areas which were predominantly Liberal, while Conservatives insisted that they were merely encouraging the principle of "representation of minorities".¹²³ Dalglish and Graham set out to see if they could overturn this principle, and recruited the Town Council as an ally in the campaign. In presenting their joint case, it was realistically claimed that Glasgow warranted special attention, as the city had long outgrown the Parliamentary boundaries fixed in 1832.¹²⁴ If the need for boundary expansion was recognised, then it followed that the electors in the newly incorporated areas should be given an extra MP. This would give Glasgow four members, rather than the three proposed by the Government, and to overcome the "representation of minorities" problem it was suggested that the city should be neatly split into two divisions, returning two MPs each, where the electors could exercise their two votes.

What was the scope of the greater Glasgow envisaged by Dalglish and Graham in 1868, and how far was an essentially political and Parliamentary debate relevant to the municipal

government of the city? The burghs of Govan and Partick, though not Maryhill, were to form the major territorial section of the new constituency.¹²⁵ In addition, it was proposed to include the residential areas of Hillhead and Kelvinside, situated north of Partick; part of the old royalty, north of the Monkland Canal, including a portion of Springburn; the new South Side or Queen's Park, belonging to the Town Council, plus nearby residential districts like Crosshill, Kinning Park and Pollokshields. It seems curious, in light of the fact that it took a further forty-four years to incorporate Govan and Partick into Glasgow, that the promoters of the amendment to the 1868 Bill should have specifically targeted these areas as suitable for assimilation. At this time, however, Partick and Govan had an estimated population of 26,000 between them, out of which a significant number of "working men" would be enfranchised if the burgh vote was extended.¹²⁶ This would clearly suit the Liberals in their quest to reinforce Glasgow as an urban stronghold, and it was a good propaganda point in their efforts to identify with the campaign for a wider democracy.¹²⁷ Yet the ambiguity of Liberal motivations should be stressed. In a speech criticising the new-fangled "three-cornered" arrangements for urban constituencies, William Graham, a Gladstonian, argued that "representation of minorities" was a dangerous principle because:¹²⁸

Toryism, as a political creed, hardly exists in

Glasgow; but there are men holding the most extreme opinions in the opposite direction ... instead of a Conservative candidate being returned for Glasgow, we may therefore have a man of extreme political opinions, with the support of the trade unions; or not, improbably, one selected by the Irish Roman Catholics ...

Although Graham was being deliberately ironic in an effort to embarrass the Conservatives, it was nevertheless thought prudent, as a check towards a wholesale drift to democracy, to incorporate the wealthy residential areas like Kelvinside and Pollokshields in the proposed new Glasgow constituency.

It seems probable that a quid pro quo arrangement for mutual support had been reached between the Glasgow MPs and the Town Council in order to push through the Parliamentary boundary extension. Both sides had broad objectives in common, even though their reasons for pursuing them did not necessarily tally. The Liberals wanted to consolidate their position in an area of strength; the Town Council wanted to co-ordinate municipal government over as wide an area as possible, with the added financial incentive of extra rates revenue from the suburbs. Each could add weight to the argument of the other when the respective cases were heard in Parliament, which was why the Council formally submitted a statement favouring the proposed constituency expansion.¹²⁹ In the short term, this would not change the existing municipal boundaries, but a redefinition of the political entity of Glasgow was likely to help considerably towards the Council's longer-term territorial

ambitions. Once the principle of extension was recognised, then hopefully the rest would fall into place.

The Council thus used the municipal argument to urge the Government to bring Govan and Partick into the enlarged constituency. It was claimed that they had "no municipal or burghal character", unlike Rutherglen or Pollokshaws, and owed their rapid rise as industrial centres solely to their proximity with Glasgow.¹³⁰ Furthermore, all the outlying areas were beholden to the city for numerous services, such as water and the use of the public parks, yet gave virtually nothing in return. In a formal statement to the House of Lords, the Council adopted an aggrieved attitude towards its neighbours:¹³¹

... it is not just that they should be exempt, as they now are, from bearing a proper proportion of the expense of maintaining the various public institutions necessary for the government and sanitary well-being of the city.

This was an elaborate way of saying they were dodging Glasgow's rates; a complaint that was to become all-too familiar from town councillors in the coming years.

Unfortunately, achieving the Greater Glasgow in 1868 depended on the success of Messrs. Dalglish and Graham in winning the four-member constituency, without the "representation of minorities" proviso. As the promoter of the original three-cornered arrangement, the Conservative Government was unlikely to be sympathetic to the revised proposal, which

would have effectively gifted Glasgow to the Liberals at twice the previous level of representation. On the other hand, numerous Liberals were uneasy about the suggested rearrangement of boundaries, despite the promise of an invincible Liberal fiefdom within. What Glasgow would gain, the surrounding counties of Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire would lose in terms of Liberal votes, leaving the county seats vulnerable to the resurgent Conservatives.¹³² This was a sore point between Liberals from the county and burgh constituencies, and tested political loyalties, but when the four-member amendment to the Scottish Reform Bill was eventually defeated at the Committee stage, Liberal opinion swung decidedly in favour of safeguarding the counties.¹³³ Conversely, the Conservatives suddenly manifested enthusiastic support for Glasgow's boundary extension, recognising the same opportunity for an entry into Liberal-held areas. With the Liberals now lukewarm, if not openly hostile to the idea of an enlarged constituency, the ambitions and credibility of the Town Council were seriously undermined. While the amendment was defeated by five votes in the Commons, many Liberals spoke against, and only Robert Dalglish resolutely adhered to the original proposal.¹³⁴ In the long term, the experience taught a cautionary lesson to the Town Council that if it intended to further its territorial ambitions, it should do so wholly on its own initiative, and avoid overtly political entanglements.

One argument used consistently by Liberals opposing the 1868 extension proposals, and which was later to be repeated, was that they had been drafted without adequate consultation with the communities concerned. Jacob Bright pointed this out in a speech against extension during the Committee stage of the Scottish Reform Bill, claiming that Glasgow Town Council was using dishonest tactics in its efforts to absorb the suburbs. The Council's prime motivation was not to altruistically give "working men" the burgh vote; rather, it was territorial aggrandizement at the expense of smaller neighbours.¹³⁵ Bright went on to outline what was to become a familiar theme:¹³⁶

... it is proposed to bring 40,000 or 50,000 persons within the municipal government of the city who do not wish to be brought there, whose franchise will be made of less value, whose taxation will be enormously increased, and who have not come to this House to petition for this favour to be confirmed upon them. Dealing thus with large populations in regard to their Parliamentary or municipal rights is contrary to the ordinary practice of this House ...

Bright's arguments were to be echoed by radical town councillors in Glasgow, notably James Moir and James Martin, who became formidable opponents of the prolonged campaign for municipal expansion. They were forthright in their reasons for this obstructive stance, detecting a lust for power among the municipal leadership and a lust for money among the Town Clerks. The latter were already given handsome remuneration for

their services in promoting the various extension Bills, and it was felt that they were manufacturing opportunities for further self-gain.¹³⁷ As erstwhile Chartists, Moir and Martin put their faith in the popular will, which they believed to be firmly against amalgamation in the outlying districts. Other councillors relied on the economist approach, notably William Collins, who was a supporter of strict financial management in the municipality, and argued that the extension proposals generated unnecessary effort and expense. Councillors like the Conservative, John Mitchell, who had long resided in Govan, stood up for the rights of his home community against city encroachment.¹³⁸ Indeed, the number of councillors who were living outside the city boundaries was sizeable; even James Moir had quitted the Gallowgate for a home in Broomhill Avenue, Partick.

Despite such manifestations of dissent, the Town Council was sufficiently determined on its expansionist strategy to provoke the residents of Hillhead into taking speedily action to achieve Police Burgh status. There were, of course, numerous reasons for the creation of the new burgh, but it was more than coincidental that the timing - May 1869 - followed so soon after the rejection of the Reform Bill amendment¹³⁹ Hillhead was significantly different from Partick, Govan and Maryhill in that it was entirely residential; most heads of household worked in Glasgow, but preferred to live well beyond the corrosive city

atmosphere.¹⁴⁰ They were also anxious to escape the heavy rates burden imposed by the Town Council and its assorted Trusts, but were clearly prepared to take more responsibility for their affairs than the limited county administration would allow. Because of the rapid rate of building development in Hillhead, it made sense to co-ordinate policing and sanitary arrangements; although there was less need to fear ruffianly behaviour from the inhabitants, house values would undoubtedly rise if the area was well-maintained.¹⁴¹

This was a different kind of "combination for self-protection", which Glasgow Town Council could only look upon with a growing sense of frustration. The law made no provision for a neighbouring municipality, or other corporate body, to appeal formally against the creation of a Police Burgh, although the statute of 1862 did grant the right to individual householders.¹⁴² The Town Council considered this to be a major flaw in the legislation, because its voice was effectively excluded from the decision-making process. It later came to believe that had there been an effective appeals procedure, then the plethora of Police Burghs which came to surround Glasgow during the 1870s would never have been created.¹⁴³ This is to beg the important question, however, of how far Glasgow would have been able to extend its jurisdiction under different circumstances.

Back in the summer of 1869 the Town Council was anxious that

any further movement towards suburban self-assertion should be nipped firmly in the bud. Moreover, it resolved to do this on the grand scale, and by December had prepared a draft Bill which in its scope was not to be finally achieved until 1912.¹⁴⁴ All the districts claimed by Glasgow in 1868 were included, in addition to others like Maryhill, Provanmill, Carntyne, Polmadie, Langside and Shawlands. Several of these areas were scarcely built upon, but the Town Council was planning for the future, in the hope that they would become promising rating propositions.¹⁴⁵ On paper, the idea of the even greater Glasgow seemed to be both far-sighted and practical. The Council was allowing sufficient scope for the expansion of services, and was already taking steps to promote a Bill in Parliament for a connected system of street tramways for the city.¹⁴⁶ In reality, however, householders in most of the outlying districts responded fiercely to what they considered to be an arrogant assumption by the Town Council that it had the power to determine the new shape of Glasgow without consultation, negotiation or compensation. In any case, the definition of "Glasgow" was itself a moot point. Robert Bruce - the first Chief Magistrate of Hillhead - gave his personal view, perhaps anticipating the creation of Strathclyde Region a century later:¹⁴⁷

I would say that Glasgow, as far as community of interests is concerned, was the valley of the Clyde, say from the Lead Hills in the Upper Ward of

Lanarkshire down to Ailsa Craig in the Firth of Clyde ... It is either ignorance or arrogance, or both combined, to ask what any of the suburbs would have been without it, when Glasgow itself is depending upon its surroundings for its present proud position ...

Bruce was hinting that Glasgow Town Council should be flexible in its approach to the suburbs, treating them more like neighbours and less like children. However, the Council remained determined to stand on its dignity, and not dance attention on the assorted interest groups opposing the Extension Bill.

It was not the combined efforts of the suburban districts which caused the defeat of the controversial 1870 Bill, despite the steady bombardment of memorials, petitions and leaflets against the Town Council.¹⁴⁸ Instead, the spectre of 1868 loomed all too ominously for many Liberals, who saw extension of Glasgow's municipal boundaries as a preliminary to extension of the Parliamentary constituency. Henry Austin Bruce, MP for Renfrewshire and Home Secretary in Gladstone's Government, threw his personal weight behind the campaign to preserve the counties.¹⁴⁹ The state of the political parties in Renfrewshire was the closeness of a hair's breadth, as shown by the Parliamentary election figures throughout the 1870s.¹⁵⁰ Even a handful of voters transferred to Glasgow could theoretically make all the difference, and the Liberals did not intend to sacrifice one of their star politicians to satisfy the

parochial ambitions of Glasgow's councillors.¹⁵¹ The pleas of the smaller districts against expansion therefore fell on receptive ears, while the Town Council was made to look selfish and grasping, particularly as it was seeking a massive territorial increase from 5,000 acres to 13,000.

The rejection of the Bill was encouragement for the suburbs to stand their ground, and a few months later the Sheriff of Renfrewshire received two applications to have the districts of Crosshill (82 acres) and Kinning Park (109 acres) made into Police Burghs. It remains unclear what precise political influence lay behind these applications, although it is worth pointing out that Crosshill's first Chief Magistrate - Robert Ramsey - was a zealous Liberal activist, who later served on Glasgow Town Council as Deacon Convener.¹⁵² At all events, there was a sudden flurry of activity in Renfrewshire to create the burghs immediately after the defeat of the Bill. The supporters of H.A. Bruce were undoubtedly anxious to safeguard their position - and their MP - by setting obstacles in the way of Glasgow. Accordingly, they must have been relieved when the applications of Crosshill and Kinning Park were approved and implemented with effect from September 1871.¹⁵³

In the interim, Glasgow Town Council had been forced to think long and hard about future tactics in the campaign to extend its area of jurisdiction. The embarrassing defeat of 1870 was made all the more galling because it had contributed to

a series of unsuccessful Parliamentary Bills promoted by the Council, which came under bitter public attack for wasting municipal funds.¹⁵⁴ Problems over the functioning of the Town Clerk's office compounded this difficult state of affairs, and it was openly accepted that a major administrative reorganisation would need to take place if the Council's legal matters were to be adequately dealt with. The supposedly avaricious tendencies of the Town Clerks had become something of a standing joke at all levels of Glasgow society; indeed, it was put forward by the outlying districts as a reason for keeping their distance from the municipality.¹⁵⁵

Of course, the Town Clerks were an easy target for the barbs of the anti-extensionists, and it suited the Council to deflect attacks away from the elected representatives. No matter who was to blame for the débâcle of 1870, the Council remained in an invidious position; it dare not attempt a further major expansion in the immediate future, and face another costly and disheartening defeat, yet it still had the problem of Glasgow University to resolve. An added difficulty existed in the part of the old royalty, north of the Monkland Canal, which had been excluded from the municipality in 1833. By the 1860s the area was a bustling industrial community, centred around Springburn, and householders were understandably anxious to obtain the full benefits of Council representation, especially as they were subject to city taxation.¹⁵⁶

It was fortunate for the pro-annexationists that James Watson became Lord Provost in November 1871. A strong supporter of municipal expansion and a shrewd negotiator, Watson was also a committed Liberal and personally close to Prime Minister Gladstone.¹⁵⁷ The Lord Provost determined to exploit his connections in an effort to resolve two of the city's thorniest problems; the boundary anomaly and the status of the Town Clerks. Both issues were largely unconnected, apart from the shared characteristic of being a source of profound irritation to councillors. With the object of killing two awkward birds with one stone, Watson became responsible for the speedy promotion of a Bill intended to enlarge the municipality and regulate the office of Town Clerk.¹⁵⁸ The boundary provisions were deliberately modest in comparison with previous territorial claims, covering (i) the Springburn district, immediately outwith the municipality; (ii) the newly-acquired Alexandra Park, next to the residential suburb of Dennistoun; (iii) the University grounds in Partick; and (iv) an extensive residential area to the south side of the municipality, under county jurisdiction, and including the South Side or Queen's Park. The Town Council could realistically claim that it was not interfering with any existing burgh, apart from Partick, but opponents of amalgamation remained unimpressed by Glasgow's apparent concession to suburban sensibilities. They alleged that the important sections relating to the Town Clerkship had

been "tacked on" to the Bill, in a contrived effort to divert attention away from the contentious extension proposals.¹⁵⁹ Above all, the measure was perceived as "an insidious attempt to get in the edge of the wedge", and that once the principle of amalgamation was conceded, then no district would be safe from Glasgow's grasp.¹⁶⁰

Lord Provost Watson staked an enormous amount on the success of his dual-purpose Bill during the Parliamentary session of 1871-72. Relations with his principal Town Clerk - the by now elderly Angus Turner - had become so acrimonious as to seriously retard the city's civic administration.¹⁶¹ If approved, the Bill would effectively remove Turner from office, and Watson was anxious to ensure that there would be no major obstacles to halt the Bill's progress. Accordingly, whatever else the anti-annexationists had to say, Watson was at least prepared to negotiate over the terms of municipal expansion, as long as the substance of the Bill reached the statute book.¹⁶² The Lord Provost was particularly wary about upsetting H.A. Bruce, who was still the Home Secretary, and in a powerful position to stop the Bill dead in its tracks. Another opponent who needed sensitive handling was Sir Edward Colebrooke, Liberal MP for North Lanarkshire and Lord Lieutenant of the county, who represented the interests of the Commissioners of Supply and voiced their concern over the prospect of losing rating territory valued at £79,650.¹⁶³ The main task of Watson and

his colleagues was therefore to conciliate two stubborn but influential county representatives. However, Renfrewshire refused to yield an inch, and the paragraphs relating to the county areas - including Queen's Park - were struck out of the Bill.¹⁶⁴ Lanarkshire's spokesman was more co-operative, although at a price; Springburn, Alexandra Park and most of the University territory was allowed to be annexed, with substantial financial compensation to the Partick and county Commissioners. On the other hand, certain valuable South Side territories, currently being feued out for residential building purposes, were excluded. As will be explained, this area eventually became the Police Burgh of Govanhill, after a bitter legal wrangle.

The Glasgow Municipal Act of 1872, which formally sanctioned the annexation proposals, was a legislative milestone for the city.¹⁶⁵ The provisions regulating the Town Clerk's office were to have far-reaching consequences for Glasgow's civic progress, as they created a firm base upon which the municipality's growing legal and administrative requirements could be constructed.¹⁶⁶ The boundary provisions established the important precedent that the city limits were no longer inextricably bound up with the Parliamentary constituency; the municipality was now a separate geographical entity, which could add to its territory as circumstances demanded. This redefinition of principle was probably what the far-seeing James

Watson was seeking, giving substance to the "edge of the wedge" theory of the anti-annexationists. Thus, although the South Side territories had been excluded from Glasgow in 1872, there was no obstacle to prevent the Town Council coming back at a more appropriate date to restake its claim. There can be little doubt that after 1872 this was the aim in view, when it was hoped that the counties could be eventually brought round to yielding their prize territories. Watson's position in the Liberal party may even have given him inside information to the fact that Home Secretary Bruce was soon to forsake his Renfrewshire constituency for the House of Lords, as Baron Aberdare of Duffryn, and that one of Glasgow's most formidable opponents would be removed.

However, the Town Council was not given any opportunity to initiate the necessary proceedings for annexation on its own terms, due to the sudden intervention of the Burgh of Crosshill, whose Commissioners had for some time been manifesting a keen interest in the fate of the South Side county areas.¹⁶⁷ Crosshill, it has already been noted, was created in the wake of the abortive 1870 Glasgow Extension Bill, which had so upset the Renfrewshire Liberals. Its Commissioners also played a prominent part in opposing the South Side provisions of the 1872 Bill, in close liaison with H.A. Bruce, when counter-proposals were put forward that the as yet unnamed Govanhill district should be taken under Crosshill jurisdiction.¹⁶⁸

Implementation of this scheme did not get properly off the ground until 1873, when Crosshill sought Parliamentary sanction to combine the two separate county areas, and transfer the Lanarkshire portion to Renfrewshire. Although the Bill was withdrawn as abruptly as it had appeared, Crosshill's activity was a sufficient catalyst for Glasgow Town Council to promote an alternative measure in 1874, which aimed to incorporate the disputed area along with the developing districts of Pollokshields, Mount Florida and Polmadie.¹⁶⁹ As a demonstration of Glasgow's disdain for Crosshill's municipal pretensions, it was also proposed that the upstart Police Burgh should itself be annexed to the city.

Using the tactics of Lord Provost Campbell against Glasgow Police Board during the 1840s, the Town Council recruited the assistance of the Glasgow press in an outrageously unsubtle campaign against Crosshill. The Bailie led the way, stating it was glad that the "flagrant anomaly" of the South Side territories would be resolved by the Council, as these "parasitic" areas formed a species of "no man's land" beyond the city boundaries.¹⁷⁰ This was one of the first uses of a term that came to be applied to Govanhill alone, as if to depict Glasgow and Crosshill fighting out their territorial claims like rival gold prospectors in the Wild West.¹⁷¹ By the spring of 1875 the confrontation between the two municipalities had reached epic proportions, with competing Bills wending their way

through Parliament for the annexation of "No Man's Land". A macabre boost was given to Glasgow's case when Crosshill was struck with a serious outbreak of enteric fever, or typhoid. A heated public debate ensued as to whether contaminated milk or defective drainage had caused the epidemic; advocates of the latter theory placed the blame firmly on maladministration in the burgh, and amidst some sensationalist reporting, the North British Daily Mail attempted to positively prove the drainage connection.¹⁷² As it happened, Crosshill's milk supply was responsible for spreading the infection, but conclusive evidence was only forthcoming months after the event.¹⁷³ In the interim, The Bailie summed up the prevailing attitude of civic self-righteousness in Glasgow:¹⁷⁴

As if it were not enough to do a smart trade in fevers, Crosshill ... [goes] ... in for general mismanagement with a liveliness and success which must charm all beholders. The roads are navigable in wet weather by vessels of light draught, and the comfort experienced by foot passengers from this state of matters is inexpressible. Protection against robbery and theft is secured by a vague rumour that half a policeman was seen wandering a few years ago about the streets. Some foolish person has placed the thieves' paradise in the Briggate. This is a mistake. The Eden of the furtive one is in Crosshill, where theft may be committed unmolested at any time ...

If Glasgow Town Council seemed to be winning the propaganda war on its own home base, there were few meaningful manifestations of support outside the city. Although by no means unanimous against annexation, the Renfrewshire

Commissioners of Supply were - as ever - highly supportive of Crosshill.¹⁷⁵ The county's new Liberal MP, William Mure, acted as spokesman for the Commissioners, and told a House of Commons Select Committee that Renfrewshire's attitude had been determined by fears that any annexation precedent set by Glasgow would be followed elsewhere.¹⁷⁶ If Glasgow succeeded, the green light would be given to the other large towns in the county - Greenock and Paisley - to cream off rich neighbouring communities like Gourock and Johnstone. According to Mure, the result would be to deplete the county of "centres of intelligence and property", reducing Renfrewshire to "a certain amount of moorland and a certain amount of arable land".¹⁷⁷ The Select Committee was particularly receptive to such arguments, and during the course of the proceedings it became clear that certain Committee members were displaying undisguised hostility towards Glasgow's stated aim of municipal centralisation, with wholly integrated police and public utilities.¹⁷⁸ As a result, the Crosshill Bill was approved in the Commons, and Glasgow's summarily rejected, although the Lords later ruled that there had not been a sufficient consensus to prove that either side had won the case.¹⁷⁹ Following this decision, the South Side areas were once again left in limbo, with seemingly no resolution to problem.

However, the stalemate did not persist indefinitely. While the municipal representatives of Glasgow and Crosshill continued

to eye each other balefully across "No Man's Land", the South Side residents began to fend for themselves. In December 1876, the Sheriff of Renfrewshire authorised that the wealthy residential district of West Pollokshields should be erected into a Police Burgh. Apart from aristocratic Kelvinside, the area was socially the most exclusive in the vicinity of Glasgow and residents boasted that there was not a shop or place of business within its boundaries.¹⁸⁰ Pollokshields would have been a highly desirable rating catch for Glasgow, but because of the continuing wrangle with Crosshill there was no opportunity to set in motion plans for amalgamation. Tensions eased the following year when, after exhaustive investigation by the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, "No Man's Land" was metamorphosised into the Burgh of Govanhill. Its relations with neighbouring Crosshill came to be cordial; the two burghs shared municipal premises, the Dixon Halls, and the Commissioners presented a joint front against Glasgow's predatory tendencies towards them. However, this attitude was not held by all residents south of the river: in 1878 town councillors were pleasantly surprised when representatives from East Pollokshields actually sought amalgamation with the city. The requisite Parliamentary Bill was immediately promoted, but the response of the Renfrewshire Commissioners of Supply was so hostile that the extension proposals had to be withdrawn.¹⁸¹ As a result, East Pollokshields became a separate Police Burgh in 1880; the last

of the "Ring of Burghs" to surround Glasgow. (See Table 2.1 and Map IV in the Appendices.)

The annexation struggles between 1868 and 1880 reflected scant glory on Glasgow Town Council. While the 1872 Municipal Extension Act was a vitally important step forward, and a non-contentious territorial addition was made to the city in 1878, the enormous effort involved in promoting and opposing successive Parliamentary Bills had yielded little of tangible benefit.¹⁸² Indeed, the Town Council's persistent belief in the righteousness of its mission only reinforced the resolve of certain outlying districts to avoid the Glasgow connection, excepting - of course - where the provision of essential services like water and gas was concerned. Nor did Glasgow's expansionist ambitions accord with prevailing mid-century notions about local administration, which favoured fragmentation rather than consolidation, because the latter was perceived as strengthening bureaucratic influence.¹⁸³ Most crucially, there were powerful vested interests at work, anxious to block any encroachment by the Town Council into areas under county control. The Police Acts were therefore used as a convenient device for preserving the status quo, ensuring that unwilling ratepayers would not become subject to the burden of Glasgow taxation, and that there would be no precedent for changing Parliamentary representation vis-à-vis the counties and the burghs.

Table 2.1: Police Burghs Surrounding Glasgow, 1888

	Date first constituted	County/Parish	Estimated population at formation 1887-88	Acreege of Burgh, 1888	Police Arrangements	Rates per £	Total Rental
PARTICK	14/7/1852	Lanark/Govan	5,043	1,006	Own force	2s 2 1/2d	£156,413
MARVHILL	9/5/1856	Lanark/Barony	c.5,000	1,183	Own force	2s 4d	£67,499
GOVAN	6/5/1864	Lanark/Govan	9,418	54,840	Own force	2s 2 3/4d	£233,385
HILLHEAD	14/5/1869	Lanark/Govan	3,634	8,629	Lanark	1s 7 1/4d	£86,822
CROSSHILL	7/9/1871	Renfrew/Cathcart	2,246	3,426	Renfrew	1s 4 13/40d	£28,924
KINNING PARK	28/9/1871	Renfrew/Govan	6,634	12,444	Renfrew	1s 9d	£54,739
P'SHIELDS (W)	6/12/1876	Renfrew/Govan	1,864	2,856	Renfrew	1s 2 1/2d	£35,236
GOVANHILL	6/7/1877	Lanark/Govan	7,212	13,115	Lanark	1s 5d	£50,095
P'SHIELDS (E)	24/9/1880	Renfrew/Govan	2,800	6,918	Renfrew	1s 1d	£52,263
GLASGOW		Lanark/ City Renfrew/ Barony Govan	543,995		Own force	1s 10 3/4d* 2s 6 5/8d	£3,363,964

* Two different rating criteria applied in Glasgow, for those whose yearly rental was under £10 (the first amount), and those whose yearly rental was over £10, (the second amount).

Source: Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Report of Commissioners, vol. I. Report, with Appendix, (C.D. 5382), 1888.

By 1880 Glasgow's civic representatives realised that nothing more could be done to achieve municipal expansion without a major legislative change. Accordingly, Glasgow's new Town Clerk - the ardently pro-annexationist James D. Marwick - prepared an intricate statement on behalf of the Council, urging the appointment of a Parliamentary inquiry into the whole boundary question.¹⁸⁴ Marwick identified three areas as in urgent need of attention: the provisions of the 1862 General Police and Improvement (Scotland) Act, which had allowed the Police Burghs to be so easily created; the inability of large urban centres like Glasgow to meaningfully challenge the constraints of the 1862 Act; and the consideration of proposals for a satisfactory long-term solution to the problem.¹⁸⁵ The Government did not immediately respond, but - quite independently - developments began to occur which were to yield positive results for Glasgow. Significantly, the sphere of operations in the border warfare shifted away from the unremunerative South Side to the much more fruitful territory of the salubrious West End.

III. The Creation of the "Greater Glasgow", 1880-1912

In 1894 James Brown Fleming of Kelvinside produced a handsome volume of photographs, illustrating various aspects of the district which he unashamedly described as "the finest in Glasgow".¹⁸⁶ There was no question, according to Fleming, that Kelvinside was anything other than part of Glasgow, even though it had been taken within the municipal boundaries only three years earlier. Indeed, the intention behind publishing Kelvinside was to show that Glasgow's poor public image in terms of housing and overcrowding was unrepresentative, and that wide boulevards and elegant terraces did exist, albeit away from the smoky city centre.¹⁸⁷ This is not to suggest that Fleming's firm identification with Glasgow was wholly altruistic; as the chief proprietor and manager of the Kelvinside Estate there had originally been strong practical motives behind municipal merger.¹⁸⁸ Accordingly, if Kelvinside was thought to be the best in terms of living standards, then it made sense that the best civic services should be applied to the district, particularly the crucial public utilities of water, gas and drainage. Above all, residents had become increasingly anxious that more adequate police protection should be afforded to their showpiece properties.¹⁸⁹ For this they were prepared to pay: Kelvinsiders were sufficiently wealthy that comparative rating levels were not an obstacle to amalgamation, and in any case,

quality - not quantity - was the local maxim.

This, in essence, was the argument that J.B. Fleming liked to use after he launched his highly personal crusade to integrate Kelvinside with Glasgow. As will be seen, the reality was not so straightforward, but a skilled self-publicist like Fleming was scarcely likely to worry about the finer points of detail as long as he could get his case across effectively. Throughout the 1880s Kelvinside was the nerve-centre of Glasgow's annexation movement, located - more exactly - in Fleming's Kelvinside Estate Office. Every legal, political and personal device was used to progress the movement, and from the outset Fleming was able to rely on the tacit support of the Town Council, even though official municipal policy was now against pressurising the outlying districts. Of course, the achievement of the 1891 annexation cannot simply be explained by the single-minded efforts of one man, and in many respects Fleming acted as the symbol rather than the substance of the struggles. Moreover, the 1880s was a vitally important decade for administrative changes in central and local government, and it can be justifiably argued that the redistribution of Parliamentary seats in 1885 and the subsequent creation of elected County Councils did more than anything to release the shackles that had territorially restricted Glasgow. Nevertheless, the behaviour of the protagonists in Glasgow's annexation movement is worth examining, for the light it sheds

on changing ideological attitudes within the Town Council, and the precise mechanism used for bringing about the long-desired objective of "Greater Glasgow".

The history of Kelvinside has been extensively examined, most notably by Michael Simpson.¹⁹⁰ The original feuing plan dated from 1840, when the proprietors of the newly established Kelvinside Estate Company - Matthew Montgomerie and John Park Fleming - consciously resolved to create an impressive residential development. Grosvenor Terrace was one particularly innovative example of Kelvinside's architectural design, which has been described as a technical tour de force, of unique character.¹⁹¹ J.B. Fleming was the son of the original proprietor who, after legal training, inherited the estate along with his brothers in 1869.¹⁹² As in Glasgow, there was a construction boom during this period, and so the junior Flemings took the opportunity to extend the development along the broad thoroughfare of Great Western Road, well within reach of the city's tramway system. Unlike neighbouring Hillhead, there was never any manifestation of a movement to create a separate Police Burgh to administer Kelvinside. Michael Simpson has attributed this to the strict estate management of the Fleming family, which obviated the need for civic government.¹⁹³ Hillhead, on the other hand, had numerous different proprietors, and was therefore erected as a burgh to ensure that it did not develop in a piecemeal manner, that would be detrimental to the

overall amenity of the area.

The method of estate management used by J.B. Fleming and his co-Trustees initially worked satisfactorily. They constructed roads and sewers, and charged the cost to householders as a proportion of the feu duties.¹⁹⁴ The Lanark County authorities eventually took some responsibility for road maintenance, but left lighting, cleansing and drainage in the hands of the feuars, who were expected to make their own arrangements. The feuars, in turn, looked to the Kelvinside Estate Company to co-ordinate the administration of the district. As the Trustees had made great play of their tight control over building development, the householders simply let them get on with the day-to-day business of maintaining Kelvinside in accordance with the high standards they had set themselves. This was not the kind of response that the Flemings had anticipated, although they did make early efforts to provide rudimentary services. Over time, however, it became clear that the pace of development in Kelvinside was outstripping the limited resources of the Estate owners. By 1881 there were some 4,700 residents settled within the district, whose needs were now much more than basic street lighting or road repairs.¹⁹⁵ In particular, the problem of sewage disposal had become critical, with no adequate drainage facility for so large a group of people.¹⁹⁶ The Trustees were not in a position to provide the appropriate outlet, especially as the recent

collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank had called into question the general funding of large-scale construction projects. Unless Kelvinside could be merged with an existing municipal authority, which would be able provide the necessary financial support, the proprietors were faced with an embarrassing dilemma which might well have serious public health implications.

Although he was later coy about admitting the course of action at first pursued by the Kelvinside proprietors, J.B. Fleming entered into merger discussions with the Commissioners of Partick during 1881, on the understanding that the Estate Company would pay the costs of the necessary petition to the Sheriff of Lanarkshire.¹⁹⁷ There was logic in Fleming's selection of Partick rather than Hillhead or Glasgow as the most appropriate vehicle for the Kelvinside rescue operation. Partick had a lengthy border on the River Clyde, which was the essential outlet for Kelvinside's sewage, and it also had the added attraction of its own police force. Hillhead could claim neither of these advantages; moreover, Fleming had a less than cordial relationship with the Hillhead Commissioners, which was later to become bitterly antagonistic.¹⁹⁸ Amalgamation with Glasgow was wholly out of the question, because Kelvinside shared no common boundary with the city, and Parliament would inevitably take a dim view of fragmented areas of jurisdiction. Hillhead was in the same position as Crosshill in forming a buffer between Glasgow and the prize territory beyond, and like

Crosshill there seemed little prospect of persuading the residents to give up burghal independence and unite with the city. Accordingly, the Kelvinside proprietors took what was to them the second best option, and threw in their lot with the Commissioners of Partick.

However, Kelvinside's amalgamation plans went quickly awry. The Hillhead Commissioners had for years nursed hopes of combining with their wealthier neighbour, and did not intend to stand by meekly and allow Partick to upstage them.¹⁹⁹ They immediately lodged a rival annexation petition, with the result that the future of Kelvinside was suddenly a hotly-debated topic in and around Glasgow. The residents of the disputed territory became split over the competing claims on their behalf; the prospect of merger with proletarian Partick was a particular sticking point, with a minority faction arguing that Hillhead should administer Kelvinside, as both districts shared a similar class composition.²⁰⁰ On the other hand, most Kelvinsiders looked down with disdain on the activities of the smaller burghs, regarding them as parochial and penny-pinching. If amalgamation must take place, then a direct link with Glasgow was greatly preferred to the dubious Partick or Hillhead connection. Residents made it quite clear that the unilateral action of the Kelvinside Trustees to promote annexation was viewed locally with disfavour, and on these grounds the Sheriff of Lanarkshire ruled that no change should be made to the status

of the district.²⁰¹ This decision prompted the Trustees to look to the Parish of Govan to solve their sewage problem and, after lengthy enquiry, the Sheriff sanctioned the formation of the Hayburn Special Drainage District.²⁰²

In itself, this episode seems scarcely to have been a crucial turning point in Glasgow's municipal history, and in all probability the impetus for annexation would have gathered pace regardless of the impending sanitary crisis in Kelvinside. However, once J.B. Fleming had been apprised of the majority feeling within the community, he set to work with characteristic energy to identify Kelvinside as part of Glasgow. The uncertain financial climate of the early 1880s guided his actions; the structural integrity of Kelvinside was at stake, because the Trustees could not afford to be caught in another compromising situation like that of 1881. Unofficial links with Glasgow's civic representatives were therefore forged, and it helped enormously that so many influential Kelvinsiders had intimate Council connections, such as W.G. Blackie, James Merry Forrester and James Morrison.²⁰³ Next, Hillhead was targeted as being ripe for conversion to annexation; there had not been an election since the inauguration of the burgh in 1869, but from 1883 seats began to be contested.²⁰⁴ As in Kelvinside, prominent Hillhead residents were recruited by Fleming to promote the virtues of combining with Glasgow. William R.W. Smith was a particular ally, who also happened to be a Glasgow

town councillor.²⁰⁵ On the more negative side, a campaign of misinformation was launched, with dark hints of maladministration and corruption in Hillhead. Indeed, in a direct reversal of accusations made against Glasgow during the 1860s, it was implied that the Commissioners were under the thralldom of ambitious burgh officials, who were effectively the de facto power in the district.²⁰⁶

Fleming and his closely-knit group of supporters were also very much aware that the redistribution of Parliamentary seats was one of the prime objectives of the Liberal Government, once the principle of reform had been conceded for the county electorate. As the Town Council had attempted to take advantage of the redistribution of 1868, so a new opportunity was created to redefine the Glasgow constituency and, hopefully, the municipality. Moreover, the political climate was considerably more auspicious during the early 1880s than it had been two decades previously, as Glasgow's Liberal and Conservative Associations were united over the need for the extended constituency.²⁰⁷ While their motives diverged, due to tactical differences over the internal division of the constituency, the basic goal remained identical.²⁰⁸ Consequently, Kelvinsiders represented a variety of views; although J.B. Fleming was an outspoken Conservative, many of his henchmen - like Forrester and Morrison - were active Liberals.²⁰⁹ Their political objective was unequivocally the

creation of the "Greater Glasgow", a term which came into popular use at precisely this time, and was to be a potent slogan for the pro-annexationist campaign.

Yet achieving the "Greater Glasgow" was much more than a matter of local pride, as it aimed to firmly establish the city in the national context, ahead of rivals like Liverpool, Birmingham or Manchester.²¹⁰ The intensity of the redistribution debate, following the passing of the 1884 Representation of the People Act, was fuelled by the fact that the Government refused to acknowledge Glasgow's place as the "Second City", not just of the United Kingdom but of the Empire. The broad consensus of opinion, as manifested throughout the city press, was that Glasgow under an enlarged constituency would be worth a total of ten or even twelve MPs, rather than the seven decreed within the existing boundaries by Prime Minister Gladstone.²¹¹ This would compare favourably with Liverpool and Birmingham, where the respective quotas were nine and seven. The Birmingham allocation was particularly galling, as Glasgow's population was some 110,000 more than the southern city, yet it had the same level of representation. An immediate result of this numerical imbalance was that a strong sense of competitiveness became implanted in the Glasgow consciousness, to the effect that anything Birmingham could do, Glasgow could do better, and with more panache. At a Town Council meeting to debate municipal strategy over the extension

proposals, Bailie John Shearer ironically summed up the general resentment about the "unfair and arbitrary" treatment meted out to the city:²¹²

Had it [Glasgow] become the centre of a communistic or Parnellite propaganda which had for its object the destruction of the rights of property and the individual liberty of the citizens, and was it because of this mad infatuation that it was considered that it would not be well for a people so given up to license to have their proportionate voice in the deliberations of the nation? Or was it that the calibre of their prospective Parliamentary representatives did not come up to the standard to satisfy Her Majesty's Government? ... Or was it that the Government, knowing that Glasgow claimed the position of the second city in the empire, were determined so to minimise its importance that it should no longer have that pre-eminence?

The Government remained resolute in face of powerful representations on behalf of assorted Glasgow interest groups to extend the constituency. There can also be little doubt that Glaswegians and Kelvinsiders were working in close liaison to make maximum impact during the Parliamentary deliberations, in order to impress upon the Government that the claim for municipal merger was valid. Early in 1885 the Boundary Commissioners came to the city, and heard pleas from Lord Provost William McOnie to reconsider their extension policy.²¹³ General John Bayly, Chairman of the Commissioners, refused on the familiar grounds that county interests would be adversely affected if any concessions were made. In response, the Glasgow delegation, headed by the Lord Provost and Town

Clerk Marwick, swept out of the meeting in the Merchants' Hall, with the defiant assurance that "every constitutional means of obtaining redress" would be taken.²¹⁴ Following on from this, an extraordinary altercation ensued between General Bayly and representatives from Kelvinside, led by Messrs. Fleming and Forrester, who unsuccessfully demanded to present a local petition. Opponents of the extended constituency, from the counties and Police Burghs, could scarcely get a word in edgeways as the Kelvinsiders stood their ground and the proceedings ended in shambles. This ostentatious demonstration showed how far Fleming had cultivated his pugnacious, pro-Glasgow image, and his supreme self-confidence that the "Wee Town Clerks" from the suburban burghs were not going to get the better of him on a public platform.²¹⁵

Meanwhile, the destabilisation tactics used in Hillhead were being extended into other districts. "Ratepayers' Groups" began to spring up, calling for the extension of the Parliamentary constituency as in the best interests of the wider community.²¹⁶ Direct political interests often lay behind these groups, with the Liberals particularly active in Partick and the Conservatives in Govan.²¹⁷ However, a general Co-ordinating Committee acting on behalf of the residents in various Police Burghs was also established; its Chairman was James Morrison, its Treasurer J.B. Fleming, and its Secretary William Boyd Anderson, who was yet another Kelvinside

lawyer.²¹⁸ Soon, public meeting after public meeting was voting in favour of the Glasgow Parliamentary connection. Feelings ran particularly high in Govanhill, where many middle-class residents were appalled at the prospect of being forced into the proposed Govan constituency.²¹⁹ Even in Govan - hitherto a bastion of burghal self-determination - strenuous efforts were being made to combine with Glasgow.²²⁰ It should be stressed that such manifestations of support did not represent the majority feelings of the assorted Burgh Commissioners; indeed, when the Town Council attempted to co-ordinate a joint strategy with burgh representatives, there was virtually no focus for mutual agreement.²²¹ It is also a moot point as to how representative the local ratepayers' groups actually were, particularly as some of the public meetings had been poorly attended.²²⁰ On the other hand, the striking propaganda success of the campaign for the "Greater Glasgow" was such that the united front previously held by the outlying districts began to fracture from within.

The Town Council was not at all daunted by the ultimate failure of the 1885 extension campaign, as a considerable moral victory had been achieved which contrasted sharply with the demoralising defeats of the 1870s. In an attempt to ride the current wave of civic patriotism, a determined effort was made almost immediately to formally attach Kelvinside and Hillhead to Glasgow.²²³ The mechanism used by the Town Council was

somewhat complex, as it could not be seen to be making the first moves in promoting the requisite annexation Bill. This would clearly show that it was coercing the Burgh of Hillhead, and past experience had proved that any element of compulsion would substantially weaken the Glasgow case in Parliament. Alternative tactics were therefore employed, which were scarcely subtle, as they involved J.B. Fleming and his wealthy coterie of Kelvinsiders.²²⁴ A scenario was then enacted, whereby a group of Kelvinside and Hillhead residents promoted their own Bill on behalf of the respective communities, which Glasgow Town Council eventually brought itself round to support after a great demonstration of reluctance.²²⁵ This support extended as far as finance, as the Council virtually underwrote the legal and other costs of the Bill, claiming to be acting on behalf of vital public interests. Yet at no time did Glasgow's civic leadership officially involve itself in presenting the case to Parliament; to all intents and purposes the impetus for annexation was seen by Select Committee members as having developed spontaneously and independently.²²⁶

As Michael Simpson has indicated, the future of Glasgow's Botanic Gardens - located in the heart of Kelvinside-Hillhead territory - was used as the main rallying point for the pro-annexationists.²²⁷ The timing of the financial crisis of the Royal Botanic Institution of Glasgow was more than coincidental, especially as the Directors had been dependent on

municipal funding since 1878, with the Town Council reserving the right of acquiring the Gardens for the city as part of the agreement.²²⁸ With this arrangement expected to run for at least ten years, the Directors were "taken very much by surprise" when they received a formal notice in September 1885 calling up the accumulated debt of over £40,000.²²⁹ Because the Town Council had no jurisdiction over the area, it appeared to be repudiating any interest in the Gardens, and was no longer prepared to act as patron for the Institution. In theory, the Directors were placed in the awkward position of having to sell the Gardens, which were expected to be snapped up by property developers for building purposes; a bleak prospect for local residents, who were fiercely proud of the Gardens' splendid amenity. In reality, there was no doubt that the Town Council was deliberately gambling with the future of the Gardens in an effort to exert maximum pressure for annexation. Moreover, with J.B. Fleming as feudal superior over the Gardens, and James Merry Forrester one of the Directors, there is uncertainty as to whether there was any surprise at all over the Town Council's actions.²³⁰ As it happened, the Gardens proved to be too rich a prize to be lost to the municipality, especially with so many councillors living in the vicinity, but at the time a sizeable number of Kelvinside and Hillhead residents were sufficiently swayed by the threat from Glasgow into signing the annexation petition.²³¹

The Commissioners of Hillhead Burgh attempted to thwart the Bill's progress, but the process was a lengthy one, and the timing unfortunate in view of the volatile political climate during 1886. Indeed, J.B. Fleming took great satisfaction in deriding the Commissioners as ardent "Home Rulers", with eccentric notions of what constituted effective government.²³² A further disadvantage for Hillhead was that - in contrast with Glasgow's experience over the abortive Crosshill annexation in 1875 - the new Bill found many supporters in the House of Commons, and passed through the Committee stage with relative ease. The Bill progressed to the House of Lords for a second reading, and was approved without a division, but the dissolution of Parliament intervened, and the Committee proceedings were deferred until February 1887.²³³ After five days of hearing evidence, it was decided by a majority of one that the preamble had not been proved. Accusing fingers were immediately pointed at the Marquis of Tweeddale for orchestrating this unexpected reversal, and the Glasgow Herald asked rhetorically:²³⁴

Why the Marquis should have been so seriously concerned over a purely local and a purely West of Scotland measure has always been something of a puzzle, and perhaps no one can explain this devotion - unless it be the Town Clerk of Hillhead ...

It should be added that J.B. Fleming had already enlightened Herald readers that the mysterious connection between the

Marquis and James Muirhead, Clerk to the Hillhead Commissioners, was that the former was Chairman of the North British Canadian Investment Company (Ltd.), while the latter was the Secretary.²³⁵

If the pro-annexationists had lost a battle, they had certainly not lost the war. The general manifestation of Parliamentary support during 1886 and 1887 was viewed as deeply gratifying, and the Town Council felt that the time was ripe to exploit this goodwill and seek the long-delayed official enquiry into the whole boundary question. The Secretary for Scotland in the Conservative Government was a Marquis who was much more approachable than his Tweeddale counterpart; Lord Lothian declared himself willing to establish the Boundary Commission, as requested. The worst fears of the Police Burghs were realised when the three Commissioners were subsequently appointed; Badenoch Nicholson, Sir Charles Tennant and J.H.A. Macdonald, the Lord Advocate, were all firmly identified as friends of Glasgow, with Macdonald personally close to J.B. Fleming. Robert Bruce, by now the elder statesman of Hillhead Burgh, wrote:²³⁶

We have heard something in these times of packed juries to try men for capital offences, but nothing that I have ever heard in the way of packed juries can at all compare with the present commission. It appears to me that in their eagerness for the death of the unfortunate parties who are about to be tried, the wire-pullers of the Corporation have over-reached themselves, and managed to get a

jury put together which is so obviously unfair and biased that their verdict can have no possible weight, and can settle nothing.

Although two extra Commissioners were appointed in response to accusations of partiality, the Police Burghs continued to nurse a burning sense of grievance, especially when the Commissioners issued their final Report and declared unequivocally, "That the City of Glasgow should be extended so as to include the whole continuous urban area, of which the present City is the centre".²³⁷

Was it luck, wire-pulling or sheer hard work that favoured Glasgow's fortunes in the Boundary Commissioners' Report of 1888? As has been seen from this account of the amalgamation struggles, all three factors contributed towards the recommendation that the Town Council's case was valid, and should be acted upon. However, there was an added factor which was less tangible, but vitally important towards understanding the shift in attitude which supported city interests, as opposed to those of the smaller burghs. J.B. Fleming's barb about the "Home Rulers" in the Police Burghs was a reflection of the growing ideological commitment towards centralisation, which in turn was influencing ideas about local administration. The advantages of central control had, in a different sense, been acknowledged forty years earlier in the arguments of Utilitarians, Evangelicals and avowed anti-Liberals like Sir Archibald Alison. Yet such a drift towards centralisation was

abruptly halted in the wake of the contentious 1848 Public Health Act, which was bitterly criticised for allowing too much concentration of power in paid officials.²³⁸ Although the Act did not apply in Scotland, and evangelical influences continued to inspire Glasgow town councillors in policies of municipal expansion, the fear of centralisation became deep-rooted in the national consciousness. The 1850 Police of Towns (Scotland) Act certainly had a practical purpose in providing an administrative mechanism for governing populous places, but it was also a concession to more localised democracy, albeit within the framework of the limited franchise. This was the kind of reasoning that guided the actions of the Commons Select Committee in 1875, when it emphatically rejected Glasgow's case for the Crosshill annexation.

Kelvinside's experience only six years later revealed the fragility of the mid-Victorian consensus, showing that localism was not necessarily advantageous when more pressing needs were concerned. Thus, in being forced to tackle its own awesome problems, Glasgow Town Council had developed a technical expertise on which the surrounding districts - willingly or reluctantly - were increasingly dependent. The much-vaunted virtue of self-reliance was rendered less relevant in the context of Glasgow's growing commitment to the vital public services, which had to be maintained on the large-scale and in the long-term. Moreover, the economic buoyancy which had helped

to foster the creation of the Police Burghs in the new residential districts had collapsed after 1878, and the destabilising effect of the City of Glasgow Bank crash made a profound impression on the confidence of the community, both materially and emotionally.²³⁹ It is significant that only East Pollokshields - reluctantly - was erected into a Police Burgh after this time, and although such a step was contemplated in areas like Langside, Mount Florida and Shawlands, the first option of the inhabitants was merger with Glasgow.²⁴⁰ There is also evidence to show that some of the existing burghs were struggling financially during the 1880s. One prominent pro-annexationist in Hillhead pointed out that rates had been deliberately pegged in the burgh to compare more favourably with Glasgow, with the result that the Commissioners were borrowing heavily to make up the shortfall.²⁴¹ Maryhill - dubbed "Clartyhill" in The Bailie - was singled out in the Boundary Commission Report as having grossly inadequate administrative arrangements, and the local movement for annexation to Glasgow was especially strong.²⁴²

If Glasgow Town Council had come to represent a reassuring symbol of solidity after 1878, then it made sense for the outlying districts to combine with it in union. The use of the term "union" is particularly appropriate in connection with the annexation movement, reflecting as it does the wider political debate about the constitutional integrity of the United

Kingdom. Whether by accident or design, the campaign for the "Greater Glasgow" echoed the contemporary call for the "Greater Britain"; civic patriotism and national patriotism were seen to be mutually reinforcing.²⁴³ One reason why the leadership of the assorted Police Burghs lost so much credibility at the time of the redistribution of seats debate was, as the Glasgow News put it, "They cannot even state their case without proclaiming that they are inhabitants of Strathbungo first and Britons afterwards".²⁴⁴ Of course, all this predated the Home Rule crisis of 1886, but it is worth noting that Gladstone's refusal to yield to pressure over the Parliamentary constituency identified him firmly with the so-called "Parnellites" of the suburbs, and helped him to make powerful enemies in the city. After Unionism became a political fait accompli, many of the leading architects of the annexation strategy on the Town Council - notably James Colquhoun, Robert Crawford, David Richmond and Town Clerk Marwick - were adherents to the new cause, while the sub-committee which progressed the Boundaries Bill had a Unionist majority.²⁴⁵ Moreover, there was a direct link between Unionist politics and ambitions for restructuring the extended city, which was to be a factor in winning over some of the more recalcitrant elements in the Police Burghs.

"Divisional management" as a solution to the problem of Glasgow's administration was first put forward as a positive recommendation in the 1888 Boundary Commission Report.²⁴⁶ The

idea was perhaps not so new after all; there were echoes of the abortive 1841 Police Bill in the suggestion that the day-to-day implementation of public services should be conducted by locally-elected Boards, under a central controlling body. The desire for more efficient policing was certainly a strong motivating influence behind the pro-annexationist movement during the 1880s; for instance, in his personal statement to the Boundary Commissioners, J.B. Fleming made pointed references to the swarms of "bad characters" from Maryhill who were able to cross unhindered into Kelvinside of a Sunday afternoon, to the annoyance of local property owners.²⁴⁷ However, there were also qualitative differences from the perceptions of authority that had prevailed during the 1840s. Divisional management was consciously conceived as a concession to ideas of localism within a centralist framework, and in this connection it had much in common with general ideas of local government currently being put forward by Joseph Chamberlain. In his famous "Radical Scotland" speech made in Glasgow during 1885, the future Unionist leader made his position quite clear:²⁴⁸

Gentlemen, I want to build up a system of local government below from very small beginnings. I would like to see no parish, no village without some kind of local authority. I do not want to crush out the germs of local life, however small and insignificant they may appear to be. I want to foster them and promote the political education of the people. Then I want to see local authorities with wider areas and larger functions to deal with local matters in districts and in counties, and in this way I should expect to find the whole

country covered with a network of popular representative bodies able to protect the rights of the people and to care for their most intimate interests.

Chamberlain's ideas of local government seemed a particularly attractive answer to Glasgow's territorial dilemma during the 1880s. He implied that the municipality was an organically developing entity, with roots in localism, but that larger administrative units were necessary to serve the needs of the wider community. From "municipality" it was an easy enough step to substitute "Empire"; hence there was no contradiction in ardent municipalisers on Glasgow Town Council being seen to embrace the imperialist ethos. On the other hand, it must be queried how far the adoption of the Chamberlainite philosophy was actually used as an expedient by certain of Glasgow's civic rulers. It has already been pointed out that centralising tendencies had been apparent at the municipal level from at least the 1840s, while the North British Daily Mail had asked pleadingly after the Crosshill débâcle of 1875:²⁴⁹

... is there any insuperable obstacle to the discovery and adoption of such a scheme of municipal government for Glasgow and its present suburbs as would secure concentration of authority as far as this is possible, and yet preserve to each district a large measure of local self-government?

By the following decade, the climate of the times had changed sufficiently for a practical framework to be constructed, based on this very question. Chamberlain's views coincided with the

long-standing territorial ambitions of many Glasgow town councillors, and did nothing to alter their ultimate aims; however, the impact of Chamberlainite thinking was such as to add much-needed credibility to the Glasgow case. In this context, the beleaguered suburban burghs were no longer seen as symbols of the mid-Victorian ideal, but had become a political anachronism.

There was another important reason why the adoption of the divisional idea of local government can be considered as something of an expedient for Glasgow Town Council; like Chamberlain's devolutionist strategy for Scotland and Ireland, it was never implemented.²⁵⁰ Divisional management was a much-talked of aspect of Glasgow's municipal politics prior to 1914, and became a "burning issue" from time to time, but it never went further than the theoretical stage, apart from a half-hearted gesture during the 1890s.²⁵¹ Nevertheless, it was repeatedly used by the Town Council as a bargaining lever with the outlying districts, and in the successful negotiations over the annexation of Govan and Partick in 1912, burgh representatives claimed to have been swayed by the promise of greater local autonomy.²⁵² The First World War put paid to the divisional debate, and so the sincerity of Glasgow's intentions can never be tested; yet, in retrospect, it would appear that the divisional option was really a cover which allowed the Police Burghs to acquiesce to annexation without

losing too much face. When the Town Council began earnestly to win round the suburbs in 1889, the clinching factor in most of the negotiations was not devolution but hard cash. Having learned their lesson over twenty years in the most costly and arduous fashion, Glasgow's civic rulers felt that they had nothing more to lose, and made a financial offer to the effect that rates would be pegged for five years at twenty per cent. less than the going-rate in the "Old City".²⁵³ This, combined with abolishing the higher water assessment imposed on the outlying areas, considerably softened the financial impact of annexation, and even lowered overall rates in districts like Maryhill. (See Table 2.2.)

Of course, it would be mistaken to assume that the Police Burghs were readily bribed into selling their independence. Progress was not smooth in the negotiations between the outlying districts and the Town Council, nor was Parliament as amenable to annexation as had been blithely expected in Glasgow after the publication of the Boundary Commissioners' Report. At the time, councillors had hoped that the Government would do all the work and approve a general Annexation Act, but after months of waiting for the Parliamentary machinery to be set in motion, Prime Minister Salisbury - who was proving to be suspiciously elusive - eventually admitted that the Town Council must promote its own Bill.²⁵⁴ Then the reform of Scottish county government intervened, to the irritation of the Glaswegians, who

Table 2.2: Yields and Assessments in Proposed Annexed Districts 1890-91, in Comparison with Glasgow

Burghs	Position in Burghs and Districts												Results if Taken into Glasgow											
	Yield of Assessment at their own rates, excl. of water				Yield of Water Rate at 10s per £ on dwelling houses				TOTALS				At Glasgow rates, excl. of water & under deduction of 20%				On water at city rates of 6d per £ on house rental and 1d on gross rental				TOTALS			
	£	s	d		£	s	d		£	s	d		£	s	d		£	s	d					
Hillhead	7,985	8	7		3,150	0	0		11,135	8	7		8,857	10	5		2,263	11	9		11,121	2	2	
Maryhill	8,227	17	10		1,932	14	2		10,160	12	0		7,084	2	11		1,475	9	6		8,560	2	5	
Govanhill	4,141	12	4		1,836	14	2		5,978	6	6		5,494	11	2		1,341	8	6		6,835	19	8	
P' shields (E)	3,636	6	4		1,631	0	10		5,267	7	2		4,087	10	1		1,150	15	2		5,238	5	3	
P' shields (W)	4,463	10	10		1,937	16	8		6,401	7	6		5,395	4	9		1,390	2	10		6,785	7	7	
Crosshill	2,235	16	9		1,067	18	4		3,303	15	1		3,003	10	2		1,767	7	4		3,770	17	6	
TOTALS	30,690	12	8		11,556	4	2		42,246	16	10		33,922	19	6		8,388	15	1		42,311	14	7	
<u>Districts</u>																								
Possilpark	2,002	10	5		536	0	0		2,538	10	5		2,019	13	8		415	10	10		2,435	4	6	
Springburn	2,054	0	9		1,292	3	2		3,346	3	11		2,068	5	6		504	8	2		2,572	13	8	
Kelvinside	4,830	5	5		3,338	16	8		8,169	2	1		8,810	12	0		2,375	11	6		11,186	3	6	
Bellahouston	1,441	5	10		321	15	0		1,763	0	10		2,499	8	4		2,299	16	3		2,799	4	7	
Folmerdie	816	8	6		171	14	2		1,988	2	8		1,424	11	9		167	1	2		1,591	12	11	
Strathbungo	1,120	18	9		731	15	0		1,852	13	9		2,066	5	7		526	19	4		2,593	4	11	
Mount Florida	2,708	12	2		1,869	16	8		4,578	8	10		5,354	0	8		1,349	3	11		6,703	4	7	
Langside	719	5	0		493	0	0		1,212	5	0		1,416	13	0		355	14	9		1,772	7	9	
Crossmyloof																								
Shawlands	15,693	6	10		8,755	0	8		24,448	7	6		25,659	10	6		5,994	5	11		31,653	16	5	
TOTALS																								
Totals of Burghs & Districts	46,383	19	6		20,311	4	10		66,695	4	4		59,582	10	0		14,383	1	0		73,965	11	0	

Source: Strathclyde Regional Archives A3/1/143: Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1891, Vol. 1, page 460.

saw it as yet another delaying factor. They were particularly concerned about arrangements for fixing the new county boundaries, believing that these might prejudice the Town Council's chances of annexing areas under county control; in consequence, a "saving clause" had to be introduced to the 1889 Local Government (Scotland) Act to safeguard Glasgow's interests.²⁵⁵ On the other hand, there were advantages to Glasgow in the creation of the new County Councils. The Commissioners of Supply were now replaced by elected representatives, allowing for a direct channel of accountability, and making it more difficult for the counties to be used as a vehicle for personal political interests. County reform also cleared the way for the extended Glasgow to be made a County of a City in 1893, which had the important effect of giving the Town Council a clearly defined administrative identity.²⁵⁶ As the sole focus of municipal government in the "Greater Glasgow" the Council's status was boosted enormously; a consideration which it was hoped would influence the further extension of the city boundaries.

Despite the delays after 1888, the Town Council was able to progress its annexation strategy surprisingly quickly, bearing in mind the tortoise-like pace of developments since 1868. It greatly helped that, apart from Partick, all the districts north of the river were in favour of annexation; Hillhead had succumbed to the eroding process initiated in 1883, and fallen

under the control of pro-Glasgow Commissioners.²⁵⁷ The South Side was a different story; the ill-feeling generated by the struggles over "No Man's Land" had not been quelled in Crosshill and Govanhill, and the Commissioners continued to campaign vigorously against the Glasgow connection. Along with Partick, Govan and Kinning Park, the two Police Burghs held out against the Town Council's first Annexation Bill, and were sufficiently successful in their resistance that the House of Lords Select Committee rejected the Bill in 1890.²⁵⁸ Not that the Lords were unsympathetic to the Glasgow case; their reason for thwarting the Bill was based on the familiar argument that there were unwilling parties involved, but that there was room for further negotiations. Glasgow's civic representatives took this advice to heart, and ardently began to woo the reluctant suburbs. So well did they perform that there were hopes that Partick could be won for Glasgow, subject to an agreement over divisional management. Stalemate was only reached after protracted but friendly discussions; Glasgow was prepared to make some concessions, but not in the direction of the essentially federalist system demanded by Partick.²⁵⁹ Fortunes with the other burghs were mixed; Govan and Kinning Park remained resolutely aloof from the annexation discussions, but Crosshill and Govanhill did participate. Holding out to the last, and winning even more concessions from the Town Council, they eventually consented to become part of Glasgow in

1891.²⁶⁰

The City of Glasgow Act received the Royal Assent in July of that year, and was to have a profound effect in shaping the future direction of municipal affairs in the extended city.²⁶¹ Not only was the geographical entity of Glasgow redefined, but the Council's administrative arrangements were drastically overhauled to cope with the suburban influx. The Act was itself straightforward; it described the new boundaries, explained the constitution of the enlarged Town Council, and detailed the legal criteria to be used for transferring funds and property to Glasgow. It also outlined the provisions for compensating staff and officials who had been removed from office during the municipal upheaval; a process of negotiation, incidentally, which was to last for over ten years. The areas added to Glasgow covered 5,750 acres and comprised the following territory: north of the river, the burghs of Hillhead and Maryhill, plus the districts of Kelvinside, Ruchill, Possilpark, North Springburn, Balornock, and the Water Works at Belvidere; south of the river, the burghs of Crosshill, Govanhill, Pollokshields West, Pollokshields East, plus the districts of Bellahouston, Polmadie, Queen's Park, Langside, Shawlands and Crossmyloof.²⁶² The added areas were overwhelmingly of a residential character and, with the creation of nine municipal wards, the number of elected councillors was increased from forty-eight to seventy-five. Until the ward reorganisation of

1896, the influence of the newcomers was disproportionate to their numbers. For instance, in 1891 three councillors were returned for the ward of Pollokshields West, with a total electorate of 586, while the "Old City" ward of Woodside retained identical representation, with a massive electorate of 11,502.²⁶³ The implications of this territorial imbalance will be assessed in detail elsewhere; it is sufficient to note that in 1891 the basis of Glasgow's municipal representation did not realistically reflect the geographical distribution of the electorate, and heavily favoured the wealthier suburbs and the central business districts.

The period after 1891 was one of the busiest ever experienced by Glasgow Town Council, when an unprecedented number of statutes were passed which altered and redefined municipal functions. An allusion has already been made to Glasgow becoming a County of a City in 1893; two years later the Town Council was metamorphosed into the Corporation of Glasgow, with the City Police and the various Trusts now legally united under one controlling authority.²⁶⁴ There was even the opportunity to make further territorial extensions to the city. Bellahouston Park, plus the lands of Craigton were added in 1896, while Richmond Park, Riddrie, Blackhill and Provanmill were acquired in 1899.²⁶⁵ Glasgow's density of population eased considerably after 1891; total acreage almost doubled from 6,111 to 11,861, while the number of persons per acre dropped

from 91.87 to 55.49.²⁶⁶ Not that this made any overnight difference to the myriad inhabitants of the city's one-roomed dwellings; however, as J.B. Fleming was at pains to point out, Glasgow was not necessarily synonymous with slums and overcrowding after 1891.²⁶⁷ Indeed, from this time there seemed to be greater scope for the Town Council to more meaningfully tackle the housing problem. In 1891 Samuel Chisholm became Convener of the City Improvement Trust, and immediately set himself the task of reorganising the Trust's administration and expanding its sphere of operation.²⁶⁸ As will be explained in a subsequent section of this thesis, Chisholm was helped in his rise to municipal prominence because he had a particular power base in the suburbs, most notably Pollokshields.²⁶⁹

If the definition of Glasgow was fundamentally altered by the extension of 1891, what became of those outsiders, Partick, Govan and Kinning Park? Negotiations to incorporate the burghs did not cease after 1891. In December of that year Kinning Park representatives declared their willingness to talk terms over annexation; a process that continued over three years, when Partick and Govan were also asked to participate.²⁷⁰ Once again, the major focus of discussion was divisional management, and the Town Council went so far as to prepare a statement outlining how such a scheme could be operated.²⁷¹ Yet, in 1896 a full meeting of Corporation councillors emphatically

rejected the divisional option, on the basis that it was an administrative "circumlocution", and hampered effective channels of communication.²⁷² One councillor summed up the prevailing mood of the meeting by suggesting that the outside districts were receiving disproportionate attention, and the divisional arrangement would only encourage this trend.²⁷³ However, the abandonment of any interest in municipal extension was short lived. In March 1898, Lord Provost David Richmond was responsible for setting up an ad hoc committee to re-examine the boundary question, and tentative discussions were held with the Commissioners of Partick.²⁷⁴ The burgh seemed to be in a particular quandary as to whether it should throw in its lot with the Corporation; sometimes it was swayed by the city, sometimes by Govan, which was always the stronger of the two in resisting the siren call from Glasgow. As it happened, Partick retained its independence until 1912, but the periodic discussions with Glasgow showed that it was never wholly aloof from the idea of municipal merger.

Perhaps the Corporation councillors in 1896 thought that the three burghs would be eventually forced into seeking annexation, and were thus prepared to bide their time. The waiting strategy bore fruit in the case of Kinning Park, and reasons for the annexation are not too difficult to discern. Wedged between Govan and the Kingston district of Glasgow, Kinning Park was strongly proletarian; indeed, Samuel Chisholm's middle-class

friends from the Pollokshields United Presbyterian Church had made regular forays into the slum areas, in order to "rescue the fallen and reclaim the lapsed".²⁷⁵ By 1904 a movement had been set in motion to combine with Glasgow, largely because it had become glaringly apparent that the majority of Kinning Park ratepayers were not receiving a square deal from the burgh. This was nothing to do with material deficiencies in administration, as Kinning Park standards seemed to be no worse than in any other Police Burgh; rather, the level of rates was the question at issue, and exactly who was reaping financial benefits from the continued separation from Glasgow.

To understand the position of Glasgow's rates in relation to the outside burghs, it should be stressed that two different assessments had long been levied in the city; for properties with a yearly rental under £10, and for those of £10 and over. This arrangement was first implemented by the pre-1846 Glasgow Police Board, and the £10 criteria was sanctioned under the 1843 Police Act.²⁷⁶ More precisely, full police rates were charged on the higher rental, and half on the lower rental. No such system of differential rating had prevailed in the Police Burghs, which had the effect of making the poorer ratepayers pay substantially more than their Glasgow equivalents by the 1900s. Thus, in Kinning Park during the financial year 1903-04, 3s 10d was the overall rate per pound, inclusive of county, parish and water assessments: in Glasgow, the rate was respectively 4s and

3s 4d above and below £10.²⁷⁷ Unlike Glasgow, the number of properties at less than £10 rental was the majority in Kinning Park; 1,960 as opposed to 1,420 at the higher rental.²⁷⁸ There was therefore no surprise when the Kinning Park electorate voted to support annexation, especially with the promise of a ten per cent. rates reduction over five years. If there was any surprise at all at this turn of events, it was that the pro-Glasgow movement had not been able to voice its feelings earlier.

What happened in Kinning Park was similarly repeated in Partick and Govan in 1912. Of course, there was much more to this major annexation than simply a ratepayers' revolt and, as will be seen elsewhere in this thesis, considerable efforts were made by the Glasgow Ratepayers' Federation Ltd. to protect the two burghs.²⁷⁹ However, the Federation represented business interests rather than individual householders, and once again the figures for the ordinary occupier speak for themselves. During 1911-12, Partick and Govan imposed a rate of 4s 1d and 4s 2d respectively; Glasgow rates compared much more favourably, with 4s 1d and 3s 6d levied above and below £10.²⁸⁰ In view of the importance of the rating question to lower income families, much of the running for municipal merger in Govan was done by the Scottish Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd., based in Shieldhall, along with the Independent Labour Party, which was building up a strong power base in the burgh.²⁸¹ Rates

were to the fore in the evidence presented to Parliament to progress the Annexation Bill, although Govan's housing crisis was put forward as another reason for favouring amalgamation.²⁸² Labour and Co-operative activists were by no means the only component in the pro-annexation movement; local residents generally spoke out against the intransigent stance of certain Burgh Commissioners, who wanted to perpetuate a system of local government which many believed to be outmoded.²⁸³ At the same time, divisional management was dismissed by Glasgow's supporters as a smokescreen, creating yet another layer of bureaucracy, while centralisation was openly preferred as it streamlined services and pooled resources.

The pressure of local feeling, strongly backed by the monolithic machine of Glasgow Corporation, was too much for the anti-annexationists of Govan and Partick, several of whom responded ineptly under cross-examination during the Bill's Committee stage.²⁸⁴ Not that the two burghs were forced into combining with Glasgow, as they ultimately consented to amalgamation in July 1912, after protracted negotiations.²⁸⁵ By holding out to the last, the better-off burgh inhabitants did extremely well out of concessions from the Corporation; rates over £10 rental were pegged for a period of ten years, while those under £10 were brought in line with Glasgow's differential arrangements.²⁸⁶ Other material benefits were also achieved, including the provision of lending libraries, public baths and

wash-houses, plus improved fire and policing arrangements.²⁸⁷ Out of eleven new wards added to the Corporation in November 1912, Govan claimed four and Partick three; totalling twenty-one councillors, or over eighteen per cent. representation in the extended city. The other areas added to Glasgow at this time were Pollokshaws, Shettleston, Tollcross, King's Park, Cathcart, Newlands, Hillpark, Shieldhall, Braehead, Scotstoun, Anniesland, Jordanhill, Knightswood, Temple and Dawsholm; these were allocated four wards, or twelve councillors between them.²⁸⁸

The city's territorial expanse now extended to 19,183 acres, as opposed to 12,975; its population was increased from 784,496 to 1,007,601. This was much to the satisfaction of Glasgow's civic leaders, who had viewed with irritation the pretensions of Birmingham to be "Second City of the Empire", after a recent municipal expansion. Glasgow was now restored to its rightful position, unchallenged and - in the mood of pre-war confidence - seemingly invincible. J.B. Fleming was long since dead, but he would have been gratified to see the removal of the ring of Police Burghs which had encircled Glasgow.

References

1. "Case for the Proprietors of the Estate of Kelvinside", in the Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, Appendix, (Cd. 5382), PP, 1888, XLVI.1, page 152.
2. See Robert Renwick (ed.), Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, with Charters and other Documents, 1760-80, vol. VII, (Glasgow, 1912), page 393, for the Town Council's decision to make application to Parliament on 30th December 1772.
3. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 112-113.
4. Ibid. Also Renwick, Extracts from the Records of the Burgh of Glasgow, op. cit., 1781-95, vol. VIII, (Glasgow, 1913), pages vii-x, and 1796-1808, vol. IX, (Glasgow, 1914), pages vii-x. The Trades' House was particularly active in the campaign against the Town Council.
5. See Map I in the Appendices to this thesis.
6. The abortive Blythswood annexation is discussed on pages 24-26.
7. For the background to civic and police administration in Gorbals, Calton and Anderston, see Blackenden, op. cit., pages 67-85. The terms of the separate Police Acts for the three districts are explained in John Burnet, The Glasgow Police and Statute Labour Act, VI and VII Victoria, cap. 99, passed 17th August 1843: with an Introduction, containing a Narrative of the Previous Police and Statute Labour Acts for Glasgow; and an Appendix containing Notices of the Present Police Acts for Gorbals, Calton and Anderston, (Glasgow, 1843), pages xv-xxvi, SRA D-TC 14.3.2.
8. Under the terms of 13 & 14 Victoria, cap. 33, [1850], "An Act to make more effectual Provisions for regulating the Police of Towns and populous Places in Scotland, and for paving, draining, cleansing, lighting and improving the same". Until 1833, districts like Calton and Anderston had to go through the convoluted process of acquiring burghal status before they could apply to Parliament for powers to erect a police establishment. However, Government policy altered after 1833, and no new burghs of barony were created for administrative purposes. The Burgh Police (Scotland) Act of 1833, 3 & 4 William, (cap. 46), regulated the arrangements whereby an existing burgh could apply for its own Police Act; unchartered districts now remained firmly outwith the scope of the legislation. The Act of 1850 was introduced to rectify this anomaly, whereby districts with a

population of 1,200 or more - regardless of administrative status - could apply to become Police Burghs.

9. See pages 31-33.

10. See the Glasgow section of the Municipal Corporations (Scotland) - Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., pages 39-40.

11. Ibid., page 39.

12. See the Glasgow Herald, 26th November 1841, for John Burnet's comments on the Town Council's lack of enthusiasm for introducing radical measures into the 1837 Glasgow Police Bill. Apparently, most of the initiative for drafting the Bill came from the Glasgow Police Commissioners.

13. 7 William IV, cap. 48 [1837], "An Act to continue for limited term of years the Acts relating to the Police of the City of Glasgow, to vest the management of the Statute Labour conversion money of the said City in the Board of Police thereof, and for other purposes therein mentioned".

14. Adam Smith, for instance, held that it was preferable to tolerate an imperfect police system as part of the price of freedom. Until the 1820s there was a broad political consensus in mainland Britain that a centralised police force would represent an infringement of personal liberty. Attitudes began to alter as a result of the combined pressure of the Peelite and Benthamite philosophies, and it has been claimed that Peel would have achieved little without the Utilitarians and their theoretical study of the "science of police". Although the Conservatives and Utilitarians did not share a mutual identity of political interests, both placed more faith than the Liberals in the use of the state as an instrument of reform. Thus, Edwin Chadwick, Bentham's zealous disciple, was particularly helpful in promoting the Metropolitan Police Act. Interestingly, another noted advocate of Utilitarian ideas was Patrick Colquhoun - a former Glasgow Lord Provost, and founder of the city's Chamber of Commerce - whose Treatise on the Police of the Metropolis, published in 1797, influenced subsequent ideas of the reform of the London police. See T.A. Critchley, A History of Police in England and Wales, (London, 1967), pages 38-50. For a more critical assessment of Colquhoun, see Stanley H. Palmer, Police and Protest in England and Ireland, 1780-1850, (Cambridge, 1988), pages 118-119.

15. Robert D. Storch, "'The Plague of the Blue Locusts': Police Reform and Popular Resistance in Northern England, 1840-57", in International Review of Social History, vol. XX, part 1, 1975, page 61. Storch's description of the police as "a professional,

bureaucratically organised lever of urban discipline" accords precisely with Benthamite, Conservative and Evangelical notions of social control.

16. Clive Emsley, Policing and its Context, 1750-1870, (London, 1983), pages 59-60; Palmer, *op. cit.*, pages 193-203.

17. Palmer, *op. cit.* This comparative analysis of the early police in England and Ireland places the crucial Irish dimension firmly in historical context.

18. Critchley, *op. cit.*, pages 49-50.

19. This sense of urgency is graphically expressed in the First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force in the Counties of England and Wales, PP. 1839, XIX. The Commission had been set up by the Whig administration in 1836, in response to the earnest promptings of the ubiquitous Edwin Chadwick. In particular, Chadwick believed that a rural constabulary was essential to enforce the new Poor Law in England and Wales. See Emsley, *op. cit.*, page 68.

20. See the section relating to the "State of Protection of Manufacturing Industry", contained in the First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force ..., *op. cit.*, pages 68-87, where Glasgow is used as a particular example of the need for a more co-ordinated system of policing in the face of trade union militancy. For the background to the industrial tensions of spring and summer 1837, see W. Hamish Fraser, "The Glasgow Cotton Spinners, 1837", in John Butt and J.T. Ward (eds.), Scottish Themes: Essays in Honour of Professor S.G.E. Lythe, (Edinburgh, 1976), pages 80-97; also Fraser, Conflict and Class: Scottish Workers, 1700-1838, (Edinburgh, 1988), pages 153-162.

21. Alison is quoted at length in the First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force ..., *op. cit.*, page 84.

22. The Alison philosophy is expounded in the Sheriff of Lanarkshire's two volume autobiography, posthumously edited by his daughter-in-law, Jane R. Alison. See Sir Archibald Alison, Bart., Some Account of My Life and Writings: An Autobiography, (Edinburgh, 1883). It should be cautioned that some of Alison's recollections are misleading; for instance, he exaggerates the extent of industrial unrest during 1837, and takes sole credit for advocating the centralisation of Glasgow's police force under a Metropolitan-style authority. As an uncompromising

Tory, Alison's distrust of the new-fangled ideology of Conservatism probably prevented him from acknowledging the impact of Peelite ideas on plans for Glasgow's policing arrangements.

23. Ibid., page 374.

24. As has been previously indicated, there were ideological differences between Alison and the Peelites, notably Alison's lack of sympathy for the principles of free trade. Nevertheless, Alison did tend to ally himself with Glasgow's Conservatives, perceiving them as the only credible alternative to the dangers of rampant Whiggery. For Alison's appraisal of Sir Robert Peel, see *ibid.*, pages 364-366.

25. The Bill is summarised, paragraph by paragraph, in the Glasgow Herald, 13th September 1841.

26. The germ of the 1866 City Improvement Trust and 1853 Forbes Mackenzie Act can be clearly discerned in these proposals. In 1841 John Leadbetter - a deeply committed Church of Scotland Evangelical and Conservative - was reported as saying at a Town Council meeting, "... this subject [opening out the city centre] had occupied his attention for several years, and he might say that any private scheme for effecting the object contemplated by this clause would utterly fail. They would never improve the Wynds unless the means to do it were obtained by compulsory assessment ...". Quoted in *ibid.*, 10th December 1841.

27. Quoted in *ibid.*, 25th October 1841. Burnet was speedily to change his views; see *ibid.*, 22nd November 1841.

28. Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 18th and 22nd November 1841, pages 116-119, SRA E1.1.20.

29. *Ibid.*, 24th March 1842, page 161.

30. Campbell made much of two major conflagrations which had taken place in 1841 immediately outside the royalty. During October, part of the Lancefield Cotton Mills, Anderston, were destroyed by fire, while the following month a similar fate befell the Barrowfield Spinning Mill, Bridgeton. At the time, Glasgow Police Board was involved in a long-standing wrangle with insurance companies over the appropriate amount of cash to be paid for servicing fires outwith its own area of assessment. The companies refused to offer what the Board considered to be a realistic sum; consequently, Glasgow's fire engines were prevented by the Board from answering any alarm calls immediately beyond the city boundary.

The Board's instructions had been followed by the Glasgow fire department during the Lancefield fire, with the result that

the press directly attributed the destruction of the Mills to the alleged intransigence of the Police Commissioners. Lord Provost Campbell therefore took it upon himself to personally command Glasgow's engines to the Barrowfield fire; like a general leading an army, the Glasgow Herald depicted him as galloping to the rescue at the head of Glasgow's fire fighters. By the time Campbell's contingent actually arrived - ninety minutes after the first alarm had been sounded - the blaze was briskly burning; nevertheless, the Lord Provost's demonstration of moral support was widely welcomed by the press, if not by the outraged Police Commissioners. The heroic Campbell - understandably - used the two incidents as an illustration of the Board's irresponsibility, and there can be no doubt that they were deeply damaging to the Board's reputation. It should be stressed that after the passing of the Glasgow Police Act in 1843, co-ordinating arrangements were agreed among the various Police Boards for tackling fires.

For a wonderfully Turneresque description of the Lancefield fire, see the Glasgow Herald, 15th October 1841; for the Barrowfield fire, *ibid.*, 16th November 1841. The intricacies of the Police Board dispute with the insurance companies are described in *ibid.*, 29th November 1841. For press accusations of Glasgow Police Board inefficiency, see *ibid.*, 3rd December 1841.

31. Reported in *ibid.* Deputations presented petitions to the Town Council in protest against the Police Bill.

32. See the report of the Town Council meeting appearing in *ibid.*, 10th December 1841. Liberal town councillors were also present at a public meeting against the Bill, organised by Glasgow Police Board, where a Chartist-inspired motion in favour of household suffrage was approved. *Ibid.*, 21st March 1842.

33. *Ibid.*, 29th April 1842.

34. One of the main objections to the 1841 Glasgow Police Bill seems to have been that it was drafted without consulting the Lord Advocate and other Government law officers. See *ibid.* Most of the preparation work for the Bill had been done before the Conservative victory in the general election of July 1841, when the Whigs were still in power, and so Lord Provost Campbell probably avoided too much contact with his political opponents in Parliament. After this time, however, Government involvement in Glasgow's policing arrangements intensified. It should be noted, also, that the new Lord Advocate, Duncan McNeill, was a personal friend of Archibald Alison, and thus likely to be receptive to the latter's views on law enforcement in the Glasgow area. See Alison, *op. cit.*, pages 336-339.

35. See Campbell's explanation of his behaviour, as reported in

the Glasgow Herald, 17th March 1843.

36. Two Liberal councillors, David Bell and Alexander Hastie, unsuccessfully attempted to move a motion critical of Reddie's action over the proposed Police Bill. *Ibid.*, 6th June 1843.

37. *Ibid.*, 17th March 1843.

38. 6 & 7 Victoria, cap. 99, [1843], "An Act to Consolidate, Amend and Extend the Provisions of several Acts, for the better Paving, Watching, Lighting, and Cleansing, and for Regulating the Police of the City of Glasgow, and adjoining Districts, and also for managing the Statute Labour of the City, and for other purposes in relation thereto". The Act, which received the Royal Assent in August 1843, is reproduced in the main text of Burnet, *op. cit.*

39. Glasgow Herald, 17th March 1843.

40. A full report relating to Anderston and Woodside appears in Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 23rd January 1845, pages 512-514, SRA E1.1.21.

41. The precise relationship of Gorbals to Glasgow is explained in John Ord, The Story of the Barony of Gorbals, (Paisley, 1919), pages 60-69.

42. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, pages 40-42. See also the Glasgow Herald, 6th March 1846, for the views of John Leadbetter, now Dean of Guild, as expressed during a Town Council meeting.

43. 9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 17, [1846], "An Act for the Abolition of the Exclusive Privileges for Trading in Burghs of Scotland".

44. Glasgow Town Council's rival Police Bill, drafted in March 1845, sought the assimilation of those areas outwith municipal authority in the Parliamentary burgh, including Woodside, but excluding Bridgeton. See the Glasgow Herald, 10th March 1845.

45. Letter, John Houldsworth to John Burnet, dated 6th November 1844, reproduced in Burgh of Anderston, Minutes, 7th November 1844, SRA H-AND 1.4.

46. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 4th February 1845. Lord Provost Lumsden seems to have been referring to the money-making proclivities of certain law-agents.

47. See "Police Bill - Report of the Deputation sent to London to Promote the Bill", in Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 15th May 1845, pages 66-67, SRA E1.1.22.

48. Quoted in *ibid.*, page 69.

49. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 14th November 1845. See also, Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 11th November 1845, pages 122-123, SRA C1.1.64.

50. Such fears were voiced by William C. Pattison at a public meeting held against the Glasgow Police Bill on 4th March 1846. See the Glasgow Herald, 6th March 1846. As it happened, the £1,500 was not increased, and was still being paid to the Common Good in 1906, when moves were made to abolish the payment. See Glasgow Corporation, Petty Customs: Memorandum by the Town-Clerk for the Information of the Special Joint Committee of the City Finance and Police Finance Committees appointed to Consider and Report as to the Abolition of the Commuted Payment of £1,500 per annum made out of the Police Rates to the Common Good, in respect of the Abolition of the Right to Levy and Exact Petty Customs within the Burgh, (Glasgow, 1906), SRA D-TC 14.1.34, MP 34-1.

51. See the Glasgow Herald, 14th November 1845, for a report of the decision of the Police Board to petition the Lord Advocate against amalgamation, and *ibid.*, 12th January 1846, for the "stormy" meeting of the Gorbalonians.

52. For separate reports of the joint meeting with the Lord Advocate, where he began to express more favourable views, see *ibid.*, 12th and 15th January 1846. The Lord Advocate initially supported the idea that the Chief Superintendent of Police should be chosen by the Lord Provost, the Sheriff of Lanarkshire and himself. See *ibid.* 23rd January 1846.

53. *Ibid.*, 6th March 1846.

54. Quoted in *ibid.*

55. *Ibid.* Although Turner chaired the public meeting on 4th March 1846, which resolved to oppose the Police Bill, the next day he was agreeing with fellow councillors that there had been a "misunderstanding" over the Town Council's intentions towards the Police Board, and that both sides should patch up their differences. This did not mean, however, that councillors were prepared to yield in their view that the Boards should be abolished.

56. See Paul Gordon, Policing Scotland, (Glasgow, 1980), pages 7-8, for general comments about the dearth of historical research into the Scottish police. On the other hand, radical influence on Police Boards south of the border has been identified by John Foster in Class Struggle and the Industrial Revolution: Early Industrial Capitalism in Three English Towns,

(London, 1974), pages 56-100. Foster also explains how this influence was gradually undermined in towns like Oldham, with the eventual incorporation of the Police Board into the Town Council.

57. Alison recollected in his Autobiography - with his usual tendency to over-dramatise - that "... the suburban police commissioners, being chosen by what amounted almost to household suffrage, had such a terror of their constituents, that they could not be induced to take powers for adequate assessment". See Alison, op. cit., pages 420-421.

58. The various franchises are explained in Burnet, op. cit., page x (Glasgow); page xvi (Gorbals); page xix (Calton); page xxiv (Anderston). Anderston Burgh Council and the Police Board were one in the same, with councillors doubling as Commissioners. Although all of Calton's householders theoretically held the franchise, occupiers of premises under £3 yearly rental were exempt from paying the police assessment, and thus excluded from voting. It is worth noting that several other Scottish burghs allowed for lower voting criteria in Police Board elections; the £5 franchise operated in Paisley, Peterhead, Dundee and Aberdeen; £4 in Kilmarnock and Dunfermline; all householders in Dingwall. See R.M. Urquhart, The Burghs of Scotland and the Burgh Police (Scotland) Act, 1833, (unpublished typescript, Winchester, 1985), page 9.

59. Burnet, op. cit., pages vi and xx.

60. Legally, Police Commissioners were designated as head or ruling Constable of their Ward, to act under the authority of the magistrates. Their original purpose - according to section lxi of the 1800 Glasgow Police Act - was "... to take Lists of Persons residing within his own respective Ward, and to take legal Steps for preventing poor Persons and Beggars from gaining legal Settlements in the City, so as to entitle them to the Charity thereof, together also with the whole Powers known by the Laws of Scotland to belong to the Office of Constable". By the early 1840s their functions had changed substantially, although not the legal definition. Glasgow's Police Commissioners were issued with ceremonial batons, in recognition of their rôle as constables.

61. See above. By 1844, according to the Standing Orders of Glasgow Police Board, Commissioners were expected to regularly "perambulate" their Ward at least once a month, to look out for manifestations of "vice, immorality, or crime in whatever form it may appear". Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 15th August 1844, pages 353-357, SRA E1.1.21.

62. The occupations of Glasgow's Police Commissioners can be

gauged from the annual election returns. In 1842 the composition of the Board's thirty-five elected representatives was thus: 7 food sellers and victuallers; 5 spirit dealers; 3 building tradesmen; 3 tailors and clothiers; 2 printers and engravers; 2 surgeons; 2 tanners and skinners; 1 calenderer; 1 drysalter; 1 pawnbroker; 1 rag and paper merchant; 1 shoemaker; 1 smith; 1 soap and candle maker; 1 umbrella maker; 1 watchmaker; 1 writer; 1 unspecified.

According to the evidence of recent research by Stana Nenadic, the composition of the Police Board in the early 1840s seems to correspond more closely with the general pattern of occupational distribution in the city than does the Town Council. The latter's strong merchant and manufacturing bias was not typical of the middle-class as a whole, while the Police Board's predominant base of shopkeepers and tradesmen was more representative. Stana S. Nenadic, The Structure, Values and Influence of the Scottish Urban Middle Class, 1800-1870, (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Glasgow, 1986), pages 52-72.

63. The Glasgow experience contradicts the assertion made by R.J. Morris that the Police Boards and Town Councils latterly shared the same personnel. See Morris, "Urbanisation in Scotland", in W. Hamish Fraser and R.J. Morris, People and Society in Scotland: Volume II, 1830-1914, (Edinburgh, 1990), page 86.

64. See, especially, "Newspapers - Report by Committee of Conveners as to the False Statements, Reports, &c, of the Reformers' Gazette and national Newspapers Relative to Police Board Proceedings", contained in the Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 4th September 1845, pages 161-164, SRA E1.1.22. Peter Mackenzie's Reformers' Gazette was identified as making particularly scurrilous accusations against the Board.

65. Alison is quoted praising the Glasgow Police in the First Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Inquire as to the Best Means of Establishing an Efficient Constabulary Force ..., op. cit., page 84. However, he had a more jaundiced view of the suburban Police Boards. See Alison, op. cit., pages 419-412. For Calton, see Blackenden, op. cit., pages 65 and 78.

66. James Smart became Glasgow's Chief Superintendent of Police in December 1848, and served until his death in 1870. See John Ord, Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force, (Glasgow, 1906), page 27.

67. Calton's lack of a fire engine was pointed out with puzzlement in the Glasgow Herald, 26th November 1841.

68. Alexander Wilson, The Chartist Movement in Scotland,

(Manchester, 1970), page 272.

69. Ibid., pages 199-215.

70. Ross, Moir and Pattison were heavily influenced by the William Lovett school of Chartism, and eschewed the use of "violent language and violent measures". The three men are discussed at length in Alexander Wilson's, "Chartism in Glasgow", in Asa Briggs (ed.), Chartist Studies, (London, 1959), pages 249-287. Ross is described as "one of the pillars of respectability of the movement"; see page 277.

71. Reported in the Glasgow Herald, 3rd September 1841.

72. The six were William Bain, Patrick Black, Alexander McDougall, John Stewart, William Yuile and John Forrester. The latter was a baker, who also held a spirit licence.

73. See pages 791-802.

74. Evangelical attitudes to drink and pawnbroking in Glasgow are discussed in Melanie Tebbutt, Making Ends Meet: Pawnbroking and Working-Class Credit, (Leicester, 1983), pages 112-113. In the 1860s the Secretary of the Glasgow City Mission claimed that the development of pawnbroking closely shadowed that of the drink trade, although - as will be seen - John O'Neil was associated with prominent pro-temperance activists.

75. Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 29th May 1843, pages 430-431, SRA E1.1.20. Henry Home Drummond was the Conservative MP for Perthshire, whose name is now inextricably connected with the Scottish Licensing Act of 1828, which attempted to regulate the opening hours of taverns and public houses. See pages 591-592 of this thesis. For the provisions relating to the representation of spirit dealers on the Police Board, see section 35 of the 1843 Glasgow Police Act.

76. Tebbutt, op. cit., page 107.

77. The Board unanimously expressed its disapproval of the "interference with the rights of the electors to choose their representatives ... from whatever classes they shall consider best qualified". Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 29th May 1843, pages 430-431. See also John Burnet's ingenious legal interpretation of section 35 of the 1843 Police Act in *ibid.*, 27th November 1843, pages 132-134, SRA E1.1.21.

78. See Hutchison, op. cit., page 40, for the reasons which prompted this apparently strange alliance. James Moir originally intended to stand as Chartist Parliamentary candidate along with Lord Provost Campbell for the Conservatives, but

withdrew at the last minute. This left George Mills - son of former Lord Provost William Mills - to step into the breach.

79. Fraser in "The Glasgow Cotton Spinners, 1837", op. cit., pages 90-91, discusses the activities of some of the leading cotton spinners during 1837. Many went on to become prominent members of Glasgow Town Council.

80. This problem arose over the appointment of the Chief Superintendent of Glasgow's Police in 1844. The candidate favoured by the Town Council, William Mackinnon of Dundee, was rejected by the Police Board in preference to Archibald Wilson of the Anderston Police. The voting among Board Commissioners was twenty-two votes to twenty; George Ross voted for Mackinnon, while the spirit dealers - and John O'Neil - favoured Wilson. See Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 25th April 1844, pages 250-251, SRA E1.1.21.

81. Ibid., 12th May 1842, pages 187-190, SRA E1.1.20. The vote to dismiss Inglis was again narrow - nineteen votes to eighteen - with George Ross abstaining.

82. Burnet eventually became the highly-respected Clerk to the Glasgow Water Commissioners, and wrote an authoritative history of the city's water supply. He was a great hero of Sir John Lindsay, appointed Town Clerk in 1912. See Lindsay, Review of Municipal Government in Glasgow: a Lecture Delivered under the Auspices of the Old Glasgow Club on 15th December 1909, (Glasgow, 1909), page 18.

83. See the report of the Glasgow Police Board meeting, held on 22nd January 1846, as reported in the Glasgow Herald, 23rd January 1846.

84. Ibid., 17th January 1845. It was the original intention of the promoters of the Glasgow Police Bill in 1845 to have the police suffrage in Bridgeton extended to "all ratepayers".

85. Ibid., 12th January 1846.

86. Quoted in *ibid.*, 6th March 1846.

87. Glasgow Police Board, Minutes, 19th March 1846, page 311, SRA E1.1.22.

88. 9 & 10 Victoria, cap. 189, [1846], "An Act to Extend the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Glasgow; to Amend the Acts relating to the Police and Statute Labour of the the Said City and adjoining Districts; and for other Purposes in Relation to the Municipality and Police of the said City".

89. See page 545.

90. See Ord, Origin and History of the Glasgow Police Force, op. cit., page 27.

91. For the most detailed contemporary account, see the Glasgow Herald, 10th March 1848.

92. Compare eye-witness accounts such as John Urie, Reminiscences of Eighty Years, (Paisley, 1908), pages 62-73, and Alexander Smith, A Summer in Skye, (London, c.1912, but first published 1865), pages 522-528. Urie treats the rioters with more sympathy than Smith, although he does seem to add retrospective colour to his description. However, to show that the rioters were not necessarily desperadoes, Urie recounts the tale of a youth who had participated in the looting of an ironmonger's shop near Glasgow Cross. Conscious stricken, he returned a stolen packet of razors to their rightful owner, with an apology in rhyme:

"Kind men or sir I'll no deny't,
I took your razors at the riot,
But noo since things have a' turned quiet,
At lang and last,
Your articles to you I've hied
Wi' muckle haste."

For more recent assessments of the riot, see Fiona Montgomery, Glasgow Radicalism, 1830-1848, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Glasgow, 1974), pages 219-221, and John F. McCaffrey, "Irish Immigrants and Radical Movements in the West of Scotland in the Early Nineteenth Century", in Innes Review, vol. XXXIX, no. 1, 1988, pages 45-58.

93. Douglas Grant, The Thin Blue Line: the Story of the City of Glasgow Police, (London, 1973), page 35. Also, the Glasgow Herald, 27th March 1848.

94. See Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 16th March 1848, pages 179-181, SRA C1.1.65.

95. Ibid., 19th October 1848, page 332. Hastie actually sent a letter of resignation to the Town Council, dated 4th October.

96. There were two vacancies in the Second Ward at the 1848 municipal elections. The result was therefore:

James Moir	184
David Gilmour	174
Alexander Hastie	168

97. Quoted in Glasgow Town Council, Statement by the Lord Provost, Magistrates and Town Council of the City and Royal Burgh of Glasgow on the Grounds on which they urge the Appointment of a Royal Commission, or Select Committee of the House of Commons, to consider the Whole Question of the Extension of Municipal Areas in Scotland for all Purposes of Municipal, Police, and Sanitary Administration, (Glasgow, 1879), page 4, SRA LK 5/503. [Hereafter referred to as Glasgow Town Council, Statement on Municipal Extension, 1879.]

98. See A.K. Cairncross, "Fluctuations in the Glasgow Building Industry, 1856-1914", in Cairncross's collection of essays, Home and Foreign Investment: Studies in Capital Accumulation, (Cambridge, 1953), pages 12-36. From 1867 building in Glasgow reached unprecedented levels, continuing in an upward spiral until 1878, when the City of Glasgow Bank sensationally collapsed.

99. Nevertheless, one component of the "Ring of Burghs" - Rutherglen - escaped annexation in 1912, and did not formally become part of Glasgow until 1975.

100. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 14 December 1869. The speaker was James Hamilton.

101. See Atkinson, op. cit., pages 84-103, for a brief account of Scottish county government. For a detailed analysis, although stopping at 1889, see Whetstone, op. cit. The Scottish counties were governed up to 1889 by the Commissioners of Supply, who were non-elected local landowners possessing property to the value of £100. Unlike England, county rates in Scotland were paid exclusively by the proprietors of land, and so theoretically the principle of taxation and the right of administration went together. Any adult male conforming to the land ownership qualification was entitled to become a Commissioner, and those who accrued over £800 a year from land rentals could pass on the privilege to their eldest son. A Commissioner who did not want to participate in the day-to-day affairs of county administration could appoint an agent to act on his behalf.

102. At the height of the salmon fishing boom in the opening decades of the nineteenth century, it was said that "the indentures of the weavers' apprentices contained a stipulation that the boys were not obliged to eat salmon to dinner oftener than three times a week". See T.C.F. Brotchie, The History of Govan, Burgh and Parish: Historical, Ecclesiastical, Traditional, Municipal, (Govan, 1905), page 102.

103. See the chapter on shipbuilding in David Bremner, The Industries of Scotland: their Rise, Progress, and Present

Conditions, (Edinburgh, 1869), pages 58-79.

104. Alexander Thomson, Random Notes and Rambling Recollections of Drydock, the Dock, or Kelvindock: all now known by the more modern name of Maryhill, 1750-1894, (Glasgow, 1895), page 195.

105. Michael A. Simpson, Middle Class Housing and the Growth of Suburban Communities in the West End of Glasgow, 1830-1914, (unpublished B. Litt thesis, University of Glasgow, 1970), pages 48-49.

106. Quoted in James Napier, Notes and Reminiscences Relating to Partick, (Glasgow, 1873), page 115. Napier was one of the driving forces behind the creation of Partick Burgh in 1852. His highly personal view of events was used uncritically in subsequent histories of Partick, notably Charles Taylor, Partick Past and Present, (Glasgow, 1902) and William Greenhorne, History of Partick, 550-1912, (Partick, 1928).

107. See the Glasgow Herald, 20th September 1865, for reference to disturbances in Partick relating to religious sectarianism in Ireland. Thomson, op. cit., clearly implies that the trouble-makers in Maryhill prior to the creation of the Burgh were Irish navvies working on the Dumbarton and Helensburgh Railway.

108. Napier, op. cit., pages 115-123; Brotchie, op. cit., page 172.

109. Thomson, op. cit., page 195.

110. Atkinson, op. cit., page 72.

111. As low a number as twenty-one proprietors could petition for Police Burgh status under the 1850 statute, and only seven under the 1862 Police Act.

112. According to Patrick Dollan in his Jubilee History of Kinning Park Co-operative Society Ltd., (Glasgow, 1923), page 6, the majority of Kinning Park's ordinary population wanted to amalgamate with Glasgow, but the "men of property" opted for the creation of a Police Burgh.

113. 25 & 26 Victoria, cap. 101, [1862], "An Act to make more effectual Provision for regulating the Police of Towns and populous Places in Scotland, and for lighting, cleansing, paving, draining, supplying Water to and improving the same, and also for promoting the Public Health thereof".

114. See *ibid.*, part V, section II, relating to "Nuisances and Obstructions in the Street".

115. According to the 1862 Act, in Police Burghs with a population of less than 1,000, "householders" were defined as occupiers paying £6 or more in rental.

116. See the Municipal Corporations (Scotland): Local Reports of the Commissioners, op. cit., pages 34-35, for information relating to the Town Council's traditional relationship with the University.

117. Quoted in "Petition of the University and College of Glasgow in Favour of the Bill and Against Alteraton", relating to the 1872 municipal extension proposals. Contained in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Municipal Extension, 1872, page 331, SRA A3/1/26.

118. The creation of the City Improvement Trust is discussed in pages 294-330, of this thesis.

119. Glasgow Town Council, Statement on Municipal Extension, 1879, op. cit., page 10.

120. For instance, see the claims made on behalf of the Town Council - as owners of Queen's Park - against the creation of Crosshill Burgh in 1871. Burgh of Crosshill, Sederunt Book of Proceedings at the Formation, 1870-71, page 58, SRA H-CRO 3.

121. This argument is put forward by one correspondent to the Glasgow Herald on 20th September 1865, using the nom de plume "Publicus": "... I give it as my opinion, that the police business - the prevention and detection of crime, &c. - is less effectively managed by there being so many police forces and so many jurisdictions ... The city has now valuable property beyond the police boundary, the South Side Park, and in a year or two the Glasgow College will be removed to Partick burgh. If the Barracks are removed ... [they] ... will probably be in the same position as the College and South Side Park, beyond the jurisdiction of the City Magistrates ...". The letter echoes many of the arguments used by Archibald Alison during the 1830s and 1840s.

122. Robert Dalglish had radical political credentials, while William Graham was a Gladstonian. Both were sons of prominent Glasgow textile merchants, who had served on the pre-reform Council. Indeed, Robert Dalglish, senior, was a former Lord Provost. This family connection helps to explain the close co-operation between the MPs and town councillors in 1868.

123. Parliamentary Debates, 1867-68, Third Series, vol. CXCVII, May 1868, page 963.

124. Ibid.

125. Govan and Partick extended over approximately 2,150 acres in 1868. The Glasgow constituency was some 5,000 acres in size.

126. See the "Representation of the People (Scotland) Bill: Statement for the Lord Provost, Magistrates and Council for the City and Royal Burgh of Glasgow", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Municipal Extension, 1870, page 35, SRA A3/1/12.

127. Parliamentary Debates, 1867-68, Third Series, vol. CXC, February 1868, page 840.

128. Quoted in *ibid.*, 1867-68, vol. CXCI, June 1868, page 1231.

129. Detailed in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Municipal Extension, 1870, *op. cit.*, pages 35-41.

130. Quoted in *ibid.*, page 35.

131. *Ibid.*, page 36.

132. Lanarkshire and Renfrewshire were both single-member constituencies at the time, returning Liberal MPs.

133. See Parliamentary Debates, 1867-68, Third Series, vol. CXCI, May 1868, pages 1255, for the speech of the Conservative Lord Advocate in favour of Glasgow's extension.

134. *Ibid.* The amendment was reintroduced into the House of Lords, but was again defeated.

135. *Ibid.*, page 1253.

136. *Ibid.*

137. See Moir's Town Council speech against municipal expansion in the Glasgow Herald, 14th December 1869. So strong were Moir's views that in 1875 he gave evidence to the House of Commons Select Committee against the annexation of Crosshill and Govanhill to Glasgow. See Burgh of Hillhead, Session 1875, Crosshill Burgh Extension: Evidence and Proceedings, Commons and Lords, pages 128-134, SRA T-HH 55/2.

138. For the general manifestation of antagonism by certain town councillors towards municipal expansion, see Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 13th, 14th and 15th December 1869, pages 368-371, SRA C1.3.3. John Mitchell, it should be noted, was a prominent ship owner, with many vested interests in Govan.

139. For a report of problems relating to the local administration of the Hillhead district prior to the creation of

the burgh, see the Glasgow Herald, 4th September 1867. By achieving formal burgh status, Hillhead residents may not simply have been uniting to fend off Town Council advances, but to place themselves in the most favourable bargaining position with Glasgow in the event of a successful municipal annexation.

140. Simpson, op. cit., page 127.

141. See pages 161-162 for further comments on the need for better co-ordinating arrangements in Hillhead.

142. However, Glasgow Town Council, as landowner for Queen's Park, was able to appeal to the County Sheriff in matters directly relating to its property. This was done during the promotion of Crosshill in 1871.

143. Glasgow Town Council, Statement on Municipal Extension, 1879, op. cit., page 2.

144. Virtually all the territory proposed to be incorporated in 1870 has been added to Glasgow by 1912. Only Jordanhill, Pollokshaws, Cathcart, Tollcross, Shettleston, and parts of Springburn - all added in 1912 - were areas outwith the proposed boundaries of 1870.

145. Glasgow Town Council, Statement on Municipal Extension, 1879, op. cit., page 19.

146. See the feature article about the introduction of the tramways in the Glasgow Herald, 22nd November 1869.

147. Quoted in page 4 of a pamphlet by Robert Bruce, "Proposed Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of Glasgow: an Address delivered at a Public Meeting of the Inhabitants of Hillhead, 19th December 1869", in County of Lanarkshire, Municipal Extension Papers, SRA CO1/7/5.

148. For copies of the petitions against the Town Council, see Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Municipal Extension, 1870, op. cit.

149. Glasgow Town Council, Statement on Municipal Extension, 1879, op. cit., page 20.

150. The Liberals narrowly retained the seat, except in 1873 when the Conservatives briefly captured it after H.A. Bruce's elevation to the peerage. See McCalmont's Parliamentary Poll Book of All Elections, 1832-1918, (Sussex, 1971; revised edition of the 1910 Poll Book), pages 245-246.

151. According to William Hector, 945 electors would have been

lost to Renfrewshire had the proposed amalgamation with Glasgow gone ahead. See "Printed Letter ... in Opposition to the City of Glasgow Extension Bill, 21st December 1869", in County of Lanarkshire, Municipal Extension Papers, op. cit.

152. For biographical information about Ramsey, see The Bailie, 16th October 1895, and the Glasgow Herald, 24th February 1917.

153. Glasgow Town Council could only appeal against the Crosshill decision, in view of the proximity of Queen's Park.

154. See *ibid.*, 26th July 1872, for the background to some of the problems experienced by the Town Council over its abortive Parliamentary expeditions.

155. See the remarks of Robert Bruce, *loc. cit.*, page 11.

156. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 13th October 1870, pages 596-597, SRA C1.1.69. Springburn's great growth industry was locomotive building, which developed in the district during the 1860s. See Aileen Smart, Villages of Glasgow, vol. I, (Edinburgh, 1988), pages 170-174.

157. Watson was Gladstone's personal stockbroker. For more about his career, see pages 298-299.

158. For full details of the Bill, see Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Corporation Municipal Extension Bill, 1872, SRA A/1/126.

159. See the letter of William Hector of Shawlands - an avowed anti-annexationist - to Thomas Speir of Blackstone, Convener of Renfrew County, in *ibid.*, pages 91-94.

160. *Ibid.*, page 92.

161. For details about the Watson-Turner affair, see pages 510-521.

162. Watson's co-operative stance was acknowledged by the opponents of the 1872 Extension Bill, but they believed that the Town Council would not be so magnanimous in the event of future boundary expansion. See "Memorandum for the Counties of Lanark and Renfrew and the Burgh of Partick and other Suburban Burghs, and Others; Against the Second Reading of the Bill to Extend the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Glasgow, to Regulate the Office of Town Clerk, and for Other Purposes", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Corporation Municipal Extension Bill, 1872, op. cit., page 124.

163. See the Glasgow Herald, 19th February 1872, for a report of the special meeting of the Commissioners, where they resolved

to petition against the Bill.

164. For reports of the Parliamentary proceedings, see *ibid.*, 19th and 22nd February 1872.

165. 35 & 36 Victoria, cap. 41, [1872], "An Act to Extend the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Glasgow; to Regulate the Office of Town Clerk; and for Other Purposes".

166. See page 523.

167. It was originally intended that the proposed Burgh of Crosshill would be considerably larger in scale than it eventually became. However, Crosshill's boundaries were circumscribed because, as part of Renfrewshire, it could not claim jurisdiction over part of Lanarkshire without seeking Parliamentary sanction. For the legal intricacies involved in the creation of the burgh, see Burgh of Crosshill, Sederunt Book of the Proceedings at the Formation, *op. cit.*

168. See the "Historical Statement" appearing in the anonymous booklet, The Burgh of Govanhill, (Glasgow, 1891), pages 38-43.

169. It should be stressed that the Crosshill Bill materialised after the election of the Conservative, A.C. Campbell, in the Parliamentary bye-election caused by the departure of H.A. Bruce. In the general election of February 1874, Campbell was defeated by William Mure, and Liberal panic about the loss of the county subsided. Although not overtly stated, part of the Bill's rationale seems to have been yet another attempt to bolster the Liberal position in Renfrew, by providing the mechanism for transferring Lanark electors to the other county.

170. The Bailie, 21st October 1874.

171. No one precisely knew how the name arose; see the remarks by Robert Ramsey in Burgh of Hillhead, Session 1875, Crosshill Burgh Extension: Evidence and Proceedings ..., *op. cit.*, pages 96-97.

172. See the feature articles appearing in the North British Daily Mail on 9th and 10th March 1875, especially the latter.

173. For a scientific analysis of the Crosshill epidemic, see Ebenezer Duncan, "Some Observations on our Present Method of Disposal of Human Excreta, and their Relation to the Spread of Epidemic Disease", in Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, vol. XIII, 1880-81, pages 156-181.

174. The Bailie, 10th March 1875.

175. For the views expressed by the Renfrew Commissioners, see the North British Daily Mail, 22nd January 1875. William Miller of Eastwood, who also happened to be a prominent Glasgow town councillor, stoutly defended the annexation strategy.

176. Burgh of Hillhead, Session 1875, Crosshill Burgh Extension: Evidence and Proceedings ..., op. cit., page 203.

177. Ibid.

178. The Bailie was infuriated by the attitude of several Committee members, and their apparent ignorance of the Scottish system of local government. At one stage the chairman of the proceedings had indicated that he "didn't know what a Bailie was"; a claim that prompted The Bailie to suggest that Home Rule for Scotland would be no bad thing. See The Bailie, 19th May 1875.

179. Burgh of Hillhead, Session 1875, Crosshill Burgh Extension: Evidence and Proceedings ..., op. cit., page 268.

180. See the Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 1, op. cit., page xxxi.

181. "Extract from Report of Parliamentary Bills Committee, 27th October 1879", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Municipal Extension Bill (Pollokshields East, Polmadie, Queen's Park), pages 945-948, SRA A3/1/62.

182. Part of the old Barony of Gorbals, to the south of the municipal boundary, was added to the municipality under 41 & 42 Victoria, cap. 100, [1878], "An Act to Extend the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Glasgow, and for Other Purposes".

183. For a discussion of the centralisation aspect, see the Glasgow News, 9th June 1875, and pages 175-182 of this thesis.

184. See Glasgow Town Council, Statment on Municipal Extension, 1879, op. cit.

185. Ibid., page 38.

186. James B. Fleming, Kelvinside: Illustrated by a Series of Drawings and Photographs, (Glasgow, 1894). See pages 1-2 for Fleming's glowing testimonial to Kelvinside. A portrait of Fleming, looking prosperous and proprietorial, was used as a frontispiece to the volume. The portrait is reproduced in Maurice Lindsay, Victorian and Edwardian Glasgow from Old Photographs, (London, 1987), page 72, where Fleming is erroneously described as an "Edwardian dandy". In fact, Fleming died in June 1899.

187. See Fleming, op. cit. The author states, "... to judge of Glasgow by the worst parts of it - leaving entirely out of sight the better, - is like judging of London by the slums of the East End, without taking into account the Parks and Palaces of the West".

188. For biographical information about Fleming, see The Bailie, 12th November 1884, and his obituary in the Glasgow Herald, 19th June 1899.

189. See the "Statement by the Ratepayers' Committee for the Burgh of Hillhead and the District of Kelvinside", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, op. cit., page 133, for opinions as to the need for policing arrangements, and local fears over an unsolved spate of burglaries in 1887.

190. Simpson, op. cit., especially Chapter IV, "The Stages of Suburban Growth: the Management of the Kelvinside Estate, 1839-1914", pages 84-122. Of course, the introductory essay to Fleming, op. cit., has much to say about the development of Kelvinside, as does the biography of Fleming's father, John Park Fleming, in Maclehose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. II, pages 137-140.

191. Andor Gomme and David Walker, Architecture of Glasgow, (second edition, London, 1987), pages 91-92. Grosvenor Terrace was the residence of the fictional Moorehouse family in Guy McCrone's Wax Fruit trilogy, published in 1947. In real life, it was also a favoured address for several Glasgow town councillors, plus Alexander Monro, one of the Town Clerks. Notable municipal names who lived there included David Carson, James Merry Forrester, Robert Gilkison and Dr. Joshua Paterson.

192. Maclehose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, vol. II, page 40.

193. Simpson, op. cit., page 127.

194. J.B. Fleming explains administrative arrangements for Kelvinside in his submission to the House of Commons Select Committee to consider the 1886 Hillhead and Kelvinside (Annexation to Glasgow) Bill. See "Proofs of Witnesses: James Brown Fleming", in Glasgow Town Council, Hillhead and Kelvinside Annexation to Glasgow Bill, 1886, vol. I, pages 298-307, SRA A3/1/194.

195. Simpson, op. cit., page 161.

196. Ibid., pages 161-162. See also "Case for the Proprietors of the Estate of Kelvinside", which forms Fleming's submission to the Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, op. cit.,

page 141.

197. Ibid.

198. Prompted by the Fleming family's long-standing refusal to combine Kelvinside with Hillhead Burgh. See Simpson, *op. cit.*, pages 127-128, for the origins of Hillhead Burgh in 1869, and the Kelvinside proprietors' resistance to inclusion. Further background information is provided in the Glasgow News, 22nd June 1881.

199. For the substance of Hillhead's case, see "Sheriff Court, Glasgow: Petition by the Commissioners of the Burgh of Hillhead for Kelvinside and Extension of the Boundaries of the said Burgh, 20th March, 1881", contained as a separate document in Burgh of Hillhead, Partick and Hillhead Extension Scheme, 1881, SRA H.HIL 15.12.

200. Such views are referred to in the decision of the Sheriff of Lanarkshire, reported at length in the Glasgow News, 22nd June 1881.

201. Ibid.

202. "Case for the Proprietors of the Estate of Kelvinside", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, *op. cit.*, page 141.

203. Forrester and Morrison were Glasgow town councillors at the time, while Blackie was the brother of former Lord Provost John Blackie, jun., becoming Dean of Guild from 1885 to 1887 at the height of the agitation to unite Kelvinside with Glasgow. All were active in co-ordinating the annexation strategy; see the Glasgow Herald, 31st December 1884.

204. Simpson, *op. cit.*, pages 138-139.

205. For detailed biographical information on Smith, which refers to his strong views on municipal expansion, see J.B. Russell's "Obituary of W.R.W. Smith", in Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, vol. XXIC, 1892-93, pages 206-210.

206. For Fleming's jaundiced views on the Clerks to the various Police Burghs, see his letter to the Glasgow Herald, 17th December 1884. James Muirhead, Clerk to Hillhead Burgh from 1882, was a particular antagonist of Fleming. For the history of Muirhead's connections with the burgh, see "Glasgow Boundaries Bill: Petition by James Muirhead Against, by Counsel", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1891, vol. I, pages 337-340, SRA A3/1/143. Muirhead was removed

from office, once Hillhead fell under the control of pro-annexationists.

207. See the editorial in the Glasgow News, "A Plea for Greater Glasgow", 8th December 1884.

208. The Liberals wanted to consolidate their position in "Greater Glasgow" by dividing the extended city into individual constituencies, on a territorial basis. The Conservatives were happy to extend the Parliamentary boundaries under the existing arrangement, whereby candidates stood en bloc for a general city seat. This would make it much easier for Conservatives to pick up a seat or two in the hitherto Liberal stronghold. For the respective views of the city's Liberal and Conservative Associations, see the report of the Parliamentary Boundary Commissioners' visit, in the Glasgow Herald, 10th January 1885.

209. Fleming went so far as to call his substantial villa in Kelvinside "Beaconsfield".

210. Compare the editorials in the Liberal North British Daily Mail, with that of the Conservative Glasgow News, 8th December 1884. Both were deeply concerned about preserving the prestige of Glasgow as the "Second City of the Empire".

211. Ibid.

212. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 9th January 1885.

213. Reported in ibid., 10th January 1885.

214. Ibid.

215. See ibid., 17th December 1884, for Fleming's gleefully dismissive reference to the "Wee Town Clerks".

216. For numerous reports of ratepayers' meetings, see the assorted press-cuttings carefully pasted by one of James D. Marwick's assistants into Glasgow Town Council, Parliamentary Elections, Redistribution of Seats Act, 1885: Papers Relating to Bill, SRA A3/1/88.

217. The Partick ratepayers' meeting, held 7th January 1885, was organised by the local Liberal Association. See ibid., page 368. On the other hand, activity in Govan was co-ordinated by Thomas Cochrane Guthrie, a protégé of Sir William Pearce who had strong Parliamentary aspirations. Shipping interests in Govan were especially anxious to combine with Glasgow, to ensure a common boundary along the south bank of the River Clyde. See The Bailie, 20th August 1890 and the Glasgow Echo, 16th September 1893, for Guthrie's background.

218. Glasgow Herald, 31st December 1884; North British Daily Mail, 22nd January 1885.
219. For a report of the Govanhill meeting, see the Glasgow Herald, 21st January 1885.
220. A separate report, in *ibid.*
221. Glasgow News, 13th December 1884.
222. See the remarks of Councillor James Martin, reported in the Glasgow Herald, 9th January 1885. Some pro-annexationists conducted postal polls of ratepayers, to counter claims that the meetings had not been representative. For the result of the East Pollokshields poll, in favour of combining with Glasgow, see the North British Daily Mail, 22nd January 1885.
223. Evening Citizen, 2nd November 1885.
224. See the Glasgow Herald, 13th November 1885, for a report of the Hillhead and Kelvinside deputation to the Town Council on the subject of annexation.
225. For the Town Council's debate on the matter, see *ibid.*, 5th March 1886,
226. "Statement by the Ratepayers' Committee for the Burgh of Hillhead and the District of Kelvinside", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, *op. cit.*, pages 130-131.
227. Simpson, *op. cit.*, pages 165-166.
228. See the 68th Annual Report of the Royal Botanic Institution of Glasgow, year ending 31st October 1885, pages 4-7, for the Directors' Report.
229. *Ibid.*, page 5.
230. For the list of Office Bearers, see *ibid.*, page 2. The Kelvinside Estate was owed £203 in feu duty for 1884-85, which had not been paid.
231. Under the terms of the 1891 City of Glasgow Act, Section 37, the Botanic Gardens passed into municipal control, and were subsequently improved and enlarged.
232. See Fleming's letter to the Glasgow Herald, 4th May 1886.
233. The Bill's progress is charted in the "Case for the City of Glasgow", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 2, *op. cit.*, pages 35-36.

234. Glasgow Herald, 19th February 1887.
235. In yet another of Fleming's Herald letters. See *ibid.*, 4th June 1886.
236. See Bruce's letter in *ibid.*, 26th October 1887.
237. "Summary of Recommendations", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888; Volume 1, *op. cit.*, page xlix.
238. For a discussion of the centralisation debate in the context of the 1848 Public Health Act, see David Roberts, The Victorian Origins of the British Welfare State, (New Haven, 1960). For a general discussion on the development of interventionism in nineteenth century government, citing Roberts, is contained in Derek Fraser, The Evolution of the British Welfare State: A History of Social Policy since the Industrial Revolution, (second edition, Basingstoke, 1984; first published 1973), pages 99-123.
239. For the background to the failure of the City of Glasgow bank, and its aftermath, see S.G. Checkland, Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973, (Glasgow & London, 1975), pages 469-486. The Central Relief Committee was still considering shareholders' hardship cases in 1888, and a total of 1,039 claims had been made by the time the Committee wound up during that year. The overwhelming number of claims were treated favourably. Others suffered without making claims; Thomas Lucas Paterson was obliged to cease building operations in Downhill because of the failure. The Bank's Directors included two former Town Council representatives, John Stewart and William Taylor. Both were found guilty of uttering false balance sheets, and received an eight months' jail sentence.
240. "Case for the City of Glasgow", in Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888; Volume 2, *op. cit.*, page 29. See also Volume 1, page xxv, where it is reported that the Sheriff of Renfrewshire had approved the petition of Shawlands' inhabitants for the erection of a Police Burgh, as from 23rd January 1888. Because of the Boundary Commission enquiry, the decision was held in abeyance, and ultimately never implemented. For the views of local representatives from Langside, Mount Florida and Shawlands, see "Minutes of the Special Committee on Union between the City and Adjacent Burghs and Districts", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1891, vol. I, pages 492-494, SRA A3/1/139a.
241. Simpson, *op. cit.*, pages 136-137. The allegations were made by Andrew Maxwell, a Hillhead Burgh Commissioner.
242. See The Bailie, 21st January 1885, for the satiric poem,

"Lines Suggested by the Boundary Squabble", which includes:

"Still one had best in Clartyhill
Reign peaceful and obscure,
There govern at one's own sweet will,
And make each footstep sure,

Than venture out on foray rough,
And tackle warriors strong,
Like Bayly bold and Fleming bluff
And Glasgow's stubborn throng."

The poem made an oblique reference to the verbal mauling given by J.B. Fleming to Joseph M. Taylor, Clerk to Maryhill Burgh, during the deliberations held on 9th January 1885 to look into the Parliamentray boundary question. Taylor was also the law agent and a principal shareholder in the North Kelvinside Feuing Company Ltd.; there was clear rivalry between Taylor and Fleming over property transactions in the north west district, beyond the Glasgow boundary.

For the critical report of Maryhill's administrative arrangements, see Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 1, op. cit., page xvii. See also the Evening Times, 13th May 1887, for the result of a plebiscite held in Maryhill on the issue of annexation, with 1822 out of 2946 ratepayers voting in favour, 171 against and 245 "neutral".

243. "Greater Britain" was the title of an influential travel book written in 1868 by Sir Charles Dilke, who became Joseph Chamberlain's great radical ally in the Liberal party. Dilke believed that "Saxendom" - as he termed the English-speaking peoples throughout the world - had a moral obligation to implant English culture and institutions on the global scale. He included the United States in this definition, and had great admiration for the American system of democracy. With such an alliance, "... it is no exaggeration to say that in power the English countries would be more than a match for the remaining nations of the world, whom in the wealth of their dominions they already considerably surpass". This potent mixture of radicalism and nascent imperialism was bound to appeal to the likes of Chamberlain, and Dilke's devolutionist strategy for India, conceived in the aftermath of the 1857 Mutiny, foreshadowed Chamberlain's later ideas for greater autonomy within the constitutional framework of the United Kingdom. See Charles Wentworth Dilke, Greater Britain: A Record of Travel in the English-Speaking Countries during 1866 and 1867, (London, 1868), 2 volumes. For the quote on English invincibility, see vol. II, page 406; for India, see *ibid.*, pages 374-387.

244. Glasgow News, 13th December 1884.

245. Out of the eleven members of the sub-committee appointed on 7th July 1890, six were Unionists; viz. Lord Provost John Muir, James Colquhoun, Robert Crawford, Thomas Cumming, John Ure Primrose and David Richmond. The remaining members included two Conservatives and three Liberals, of whom Samuel Chisholm was the only zealous Gladstonian.

246. Glasgow Boundaries Commission, 1888: Volume 1, op. cit., page xxxv-xxxvi.

247. "Case for the Proprietors of the Estate of Kelvinside", in *ibid.*, Volume 2, pages 144-145.

248. The speech is reported at length in the Glasgow Herald, 16th September 1885.

249. North British Daily Mail, 9th June 1875.

250. For Chamberlain's devolutionist proposals, as part of the 1885 "Unauthorised Programme", see Michael Balfour, Britain and Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1985), page 144.

251. The history of the divisional management debate from the 1880s is explained in two Glasgow Herald feature articles from the 1907 "Glasgow Problems" series, looking in depth at the city's municipal administration. See "Municipal Government: Proposal for Federal Districts", (no author credited), 2nd and 9th October 1907, and James Muirhead, "Division in Municipal Management", 16th and 23rd October 1907. Muirhead was, of course, the former Clerk to the Hillhead Commissioners, who had by this time become an acknowledged expert on Scottish Police Burgh administration.

252. Section 14 of the 1912 Glasgow Boundaries Act provided for a system of divisional management after five years, but only if the Corporation deemed it advisable. However, the First World War intervened, and permanently shelved the divisional option.

253. For the negotiations leading to this decision, see "Glasgow Boundaries: Minutes of Town Council and Committees with reference thereto", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1890, volume 2, pages 218-219, SRA A3/1/124. The precise Minute reference is the Parliamentary Bills Committee, 12th March 1890, Sub-Committee of the Glasgow Boundaries Bill.

254. Salisbury was eventually pinned down by a Glasgow Town Council deputation to Parliament in March 1889, although he made no formal pronouncement on the proposed Boundaries Bill until May. See Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bills, 1888-89, pages 418-421, SRA A3/1/119.

255. 52 & 53 Victoria, cap. 50, [1889], "An Act to Amend the Laws relating to Local Government in Scotland". See also, Glasgow Town Council, Local Government (Scotland) Bills, 1889: County Councils, pages 142-143, SRA A3/1/121.

256. 56 & 57 Victoria, cap. 188, [1893], "An Act to provide for the constitution of the City and Royal Burgh of Glasgow as a County of a City, and for other purposes connected therewith".

257. Simpson, op. cit., pages 138-140.

258. See "Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee of the House of Lords on the Glasgow Boundaries Bill, Friday, 2nd May 1890", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1890, vol. II, op. cit., page 137. See also the Evening Citizen, 2nd May 1890, for a report of the decision, and the North British Daily Mail, 3rd May 1890, for responses to the news in Govanhill and Crosshill.

259. See "Minutes of the Special Committee on Union between the city and Adjacent Burghs and Districts", in Glasgow Town Council, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1891, vol. I, op. cit., pages 497-498, 500, and 503-509. Partick formally bowed out of the negotiations in a letter from the Clerk, James Donaldson, to Sir James Marwick, dated 18th November 1890. The letter, reproduced on page 508, concludes: "The Commissioners, however, would respectfully ask the Town Council ... to delay for another session, so as to give time to all parties interested to consider and devise a satisfactory scheme by which a permanent settlement of the whole question might be arrived at".

260. The Govanhill Commissioners originally petitioned against the Bill, but were appeased by the Town Council with the promise of a children's playground and improved pavements in the main thoroughfare of Cathcart Road.

261. 54 & 55 Victoria, cap. 130, [1891], "An Act to Extend the Boundaries of the City of Glasgow, and for other purposes".

262. Bell and Paton, op., cit., pages 54-55.

263. The number of electors in each ward is listed in the Glasgow Town Council Diary for 1891-92, SRA D-TC 14.5.1.

264. See pages 121-122.

265. A useful resume of Glasgow's municipal extensions is contained in W. Boyd Anderson, "The Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of Glasgow, 1800 to 1912", in Transactions of the Old Glasgow Club, no. 1, vol. 4, 1918-19, pages 9-15. Boyd

Anderson was J.B. Fleming's Kelvinside colleague during the annexation campaign of the 1880s and early 1890s.

266. For complete lists of valuation, population and acreage in Glasgow between 1854 and 1912, see Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Statements prepared by Alexander Walker, FSI, (City Assessor), SRA A3/1/265.

267. Fleming, op. cit., pages 1-2.

268. See pages 445-450.

269. See pages 440 and 779-780.

270. See Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Minutes Relative to Extension, 1891-1912, vol. VIII, pages 187-203, SRA A3/1/261. The original Kinning Park correspondence is contained in Glasgow Corporation, Loose Papers relating to Annexation, up to 1895, SRA A3/2 1890-91.

271. See SRA A3/1/261, cited above, pages 192-193, "Memorandum as to the Application of a System of Divisional Administration to a District comprising the Burgh of Partick and a Small Area of the City adjacent thereto".

272. Ibid, page 203; the Corporation meeting is reported in the Glasgow Herald, 3rd July 1896. Accusations of "circumlocution" were voiced by Councillor William Hamilton.

273. Ibid. The speaker was Bailie William Fife.

274. Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Minutes Relative to Extension, 1891-1912, vol. VIII, op. cit., page 205.

275. The minister at Pollokshields UP Church was the Rev. Alexander Brown, and his "noble" mission to the poor of Kinning Park is described in John J. Rae (ed.), The Ministers of Glasgow and their Churches, (Glasgow, 1899), The quote appears on page 186.

276. See Turner, op. cit., pages 204-205, for an explanation of differential rating in Glasgow.

277. The figures are quoted in Glasgow Corporation, General Order, 1905: Drafts, vol. I, page 917, SRA A3/1/230.

278. Ibid.

279. See pages 458-467 for more about the Ratepayers' Federation Ltd., and its energetic leader, Arthur Kay.

280. The figures are quoted in "House of Commons, 1912: Glasgow Boundaries Bill, a Brief for Counsel for the Promoters", in Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Brief and Proofs, House of Commons, vol. II, page 125, SRA A3/1/255. The Brief gives an excellent insight into administrative arrangements in the remaining Police Burghs and districts surrounding Glasgow.

281. "Glasgow Boundaries Order, 1912 - Govan: House of Lords Committee: Proccognitions of Witnesses", in Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Proofs, Statements, Agreements, &c.; House of Lords, vol. VII, pages 625-756, SRA A3/1/260. See, especially, the submissions of John Reid and Robert Stewart of the SCWS Ltd., and John S. Taylor, ILP councillor in Govan.

282. Ibid. Cited by John S. Taylor, pages 751-753.

283. Ibid., especially the evidence of Peter Masterton Martin, a former Partick Commissioner and pro-annexationist, pages 759-809.

284. See "House of Commons: Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912, Minutes of Evidence", in Burgh of Govan, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912, pages 639-650, SRA H-GOV 35-37. Under cross-examination by Glasgow's Counsel, David Pollock McKechnie, Provost of Govan, was forced to admit that he chose to live in Glasgow - where rates were lower - while he worked for the non-local firm of J. Potter & Co., Liffey Saw Mills, Dublin. On being asked why the burgh had such a tardy policy on the provision of public wash-houses, Provost McKechnie evoked memories of "Clartyhill" when he replied that, "I am not a great believer that wash-houses were such a good thing". This was scarcely the kind of attitude likely to inspire Govanites with confidence, especially as housing conditions in parts of the burgh constituted a series public health problem.

285. Govan agreed terms in Glasgow, 8th July 1912, and Partick agreed terms in London, 11th July 1912. See Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Corporation Minutes relative to Extension, 1891-1912, vol. VIII, op. cit., pages 422-425.

286. 2 & 3 George V, cap. 95, [1912], "An Act to Extend the Boundaries of the City and the Royal Burgh of Glasgow and the County of the City of Glasgow, and to Alter and Adjust the Boundaries of the Counties of Lanark, Renfrew and Dunbarton; and for other purposes". See Section 55 for rating arrangements.

287. The Burgh of Pollokshaws had blown hot and cold over assimilation with Glasgow, while Rutherglen had fiercely and consistently resisted overtures from the Corporation for

merger. Pollokshaws was situated on the banks of the River Cart, roughly equidistant from Glasgow and Paisley. Because of this convenient location, it had developed from the eighteenth century as a weaving community, supplying textile manufacturers from both major towns. The district had an intriguing history - it was a centre of Covenanting activity, and many of the men and women condemned at the 1677 Paisley witchcraft trials came from the "Shaws". Pollokshaws people later became identified with radicalism, manifesting particular militancy during the 1812 Weavers' strike, and supporting Chartism. This tradition continued through to the twentieth century, as John Maclean was a native of Pollokshaws, and the Social Democratic Federation had a base in the locality.

Pollokshaws became a Burgh of Barony in 1812, and because of this status could not formally reconstitute itself as a Police Burgh. This was the reason why, in 1858, the Sheriff of Renfrewshire rejected a petition from householders and proprietors in the neighbouring districts of Shawlands, Crossmyloof and Langside to be incorporated into the Burgh. However, he did rule that it was competent for the Burgh of Pollokshaws, under its 1812 boundaries, to implement the terms of the 1850 Police Act, and levy householders accordingly. It would have been preferable from a financial point of view if Pollokshaws Council could have relied on the income from the wealthier outlying districts, as the residents of the old burgh tended to be working-class, and often did not qualify for assessment purposes. Indeed, the Burgh Council was anxious for merger with Glasgow in the 1880s, although this policy was subsequently changed. Like Kinning Park and Partick, local feelings in Pollokshaws were erratic on the subject of annexation, but by the 1900s it seemed only a matter of time before the connection with Glasgow was formalised. For a general history of Pollokshaws, see Andrew McCallum, Pollokshaws: Village and Burgh, 1600-1912, with some account of the Maxwells of Pollok, (Paisley, 1925).

288. See the Glasgow Herald, 2nd November 1912, for a feature article of the scope of the "Greater Glasgow", plus comparisons with other cities.

PART THREE - IMPROVING GLASGOW: THE EVOLUTION
OF THE MUNICIPAL ETHOS

- I. "Living Gold": the Loch Katrine Water Supply, 1833-59.
- II. Of Parks and Galleries, 1846-59.
- III. Lord Provost Blackie and the City Improvement Trust,
1865-72.

"Bless, O Lord, our native land. Abundantly bless our Sovereign Lady, Queen Victoria ... Shower down thy blessing on the Magistrates of our city, and on those who are associated with them. Reward them with better than earthly blessings for their zealous labours in this and in all good works, and give them the gratification of feeling that their high endeavour has been crowned with great success ..."

¹From a benediction by the Rev. Dr. James Craik, given at the inauguration of the Loch Katrine Water Works, 14th October 1859.

I. "Living Gold": the Loch Katrine Water Supply, 1833-59

On a brilliantly sunny day in August 1872, a ceremony took place in Glasgow's Kelvingrove Park which triumphantly celebrated the city's civic achievements over the past two decades. Clustered round the Floral Circle in the centre of the park, several thousand Glaswegians looked on with pride as the handsome Loch Katrine Memorial Fountain was inaugurated as a tribute to Lord Provost Robert Stewart, who had died in 1866.² Kelvingrove's newest showpiece was the work of James Sellars, a talented young architect, who had won a competition initiated by the Magistrates and councillors, in their capacity as the city's Water Commissioners.³ Designed in "the Scottish type of Gothic", the fountain was adorned with numerous watery motifs, including - at the topmost pedestal - a representation of Scott's Lady of the Lake.⁴ The imagery was intended to evoke

the rugged Trossachs landscape so lyrically described in the poem; at a different level, it symbolised Stewart's commitment to the introduction of a pure water supply under municipal control. After numerous setbacks, this objective had become a reality when the Loch Katrine Water Works were formally opened by Queen Victoria in 1859.

The setting for the 1872 ceremonial could not have been more appropriate; Kelvingrove - or the West End Park, as it was still popularly known - was itself an important symbol of Glasgow's municipally inspired regeneration.⁵ Acquired by the Town Council in 1852, the eighty-five acres of parkland represented a wholesome contrast to the squalor prevailing in the city centre, showing that Glasgow had a positive as well as a negative profile. Not that the city fathers were prepared to allow the urban heartland to deteriorate at the expense of their prestigious new projects; in 1866 they had made a huge financial commitment to slum clearance via the City Improvement Trust.⁶ Accordingly, there was cause for much municipal self-congratulation when Bailie James Salmon - Convener of the Council's Parks Department - formally accepted the fountain on behalf of the people of Glasgow.⁷ Hope for the future was the theme of his address to the assembled gathering, particularly the potential of the Improvement Trust to transform the city's deleterious environment. He claimed that the spirit of Kelvingrove and Loch Katrine would eventually permeate Glasgow,

to create a greener, healthier and more open city, "... where the honest man may smoke his pipe, and his children may play, breathing freer air than can at present be enjoyed".⁸

This concern about the quality of life was by no means a new feature of municipal policy, as it reflected evangelical preoccupations during the 1830s and 1840s. Indeed, James Salmon was very much a man of this time, having participated in the power struggles within the Established Church, before following Thomas Chalmers to the Free Church in 1843. Significantly, Salmon was also one of Glasgow's leading architects, and had a deep understanding of the relationship between order and space in society. During the 1850s he had written extensively about the necessity of good urban design, to combat the dangerously destabilising effects of unplanned and uncontrolled development.⁹ By 1872 he must have felt that the Chalmersian ideal of the Godly Commonwealth was beginning to bear fruit, and was able to speak about Glasgow's future with some degree of confidence. The Town Council had consolidated its position by taking on an increasing number of civic responsibilities, and the Loch Katrine scheme, in particular, had proven to be a spectacular success. There was now a determined mood in the Council Chambers that - despite initial public hostility - the City Improvement Trust would yield similar social benefits.

In the context of Glasgow's municipal development between 1833 and 1912, the importance of Loch Katrine cannot be

overstressed, largely because water was - and remains - so tangibly identified as a cleansing and regenerative force.¹⁰ It was therefore highly appropriate that the temperance movement began to gain ground at the same time as efforts were being made to initiate the Loch Katrine project, as intoxicating liquor was perceived as a potent symbol of tainted water and its corrupting influence.¹¹ Yet the history of Glasgow's water supply was by no means a straightforward crusade to imbue the "cleanliness is next to Godliness" principle into the community, despite the vigorous promptings of the evangelicals. For years councillors agonised over what to do about the water problem, fearing to remove the competitive element represented by the private companies, but aware that public needs went well beyond the limited scope of the existing service. As has already been shown, the Town Council of 1833 was confronted with this dilemma immediately after the first municipal elections under the reformed régime.¹² Although councillors unanimously endorsed the need for "salutary competition" in water provision, they also bitterly attacked the inertia of the Glasgow and Cranstonhill Companies.¹³ Ideally, what they wanted was a wholly new enterprise, which would be able to compete the established companies out of existence.

What was the original extent of water provision on Glasgow, and why were its deficiencies so vocally criticised even before 1833? Most of the Royalty's population relied on public wells,

under municipal control, and by 1800 there were twenty-nine of these in use.¹⁴ In response to such an inadequate source, especially to meet the needs of industry, the Glasgow Water Company had been formed in 1806 with a view to raising water from the Clyde at Dalmarnock, to the east of Bridgeton. After filtration, the water was conveyed to reservoirs within the royalty, and then distributed for public consumption. A similar enterprise - at Cranstonhill - was given Parliamentary sanction in 1808, to service the western end of the Royalty, plus Anderston. The sphere of Glasgow's water operations was thus firmly fixed to the north of the river, with the result that Gorbaliolians and other South Siders had to fend for themselves. Those who were lucky enough to benefit from the service paid water rates based on the rental of their properties, except for instances of fire. The Town Council - representing the city's mercantile and trading community - was acutely sensitive to the threat of conflagration, and had insisted that fire plugs be installed by the Companies, to be used freely and at no extra cost.¹⁵ Of course, this stipulation was made on the assumption that there would be sufficient water in the mains to combat fires; however, it became a source of profound irritation in the city that neither the Glasgow nor the Cranstonhill Company could guarantee such a requirement.¹⁶

By 1829, the civic administration was effectively "the mouthpiece of public complaints regarding the water supply"; a

rôle it was to repeat later in the century, when the operation of the private gas and tramways companies fell under similar critical scrutiny.¹⁷ The principal source of grievance remained the unavailability of water for extinguishing fires, plus habitual deficiencies during the night when the mains were turned off. The irregularity of the service was not the consequence of perverseness on the part of the Water Companies; rather, financial constraints and technological difficulties combined to ration water to hours of peak demand. Yet, paradoxically, the Companies were in a peculiar position of ascendancy within the city, for as long as there was no other alternative, it was vital to the public interest that they remained viable. Notwithstanding the Town Council's rôle as a shareholder in the Glasgow Water Company, municipal interest in the city's water supply intensified, to ensure the maintenance of some kind of service to the community. This experience made it all the more apparent that, as far as water was concerned, the laws of supply and demand made little practical sense in Glasgow. Even without the stimulus of meaningful competition and efficient management, demand was constantly generated.

The reformed Town Council of 1833 was anxious to boost its credibility as public watchdog over the provision of water, especially as the Glasgow and Cranstonhill Companies had resolved to cut their losses and amalgamate. Critics saw something sinister in the timing of the proposed merger, as it

coincided with the passing of the Burgh (Police) Scotland Act, which specifically excluded Glasgow's water supply from its terms of reference.¹⁸ The Council led the opposition to the formation of the combined company, claiming that because the recent legislation had rendered the Police Commissioners powerless to act, a dangerous monopoly situation would be created with no public accountability.¹⁹ At the same time, the Council was prepared to sanction tentative plans to establish a wholly new enterprise based on the system of gravitation.²⁰ Gravitation - which had been successfully applied in Greenock and Edinburgh - depended on the carefully aligned curve of the water pipe to create an even flow and prevent deposits of sediment.²¹ It thus allowed for supplies to be drawn from a distance; an attractive proposition for Glasgow, as some of the plentiful lochs and rivers near to the city could be tapped, instead of the murky and polluted Clyde.

During the 1830s, the strength of public feeling was clearly in favour of creating a rival to the established Companies, although the precise mechanism for achieving this remained hazy. The climate of uncertainty prompted Councillor Henry Dunlop to suggest in 1834 that decisive action was needed, and he expressed unease over the siege mentality of the Companies, which directed their energies towards self-preservation rather than improving and extending the service. Despite claims to the contrary, Dunlop believed that, "... the public can have no

security that the supply shall be either abundant or of good quality, if it be furnished exclusively by one company".²² Yet although talk of establishing a rival company appeared very laudable, the existing water supply was all that there was. To preserve such a vital public utility, Dunlop urged the Council to have exploratory discussions with the Companies, with a view to persuading them to place their works in municipal hands. Dunlop's ideas were accepted as an option by the Council, although it should be emphasised that they represented only one strand of municipal thought as how best to deal with the water problem. Indeed, his fellow councillor - Andrew Macgeorge - was obliged to take a contrary view, largely because he was the legal agent representing the interests of the Glasgow and Cranstonhill Companies.²³

Whatever the merits of Dunlop's argument, it was not until 1835 that the Council took practical steps to meet with the Companies. The amalgamation plans had not been progressed, and there were hopes on both sides that the stalemate could be broken. In March 1836 a report was presented on behalf of a municipal sub-committee, detailing the proposed terms of settlement.²⁴ A major concession towards public accountability had been agreed by the Companies, with the formation of a Board of Control composed of representatives from the Council, suburban Burghs and assorted Police Commissioners. However, this new departure did not meet with universal

approbation, either on the Town Council or in the city. The Companies seemed to be suspiciously vague about provision for extinguishing fires, endeavouring to ensure "as far as may be" that the mains would be constantly charged.²⁵ Depending on the height of properties from the level of the river, water could still only be guaranteed for a limited period, with an eight hour maximum in the hilliest districts. Councillor Robert McGavin poured scorn on the proposals, and stressed the need for a "... sufficient, constant, and abundant supply of water, in terms of the existing Acts".²⁶ His views were overwhelmingly endorsed by the wider population, and a vigorous campaign against the Water Companies ensued.

Lord Provost William Mills nailed his colours firmly to the mast by chairing a public meeting in support of the long-awaited "New Water Company".²⁷ His stance was endorsed by numerous town councillors, including Henry Dunlop, who agreed to act as interim treasurer to the rival enterprise. Gorbalonians, such as John Mitchell and Thomas Laurie, were also to the fore in promoting the scheme, showing that discontent over the south-side's exclusion from the existing supply was being channelled into positive action.²⁸ Launched as a popularly-based joint-stock venture, it was hoped that investment in the new Company would come from the mass of "shopkeepers, householders, and proprietors of works, who will be the principal customers".²⁹ Advertisements duly appeared

in the Glasgow newspapers, with a patriotic appeal to purchase shares "... as Scotsmen, and as men determined to protect your own interest."³⁰ To undermine the position of the old Companies even further, there were hints of unhealthy collusion between the proprietors and certain councillors, which resulted in heated exchanges in the Council Chambers.³¹ The pressure was enough to put supporters of the proposed merger uncomfortably on the defensive, and tip the municipal balance away from any position of compromise. The field was left clear for the New Water Company to take the initiative, and establish itself as a dynamic alternative to the discredited water Companies.

The great hopes for the New Water Company were never fulfilled. The enterprise did not prove to be viable, leaving the Town Council in a worse position than before, as time was running out for rescuing the old Companies from financial collapse. By 1838 the majority of councillors were prepared to sanction yet another merger application to Parliament; even Robert McGavin - the veteran radical - had changed his mind, despite the continuing opposition of his constituents.³² The dominant position of the Conservative-Evangelical alliance was another factor in the Council's willingness to come to terms, particularly as the Glasgow Police Commissioners had appointed themselves as champions of the people against the Water Companies. Much more than the Town Council, the Police Board

was prepared to uphold Liberal anti-monopoly principles, although it was also not disinterested in taking responsibility for the water supply, should all else fail. The complex ideological differences between the Police Board and the Town Council have been explained at length elsewhere; it should be reiterated, however, that municipal opinion after 1837 was anxious not to allow any increase in Police Board powers, even though water was a perfectly legitimate area of the Board's activity.³³

This does not mean to say that the Town Council readily acquiesced to the demands of the Water Companies in 1838; indeed, it was only after Parliamentary intervention that agreement could be reached. Under the terms of the merger Act, the newly constituted Glasgow Water Company was obliged to fulfil promises of greater accountability via the Board of Control; to limit dividends to seven per cent.; to restrict domestic charges; to ensure that the mains would be constantly charged for fire-fighting purposes; and to generally provide for a "sufficient supply".³⁴ Under the last vague requirement, consumers were still limited to a peak hour service, depending on the location of their properties. It was clear to all concerned that the merger arrangements were intended as a stop-gap measure, until such times as a wholly new water system could be devised for Glasgow. Effectively, the Company had been given a breathing space to put its house in order, while

the Council tackled the thorny problem of Glasgow's police administration, and the likely repercussions for the future of water provision in the city.

In the interim, developments at the national level were drastically changing perceptions of water and its uses within the urban environment, which were to have no small impact on the civic consciousness in Glasgow. 1838 was an important year in this respect, and more than one commentator has affirmed that it represented a crucial turning-point in the history of Britain's public health movement.³⁵ As Michael Flinn succinctly put it:³⁶

Although its roots stretch back fifty years, the movement was, before 1838, unorganised leaderless, and, in a legislative sense - the only sense that mattered in the long run - aimless. Essential foundations had been laid, preconditions established, but, important as these were, effective action was missing. This was what Chadwick supplied.

Edwin Chadwick was, of course, the energetic Secretary to the Poor Law Commission of England and Wales. In 1838 he began to produce investigative reports into the horrifying conditions prevailing in London's East End, following a serious outbreak of typhus fever. It was the first time that medical experts had been systematically used to study the factors which contributed to ill health, and draw conclusions about the effects of sanitation on physical wellbeing. Leading on from this, Chadwick immediately sought evidence on the larger scale to

confirm his views on the relationship between health and environment. The result was The Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in 1842; a publication in which Glasgow was to consolidate its notoriously unhealthy reputation, which had been building up since at least 1818.³⁷

It is not intended to go into details about the findings made by Chadwick and his colleagues, or the accuracy of their observations; suffice it to say that their negative impressions of Glasgow can be summed up in the following much-quoted statement:³⁸

It might admit of dispute, but, on the whole, it appeared to us that both the structural arrangements and the condition of the population of Glasgow was the worst of any we have seen in any part of Great Britain.

In such a context, it is worth noting that pre-Chadwick, sanitary considerations were not to the fore in the debate over Glasgow's water supply; dominating factors tended to be inadequate fire-fighting facilities and the patchiness of the service, both in terms of quantity and geographic location.³⁹ Post-Chadwick, the public health dimension was consciously used as an argument for improvement.⁴⁰ Not that Glasgow reflected a monopoly of squalor north of the border; Chadwick made substantial use of Scotland in his Report, to illustrate concern over the absence of uncontaminated water supplies in urban areas.⁴¹ From 1842, municipal opinion in Glasgow could not fail to make comparisons with the broader Scottish experience,

especially when one of Chadwick's investigators made the following revealing comments:⁴²

I have reason to believe that in many parts of Scotland the want of a good supply of water is one of the material impediments to the furtherance of cleanly habits among the working people. Besides the immediate evils of the narrow supply, much time is wasted, and bad habits are acquired by those who have to wait their turns in a time of drought ... The demand is rendered more serious by the demand for cooling water for the numerous steam-engines ... I believe that in many of the colliery and manufacturing districts there is an inconvenience amounting to suffering, from want of water. Where there is a positive deficiency of the element on the spot, the means of procuring a supply from another place are so dependent on local circumstances, that nothing but some arbitrary authority, possessed of sufficient funds, could ensure its being obtained in every instance.

As a wealthy cotton-master and Church of Scotland Evangelical, Henry Dunlop perhaps anticipated Burton's conclusions when he first suggested that the municipality was the appropriate "arbitrary authority" to administer Glasgow's water supply. After 1842, the connection between the Council and Chadwickian ideas became much more pronounced. Accordingly, James Anderson and William Bankier were two influential councillors who shared Dunlop's preoccupations with cotton and evangelicalism, although belonging respectively to the United Secession and Relief Churches.⁴³ Both became committed to the idea of municipalising Glasgow's water supply, and strongly based their arguments on the 1844 Health of Towns Commission, which was an attempt by the Government to respond to Chadwick's

shocking Report of 1842.⁴⁴ It should be added that their enthusiasm for municipalisation could - more subtly - have been influenced by the fact that the merged Water Company was facing yet another crisis, and the proprietors were talking terms for getting rid of their ill-starred enterprise.⁴⁵ Whatever the motivations, Messrs. Anderson and Bankier pushed forward with the municipal option, and in October 1845 the matter was fully debated in the Council. There can be no doubt that the Water Company was there for the taking, had the majority opinion been favourable; however, the argument was decisively lost by sixteen votes to seven.⁴⁶ Councillors had been strongly swayed by the view that, as the Water Company was scarcely a model example of private enterprise, it would be unlikely to perform much better under municipal control.

Nevertheless, the findings of the Health of Towns Commission continued to make an impact, and demonstrated that there were meaningful alternatives to Glasgow's anachronistic system of supply. The experience of Greenock had provided particular food for thought, based on the evidence of Robert Thom, designer of the town's innovative water system.⁴⁷ During the 1820s Thom had been approached by Sir Michael Shaw Stewart - one of Greenock's great estate owners - to make a detailed examination of water resources in the locality. The result was "Shaw's Water Works", described glowingly by contemporaries as one of the wonders of engineering in the West of Scotland.⁴⁸

Channelling water from streams in the Renfrewshire hills, a feature of the scheme was the use of massive reservoirs to ensure a plentiful supply at all times. The system served the dual function of water resource and power supply; Thom had been deliberately chosen for his skill in this direction, largely because he combined an engineering career with the management of the Rothesay Cotton Works, which had substantially increased output using his pioneering ideas. Significantly, Greenock also happened to be a major Clyde port, and the focus of much mercantile activity from Glasgow. Town councillors were therefore familiar with developments down river, and looked with envy on Greenock's gravitation system. Indeed, Thom had acted as consultant to the promoters of the New Water Company in 1836, when he suggested that the river Calder was the most suitable source for the city.⁴⁹

If Greenock showed a positive profile during the deliberations of the Health of Towns Commission, evidence from south of the border confirmed fears in Glasgow about the efficiency of the competitive element in water provision. Using words that were to foreshadow Joseph Chamberlain's municipal arguments of the 1870s, Thomas Hawksley - engineer to the Trent Waterworks - described what he saw as the injurious effects of competition:⁵⁰

Two capitals become invested: two sources of wear and tear are created - two managements - and two complete sets of officers must be maintained; two causes of loss and leakage are established; for

all which the public must and do ultimately pay as well as for the enormously expensive conflict to obtain the Act of Parliament, and for the rivalry and strife of subsequent years ...

Hawksley went on to point out that many of the rival companies were in such dire straits that they had voluntarily merged, as in Glasgow. More disturbingly, some had tacitly entered into a "private understanding" to fix prices and cut costs.⁵¹ Hawksley's expertise as a witness much impressed Chadwick, who declared:⁵²

... I think the evidence I have collected from Mr Hawksley and others will revolutionise the whole of that branch of engineering, and place our towns on an entirely new footing. Until these conclusions had been established, I am convinced that the practice and position of the Water Companies formed an impenetrable barrier to all improvement.

Monopoly, therefore, was becoming accepted as no bad thing under the peculiar circumstances of water provision. Yet - as good Liberals, imbued with free market principles - the majority of Glasgow's post-1843 councillors had difficulty in coming to terms with such a notion. Perhaps they hoped that the technology which had been so successfully applied in Greenock would allow the Water Company one last chance to render a more meaningful service to the community. There had been talk of a project to bring in water from Loch Lubnaig, set in the heart of the Perthshire Highlands, and after the Council's rejection of the purchase proposals in 1845, the Water Company had no alternative but to pursue this option.⁵³ An application was

immediately made to Parliament for the necessary powers, and the new Water Act was approved in 1846. However, with the bad luck that latterly seemed to dog the Company, the venture was soon shown to have been hastily-conceived; sufficient compensation water could not be provided to millowners and other users of the river Teith, flowing out from the loch, as required by the 1846 Act.⁵⁴ Pending further Parliamentary sanction, the Company was therefore powerless to progress any of its grand new plans to supply Glasgow with water.

Gorbalonians, meanwhile, were taking an increasingly jaundiced view of the ponderous activities north of the river. It has already been pointed out that Gorbals' interests were to the fore in promoting the "New Water Company" of 1836, and since then the state of the district's water supply had not substantially altered. Immediately prior to amalgamation with Glasgow in 1846, Andrew Gemmill - the Barony's Chief Magistrate - had become leader of a revived movement to introduce a gravitation system for the South Side.⁵⁵ As a lawyer, Gemmill was best-known for his defence of the accused Glasgow cotton-spinners, after the murder of a blackleg worker during the industrial conflicts of 1837. With a reputation for purposefulness over the water issue, his legal ability stood him in good stead, and ensured that there were no repetitions of the Glasgow Company's embarrassing faux pas over the river Teith.⁵⁶ The Gorbals Water Bill was thus successfully

promoted under his watchful eye, with the aim of taking supplies from the Barrhead district to service Gorbals, Pollokshaws, Govan and places adjacent.⁵⁷ There were even hopes to penetrate the preserve of the Glasgow Company, and after the Gorbals' supply had been turned on in 1848, there was a significant drop in the profits of the northern rival. However, 1848 was not a good year for the money market, and the proprietors of the Gorbals Gravitation Company - of which Gemmill was the Secretary - were forced to delay expansion plans.

Amidst all this development - or lack of development - when did Loch Katrine first begin to be mentioned as a suitable source for providing Glasgow's water? John Burnet, in his pioneering history of the city's water supply, has attributed the general idea of using the Perthshire lochs to the Very Rev. Principal Duncan Macfarlan, who had served as an Honorary Director on the Board of the Water Company.⁵⁸ Bearing in mind Loch Katrine's future symbolism as a force for regenerating the city, it seems fitting that a clergyman should take some of the credit for launching the scheme. Whatever the story behind its origins, Loch Katrine was extensively surveyed in 1844, and the project was actively canvassed at the same time as the abortive Loch Lubnaig proposals.⁵⁹ Lewis Gordon and Laurence Hill, junior, were the engineers responsible for the initial plans, which were drafted in strict accordance with the recommendations

of the Health of Towns Commission.⁶⁰ Reflecting further Chadwickian influences, the promoters stated that they would be prepared to sell the the Works to the local authority, should this be deemed in the public interest. Loch Lubnaig eventually won out over the rival enterprise, largely because the established Water Company promised to improve the service, while the Loch Katrine promoters were beginning to doubt their ability to start a new and ambitious water project wholly from scratch.⁶¹ However, the failure of Loch Lubnaig revived hopes for Loch Katrine, although it was not until 1852 that these became positive expectations.

In the intervening period, the spectre of cholera stalked the land. As a catalyst for altering the attitudes of Glasgow's middle-classes in favour of municipal control, the cholera experience of 1848-49 stands out as of vital importance. This grim visitation left a searing impression on the civic consciousness, not so much because some 4,000 of the population died from the disease, but because a significant proportion came from the better-off sections of the community, including more than one municipal representative.⁶² In March 1849, after the worst of the epidemic was over, City Chamberlain Strang presented a detailed Report on Glasgow's recent mortality rate to the Town Council. In it, he made comparisons with the previous cholera outbreak of 1832, and observed:⁶³

On the former occasion the malady was chiefly confined to the lower and more densely peopled

portion of the Town, and was generally found among the more destitute of the population. On this occasion, however, it throws a gloom of mourning over the best habitations of the wealthy, and was comparatively careless of the more abject inmates of our more crowded hovels.

The Town Council had made contingency plans by creating a Board of Health to co-ordinate action to combat the disease, and public money was made available to open up disused wells for cleansing purposes.⁶⁴ However, good intentions were not enough to halt the seemingly indiscriminate spread of cholera in the city. Indeed, good intentions may have made matters worse, because the wells were probable breeding grounds for the "vibrio cholerae" which propagated the disease. Faced with such an unfathomable crisis, striking rich and poor alike, councillors became increasingly anxious about the threat posed by the water problem to the city's social fabric.

Yet, incredibly, the municipality did not take immediate action to tackle the deficiencies which had been exposed so tragically during the winter of 1848-49. This can be partly attributed to the sense of relief which greeted the departure of cholera from Glasgow. As in war-time, once the crisis was over, the governing authority was less prepared to enforce measures for the protection of the community. On the other hand, memories of the epidemic did not fully disappear, and insidiously reimposed themselves over time. In 1852, when the Loch Katrine project was under consideration in the Council

Chambers, Bailie James Gourlay vividly summed up prevailing attitudes in Glasgow:⁶⁵

It is astonishing, my Lord Provost, how active we become with our tongues when we apprehend danger, and how soon we grow quiet when we imagine danger has passed. It is really amusing to reflect how, when the approach of cholera was threatened during the heat of summer, every one was more active than another in urging the authorities to enforce sanitary measures. The press proclaimed the urgent necessity; Parochial Boards met and appointed Committees to confer with the police; police committees met and appointed some of their members to meet with Parochial Boards, and both together got up such a fuss of white-washing, and scrubbing, and cleansing out of dunghills, and turning out of swine from the closes and vennels, as perfectly astonished the denizens of those abodes of filth and wretchedness. It is all very right - highly proper, that such should be done. The complaint I make is, that it is not done more frequently - that it is done only by fits and starts - that this process of purification is not continued throughout the year; and yet I have no right to complain on that score, for until we get an abundant supply of the necessary element of water it never will be done effectively. Nevertheless, you must admit that since the summer has passed away, and the effluvia, of which we all complain during the dog-days, is less noxious, and a belief has obtained that all-merciful Providence is to spare us from the visitation of the mysterious plague; the press and the public have become wonderous quiet, so quiet that one might imagine the scorching sun of summer and the sultry relaxing rays of autumn were never again to visit our city. This would be a sad mistake, although a too common instance of careless indifference. The seasons, we all know, will again come round, and unless we do something now, we will just be next year, and the next, and the next after that, what we have been for the last eighteen years, grumbling against the Glasgow Water Company, whereas we ought to be finding fault with ourselves.

Gourlay's carefully thought out speech was much-applauded at the time, and was generally welcomed as a cogent argument in favour of a more efficient system of water supply for Glasgow.

The question must, however, be asked as to how far he was using the sanitary argument as a cover for commercial rather than community interests. In his examination of the British water industry during the nineteenth century, J.A. Hassan has urged caution in stressing the public health dimension, pointing out that manufacturers were largely behind the movement towards municipalisation, in order to maximise efficiency.⁶⁶ Thus, Manchester's pioneering rôle during the 1840s can be explained in terms of self-interest:⁶⁷

The long-term benefits of a modernized water supply, including reduced fire-risks, lower industrial costs, the enhancement of property values, and a healthier work-force, were sought by the economic elites of manufacturing towns, rather than any kudos gained as a result of their cities' creation of famous civil engineering projects.

The Glasgow experience undoubtedly fits in with the pattern identified by Hassan. Most of the names appearing in the Provisional Committee of the abortive New Water Company in 1836, and the Loch Katrine Water Company in 1845, constituted a roll-call of leading Glasgow manufacturers. The Baird brothers, Sir James Campbell, Alexander Dennistoun, John Orr Ewing, Alexander Hastie, John and William Houldsworth, Charles J. Tennant and John Wilson of Dundyvan were all behind the original Loch Katrine scheme.⁶⁸ Their range of manufacturing interests covered cotton, coal, iron and chemicals; precisely those areas that demanded massive water resources for steam power.

Moreover, Loch Katrine was famous for its soft water, which was delicious to drink, but also cost-effective, as it was less harmful to machinery, less wasteful of soap, and improved the overall quality of the finished product.⁶⁹ Other municipalities, such as Bradford, went to enormous lengths to acquire a soft water supply to serve the needs of industry; a lesson that was not lost on the Glaswegians in their quest to find an improved source for the city.⁷⁰

Yet it would be unfair to suggest that in 1852 James Gourlay was cynically using the threat of cholera as emotional blackmail, in order to help his friends in the manufacturing sector. He had genuine fears for Glasgow's future, which were strongly reinforced by his evangelical commitment as a United Presbyterian.⁷¹ The same can be said of his fellow-Churchman, James Anderson, who served as Lord Provost between 1848 and 1851, and who never relinquished his faith in the municipal option for Glasgow's water supply. It was Anderson who revived the movement for the Loch Katrine scheme, when he proposed in 1850 that the Council should take over the Glasgow and Gorbals Companies. The motion was lost by twenty-three votes to nineteen, with the opposition - understandably - being led by councillor Andrew Gemmill.⁷² Nevertheless, the water question was not immediately buried by the municipality as a result of this setback. During 1851, discussions were held with the proprietors of the two Water Companies, to ascertain their views

on the future of water provision in the city. Neither were prepared to yield their entrenched positions; indeed, both were in an aggressive mood, with plans for expansion.⁷³ As a result, the Loch Katrine scheme re-emerged as an alternative for the consideration of the Council. The promoters were convinced of its commercial viability, although they stressed that this was not necessarily the best way forward for such an ambitious project. Municipal control was their favoured method of management, and they cited the example of Manchester Corporation, which in 1848 had implemented a major project to exploit the river Etherow, in the Longendale Valley.⁷⁴

Even at this stage, there was still resistance to the idea of a municipal water monopoly. While James Gourlay had argued convincingly in favour of Loch Katrine, he could not initially bring himself to endorse a non-commercial venture. However, James Anderson and his friends from the Glasgow Health of Towns Association successfully set to work to bring about a change of heart.⁷⁵ The clinching argument for Gourlay was the dubious example of railway speculation, which had "made the public so alarmed at joint-stock companies now a days", that he believed it would be a dangerous gamble to float the new project for fear of being under-subscribed.⁷⁶ Notwithstanding the continued hostility of Andrew Gemmill, the municipal argument was conclusively won. In December 1852, the Town Council secured the services of an able engineer - John Frederic Bateman

- who had made his name with the Longendale project, and enjoyed excellent relations with Manchester Corporation. Significantly, Bateman had been first recommended to the Manchester authority by Edwin Chadwick.⁷⁷

It took the best part of a year for Bateman to survey the sites which had the potential to provide Glasgow's water supply.⁷⁸ He eventually confirmed that, "Loch Katrine and the river Teith, as it flowed from it, were perfectly bright, and unquestionably the finest water I had seen".⁷⁹ By the end of 1853 the requisite Parliamentary Bill was prepared and submitted, seeking powers to purchase the two existing Water Companies and bring in fifty million gallons per day from Loch Katrine and the existing sources. However, it soon became clear that progress was likely to be stormy. At the local level, anxiety was expressed at numerous public meetings - notably in the South Side - about the dangers of bureaucratic control.⁸⁰ At the Committee stage of the House of Commons, Bateman's painstaking investigations were called into question by Frederick Penny, Professor of Chemistry at the Andersonian University, who claimed that Loch Katrine water vigorously dissolved lead, and was therefore highly toxic.⁸¹ Penny's sensational evidence caused an adjournment of the inquiry, and much time was taken up in an effort to refute the claims.⁸² Once that had been cleared out of the way, the Admiralty complained that the Forth navigation would be adversely affected

by developments upstream, if the river Teith was interfered with.⁸³ This surprising intervention effectively scuppered the Bill, and the Glasgow delegation - comprising Lord Provost Stewart, James Gourlay and James Scott - were forced to return home empty-handed.

The majority of councillors were undoubtedly surprised at the strength of feeling generated against the 1854 Bill. However, they had no intention of giving up the struggle, having committed so much time and effort, not to mention £17,000 of public money on legal costs.⁸⁴ Municipal esteem was also at stake, particularly after the lofty claims that had been originally made for Loch Katrine. In a change of tactics, which was to be repeated in the 1891 negotiations over boundary expansion, a much more conciliatory stance was adopted. Rather than fuel further confrontation, the opposition was bought off, including the Forth Navigation Trustees and the Water Companies. Compensations eventually totalled £79,180, including land purchase, although this was comparatively small in contrast with the £770,000 spent on the construction of the Water Works.⁸⁵ After much municipal spadework, and only token resistance from the House of Lords, the Glasgow Corporation Water Works Act received the Royal Assent in July 1855.⁸⁶ The Magistrates and Council became responsible for the new Works, in their capacity as Trustees, with power to delegate executive authority to a smaller Water Committee.

Four years later, the Water Works were formally opened by Queen Victoria in one of the most elaborate ceremonials ever staged by the municipality.⁸⁷ No expense was spared in making the inauguration a success, especially as royal patronage had been bestowed. The emotional appeal of the occasion had much to do with Loch Katrine's strong identification with Sir Walter Scott, who shared a good deal of the Queen's responsibility - and culpability - for shrouding the Scottish identity in swathes of tartan.⁸⁸ Loch Katrine lay at the heart of Scott's great narrative poem, The Lady of the Lake, along with the character of the beautiful and spirited heroine, Ellen Douglas. In the context of the poem, both were metaphors for an idealised Scotland, set in an age of romance and chivalry. Yet, as one twentieth century writer has pointed out, Scott aroused the nostalgic sentiments of more than his fellow-countrymen.⁸⁹

It is impossible to guess how many people today have read The Lady of the Lake; but anyone who cares to do so will soon discover that it has not lost the freshness that made its appeal on publication. It is full of exciting and vivid pieces of action - the stag hunt, the sending round of the "fiery cross", the battle. It all sounds so well and so emotive - and not only to people in Scotland or elsewhere in Britain who may have seen or who know about the Highlands.

On the strength of its popularity, The Lady of the Lake worked wonders for the nascent Scottish tourist industry, with the result that Loch Katrine was famous long before Messrs. Hill and Gordon made their initial explorations to test its potential as

a water supply.⁹⁰

Whatever else Scott was able to communicate to the nineteenth century consciousness, Glaswegians were inspired by the heroic and glamorous world he had created.⁹¹ Accordingly, Loch Katrine was not just thought of as a formidable engineering tour de force, but as the enchanted lake where Ellen Douglas dwelled. This magical quality was precisely what town councillors were anxious to reflect on their massive new undertaking, in order to pacify public opinion over the £1,500,000 ultimately spent on the project. Scott's lines summed up the civic vision:⁹²

The broom's tough roots his ladder made,
The hazel saplings lent their aid;
And thus an airy point he won,
Where, gleaming with the setting sun,
One burnish'd sheet of living gold,
Loch Katrine lay beneath him rolled ...

The great public asset was represented as "living gold", which had far more potential to benefit society than the arid and soulless gold of the money market. As a mid-Victorian public relations exercise in favour of municipal control, the Loch Katrine project was a masterstroke. Attractive though they were as sources for Glasgow's water, the Falls of Lanark, the river Earn, or even Loch Lubnaig could not evoke the same powerful images. Of course, John Bateman would have denied indignantly that the loch had been chosen on the strength of its literary associations, but there can be little doubt that in terms of

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popular perceptions, Sir Walter Scott and Ellen Douglas contributed enormously towards the making of municipal Glasgow.

II. Of Parks and Galleries, 1846-1859

While Glasgow's parks and galleries have been justifiably depicted as among the most enduring municipal legacies bequeathed to the community during the nineteenth century, the motivations behind the original acquisition of these splendid public amenities seem never to have been explored in any depth.⁹³ This is in marked contrast with the story of the Loch Katrine water supply, which was first told with painstaking accuracy by John Burnet in 1869, and thereafter became a central theme in numerous accounts of the city's civic achievements.⁹⁴ As will be seen, there were good reasons why municipal representatives did not want the parks and galleries subjected to similar critical scrutiny, however well-intentioned. There were, to put it mildly, some curious connections between the personal interests of certain town councillors and the purchase and development of Kelvingrove Park and the McLellan Galleries during the 1850s. Although damaging enough to individual reputations, these factors became inadvertently bound up with one of the most notorious scandals in Glasgow's history, which for a time threatened the very fabric of municipal authority. Understandably, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which the middle-classes closed ranks, in order to preserve civic stability; on the other hand, there is sufficient cumulative evidence to show that

high-ranking councillors placed themselves in a dangerously compromising position over their parks and galleries associations, which came very near to public exposure.

It is essential to consider the parks and galleries together, in order to make sense of the events leading up to the personal crisis which confronted Glasgow's civic leadership during the fateful year of 1857. However, the roots of all this lay - as in much of Glasgow's mid-Victorian municipal activity - in the boundary expansion of 1846. Not only did the Extension Act redefine Glasgow's municipal profile, but - more generally - allowed greater scope for urban development, once the uncertainties over policing and jurisdiction had been apparently resolved. This did not in itself cause the building-boom which was to characterise Glasgow up to the 1870s; the movement was already underway before 1846, and the complex history of the "Ring of Burghs" has shown that communities outside the city were capable of maintaining their own momentum.⁹⁵ Yet during the 1840s, the creation of the suburban Police Burghs had not been anticipated, and the boundaries of the new municipal entity were regarded as being sufficiently self-contained for coping with the needs of the city's population. For the poorer citizens, this was perceived as fulfilling hopes of clearing out the unhealthy warren of slums from the heart of the old royalty, as had been previously suggested by influential Evangelicals like John Leadbetter and Henry Paul. Conversely, the sights of

many wealthy citizens were firmly fixed west, beyond the tainted atmosphere of the city centre, where a cluster of pastoral estates lay ripe for residential development.

Michael Simpson has described the history of Glasgow's West End during the first half of the nineteenth century, identifying the changing pattern of land ownership, and the growing trend towards residential building.⁹⁶ In 1830, South Woodside was the first estate to be specifically sold for such a purpose, and over the next three decades others followed suit. Prospective purchasers of South Woodside had been wooed with assurances that:⁹⁷

The lands ... are, from the state of surrounding property, effectively secured against any kind of nuisance, while the form into which the pleasure grounds, and openings of these lands has been thrown, is such to exclude the possibility of disturbance from carting, carriage-drawing, or any foreign intrusion whatever.

The prospect of salubrious surroundings, free from "nuisances" and "foreign intrusion" was an increasingly attractive prospect for wealthy Glaswegians, who were appalled by the deteriorating fabric of the inner city. Not a few town councillors took advantage of the prestigious Woodside address, with one of the most notable long-term residents being Sir James Watson.⁹⁸ Councillors and their families also took advantage of the desire to move west, by selling or feuing-out their properties. For instance, John Fleming's Claremont estate was developed from the 1830s, in accordance with the impressive architectural design of

neighbouring South Woodside.⁹⁹ Not surprisingly, this personal dimension came to be cause for criticism, especially after the Town Council began to manifest a keen collective interest in creating a new, custom-built park, located in the west.

Until the 1850s, there had only been one substantial area of public parkland within the municipal boundaries; this was Glasgow Green, the traditional grazing, drying and bleaching ground of the old royalty, which James Cleland - as Superintendent of Public Works - had reconstructed between 1815 and 1826.¹⁰⁰ The Green was located in the eastern side of the city, extending along the river into proletarian Bridgeton; precisely those areas which Glasgow's middle-classes were abandoning in favour of the west. Loyal East Enders were worried about the Green's declining status, particularly as the Town Council had made moves to investigate valuable mineral deposits lying under the surface, with a view to commercial exploitation.¹⁰¹ Then, during the 1840s, the proprietors of the Glasgow, Airdrie and Monklands Junction Railway Company became interested in running a viaduct through the Green, to the dismay of East End radicals like James Moir and William C. Pattison.¹⁰² The railway proposals were not given Parliamentary sanction, but for several decades afterwards there remained nagging doubts over the future of Glasgow's oldest open space. These became all the more insidious after 1850, when the

idea of the West End Park was first openly promoted.

The timing of the park proposals corresponded almost exactly with the re-emergence of the Loch Katrine project as a serious option for Glasgow's water supply. The grim recollections of the 1848-49 cholera epidemic had not only gnawed at the consciousness of the city fathers in terms of pure water; pure air was also a foremost consideration when it came to preventative measures. This was especially so during the middle years of the century, when there was a widely-held theory that public parks could act as the "lungs" of densely-populated districts, by generating sufficient fresh air to purify the polluted urban atmosphere.¹⁰³ Such a notion was important in the context of "miasma", or the belief that infectious diseases - notably cholera - were spread by noxious vapours. Although eventually disproved, the beneficial qualities attributed to parks as "reservoirs of fresh air" were not lost on the civic authorities.¹⁰⁴ However, the parks had to remain themselves unsullied in order to retain maximum potency, and Glasgow Green - despite Cleland's improvements - was regarded as being located too dangerously close to the city's unsavoury heartland. Contemporary perceptions of the Green were summed up by Hugh Macdonald - writer, poet and erstwhile Chartist - describing a visit in May 1852:¹⁰⁵

In the vicinity of the Saltmarket, where we have made our entree, the Green is alive with squalid

groups, the children of misery and vice. Beguiled by the radiance of the summer noon, they have sneaked forth, for a brief interval, from their reeky and noisome haunts, to breathe for a time the comparatively "caller air". Unfortunate females, with faces of triple brass hiding hearts of unutterable woe - sleeping girls, who might be mistaken for lifeless bundles of rags - owlish-looking knaves, minions of the moon, skulking half-ashamed in their own appearance in the eye of the day; and, alas! poor little tattered and hungry-looking children, with precocious lines of care upon their old-mannish features, tumbling about on the brown and sapless herbage. The veriest dregs of Glasgow society, indeed, seem congregated here.

Yet for all the Green's dubious reputation, the social value of public parks was not called into question by town councillors, and James Moir led a tireless campaign to effect improvements which would reclaim the territory as the historic focal point for all Glaswegians.¹⁰⁶ Moreover, Hugh Macdonald was careful to point out the difference between the idle "vermin", who had temporarily usurped the Green, and the "industrious poor", who were the true inheritors of the Green's traditions.¹⁰⁷ This attitude accorded with Parliamentary statements from as early as 1833, when the Select Committee on Public Walks had reported:¹⁰⁸

It cannot be necessary to point out how requisite some Public Walks or Open Spaces in the neighbourhood of large Towns must be; to those who consider the occupations of the Working Classes who dwell there; confined as they are during the weekdays as Mechanics and Manufacturers, and often shut up in heated Factories: it must be evident that it is of the first importance to their health on their day of rest to enjoy fresh air ... if deprived of any such resource,

it is probable that their only escape from the narrow courts and alleys (in which so many of the humble classes reside) will be drinking shops where, in short-lived excitement they may forget their toil ...

It should come as no surprise that the ubiquitous Edwin Chadwick had heartily endorsed these sentiments when he gave evidence before the 1834 Select Committee on Drunkenness, adding that "zoos, museums and theatres" were also useful diversions from the drink shop.¹⁰⁹ As the Loch Katrine experience has shown, Chadwickian ideas were highly-regarded by an influential body of Glasgow councillors, especially as they had much in common with prevailing evangelical attitudes.

Both the public health and the moral arguments seemed strongly to support the case for a second public park in Glasgow. Yet how was this to be achieved in terms of finance, and where precisely was the new park to be located? It seems that "several influential citizens" had given this matter careful thought, after three of the West End estates - Kelvingrove, Gilmorehill and Woodlands - were placed on the market at the beginning of 1850.¹¹⁰ The properties lay on either side of the river Kelvin, contiguous to each other, and were described as possessing "every feature of sylvan beauty".¹¹¹ At the time of the proposed sale, Kelvingrove was in the possession of the trustees of Colin McNaughton, who had recently died; Gilmorehill belonged to a joint-stock feuing company, which had purchased the estate in 1845 after the

previous owners failed to raise sufficient cash to convert it into a "beautiful suburban place of sepulture"; Woodlands was the property of the Glasgow, Airdrie and Monklands Junction Railway Company, and had originally been earmarked as the site for Glasgow University, in return for acquiring the existing College grounds as a railway depot.¹¹² Like the abortive cemetery at Gilmorehill, the plans for Woodlands had floundered, although the University authorities still retained a keen interest in moving west, as many town councillors were aware.¹¹³

The identity of the "several influential citizens" who first floated the scheme for transforming the three estates was something of a mystery, although probable identities will be discussed in due course. At all events, the Glasgow Herald seems to have been deliberately used to bring the idea to public notice in June 1850.¹¹⁴ In a lengthy feature article, it was reported that the immediate objective was to acquire the hundred or so acres, turning the bulk of the territory into parkland, but reserving from a fourth to a fifth for building purposes. The purchase was promoted as a sound business venture as well as a useful public service; it was thought that prospective feuars would be attracted by the proximity of the park, and there would be consequently no problem about disposing of plots. The financing of this ambitious project was a more delicate matter, particularly as money was thinly spread around for investment

purposes, but the Herald put forward a tentative solution:¹¹⁵

... to bring about this most desirable objective, we suspect that the Corporation must come in with its helping hand, especially if it can be shown that the scheme is neither of a speculative or uncertain character. Good proof of this kind can be given, we are assured, by gentlemen who have dealt largely in property for building purposes during the last twenty years, and who state that the Council may with safety interpose its credit for the purchase money of £100,000.

By January 1851 the initial scheme had materialised into a concrete plan for the consideration of the Council.¹¹⁶ While the directors of the Gilmorehill Company were no longer interested in selling their lands as part of the transaction, they were prepared to donate sixteen acres, in return for obtaining "favourable accesses" to their territory, which they hoped would dramatically increase in value.¹¹⁷ The scope of the proposed site was substantially reduced, but enough remained for Charles Wilson - one of Glasgow's most gifted architects - to draft plans for the redefined area, carefully incorporating the features of neighbouring South Woodside and Claremont.¹¹⁸ The total cost of the project was estimated at £70,000, of which the Town Council was asked to contribute £10,000, with the same sum to be raised by public subscription. It was hoped that the remaining £50,000 would be supplied via a specially-created joint-stock company, in which the municipality was expected to take shares. The spokesman for the promoters was James Wyllie Guild, an accountant, who successfully persuaded the Council's

Finance Committee to consider the matter.¹¹⁹ The names of Guild's backers were still not mentioned, and there began to be rumours that vested interests within the Council were at work. At a subsequent Council meeting a question was asked by an East End representative, George Mitchell, as to the identity of the Park's promoters. William Bankier, City Treasurer and Convener of the Finance Committee, replied that he knew of only two - Guild and Wilson - "and from all that he had been able to learn there were no others".¹²⁰

Meanwhile, Glasgow's radical press was being more forthcoming in its accusations that there was something suspicious at the bottom of the park proposals. After claiming that "underhand work" was guiding the Loch Katrine scheme, the Glasgow Examiner went on to suggest that the public would have to be equally cautious about the West End developments:¹²¹

... our very active Council, finding that certain parties are rather implicated with certain lands on the west-side of the city, have been toiling most perseveringly to ease the minds of these persons by proposing to make the Corporation pay, in part, for them as a west-end park! ... £10,000 are proposed, with all gravity, to be given for this purpose. It is not even alleged that this new job is for the benefit of the working-classes - it is to be paid to make a fine park for the idle people of the west ...

From within the Town Council, Andrew Gemmill was busily fighting the Loch Katrine proposals, but still found time to lead the assault against the plans of Messrs. Guild and Wilson. He was convinced that an influential body of persons was lurking in the

background, "who were prepared to carry out this proposal for the advancement of their own ends".¹²² He stopped short of naming names, although he did repeat the Examiner's view that the park was intended solely for the benefit of the rich, who needed only to "step from their lobbies" to take advantage of the new amenity, while poorer citizens from the East End and South Side would have a weary trudge across the city.¹²³

By the narrow margin of twenty-five votes to twenty, reflecting a strong east-west split, the Town Council agreed to support the Finance Committee's recommendation to contribute £10,000.¹²⁴ Yet despite this initial reluctance, councillors were soon to commit themselves to a much larger sum. This was because throughout 1851, nobody appeared to be making any moves to buy the two estates. The asking price for Woodlands eventually dropped to £21,000; a substantial difference from the £38,000 which the railway proprietors had originally paid when the speculation seemed promising.¹²⁵ By April 1852 the optimistic plans for developing the West End Park were seriously under threat, and - as a last resort - the Kelvingrove and Claremont trustees offered their properties to the Town Council for £30,000 and £4,525 respectively.¹²⁶ The owners of Woodlands swiftly followed suit, asking £21,000 for the twenty-two acre site.¹²⁷ The Finance Committee - now under the Convenership of James Scott - immediately jumped at the opportunity.¹²⁸ Andrew Gemmill warned his colleagues against

the transaction, claiming that it had not been sufficiently thought through, and that "bankruptcy, insolvency, and ruin" would be the inevitable outcome.¹²⁹ However, this time he was the sole municipal voice against the expenditure, and did not even find a seconder for his request to defer consideration of the item, pending investigation.

The price eventually paid by the municipality for the West End Park was £77,995, with the aim of recouping this sum by feuing-out a proportion of the sixty-six acres for building purposes.¹³⁰ Apart from the tenacious Andrew Gemmill, councillors were generally enthusiastic about prospects for their fine new acquisition, despite lingering doubts about its location. There were a variety of reasons for the positive change in attitude. The fact that the park development would now be completely under municipal control had prompted many erstwhile critics into supporting the purchase, while James Scott's firm assurances that the feuing plan would wash its face financially removed fears about insolvency.¹³¹ Moreover, by 1852 the Town Council appeared to be well in credit, with a large cash sum pending from the Caledonian Railway Company for the sale of municipal property on the south-side of the river.¹³² Aggrieved feelings in the various districts of Glasgow over the West End's favoured status were pacified with promises that additional sites for parkland would be investigated.¹³³ Above all, the success of the 1851 Great

Exhibition had boosted the popularity of public parks enormously, to the extent that Joseph Paxton - designer of the Crystal Palace - was prevailed upon to lay out the forty-five acres which constituted the landscape section of the West End Park.¹³⁴ His belief that parks were a moral instrument, for instruction as well as enjoyment, tied in well with the architectural ideas of Charles Wilson, who was asked to tackle the feuing plan.¹³⁵

By the beginning of 1853 the project seemed to be progressing smoothly. The new park had been formally given the name of Kelvingrove, although the "West End Park" remained a popular appellation until well into the twentieth century.¹³⁶ In addition to Paxton and Wilson, James Wyllie Guild was employed by the Council as a financial adviser, assisting City Chamberlain James Strang. Both men were involved in discussions with the University authorities with a view to reviving the former plan to shift the College west, although after working out the logistics, the Woodlands site proved to be too small.¹³⁷ It was about the time of the abortive University discussions that doubts started to surface about the Town Council's handling of the affair. Not that there was any criticism of the park per se; rather, it was the design of the park which prompted the hostile reaction. Charles Wilson was in the process of drafting an imaginative feuing plan, embracing the crest of the steep hill towards Woodlands, but the veteran

Peter Mackenzie of the Reformers' Gazette was horrified by the effect, because it meant that the airiest and most elevated part of the development lay outside the public park. As Mackenzie put it, in his inimitable style:¹³⁸

... when the Public proceeds to visit the Park, he (the said respectable public) will find himself confined to a wonderfully narrow space, from which he will be glad to escape to the streets and terraces above, to obtain a mouthful of air. The public, in short, must break into private property, and look out at windows of private houses, or walk with his multitudinous hoof on Brussels carpets or stone pavements, or squat upon the top of stacks of chimneys, or ruminant on the roofs of houses in the heart of a slaty wilderness if he would obtain so much as a Pisgah-peep of the really magnificent prospect which is at present commanded by the highest part of the park.

Mackenzie was voicing concerns that were being expressed inside and outside the Town Council. Ironically, the most vocal municipal critics were not East End radicals, but two exemplary Glasgow citizens, with strong West End connections. Archibald McLellan and Andrew Orr were highly regarded as "coming men" on the Council; indeed, both had been suggested as candidates for the Lord Provostship during 1851, with McLellan standing unsuccessfully against Robert Stewart.¹³⁹ McLellan's intimate connection with Glasgow's municipal history dated from the 1820s, when - as a nominee of the Trades' House via the Incorporation of Hammermen - he served as a councillor and later as a Magistrate.¹⁴⁰ He was then a young man, still in his twenties, and a partner in the family's well-established

coach-building business. Like many councillors under the unreformed régime, he had strong Conservative sympathies, although his friends and business associates were of assorted political hues. It was not until 1847 that he was prevailed upon to stand for municipal office, representing the Fourteenth or Anderston Ward. He did so as leader of the short-lived "Means and Substance" party, which sought changes in the method of assessing the Poor Rates in Glasgow, and in this capacity the apparently uncompromising Tory was given considerable radical backing.¹⁴¹ McLellan's great interest was art and architecture; he purchased sculpture and many fine paintings, plus rare antiquarian books, and made plans to exhibit the collection in buildings specially constructed for the purpose in Sauchiehall Street.¹⁴² McLellan's acquisitions eventually formed the basis of Glasgow's municipal Art Galleries; a circumstance which - as will be seen - he did not plan for.

Andrew Orr was as forthright in his Liberal commitment as McLellan was a Conservative, having first stood for municipal office in 1842 on a free trade platform. Yet, like McLellan, politics did not stand in the way of personal or business relationships. One of Orr's closest friends was Alexander Baird - wealthy ironmaster, active Conservative and erstwhile town councillor - whom he accompanied on a tour of Turkey and the Middle East after the Crimean War. In a bizarre symbol of mid-Victorian capitalist collaboration, they posed together for

John Urie, a well-known city photographer, in Turkish robes, turbans and slippers.¹⁴³ A wholesale stationer to trade, Orr came from a prosperous Glasgow background, and represented the Sixth Ward on the Council, located in the central Candleriggs district.¹⁴⁴ His home was nearer to the West End, in a fine town house in Blythswood Square, where ex-Lord Provost James Anderson was a close neighbour.¹⁴⁵ In addition to his municipal activity, Orr was best-known as the energetic Chairman of the Glasgow and South Western Railway Company, a position which he held from 1849 to 1871. His railway involvement caused doubts to be expressed about the propriety of him standing as Lord Provost in 1854, to succeed Robert Stewart; nevertheless, his Council colleagues were persuaded that there was no clash of interests, and Orr was unanimously endorsed for election to the civic chair.¹⁴⁶

Orr's popularity in 1854 seems surprising, bearing in mind the strong feelings that had been generated the previous year over the feuing plan for Kelvingrove Park. What, therefore, had been his motivations in 1853, and why were Archibald McLellan and the radicals such unlikely allies in support of Orr? John McDowall, one of Glasgow's most prominent municipal activists during the 1850s, admitted to being "at a loss" to understand his colleague, although McDowall was being deliberately ironic.¹⁴⁷ At the time, the two men were keen rivals; McDowall was another of the Council's "coming men", with hopes

of achieving high municipal office.¹⁴⁸ There were also personal tensions between Orr and McDowall; McDowall's dour evangelicalism was not to the taste of the easy-going Orr, nor was his political support for Alexander Hastie, MP for Glasgow, who had so antagonised East Enders during the "Bread Riots" of 1848.¹⁴⁹ It seems clear that Orr was courting popularity in 1853 as part of his campaign to win the Lord Provostship, and keep the ambitious McDowall at bay. The ostentatious manner in which Orr conducted his onslaught against the park proposals, including skilful use of the press, brought him into public prominence and won a following among the radicals. He may even have been looking beyond the Provostship, as his obituary states that he had been approached to stand as MP for Glasgow during the 1850s, although he later gave up interest in pursuing a Parliamentary career.¹⁵⁰

McLellan's place in this scenario is not so easily explained, but seems to have been more personal than political. Nevertheless, the McLellan connection was useful to Orr, as his stance over the Poor Law debate had endeared McLellan to the radicals, who readily gave him support within the Council Chambers. After 1851, McLellan's municipal ambitions became muted, and he directed his energies towards his art collection and property development. It was as a developer that the potential of the Kelvingrove site appealed to McLellan. This interest was nothing new; along with his friend and business

associate, James Smith, he had been involved with West End property transactions during the 1840s, although cash-flow problems had prevented him from making anything out of the speculation.¹⁵¹ In 1853 McLellan was full of ideas about restructuring Kelvingrove Park, which Peter Mackenzie obligingly published in the Reformers' Gazette.¹⁵² The ideas became refined into a grandiose plan to construct a Crystal Palace on Woodlands Hill, to emulate the success of Paxton's famous Hyde Park structure. James Smith - who happened to be an architect - submitted a preliminary design to the Town Council, along with proposals to float a joint-stock company which would buy back the Kelvingrove site and organise a "grand international exhibition of art and industry", on a commercial basis.¹⁵³ To be fair, Smith was attempting to make maximum use of the parkland, at minimum public expense. Nevertheless, given the speculative climate of the times, a more cynical interpretation could be given to Smith's plan, especially as he did not state who was to be in control of this ambitious enterprise.

The efforts of Messrs. McLellan and Orr to change the park's profile were viewed with mounting irritation by the civic leadership, and James Gourlay responded vigorously in defence of the existing plans. As far as he was concerned, the criticisms were totally unfounded:¹⁵⁴

I have heard an awful quantity of nonsense spoken in this Council in name of the public - that sadly misused body, along with its twin brothers, the

working classes, and sanitary improvement has lately been used very much like a crutch to help a lame argument ... I believe, in my conscience, that the public who have made any noise about it at all is confined to three or four members of this Town Council, and one newspaper editor, distinguished far more for his zeal than his prudence in whatever cause he espouses. I mix as much with the public as any of you, and my experience has been this - that the public laugh at us, and wonder what we are making such a work about.

James Moir acted in a conciliatory capacity during the Council debate, and on his recommendation it was agreed that any shortcomings in the existing plans would be thoroughly investigated, with a view to readjustment.¹⁵⁵ The alternative Crystal Palace proposals were later noted, and Smith was politely thanked for his efforts, but Charles Wilson was allowed to progress the development.¹⁵⁶ As it transpired, the Town Council's faith in Wilson was to be entirely justified. He used inspired French influences to design the elegant terraces of the new Park district, and his Free Church College - crowning Woodlands Hill - became one of the most striking landmarks in the city.¹⁵⁷ In due course, Park was transformed into a highly desirable - and exclusive - residential area. The great irony was that this had been made possible largely through municipal rather than commercial initiative.

During 1854, while Wilson was busily executing his architectural tour de force in the West End, Archibald McLellan died at his country residence of Mugdock Castle, Dunbartonshire.¹⁵⁸ He was thus never able to congratulate his

friend, Andrew Orr, on achieving the Lord Provostship, although he must have been aware that the honour was pending. The Glasgow Herald paid effusive tribute to "this able and excellent citizen", showing the esteem with which he was regarded in the upper echelons of Glasgow society.¹⁵⁹ The Herald also noted that McLellan had been anxious to bequeath his valuable art collection to the care of the community, and hoped that arrangements could be quickly made to carry out his wishes. It should be stressed that McLellan had never intended the collection to become the property of the Town Council, but that it should belong to a "semi-private but shifting body of trustees"; nor did the ownership of the buildings which housed the Galleries come under the terms of the original deed of settlement, as executed by McLellan in November 1853.¹⁶⁰ When he died, the estate should have been disposed of as he requested, and the municipality would certainly not have been able to lay any exclusive claim to the art collection and properties. However, McLellan died prematurely, aged fifty-eight, in the midst of complicated financial transactions over the heavy construction costs of the Sauchiehall Street development. The estate was left substantially in debt, and the only effective means of satisfying creditors was to negate the deed of settlement, and sell the Galleries and personal effects. It was at this crucial stage that the Town Council manifested an interest in buying the entire Sauchiehall Street

property, plus art collection; a proposal that was seized upon by the estate trustees, with the result that negotiations were immediately entered into.

Many Glasgow councillors supported the purchase, believing it to be a unique opportunity to obtain the foundations of a city art collection which would not only be invaluable for educating the public, but would be yet another asset to add to the growing number of municipal properties and heritages.¹⁶¹ Others were highly dubious about the whole affair, detecting a "job" at the bottom of it; a claim, as it transpired, that was not without foundation.¹⁶² Among the main trustees for the McLellan estate were James Smith and David Dreghorn, an accountant, who was also a long-standing councillor for the Thirteenth Ward.¹⁶³ The main creditor of the McLellan estate was the City of Glasgow Bank, whose Chairman at the time happened to be Lord Provost Orr, and which had a number of other councillors as shareholders.¹⁶⁴ The trustees, through their spokesman, Dreghorn, had suggested to the Council that a sum of £44,500 for the Sauchiehall Street property and collection would be an appropriate purchase price, to enable the estate to be immediately wound up and the creditors paid.¹⁶⁵ The proposal was speedily accepted, on the basis that substantial income would accrue to the Council in the form of rents from the shops and revenue from the Galleries, to be used for functions, lectures, concerts and other entertainments. It was later

pointed out that the Council had failed to take into account necessary additional expenditure, in the form of repairs, alterations, taxes and insurance, and that claims that the purchase would be self-financing were unrealistic.¹⁶⁶ By 1857 the McLellan Galleries had become an embarrassing burden to the Town Council, and the Finance Committee - under City Treasurer John McDowall - was anxiously casting around for means of attracting additional revenue to offset the the costs of the purchase.

To make matters worse for McDowall and his colleagues, the expected remuneration from the Kelvingrove Park feu duties had not been realised, so that overall costs, including outlay, maintenance and interest, had risen to £129,601 by the end of the 1857-58 financial year.¹⁶⁷ A third complicating factor in the municipal budget was the recent purchase of lands outside the city boundary, in a district known as Pathhead, for the purpose of laying out the promised South Side Park.¹⁶⁸ In a desperate effort to recoup the Parks and Galleries losses, the idea was mooted during 1857 that the mineral deposits on Glasgow Green should be re-examined as a moneymaking concern.¹⁶⁹ John McDowall was charged with implementing this proposal, although - as the owner of the Milton Ironworks in North Woodside Road - he was personally not disinterested in the prospect of mining in the Green. On the other hand, as leader of the Council's evangelically-inclined representatives, McDowall had a

reputation for placing public interests above personal considerations, and was undoubtedly anxious to protect the Common Good. He recognised, from a strictly financial point of view, that if the mineral deposits could be turned into a tangible asset, then the Council would no longer need to juggle with balance sheets, and would have a solid basis of ready revenue. However, paper calculations were different from the reality of what many Glaswegians perceived as the loss of their heritage, and a furious public campaign ensued.

Prominent in the leadership of the campaign was James Moir; the fact that McDowall was politically close to Alexander Hastie must have fuelled his resentment against the proposed messy plundering of the Green. As a municipal representative, Moir had become extremely popular, and even the Glasgow Herald admitted that he was "an excellent working councillor", who had won the "full confidence of his ward".¹⁷⁰ In his endeavours to stop the mining of the Green, Moir was generally supported by the inhabitants of the locality, rich and poor alike. Traders opposed the Town Council, fearing that their businesses would be affected as property values plummeted and residents departed elsewhere. Similarly, the wealthy feuars of the still elegant Georgian terrace of Monteith Row, which overlooked the Green, petitioned vigorously against the measure.¹⁷¹ The strength of East End feeling was captured in a contemporary song, "Ain John", (ie. "Iron John", McDowall's nickname), which was sung to

the tune of Burns' "John Anderson, My Jo":¹⁷²

Aim John, since that's your name,
Let me say this to thee;
Ye'd better try some ither scheme,
An' let the Green a be,
Look at it yousel' John,
Is't no dishonest wark
O you, to sell the Glasgow Green
To pay the West End Park?

But honest men like you, John,
Are unco laith to steal
Frae big folk like yoursel', John,
You're unco laith at weel;
Ye'd rather skin the puir, John,
Who has nae second sark,
Ye'd pu' the buttons aff oor coats,
To pay the West End Park.

If ye maun sink a pit, John,
Sink it in George's Square,
Or sink it in the Crescents, John,
Amang the rich folk there,
An' they'll be highly pleased, John,
To see sic noble wark
Gaun on amang thesel's, John,
To pay the West End Park.

If ye come to the Green, John,
Ye may expect a fecht,
For a' the folk in this gate-en'
'Ill stan' oot for their richt.
Wi' sticks an' stanes, we'll come John,
An' fecht while we've a spark -
Ye'll never get the Glasgow Green
To pay the West End Park!

Such pugnacious sentiments were enough to convince the Town Council's Finance Committee that it was stirring up a potentially damaging confrontation with a single-minded body of Glasgow's citizens. The contrasts between the declining East End, as opposed to the developing west, were astutely played upon by Moir and other anti-coal campaigners, and one

commentator, expressing a somewhat overblown image of Arcadian idylls on Glasgow Green, pushed in the knife still further:¹⁷³

Surely they will not deprive the citizens of Glasgow of the Green, which, for centuries, has provided so much benefit to them as a place of resort for pleasure; where youth can freely gambol, sport and play: where age can slowly bend their peaceful steps and breathe the fresh air of heaven. When our humble artizan, after a day's incarceration in the foul and poisonous air of the city, finishes his daily toil and bethinks himself for a stroll, where can he go but to the Green? If it were but for this alone the Green should stand unmolested, for were it not for the working man, there would be no West End Park ...

Sheepishly, the Finance Committee formally conceded defeat, acknowledging that plans for working the coal would have to be shelved as "at least a portion of the community are of the present moment opposed to it".¹⁷⁴ From this it is clear that the idea of mining Glasgow Green had not been permanently abandoned by the Town Council, and - indeed - the matter was resurrected in 1869 and 1888. However, the struggles of the late 1850s had already passed into the collective folk-memory of Glasgow's East End, so that any moves by the Town Council to deprive the inhabitants of their traditional rights in relation to the Green were sharply - and successfully - countered.

It is worth noting that throughout the Green affair, John McDowall had been singled out as being responsible for the shaky state of municipal finances. While the question of the McLellan Galleries bequest had also re-emerged during 1857, mention of

the curious circumstances behind the transaction was generally muted. However, at least one town councillor was prepared to take a stand; he was William Govan, junior, who - along with David Dreghorn - represented the Thirteenth Ward. A muslin manufacturer, Govan was a McDowall supporter, noted for his zealous evangelical commitment.¹⁷⁵ After the McLellan estate had been formally wound up in July 1857, he felt that the time had come to declare his doubts over the transaction to his constituents, especially as Dreghorn was up for re-election in the November municipal polls.¹⁷⁶ His personal pursuit of Dreghorn was such that the latter eventually refused to accept nomination for the Thirteenth Ward, although he later stood successfully for a vacant seat in the Sixteenth Ward.¹⁷⁷

Dreghorn was a popular representative, with influential allies inside and outside the Council, and it proved impossible for Govan to permanently damage his reputation. However, Dreghorn made no real efforts to refute any of Govan's accusations, made at successive Ward Committee meetings and in the press, or take recourse to the law. Rather, his withdrawal from the Thirteenth Ward signified his reluctance to make an issue of the affair, in the hope that it would quickly blow over and be forgotten. Nor did Govan wish to pursue the matter after Dreghorn had declared his intention to stand down, as he felt that his actions in exposing Dreghorn to his constituents had been vindicated. Fundamentally, Govan wanted to ensure that

such a transaction would never occur again, even though some councillors claimed that the long-term benefits to the community outweighed immediate personal concerns. To this, Govan retorted:¹⁷⁸

... the force of my strictures [cannot] be at all weakened by high-sounding words about securing a magnificent Picture Gallery, the elevating influences of the Fine Arts, and the amusement and recreation of the Working Classes. This is but dust in the eyes. A wrong act seldom wants some specious pretext, as little can they be affected by the results of the purchase, whatever they may be.

David Dreghorn's reluctance to speak out against Govan can be attributed to his desire to protect a number of reputations, not least his own. Accordingly, Lord Provost Orr was the most obviously implicated in the McLellan Galleries transaction, because of his pivotal position as head of the municipality. However, what superficially appeared to be a case of sharp financial practice was made all the more complicated by the rôle of James Smith as one of the McLellan trustees. In the spring of 1857 Smith's reputation had already been shattered when his twenty-two year old daughter, Madeleine, was arrested and charged with poisoning her lover, Emile L'Angelier, with a massive dose of arsenic.¹⁷⁹ It was, and remains, one of the most celebrated cases in the annals of British criminology, and at the time the scandal had enormous emotional impact.¹⁸⁰ In June 1857 Madeleine was sent for trial to Edinburgh's High Court of Justiciary, and was eventually found "not proven" on a

majority verdict. However, her voluminous correspondence to L'Angelier - which the deceased had carefully stowed in his desk at Messrs. W.B. Huggins, seedsmen and warehousemen - revealed that Madeleine was unashamedly a woman of profound physical passion. The grounds of James Smith's country residence at Rhu had been the scene of her undoing with the amorous Emile; as her letters clearly indicated, the nature of this ill-starred relationship can be best summed up as a question of "who seduced whom?".

The solution to the "mystery of Blythswood Square", as the murder became known, has been the subject of endless speculation, a good deal of it salacious and ill-informed.¹⁸¹ Lawyers, crime-writers and journalists have minutely analysed the pathological aspects of the crime, with the result that scant attention has been paid to the historical context of Glasgow during the 1850s. Above all, the municipal connection has been consistently played down, although this might have been due to deliberate efforts by the civic authorities not to implicate prominent councillors. This thesis is not the place to re-examine the evidence for or against the guilt of Madeleine Smith; the question will, in all probability, never be resolved, although the consensus seems to support the view that she did commit the murder. On the other hand, her father's involvement in civic affairs does require closer scrutiny, because of its bearing on the behaviour of town councillors during 1857,

particularly over the financial difficulties connected with the parks and galleries. Moreover, there was a political dimension to the affair, which was to be a crucial factor in suppressing any municipal scandal which might have erupted as a consequence of Smith's misfortune.

James Smith had first stood as municipal candidate for the Twelfth Ward in 1855. The territory of the ward included Blythwood Square and the McLellan Galleries; the latter was, of course, a property in which Smith had a deep personal interest, both as architect and trustee of the McLellan estate.¹⁸² Although narrowly defeated, Smith again tried his luck as a candidate the following year. He must have been relieved that the McLellan Galleries purchase had been approved the previous May, and felt some personal satisfaction over a recent statement from Lord Provost Orr, where he glowingly referred to Glasgow as the "model municipality of the United Kingdom", because of its parks and galleries acquisitions.¹⁸³ Moreover, Smith was standing alongside another close friend, who had considerable power in the city. He was John Houldsworth, the former Provost of Anderston, who after a ten years absence from municipal affairs was reclaiming the territory as prospective town councillor. A wealthy man, with an expensive taste in yachts and fine art, Houldsworth leased part of his imposing offices in St. Vincent Street to Smith, and acted as chairman of his Election Committee.¹⁸⁴ Houldsworth was regarded as yet

another "coming man" to fill the civic chair; his standing was such that he was returned unopposed and immediately rewarded with a full Bailiership. Smith, on the other hand, had again unsuccessfully challenged the sitting councillor in the Twelfth Ward; a decision which perplexed the Glasgow Herald, which remarked:¹⁸⁵

We readily admit Mr Smith's merits, and do not dispute that a councillorship is a legitimate object of his ambitions, but we think he might have done better than disturb a Ward which is well-filled already, especially as he would have been welcomed, and pretty sure to be returned, by some of those wards who were on the look-out for candidates ten days ago. From occurrences which took place last year, however, Mr Smith considered himself bound in honour, it would appear, to offer his services to the Twelfth in the first instance.

It can be construed that Smith was anxious not to be accused of carpet-bagging, by switching to another ward after his hopes for the McLellan Galleries had been realised. However, he was astute enough to know that his intimate association with Orr and Houldsworth stood him in good stead, and he would have the freedom to choose a more suitable constituency in 1857. It can therefore be realistically claimed that, but for his daughter's tangled love-life, Smith would have had a distinguished municipal career in Glasgow. Certainly, prior to Madeleine's arrest, he had laid the groundwork for his ambitions with painstaking care. Part of his plans included a move to Blythswood Square in November 1856, to a house in the same terrace as Lord Provost Orr and Sir James Anderson.¹⁸⁶

Another neighbour was William Harper Minnoch, a junior partner at Houldsworth's, who was expected to marry Madeleine, and thus cement the business relationship still further.¹⁸⁷ The murder of Emile L'Angelier abruptly put paid to Smith's bid to become a power in the municipality, although by this time the optimistic hopes of the previous year were turning sour, as the parks and galleries acquisitions bit further into the civic budget. The irony for Smith was that by this time his two closest friends were respectively Lord Provost and Bailie of Glasgow; a macabre irony, bearing in mind the Magistrates' traditional responsibility for overseeing public executions in royal burghs.¹⁸⁸

James Smith's agony after Madeleine's arrest must have been made all the more acute because of his allegiance to Orr and Houldsworth. Moreover, his network of personal connections extended further than these two leading citizens, to the most sensitive levels of political authority in the city. Coincidentally, L'Angelier's death took place during the general election campaign of 1857, when Alexander Hastie faced a bitter onslaught against his record as MP for Glasgow. The candidate who came forward to successfully challenge him was Robert Dalglish, a wealthy calico printer, who attracted a broad range of support, including several town councillors.¹⁸⁹ Although Lord Provost Orr remained diplomatically aloof from direct involvement, prominent members of Dalglish's Election Committee

included John Houldsworth, David Dreghorn, Andrew Gemmill, James Moir and James Smith.¹⁹⁰ Dalglish's election statements were tinged with much radical rhetoric, claiming to be "in favour of every social and sanitary reform in this city", and committing himself to supporting "our local philanthropists" in any scheme for "the building of better houses for the working classes".¹⁹¹ On 1st April, the Glasgow Herald gave its views on the Hastie defeat, strongly criticising the ex-MP for his stridently pro-temperance and Sabbatarian stance:¹⁹²

... by identifying himself with and becoming the the impersonation [sic] of a party in the city of gloomy and impracticable views as regards the social matters of everyday life, we found it impossible to lend him any little influence which we might possess.

Dalglish had won a famous victory, which was to shape the direction of Glasgow politics for several years to come. However, the Smith affair had the potential to immediately upset this new alignment, by dragging some of Dalglish's closest supporters into an unsavoury scandal, which included the use of public money for funding the questionable McLellan Galleries project. All this depended on whether Madeleine was convicted of murder, and although subsequent writers have claimed that she escaped the noose solely by the skill of her defence counsel, at the time rumours abounded that "influential friends" were busily working behind the scenes in an effort to save her.¹⁹³ The Glasgow Sentinel did not mince its words after the verdict had been declared:¹⁹⁴

Had Madeleine Smith been Betty Smith of the Old Wynd or the Goosedubs, without wealth or influence at her back to defend her, and make the worse appear a better cause, instead of being Madeleine Smith of Blythswood Square, she might, in all probability, at this moment have been waiting in jail for the last finisher of the law to do his work.

The Glasgow Examiner was more explicit about naming some of the "influential friends" who were prepared to provide financial backing for the defence.¹⁹⁵ Allegedly, these included a member of the Dalglish family, though not Dalglish himself, the Bairds of Gartsherrie, and - of course - the Houldsworths.

Despite the righteous indignation expressed by radical newspapers like the Sentinel and Examiner, many radicals were anxious not to exploit the affair, in order to protect the city's newest MP. Dalglish and James Moir had worked closely together during the election campaign, with the former promising action on electoral reform, in return for East End votes.¹⁹⁶ This was clearly a continuation of the overtures that Andrew Orr had been making since the early 1850s, in his bid for municipal stardom. Accordingly, the group with most to gain from the discomfiture of the civic leadership was not the radicals, but pro-temperance evangelicals, under the leadership of John McDowall. The Govan-Dreghorn confrontation over the McLellan Galleries must be viewed in this context; political as well as municipal scores were being settled in the wake of the 1857 general election. Yet the McDowallites stopped short of rubbing

Dreghorn's nose in his past relationship with James Smith; the Smith connection was cleverly implied, but never openly stated. The tactic of subtly pressurising the opposition's weak spot proved to be much more advantageous than any sensational exposé of municipal scandals, which could only reflect badly on everyone. After 1857, the evangelicals steadily began to regain some of the initiative, and it is revealing that Robert Dalglish's attitude to licensing reform began to alter, once he realised the influence of the pro-temperance lobby.¹⁹⁷

There can be no doubt that the Smith affair caused shock waves to reverberate through the Council Chambers, at a particularly awkward time in Glasgow's municipal history. The Lord Provost's carefully cultivated image as the champion of civic enterprise was already beginning to tarnish during 1857 because of the accumulating cost of the new undertakings.¹⁹⁸ It was easy enough to divert some of the blame in the direction of John McDowall, but for Orr and his circle to become the target of sustained public criticism was much more serious. Information might be unearthed which was not exactly flattering to the civic leadership, and was arguably illegal.¹⁹⁹ This did not just relate to the McLellan Galleries bequest, but to the original plan to promote the West End Park in 1850. Apart from a vague reference to "several influential citizens", the Council's leadership claimed to have no knowledge of who was actually behind the proposals. This failure to name names was

regarded as suspicious at the time; it therefore seems appropriate to consider the grounds for this suspicion.

Of the three estates first suggested as suitable for parkland, two - Woodlands and Gilmorehill - were corporately owned. Woodlands had been the original choice of the site for Glasgow University; Gilmorehill eventually fulfilled this rôle during the 1860s, after Kelvingrove had been laid out. The University authorities would have preferred an earlier move from the decrepit surroundings of the city centre, where students were regularly confronted with "the parade of women of the town in front of the College entrance".²⁰⁰ However, financing the proposed shift westwards was a thorny problem, and it has been seen that the original negotiations with the railway proprietors floundered. Both sides were left in the unsatisfactory position of wanting to swap sites, but being faced with complicated legal transactions, which were rendered all the more difficult because of the fluctuating state of the money market. To break the stalemate, the West End Park was proposed in 1850. The Town Council's involvement in the initial enterprise was intended as a stabilising factor, at a time when there were mixed public feelings over the efficacy of joint-stock companies.²⁰¹ Even this compromise proved to be unworkable, and the Council was called upon to bale out another dubious enterprise, like the Glasgow Water Company and - later - the McLellan Galleries. The declining value of the Woodlands estate between 1845 and 1852

shows the extent of anxiety that the park should become viable, even if the University could not be accommodated on that particular site. As the Glasgow Examiner hinted, but did not elucidate, the Town Council did a service to the railway proprietors by relieving them of their otherwise unsaleable property.

Railway interests lay at the heart of the West End Park and, as one of the most prominent railway proprietors in Scotland, Andrew Orr cannot be absolved from having a personal interest in progressing the development. The extent of Orr's railway commitment was such that it was queried when he was put forward as Lord Provost in 1854; however, he had worked diligently to win the backing of his colleagues, including the initially sceptical radicals. Nor was Orr unique in this dual municipal-commercial rôle; John Kellett has traced the intricate network of connections between railway development and the local government of British cities during the mid-Victorian era.²⁰² In particular, he gives the example of Manchester, Birmingham and Liverpool during 1849, where the list of those active in the campaign to reduce rates on railway property "reads like a council meeting".²⁰³ With reference to Glasgow, Kellett has pointed out the covetousness of the railway companies for the central College site. The abortive Glasgow, Airdrie and Monklands Junction Railway was conceived of in terms far grander than "a mere mineral line", with the Edinburgh and Glasgow

Railway Company behind an elaborate plan to turn the College grounds into a major rail terminus.²⁰⁴ The Edinburgh and Glasgow and the G & SW were close enough for one rival to sarcastically describe the two companies as a "happy family", mutually reinforcing each others' interests.²⁰⁵ Several ex-Lord Provosts - with Orr to the fore - were later personally involved in progressing the transactions over the central College site, leading up to the 1864 Union Railway Company Bill, which was the catalyst for shifting the University to Gilmorehill.²⁰⁶ Kellett can only give a cynical explanation for the motives of such men:²⁰⁷

It is possible, of course, that ... [they] ... found it easy in their minds to distinguish always the single-minded and impartial conduct of municipal objectives from the pursuit of their private interests, or that they genuinely believed that the two coincided, and that what was good for the Glasgow and South Western Railway Company was good for Glasgow. Whatever their motivation may have been, their resulting actions and public statements fitted the railway companies' intentions perfectly, and the railway companies were not ungrateful.

It can therefore be seen that in 1857 Andrew Orr had a lot to lose from his association with James Smith, although it can only be speculated the extent to which he pulled strings to help his friend, if at all. Intriguingly, Orr took the unusual step of issuing an open letter to his Sixth Ward constituents in October 1857, where he referred darkly to the "vituperations of some parties" over his municipal record, and claimed only to

have acted for the "public weal".²⁰⁸ At all events, the Smith affair was conveniently disentangled from any civic connection, while the origins of the parks and galleries were later vaguely attributed to "a fortunate conjunction of circumstances".²⁰⁹ By 1859, the Council's financial affairs had been put in order by means of the Glasgow Parks and Galleries Act, whereby Kelvingrove and Queen's Park, along with the McLellan Galleries, were placed under the control of a special Trust.²¹⁰ Like the Police and Statute Labour Committee, the Trust was wholly elected from the Town Council, but had separate financial arrangements, including powers of taxation. While reluctant to impose an assessment upon ratepayers, councillors became painfully aware that they had no realistic alternative if the Common Good was to remain solvent. In 1859 the resolution of the municipal cash-flow crisis was greeted with satisfaction by the Finance Committee, whose new Convener - David Dreghorn - reported:²¹¹

... by the transference of the sums heritably secured on certain of the properties under the Parks and Galleries Act to the books of that special Trust, a considerable amount of Corporation debt has been cancelled, while the large amount otherwise due by the Trust to the Corporation may now be regarded as one of its best assets.

For the 1860s, at least, the slate was wiped clean.

III. Lord Provost Blackie and the City Improvement Trust, 1865-72

Of the many Lord Provosts elected between 1833 and 1912, the name of John Blackie, junior, remains one of the best known, largely through his efforts to promote the City Improvement Trust, and thus acquire and clear under municipal auspices some of Glasgow's worst residential properties. In defence of what became a bitterly controversial measure, the aims of Blackie and his supporters were subsequently depicted by Town Council propagandists as idealistic, even Utopian, and the defeat of Blackie in the municipal elections of November 1866 by "unrighteously indignant citizens" as a blot on the reputation of an otherwise enlightened municipality.²¹² Some contemporaries went so far as to hint that Blackie never completely recovered from the shock of losing his seat, which contributed to a breakdown of health and his eventual death in 1873.²¹³ A carefully fostered and enduring image has emerged of Blackie as a far-seeing visionary, betrayed by narrow-minded ratepayers whose sole concern was to preserve the lowest possible level of local taxation, irrespective of the general good of the community. Yet these starkly contrasting categorisations of Blackie and his opponents have seriously obscured the objectives of both sides, which were more complex than is generally recognised. The debate which came to a head in 1866 was not simply to do with an excessive rates imposition,

but was intricately caught up with a series of issues relating to pressure for electoral reform, a new political assertiveness in the city's East End, and resentment at the apparent grip of one interest group on civic affairs, whose figurehead was firmly identified as Lord Provost Blackie.

The acknowledged architect of the City Improvement Act, John Blackie, junior, was the eldest son of a Glasgow handloom weaver who had turned to publishing during the early years of the nineteenth century. It was later believed that John, senior, had attracted the support of a wealthy patron in the person of Walter Graham, a prominent West India merchant, who helped to finance the publishing enterprise. Although there is no conclusive evidence to confirm Graham's contribution, he was certainly an important influence in the early success of the Blackie family.²¹⁴ Following on from this example, John, junior, and his two brothers worked hard to build up the business, with John in overall control from the 1840s. The Blackie brothers inherited strong religious beliefs from their father who, like many of his generation, had been inspired by the Evangelical philosophy of Thomas Chalmers.²¹⁵ During the 1830s this had led John, senior, and his eldest son to express enthusiastic support for the Conservative-Evangelical alliance, which was then one of the dominant influences in Glasgow politics, and both participated in the organisation of the great banquet to celebrate Robert Peel's election as Lord Rector

of Glasgow University in 1837.²¹⁶ A special guest at the banquet had been the young William Ewart Gladstone, whose links with the Blackie family were to be strong and enduring, and John, junior, and his brother Walter became confirmed Gladstonians in later life.²¹⁷ In 1843 the Blackies adhered to the Free Church, and the family was thereafter a zealous promoter of its aims.

The reasons for the onslaught by Blackie and his associates on the decaying wynds and closes of old Glasgow have been well-documented, although it has only been comparatively recently that the motivations behind the Improvement Trust have been critically examined.²¹⁸ Early commentators were generally keen to defend Blackie and his circle, claiming that they characterised "public spirit and true patriotism" by taking a calculated risk with their plan to reshape the city centre.²¹⁹ Blackie himself outlined the reasons for the Improvement Act in 1866, at the height of public controversy, claiming that it was not simply intended to improve the physical appearance of the city, or to provide more efficient channels of communication.²²⁰ The rationale was, above all, to ameliorate the sanitary problem. He referred to the recurring incidence of fever in the localities earmarked for demolition, emphasising that:²²¹

The state of matters existing in the central portion of the old city and in Gorbals, has, I believe, no parallel in any other city in

Britain. In these overcrowded vennels and closes we have the sources of those attacks of contagious and epidemic disease that have from time to time spread over the city, and which seem constantly to linger amongst the dwellers in these dense localities.

Blackie went on to deny accusations that the Improvement Trust was a hasty and ill-conceived measure, and made the revealing statement that:²²²

... the desirableness of some renovation of the old portion of the city has been long felt by me - as doubtless it had been by others in official position before me - and the actual outline of the present plan, so far as the greater part of the north side of the river is concerned, had been sketched out ten years before ...

Indeed, there had been efforts further back than the mid-1850s to come to grips with the awesome problems arising from the blighting presence of the closes and wynds at the heart of the old Royalty. As has been pointed out in a previous episode of Town Council history, in 1845 a number of wealthy businessmen and merchants had combined together in an unsuccessful attempt to float several joint-stock companies aimed at clearing parts of the city centre and East End.²²³ This was partly in response to a well-publicised series of articles in the Glasgow Examiner, where the joint-stock option was promoted as the great panacea to urban ills:²²⁴

Now that the passion for speculating is so general, why have not some speculators sufficient humanity to aid the suffering while they help themselves? Why not form a company to provide good and cheap accommodation

for those unable to procure houses?

Like the original West End Park proposals, the motivations behind the project appeared to combine philanthropy with sound business sense. The companies would not only finance the widening of streets, to facilitate transport and communications, but would also build model dwellings for the working classes to replace those demolished. In keeping with prevailing sanitary ideas, the recommendations contained in the Report of the Select Committee on the Health of Towns were specifically referred to as setting the standards for the new enterprises.²²⁵

Many town councillors - past, present and future - were directly involved in promoting this ambitious project, although the name of John Blackie, junior, does not appear on any of the prospectuses. However, James Watson, who was Blackie's great friend and collaborator, did associate himself in 1845 with the "Society for Improving the Dwellings of the Working Classes in Glasgow".²²⁶ As a young man in the early 1820s, Watson had been involved in Sunday-school work in the wynds of the Tron Parish, where Thomas Chalmers had his first Glasgow ministry, and since that time had taken a keen interest in the moral welfare of the locality.²²⁷ He shared Blackie's high regard for Peelite and later Gladstonian politics, becoming a life-long friend of Gladstone, as well as being his personal stockbroker.²²⁸ Watson was a shrewd and successful businessman, responsible for founding Glasgow's Stock Exchange

in 1844, and was thus well-placed to lend his financial expertise to schemes for city improvement. Accordingly, although the proposed companies of the 1840s failed as speculative ventures, the original ideas behind the proposals did not disappear. Shortly afterwards, in 1847, James Watson was instrumental in forming a philanthropic association for the erection of model lodging houses for the working classes, and John Blackie, junior, became an enthusiastic supporter of the scheme.²²⁹

The ideological roots of the City Improvement Trust can be partially detected in the formative influences on Blackie and Watson, which combined Chalmersian Evangelicalism with Conservative paternalism. In Glasgow the two were generally indistinguishable until the Disruption of the Church of Scotland in 1843, when old allegiances were shattered and new alliances began to be constructed. However, the break with the past was never wholly complete, as the relationship between Blackie and Watson clearly demonstrated. Blackie, of course, became an adherent to the Free Church, while Watson chose to remain inside the Established Church, perhaps in support of the Church and Constitution principles enunciated at the time by the likes of Gladstone.²³⁰ Nevertheless, this pre-Disruption legacy cannot wholly explain the impulse towards city improvement, important though it was. Many of the promoters of the abortive 1845 scheme had been neither Evangelical or Conservative, and the

only readily identifiable features common to all were their prominence in the community and their wealth. The presence of Andrew Orr among the Provisional Committee of the "Glasgow Eastern Improvement Co." suggests that subscribers were attracted by the commercial possibilities of the venture, which intended to open out the city centre for ease of communications.²³¹ Moreover, the Orr connection with Watson and Blackie was to continue after 1845. Long before the idea of the City Improvement Trust was openly suggested, the three men had evolved a plan to privately purchase some of the most dilapidated properties in the central area of the city, with a view to their demolition.²³²

John Blackie, junior, first became a Glasgow town councillor in 1857. He originally represented the Seventh Ward, covering an overwhelmingly business district, but switched abruptly in 1860 to the neighbouring Sixth Ward. He inherited the seat from no less a person than ex-Lord Provost Orr, showing the importance of the area in the plans of the city improvers. In addition to the Council Chambers in Wilson Street, the Sixth Ward contained the Tontine Buildings and the notorious Tontine Close, which James Watson described in 1860 as "one immense hot-bed of debauchery and crime".²³³ Blackie and a number of personal associates had specifically earmarked "the locality around the Tontine Close" as suitable for improvement, and in 1861 entered into a formal agreement to acquire available

property in order that the area could be more easily cleared and redeveloped.²³⁴ The plans of what was christened the "Philanthropic Company", which was to comprise twenty-three prominent citizens, strongly resembled the projects floated in 1845, though with one significant difference.²³⁵ The promoters of the 1861 venture were circumspect, ~~of~~ not furtive, about their activities, choosing not to declare their intentions openly and seeking no public subscriptions. Perhaps they wished to avoid the situation in 1845, when grand claims had been made for the city centre which were never fulfilled. Perhaps they wished to retain the best possible bargaining position by keeping their long-term objectives to themselves, and not convey the impression that they were especially anxious to obtain certain properties. Perhaps they simply wished to avoid publicity, disdaining in true Christian spirit to be cast in the rôle of heroic benefactors.

There are an enormous number of imponderables about the original motivations of Blackie and his circle, which were as obscure to contemporaries as they are today. By not placing their cards on the table from the outset, the Philanthropic Company allowed rumour and speculation to ripen, often on a wholly false basis and causing much personal and political friction within the city. The lack of openness about their dealings led many people, quite understandably, to believe that there was something illicit about the whole affair, and that the

chief protagonists had somehow devised an elaborate ploy to make money, chiefly for their own benefit. When the subsequent purchases of the Philanthropic Company were resold to the newly-constituted City Improvement Trust in 1867, at less than the market value though not the original purchase price, critics began to murmur of "jobbery", and thinly veiled accusations were levelled against the main promoters of the scheme. It is important to stress that this uncomfortable atmosphere prevailed within Glasgow's municipal politics at least from 1865, when the City Improvement Trust was first mooted, and Blackie and Watson were both members of the Town Council. It lasted until 1872 when the air was finally cleared by an "exposé" of the Philanthropic Company in the North British Daily Mail, which - after legal proceedings - was soundly refuted.²³⁶

What actually was the scheme which caused so much bitterness and furore in Glasgow during the 1860s? As presented to the Town Council in 1865, and given Parliamentary sanction in 1866, the City Improvement Act provided for the Lord Provost, magistrates and Town Council to form a Trust on behalf of the community, with powers to buy up and clear congested areas deemed particularly hazardous to health.²³⁷ An area of approximately eighty-eight acres was involved, centred upon Glasgow Cross, and including parts of High Street, Trongate and the Saltmarket. Although based in the city centre, the area also extended eastwards to Calton and southwards to the

Gorbals. It was proposed to form thirty-nine new streets and reconstruct twelve existing ones; to sell, lease or feu the cleared land; and to purchase ground for a public park in the north-east of the city, at a maximum cost of £40,000.²³⁸ Borrowing powers of £1,250,000 were conferred on the Trust, and to recoup this the Trustees were authorised to levy a rate not exceeding sixpence in the pound for the first five years, and up to threepence in the pound for the next ten years. There were also powers, under Section 20 of the Act, to build artisans' dwelling houses for sale or rent, but the Trustees did not initially intend to implement this clause, fearing the likely reaction from the private sector against such municipal enterprise.

After the controversy about the Improvement Trust first came to the boil in 1866, Lord Provost Blackie and his supporters liked to claim that there had been no public opposition when the measure had been introduced to the Town Council in September 1865. It was certainly true that when Blackie had originally outlined the basis of the scheme, fellow councillors seemed to give it a cordial welcome. However, this enthusiasm was double-edged, as the words of Bailie James Salmon in response to Blackie's introductory statement imply:²³⁹

... it should be a delight to the Council, as representing the citizens, that while they might be by his Lordship's suggestion effecting changes beneficial to the health of the community, they were also effecting changes that would greatly

improve the appearance and amenity of the city. They must confess that in the east end of the town, and every where except the west end, there was great room for improvement.

Salmon was mildly rebuking the Lord Provost for his residence in the West End, while at the same time championing the cause of the East End. This was scarcely surprising, as Salmon had been responsible for laying out the feuing plans for the Dennistoun estate in the city's north-east, and was the architect of many of the properties within the new district.²⁴⁰ Moreover, he was soon to become a resident of Dennistoun - in fact, he remained there for the rest of his life - so he was clearly interested in schemes which would benefit the locality, and hopefully, provide some remuneration for his professional efforts.

However, other East Enders were less supportive of the Lord Provost's proposals. A vehement critic was James Martin, popularly known as the "East End Tribune" or "Oor Jeems", who had a gruff Glasgow accent that was to become something of a personal trademark.²⁴¹ Martin emerged as one of the great characters of Glasgow Town Council, making concessions to no one and taking a pride in his origins as a handloom weaver in the village of Parkhead. The airs and graces of Glasgow's West End were anathema to him, as were the pretensions of those from similar social backgrounds to himself, who were ardently trying to lose all traces of their humble beginnings. Martin, defeated

candidate for the First Ward in the 1865 municipal elections, did not mince his words about the Improvement Scheme, believing that it would uproot the community and cause an unbearable financial burden to fall on the poorer classes. He was perhaps comparing Glasgow with the showy splendour of Paris under Napoleon III when he said:²⁴²

... there is an old saying, which is, that ... when cities in architectural grandeur flourish the poor die and decay. And I would rather see the people rising in comfort and in the necessaries of life, as see our city decked with all the architectural grandeur that it is possible for the mind of man and the chisel of the architect to form out ... Although we ought all to be proud to see our city flourishing, and be beautiful in every way ... still let us in the first place look after the condition of the people, and see that they are dignified in their mind and healthy in their bodies, and comfortable in their homes.

Martin was not swayed by the persuasive arguments of the soft-spoken Lord Provost Blackie and he, for one, was ever firm in the belief that there was a "job" at the bottom of the Improvement Trust transactions.

Also defeated in the 1865 election was a fiery lawyer called James Leitch Lang, who had contested the Tenth Ward, to the north of the city. Lang was known for his sharp tongue which, he admitted, sometimes caused him to say things that were over-hasty.²⁴³ In addition to accusations of impetuosity, he had been branded by opponents during the election as eccentric because he was a hard-line teetotaler and Sabbatarian,

but he typically laughed off the criticisms with assurances that he had "very common sense notions about a great many subjects, even if he was a little wild about teetotalism".²⁴⁴ He was particularly hostile to Bailie James Couper - the Tenth Ward representative - because Couper was a glass manufacturer, and one of the major bottle suppliers to the drinks' trade. Lang and his temperance colleagues zealously endorsed the view that the Town Council should be won over to stricter licensing policies; however, the ruling group within the Council - including Blackie, Watson and Couper - was not noted for its teetotal commitment, and, if at all, tended to support the "moral suasion" school of temperance.²⁴⁵ The group was also not prepared to make fundamental changes to the system of licensing, believing that the Town Council had gone far enough down the road of restriction. By adhering to the status quo, they thus courted the enmity of the temperance militants, who began to detect that the transactions over the City Improvement Trust could be used as a device for breaking the seeming invincibility of Blackie-Watson domination.

The colourful personalities of James Martin and James Leitch Lang represented two disparate strands of opposition to the prevailing order in the Town Council; the East End radicals and the pro-temperance evangelicals. There had, of course, been little love lost between the two groups since the defeat of Alexander Hastie in the 1848 municipal elections, and "Jeems"

Martin was later to expend considerable energy in conducting a highly personal crusade against what he perceived as teetotal hypocrisy. Nevertheless, there was a mutuality of interests during the mid-1860s, which was to bring both sides together in the common cause of shaking up municipal affairs. The prospect of electoral reform had much to do with reshaping attitudes; if the "working man" was to be wooed and won over, radical and temperance supporters had to pitch a directly populist appeal.²⁴⁶ Some even had a foot in both camps; for instance, Councillor John Burt of Bridgeton was one of the leading activists within the Scottish Permissive Bill and Temperance Association, and later served as President of the Scottish Reform League.²⁴⁷

As if this radical-temperance alliance was not enough, there were other sections of the community anxious to see Lord Provost Blackie lose his power-base. Blackie was deeply-committed to a formal merger of the Free and United Presbyterian Churches, and had been a prominent supporter of the discussions between the two organisations from 1863.²⁴⁸ On the other hand, some Free Churchmen had never wholly relinquished pre-1843 Church and Constitution principles, and considered that union with United Presbyterian voluntaries would undermine their status as the true inheritors of the Evangelical tradition. The logical outcome of this identification with the pre-Disruption era was to revive the Evangelical connection with Conservatism, and to

form closer links with the Established Church.²⁴⁹ One consequence was that, as a Glasgow figurehead for the pro-merger faction, Blackie became a target for the anti-union wing of the Free Church.

The fortunes of Conservatism were changing in Glasgow during the 1860s, after years of having no real political impact in the city. This does not mean that individual Conservatives were unable to wield influence, as Lord Provost Peter Clouston had been an adherent to the cause. Yet during the 1860s, Glasgow Conservatism was carving out a new and bolder profile for itself, reinforced by the activities of Free Church zealots like William Kidston and the steady growth of Orangeism.²⁵⁰ More than any other issue, the religious debate polarised political attitudes, and the thorny question of the rôle of the Churches in the new State education system was to be the decisive factor in confirming the presence of organised Conservatism in the city. Yet the east-west divide in Glasgow played a significant part in fostering this development, because the Conservatives were able to harness the mounting discontent in the East End and use it to undermine the position of the long-standing Liberal élite.²⁵¹ They were often ruthlessly opportunist in their bid for a more prominent place in Glasgow's political arena; wooing disgruntled evangelicals, while at the same time supporting the efforts of the drinks' trade to stave off the temperance onslaught. They were also quite prepared to throw in their lot

with the campaign against the closely-knit Blackie-Watson group, in order to identify themselves with an increasingly vocal movement to alter the direction of municipal affairs.

It was in this context of shifting ideological differences that a concerted effort was made in 1866 to open out the power base on the Town Council. The initial intention had not been to attack Blackie individually, or to indulge in the ungentlemanly tactics of opposing the Lord Provost at the municipal poll. Instead, the critics of Blackie-Watson domination set their sights on the forthcoming elections for the Lord Provost, as Blackie's term of office was due to expire with effect from November 1866. The favoured candidate from the ruling group was James Lumsden, junior, who was following the footsteps of his famous father on the road to municipal honours. Lumsden had been one of the founding members of the Philanthropic Company, shortly after he became a Council representative as Dean of Guild. His involvement with the enterprise was not surprising, given that his late father had been one of the early promoters of the model lodging house movement in Glasgow, and had wide-ranging philanthropic interests.²⁵² However, the junior Lumsden also happened to have close associations with railway development as a director of the Glasgow and South Western Railway, and shared the anxiety of his fellow Board member - ex-Lord Provost Orr - that the city centre should be reconstructed in order to clear the way for terminals.²⁵³

Lumsden's motives as a supporter of the City Improvement scheme were thus highly ambiguous; a situation that contemporary critics did not fail to exploit.²⁵⁴

There was also deep concern about the sudden rise to municipal stardom of men like Watson and Lumsden. Lumsden had been an elected councillor since 1862 and Watson since 1863, yet the latter was already a Bailie and Lumsden was in line for the civic chair without having served as a Bailie at all. Apart from the immediate post-reform period in 1833, this was an unprecedented situation in Glasgow and ruffled not a few feathers among long-serving councillors and magistrates. There was also resentment over the attitude of the Lumsden supporters, who appeared to think that his elevation to the Lord Provostship was already a fait accompli, and that the entire corps of councillors would fall dutifully into line when it came to the election. Rather than be taken so readily for granted, dissident councillors began to promote a rival candidate in the person of William Rae Arthur, a dyer and calico printer from Dalmarnock, who had the advantage of magisterial experience and close connections with the East End.²⁵⁵ He was a staunch Conservative though also, curiously, one of the twenty-three members of the Philanthropic Company and was rapturously enthusiastic about the City Improvement Trust.²⁵⁶ It can only be assumed that from his willingness to stand against the Liberal Lumsden that his motives were personal or political, or

a mixture of both. Arthur had ambitions for the Provostship, and was anxious to stake his claim at an early stage; at the same time, the Conservatives were determined to make an impact in Glasgow during the electoral reform agitation, and used Arthur as the popular candidate to promote their interests.

Whilst there were vocal critics of the ruling group on the Town Council, there was also one source of simmering discontent not quite so obvious, but in a position to make substantial mischief. Angus Turner - first Town Clerk - was a protégé of his predecessor, James Reddie. Appointed to the service of the Council as a young lawyer in 1825, Turner belonged firmly to the pre-reform era, and was distrustful of the elective machinery which had caused the traditional rôle of the Town Clerk to be called into question. Purposeful men like Watson and Blackie found it virtually impossible to work with Turner, who adhered dogmatically to the old style of operating, even though the flow of legal work was accumulating as the functions of the municipality rapidly expanded. The legal status of the Town Clerk meant that it was difficult to get rid of Turner unless he committed some gross misdemeanour, so rather than contend with him directly, the civic leadership chose virtually to ignore him. Any meaningful work was passed on to his depute, Alexander Monro, a post-reform appointment who took a wholly different attitude to the Town Clerkship, and was quite prepared to follow the directives of the elected representatives.²⁵⁷ It may

have suited Turner to make his money without being burdened with the full responsibilities of office, but councillors made no secret of the fact that they were bitterly unhappy with such an unsatisfactory state of affairs. As will be seen, the episode was to reach a sensational, mud-slinging climax in 1872, when James Watson was Lord Provost, but in the meantime it cannot be ruled out that there was a disruptive mole in the Town Clerk's office, who was quite happy to do all that he could to discredit the ruling administration.²⁵⁸

The criticism of Blackie and his supporters during the early stages of the 1866 electoral campaign were general, rather than specifically related to the operation of the City Improvement Trust. This was despite the decision taken on 6th September by the newly-constituted Trustees, under the direction of Lord Provost Blackie, to levy the maximum sixpenny assessment on rental only. At a well-attended meeting of the Sixth Ward on 2nd October, councillor Alexander Osborne - a Conservative Free Kirker - voiced the concern of those who were uneasy about the direction of municipal affairs.²⁵⁹ He made reference to the forthcoming election for the civic chair, naming no names, but stating his views that, "... one of the gentlemen proposed represented the free action of the Town Council, and the other the action of a section of the Town Council".²⁶⁰ He then turned his attention to the Lord Provost, who was at the meeting in order that he could be endorsed by the Ward as a candidate

for the municipal elections:²⁶¹

I will yield to no one in my esteem for the present Lord Provost. He has devoted much valuable time to that important office. In fact, the principal objection I have to him is that he has given it altogether too much attention. He has made it altogether a business; he has acted as if the whole responsibility for the legislation of this city rested on his shoulders ...

Osborne went on to suggest that Blackie had elevated the Lord Provostship to an unassailable position of power, by controlling the conduct of business within the Town Council, and making the Magistrates directly accountable to him. Blackie indignantly responded that he was no manipulator, but that he had "not refused to take the initiative when it seemed his duty to take it".²⁶²

Blackie's defence of his actions seemed to convince the meeting, as no rival candidate was proposed against him and a vote of confidence in his previous term of office was carried without dissent. However, Osborne's criticisms were echoed elsewhere, notably at the meeting of the Eleventh Ward on 12th October, where James Salmon - a Liberal Free Kirker - was again endorsed, with acclamation, as a municipal candidate. Salmon began his statement by positively welcoming the Improvement Trust and its likely "good effects", but went on to express support for William Rae Arthur as future Lord Provost.²⁶³ His reasons were, as Osborne's, because he supported "freedom of action" within the Town Council, and feared that:²⁶⁴

... a small bureau of councillors connected with a small bureau of officials now transacted the whole business of the city ... the system has so grown up, the Councillors have been so bred and brained to it, that they had almost become afraid to interfere with it. But ... a majority were now so convinced of the evils of the system, so convinced it was degrading to their independence as Councillors, and so injurious to the public interest, that they would not again set foot within the Council door were it not for the prospect of getting a system so objectionable done away with.

According to Salmon, James Lumsden had been brought forward "by the party who had been most active in riveting its chains around the Council".²⁶⁵ This was clearly a reference to Blackie and Watson, and their loyal servant in the Town Clerk's office, Alexander Monro. Indeed, some of Salmon's supporters at the meeting voiced sentiments strikingly similar to the debate prior to the 1833 Burgh Reform Act, that the Council was under the thralldom of non-elected officials and that business was conducted in a "hole-and corner" manner. This analogy with events of the 1830s was even more intriguing, as within days of the meeting - on 16th October - a great demonstration was to take place on Glasgow Green, in support of electoral reform.

Lord Provost Blackie was incensed at the attack made on him by James Salmon and, much to the obvious embarrassment of many councillors, ostentatiously demanded a public apology from him during the course of a Town Council meeting.²⁶⁶ This episode drew attention to Blackie's notorious ability to handle opponents in a tactful and diplomatic manner; a fault which his

critics had already brought to notice in various incidents during his term as Lord Provost. For example, the Second Ward Committee was nursing a grievance about the "critical and unsympathetic" reception Blackie had apparently given a to a Ward delegation which was anxious to convey public unease about the erection of a cholera hospital on Glasgow Green.²⁶⁷ Some claimed more bluntly that Blackie had been downright rude to their demands, while others pointed out occasions when the Lord Provost had apparently refused to listen to their appeals at all.²⁶⁸ The verbal slanging match on the Town Council during the debate over Salmon's offending remarks was perhaps the incident that tipped the balance in favour of a rival candidate being promoted in the Sixth Ward. Salmon was a popular councillor, yet Blackie was apparently calling his integrity into question. Accordingly, Blackie had to be publicly challenged, so that the substance of Salmon's accusations could be shown to be wholly valid. It was vital that any champion should be capable of fighting fire with fire in the likely confrontation that would follow, and so a candidate with a reputation for ebullience, volubility and toughness was selected - James Leitch Lang.

The accusations against Blackie made by the likes of Osborne and Salmon had been vague and unspecific, generally hinting at "cliques" conducting actions in a covert and undemocratic way. As a lawyer, Lang realised it would be preferable to rally

support on an issue that was glaringly obvious, that would be difficult for Blackie to legally challenge and, moreover, was likely to appeal to the electorate. The sixpenny assessment of the City Improvement Trust appeared to fit the bill because, despite the committed support of men like Salmon and Arthur, there was widespread distrust of the aims of the scheme, and resentment that the rate was being applied to tenants only, rather than to property owners. A Glasgow Herald editorial captured this general sense of uncertainty, a week before the municipal poll, when Lang had not yet declared his candidacy:²⁶⁹

... to improve the East End, Glasgow is submitting to a rate of taxation unprecedented in amount, and which will be severely felt ... At the same time, it is essential that the progress of this hastily got-up and much-lauded venture should be carefully watched. If wynds and closes, and "rookeries", are to be knocked down in the East, only to rise up in other parts of the city - if thousands of wretched people are to be hunted out of one district only to congregate densely in another - then indeed the benefits of the Improvement Bill will be of a most illusive kind.

According to the Herald, the new levy was in the process of being served on the public that very week; a scarcely subtle calculation on the part of the civic leadership, which made the timing of Lang's sudden appearance even more damaging for the Blackie camp.

A few days before the municipal poll, the Herald carried election notices from Lang and William Govan, junior, who was

standing against James Watson in the Eighth Ward.²⁷⁰ Govan was attempting a municipal come-back, after having retired the previous year from the Thirteenth Ward. His presence in the 1866 election was an uncomfortable reminder to the Lord Provost of events in 1857, when several skeletons had been left to rattle in the municipal closet. Govan promoted himself as the champion of "Economy and Retrenchment", and claimed that he was standing as a check "upon the enormous Expenditure and heavy Taxation which are growing upon the Citizens from year to year".²⁷¹ In the same edition of the Herald, a letter to the Editor appeared, signed with the pseudonym of "Orient", meaning, generally, "from the east", although the literal Latin derivation of the word means more subtly, "where the sun rises". "Orient" took exception to the notion that the City Improvement Trust was likely to benefit the East End:²⁷²

... the locality in which the greatest amount of money is likely to be spent, and where the operation will be of the most extensive kind, belongs more particularly to the central district.
... How many of our West End citizens are owners of property in the localities to be operated upon by the bill? That is a question many would like the answer to ...

The most obvious interpretation of this cryptic question seems to be that the activities of the Philanthropic Company and its close involvement with the Improvement Trust were now the talk of the city, although "Orient" seems to have been coy about naming names. After feeding the imagination of the Herald

readership, "Orient" went on to express his (or her) fears about the long-term effects of the scheme:²⁷³

... to the poorer districts in the neighbourhood, I am firmly convinced, this will prove a curse instead of a blessing. The very dregs of the population live in the lanes and streets proposed to be demolished - the profligate and those who prey upon society. Do the promoters of this scheme imagine that by pulling down their houses they will get rid of them altogether? If so, they are very much mistaken, for they will undoubtedly settle down in some locality which though poor has hitherto been respectable, and free from the influence of the vicious.

In making this statement, "Orient" was expressing widely held fears that the Improvement Act would force the dispossessed slum-dwellers into the hinterland of the east, thus leaving the city centre clear for commercial development at the expense of the outlying districts.

Lord Provost Blackie and his supporters were clearly worried about the growing movement in the city against the civic administration. They thus took the unprecedented step of moving at the last Council meeting prior to the election:²⁷⁴

That a cordial vote of thanks be given to the Hon. the Lord Provost for the talent he has displayed in conducting the public business of the Corporation, his unwearied efforts for the moral, social and physical well-being of the community, and especially for his successful carrying through of the City Improvement Bill and other measures.

This effusive tribute on behalf of the Council was to be inscribed on vellum, placed in a handsome silver casket, and ceremoniously handed over to the Lord Provost the day he

relinquished office.²⁷⁵ It was clearly intended to send critics like Bailie Salmon shuffling uncomfortably in their seats, because they had little option but to endorse the sentiments, or else appear ungracious and churlish. James Leitch Lang subsequently wrote a letter to the Glasgow Herald, claiming that Blackie was suffering from delusions of grandeur and was obsessed with having his name forever associated with a prestigious civic project, in emulation of the late Lord Provost Stewart and his efforts over the Loch Katrine water supply.²⁷⁶ In response to such attacks on him, Blackie rounded off his campaign with a rally of supporters where - interspersed with much heckling - he refuted the criticisms of the Improvement Trust, suggesting that it would be prevent taxation in the long term by making Glasgow a healthier city.²⁷⁷

Blackie was undoubtedly wounded that his opponents should have singled out the City Improvement Trust as a focus for their campaign against him, particularly as his initial plans had been generally welcomed by councillors, despite occasional rumblings of discontent over the sixpenny assessment.²⁷⁸ However, as has been seen, the Act was being used as a rallying point for the general movement in the city against the civic leadership. In most subsequent accounts of the early history of the Improvement Trust, this factor has remained obscure, with the movement identified solely as a ratepayers' revolt against

Blackie.²⁷⁹ It is true that the Lord Provost was particularly vulnerable to attack, but this was because his base in the Sixth Ward had always been insecure. Colleagues like Watson or Lumsden were in a much stronger position to fend off opposition because they represented overwhelmingly business districts, where the supporters of the ruling administration tended to be concentrated. Thus, in 1866 Watson easily defended his seat against William Govan, junior, and Lumsden was returned unopposed. If Blackie had stuck with the neighbouring Seventh Ward, where Lumsden was a councillor, it is improbable that the débâcle of the 1866 election in the Sixth Ward could have been reproduced. As it happened, he had only the qualified support of the Ward Committee, many of whom later rallied behind Lang; he was vehemently opposed by his fellow councillors in the Ward; and he had the further disadvantage of being caught out by the sudden emergence of a persuasive opponent, so that there was little time left to organise an effective counter-campaign.

The outcome was, as the Blackie camp had dreaded, that Lang beat the Lord Provost by 156 votes to 154 in the election of 6th November. (Six seems to have been a singularly inauspicious number for Blackie.) Once again, the famous Blackie irascibility was displayed during a sour address to supporters immediately following the declaration of the poll:²⁸⁰

... we would have been in a different position if the committee had taken my advice a fortnight ago, and allowed me to put on an effective agent.

But they were so confident of their own success that they had no doubt of the matter at all. And there is the result. I care nothing of myself, but it is a disgrace to the Ward and a disgrace to the city. It is no encouragement for any gentleman to put himself to trouble and to spend his time and labour when he is rewarded in this way, and be tossed out by one who has exhibited no competency for serving the public or representing this Ward on the Council.

The jubilant Lang camp, meantime, was listening to a rousing statement from the Sixth Ward's newest councillor, who was perched precariously on a window sill at Whyte's Temperance Hotel, Candleriggs, "... with two gentlemen behind holding on to his coat-tails to prevent him from falling".²⁸¹ Lang clearly believed he had right on his side:²⁸²

... notwithstanding gold chain and gold badges, I have been successful simply because I was fighting for the right principle ... I know this, that had I polled simply for the working classes, I would have polled ten for one.

Having then withdrawn into his committee rooms, which were crowded to suffocation, Lang climbed on to a table and, after giving hearty thanks to his supporters, began to relate a "curious story" to the assembled company. It concerned "certain gentlemen interested in a large property in the West End of Glasgow", the proposed purchase of Glasgow College by the Union Railway Company, and the introduction of the City Improvement Act.²⁸³ Lang said that all were inextricably connected, that the personnel involved were identical, and that it was all a carefully contrived plot to open out the city centre for the

benefit of railway companies to shift the University to the salubrious West End. He named Blackie as being involved in the plot, claiming that he had abused his position as Lord Provost to push it through the Town Council and Parliament.

In the heat of the moment, Lang was stating what appears to have been widely believed in many quarters of the city, but could not be decisively proven. He was later more circumspect about his accusations, although - as has been previously shown - there was substance to the claim of collusion among municipal and business circles over the Union Railway Bill and relocation of the University.²⁸⁴ Whatever the precise rationale behind the transactions, they were interpreted at the time by the likes of Lang as contrary to the public interest and against the will of the Town Council, which had originally voted to oppose the railway proposals.²⁸⁵ This scarcely helped the image of Blackie as the great benefactor of city improvement, or the prospects of Lumsden in the forthcoming election for Lord Provost. The defeat of Blackie and the aura of sharp practice hovering over his heir apparent bluntly demonstrated to the ruling group that their position was seriously under threat within the Council, and that they had to make efforts to regain the initiative. Unfortunately, their attempts were often ham-fisted and counterproductive. For example, the Glasgow Herald - a consistent supporter of the Blackie-Watson group during this period - took the desperate step of reproducing the

names and addresses of "the men who put the Lord Provost out, and who put Mr. J.L. Lang in", from the Sixth Ward poll-book. This was a tactic generally regarded as "ungentlemanly", and which the Herald had disdained to use in the past.²⁸⁶

The final denouement was, of course, the election for the Lord Provost at the Council meeting of 9th November. James Raeburn, a shipowner and Senior Bailie, proposed Lumsden, while James Salmon took on the task of nominating Arthur. Salmon referred directly to Lumsden's controversial business involvements, notably his directorship of the Glasgow and South Western Railway and the Clydesdale Bank, and could not agree that Lumsden could be relied upon to keep his business and his civic responsibilities separate. In words that echoed the election of Lord Provost Orr in 1854, Salmon stated:²⁸⁷

... we know very well that in the days gone past, one great portion of the expense which this Council has had to encounter has been occasioned by the railway companies, and by guarding ourselves against their encroachments. Now, it would almost have occurred to me that a great proprietor or railway director or chairman, and being greatly engaged in the banking interests, was rather a disqualification for a Provost than a qualification.

The result of the vote was close, with Lumsden winning by a majority of twenty-five votes to twenty-two, including the support of the ex officio Dean of Guild and Deacon Convener. There was a broad east-west divide in favour of the two candidates, with Arthur generally supported in the East End and

those areas directly affected by the Improvement Trust developments. Despite the defeat, the strength of feeling in favour of Arthur had brought home to the Lumsdenites that they could not continue to take the electorate or the Town Council for granted. Perhaps this had been the point that the Arthur camp had originally wished to stress, rather than effect sweeping changes within the Town Council. Indeed, some of the Arthurites quickly rallied round the new Lord Provost in 1866, and James Lumsden entered into this spirit of reconciliation by saying:²⁸⁸

I regret exceedingly, as matters have stood, that for some time past there has been a feeling of a separation of parties in the Council. I trust that if it has arisen from anything that has previously occurred it will be forgotten and forgiven, and that there will be no East or West-End party feeling.

Yet the controversy over the City Improvement Trust could not be quelled as a result of Lumsden's soothing words in 1866. For almost eight years the uneasy rumours about the Philanthropic Company cast a cloud over the municipality, until the matter came glaringly into the open during the autumn of 1872, when James Watson was Lord Provost. Detailed revelations about the Improvement Trust transactions first appeared in the North British Daily Mail, a newspaper under the proprietorship of the pro-temperance radical, Dr. Charles Cameron.²⁸⁹ Once again, the long-standing animus which existed between the militant evangelicals and the civic leadership came to the fore,

and there can be no doubt that Cameron was attempting to court popularity for his cause, and at the same time boost his own political profile. He was inspired by the recent success of crusading journalism in the United States, where the New York Times had been instrumental in exposing the infamous goings-on at Tammany Hall, where William Marcy Tweed had constructed his corrupt municipal empire.²⁹⁰ While it was clearly stretching credibility to equate Messrs. Watson, Lumsden and Blackie with the outrageous Boss Tweed and his acolytes "Slippery Dick" Connolly, Peter "Brains" Sweeny and the "Elegant" Oakey Hall, Cameron had no scruples about blazoning the city centre with placards reading "TAMMANY IN GLASGOW? - See the Daily Mail".²⁹¹ The implication was of massive fraud, with dubious political overtones, and as Glasgow's civic head, Watson could not afford to leave the Mail's case unanswered.

To counter the precise allegations made by the Mail, the rival Glasgow Herald became the mouthpiece for Watson, and he was skilfully able to refute the charge that the Philanthropic Company had profited from the Improvement Trust transactions. The moral argument was strongly emphasised:²⁹²

... the Philanthropic Company let light and air into the foulest fever dens of the city, long before the city was ready to do it, but they could not both do that and get rents for the properties they had knocked down. They voluntarily undertook public work - they risked their money and they gave their time and labour - and when the City relieved them of their burden, it entered, at a cheap rate,

into their labours. Had they not undertaken these responsibilities, the Improvement Act might never have been passed, and if it had passed, the City would have had to pay a heavy price for the absence of their generous public spirit.

However, favourable publicity was not enough to clear the air, and the Lord Provost was obliged to sue for defamation. Watson stated under cross-examination at the Court of Session that he was aggrieved by the tenor rather than the accuracy of the article: "I don't object to the facts - it is the inferences drawn from them".²⁹³ Following the testimony of an impressive array of witnesses, including James Leitch Lang, the sum of £575 was awarded as damages to Watson; a moral victory, although scarcely a ruinous one for a successful newspaper.²⁹⁴ Moreover, from statements made by Lang, it would appear that the article had been a deliberate device to put pressure on the civic leadership for a formal statement about the tangled history of the Improvement Trust, and that the price - in terms of legal costs - had been well worth it.²⁹⁵

The pro-temperance evangelicals were on the ascendancy in Glasgow's municipal affairs during the 1870s, and the conflict between Lord Provost Watson and the North British Daily Mail must be seen in the context of the shifting balance of power within the Town Council. However, the roots of the whole affair can be traced back to 1845, when the abortive joint-stock companies were first promoted as the ideal solution to the

city's social problems. As has been seen, it was hoped to harness private enterprise and philanthropy, to generate sufficient capital to restructure the city centre and relocate the slum dwellers. A considerable amount of effort must have gone into drafting the new development; indeed, it was later claimed that the plans prepared for 1845 had been deposited in the Town Clerk's office, and that Alexander Monro used these as the basis for the 1866 scheme.²⁹⁶ Whatever the precise connections between 1845 and 1866, the City Improvement Trust conformed to the pattern previously set by Loch Katrine and the West End Park. Good intentions were not enough to make a success of the original projects, and eventually the Town Council was called upon to provide the resources and administrative expertise to take the plans beyond the blueprint stage.

The objectives behind the 1845 city improvement plan remained intact, despite control of the scheme passing to the municipality. Yet the civic leadership chose to play down the commercial dimension, and instead were seen to concentrate on the philanthropic and sanitary aspects, to the growing cynicism of East Enders and dissident councillors like James Salmon. This is not to suggest that men like Blackie and Watson were hypocrites; their formative ideological influences were deeply engrained, and they sincerely believed that they were acting in the best interests of Glasgow. On the other hand, to attribute

this improving impulse to what Callum Brown has called "the evangelical agenda of social reform issues" is to explain only part of a complex story.²⁹⁷ Evangelicals, after all, were among the fiercest critics of the civic leadership, especially after Andrew Orr became Lord Provost. The campaigns conducted by Messrs. Govan in 1857 and Lang in 1866 were based on their belief that the dividing line between moral and material interests had become too blurred, and that the "benefiting mankind" part of the civic programme was being used as an expedient.²⁹⁸ Significantly, from the 1860s leading evangelical councillors - notably William Collins - declared themselves as champions of retrenchment.²⁹⁹ The motivations of John Blackie, junior, and James Watson are therefore best understood in the general context of their personal, political and business interests, rather than simply from their evangelical commitment. Accordingly, the conflict over the City Improvement Trust cannot be attributed to any dominating factor, but represented a variety of different perspectives as to how the city was developing.

Of course, Glasgow was by no means unique in its response to city improvement. Councillors were keen to learn from developments elsewhere, and it has already been noted that the example of Manchester was a fruitful source of inspiration in the provision of parks and pure water.³⁰⁰ The original plan to alter Glasgow's city centre had parallels with London, where

railway development formed part of a general strategy to displace the denizens of the Dickensian "rookeries".³⁰¹ Within the European context, there were a number of intriguing similarities between Glasgow and Paris of the Second Empire. Indeed, the early British and French plans for urban redevelopment have been a rich source of comparative analysis for historians, and the Glasgow-Paris analogy is only one aspect of this broad approach.³⁰² Although some of Blackie's contemporaries would not have hesitated to identify Napoleonic tendencies during his Lord Provostship, it may seem inappropriate to equate the grandiose aims of Napoleon III with the more parochial ambitions of Glasgow town councillors. Yet given their considerable cultural differences, there were some shared characteristics between Blackie and the Emperor. Both adhered to a liberal-paternalist view of the world, and had genuine concern for the welfare of the masses.³⁰³ Both were determined to create order out of chaos in their plans to restructure the urban heartland, demonstrating that the ruling authority was a progressive force, visibly changing the face of society.³⁰⁴ Above all, both wanted the regenerated city to reflect their own image of the urban ideal, whether evangelical or imperial; a lesson that was soon to be absorbed by that great municipal self-publicist, Joseph Chamberlain.³⁰⁵

Until the cataclysm of the Franco-Prussian War in 1870-71, the administration of Paris was consciously used as a model for

other European cities, whose leaders were impressed by the way in which social problems were being apparently tackled. Indeed, despite the collapse of the Second Empire, the Napoleonic vision survived into the twentieth century, and plans for Chicago in 1909 were consciously based on those drawn up for Paris some fifty years previously.³⁰⁶ Lord Provost Blackie visited Paris more than once in his quest for ideas to improve Glasgow, and the Town Council made a great show of participating in the Paris Exhibition of 1867; the first time the Glasgow Coat of Arms was officially used as a symbol for the city.³⁰⁷ The idea for the City Improvement Trust was generally welcomed in 1865 as having the potential for turning Glasgow into "a second Paris", showing that the impact of Napoleonic urban planning was perceived at the time in a wholly positive way.³⁰⁸ How far the city fathers grasped the more sinister aspects of social control underpinning Napoleon's policies is a matter for debate, but they did learn that civic pride, and being seen to foster such pride via projects like slum clearance, could yield fruitful returns.³⁰⁹

References

1. The text of the prayer is reproduced in the Glasgow Herald, 15th October 1859. The Herald reporter made the following revealing comment about its effect on the assembled gathering: "Although the above prayer was listened to with deep silence and attention by all who heard it, we feel constrained to remark that it was very generally impressed that under the circumstances it was unnecessarily lengthy".
2. See *ibid.*, 15th August 1872, for a detailed description of the inauguration. For personal information about Stewart, particularly with reference to his involvement in the Loch Katrine negotiations, see Tweed (publisher), *op. cit.*, pages 145-151. It should be noted that this is an almost verbatim reproduction of the obituary which appeared in the Glasgow Herald, 13th September 1866. A very similar profile of Stewart appears in Macle hose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, *op. cit.*, vol. II, pages 297-298.
3. For biographical details of Sellars and his work, see Gomme and Walker, *op. cit.*, pages 298-299, and passim.
4. A full description of the fountain, and the significance of the various motifs, appears in the Glasgow Herald, 15th August 1872. The sculpture of the Lady of the Lake was executed by James Mossman.
5. For more about the origins of the West End Park, see pages 262-274 and 289-293.
6. Similarly, for the City Improvement Trust see pages 294-330.
7. Salmon's career is also examined in Gomme and Walker, *op. cit.*, pages 297-298. For his obituary, see the Glasgow Herald, 6th June 1888.
8. Quoted in *ibid.*, 15th August 1872.
9. Salmon's evangelising role as an architect is referred to in James Schmiechen, "The Victorians, the Historians, and the Idea of Modernism", American Historical Review, vol. 93, 1988, pages 313-314.
10. In this context, see John C. Gibson (ed.), The Diary of Sir Michael Connal, 1835 to 1893, (Glasgow, 1895), pages 80-81. Connal was the nephew of William Connal, Glasgow's Dean of Guild between 1850-52, at the time of the Town Council debate over water municipalisation. Like his uncle, Connal was a zealous Free Churchman and philanthropist. In 1848 he was responsible

for founding the Spoutmouth Bible Institution in Glasgow's East End, and subsequently took "Spout" lads on invigorating visits to Loch Lomond and the Trossachs. This was intended to represent a symbolic baptism to the young city-dwellers, initiating them into a healthier way of life, and revealing God's majesty in the splendid landscape. Youngsters were not always appreciative of Connal's efforts on their behalf, as revealed in this extract from the Diary, dated 27th July 1850: "Walked over to Loch Katrine and washed my hands in the Loch; six miles across; almost constant rain. Much the better for the change of air and the exercise. Learned a lesson today about meddling with boys on the street. Shook a little fellow for thrashing a girl and inadvertently kicked him. Got no thanks, but was likely to get into words with rude, low people. I hope to try to do good, cautiously avoiding notice."

11. See pages 587-682. The significance of memorial drinking fountains, as the preferred tribute to temperance crusaders, is referred to on page 625.

12. See pages 70-72.

13. Glasgow Town Council, et al., Report by the Deputation Appointed by the Committees of the Lord Provost, Bailies and Councillors, of the Glasgow Trades' House, and the Commissioners of Police, to Conduct the Opposition to the Bill, entitled, "A Bill for the Better Supplying of the City and the Suburbs with Water", (Glasgow, 1834), page 12. The chief signatory to the Report was William Gilmour, the Town Council's Senior Magistrate.

14. For the detailed history of Glasgow's water supply, see John Burnet, History of the Water Supply to Glasgow: from the Commencement of the Present Century, with Descriptions of the Water Works Projected, Executed, and from Time to Time in Operation, (Glasgow, 1869); Bell and Paton, op. cit.; Sir James D. Marwick, Glasgow: the Water Supply of the City from the Earliest Period of Record, with Notes on Various Developments of the City till the Close of 1900, (Glasgow, 1901); Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit. All of the above were produced at the behest of the city fathers, with the clear intention of promoting the virtues of Loch Katrine water. Nevertheless, great attention is paid to detail, especially in the works of those public service lawyers par excellence, Messrs. Burnet and Marwick.

15. Marwick, op. cit., pages 73-78.

16. Ibid., pages 91-92. For some original evidence of the Town Council's concerned attitude, see the Glasgow Water Company's Letter Book, 1806-1825, unpaginated, SRA F13.1.1. The Company's

response to accusations of laxity in providing water to combat fires appears in a letter dated 15th November 1825, from J.O. Denny, Company Secretary, to the Lord Provost.

17. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 237.

18. Glasgow Town Council, et al., Report by the Deputation Appointed by the Committees of the Lord Provost ..., *op. cit.*, pages 14-15; these accusations are repeated in the Glasgow Herald, 28th March 1836.

19. See sections 105 and 138 of 3 and 4 William IV, cap. 46, [1833], "An Act to Enable Burghs in Scotland to Establish a General System of Police". Police Commissioners were empowered to provide water in any burgh which did not already have Parliamentary sanction for a private supply, as in Glasgow.

20. At the time, the river Earn was greatly favoured as a suitable source for Glasgow's water. See Thomas Grainger and John Miller, Report by Thomas Grainger and John Miller, Civil Engineers, Relative to the Best Mode of Obtaining a Plentiful Supply of Pure Water for the City of Glasgow, (London, 1834), SRA D-WA/1.

21. Glasgow Town Council, et al., Report by the Deputation Appointed by the Committees of the Lord Provost ..., *op. cit.*, page 13. For the background to the Greenock water supply, see the New Statistical Account of Scotland, vol. VII, Renfrew-Argyll, (Edinburgh & London, 1845), pages 432-438. For Edinburgh, see James Colston, The Edinburgh and District Water Supply: a Historical Sketch, (Edinburgh, 1890), pages 35-39. Edinburgh's system dated from the 1820s, and was considered to be "one of the most important gravitation water works of the time". The supply was brought from the Crawley Springs and the Glencorse Burn, in the Pentland Hills. The water problem in "Auld Reekie" during the 1840s was not the result of technological inadequacies, as in Glasgow, but because the volume of water was insufficient for the growing population.

22. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 20th March 1834, pages 307-308, SRA C1.1.59.

23. It should be added that Macgeorge did not stand for re-election in November 1834.

24. For the text of the "Report by the Committee of Council appointed to confer with the Water Companies", see the Glasgow Herald, 18th March 1836.

25. *Ibid.*

26. Quoted in *ibid.*
27. The meeting is reported in *ibid.*, 25th March 1836. See also Marwick, *op. cit.*, page 102.
28. The prospectus of the New Water Company is contained in the Report of Projected Water Works for Glasgow, SRA D-WA/1, pages 11-15. See also the Glasgow Herald, 25th March 1836, where the prospectus is reproduced. John Pattison was the Convener, Henry Dunlop was the Interim Treasurer, and David Murray the Interim Secretary.
29. Quoted in *ibid.*
30. Quoted in *ibid.*, 28th March 1836.
31. For a report of one particularly stormy Council meeting, see *ibid.*, 8th April 1836.
32. *Ibid.*, 9th and 13th March 1838. McGavin's change of heart is difficult to understand, given his radical commitment, and the fact that he was James Moir's father-in-law. However, business interests may have been a factor in persuading him to tone down his previous hostile stance. Thereafter, he seems to have been consciously used by the pro-merger faction on the Council to win public support.
33. See pages 92-124.
34. For the agreement reached between the municipality and the merged Water Company, see the "Report of Deputation on Water Bill", in Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 16th August 1838, pages 569-576, SRA C1.1.61.
35. Chadwick's rôle in the development of Britain's water supplies is discussed at length in G.M. Binnie, Early Victorian Water Engineers, (London, 1981). See pages 4-5 for the implications of 1838. See also Michael Flinn's introduction to Chadwick's re-issued Report on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain, 1842, (Edinburgh, 1965), especially pages 29-37, and C.H. Hume, "The Public Health Movement", in J.T. Ward (ed.), Popular Movements, c.1830-1850, (London, 1970), pages 189-191.
36. Flinn's introduction to Chadwick, *op. cit.*, page 35.
37. In 1818 Glasgow's first recorded typhus epidemic alerted local observers to the squalid conditions of the districts where the disease prevailed. See A.K. Chalmers, The Health of Glasgow, 1818-1925: an Outline, (Glasgow, 1930), page 3.

38. See the Report to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Home Department, from the Poor Law Commissioners, on an Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population of Great Britain; with Appendices, PP., 1842, HL XXVI.I, pages 23-25, for Chadwick's negative impressions of Glasgow. The quote appears on page 25. The Glasgow experience is reported at length in Sanitary Inquiry - Scotland: Reports on the Sanitary Condition of the Labouring Population in Scotland, in Consequence of an Inquiry directed to be made by the Poor Law Commissioners, PP., 1842, HL XXVIII.I, especially pages 159-203. One of the recommendations made by the Glasgow reporter, Charles R. Baird, was that "an ample water supply" should be provided, to combat public health problems. See page 194. See also Michael Flinn's introduction to Chadwick, op. cit., page 10; Thomas Ferguson, The Dawn of Scottish Social Welfare: a Survey from Medieval Times to 1863, (Edinburgh and London, 1948), page 191; and Geoffrey Best, "The Scottish Victorian City", in Victorian Studies, vol. 11, 1967-68, page 345.

39. See Burnet, op. cit., pages 41-42, for the basis of early complaints.

40. The extent of Chadwickian influence is well-illustrated in a lengthy letter calling for improvements to Glasgow's water supply, appearing in the Glasgow Herald, 9th March 1846.

41. The disproportionate weighting given by Chadwick to the Scottish experience is referred to in Michael Durey, The Return of the Plague: British Society and Cholera, 1831-32, (Dublin, 1979), page 47.

42. Report ... on an Inquiry into the Sanitary Condition, op. cit., page 69, and Chadwick, op. cit., page 140. These observations were made in the 1842 Report by John Hill Burton of Edinburgh.

43. See the Glasgow Herald, 14th March and 17th October 1845, for statements of Anderson and Bankier on the municipalisation issue.

44. First Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the State of Large Towns and Populous Districts, PP., 1844, XVII.I, and the Second Report, PP., 1845, XVIII.I.

45. The Town Council had been formally approached by representatives of the Water Company to enter into negotiations. See the Glasgow Herald, 14th March 1845.

46. Burnet, op. cit., page 47.

47. See vol. II of the First Report of the Health of Towns Commission, op., cit., pages 1-11, for Thom's evidence. See also Binnie, op. cit., pages 9-10.
48. New Statistical Account of Scotland, Vol. VII, op. cit., page 433.
49. Robert Thom, "Report By Robert Thom, Civil Engineer, Greenock", and "Report on Supplying Glasgow With Water", (dated 1836 and 1837 respectively), in Reports of Projected Water Works for Glasgow, op. cit., pages 15-44.
50. Vol. I of the First Report of the Health of Towns Commission, op. cit.,, page 89; also quoted in Binnie, page 10.
51. Ibid., pages 10-11.
52. Ibid., page 15. Chadwick was expressing these views in a letter to his colleague, Thomas Southwood Smith, on 16th July 1844.
53. Marwick, op. cit., pages 113-114.
54. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 239.
55. See the Glasgow Herald, 22nd August 1845, for discussions within the Town Council about the Gorbals Company, and the doubts expressed by Messrs. Anderson and Bankier about allowing the new water enterprise to come forward.
56. Gorbals Gravitation Company, Contract, Signed along with the Parliamentary Contract, 1845, SRA D-WA 2/1.
57. The Gorbals system is described in detail in Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 239-242.
58. Burnet, op. cit., page 47. In 1843 James Smith of Deanston had proposed Loch Lomond as a suitable source for Glasgow's water. See John Smith, "Notes by James Smith of Deanston as to the Practicability of Providing a Plentiful Supply of Pure Water for the City of Glasgow and Suburbs", in Reports of Projected Water Works for Glasgow, op. cit., pages 45-52.
59. See the "Report on the Plan of Supplying the City of Glasgow with Water from Loch Katrine, as proposed by the Loch Katrine Water Company", (probably by Messrs. Gordon and Hill), in ibid., pages 79-87. The prospectus of the original Loch Katrine Water Company can be found in the Glasgow Herald, 13th October 1845.
60. See ibid.

61. Ibid., 6th February 1846, for the report of a special meeting on behalf of the Loch Katrine Water Company, which expresses the Committee's unease over the unsteady state of the money market, and the difficulties involved in pressing forward with an application to acquire Parliamentary powers.

62. See G.S. Knox, Cholera and the Influence of the Public Health Movement in Glasgow, 1832-1848/49, (unpublished M. Litt thesis, University of Strathclyde, 1976), pages 42-45. The deceased councillors were John Anderson and Robert Fleming, and there may well have been others; see pages 752-753 of this thesis.

63. John Strang, "Report on the Mortality from Cholera in the City of Glasgow", in Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 29th March 1849, page 454, SRA C1.1.65.

64. The decision to set up the Board of Health was made in 1847. See *ibid.*, 25th November 1847, pages 102-103. See also Knox, *op. cit.*, pages 23-24.

65. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 15th October 1852.

66. J.A. Hassan, "The Growth and Impact of the British Water Industry in the Nineteenth Century", in Economic History Review, Second Series, vol. XXXVIII, 1985, page 543.

67. *Ibid.*, page 538.

68. Glasgow Herald, 13th October 1845.

69. Hassan, *loc. cit.*, page 541-542. The exceptional purity and softness of Loch Katrine water was drawn to public attention in the "Report on the Plan of Supplying the City of Glasgow with Water from Loch Katrine ...", *loc. cit.*, page 81.

70. The history of the Bradford water supply is contained in Binnie, *op. cit.*, pages 116-129. Municipalisation took place in 1855, at much the same time as Glasgow.

71. For a discussion of evangelical influences in Glasgow Town Council during the nineteenth century, see Callum G. Brown, "Did Urbanisation Secularize Britain?", in Urban History Yearbook, (Leicester, 1988), pages 11-12.

72. Burnet, *op. cit.*, pages 49-50.

73. Marwick, *op. cit.*, page 127 and John Frederic Bateman, Supply of Water to the City of Glasgow: Reports from John Frederic Bateman, Civil Engineer, FGS, Member of the Institution of Civil Engineers, on the Various Schemes for Supplying Glasgow

with Water, with Maps of the Districts, (Manchester, 1853), page 3-4. The Glasgow Water Company had dusted down the abortive Loch Lubnaig proposals of 1846, and was actively promoting these.

74. William John Macquorn Rankine and John Thomson, On the Means of Improving the Water Supply of Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1852), page 6. For the background to the Manchester development, see Binnie, op. cit., pages 171-177.

75. The Health of Towns Association was formed in 1844 and the Glasgow Branch in 1847. See Knox, op. cit., page 70..

76. Gourlay's change of heart is reported in the Glasgow Herald, 29th October 1852.

77. Chadwick's glowing testimonial to the abilities of "Young Mr Bateman" is reproduced in Binnie, op. cit., page 172.

78. His findings are detailed in Bateman, op. cit.

79. Ibid., page 5.

80. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 245-246.

81. Burnet, op. cit., pages 78-83.

82. Two detailed reports on the purity of Loch Katrine water subsequently appeared, where Penny retracted his previous claims, after comparative investigations in soft water areas like Inverness and Whitehaven. See S. Galon (publisher), Glasgow Corporation Water Works: Chemical and Medical Reports and Evidence on the Quality of Loch Katrine Water, and Additional Chemical Reports as to the Supply of Water to the City of Glasgow from Loch Katrine, (both London, 1854).

83. Burnet, op. cit., pages 83-86.

84. Marwick, op. cit., page 132.

85. See *ibid.*, page 144, for a breakdown of costs.

86. 18 and 19 Victoria, cap. 118, [1855], "An Act to authorise and empower the Magistrates and Council of the City of Glasgow to Supply with Water the said City and Suburbs thereof, and Districts and Places Adjacent; to Purchase and Acquire the Glasgow Water Works, and the Gorbals Gravitation Water Works; and to introduce an additional supply from Loch Katrine, and for other purposes".

87. The occasion is described in detail in the Glasgow Herald,

15th October 1859.

88. A point worth noting is that two of the most prominent statues in George Square, outside the modern Glasgow City Chambers, are those of Queen Victoria and Sir Walter Scott. See the cover of Simon Berry and Hamish Whyte (eds.), Glasgow Observed, (Edinburgh, 1988), for a striking silhouette illustration of this.

89. Moray McLaren, Sir Walter Scott: the Man and Patriot, (London, 1970), page 78. McLaren also gives the background to the phenomenal success of The Lady of the Lake. It was an immediate best-seller after it was first published in 1810, and by 1836 some 50,000 copies of the poem had been legally sold in the United Kingdom. This figure takes no account of the myriad "pirated" versions, and McLaren estimates a more realistic figure of 100,000.

90. See the map, A Guide to Loch Catherine and Loch Lomond constructed for the Pleasure Tours throughout Scotland, respectfully inscribed (by permission) to Sir Walter Scott, Bart., (Edinburgh, 1821), SRA TD 232/135. As late as 1929, H.V. Morton wrote "There is only one book for the Trossachs: The Lady of the Lake". See Morton, In Search of Scotland, (London, 1929), page 240.

91. John Henry Raleigh, "What Scott Meant to the Victorians", in Victorian Studies, vol. VII, 1963-64, pages 7-34. See also pages 737-740 of this thesis.

92. Walter Scott, The Lady of the Lake: A Poem, (Edinburgh, 1810). See the first Canto, Section XIV.

93. For some official histories, see Duncan McLellan, Glasgow Public Parks, (Glasgow, 1894): Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 328-361; Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., pages 34-47 and 162-184. While the background to Glasgow Green is described in all of these accounts, its unique place in the city's cultural heritage is examined by Elspeth King in The People's Palace and Glasgow Green, (Glasgow, 1985). The origins of the municipal art collection are dealt with in T.J. Honeyman, Art and Audacity, (Glasgow, 1971); Richard Marks, Burrell, Portrait of a Collector: Sir William Burrell, 1861-1958, (Glasgow, 1983); Glasgow Museums and Art Galleries, Glasgow Art Gallery and Museum: the Building and Collections, (Glasgow, 1987).

94. Burnet, op. cit.

95. Detailed information about Glasgow's building-boom appears in Cairncross, loc. cit., pages 12-36.

96. Simpson, op. cit. See also Simpson's published essay, "The West End of Glasgow, 1830-1914" in M.A. Simpson and T.H. Lloyd (eds.), Middle Class Housing in Britain, (Newton Abbot, 1977), pages 44-85.

97. Glasgow Herald, 14th May 1830. Quoted in Simpson, op. cit., page 43 (thesis) and page 55 (essay).

98. Sir James Watson lived at no. 9 Woodside Terrace from the 1850s until his death in 1889. Like James Smith, he also had a country residence in Rhu.

99. Simpson, "The West End of Glasgow ...", loc. cit., pages 55-56; Gomme and Walker, op. cit., page 92.

100. The Botanic Gardens, of course, lay outside the municipal boundaries until 1891, and public access was restricted. The location of the Green within the royalty boundary was of vital importance to Glaswegians until 1846. This was not only because of the recreation value, but because the Green afforded public facilities such as wash-houses, drying areas, bleaching greens, and land for the pasturage of cattle. It is often overlooked that prior to the coming of the railways, the transportation of milk in bulk over any substantial distance was a difficult task, and the Green was consequently necessary to ensure that citizens could get a readily available supply. This was one of the reasons that plans for mining the Green were shelved during the 1830s.

101. See James Cleland, Report Respecting Improvements in the Green of Glasgow, with an Account of its Minerals and its Natural Filter for an Additional Supply of Water to the City, (Glasgow, 1828). A detailed history of the various attempts to investigate the Green's mineral deposits appears in Glasgow Corporation, Report by the Town Clerk [John Lindsay] as to Unworked Coal belonging to the Corporation of Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1914), SRA D-TC 6/606/8A. First borings for coal were authorised by the Town Council in November 1821, and thereafter Cleland gave regular updates on developments. Investigations continued until September 1837, when a report was submitted by John Craig, mineral surveyor, estimating that 1,452,000 tons of coal lay under the Green. Rather than exploit this municipal El Dorado, councillors ordered that the report should "lie on the table", which it did until the revival of interest during August 1857.

102. King, op. cit., page 32. William C. Pattison had previously written a pamphlet on behalf of East Enders, History of Glasgow Green and of the Various Struggles made by the Citizens to Preserve it from Encroachment, particularly those of 1575-76, 1745 and 1845, (Glasgow, 1845).

103. For a discussion of this theory, in relation to the campaign to introduce public parks to Manchester, see Manchester City Art Galleries, Parks for the People: Manchester and its Parks, 1846-1926, (Manchester, 1987), pages 7-8.

104. Ibid.

105. Hugh Macdonald, Rambles Round Glasgow: Descriptive, Historical and Traditional, (Glasgow, 1910; first published 1854), pages 5-6. The Rambles were initially published as separate features in the Glasgow Citizen; "The Public Green" appeared on 22nd May 1852.

106. See the Glasgow Herald, 17th June 1850, for the letter from "A Glaswegian", praising Moir's efforts to "improve the great lung" of the Green.

107. Macdonald, op. cit., page 6.

108. Report from the Select Committee appointed to consider the Best Means of securing Open Spaces in the Vicinity of Populous Towns, as Public Walks and Places of Exercise, calculated to Promote the Health and Comfort of the Inhabitants, PP., 1833, (448), XV, 337. Quoted in George F. Chadwick, The Park and the Town; Public Landscape in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, (London, 1966), pages 50-51.

109. Report from the Select Committee appointed to inquire into the Extent, Causes, and Consequences of the Prevailing Vice of Drunkenness among the Labouring Classes of the United Kingdom, in order to Ascertain whether any Legislative Measures can be Devised to Prevent the further Spread thereof, PP., 1834, (559), VIII, 315. Quoted in George F. Chadwick, op. cit., page 51.

110. See the Glasgow Herald, 17th June 1850, for the first reference to the "several influential citizens".

111. Ibid.

112. All this is explained at length in ibid., but see also Simpson, op. cit., Middle Class Housing and the Growth of Suburban Communities ..., op. cit., pages 40-42.

113. See J.R. Kellett, "Glasgow's Railways, 1830-1880: A Study in Natural Growth", in Economic History Review, Second Series, vol. XVII, no. 2, 1964, pages 360-326, and John Thomas, A Regional History of the Railways of Great Britain, Volume IV: Scotland - the Lowlands and the Borders, (second edition, Newton Abbot, 1984), pages 56-58, for accounts of the short-lived Glasgow, Airdrie and Monklands Junction Railway Company. The

Company first became interested in the College grounds in 1845, with the result that generous terms were offered to the University authorities for acquiring the site. These included a contribution of £10,000 towards the cost of a new teaching hospital, plus a guarantee to transfer any stonework of historical or archaeological interest to the Woodlands site. The architect, John Baird, drafted initial plans, and contracts to the value of £147,000 were provisionally let. However, the Treasury prevaricated over sanctioning the project, with the result that the railway proprietors became bogged down in financial difficulties. In 1848 the plans were formally abandoned, and the University authorities successfully sued the company for £12,000 damages.

114. Glasgow Herald, 17th June 1850. See also James Wyllie Guild's scrapbook, which contains numerous press-cuttings about the Park development between 1850 and 1853. The scrapbook can be found in the Glasgow Room of the Mitchell Library, under "J.W.G.", Kelvingrove: A Book of Press-Cuttings.

115. Glasgow Herald, 17th June 1850.

116. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 30th January 1851, page 125, SRA C1.1.66. The Glasgow Herald, 31st January 1851, reproduces Guild's formal letter to Lord Provost Anderson, dated 30th January 1851, seeking the financial assistance of the Town Council in implementing the Park proposals.

117. *Ibid.*, 3rd February 1851. This is essentially a progress report from that of June 1850, and seems to have been supplied to the Herald from the same source, almost certainly Guild.

118. Biographical details about Wilson appear in Gomme and Walker., *op. cit.*, pages 303-304. Wilson must have known James Smith well, through their mutual association with David and James Hamilton, Glasgow's leading architects during the first decades of the nineteenth century. However, by the 1850s there appears to have been keen rivalry between the two men over the Park proposals.

119. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 20th February 1851, page 134, SRA C1.1.66.

120. Glasgow Herald, 14th May 1851.

121. Glasgow Examiner, 27th February 1851.

122. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 14th March 1851.

123. *Ibid.*

124. Ibid. The list of councillors voting for and against the £10,000 contribution is provided.

125. The property columns of the Glasgow Herald indicate that Woodlands was on offer at an "upset price" of £24,000 from April 1851, dropping to £21,000 by August. Asking prices for Kelvingrove were not given, but advertisements for the property recur throughout 1851.

126. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 7th April 1852, page 356, SRA C1.1.66; also, the Glasgow Herald, 8th April 1852.

127. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 29th April 1852, page 372, SRA C1.1.66.

128. Biographical information about Scott appears in Maclehoze (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. II, pages 279-280. A formidable businessman, Scott - like Andrew Orr - was an extensive landowner in the city centre, selling a substantial segment of his property to the Caledonian Railway Company during the 1870s. The site became Central Station. Throughout his life, Scott took a keen interest in railway development.

129. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 7th April 1852.

130. McLellan, op. cit., pages 41-42. Duncan McLellan, it should be added, was no relation to Archibald, of McLellan Galleries fame. Born in the picturesque village of Luss, Dunbartonshire, he was Glasgow's first Superintendent of Parks, appointed in 1853 and serving for forty years until his retirement, aged seventy-eight. For his obituary, see the Glasgow Herald, 27th April 1897.

131. Ibid., 9th April and 7th May 1852.

132. In connection with the Glasgow, Barrhead and Neilston Direct Railway. See Thomas, op. cit., pages 125-126.

133. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 5th May 1852, page 380, C1.1.66.

134. Paxton's career, including his Glasgow involvement, is dealt with at length in George F. Chadwick, op. cit., pages 66-94. The success of Paxton's design for Birkenhead Park, opened in 1847, probably inspired Glasgow's councillors to try out a similar scheme for Kelvingrove. Although an ambitious project, the sale of land around Birkenhead Park for building purposes met the cost of the original purchase price.

135. See Schmiechen, loc. cit., page 306.

136. See Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 20th June 1852, where the unanimous decision for "Kelvingrove" is recorded; see also Gomme and Walker, op. cit., page 92.

137. Glasgow Herald, 4th March and 8th April 1853. Peter Blackburn, who had conducted the transactions with the Town Council for the sale of Woodlands, appeared along with the University delegation to discuss the proposed transfer from the city centre.

138. Reformers' Gazette, 2nd March 1853.

139. See the Glasgow Herald, 3rd November 1851, for mention of Orr and McLellan as candidates for the Lord Provostship. See also Tweed (publisher), op. cit., pages 132-136, for a report of the contest for the civic chair, with Robert Stewart beating McLellan by twenty-nine votes to seventeen. John McDowall and James Bogle proposed Stewart, while David Dreghorn and Dr. John Aitken proposed McLellan. James Moir supported McLellan on the grounds that he preferred his "intellectual qualifications". Dr. Aitken - who was another Blythswood Square resident - later switched allegiances because of his strong pro-temperance stance, and was prominent in the campaign to re-elect Alexander Hastie as MP in 1857.

140. McLellan's biography can be found in his Glasgow Herald obituary, dated 27th October 1854, and in Maclehoze (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. II, pages 350-353.

141. The "means and substance" debate first surfaced in Glasgow after the passing of 8 and 9 Victoria, cap. 83., [1845], "An Act for the Amendment and Better Administration of the Laws relating to the Poor in Scotland". The issue was a complicated one, and hinged on the options for Poor Law assessment under Section XXXIV of the Act. In Glasgow, the debate became polarised between partisans of the "rental" or "means and substance" systems. The former was based on the fixed value of property; the latter - which had previously applied in Glasgow - was more akin to an income tax, based on moveable as well as heritable property. Critics of "rental" claimed that it favoured the rich, while critics of "means and substance" argued that it was too inquisitorial. Under prompting from McLellan, the newly-created City Parochial Board voted initially for "means and substance". However, the "rental" party, led by James Gourlay, successfully overtured the "means and substance" policy in 1849, and the subsequent animus between Gourlay and McLellan on the Town Council can be partly explained by their Parochial Board experience. The Poor Law debate had relevance to municipal affairs, as the Lord Provost was automatically a member of the Scottish Board of Supervision. An explanation -

though from an implacable enemy of the "means and substance" system - can be found in Robert Peel Lamond, The Scottish Poor Laws: their History, Policy and Operation, (Glasgow, 1892), pages 215-223.

142. With reference to McLellan's architectural interests, he was instrumental in having controversial renovations carried out to Glasgow Cathedral during the 1850s, which - to the dismay of conservationists then and since - removed the Gothic western tower and fifteenth century consistory house. In J. Cunnison and J.B.S. Gilfillan (eds.), The Third Statistical Account of Scotland: Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1958), pages 127-128, critical referenc is made to the damaging effects of Town Council policy on the Cathedral and other municipal buildings. From this, the reputation of recognised city benefactors like McLellan can be shown as double-edged.

143. Urie, op. cit., page 138.

144. Biographical information about Orr appears in his Glasgow Herald obituary, dated 19th April 1874; Macle hose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. II, pages 253-254; Tweed (publisher), op. cit., pages 169-172.

145. Orr lived at no. 5 Blythswood Square, Anderson at no. 3, and the Smith family at the notorious no. 7.

146. Tweed (publisher), op. cit., pages 152-153. Two East End councillors, George Mitchell and William Gilmour, proposed Orr as Lord Provost.

147. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 15th April 1853.

148. McDowall's obituary appears in *ibid.*, 10th September 1861. McDowall was another sworn enemy of "means and substance", as Chairman of the Barony Parochial Board. For an account of his activities during the 1850s, in relation to the Town Council's licensing policy, see pages 597-606.

149. Another source of tension may have been rival railway interests; McDowall was a director of the Caledonian Railway Company, while Orr was Chairman of the Glasgow and South Western. However, McDowall also had investments in the G & SW, while Orr's friend - John Houldsworth - was a director of the Caledonian.

150. Glasgow Herald, 19th April 1874.

151. John Kellett, Railways and Victorian Cities, (second edition, London, 1979), page 220. McLellan was interested in the Kelvinbank and Sandyford estates, which he subsequently sold

to the Trades' House.

152. Reformers' Gazette, 28th May 1853.

153. The Crystal Palace plan, along with a letter from Smith to Lord Provost Stewart, dated 1st June 1853, can be found under reference SRA D-TC 13/656 and D-TC 6/534/1. The quote is taken from the letter. Smith's daughter, Madeleine, was at school in London at the time of the Great Exhibition, and was a regular visitor to the Hyde Park Crystal Palace.

154. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 22nd July 1853.

155. Ibid.

156. Glasgow Town Council Minutes, 4th August 1853, pages 692-693, SRA C1.1.66.

157. Gomme and Walker, op. cit., pages 94-99. A photograph is reproduced of the Park area, taken from the University tower, where the French - or Parisien - influences clearly show.

158. An evocative description of Mugdock Castle, during the time of McLellan's residence, appears in Macdonald, op. cit., pages 373-380.

159. Glasgow Herald, 27th October 1854.

160. McLellan's deed of settlement is reproduced in Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 350-351.

161. For the debate within the Town Council over the decision to purchase the McLellan Galleries, see the Glasgow Herald, 16th May 1856. Somewhat theatrically, David Dreghorn evoked McLellan's deathbed scene, in an attempt to win support for his cause. According to William Govan, junior, in *ibid.*, 2nd November 1857, eight councillors out of the twenty-four voting for the resolution could be classified as "interested parties" in the transaction, indicating that they had tipped the balance in favour of the purchase. Nineteen councillors - led by John McDowall - voted against.

162. The veteran John Mitchell made reference some eleven years after the purchase to the widespread feeling that there had been more behind the Council's enthusiasm to purchase the Galleries than met the eye. See the Glasgow Herald, 14th November 1867.

163. As spokesman for the trustees, see Dreghorn's 1857 report to the general meeting of creditors, reproduced in the Glasgow Herald, 17th July 1857. The extent of James Smith's friendship is shown by the fact that not only was he a trustee to the

McLellan estate, but was one of the chief mourners at McLellan's funeral.

164. Andrew Orr remained on the Board of Directors of the City of Glasgow Bank until 1860. Sidney Checkland has characterised the Bank as using "aggressive" tactics to encourage depositors in his Scottish Banking: A History, 1695-1973, (Glasgow and Edinburgh, 1975), page 469. It had much in common with the Western Bank of Scotland, which spectacularly failed in 1857, causing the City of Glasgow Bank to close its doors for a short period. The problems in connection with the Bank, and the state of the money market generally, must have added to Orr's personal list of woes during 1857, particularly as one commentator has stated that the Bank "was seen to be weak, having a number of acceptances tied up with firms that were not particularly solvent". See Joseph P. McLean, The City of Glasgow Bank Failure, 1878, (unpublished BA dissertation, University of Strathclyde, 1977), page 2.

165. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., pages 34-35. £29,500 was paid for the Galleries, and £15,000 for the works of art. The latter price was undoubtedly a bargain.

166. Glasgow Herald, 2nd November 1857.

167. "Report by the Committee of Finance of the Town Council of Glasgow for 1858-59", pages 5-6, appearing in Glasgow Town Council, Committee on Finance: Reports, 1834-59, SRA C2.5.

168. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 337-338. The property was later to become Queen's Park, and embraced 143 acres. The purchase price was £30,000. As has been noted in the section of this thesis on Municipal Expansion, the feuing ground formed the basis of the district of Crosshill, which was to cause such headaches for the city fathers during the 1870s.

169. The issue was first raised by councillor Charles Gray at the municipal meeting of 20th August 1857. See the Glasgow Herald, 21st August 1857.

170. Ibid., 27th October 1856.

171. Friends of the People's Palace, Glasgow Green and Round About, (Glasgow, n.d., but c.1980), page 8.

172. Reproduced in *ibid.*, pages 7-8 and King, op. cit., pages 30-31. The song was originally published by Poet's Box, off the Gallowgate, and was revived in the 1980s by the folk-singer, Adam McNaughton.

173. Quoted in King, op. cit., page 31. Originally from "The

Diggings in Glasgow Green", April 1858, Poet's Box Collection, Mitchell Library.

174. "Report by the Committee of Finance ... for 1857-58", page 6, loc. cit.

175. For biographical information on Govan, who was a founder member of the Scottish Temperance League, see the North British Daily Mail, 27th September 1883 and the League Journal of the STL, 6th October 1883. See also pages 317-318 of this thesis for Govan's close connection with James Leitch Lang.

176. Govan wrote an open letter to the constituents of the Thirteenth Ward, dated 30th October 1857. It is reproduced in the Glasgow Herald of 2nd November 1857.

177. See the report of a meeting held in the Thirteenth Ward on 14th October 1857, appearing in *ibid.*, 16th October 1857. Dreghorn and Govan confronted each other and, according to the Herald reporter, who was clearly biased in his favour, Dreghorn came out well from the exchange. However, he had to fend off attacks that not only was he improperly involved in the McLellan Galleries transaction, but that he had made a financial killing from the sale of riverside land, which he personally owned, to the Clyde Navigation Trust. The Thirteenth Ward, it should be added, was centred on the Broomielaw district of Glasgow, along the river Clyde.

178. *Ibid.*, 2nd November 1857.

179. To be more precise, Madeleine Smith was accused of lacing a cup of cocoa with arsenic, which she handed to L'Angelier during one of their late-night assignations at her bedroom window in Blythwood Square. The motive for such a drastic end to a passionate affair was her impending engagement to the wealthy and upright William Harper Minnoch. Madeleine's great problem was that under Scottish law she could be legitimately regarded as L'Angelier's wife, in accordance with the tradition of "handfast" marriage, ie. by both parties previously having declared themselves as wed. It seems that L'Angelier was perfectly aware of his legal status as Madeleine's husband, and was using blackmail by threatening to show her very explicit letters to James Smith. The impoverished but ambitious L'Angelier must have known of Smith's influential position in Glasgow, and his friendships among the city's middle class élite. Evidence of L'Angelier's knowledge of the law is cited by one of his friends, Adam Pringle, in the Glasgow Herald, 7th September 1857. Intriguingly, L'Angelier was lodging at the Curator's house at the Botanic Gardens when he first met Madeleine; his personal knowledge of botany would therefore have given him an interest in the development of public parks in

Glasgow, although how far this influenced his relationship with Madeleine remains unknown. It should be finally added that Madeleine was born 29th March 1835; she was therefore aged twenty-two at the time of her arrest, and not twenty-one, as stated in her Declaration, dated 31st March 1857.

180. For two classic accounts of the Smith case, from the "Notable British Trials" series, see A. Duncan Smith (ed.), The Trial of Madeleine Smith, (London and Edinburgh, 1905), and the revised edition, edited by F. Tennyson Jesse, published in 1927. The Jesse edition contains Madeleine's unexpurgated letters to L'Angelier, which were regarded as too shocking for Victorian and Edwardian sensibilities, and were not made public at the time of her trial. For more recent accounts of the Smith case, the following selection should more than suffice: Peter Hunt, The Madeleine Smith Affair, (London, 1950); John Gray Wilson, Not Proven, (London, 1960); Henry Blyth, Madeleine Smith: A Famous Victorian Murder, (London, 1975); Nigel Morland, That Nice Miss Smith, (second edition, London, 1988).

Two of the best analyses appear in Mary S. Hartman, "Murder for Respectability: the Case of Madeleine Smith", in Victorian Studies, vol. XVII, June 1973, pages 381-400, and Jack House, Square Mile of Murder, (second edition, Glasgow, 1984). One of Hartman's virtues is that she does not glamorise Madeleine as a femme fatale - a fault of F. Tennyson Jesse - and refuses to accept her statements to L'Angelier at face value. Most writers have uncritically believed Madeleine when she told L'Angelier that James Smith had refused to allow his consent for their marriage; Hartman gives credence to the view that Smith, senior, did not even know of L'Angelier's existence, and that Madeleine had consistently lied to her lover. The behaviour of Smith and his friends after the arrest would seem to bear out this theory, hence the discovery of the shocking letters by the police. If Smith had known of a clandestine liaison by his daughter, it seems logical that he would have immediately attempted to retrieve any compromising evidence, and thus avoid a scandal which might bring down several reputations in the city. Curiously, Smith was never asked to testify at his daughter's trial; if he had been asked directly whether he had known L'Angelier, a negative answer would have been highly damaging to Madeleine's case.

Jack House is one of the few Glaswegians to have written about the case, and has placed it firmly in the context of three other famous murders in or near the West End of the city. There is general agreement that all of the crimes were committed by "respectable" persons, and - with the exception of the Smith case - convenient scapegoats from the lower orders were found to take the blame. In only one instance - that of the unspeakable Dr. Edward William Pritchard - was the true murderer ever brought to justice. After her trial in 1861, Jessie McLachlan served fifteen years for a murder she did not commit; yet there

was blatant evidence of a cover-up among elements of Glasgow's middle-classes, which is amplified by Christianna Brand in her reconstruction of the crime, Heaven Knows Who: the Trial of Jessie McLachlan, (London, 1960). Referring back to the Smith case, the "scapegoat" was clearly L'Angelier himself. A Jersais, from St. Helier, of French extraction, he had no real Scottish connections, and Madeleine's defence counsel felt free to savage the character of the dead man. That he "deserved to die" became the conventional wisdom among the many pro-Madeleine partisans who emerged during and after the trial.

181. For some of the more bizarre theories about Madeleine and L'Angelier's sexual activity, see Blyth, op. cit. A particularly bad analysis of the case appears in Sir John Smith Samuel's Personal Recollections, (unpublished typescript, Glasgow, n.d., but c.1929, SRA ID 255). As an habitu  of Glasgow's Art Club, located round the corner from Blythwood Square, Samuel refers to a fellow Club member - dubbed "the Missing Link" - who allegedly witnessed Madeleine give L'Angelier the fatal cup of cocoa. From the number of similar "Missing Links" who retrospectively claimed to have knowledge of the crime, it would appear that Blythwood Square was swarming with onlookers as L'Angelier supped the poisoned beverage.

182. Smith's career as an architect is dealt with in Gomme and Walker, op. cit., pages 298-299. He was born in Alloa, Clackmannanshire, in 1808, but his origins remain obscure. It is known that his father was a builder, and Smith was latterly known as an architect and builder. He married Elizabeth Hamilton, daughter of David Hamilton, the successful Glasgow architect, and briefly entered into partnership with his brother-in-law, James Hamilton, before the business was sequestered in 1844. There has been much speculation as to why Smith christened his eldest child with the unusual name of Madeleine. In fact, it was a Hamilton family name; Madeleine's grandmother was originally Magdalene Marshall, and she also had an aunt Magdalene. Smith - who was always a man of pretensions - gave his daughter the Frenchified version of the name.

183. For the text of Orr's important speech to the Trades' House, see the Glasgow Herald, 10th October 1856. The Lord Provost outlined his municipal vision, which included - at this early stage - the incorporation of Govan, Partick and Maryhill within the city boundaries. Alexander Hastie, MP, was conspicuously absent from the occasion; the Herald commented that reasons for this were "diplomatic".

184. Biographical information about Houldsworth can be found in his Glasgow Herald obituary, dated 20th October 1859, and James Maclehose (publisher), op. cit., vol. I, pages 165-166. See also John L. Carvel, The Colness Iron Company: A Study in

Private Enterprise, (Edinburgh, 1948), for the general background to the Houldsworth dynasty. Houldsworth was burningly ambitious, and made no secret of his desire to become Lord Provost. He was also, latterly, one of the most prominent residents of the new Park district.

185. Glasgow Herald, 27th October 1856.

186. Morland, op. cit., pages 97-98.

187. Minnoch first met the acquaintance of James Smith in the presence of Orr and Houldsworth. See *ibid.*, pages 93-94.

188. See Samuel, op. cit., pages 1-14, for a lurid account of magisterial involvement in executions during the nineteenth century.

189. For Dalglish, see J.S. Jeans, Western Worthies: A Gallery of Biographical and Critical Sketches of West of Scotland Celebrities, (Glasgow, 1872), pages 36-41, and Maclehose (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. I, pages 97-98. Dalglish had close connections with the Town Council, as his father - also Robert - was Lord Provost from 1830 to 1831.

190. Houldsworth and Smith are both listed as Dalglish supporters in the Glasgow Sentinel, 28th March 1857.

190. Quoted in Jeans, op. cit., page 38.

192. Glasgow Herald, 1st April 1857. This is the same newspaper where the first report of Madeleine's arrest appears. For some additional background to the Hastie-Dalglish confrontation, see Hutchison, op. cit., page 82.

193. Glasgow Herald, 31st July 1857. At the time, several of L'Angelier's friends were actively attempting to counter the smears directed against him during the trial.

194. Glasgow Sentinel, 11th July 1857.

195. Glasgow Examiner, 18th July 1857.

196. I.G.C. Hutchison, "Glasgow Working Class Politics", in R.A. Cage (ed.), The Working Class in Glasgow, 1750-1914, (London, 1987), page 108.

197. See pages 606 of this thesis for the context of Dalglish's change of heart.

198. Orr was, of course, Lord Provost when the Loch Katrine

water supply was given Parliamentary sanction in 1855, and thereafter he basked considerably in the reflected glory of the project. Indeed, his coat-of-arms as Sir Andrew Orr was inscribed on the Stewart Memorial Fountain in 1872. It should be added that Orr voted against William Bankier's original proposal to municipalise Glasgow's water supply in 1845.

199. In his open letter, appearing in the Glasgow Herald of 2nd November 1857, William Govan, junior, alludes to the disparity in the law between England and Scotland. He states that in the English Corporations, no councillor could take part in municipal proceedings in which he or his partner had any personal interest. However, James D. Marwick has subsequently contradicted this view. Accordingly, magistrates and councillors in Scotland were subject to the same liabilities, responsibilities and disabilities imposed at common law upon trustees. During the 1850s it was ruled that, "... no one having such [fiduciary] duties to discharge shall be allowed to enter into engagements in which he has or can have a personal interest, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of those whom he is bound to protect". (Marwick's emphasis.) It would seem that there were grounds for suggesting that Orr was acting illegally over the McLellan Galleries transaction in 1856, although a formal legal ruling would have been necessary to clarify the matter. See James D. Marwick, Observations on the Law and Practice in Regard to Municipal Elections, op. cit., pages 427-437.

200. Kellett, Railways and Victorian Cities, op. cit., page 218. See also pages 133-134 of this thesis.

201. The lack of public enthusiasm for joint-stock companies was, of course, a reason for James Gurlay's change of heart over the Loch Katrine project. See the Glasgow Herald, 29th October 1852.

202. Kellett, Railways and Victorian Cities, op. cit., especially pages 208-243, where Glasgow is dealt with at length.

203. Ibid., page 107. The Glasgow experience echoes that of Manchester during the 1840s, where railway entrepreneurs were to the fore in the movement to establish public parks. Like Glasgow, Manchester's parks were located in the outskirts of the city, leaving the central areas free for railway development. On the other hand, the parks in Manchester had been funded entirely from public subscription, and were transferred to municipal control only after the lands had been purchased and laid out. No residential building schemes were involved, and Orr, Smith and McLellan may have been influenced by the success of Manchester - which John Houldsworth knew intimately - in their 1853 ideas for the West End Park. See Manchester Art

Galleries, *op. cit.*, pages 10-11.

204. Kellett, Railways and Victorian Cities, *op. cit.*, page 224.

205. Quoted in *ibid.*, pages 223-224. The rival was the Caledonian Railway Company.

206. William McIlwraith, The Glasgow and South Western Railway: Its Origin, Progress and Present Position, (Glasgow, 1880), page 115. See also Kellett, Railways and Victorian Cities, *op. cit.*, pages 115-119. Kellett specifically names Peter Clouston, James Lumsden, junior, and Sir James Campbell as keenly interested parties in the Union Railway Company Bill. Campbell happened to be the chairman and chief shareholder of the Gilmorehill Land Company, which was able to sell the site for £82,000 in 1864. It was indeed fortuitous that the Company did not sell Gilmorehill in 1850, as the proximity of Kelvingrove Park must have added to the value of the property considerably, bearing in mind the original 1845 purchase price of £12,000. Meanwhile, Lumsden and Orr were assiduously buying land in the city centre, which they were able to resell as part of the railway development. Orr was, of course, chairman of the G & SW Railway Company; Lumsden took over this role when Orr retired in 1871. Much more about Lumsden, and his property interests in the city centre, appears in the section of this thesis on the City Improvement Trust.

207. *Ibid.*, page 117.

208. Glasgow Herald, 21st October 1857.

209. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 336. It may, at this point, be worth providing some background as to what happened to James and Madeleine Smith after 1857. Understandably, the family speedily departed from Glasgow, and James Smith's last years were spent in seclusion at Old Polmont, Stirlingshire, where he died - aged only fifty-five - in 1863. Two years previously Madeleine had married an artist, George Wardle, in London; Wardle was closely involved with William Morris in the Arts and Crafts movement, and eventually became the general manager of Morris & Co. During the 1880s the Wardles joined the Socialist League, and Madeleine worked with her friends May Morris and Eleanor Marx as one of the League's organisers. She later separated from her husband, and emigrated to New York, where she remarried and lived in a Bronx apartment, flanked on one side by a delicatessen and the other by a Coca-Cola plant. She died in 1928, aged ninety-three, and was buried as Lena Sheehy.

210. 22 Victoria, cap. 17, [1859], "An Act to Enable the

Magistrates and Council of the City of Glasgow to Lay Out, Maintain, and Improve the Kelvingrove and Queen's Parks and the Galleries of Art and Corporation Halls in the said City; and for Other Purposes".

211. "Report by the Committee of Finance of the Town Council of Glasgow for 1858-59", page 6, in Glasgow Town Council, Committee of Finance: Reports, 1834-59, op. cit.

212. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 222. In the same source, Blackie is lyrically described as "the man who, more than any other, did a great work for the health, the moral sweetness, the credit of the city". Blackie - who predeceased his father, and therefore always used the "junior" after his name - was ousted from his municipal seat on 6th November 1866. Many subsequent sources have repeated the error contained in his Glasgow Herald obituary of 13th February 1873, which stated that he was defeated in the 1867 elections.

213. Tweed (publisher), op. cit., page 240. However, the anonymous writer is unable to confirm the impression put about by contemporaries that Blackie died as a result of the stress of his municipal endeavours. See also Agnes A.C. Blackie, Blackie and Sons, 1909-1959: A Short History of the Firm, (London and Glasgow, 1959), page 27, for a similar observation.

214. Ibid., page 4, and Walter W. Blackie, John Blackie, Senior, (1782-1874): Some Notes Collected by his Grandson, (London and Glasgow, 1933), page 22, for the family view of Graham's involvement. The name of Walter Graham Blackie, brother to John, junior, and an ex-officio councillor as Dean of Guild from 1885 to 1887, is testimony to the high esteem the Blackies held for Graham.

215. The Evangelical impulse was passed on to the Blackie grandchildren, also. Intriguingly, and as if to reinforce the strong social and political ties of the Blackie family to Glasgow, W.G. Blackie's daughter, Marion, was one of two women who stood for the first time as prospective town councillors in the municipal elections of 1911. See pages 747-748 of this thesis.

216. See Cleland's detailed account of the banquet, Description of the Banquet in Honour of the Right Honourable Sir Robert Peel, Bart., MP ..., op. cit. John Blackie, junior, would have been aged thirty-one at the time, having been born on 27th September 1805.

217. While John, junior, was Lord Provost in 1865, Gladstone - then Chancellor of the Exchequer - was given the Freedom of Glasgow. See J. Nicol, Gladstone in Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1902),

for a detailed account of events.

218. Retrospective accounts of the Glasgow City Improvement Trust tend to reflect the immediate period during which the individual writers were living. Two of the best-known analyses are those of Samuel Chisholm, "The History and Results of the Operations of the Glasgow City Improvement Trust", in Proceedings of the Philosophical Society of Glasgow, vol. XXVII, 1895-96, pages 39-56, and Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, pages 218-232. Both were written by people deeply involved promoting Glasgow Corporation enterprises in the 1890s, at a time when the civic rulers were anxious to depict the Trust in the most favourable light, due to the current controversy over a scheme to erect municipal buildings on Improvement Trust land.

C.M. Allan's, "The Genesis of British Urban Redevelopment with Special Reference to Glasgow", in Economic History Review, second series, vol. XVIII, 1965, pages 598-613, and J.N. Tarn's, "Housing in Liverpool and Glasgow: the Growth of Civic Responsibility", in Town Planning Review, vol. 39, 1968-69, pages 319-334, were written during the 1960s, when Comprehensive Development Areas were reviving an interest in early slum clearance projects and municipal action was generally perceived as a definitive solution to the problem of working-class housing. Henry W. Bull's unpublished M.Litt thesis, Working Class Housing in Glasgow, 1862-1902, (Strathclyde University, 1973), tends to reinforce this view.

Enid Gauldie's article, "The Middle Class and Working Class Housing in the Nineteenth Century", in A.A. Maclaren (ed.), Social Class in Scotland, Past and Present, (Edinburgh, 1976), pages 12-35, and P.J. Smith's "Planning and Environmental Improvement: Slum Clearance in Victorian Edinburgh", in Anthony Sutcliffe (ed.), The Rise of Modern Urban Planning, 1800-1914, (London, 1980), pages 99-133, discuss improvement schemes in a comparative context and adopt a more critical approach than hitherto. This reflects the trend against wholesale urban clearance schemes and the emphasis on popular participation in planning which emerged during the 1970s.

In the 1980s, with the municipal ethos under increasing critical scrutiny, Callum Brown's Religion and the Development of an Urban Society, *op. cit.*, and Kathleen Barclay Logan's The City Improvement Act (1866) and its Effect on Municipal Housing Policy, (unpublished BA dissertation, Strathclyde University, 1985), have looked more deeply at the controversy over the implementation of the Improvement Act in the 1860s and '70s, with Callum Brown playing close attention to some of the evangelical influences behind the original plan to clear Glasgow's city centre.

219. Chisholm, *loc. cit.*, page 41.

220. John Blackie, junior, The City Improvement Act: A Letter

to the Lord Provost of Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1866), page 2.

221. Ibid., pages 2-3.

222. Ibid., page 11.

223. The companies were the Glasgow Eastern Improvement Company, the Society for Improving the Dwellings of the Working Classes in Glasgow, and the City of Glasgow Improvement Joint Stock Company. A Gorbals Improvement Company was also tentatively promoted, although this seems to have been a separate venture from the others. See the Glasgow Herald, 5th, 8th and 12th September 1845 for the prospectuses, and pages 68-70 of this thesis.

224. Glasgow Examiner, 10th May 1845. For the series of articles on "Glasgow Lodging Houses", see *ibid.*, 10th, 17th and 24th May 1845. A perusal of the Examiner in April and May of that year shows that this was precisely the time when the Glasgow Joint Stock Feuing Company got off the ground, initial plans for the Glasgow, Airdrie and Monklands Junction Railway were floated, and the idea of constructing new University buildings was openly discussed. The Examiner's interest in sanitary questions - in the Chadwickian context - is discussed by Callum Brown in Religion and the Development of an Urban Society, *op. cit.*, page 235.

225. "Prospectus of the Society for Improving the Dwellings of the Working Classes in Glasgow", in the Glasgow Herald, 8th September 1845.

226. Ibid.

227. See Watson's obituary in *ibid.*, 15th August 1889.

228. H.G.C. Matthew, Gladstone, 1809-1874, (Oxford, 1986), pages 129 and 244.

229. For the Blackie-Watson connection, see Maclehorse (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, *op. cit.*, vol. I, page 38.

230. Gladstone's influential, The State and its Relations with the Church, was published in 1838, with a second edition appearing in 1841. See Matthew, *op. cit.*, pages 61-65.

231. Glasgow Herald, 12th September 1845. Orr was represented on the Provisional Committee in his municipal capacity as Third Ward representative, along with fellow Ward councillors Robert Bryson and Duncan McPhail.

232. The Blackie-Watson-Orr connection is specifically referred to in a revealing series of articles about the early history of the Improvement Trust, which appeared in the Evening News and Star, between 22nd and 30th October 1886. Another town councillor - David Smith - is named as a close associate of the three men, and Smith's obituary in the Glasgow Herald of 6th May 1870 states that he was "the first to suggest the acquiring of old properties by the Corporation" back in the 1840s. The Evening News later specifically claimed that this quartet of municipal luminaries conducted a rescue operation after the failure of the original improvement plan, personally purchasing some of the property acquired by the companies during the initial enthusiasm of 1845.

233. Quoted in Chisholm, loc.cit., page 41.

234. See the famous exposé, "Facts which Demand a Thorough Explanation", in the North British Daily Mail, 3rd October 1872. Extracts are reproduced from the 1861 "Memorandum of Agreement Between the Subscribers".

235. The Evening News and Star articles, op. cit., explain the similarities between the 1845 and 1866 plans. The Glasgow Herald of 4th October 1872 was quick to respond to the Mail's allegations, and named the entire twenty-three members of the Philanthropic Company. Andrew Orr did not put his name to the scheme, but out of this number William Rae Arthur, John Blackie, junior, Peter Clouston, Archibald Orr Ewing, James Lumsden, James B. Mirrlees, James Watson and James H. Young had been town councillors during the late 1850s and '60s. Five consecutive Lord Provosts were involved, rather than the six stated by Callum Brown in his thesis and repeated in the article, "Did Urbanisation Secularize Britain?", loc. cit., page 11. Glasgow's two MPs - Walter Graham and James Dalglish - were numbered among the twenty-three. The number of prominent citizens in the Philanthropic Company may have been to secure more credit from the banks, or simply to stress that the Company was a credible and broadly-based enterprise.

236. North British Daily Mail, 3rd and 4th October 1872.

237. 29 and 30 Victoria, cap. 85, [1866], "An Act for the Improvement of the City of Glasgow, and the construction of new, and widening, altering, and diverting of existing Streets in the said City; and for other purposes".

238. The park eventually became the Alexandra Park.

239. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 8th September 1865.

240. See Maclehose, (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One

Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. I, page 101, and Simpson, "The West End of Glasgow, 1830-1914", loc. cit., page 46, for some of the background to Dennistoun. Alexander Dennistoun - former town councillor and ex-MP for Dunbartonshire - was responsible for feuing out the family estate of Golfill, plus neighbouring properties, from 1861. There had originally been high hopes that Dennistoun would become an eastern rival to the West End, but the new district was adversely affected by air pollution and the proximity of the "lower orders", so that the wealthy were not encouraged to settle there. Only the petit bourgeoisie and skilled artisans were attracted to Dennistoun in any number.

241. For more about Martin, see pages 623-625 of this thesis.

242. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 8th November 1865.

243. In 1869, when Lang was defeated in the Sixth Ward, he attributed his downfall to the "power of spiritdom", (ie. the drinks' trade), and "that unruly member, the tongue". See the Glasgow Herald, 3rd November 1869. For Lang's obituary, see ibid., 2nd June 1876. It seems probable that - like James Salmon - Lang was a Free Churchman, although his precise religious affiliations have not been identified.

244. Quoted in ibid., 8th November 1865.

245. See pages 610-611 of this thesis.

246. The Glasgow Sentinel - which expoused the cause of labour and electoral reform - expressed strong support for Lang in the 1866 municipal elections, despite its antipathy to temperance zealotry.

247. See Burt's obituary in the Glasgow Herald, 14th September 1891; also the Bailie, 22nd October 1873.

248. Maclehorse (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. I, page 39.

249. Hutchison, A Political History of Scotland, op. cit., pages 115-116 and 135.

250. Ibid., pages 121-122.

251. Bridgeton, of course, had strong radical traditions throughout the nineteenth century, but Orangeism began to make its mark in the locality from the 1860s.

252. Maclehouse (publisher), Memoirs and Portraits of One Hundred Glasgow Men, op. cit., vol. I, page 181.

253. See page 271.

254. See the report of a speech made by John Burt in the Glasgow Herald, 12 October 1866, where he stated that, "... it was impolitic to place such a man [Lumsden] in a position where his own private interests were such to come into contact with the interests of the public".

255. For Arthur's obituary, see *ibid.*, 6th September 1897.

256. See the report of a speech by Arthur favourable to the Improvement Trust in *ibid.*, 23rd October 1866.

257. See the Glasgow Herald, 26th July 1872, where James Watson states categorically that, "... ever since I became connected with the Town Council nearly all of the more important and difficult of the business was discharged by the late Mr. Monro".

258. See pages 517-521.

259. *Ibid.*, 3rd October 1866.

260. Quoted in *ibid.*

261. Quoted in *ibid.*

262. Quoted in *ibid.*

263. *Ibid.*, 13th October 1866.

264. Quoted in *ibid.*

265. Quoted in *ibid.* It is possible that Salmon was referring to the railway interests in his cryptic allusion to the "riveting" party. This would tie in with the suggestion made by John Burt that Lumsden was too closely involved with the G & SW Railway Company to be an impartial Lord Provost.

266. *Ibid.*, 18th October 1866.

267. *Ibid.*, 12th October 1866.

268. *Ibid.*, 13th October 1866. Blackie had apparently snubbed a deputation from the Tenth Ward Committee.

269. *Ibid.*, 29th October 1866.

270. *Ibid.*, 3rd November 1866.

271. *Ibid.*

272. Ibid.

273. Ibid.

274. Ibid.

275. Similar tactics were used by the supporters of the beleaguered Lord Provost Chisholm in 1902, although not via the Town Council. See pages 658.

276. Ibid., 6th November 1866.

277. Ibid.

278. See, for example, *ibid.*, 8th December 1865, where several councillors had expressed unease about the proposed sixpenny assessment when detailed plans were put to the Town Council for the first time. However, no motion was forthcoming to change the assessment.

279. Kathleen Barclay Logan, *op. cit.*, page 21 does suggest that the campaign against Blackie was used a focal point for more general grievances.

280. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 7th November 1866.

281. Quoted in *ibid.*

282. Quoted in *ibid.*

283. Quoted in *ibid.*

284. See pages 291-293 of this thesis, and Kellet, Railways and Victorian Cities, *op. cit.*, pages 115-116. However, Kellet believes that Blackie was innocent of any intentional involvement in the railway proposals.

285. Glasgow Town Council, Report by the Deputation Appointed by the Town Council to Proceed to London in Charge of Railway Bills Affecting the City, (Glasgow, 1864).

286. Glasgow Herald, 9th November 1866.

287. Quoted in *ibid.*, 10th November 1866.

288. Quoted in *ibid.*

289. North British Daily Mail, 3rd November 1872. For Cameron's interest in the newspaper, and the influence of his evangelical associates - notably William Quarrier, Thomas Corbett and Lord Overtoun - see Hutchison, A Political History

of Scotland, op. cit., page 136.

290. See Alexander B. Callow, junior, The Tweed Ring, (New York, 1966), for a highly readable account of the rogue who governed New York from 1866 to 1871. Tweed, it should be added, was of Scottish descent.

291. Glasgow Herald, 4th and 7th October 1872.

292. Ibid., 7th October 1872.

293. Quoted in *ibid.*, 28th October 1872, where the Court of Session proceedings are described in detail.

294. Ibid., 30th December, 1872.

295. See *ibid.*, 4th October 1872 for Lang's statement to the Town Council, and 30th December 1872 for his appearance in the Court of Session.

296. Evening News and Star, 23rd October 1886.

297. Brown, "Did Urbanisation Secularize Britain?", loc. cit., page 11.

298. See Evening News and Star, 22nd October 1886, which reiterates this argument.

299. See pages 629-631.

300. See pages 250.

301. H.J. Dyos, "Railways and Housing in Victorian London", in David Cannadine and David Reeder, (eds.), Exploring the Urban Past: Essays in Urban History by H.J. Dyos, (Cambridge, 1982), pages 101-118, and Gareth Stedman Jones, Outcast London: A Study in the Relationship between Classes in Victorian Society, (Harmondsworth, 1984 edition; first published 1971), pages 161-163.

302. In particular, see Leonardo Benevolo, The Origins of Modern Town Planning, (London, 1967). Originally published in Italian in 1963, the book was translated into English by Judith Landry. Benevolo has singled out the year 1848 as representing "a crucial moment in the history of town planning". The bitter political experience of the 1848 revolutions and the final failure of movements like Chartism generally discredited Utopian ideas of reconstructing society, enunciated by the likes of Robert Owen and Saint-Simon. After this time, the ruling classes harnessed the early ideals town planning to their own ambitions, so that for the next twenty years or so planning came

to be used solely as an instrument for implementing grand projects in cities.

303. For the ideology of Napoleon III, see Alain Plessis, The Rise and Fall of the Second Empire, 1852-1871, (Cambridge, 1985), especially pages 4-15. The book was first published in French in 1979, and translated into English by Jonathan Mandelbaum.

304. See David H. Pinkney, Napoleon III and the Rebuilding of Paris, (Princeton, 1958). This is a classic account of the development of Paris during the Second Empire. Pinkney suggests on page 4 that the story of the rebuilding is, "... not a simple narrative of plans, demolitions and building, but a complex story of architecture and engineering, slum clearance and sanitation, emigration and urban growth, legal problems of expropriation and human problems of high rents and evictions, public finance and high politics, dedicated men and profiteers". All this could, on a smaller scale, be applied to Glasgow.

305. See Briggs, Victorian Cities, op. cit., pages 228-231, for the Paris-Birmingham analogy in the 1870s. Critics of Chamberlain's municipal improvement policy wryly commented that Napoleon III was not the best of rôle models: "Look at Napoleon. Where did he finish? In exile".

306. Norma Evenson, Paris: A Century of Change, 1878-1978, (New Haven and London, 1979), page 23.

307. See the Glasgow Herald, 5th October 1866. Up to this time the city had no authentic Coat of Arms, as the Herald's College had never formally approved of any. Andrew Macgeorge - son of the councillor of that name - was given the task of drawing up the "standard" model, in time for the 1867 Paris Exhibition. Blackie officially visited Paris in June 1865, with Bailie James Raeburn, William T. Gairdner, Glasgow's first Medical Officer of Health, and John Carrick, City Architect.

308. Ibid., 6th November 1866.

309. See Dyos, loc. cit., page 107, for contemporary views of "haussmanisation" in relation to slum clearance and the railways.

PART FOUR - THE CONSOLIDATION OF PUBLIC
OWNERSHIP IN GLASGOW

- I. The Town Council and the Tramways, 1870-94.
- II. Gas, Electricity and New Technology, 1833-99.
- III. The Myth and Reality of 'Municipal Socialism',
1888-1912.

"They're faur owre mony fads on hand,
They'll bankrupt mak' the toon yet;
I tell ye this "progressive" band,
Ye'll hae to pin them doon yet."

¹Anxious sentiments, expressed in 1897 by the ghost of Glasgow's patron saint, St. Mungo, in an anonymous poem "Our Municipal Candidates".

I. The Town Council and the Tramways, 1870-94

In 1914, on the eve of the First World War, Lord Provost Daniel Macaulay Stevenson wrote of Glasgow as being "still in the morning of the times" in terms of expanding its municipal services.² It was not that he believed the existing civic achievements to be insubstantial; on the contrary, their success was such as to prove the case for local self-determination, to the extent that the next logical step would be for a meaningful devolution of powers from the Westminster Government.³ Stevenson expressed these views in the preface to an impressive Corporation publication - Municipal Glasgow: its Evolution and Enterprises - which collated some of the copious documentation which had been used to promote the 1912 Boundaries Bill.⁴ The aim was to show the extensive range of services available to Glaswegians, from the great utilities of water, gas, and electricity, through police and public health provision, to recreational facilities like parks, libraries and art galleries. Lord Provost Stevenson was unashamedly proud of the

newly-expanded city, and regarded it as something of a back-handed compliment when outsiders suggested that municipal policy veered too dangerously in the direction of socialism. Like many of his colleagues, he did not decry the daringly progressive image that words like "socialism" implied, even though he was a successful businessman and an unswerving Liberal.⁵ In any case, Stevenson attributed Glasgow's municipal efficiency to the calibre of its elected representatives, who - in the spirit of "civic co-operation" rather than "rank socialism" - fostered a feeling of partnership and common cause among all sections of the community.⁶

Of all the public services falling under the control of the Town Council prior to 1914, the Corporation tramway system overwhelmingly came to represent Stevenson's ideal of the common good prevailing over narrow sectional interests. The strong moral emphasis may have been treated with scepticism in some quarters; nevertheless, like the Loch Katrine water supply, the trams were consciously promoted as the embodiment of civic enlightenment. Indeed, Bernard Aspinwall has graphically illustrated the parallels between Glasgow's municipal aspirations at the turn of the century and the American Progressive concept of the "good society", based on class reconciliation rather than class conflict.⁷ During the 1890s, one American analyst of European city government remarked to his compatriots that Glasgow's tramway experience was one "... which

may well make American cities blush for their own short-sightedness".⁸ Other commentators from the United States shared this enthusiasm, perceiving the municipal example of Glasgow as one which combined efficiency and order according to sound business principles, albeit in the public rather than the private sector. In some quarters there was an almost millenarian passion for Glasgow's apparent ability to blend "civic moral uplift with practical improvements", contrasting sharply with the tainted image of American municipal politics, which dated from the days of the notorious Boss Tweed and his Tammany Hall acolytes during the 1860s and 1870s.⁹

The seeming paradox of American support for municipal control can be explained by stressing that on both sides of the Atlantic during the 1890s and 1900s collectivist ideas and entrepreneurial activity were not necessarily regarded as incompatible. Lord Rosebery, who had strong Glasgow connections, believed that government should be organised on a strict "business footing", and that successful businessmen made the best politicians because they understood how to handle money and achieve maximum administrative efficiency.¹⁰ What applied in industry and commerce could equally apply to the state and, at a lesser level, the municipality. Another American commentator - F.C. Howe - tried to reassure those who feared municipalisation as an insidious form of socialism by claiming that:¹¹

... in its present stage of development municipal ownership is inspired by no ideal of a changed social order, and the movement is likely to continue to be one for improved service, for business thrift, for the relief of taxpayers from the burden of taxation and for increased revenue for the community.

Glasgow's municipalised tramways conformed precisely to the priorities listed by Howe. With the exception of the tramlines, the Tramways Department had been started virtually from scratch in July 1894, necessitating heavy capital expenditure by the Corporation on property, plant and horses; yet, by the end of the 1895-96 financial year, the accounts stood at £83,267 in credit and were to go on to realise far larger surpluses.¹² In 1914, Municipal Glasgow presented a statement of "progress" over the previous twenty years, showing a massive rise in the number of passengers from over 57 million to 311 million per annum, while receipts from fares had been boosted from £222,121 to £1,007,652.¹³ (See Table 4.1.) In the light of such rapid expansion, it is revealing that James Dalrymple - the forthright General Manager of the Corporation Tramways from 1904 to 1927 - commented immediately prior to his departure from Glasgow to administer the São Paulo tramway system, that over the years there had been nothing wrong with his vigorous style of management, despite criticisms that he had run the Department as if it was his own business, and not a public service.¹⁴

That the climate of the times was more favourable to municipal ownership in 1894 is, however, only one of several

Table 4.1: The Development of Glasgow's Municipal Tramways, 1894-1913

Year	Average Number of Cars in Use*	Single Track Lane in Use	Car Mileage	Passengers Carried	Receipts	Average Receipts per Car Mile
1894-95+	170.97	64	5,192,031	57,104,647	£222,121	10.26d
1895-96	227.66	65	6,932,650	86,462,594	£328,827	11.38d
1896-97	268.20	73	8,127,111	98,966,658	£365,761	10.80d
1897-98	280.96	73	8,483,012	106,344,437	£389,216	11.01d
1898-99	305.85	81.5	9,071,640	118,775,668	£433,128	11.46d
1899-1900	316.96	83.5	9,657,429	127,628,484	£464,786	11.55d
1900-01	322.02	88	9,847,545	132,557,724	£484,872	11.82d
1901-02	365.41	103.5	12,615,021	163,678,190	£612,826	11.66d
1902-03	399.58	130	14,008,750	177,179,549	£653,199	11.19d
1903-04	410.45	140	16,291,082	188,962,610	£717,893	10.58d
1904-05	448.59	147.5	17,943,595	195,767,519	£756,480	10.12d
1905-06	517.91	160.75	18,886,910	208,059,833	£813,768	10.34d
1906-07	543.98	176.25	20,350,367	224,063,098	£887,380	10.47d
1907-08	548.15	179	20,776,722	226,948,290	£907,494	10.49d
1908-09	547.15	189.5	20,802,797	221,744,569	£889,530	10.26d
1909-10	546.40	195.125	20,974,016	222,730,571	£893,591	10.22d
1910-11	562.25	196.5	21,704,237	237,967,307	£946,021	10.46d
1911-12	582.19	196.625	22,435,076	275,610,385	£987,280	10.56d
1912-13	606.04	196.75	23,335,008	311,480,086	£1,007,652	10.36d

* Up to 1905-06 calculated on the basis of a 16 hour day, thereafter on the basis of a 14 hour day.
 + 11 months only

Source: Municipal Glasgow: its Evolution and Enterprises, (Glasgow Corporation, 1914), page 76.

reasons why Glasgow Corporation should have taken over the city's tramway system. The municipality had not suddenly manifested an interest in the operation of the tramway service, because it had acquired a direct responsibility for Glasgow's newly inaugurated system as early as 1871, when it undertook to construct and lease the tramlines in accordance with local Act, passed by Parliament one year previously.¹⁵ With such a stake in the success of the system, it is understandable that the Town Council should have carefully monitored the progress of tramway development, and councillors taken steps to understand the intricacies of tramway administration via the deliberations of the Council's Tramway Committee, established in 1870.

Moreover, the roots of municipal interest in public transport stretched even further back - to 1840 - when the Council had agreed to seek tenders for the provision of several street coaches and cabs, to shuttle passengers between strategic city centre landmarks like the Old Tontine, the Royal Exchange and the Black Bull Hotel.¹⁶ While this early example of municipal initiative appears not to have been implemented, larger-scale ventures under private control did get off the ground, and from the 1840s regular omnibus services were operated from Glasgow to the outlying districts.¹⁷ Involvement with the tramways began in earnest during the late 1850s, when a brash young American entrepreneur, George Francis Train - or "Tramway" Train, as he came to be known - arrived in

the United Kingdom at the behest of financial interests in the United States.¹⁸ After initiating tramway ventures in London and Birkenhead, Train unsuccessfully attempted to obtain Parliamentary authority in 1861-62 to begin operations in other British cities, including Glasgow.¹⁹ The Town Council opposed such intervention, its members sharing the general antipathy to Train's flamboyance, impetuosity and unorthodox business methods. As a result of this hostility, coupled with serious technical problems relating to the laying of the tramlines, few of Train's undertakings became going concerns in Britain, but he nevertheless did manage to activate public interest in the potential of tramways as a more efficient means of transport.

The continuing interest in tramways was to culminate in the first bout of "tramway fever" after 1868, when a Bill was passed by Parliament sanctioning the operation of a commercially-run system in Liverpool.²⁰ Immediately thereafter, that city became a focus of considerable attention, with enquirers from throughout the country anxious to ascertain for themselves the benefits and disadvantages of the new form of street locomotion. Following separate applications from two private companies to commence operations in Glasgow, a Town Council deputation visited Liverpool in 1869, and reported back the view that:²¹

From the easy level of our streets, there was no city in the world in which tramways could be more

easily laid than in Glasgow. The working of these tramways in Liverpool in no way interfered with the ordinary traffic; and ... there could be no doubt of their superiority to the ordinary omnibus. The tramway occupied six inches less of the street than the ordinary conveyance, and was much more lofty, airy and comfortable.

Despite this effusive testimonial to the efficiency of tramways, the Town Council was wary about allowing a private company wide-ranging powers to interfere with the city's thoroughfares.²² It had taken long years to establish a reasonably efficient system of road maintenance, and the Police and Statute Labour Trustees - alias the Town Council - were not going to undermine this legacy by sanctioning a venture which might prove to be unsound. While the idea of the tramways was generally welcomed, it was felt that their advent had been too sudden to allow for a meaningful assessment of their effects. Consequently, many councillors felt they had to retain a controlling influence in any projected enterprise, in order to underwrite the damage that might arise as a result of commercial failure and to preserve the integrity of Glasgow's streets, which were vital life-lines for the functioning of the city.

Such sentiments were widely endorsed in Glasgow at the time. The Glasgow Herald, in response to the announcement that applications had been made via Parliament to incorporate a tramway company, urged that the whoever the successful promoter of the scheme was likely to be, "... due care should be taken by local authorities that the public interest shall be

secured".²³ It later categorically stated that, "... should the Corporation eventually obtain the power on behalf of the community to lay down, manage, and let out these tramways, so much the better".²³ A correspondent to the Herald, using the nom de plume of "Anti-Monopoly", drew a cautionary lesson from the experience of the railways, and advised careful planning for the introduction of the tramways:²⁵

When we remember the great additional cost of the railway system of this country, formed as it was by hap-hazard, it behoves us, now the tramways are about to be introduced, to see that the same disastrous results do not follow ...

"Anti-Monopoly" believed, furthermore, that the Town Council should give serious consideration to constructing the tramlines, "... instead of our streets and highways being taken possession of by selfish companies".²⁶ Public opinion undoubtedly encouraged the Town Council to adopt a firm approach with the competing companies during the progress of the Glasgow tramway legislation through Parliament, although the notion of municipal control was eventually provided for during 1870 by the passing of the General Tramways Act. By this device - which was intended as much as anything to save Parliamentary time in consequence of the numerous individual tramway applications - local authorities could take up the option of constructing tramlines, but were required to lease them to a private company for at least twenty-one years.²⁷ At this stage, local authorities were given the right of ownership after the expiry

of the lease, but as yet could not actually operate the tramway services.

While the General Tramways Bill was being discussed in Parliament, Glasgow Town Council had made efforts to come to terms with the two syndicates promoting the local Parliamentary Bills - at least one of which had American backing.²⁸ In a compromise arrangement, the promoters were brought together in association with the Town Council, and the Glasgow Street Tramways Act was subsequently ratified in September 1870.²⁹ The provisions of this Act and the terms of the original lease had much in common with the General Tramways Act, although the concession to the company was made effective for twenty-three rather than twenty-one years. From the outset, the Town Council had taken as few risks as possible with the tramways venture; the example of excessive rail speculation and the bombastic claims of "Tramway" Train were perhaps too fresh in many memories to allow for over-optimism. The worries about the staying-power of the original promoters certainly had some substance, because they quickly sold their lease to another undertaking, called the British and Foreign Tramways Company.³⁰ The new lessees, in turn, issued a prospectus for the locally-based Glasgow Tramways and Omnibus Company, with a capital of £350,000.³¹ There were vocal complaints at the time that the amount of capital had been fixed too high, and allowed generous room for indefinable "promotion fees and

expenses", although all the shares were eventually subscribed.³² In this connection, it should be noted that during the years immediately prior to the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank in 1878 there had been a speculative boom in Glasgow, and the "tramway fever" formed only part of a general flurry of economic activity, headed by property development. Nevertheless, despite the financial killing made out of the Glasgow Tramways and Omnibus Company, the involvement of the Town Council solidly underpinned the long-term economic viability of the undertaking.

A formal agreement was reached between the Town Council - now confirmed as Tramways Trustees - and the Tramways Company, with effect from 1st July 1871. This meant that the lease was due to expire on 30th June 1894. While the Council undertook to lay the tracks, the Company undertook to keep them in good working condition, and to maintain the roadway between the rails and eighteen inches beyond the outer rails.³³ At the expiry of the lease it guaranteed to hand over the lines to the Council, as good as new. To implement these conditions, the Company agreed to set aside a specified amount as a renewal fund, for maintenance and improvement of lines. It also undertook to pay a rent equal to £150 per mile for all tramway lines constructed and in use; a condition which some councillors later felt was over-generous in comparison with agreements elsewhere, and which was to be a source of contention as

tramlines began to be built outside the municipal boundary, and were thus not subject to rent.³⁴

Despite such quibbles, the really important point about the agreement was the enormous extent of Town Council control over the enterprise in terms of immovable property, mainly the tracks. Along with the twenty-three year lease, this was the crucial bargaining point with the Company, which limited the latter's freedom of action considerably. As various writers on tramway history have pointed out, such conditions - which also applied under the General Tramways Act - held back development throughout the United Kingdom, as companies were reluctant to invest or to introduce mechanical traction with lease negotiations looming in the not-too-distant future.³⁵ The rights of property for the companies were also circumscribed by municipal control of the tramways, which established from the outset a "built-in mechanism for eventual municipal ownership".³⁶ In this context, it should be seen that the much-vaunted "struggles" over the municipalisation of the Glasgow tramway system during the 1890s were in fact fought out by the Town Council from an overwhelming position of strength.

On 22nd September 1871, Bailie James Watson performed the inaugural ceremony of breaking the ground for the new tramlines with an ebony-handled, silver-mounted spade and pick-axe.³⁷ This was a doubly symbolic gesture, for in addition to being the Town Council's acting Chief Magistrate and soon-to-be Lord

Provost, Watson was, of course, Glasgow's leading stockbroker. However, the relationship between the municipality and private enterprise in the administration of the tramway system was to be an uneasy one, after the lines were first opened for traffic in August 1872. From 1875 there was continual friction over applications by the Town Council for Parliamentary authority to extend the lines, with the Council invariably winning over Company claims that the new routes would be uneconomic.³⁸ The Company was thus put in the difficult position of having to run the lines, or else face the threat of the Council allowing another company to step in and operate the rejected routes; a dangerous precedent, as the existing Company wished to renew its lease in 1894.

The addition of new routes was a particularly thorny problem from the 1880s, when mechanical traction became an increasingly attractive proposition to town councillors. For instance, the steep incline from Glasgow Cross up to High Street and Castle Street, forming part of the projected Springburn line, was considered by the company to be a difficult one for horses to negotiate. Once the Company had made its doubts known, the Patent Cable Tramway Corporation, Ltd. contacted the Town Council with proposals to introduce an overhead cable system, and though the Tramways Committee did not take up this option, it did make a great show of investigating alternative mechanical systems.³⁹ Despite resistance from the Glasgow Tramways and

Omnibus Company, the Council was given Parliamentary authority in 1885 to lay the lines.⁴⁰ The Company was thus placed uncomfortably on the defensive, and in 1887 agreed to work the route.⁴¹ However, the High Street segment did not become finally operational until 1898, when the first experimental electric trams were introduced on the Springburn line.⁴²

The Tramway Company's concern about profits as a priority came to be increasingly resented by many Glaswegians; a good bargaining point for the Town Council, which it was to dexterously exploit when the time came for lease renewal negotiations. Apart from the East End, the two main routes in the 1870s were from the city centre (Jamaica Street, Renfield Street and Argyle Street) to Kelvinside and Queen's Park; both areas outside the municipal boundary, and containing the residences of Glasgow's wealthiest commuters.⁴³ These were the most profitable routes, although by 1885 more working-class areas had been serviced.⁴⁴ J.J. Bell in I Remember, his evocative memoir of a middle-class childhood in Hillhead during the 1870s, recalled the early days of the Tramway Company:⁴⁵

None of the routes exceeded three miles; all radiated from the centre of the City, that of Hillhead cars, which were green, from St. Vincent Place. The penny tickets were white, the twopenny red, the threepenny blue. Boys "collected" the tickets, the blue ones being rather rare. Boys also made friends with the guards - never "conductors" then - and obtained rides for nothing. Inspectors were said to exist, though I never encountered one. There were fare stations, but no

regular stopping-places. You simply waved. If the driver did not see you, the guard pulled a leather thong, a bell tinkled above the driver's head, the horses heard and made ready to halt, while the driver applied the brake. Inside, a car held something like eighteen passengers, a double seat running the length of the unsheltered roof about the same. Ladies did not go up the narrow stair. When the car came over the bridge, a boy was waiting with a third horse to help it up the steep hill. As it ascended quite briskly, 'twas a sight to behold, in the early evenings, the gentlemen returning from business step nonchalantly off at the foot of their respective streets; but no lady would have dreamed of attempting the feat ...

Bell's homely impression contrasts with the super-efficiency which was to mark the days of John Young and James Dalrymple as General Managers of the Corporation Tramways Department, although in 1880 a "new broom" did arrive at the Company in the person of John Duncan, Manager and Secretary, who did much after this time to boost a more professional image for the Company.⁴⁶

Complaints about the Company's over-riding profit motive began to be voiced after 1876, when the Company was for the first time able to pay its shareholders a dividend of 3½ per cent.⁴⁷ It was felt that the Company could now afford to plough part of its profits into improving the service, although it was not the Company's directors and management who necessarily became the focus of popular disgruntlement when improvements did not materialise. Increasingly, the Council Tramways Committee began to be used as a sounding board for expressions of discontent. As municipal representatives, Committee members were perceived as having more clout than the

general public, so that when, for example, West End residents sought a more convenient location of fare stations between Kelvinbridge and Maryhill in 1883, it was to the Tramways Committee that the first approach was made.⁴⁸ Maryhill and the area west of Kelvinbridge - J.J. Bell's Hillhead - were, of course, still outside the municipal boundary, and so the Committee was dealing with an area technically outwith Council jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Committee requested the Company to consider the matter, and its representatives did so, without obligation to act on Committee recommendations. In the instance of the resiting of the fare stations it agreed to act, although the response to another request - to provide covered tramcars in winter months for workmen travelling on the long route between Parkhead and Finnieston - it could not agree.⁴⁹ John Duncan sent a curiously worded letter to the Committee about the use of workmen's tramcars, claiming that, "... the Company have tried the closed cars for workmen, but the result has been that on wet days they crowded both platforms and the cars had been destroyed".⁵⁰ Such a statement reveals much about the Company's priorities, and also its differing attitudes to residents travelling from the East and West Ends of the city.

The intermediary position of the Town Council between the community and the Tramways Company was not a satisfactory one, as it was time-consuming and meant that the Company did not respond directly to popular needs. Councillors were becoming

impatient with municipal involvement in a concern whereby they had an important public responsibility for the maintenance of the tramlines, yet could do little more than exert moral influence over the provision of an efficient service. They were also wearying of the legal wrangles with the Company which frequently accompanied applications to Parliament to extend the lines, especially as municipal expansion was a burning question during the 1880s and the likelihood was that there would be considerably more room for tramway development. Above all else, tramway technology had progressed rapidly in the 1880s, with a number of mechanical options now available, including steam locomotion, battery traction, overhead cable cars and the surface conduit system.⁵¹

Glasgow's horse-drawn trams were now virtually obsolete in comparison with developments in the United States and Europe; held up, as in many other British cities, by what John P. McKay has called the "institutional blockage" of the 1870 legislation.⁵² Companies were simply not prepared to take the risk of introducing mechanical traction without renegotiated leases. The future of Glasgow's tramway system was thus, metaphorically, at a crucial crossroads with the renewal of the lease pending in 1894. The Town Council had the choice of either putting its faith in private enterprise, and continuing in its unsatisfactory rôle as intermediary between the public and the Company, or could initiate the alternative of wholesale

municipalisation. The precedents of water and gas municipalisation had already been highly successful; moreover, the most uncompromising critics of the private companies argued that only municipalisation could break the stalemate created by the 1870 Act.⁵³ Ironically, municipalisation could also encourage private enterprise by providing the plethora of new electrical companies with the opportunity of breaking into a guaranteed market, ripe for exploitation.⁵⁴ The private horsecar companies therefore represented the old technology, which had to be squeezed out to make room for the new.

The advantage of mechanical traction over the horse-drawn system appealed to Glasgow's town councillors in a variety of ways. As custodians of the city's public health and sanitary arrangements, the serious hygiene problem and pervasive odours created by horse droppings could at last be overcome. Motors were also more reliable than horses, as they were not subject to the assorted ailments which might affect the beasts. John Young, for example, had an anxious time shortly before the launching of the Corporation service in 1894 when influenza swept through the municipal stables, rendering many of the recently-acquired horses unfit for service.⁵⁵ In terms of general efficiency and economy - always close to the heart of Glasgow's councillors - mechanical traction won over the horse every time. Horses could not negotiate steep gradients, had a short working life of four to five years, caused an uneven

wearing of the streets with the "pickaxe blows" of their hooves, and accounted for some fifty per cent. of total operating costs of any tramway undertaking.⁵⁶ On the other hand, the electric tramcar travelled at a minimum of twenty-five to fifty per cent. faster than its horse-drawn equivalent, both on level ground and on gradients.⁵⁷ It was also easier to control and thus much safer, and less likely to be debilitated by the vagaries of the weather. Passenger-carrying capacity was greater, yet the cars were more comfortable and the rides were smoother. Operationally, a better service could be run more cheaply than hitherto.

In comparison with the experience of the past, the prospect of mechanical traction seemed irresistible to Glasgow Town Council. In 1884 and 1885, representatives of the Tramways Committee had made preliminary investigations into cable and other mechanical systems, following the decision to construct the problematic Springburn line.⁵⁸ The delegation had recommended the use of steam motors, although the full Town Council eventually could not agree to this proposal, and the matter was held in abeyance.⁵⁹ More serious interest was taken during 1889, when the lease negotiations were under consideration and the Tramways Committee was anxious to examine tramway operations in other towns. In 1890 a positive recommendation was made to support the introduction of electric traction, following an impressive demonstration of its effects

in London and Birmingham.⁶⁰ The Tramways Committee enthusiastically reported that:⁶¹

'There is a total absence of smell, vapour and other nuisance; the machinery is entirely concealed under the car, the same power which propels the cars also lights them electrically, and they are thus clean and well-lighted ... In conclusion, we are of opinion that having regard to the near termination of the lease of the Glasgow Tramways, the end of which is the natural time for making a change in motive power, the time has come when application should be made to Parliament to use electricity and other power.

The Tramways Company had scarcely figured at all in the Committee's calculations. That the new lease was to be under terms stipulating the use of electric traction was clear, but the action of Council members at the time indicates that they were veering in the direction of municipalisation, and were making no effort to cultivate the Tramways Company or any other enterprise. This can be shown by the unsuccessful efforts of the Council to purchase the insolvent Glasgow and Ibrox Tramways Company, which was greeted with alarm by the existing Company as it was "in bad condition and at present is not paying".⁶² The Council abruptly retorted that it was attempting to ensure the provision of a public service, and that it had "never entertained the idea of requiring the Company to work that line or of renewing and maintaining it".⁶³ The Town Council, it would appear, was unilaterally initiating the process of acquiring its own tramway empire.

What was the attitude of Glaswegians to the constant sniping

that was increasingly souring relations between the Town Council and the Company? As has previously been indicated, there was scant sympathy for the Company's case, because of the inadequacies of the service while profits continued to soar. Moreover, as the general travelling public already used the Town Council to state its case when there were complaints to the Company, it made sense to appeal directly to the elected representatives under a municipalised system. The Town Council was also able to foster close links with public organisations in its rôle as intermediary, giving the impression that it was firmly on the side of the tramway users.

It did not seem to matter that the Council was in no real position to make promises, for as long as it showed willing, there was at least some hope for fundamental improvements of the system. For example, the running of tramcars on a Sunday had long been resented by Sabbatarians, and numerous communications had been received by the Tramways Committee to approach the Company for a change in policy. The Company had gone so far as to instruct its drivers to walk their horses quietly for fifty yards before and after passing any church during divine service, but had refused to sanction a ban on Sunday tramcars, arguing - with justification - that many worshippers used the trams to get to and from their churches.⁶⁴ In 1890 the Free Church Presbytery once again urged the Tramways Committee to take appropriate steps to have the Sunday tramcars stopped.⁶⁵ The

Committee, in response, regretted its inability to act, but advised that the subject was under consideration for "any new lease that might be entered into".⁶⁶ The Committee was broadly hinting that it was in a position to champion the Sabbatarian cause although, of course, it could make no firm commitment. By this means it was subtly rallying support for the idea of municipalisation - hence the vague language about the projected lease - and further undermining the case of the Tramways Company.

Of all the allies cultivated by the Town Council in support of tramway municipalisation, Glasgow Trades' Council is perhaps the best known.⁶⁷ Ironically, town councillors may have unleashed something of a Frankenstein's Monster in their efforts to rouse the working classes, because - as a result of Trades' Council agitation against the Company - labour representatives began to stand for municipal elections and be successful. This is not to belittle the vigorous efforts of the Trades' Council; on the contrary, its leaders were astute enough to realise that a high profile during the lease negotiations would attract favourable publicity, hopefully increase membership, and if this helped to bring about municipalisation, then so much the better.⁶⁸ The advantage of this strategy for the Town Council was that the Trades' Council could argue for an outright policy of municipalisation from an early stage, when the civic authority was not in a position to prejudice negotiations by

making definite recommendations. After 12th November 1891, when it finally took the decision to municipalise, the Town Council was able to openly run its own campaign against the Tramway Company.⁶⁹ Of course, the Trades' Council had genuine grievances against the Company, but it is significant that it was 1889 - the year lease negotiations commenced in earnest - that it began to confront the Company's authoritarian policy towards its staff. It may have been that Trades' Council leaders initially saw the opportunity to put pressure on the Company, which would be anxious to curry favour with the Town Council over lease renewal, or it may have been that municipalisation was already in the air, and they wanted to ensure long-term security for the tramway workers. They may even have been hedging their bets in both directions.

At all events, with the Company in an especially weak position over the mounting insecurity of its tenure:⁷⁰

... the long-suppressed feeling of discontent that had for years been smouldering amongst the Tramway Servants found vent in an attempt to form a Society to overthrow the system of oppression and espionage under which they had so long groaned.

Robert Chisholm Robertson, the volatile representative of the Scottish Miners' Federation on the Trades' Council, took up the cause of the tramway workers after John Duncan had dismissed men for attending a union meeting.⁷¹ In response to this victimisation, the Trades' Council resolved to campaign against

a renewal of the Company's lease, and attempted to come to terms with the management over improved conditions of service and trade union recognition. Its representatives were received with courtesy by the Company, but not much else, causing the Trades' Council to pass the following resolution:⁷²

That inasmuch as the city Tramway system was a public institution necessary for the convenience of the citizens, and recognising the grossly unfair manner in which for years the present Tramway Company have treated their employees, we believe the concern should be managed by the Municipality in the interests of the community, and resolve to send a deputation to the City Council, requesting them to withhold the renewal of the lease to the present Company until an opportunity has been given to the ratepayers to have the whole question fully considered by them at the forthcoming municipal elections.

This declaration of intent was indeed implemented, with four candidates standing in November 1889 under Trades' Council auspices after years of plaintive regrets that it could not find suitable "working men" to come forward.⁷³ The Roman Catholic Chisholm Robertson stood in the Fifteenth Ward, which had a large Irish community. All the Trades' Council candidates did creditably, and Henry Tait - local Secretary of the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, standing as a "true radical Liberal and temperance reformer" - was victorious in the Fourteenth Ward.⁷⁴

According to the Glasgow Herald, the tramways dispute was not the "burning question" of the 1889 elections; the ubiquitous problem of temperance reform had pushed it into second place as

a topic of public interest.⁷⁵ This was largely because temperance generated strong feelings from the pro- and anti-point of view, while there was remarkable unanimity among Council candidates on the subject of the tramways. Councillor Hugh Caldwell, up for re-election in the Fourth Ward, echoed the general sentiment when he said that, "... the streets of Glasgow belonged to the citizens, and if there was any benefit or profit to be derived out of these streets it should accrue to the pockets of the ratepayers".⁷⁶ Caldwell was accused by his successful opponent, Peter Burt, of being part of the Ward's "Tory clique and whiskey ring", so he was no radical in terms of his politics or allegiances.⁷⁷

When the Council agreed to municipalise the tramways in 1891, seven as opposed to forty-nine councillors voted against the motion, with the dissenters seeking to defer the decision pending further investigation.⁷⁸ Among this number was James Martin, the famous "East End Tribune", whose political credentials stretched back to youthful support for Chartism. As he detected a "job" at the bottom of the City Improvement Trust transactions in 1866, so he implied that there were ulterior motives behind the municipalisation of the trams.⁷⁹ He also doubted the success of the venture, as "... the Corporation had already plenty white elephants without taking on another in the shape of the tramways".⁸⁰ Martin was one of the great individualists on the Town Council, and it is revealing that his

son - James H. Martin - who was also a councillor and much less vocal than his father, threw in his lot with municipalisation.

James Dalrymple seems to have been looking back with rosy hindsight when he claimed in 1914 that, "... the municipal working of the tramways was made a test question at the elections in November, 1890, and 1891".⁸¹ After the 1891 elections, in direct contradiction to this view, the Glasgow Herald commented in an editorial that, "... the tramways have not been made a test question, as they should have been".⁸² Pointing out the likelihood that the Town Council would seek powers to municipalise the tramways, the Herald continued: "The ratepayers have not questioned this opinion, and in returning representatives who have expressed it they must be held to have endorsed it".⁸³ A few voices were raised in opposition to the demise of the Tramways Company, like the Herald correspondent who remarked in October 1891:⁸⁴

There has been much feminine screeching over the rudeness of conductors and the iniquities of the Tramway Company generally. Will human nature be changed if the Corporation takes over the Tramways? Will overcrowding in cars cease from your streets? Accidents will continue to happen. Action for damages will still be brought. Some very snug posts will be created for friends of those in power. Jobbery will enlarge its borders, and the millennium will be as remote as ever. The universal penny fare is dangled temptingly before the eyes of the working man, to be followed ere long in due sequence by "free conveyance". Why, indeed, should not the free voter be carried free along his own streets by his own cars? Of course horse haulage is

condemned and must go. But the present company is empowered, and is quite competent to introduce mechanical power. Give them a renewal of their lease on fair terms and pocket your share of the profits without incurring either the trouble, pecuniary risk or odium of carrying on this difficult business.

It is worth noting that the writer used the pen-name, "An Outsider", and gave an Alloa address. Glaswegians, on the whole, did not seem altogether convinced of such arguments.

The Company did attempt to fight back. It successfully petitioned the Court of Session for powers to widen the scope of its Articles of Association to enter into a variety of undertakings, including road haulage, general hiring and omnibus services, as well as tramways.⁸⁵ The Company thus set itself up in competition with the newly-inaugurated Tramways Department, and continued to operate on this basis into the 1900s, although its public transport ventures were unsuccessful.⁸⁶ It had initially agreed to sell its tramway equipment and property to the city in 1892, but after the decision to launch a competing service with the municipal tramways, negotiations broke down altogether.⁸⁷ As a result, the Tramways Committee was left with little more than two years to equip the new service. This was not sufficient time to experiment with methods of electric traction, so the municipal tramways were introduced in 1894 on the basis of horse haulage, although the Corporation stations were planned from the start to

be adapted to other forms of power. As promised to the public, and especially the Trades' Council, the hours of tramway workers were lowered to ten hours a day, and wages per hour were increased by about fifteen per cent.⁸⁸ Drivers and conductors were provided with smart Corporation uniforms, free of charge, and instructed to be polite and obliging to passengers. As a result of the new régime, it was hoped that strikes would be obviated - which proved to be the case until a major dispute erupted in 1911.⁸⁹ To stamp the cars solidly with the Glasgow municipal identity, advertisements were banned from the tramcars. The efficiency of the new service soon came to be admired world-wide, especially as the Corporation began to make substantial profits. The 1891 decision to municipalise had been thoroughly vindicated, according to the terms that most town councillors had all along desired.

II. Gas, Electricity and New Technology, 1833-99

Municipal trading, according to Herman Finer, was "... not an extraordinary caprice which began to afflict a part of mankind somewhere towards the end of the nineteenth century".⁹⁰ Confirmation of this statement has already been demonstrated for Glasgow, where some of the attitudes that came to be inextricably connected with the municipal "golden age" were evolving even in the pre-reform period.⁹¹ Yet for all the pioneering examples throughout the United Kingdom, it was in Birmingham during the 1870s that the image of enterprising local government was born. Joseph Chamberlain's contribution to municipal history rests not so much on the practical achievement of transforming the administration of his adopted city, but on the influential philosophy he consciously created as a result of this experience. Above all, the municipalisation of the Birmingham gas supply was used as a symbol of the Chamberlainite faith in public ownership, under the trusteeship of a representative authority.⁹² Thereafter, municipal undertakings came to represent much more than a response to urban problems that could not be otherwise solved; they became an aspect of business organisation in their own right, with important lessons for the management of large-scale enterprises, whether in the public or private domain.⁹³

Glasgow's municipal gas supply became fully operational on

1st July 1869, six years before Chamberlain fulfilled his loudly-proclaimed ambition that Birmingham Corporation should take on the task of gas provision.⁹⁵ The Glasgow experience was certainly an object lesson to Birmingham's young and energetic mayor, who astutely managed to avoid paying the same high price that the Scottish Town Council had been forced to agree as part of the compensation to the private companies.⁹⁵ However, unlike Glasgow, Chamberlain was not confronted with the same vested interests, and the municipalisation was progressed surprisingly quickly, bearing in mind that gas had never previously been a civic priority. Only two months after the commitment had been made to proceed with the venture, terms were negotiated, and the machinery for achieving Parliamentary approval was set in motion.⁹⁶ This was in sharp contrast with years of thwarted efforts in Glasgow, and continuing doubts within the community that the Town Council had acted in the best interests of the ratepayers. As will be seen, the circumstances of the gas acquisitions in the two cities were by no means comparable, and in some ways Chamberlain was able to reap the benefits of Glasgow's ponderous struggle, during a time when the national trend was moving firmly in the direction of municipal control.⁹⁷ In this respect, Glasgow resembled the fabled tortoise in comparison with the Birmingham hare; cautious in its approach, and circumspect about its achievement, but eventually making an impressive show in spite of the handicaps.

The official history of Glasgow Corporation's Gas Department, published immediately prior to nationalisation in 1949, refers back to 1805 for the first reports of gas as an illuminant in the city.⁹⁸ It seems highly appropriate that "Mr Lumsden, bookseller in the Trongate" should have been credited as being a pioneer of the new energy source, bearing in mind that he was the father and grandfather of two Lord Provosts who manifested a keen interest in developing the city's gas supply.⁹⁹ The commercial provision of gas was first undertaken on a large scale in 1817, when the Glasgow Gas-light Company was inaugurated with the help and encouragement of the civic authority.¹⁰⁰ Town councillors were prominently represented on the Committee of Management, to keep a vigilant eye on profit levels, and ensure that dividends could not be paid out before adequate funds were set aside to meet the cost of "contingencies".¹⁰¹ As Malcolm Falkus has demonstrated in his analysis of the British gas industry prior to 1850, profits at this time depended overwhelmingly on business consumption, for although the provision of street lighting was considered to be vitally important for the well-being of the community, it generally yielded minimal financial returns.¹⁰² Domestic supply scarcely entered the equation at all; the widespread adoption of gaslight in private houses was a feature of the post-1850 period, while the use of gas for heating and cooking occurred towards the end of the century.¹⁰³

During the 1820s the Glasgow Gas-light Company made repeated requests to Parliament to increase its capital, showing the enormous extent of demand from city businesses. Understandably, city businessmen - via their burgess institutions - voiced concern about value for money, especially as the Company's capital had grown from £40,000 to £150,000 in less than ten years.¹⁰⁴ Accordingly, under an 1825 Act of Parliament, the Company's dividends were pegged at ten per cent. per annum, with the requirement that prices should be lowered if this continued for three consecutive years.¹⁰⁵ Despite such strict consumer safeguards, the gas proprietors were unable to shake off the impression that they were making the most out of their monopoly position. By the time the reformed Town Council was in control during the 1830s, public feelings were running sufficiently high for a municipal investigation to be sanctioned into the Company's booming finances. A Report duly appeared in July 1835, which bluntly accused the proprietors of juggling with the accounts in order to avoid making any price reduction, and gave a stern warning that the existing gas monopoly was likely to be challenged.¹⁰⁶ It is worth pointing out that this was precisely the time that the Glasgow Water Companies were seeking a merger; the omnipotent example of the Glasgow Gas-light Company must have lent substantial weight to the movement to get the "New Water Company" off the ground, as a challenge to monopoly power.

Notwithstanding the vocal discontent expressed over the state of gas provision in Glasgow, no "New Gas Company" was inaugurated until the 1840s. True to family tradition, James Lumsden was to the fore in promoting the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow, which was formed by Act of Parliament in 1843.¹⁰⁷ There were mixed feelings among councillors about supporting the rival enterprise; Liberal anti-monopolists welcomed the development, in the belief that the existing Company was continuing to dodge its responsibilities, but the Peelite faction was much more circumspect. This was not because of any principled objection to competition per se; Lumsden's personal motivations were really the point at issue, and the fear that he was using his municipal position as a vehicle for furthering business ambitions.¹⁰⁸ To complicate matters further, there was another school of thought within the Council Chambers, that was beginning to look in a wholly different direction for the solution to Glasgow's gas conundrum. James Anderson and William Bankier were not just enthusiasts for the municipalisation of water; they believed that gas should be provided as a public service, in accordance with the evangelical notion that "dirt and darkness" were moral evils that must be vanquished.¹⁰⁹ Moreover, as admirers of the Chadwickian ethos, they saw sense in the view that the supply of gas - like water - was best administered under one authority, subject to direct public accountability.

There was nothing revolutionary about the idea that gas should be placed in civic hands, as there had already been a few notable British precedents, which were given strong emphasis in the arguments of the municipalisers. When Messrs. Anderson and Bankier succeeded in persuading the Town Council to consider the municipal option in 1845, the example of Manchester was much-quoted, because the city's gas supply had always been under public ownership.¹¹⁰ As Malcolm Falkus has explained, the Manchester initiative was not due to any manifestation of corporate zeal, but arose from expediency.¹¹¹ There was no private gas company in the locality which could provide for street-lighting, and so the Police Commissioners exercised their legal prerogative, and commenced manufacture and sale in 1817. Towns like Keighley, Salford and Stockport followed suit, while in Scotland the best-known example of municipal control was in Greenock, where the Town Council had acquired the Gasworks in 1836.¹¹² As in the case of its famous gravitation waterworks, Greenock seemed to be showing the way to Glasgow, and certain councillors must have been again discomfited that the smaller burgh was managing to upstage them. Not that the municipalisers formed the majority on Glasgow Town Council at this time; when gas was considered during the same important debate over the water supply in October 1845, it was decided that despite the problems, private enterprise was still the most effective means of meeting the needs of consumers.¹¹³

Immediately following the defeat of the Anderson-Bankier proposals, a new joint-stock enterprise was floated, with the significant title of "The Glasgow and Suburban Consumers' Gas Company".¹¹⁴ William Bankier was represented on the Provisional Committee, along with several other leading cotton, coal and iron industrialists, including James Baird of Gartsherrie, William Dixon and Robert Monteith. The rationale behind the movement for yet another company was firmly stated in the prospectus:¹¹⁵

When the City and Suburban Gas Company was formed two years ago, great hopes were held out, and high expectations were consequently entertained that the community would be accommodated with a copious supply of gas, not only of superior quality, but at a much lower rate than was previously charged. How far these promises then held out have been realised, the community may judge from the fact that but a trifling reduction has yet been given to the ordinary consumer ...

Despite this spirit of determination, the proposed company went the way of many speculative ventures during 1845, and was never able to get off the ground. As with the original Loch Katrine scheme, the heavy capital outlay proved to be too much of a risk for the promoters. Accordingly, the frustration of consumers intensified, and in common with other British cities, the agitation for "cheap gas" grew.¹¹⁶ At the same time, the panacea of competition came to be increasingly discredited; in places like Glasgow there seemed to be unhealthy collusion between the Gas Companies, while in other areas the effects of

inter-company rivalry could be ruinous to the parties involved. The case of Sheffield was particularly notorious, where constant price-cutting had caused profits to plummet, and the two local companies were forced to call a truce and amalgamate.¹¹⁷

The movement towards municipalisation was boosted by the uncertainties that came to be associated with gas provision during the 1840s. As a result, a growing number of the gas Bills passing through Parliament allowed for the local authority to acquire the undertaking, should this be deemed necessary.¹¹⁸ The transfer of gas from private to public enterprise moved at a slower pace than its water equivalent, with twenty-eight as opposed to sixty-one municipal corporations exercising this option prior to 1866.¹¹⁹ Yet the trend was sufficient for municipalisation to feature prominently in the campaign for consumers' rights, which began to reach a climax in Glasgow by the late 1850s. The example of Loch Katrine strongly influenced the view that public ownership was not only acceptable but desirable, and a golden opportunity appeared to present itself in 1857, when the two Gas Companies sought Parliamentary powers to increase their capital.¹²⁰ In accordance with the changing drift of opinion, town councillors had already rethought their 1845 decision, and now "favourably entertained" the idea of acquiring the Companies.¹²¹ Indeed, matters had progressed sufficiently for a Special Committee to recommend that appropriate terms should be offered to the gas

proprietors.¹²² The champion of the gas acquisition was Lord Provost Andrew Orr, who made an eloquent appeal to proceed with negotiations in August 1857.¹²³ Consciously invoking the success of the new Waterworks, he stated:¹²⁴

Water and gas are the right and left arms of any police, and had we the supply of gas as we now have of the water, it would give us an additional claim to the title of being a model municipality in respect of self-government.

It seems likely that had the state of municipal finances been more secure, the Town Council would have endorsed the Lord Provost's motion to go ahead with the purchase of the Gas Companies. However, Orr's taste for entrepreneurial adventurism caused alarm bells to ring even among his closest supporters, who rapidly backed away from such a huge commitment, in light of the cash-flow crisis over the parks' and galleries' acquisitions.¹²⁵ While there was still broad support for the principle of a municipal gas supply, councillors voted by twenty-six votes to ten to abandon the negotiations, with McDowallites and East End radicals joining forces to defeat the plan.¹²⁶ The misjudged timing of the first serious effort at municipalisation resulted in renewed attempts to promote a third "Consumers' Company", but although a good deal of rhetoric was directed against the management of the existing Companies, nothing meaningful resulted from the agitation.¹²⁷ It was soon glaringly apparent that the choices were limited to upholding the status quo, or once again pursuing the municipal

option. Fortunately for the partisans of the latter strategy, by the 1860s there was renewed confidence in the Council's ability to administer such a large undertaking, so that negotiations with the gas proprietors were able to recommence in earnest.

In September 1867, James Couper formally restated the argument for municipalisation to his Council colleagues, who unanimously accepted the need to come to terms with the Gas Companies.¹²⁸ Couper presented the classic case against competition in gas provision, which had been enunciated during the 1840s by the likes of Thomas Hawksley and was later refined by Joseph Chamberlain into the doctrine of the "natural monopoly".¹²⁹ Accordingly, gas was considered to be too vital a commodity to be left to the vagaries of market forces, and too volatile a resource to be left in the hands of private companies, which might be tempted to put profits before safety standards. Couper went on to describe the popular perception of the two Glasgow Companies in 1867:¹³⁰

I have already stated that the gas companies compete with each other in laying their pipes in every street and place; but although they compete in this way they have a perfect understanding in selling their gas; in fact, they are a trades' union, keeping up the price of their manufacture. This state of things must not be allowed to exist much longer.

He then pointed out that railway development and the City Improvement Trust were changing the face of central Glasgow, and

that a new network of gas piping would be necessary for the reconstructed inner city. It was desirable that this should be at the lowest cost to the community, and he firmly believed that the best means of achieving this was under municipal control.

Nevertheless, the two Gas Companies were not prepared to make things easy for the Town Council, nor was public opinion quite so favourably disposed towards municipalisation as the civic leadership liked to imply. By the end of 1868, councillors and gas proprietors were embroiled in a war of attrition over tactics for determining the price of the two Companies. The confrontation was triggered by the decision of the Town Council to give notice of separate Parliamentary Bills, which not only sought to acquire the existing undertakings, but asked for authorisation to construct entirely new gasworks.¹³¹ Spokesmen for the Companies claimed that the "New Works" provisions were a ploy to enforce a quicker and cheaper sale, because any threat of municipal competition would undermine the viability of the two enterprises, should they choose not to come to terms. In the formal petition of the Glasgow Gas-light Company against the Town Council, it was declared:¹³²

Your Petitioners do not conceal from themselves, nor do they wish to conceal from your Honourable House, that the establishment of competing Gas Works, to be carried on by public credit, would seriously impair the dividend, and otherwise diminish the property of your Petitioners. That

is the purpose of the proposal on the part of the Corporation; and they know well that by obtaining an Act to enable them to establish competing works, they would, without even erecting a single retort, or laying an inch of pipe, seriously depreciate the value of your Petitioner's undertaking ...

It is a matter of debate as to how committed the Companies actually were to holding on to their undertakings, in light of their speedy acquiescence to favourable terms, once Parliament had rejected the objectionable "New Works" Bill.¹³³ The precedent of 1857 - when the Council had abruptly terminated joint discussions - suggests that the prospect of municipalisation had remained on the minds of the directors and shareholders, giving them ample time to think through a negotiating strategy by 1869. As a result, the Companies successfully stood their ground against pressure from the Town Council, and were eventually able to accept a generous offer for their properties. Buying goodwill in such transactions was not unusual, as the example of Loch Katrine has already shown; however, the dealings over the Glasgow Gas Companies entailed an enormous financial commitment from the municipality. Under the terms of the 1869 Glasgow Corporation Gas Act, the Council was obliged to pay perpetual annuities to shareholders at two different rates; viz., 9 per cent. on a capital of £300,000, and 6.75 per cent. on a capital of £115,000, involving an annual charge of £34,762 10s.¹³⁴ As security for these payments, the properties of the new Gas Trust had to be mortgaged, while

provision was made - though never actually implemented - for rating powers to a maximum of sixpence in the pound. The Council also undertook to take over the mortgage debts of the two Companies, which totalled £119,265.

Understandably, there was considerable public unease over the implications of the proposed municipalisation. However, views varied as to how precisely the Council should handle the Gas Companies; indeed, there was a forceful school of thought as to whether the acquisition was necessary in the first place. The "let well alone" argument was pursued within the Council Chambers by James Martin - the former Chartist - who claimed that gas "properly belongs to the domain of private enterprise".¹³⁵ The Martin view was echoed in letters to the Glasgow Herald, where one correspondent quoted the words of Richard Cobden that "... no Government should be allowed to manufacture any article which can be supplied through public competition".¹³⁶ Yet despite Martin's strong defence of the status quo, the sustained criticism of the Gas Companies had built up such a climate of hostility, that the principle of municipalisation was generally not called into question.¹³⁷ Instead, passions were aroused over the prospect of the sixpenny assessment, which the majority opinion within the Council considered to be a necessary evil, in order to guarantee to Parliament the viability of the venture.¹³⁸ Taxation was a sensitive subject in the wake of the Second Reform Act, and also

a popular cause on which to appeal to the electorate against municipal extravagance. Accordingly, there was vocal agitation in the predominantly working-class districts over the threatened rates' burden, with William Collins - a new and determined teetotal councillor - making much of the running in promoting the campaign.

Collins was attempting to build up a municipal power-base by posing a challenge to the ruling order, which did not share his strong views on drink or the gas question.¹³⁹ Consequently, there was an element of mischievous irony when the Council leadership chose to respond to its critics in the convivial atmosphere of a public dinner.¹⁴⁰ The event had been organised to celebrate the civic career of David Dreghorn; and luminaries in attendance included Sir Andrew Orr, Robert Dalglish, James Moir and Andrew Gemmill. A particularly honoured guest was James Gourlay - one of the heroes of Loch Katrine - who in his toast to "The Lord Provost, Magistrates, and Town Council of the City" refuted suggestions that it was business interests which would be likely to benefit from the transfer of gas to the public sector. Drawing parallels with the water municipalisation, he stated:¹⁴¹

Motives were attributed to the promoters sufficient to disgust them, and nothing but the consciousness that they were doing their best to return good for evil, could have sustained them ...

Expressing buoyant hopes for the future, Gourlay dismissed as

short-sighted the fears that the gas acquisition would increase taxation:¹⁴²

'No large measure was ever projected in our city but was opposed by some one. Whenever the power of taxation was sought, people got alarmed - (laughter) - and it was no great wonder; but really, in the present case, the assessment sought for the bill, when looked at aright, was a positive saving ...

Such arguments eventually won the day over the anti-taxation lobby, although it is worth noting that in the process, William Collins had done himself no harm in presenting his profile so boldly to the public.

Nevertheless, Glasgow's gas municipalisation, like that of water, poses questions as to the precise motivations of councillors in making such a huge financial commitment. Although James Gourlay had stressed the principle of "good for evil" as guiding civic actions, the movement towards acquiring the Gas Companies had been clearly initiated during the 1840s by a section of the larger industrial consumers. There was nothing paradoxical about this seeming repudiation of "free trade" values, although ardent Liberals like Andrew Orr - who had voted against the Anderson-Bankier proposals in 1845 - took longer to accept the legitimacy of the municipal option. Yet as Herman Finer has pointed out, the pioneers of gas municipalisation - notably Manchester - were located overwhelmingly in the northern manufacturing centres, where business interests had discerned certain advantages in supporting public ownership.¹⁴³ In

these areas, there was need for "an efficient and regular supply of certain basic services for city and factory", which private enterprise could not adequately provide.¹⁴⁴ Although gas was increasingly used for domestic purposes after 1850, the early arguments still had validity as far as industry was concerned, and were certainly part of the rationale behind the acquisition of the Glasgow Companies in 1869. This is not to suggest that the moral virtues of municipalisation, as proclaimed by Messrs. Orr and Gourlay, were insubstantial. Despite the reservations of Messrs. Martin and Collins, the public was generally receptive to the notion that gas was as vital as water to improving the quality of urban life.

In later years the moral dimension was brought repeatedly to the fore as an explanation of why the Town Council had refused to follow the Birmingham example, and use the gas profits to subsidise civic projects that could not generate their own income.¹⁴⁵ Indeed, despite the fact that Birmingham had no equivalent of the Common Good, and was expected to meet all expenditure from the rates, it came to be implied that there was something opportunistic and unbusinesslike about redirecting revenue in such a way.¹⁴⁶ With an oblique reference to the fruits of Chamberlainite improvement policy, "prudent" Glasgow was favourably contrasted with Birmingham in an official Corporation publication during the 1890s:¹⁴⁷

The man who burns gas in Glasgow and its suburbs is assured that he is thereby called on to pay for gas only and not for palatial erections, for libraries, or art galleries, nor for any other public object however laudable or desirable.

However, the Glasgow attitude to the gas surplus must be placed firmly in the context of the rivalry that had developed with Birmingham over their respective claims to be the "Second City of the Empire".¹⁴⁸ As an historic royal burgh, the Scottish city was pulling rank over the relatively new municipal entity south of the border, to show that its finances had always been sufficiently well-administered for each department to look after its own needs.

In any case, contrary to the lofty claims that were made towards the end of the century, there had originally been a strong profit-motive behind the movement to acquire the Glasgow Gas Companies. When the Parliamentary Bills were first drafted by Alexander Monro in 1868, a clause had been included which specified that any surplus cash from the undertaking should be carried "to the credit of the Corporation for their general purposes".¹⁴⁹ The object was to emulate the model Manchester and Greenock gas supplies, which had long predated Birmingham in using their profits for the purpose of city improvements.¹⁵⁰ Yet although the idea seemed irresistible, in reality it was a course of action which proved to be fraught with difficulties as far as Glasgow was concerned. As has already been seen, 1869

was the year of the grand plan to extend the municipal boundaries to include Govan, Partick, Maryhill and a host of smaller county districts.¹⁵¹ It was not coincidental that the timing corresponded with the moves to acquire the Gas Companies, as one or other of the enterprises operated in virtually all of the areas which the Council was aiming to annex. Therein lay the root of the problem; as long as gas was supplied to the suburbs, local ratepayers would have grounds for grievance if the profits were applied to projects which would solely benefit Glaswegians. To placate public opinion, the contentious paragraph was amended, although the Council still retained the right of diverting the gas profits should this be deemed desirable.¹⁵² The continuing struggle over boundary expansion meant that this option could never be exercised, and so - making a virtue out of necessity - Glasgow's self-promoted image as guardian of the gas surplus was born.

There can be no doubt that James Gourlay's defence of the 1869 gas municipalisation was vindicated in the long term. This was in spite of the need to renew much existing property, and undertake large-scale extensions to meet growing demand. In 1871 the Town Council was granted Parliamentary authority to erect the "New Works", which had been thwarted only two years previously.¹⁵³ Dawsholm, near Maryhill, was the location for this prestigious undertaking, which started off with a productive capacity equal to 3,000,000 cubic feet per day.¹⁵⁴

Over time, the outmoded works of the old Companies were abandoned, while in 1891 the Partick, Hillhead and Maryhill Gas Company - a last suburban outpost of private enterprise - was bought out for £202,500.¹⁵⁵ The gas revenue grew steadily, (see Table 4.2), while municipal indebtedness was regulated by the institution of a sinking fund. A major innovation occurred in 1885, with the implementation of what the press dubbed "the Glasgow Corporation Gas Stove Scheme".¹⁵⁶ Cookers, fires, washing machines and water heaters were offered for sale or hire to the public; symbols that "municipal trading" had become a well-established feature of the Council's activity. Part of the rationale behind the scheme was to utilise resources during the summer, when consumer demand for lighting was at a minimum; another factor was the environmental advantages offered by gas. As one contemporary report put it:¹⁵⁷

The adoption of the new system during the summer months will ensure more cleanliness and comfort than was possible under the old. There will be no trouble with smoke, wood or coal; all that will be necessary is to turn on the gas, and you have got a fire sufficient to cook a steak or a chop, or any other article of diet.

The Town Council was by no means a pioneer in the provision of gas appliances in Scotland; Dundee, Aberdeen, Elgin, Forres and Dumfries had all offered the service in advance of Glasgow.¹⁵⁸ On the other hand, as the largest centre of gas consumption north of the border, developments in Glasgow did have ramifications for other authorities wishing to take

Table 4.2: Development and Manufacture of Glasgow's Gas, 1860-1913

Year	Gas Made in Cubic Feet	Price per 1,000 Cubic Feet	Total Revenue*
1860	769,241,000	5s 0d	£153,585
1870	1,295,863,000	4s 7d	£235,701
1880	1,859,582,000	3s 10d	£341,274
1890	3,058,277,000	2s 6d	£417,589
1900	5,969,111,000	2s 2d	£770,002
1910	6,977,904,000	2s 0d to 1s 8d	£879,434
1913	7,732,914,000	1s 11d to 1s 4d	£1,022,917

* including revenue from the sale of coke and residuals, eg. tar and ammoniacal liquor.

Source: Municipal Glasgow: its Evolution and Enterprises, (Glasgow Corporation, 1914), page 123.

responsibility for local supplies. Although there had been several examples of municipalisation before 1869, the transfer of the Glasgow Companies to public ownership prompted a large number of applications to Parliament during the 1870s. As a result, legislation was passed in 1876, allowing Scottish burghs to produce their own gas, as long as any existing agency did not already have Parliamentary powers.¹⁵⁹ A clause in the Act stipulated that profits could not be used for purposes other than those relating to the maintenance and improvement of the service; the Glasgow experience had taught the salutary lesson that as gas supply could often transcend burghal boundaries, safeguards had to be given to all consumers.¹⁶⁰ Rating was generally an important factor in the development of the publicly-owned gas industry in Scotland, which by 1913 was the most completely municipalised in the United Kingdom, with only four out of eighty statutory undertakings still in private hands.¹⁶¹ Unlike England, there was no compounded rating system in Scotland, so that the burden of local taxation was much less onerous for property owners. There was consequently less incentive for municipal authorities to exploit the profit motive, even if it had latterly been in their power to do so.¹⁶²

As will become apparent, this entrenched position created awkward problems when a new power source began to emerge, although there had long been an awareness that gas was likely to

be superseded. When Lord Provost Orr had unsuccessfully pursued the takeover of the Glasgow Companies in 1857, his Council colleague and close friend, Peter Clouston, had expressed opposition on the grounds that scientists might discover a better and cheaper alternative to gas.¹⁶³ Orr retorted that such fears were unnecessarily "raising a phantom", although like all phantoms, the possible impact of new technology lurked uneasily within the municipal consciousness.¹⁶⁴ Indeed, part of the rationale behind the Gas Trust's sinking fund was to build up a sufficient cash accumulation, which would offer some protection in the event of any revolution in power production.¹⁶⁵ Whatever else Clouston had in mind when he urged caution in the acquisition of the gas supply, from the 1860s there were rapid developments in the application of electricity as an illuminant, although the glaring beam of the available arc-lighting was suitable only for public places, such as theatres or railway stations. In this respect, Clouston must have had an early premonition of the commercial potential of electricity; in 1879, when he was Chairman of the Glasgow & South Western Railway Company, one of the city's first confirmed electrical installations was inaugurated at the newly-built St. Enoch Station, under G & SW control.¹⁶⁶

The disadvantages of electricity as a source of home illuminant were overcome in 1878, when Joseph Swan developed an effective mechanism for providing incandescent lighting.¹⁶⁷

The House of Commons set an important precedent in 1881 by adopting Swan's innovation; thereafter a flurry of enterprises were established to cater for commercial and domestic demand.¹⁶⁸ While clearly prepared to encourage the use of the new power resource, Parliament was careful to monitor the growth of the fledgling undertakings. Memories of the problems that had been associated with gas installation influenced the view that regulatory measures should be introduced at an early stage, and that the municipality was the appropriate agency to oversee the operation of electrical companies within localities.¹⁶⁹ This was precisely the philosophy which had governed the 1870 Tramway Act - itself a response to railway development - and therefore constituted no deviation from previous policy when the 1882 Electric Lighting Act was passed.¹⁷⁰ It was part of the continuing process of giving legislative substance to practices which had steadily become part of municipal activity, and in this context, the vigilance of Glasgow's pre-reform Council over the operation of the private Gas and Water Companies foreshadowed the more comprehensive civic rôle later in the century.

Yet in the demonology of the anti-municipalisers, which began to appear forcefully from the 1890s, the Electric Lighting Act was singled out as a sinister turning point, which stifled the spirit of free enterprise and handed the nascent industry to monopoly control.¹⁷¹ The radical pronouncements of Joseph

Chamberlain, as the principle architect of the Act, only fuelled the belief that the legislation had pushed the country firmly down the slippery slope towards collectivism. In 1907 the argument was put succinctly:¹⁷²

By virtue of the Act referred to no electric-lighting company could carry on business in any locality without the sanction of the municipality, who themselves had the option of obtaining the same powers by which the private company could be ousted; or even if the latter were allowed to exist, the municipality could step in within a certain period, after the private company had proved the utility of their business, and expropriate the entire concern at its bare value. By such powers the municipalities could keep private enterprise out altogether, or admit it under onerous restrictions. They have done both.

The writer was making reference to a clause in the Act which allowed for local authorities to compulsorily purchase electricity companies after twenty-one years; a provision which provoked such a hostile response from electrical interests that in 1888 Parliament extended the purchase period to forty-two years.¹⁷³ However, critics considered this to be a meaningless concession, as the principle behind the legislation remained unaltered. In their capacity as the licensing body for any company wishing to supply electricity, local authorities still remained in a key position to dictate the pace of the industry's development.

Given the particularly favourable conditions for municipal control under the 1882 Act, what was the civic response in

Glasgow to the commercial impact of electricity? Ironically, there had initially been scant enthusiasm among local authorities to operate their own electrical undertakings, and Glasgow was no exception to this rule.¹⁷⁴ Such ambivalence was understandable, in view of the continuing uncertainties over the efficiency of electricity as a power resource. As Leslie Hannah has pointed out in his exhaustive history of the industry before nationalisation, the early public supply systems were bedevilled with technical problems, which retarded efforts to provide a comprehensive service.¹⁷⁵ More crucially, however, the timorous municipal approach had been prompted by an anxiety to safeguard the existing gas undertakings. The risk factor was of prime importance as far as Glasgow was concerned; having made an enormous financial commitment in 1869, councillors were fiercely protective of the capital which had been sunk into the creation of the Gas Trust. Accordingly, it was the organised pressure of substantial municipal gas suppliers - spearheaded by Glasgow, Manchester and Birmingham - which helped to define the strict provisions of the Electric Lighting Act.¹⁷⁶ Their appeals fell on the receptive ears of Joseph Chamberlain, who as President of the Board of Trade was in a pivotal position to influence his Government colleagues as to the merits of the municipal argument.¹⁷⁷

As it happened, Glasgow was among thirteen local authorities which had sought powers to supply electricity early in

1882.¹⁷⁸ The motivation was purely defensive, in response to a plethora of Parliamentary applications from companies keen to establish their legal standing in electricity provision.¹⁷⁹ Several well-known enterprises were involved, including Siemens Brothers and Edison's Electrical Lighting, indicating the strong international dimension to the new industry. The Council's case against the Companies pointedly referred to the foreign connection, and the accountability problem that this constituted.¹⁸⁰ In contrast, the municipality was depicted as having a proud track record in defence of community interests, with a deep commitment to preserving the integrity of the local infrastructure. Yet for all the glowing references to its public service image, the Council made no secret of the fact that it had been compelled to take action in order to stave off any likely challenge to the gas supply. As a result, when the Electric Lighting Act was passed later in the year, the threat from the commercial companies receded, and the Glasgow application was withdrawn.¹⁸¹ Although a revised Provisional Order was submitted for the city in 1883, there was a difference of opinion with the Board of Trade over the precise area to be serviced, and the proposals floundered.¹⁸² At the same time, general interest in the promotion of electrical undertakings waned, due to the effects of economic recession and temporary doubts about the industry's technological efficiency.

The electricity question re-emerged at the municipal level

in Glasgow during 1889. Reasons for the revival of interest were twofold; firstly, the 1888 Electric Lighting Act had helped to restore commercial confidence, with the result that a Glasgow-based firm of electrical engineers - Messrs. Muir, Mavor & Coulson - immediately sought incorporation. Amongst the Company's most prominent city-centre consumers was the Town Council, whose prestigious new City Chambers was illuminated from generators located in nearby John Street.¹⁸³ In April 1889 Muir, Mavor & Coulson (Ltd.) gave notice of their intention to apply to the Board of Trade for a Provisional Order, "to supply electricity for public or private purposes in the municipality of Glasgow".¹⁸⁴ The definition of "municipality" was, of course, a subject of intense debate at this time, because of the Council's crusade to extend its boundaries over the adjacent Police Burghs. Accordingly, the civic leadership did not relish the prospect of the new undertaking gaining a foothold in such a sensitive area as power supply, with considerable opportunity for expansion. Connected with this was the future of the tramways lease, which began to loom large during 1889. As has been seen, electrification was already under active consideration by the Tramways Committee, opening up entirely new horizons for public transport in the Glasgow conurbation.¹⁸⁵ With councillors in a strong position to influence the course of developments, they understandably looked towards furthering municipal interests. Not only did this

involve squeezing out the existing Tramways Company; the new electrical enterprise constituted too much of a threat to the burgeoning civic entity of "Greater Glasgow".

There was a second major consideration for the Town Council in respect of electricity, which was to have an important bearing on the first. In the spring of 1889 the Board of Trade set up a public inquiry under Major Marindin to examine the operation of electrical undertakings in London, and how the needs of the metropolis could best be serviced.¹⁸⁶ With the creation of London County Council on 1st April of that year, it was felt that ground rules had to be established for effective co-operation between the private and public sector, to ensure in particular that safety standards were maintained. One of the requirements thus determined was that all overhead lines in London should be removed, and cables laid underground. With much prompting from Town Clerk Marwick, Glasgow's councillors seized on this section of the Board of Trade Report, in order to exert some leverage in their case against Messrs. Muir, Mavor & Coulson.¹⁸⁷ Significantly, all the electric lines in central Glasgow were overhead; a policy which had at first been encouraged by the Council, in order to avoid the necessity of breaking up the streets. Yet with the growing popularity of electricity among city businesses and institutions, this state of affairs was creating wholly new problems. Somewhat luridly, Glasgow's Fire Inspector summed up the hazards he perceived in a

letter to the Council's Police Committee:¹⁸⁸

I do not desire to create any unnecessary panic or alarm in regard to overhead electric wires, but within the past few months there have been numerous deaths from this cause, and the men in this Department are specially liable to risk, as our work on roofs has frequently to be carried on during the night ...

The Council made a great show of referring the matter to the Board of Trade, for an official investigation into the existing mechanism for supplying Glasgow with electricity.¹⁸⁹ There were perhaps mixed feelings when the Board's Major Cardew reported early in 1890 that Muir, Mavor & Coulson operated one of the best installations he had seen, which was well up to safety standards.¹⁹⁰ However, even without Board of Trade backing, the Council was still in a considerable position of power. Increasingly, the weight of evidence was against the use of overhead wires, no matter how careful the precautions. Muir, Mavor & Coulson's prospects of expanding their enterprise were thus doomed at an early stage, because of municipal reluctance to allow them access to lay underground cables. By 1890, town councillors overwhelmingly believed that the "natural monopoly" argument held good for electricity as much as for gas, and in these circumstances successfully pursued their own Provisional Order to supply Glasgow.¹⁹¹ Unlike the acquisition of the Gas Companies in 1869, there was no vocal opposition against the principle of municipal control, or the costs involved to the community. Characteristically, the veteran James Martin did

express personal misgivings, but this time he did not record his dissent.¹⁹² When the decision was eventually taken to approve the draft Provisional Order for submission to the Board of Trade, there was barely a quorum of the Town Council in attendance.¹⁹³

Although the Provisional Order was granted in 1890, it was not until 1893 that Lord Provost James Bell ceremoniously switched on the current to inaugurate the municipal supply.¹⁹⁴ A good deal had happened in the intervening period, above all the implementation of the 1891 City of Glasgow Act, which substantially added to the scope of civic jurisdiction.¹⁹⁵ Exploitation of the new power resource was initially cautious, bearing in mind that electricity was originally treated as an adjunct of the gas supply, and used wholly for lighting purposes. After agreeing to purchase the plant and premises of Muir, Mavor & Coulson, it was not until March 1892 that the Council was able to take charge of its new acquisition.¹⁹⁶ In marked contrast to the sums expended on compensating the Gas Companies, the cost of the undertaking was a mere £15,000.¹⁹⁷ With such a small initial outlay, the Council could afford to be generous, and constructed a custom-built generating station at Waterloo Street, which was soon working to full capacity. Thereafter, the number of consumers grew steadily, (see Table 4.3), but until 1899 supplies were limited to a small and overwhelmingly central

Table 4.3: Development and Manufacture of Glasgow's Electricity, 1892-1913

Year	Total Generated*	No. of Consumers	Total Sold*	Gross Revenue
1893	408,529	108	287,712	£7,784
1894	854,766	378	702,248	£18,015
1895	1,022,730	586	901,287	£21,196
1896	1,279,687	855	1,090,959	£25,862
1897	1,729,483	1,090	1,497,842	£30,474
1898	2,619,019	1,437	2,114,036	£36,360
1899	3,401,731	1,858	2,824,350	£44,141
1900	5,226,818	2,852	4,250,669	£59,762
1901	8,254,146	4,031	6,813,991	£79,449
1902	11,122,606	5,374	9,282,043	£103,940
1903	13,197,612	7,013	11,501,324	£127,004
1904	17,770,488	9,324	15,107,665	£158,190
1905	21,584,088	11,643	18,248,468	£186,371
1906	25,758,521	13,705	21,536,425	£195,841
1907	32,052,937	15,497	26,332,998	£224,844
1908	40,153,676	16,926	32,794,807	£253,401
1909	41,493,033	18,158	34,464,911	£245,673
1910	43,245,524	19,489	36,479,243	£245,959
1911	49,071,933	21,166	40,823,090	£260,526
1912	54,088,835	22,645	44,492,630	£276,659
1913	77,610,855	27,848	63,183,063	£345,749

* B.T. Units

Source: Municipal Glasgow: its Evolution and Enterprises,
(Glasgow Corporation, 1914), pages 131-132.

business area, and prices were considered to be high.¹⁹⁸ That year the Kelvinside Electricity Company was bought out for £37,000, giving Glasgow Corporation a foothold in an important residential district.¹⁹⁹ Meantime, the Corporation Electricity Department had been established in its own right, after protracted debate as to whether all municipal generating equipment should be transferred to the Tramways Department, which was preparing to adapt to electric traction.²⁰⁰ Thereafter, rapid technological developments in the industry allowed for much greater efficiency and larger economies of scale, which in turn boosted commercial and domestic demand.

The implications for Glasgow of the revolution in electricity supply during the 1900s will be examined in the next section of this thesis. However, before going on to consider the wider debate about municipal enterprise, in which Glasgow was to play such a prominent part, a few conclusions should be drawn about the importance of the gas and electricity undertakings in defining civic attitudes during the late nineteenth century. Reference has already been made to the symbolic significance that Joseph Chamberlain attached to the acquisition of the Birmingham gas supply, and how the municipal "consciousness" was thereafter given a concrete identity. This did not just relate to local civic pride, which had been alive and well in the likes of Glasgow and Manchester long before Birmingham. Part of the post-Chamberlain process involved the

mutual sharing of municipal interests, recognising that although local authorities may have evolved according to different criteria, they had broadly reached a similar state of development.²⁰¹ By the 1880s, Gladstone was able to state that water and gas were "two of the most elementary among the purposes of municipal government", while the principle of the "natural monopoly" had been acknowledged both in the 1870 Tramway Act and the 1882 Electric Lighting Act.²⁰² Local government, therefore, was in a position to consolidate its gains, and - with much at stake - did not take kindly to what its leaders perceived as retrogressive influences.

Gas and electricity provide graphic examples of the collective assertiveness that was beginning to emerge among municipalities in defence of their hard won public utilities. When Glasgow, Manchester and Birmingham led the campaign to tighten the provisions of the Electric Lighting Act, they did so on behalf of "... 130 municipal corporations, who have expended up to £40,000,000 in connection with gas".²⁰³ Nor can there be any doubt of a deliberately obstructive policy among local authorities towards the establishment of electricity undertakings, even under public ownership. Glasgow seems to have been fairly typical of most other authorities by adopting a reactive rather than initiating approach, despite the highly favourable circumstances for municipal control. Indeed, Glasgow's record was not so bad when compared with the likes of

Greenock, which was so protective of its famous Gasworks that there was a sixteen year lapse between obtaining the Provisional Order and inaugurating the electricity supply.²⁰⁴ All this would accord with the accusations of the anti-municipalisers that local government had consciously "strangled" the electricity industry at birth.²⁰⁵ On the other hand, much of the invective hurled against the municipalities was made with the benefit of considerable hindsight, after the early uncertainties surrounding electricity provision had been overcome. Glasgow's decision to supply its own electricity was one of the least controversial municipalisations of the nineteenth century, and if vested interests had felt threatened at the time, they were strangely muted in making their objections known.

III. The Myth and Reality of "Municipal Socialism",
1888-1912

In August 1888, Glasgow's new City Chambers in George Square was opened by Queen Victoria amidst much pomp and ceremony.²⁰⁶ This magnificent municipal edifice not only represented a sense of civic pride in the city's past achievements, but was an important augury of things to come, as the Town Council entered into a period of unprecedented development, with its sphere of operations expanding substantially in scope and scale. Indeed, as a symbolic starting point for the municipal "Golden Age" - which prevailed until the onset of the First World War - the year 1888 seemed singularly appropriate. After a wild start to the weather, the sun shone brilliantly during an extraordinary summer, as the city attracted an unusually large number of sightseers, all savouring the experience of attending Glasgow's first International Exhibition.²⁰⁷ The organisers of this grand extravaganza of Art, Industry and Science were spearheaded by an enthusiastic Town Council, anxious to show the world what Glasgow had to offer in terms of cultural and commercial achievements. Not surprisingly, the Exhibition was based in the verdant grounds of Kelvingrove, where - true to the aims of the Park's original promoters - visitors could be both entertained and educated by a dazzling array of displays and demonstrations. One contemporary commentator evocatively summed up the impression left on the public consciousness by the

Exhibition: 208

By day, with bands playing and well-dressed crowds of promenaders, the scene is one of gaiety and brightness, and when night falls, and the electric light shines brilliantly, and from the fairy fountain the many-coloured waters climb into the sky, the sober-sided citizens of Glasgow can hardly believe that some spirit of enchantment has not transformed their own grey, steady-going town into the likeness of Paris on a fête day.

The old magic of the West End Park, combined with the wonders of new technology, had once again been brought into service by town councillors and officials in their efforts to promote Glasgow's image as the civic citadel of progress. Only a few months after the stalls, tearooms, pavilions and model workshops had been dismantled at Kelvingrove, Albert Shaw - an American analyst of urban government - wrote glowingly of Glasgow in the Political Science Quarterly, and thereafter held up the administration of the Scottish city as a guiding light to his fellow countrymen.²⁰⁹ For their part, Glasgow's civic representatives were highly flattered by the attentions of outsiders like Shaw, and assiduously fuelled the notion that the city held a prime position in the international league table of municipal government. Indeed, when an American magazine claimed in 1890 that Birmingham was the best-administered city in the world, Glaswegians responded with a mixture of scepticism and amusement, as if to demonstrate their own superior wisdom.²¹⁰ In an editorial, the Glasgow Herald put Birmingham firmly in its

place by suggesting that the Midlands city was merely "a mushroom in comparison with the venerable Corporation of the Clyde", while the description of Birmingham as "a business city, run by business men, on business principles", elicited the curt response that, "Most of us have been under the impression that Glasgow is about as business-like a city as is to be found in the three kingdoms".²¹¹ Such patriotic sentiments left little room for doubt that the spirit of '88 was still holding firm, and that the prevailing public attitude was overwhelmingly supportive of the ruling administration.

Round about the same time as the "Birmingham versus Glasgow" confrontation hit the headlines, one town councillor was building up a reputation as an enthusiastic exponent of the municipal ethos, to the extent that he was much in demand on Glasgow's public speaking circuit. Robert Crawford's favourite theme was "municipal socialism", although what actually constituted his precise definition of the term was open to considerable interpretation. In one lecture - addressed to members of the College Division Shopkeepers' and Traders' Debating Association - Crawford stated that "municipal socialism might mean anything from co-operation to Nihilism", although in the Glasgow context he maintained that the Town Council adhered strictly to the "co-operative" ideal.²¹² He went on to make the bold statement that, "Municipal government as it was realised in Glasgow was pure socialism"; words that seemed

deliberately designed to shock his middle-class audience, and cast doubts on the credibility of the civic leadership.²¹³ However, Crawford was no fiery tribune of the Red Revolution, despite his ostentatious flirtation with socialist language and ideology. A prosperous fancy goods merchant and stationer, he was recognised - even by his fiercest critics - as a man of outstanding ability; the kind of councillor that Albert Shaw would have had no hesitation in commending.²¹⁴ Moreover, Crawford had previously distinguished himself by playing a prominent part in the organisation of the 1888 International Exhibition, and was - so rumour had it - the éminence grise behind the sitting incumbent of the Civic Chair, Lord Provost John Muir.²¹⁵

Crawford had derived his political inspiration from two apparently diverse individuals, who both happened to be alive in 1890 - John Ruskin and Joseph Chamberlain.²¹⁶ To Ruskin he attributed his belief in the principles of public service, in accordance with the guiding maxim from Unto This Last that, "There is no wealth but life".²¹⁷ The connection between Chamberlain and the creed of "municipal socialism" was, of course, immediately obvious; Chamberlain the municipaliser was very much behind Crawford's declaration that, "... his party was the party who would do most for the realisation of a well and wisely organised community, and who were anxious to develop local governing powers".²¹⁸ However, like his two mentors,

Crawford was an emotional man of contradictions, his personality reflecting the uneasy spirit of the age during the decades leading up to the First World War. Prior to the Home Rule crisis of 1886 he had been an outspoken radical Liberal, championing the Chamberlainite cause and encouraging a younger generation of political activists, including Robert Bontine Cunninghame Graham, the flamboyant "Laird of Gartmore".²¹⁹ Thereafter, he became an active and influential Unionist, while at the same time retaining much of his old radical persona. Erstwhile Liberal colleagues were perplexed by the *mélange* of ideas which latterly motivated Crawford, and in 1915 his obituary captured something of his contradictory qualities:²²⁰

He appeared, at one time, to more timid confrères, no little of the firebrand revolutionary, and used the phrase "municipal Socialism" with disquieting amiability; but no man had a clearer idea as to where the public claims upon the common purse should terminate, and though he was essentially a democrat, he was "on the large" (to use a phrase much used by him in a spirit of humour), conservative. For years he was a member of the Imperial Union Club.

Robert Crawford was almost certainly the first Glasgow town councillor to talk consistently of the "municipal socialist" ideal, and it is therefore important to understand something of his background, in light of the negative stress on public ownership which began to emerge forcefully from the 1890s. The ambiguous nature of the Crawford philosophy would accord with a recent retrospective assessment of municipal socialism as "a

chimera", one of history's great intangibles, and from the outset the expression seems to have been deliberately cultivated as a polemical device rather than as a useful short-hand description for the provision of assorted utilities in the local government sphere.²²¹ In another recent discussion of the municipal ownership debate, Sue Laurence has suggested that the best contemporary studies of the subject consciously avoided the value-laden "socialist" element among their terms of reference.²²² "Municipal trading" was therefore much preferred by serious analysts of civic government, including the Fabians, who came to be identified as among the most ardent of municipal socialists. Indeed, Laurence goes on to cite the Fabian law expert, William Robson, as adopting the most scientific approach; according to his criteria, "municipal trading" specifically related to non-essential services, which consumers could choose to purchase from the municipality, while "public utilities" covered essential services payable via the rates, such as water or environmental health.²²³

The fine detail of definition was clearly not a problem which confronted Robert Crawford in 1890, when he boldly asserted that Glasgow Town Council practised "pure socialism" in the administration of its services. Of course, at the time he was saying all this, there was no actual socialist presence within the City Chambers, and only one councillor - Henry Tait - who could conform to the vague criterion for labour

representation then in force, whereby a suitable candidate was simply endorsed by the Trades' Council.²²⁴ However, by making the "socialist" connection, Crawford was attempting to do two things that were emphatically not bound up with furthering the labour cause. Firstly, out of a mixed sense of civic pride and political loyalty, he was equating Glasgow with Birmingham-style municipal government. Secondly, he was trying to woo both the working-class and middle-class electorate by implying that Council policy represented socialism, but of an eminently safe and responsible variety. This ambiguously-populist stance was a tried and tested Chamberlainite technique; indeed, H.M. Hyndman astutely identified the double-edged implications of such a strategy as early as 1885:²²⁵

By his constant and flattering references to Socialism as beneficial, as in point of fact underlying most of the legislation which has been advantageous to the working classes and so forth, Mr. Chamberlain has made our revolutionary doctrines almost "respectable" ...

It is important to bear these words in mind before looking more closely at the complex factors which prompted Glasgow's rise to prominence as one of the most noted - and notorious - strongholds of the "municipal socialist" ethos. As will be seen, much of this reputation was rooted in myth as well as in reality, at a time of unsettling political change and unprecedented administrative restructuring.

From the outset, it should be made quite clear where civic

power lay during the early phase of the municipal "Golden Age". One of the most enduring myths about Glasgow at this time has been that it was solidly "a Liberal City, with a Liberal majority of long-standing on the City Council".²²⁶ Such an emphatic statement begs a variety of questions, notably about the use of party labels in municipal elections and the nature of political control within the City Chambers. However, it has already been shown that from the 1840s the tradition was for Glasgow town councillors to be publicly non-political, directing their energies in the interests of all citizens, regardless of personal beliefs. Of course, this tradition was often more apparent than real, and although Glasgow remained aloof from operating a municipal party machine - unlike Birmingham - voters were usually perfectly aware of the preferences and prejudices of their candidates. As one aggressively Liberal pamphleteer put it in 1902, "... you might as well try to separate daylight from the sun as politics in any of our elections".²²⁷ On the other hand, councillors in both Glasgow and Birmingham shared a strong faith that "real business capacity" in public life was a quality that could override crude political considerations.²²⁸ Accordingly, a political stance was only acceptable if it was accompanied by sound business credentials, and a recognised position in the community. The rationale behind Glasgow's Citizens' Union - founded in 1898 as a municipal pressure group - was wholly in accordance with these

principles, and it had no scruples about giving support to political activists within the Corporation, whether Liberal, Unionist or Conservative, as long as they conformed to the business ideal.

Politics and power were not necessarily synonymous as far as the municipal experience in Glasgow was concerned, and from events surrounding the origins of the City Improvement Trust, gas municipalisation and boundary expansion, it has been shown that serious tensions existed among the ranks of self-confessed Liberals long before the Chamberlain-led split over Irish Home Rule. Thereafter, loyalties became even more blurred, as can be seen from an examination of the declared political preferences of Glasgow's civic representatives between 1886 and 1896. (See Table 4.4.) During this time, steadfast Liberals were consistently the largest grouping on the Council. However, they did not have the same position of strength as before 1886, because of the disconcerting presence of Liberal "waverers" who never threw in their lot with Unionism, but remained uneasy about their commitment to the old Gladstonian party. Unswerving Liberals scathingly referred to these individuals as "Men of Mystery", whose allegiances were unpredictable, and who were in a position to barter their support among the various interest groups.²²⁹ At the same time, there were sizeable numbers of Conservatives and Unionists, who were particularly influential during the period prior to boundary expansion in 1891. Although

Table 4.4: Political Allegiances of Glasgow Town Councillors, 1886-96

Year	{Loyal	Liberals Waverers*	Total)	Unionists	Conservatives	Stalwarts	Unknown
1886	15 / 30%	7 / 14%	22 / 44%	13 / 26%	9 / 18%	-	6 / 12%
1887	14 / 28%	8 / 16%	22 / 44%	12 / 24%	9 / 18%	-	7 / 14%
1888	14 / 28%	9 / 18%	23 / 46%	11 / 22%	10 / 20%	-	6 / 12%
1889	18 / 36%	8 / 16%	26 / 52%	13 / 26%	8 / 16%	-	3 / 6%
1890	17 / 34%	10 / 20%	27 / 54%	13 / 26%	8 / 16%	-	2 / 4%
			-	boundary expansion	-		
1891	36 / 46.7%	12 / 15.5%	48 / 62.3%	16 / 20.7%	13 / 16.5%	-	-
1892	36 / 46.7%	11 / 14.2%	47 / 61%	15 / 19.4%	14 / 18.1%	-	1 / 1.2%
1893	35 / 45.4%	10 / 12.9%	45 / 58.4%	17 / 24.2%	13 / 16.8%	1 / 1.2%	1 / 1.2%
1894	35 / 45.4%	10 / 12.9%	45 / 58.4%	14 / 18.1%	15 / 19.4%	1 / 1.2%	2 / 2.5%
1895	35 / 45.4%	10 / 12.9%	45 / 58.4%	14 / 18.1%	12 / 15.5%	3 / 3.8%	3 / 3.8%
			-	ward redistribution	-		
1896	36 / 46.7%	5 / 6.4%	41 / 53.2%	10 / 12.9%	11 / 14.2%	9 / 11.6%	6 / 7.7%

* includes those alienated by the likes of (a) Church disestablishment; (b) temperance zealotry; (c) anti-landlordism; (d) excessive municipal interventionism; (e) dislike of Gladstone himself.

Source: Biographical Appendix to this Thesis

the position of the Gladstonians improved considerably after this time - for reasons that will shortly be elucidated - the balance in their favour remained tenuous. One consequence was that from 1883 to 1899 no Liberal was elected to the Lord Provostship; a highly revealing phenomenon, as it was during this period that Glasgow's reputation for civic excellence was firmly established.²³⁰

It can also be seen from the table of political allegiances that in 1896 the committed Liberals and pro-labour "Stalwarts" gained sufficient ground to establish an overall majority of "progressive" councillors within the City Chambers for the first time. Reasons for this breakthrough were administrative as well as political; 1896 was the year when a comprehensive ward redistribution had taken place, under the requirements of the 1891 Annexation Act. Prior to this time, the basis of municipal representation was grossly weighted against electors in working-class wards, who were those most likely to support "advanced" candidates. (See Table 4.5.) Put in simple terms, the composition of the Council did not accurately reflect the relative voting strength of the ratepayers. In the sixteen wards which had previously constituted the "Old City" there had been no meaningful rearrangement of boundaries since 1846, so that by the 1890s social and industrial changes had rendered the physical structure of the municipality obsolete.²³¹ On the eve of the 1896 redivision, the largest ward in Glasgow was

Table 4.5: Municipal Voters, 1891-96

Ward	1891-92	1895-96	New Wards*	1896-97
1	8,004	8,368	1. Dalmarnock	6,972
2	9,980	10,564	2. Calton	6,400
3	8,422	9,519	3. Mile-End	5,988
4	4,740	4,684	4. Whitevale	6,150
5	8,867	9,288	5. Dennistoun	4,843
6	2,754	2,991	6. Springburn	4,810
7	1,628	1,598	7. Cowlairs	4,157
8	2,007	2,065	8. Townhead	6,749
9	3,376	3,541	9. Blackfriars	4,441
10	5,738	5,922	10. Exchange	2,130
11	11,502	13,113	11. Blythswood	2,618
12	4,981	5,225	12. Broomielaw	2,514
13	4,995	5,161	13. Anderston	5,242
14	8,322	9,008	14. Sandyford	5,329
15	5,869	6,253	15. Park	5,265
16	5,794	5,988	16. Cowcaddens	6,446
17	3,104	3,508	17. Woodside	7,672
18	884	1,032	18. Hutchesontown	6,721
19	1,769	2,085	19. Gorbals	6,223
20	2,040	2,340	20. Kingston	6,022
21	586	695	21. Govanhill	4,930
22	1,719	1,883	22. Langside	3,879
23	980	1,013	23. Pollokshields	2,948
24	2,725	3,958	24. Kelvinside	3,151
25	2,424	2,814	25. Maryhill	4,220

* Old and new Ward designations do not correspond.

Source: Glasgow Town Council Diaries, SRA D-TC 14.5.

Woodside, with a massive electorate of 13,113. The two city centre business wards, covering the area designated as "Exchange", had 3,663 voters between them; six Conservative and Unionist councillors to Woodside's three Liberals, but with twenty-eight per cent. of the voting capacity.²³² This imbalance was distorted even further, with the addition of highly-rated but sparsely populated areas like Kelvinside, which under the generous provisions of the Annexation Act had been initially allowed three councillors with a total electorate of less than 700. At the same time, nearly forty per cent. of Glasgow's ratepayers were concentrated in the six working-class wards of the city centre and East End, yet returned less than a quarter of the councillors.

The broad implications of all this are not difficult to determine. Up to 1896, civic control remained firmly in the hands of what Albert Shaw approvingly described as "the best elements of business life", under whose guidance there was room even for Robert Crawford's idiosyncratic brand of "pure socialism".²³³ The remarkable unanimity over various municipalising decisions - notably electricity and the tramways - can be partly understood in this context. Thus, in the case of the tramways, there had been no meaningful ideological debate, except with the vested interests administering the Tramways Company; to most councillors it was simply a question of maximum efficiency under effective management at the best

economic rates, which unquestionably made good business sense. Municipalisation also made good electoral sense, particularly in view of the long-standing public concern over the quality of the previous privately-run system. The most consistent critics had been generally from the middle-classes, for reasons summed up by one recent historian of Glasgow's tramways:²³⁴

It was the long-distance travellers, the
residents of Hillhead, Crosshill and Partickhill,
who were becoming dependent on the tramcar
in their quest for the good address.

By and large, this was the same influential body of ratepayers who had been added to the enlarged municipal entity of Glasgow in 1891. Working-class areas still tended to be concentrated in or near the city centre, and some outlying districts - notably Springburn - did not benefit from the tramways service until the advent of electric traction in 1898.

The so-called "General Election" of 1896, whereby all seats were up for contest in the newly-delineated wards, was something of a watershed for perceptions of municipal socialism in Glasgow. Committed Liberals and pro-labour supporters had realised the significance of the restructured municipality long before the actual poll, and had been working conscientiously towards winning substantial gains under the more favourable voting conditions. Accordingly, the Municipal Committee of Glasgow Trades' Council had resolved not to put forward its own "labour" candidates for the 1895 elections, preferring to

"husband their resources" until the next year.²³⁵ This did not prevent moral support being given to two successful ILPers in 1895 - George Mitchell and P.G. Stewart - although both men were not official Trades' Council nominees.²³⁶ Organisationally, the Municipal Committee was a wholly new departure for the Trades' Council, and came to form the nucleus of the much broader Workers' Municipal Committee, inaugurated in June 1896 for the forthcoming elections.²³⁷ The other participants were the Irish Nationalist League, the ILP and the Co-operators; the last-named group allying themselves in a bid to combat the bitter reaction of independent traders to the success of retail co-operation.²³⁸ Such concerted efforts to firmly establish the labour presence within the Corporation were initially greeted with scepticism by electoral rivals, but subsequent stalwart victories - and the strong possibility that they might become power-brokers among the competing municipal interest groups - speedily turned scepticism into alarm.²³⁹

As for the Liberals, they were very much aware that their municipal position was steadily improving after the débâcle of 1886. Boundary expansion had helped considerably in this respect, as outlying areas like Langside, East Pollokshields and Springburn were Liberal strongholds.²⁴⁰ Indeed, of the twenty-one councillors returned from the new constituencies in 1891, fourteen - exactly two-thirds - were committed Gladstonians, of zealous pro-temperance views.²⁴¹ A good deal

of organised Liberal effort had gone into the 1891 elections, and 1896 was perceived in terms of similar success.²⁴² Part of the strategy for winning an overall municipal majority involved the creation of a new pressure group - the Progressive Union - which clearly derived inspiration from the ruling Progressive coalition on London County Council.²⁴³ However, the Glasgow Progressives differed considerably from their counterparts south of the border, as revealed by the unmistakably evangelical tenor of their prime objective, which was: "To unite Christian, Philanthropic, and Temperance Agencies for the Maintenance and Advancement of Good Government within the Municipality".²⁴⁴ Nor were the Glaswegians faced with the same uphill struggle as the Londoners to construct a framework of local government virtually from scratch; in fact, Glasgow's administration was considered by London's Progressives as an object lesson in the provision of public services, to the extent that John Burns of the LOC suggested that the civic motto of "Let Glasgow Flourish" should be adapted to "Let London Live!".²⁴⁵

Yet although there were strong dissimilarities between the Glasgow and London brands of Progressivism - with the latter coming to be identified with Fabian ideas - both aroused sustained and vehement criticism for the direction of their policies, which seemed to radically overstep the line which made municipal intervention acceptable.²⁴⁶ The basis of the

Glasgow attack was initially to do with political gamesmanship, as the Progressive Union was a Liberal party "front" of the most unsubtle variety, its origins firmly attributable to Lord Overtoun, the Free Church evangelical. Overtoun - or, in common parlance, John Campbell White - has been described as "the hereditary king of the chrome branch of the United Kingdom chemical industry"; rich, powerful, and with the single-minded ambition of reconstructing the Liberal power-base in Glasgow.²⁴⁷ His father - James White of Overtoun - had been personally and politically close to Sir William Collins, and Overtoun himself belonged to the same generation as Collins' best known municipal protégé, Samuel Chisholm.²⁴⁸ In 1895, Overtoun had generously supported Chisholm in his endeavours to win the Camlachie Parliamentary constituency from the sitting Unionist; part of a grand plan for Liberal revival, which involved Overtoun himself entering the municipal arena in 1896, and virtually buying his way into the Lord Provostship.²⁴⁹ The plan backfired when Robert Smillie of the ILP split the Camlachie vote in favour of the Unionist; an occurrence, incidentally, which was to rankle everlastingly in the brooding Chisholm consciousness.²⁵⁰ However, Chisholm still remained a force to be reckoned with in the municipality, so that Liberal tactics were switched for the 1896 elections, with Overtoun stepping down to allow his friend to become the "coming man" for the Provostship, and the "Progressive" figurehead within the

Corporation.

Shortly before this historic poll took place, a poem appeared in The Bailie, written in a withering parody of the Burnsian style:²⁵¹

Oor-toun's Progressive Union baun,
The saunt, the savour o' the laun,
Has ta'en the hail affair in haun
 To mak' selection
O' wha's to gang, and wha should staun,
 At this Election.

The toun was fast gaun a' to wreck,
When fortune sent a Liberal cheque
To mak' the Council mair select,
 An' highly moral;
Syn e we'll can haud oor heads erect
 Before the worl'....

At this stage, the stress was clearly on personalities rather than policies, although some of the more zealous endeavours of Samuel Chisholm - notably in the sphere of municipal licensing - had caused hackles to rise among the drinks' trade. Chisholm's almost Messianic rôle as Glasgow's temperance champion was legendary, and is so crucial to an understanding of municipal affairs during the 1890s and 1900s that a separate section of this thesis has been devoted to it.²⁵² For the present, it is sufficient to understand that under the unreformed Council, the Chisholmite impulse was held in check, but after 1896 the Progressives were in a far stronger position to realise their ambitions and upset the precarious power balance which had hitherto prevailed at the municipal level. Of course, much of this depended on which way the unpredictable Stalwarts were

likely to swing, with the result that the battle for Glasgow's working-class vote intensified; and the "gentlemanly" character of municipal elections degenerated into an outright clash of ideological wills.

It was in this uncertain climate that the term "municipal socialism" acquired an identity far more sinister than the breezy claims of Robert Crawford in 1890. LCC Progressives like John Burns and Sidney Webb had already created a hostage to fortune by depicting the aims of socialists and municipalities as one in the same; indeed, Burns deliberately compared his vision for the future government of London with that of the Paris Communards.²⁵³ The "Moderate" opposition within County Hall - encouraged by an assortment of wealthy and influential interest groups - seized on the provocative Progressive programme, with its forthright attack on "the publican, the jobber, and the monopolist".²⁵⁴ Soon Glasgow's Progressives began to be tarred with the same subversive brush, in a campaign which was not to abate until it reached a startling crescendo in 1902, and then took off in a wholly different direction. As The Bailie put it with heavy irony, shortly after the 1896 poll:²⁵⁵

Now, in the interests of truth and soberness, it should not go forth that Glasgow dates from the promulgation of silly rants concerning Municipal Socialism ... For it must be in the memory of men still living that Glasgow not only existed, but existed as a flourishing

community, before the advent of Bailie Chisholm, and the other rather feeble folk who have modestly dubbed themselves of "the best".

By this time, resentment of Chisholm was directed not only at his pivotal political and temperance position, but at his controversial plans to extend the sphere of municipal housing operations, after years of City Improvement Trust stagnation.²⁵⁶ Chisholm had become Convener of the Trust in 1891, and was anxious to prove himself in a position which he considered to be crucial for furthering the moral welfare of Glaswegians. Yet he had first to restore confidence in the Trust's financial arrangements, which had been tainted with an embarrassing whiff of scandal in 1884 over accounting irregularities, and which remained deeply in the red, despite operations having virtually ground to a halt.²⁵⁷ Chisholm and others realised that, unless the Town Council had a fatalistic desire to hold on to an expensive white elephant, a positive strategy had to be planned to make the Trust viable. The dilemma facing the Trustees was, as Chisholm put it, "Shall we force our ground on what seems to be an unwilling market, or shall we ourselves build?".²⁵⁸ The latter option was more financially realistic, but also more contentious. Nevertheless, it was worth the risk in order to extricate the Town Council from a serious predicament, and appease the bulk of the ratepayers. Accordingly, in 1888 building was tentatively

commenced under Improvement Trust auspices at the corner of Steel Street, Saltmarket. With the principle now established, Convener Chisholm endeavoured to hurry it along from 1891, in order to diminish the debt and the ratepayers' burden still further.

Following the example set by Sir William Collins, who had posed as the great enemy of waste and inefficiency within the Town Council, Chisholm always maintained that in terms of public spending he was a strict "economist".²⁵⁹ His subsequent stance within the Improvement Trust was wholly consistent with this claim, as he was able to reduce the rate from 1d in the pound to $\frac{1}{4}$ d by 1897, and afterwards remove it altogether, on account of the surplus revenues generated from rentals on Trust properties.²⁶⁰ It was an achievement of which Chisholm was immensely proud, and was his immediate riposte to critics who queried the direction of the Trust's policies under his control. Reasons for such criticisms were not simply that the Trust allegedly interfered with the freedom of the property market; Chisholm had not forgotten the moral dimension of the housing question, and the need for Glasgow Corporation - embodying the "responsible" citizens - to set standards that would encourage self-reliance in the poor. He consequently expanded the Trust's sphere of operations, and pioneered developments like the "Family Home", which was opened by the Trust in March 1896 to enable widowers with young families to

obtain lodgings and child-care facilities.²⁶¹ He also turned his attention to slum clearance, with a view to obtaining Parliamentary sanction for a new demolition programme in the city centre. Part of this strategy involved purchasing land for building houses, designed specifically for the poorer classes; a response to the dilemma of what to do with the dispossessed, which had bedevilled the Trust in its early days.²⁶²

Chisholm's main difficulty in persuading certain municipal colleagues of the validity of his case was not so much that the scale of Glasgow's housing problem had grown considerably since the 1860s, but because of a new ideological dimension to the debate on property and land ownership in the British Isles. The controversy had been ignited by the American, Henry George, whose best-selling Progress and Poverty became something of a surrogate bible for Scottish radicals after its publication in 1880.²⁶³ George's solution to the land problem was the "single tax", or taxation of land values, the object of which was: "... to relieve labour and capital from all taxation, direct and indirect, and to throw the burden upon rent".²⁶⁴ By placing the financial onus on landlords rather than tenants, George's ultimate aim was to eliminate land speculation - which he regarded as nonproductive and parasitical - and to create the circumstances for a more equitable distribution of wealth.

George was certainly not a socialist, although many mistakenly construed his theories as such; he believed firmly in

the profit motive, under the freest possible economic conditions, and thus had far more in common with classic Liberalism than Marxism.²⁶⁵ Yet his depiction of landlordism as the prime obstacle to an harmoniously integrated society had enormous popular appeal, especially in a city like Glasgow, where concern over the quality of urban life centred upon the appalling housing conditions and apparent lack of opportunity for improvement. Glasgow soon became fertile ground for the development of Georgeite ideas, to the extent that outspoken "single taxers" began to make an impact in municipal elections, and the Council's Progressives - led by Samuel Chisholm - did not dissociate themselves from the campaign.²⁶⁶

Given that Chisholm had taken on the task of redirecting Improvement Trust policy while at the same time identifying himself with the radical anti-landlord movement, it is scarcely surprising that Glasgow's powerful property interests joined forces with the other enemies of Progressivism in an attempt to undermine his position. The Glasgow Landlords' Association (Ltd.) was to the fore in petitioning against the Improvement Bill, citing a variety of objections, not least the chequered history of the Improvement Trust since its inception in 1866.²⁶⁷ However, the principal fear of the landlords was summed up by John Harrison - the GLA's President - who stated under cross-examination at the Bill's Committee stage:²⁶⁸

I undoubtedly object very strongly to the Corporation becoming speculative builders themselves with the facilities of the Corporation at their back for borrowing money at low rates of interest.

In their bid to halt the Bill's progress, the landlords were joined by the licensed trade in Glasgow, who detected an insidious temperance plot behind its main provisions.²⁶⁹ Thus, scores of publicans were likely to be dispossessed by slum clearance, with no prospect of claiming back their businesses after the building programme had been implemented. This was because Chisholm had already been instrumental in securing a ban on the operation of drinks' licences on all municipally-owned premises; a prohibition which would be extended wholesale if the Corporation was allowed to construct its own property empire.²⁷⁰

Despite the concerted efforts of the anti-Chisholmites, the Glasgow Corporation (Improvements and General Powers) Act received the Royal Assent in August 1897.²⁷¹ Section twelve of the legislation empowered the Corporation to spend up to £100,000 on land for building purposes within a half-mile radius of the municipality, while a global sum of £560,000 was authorised for borrowing purposes. The prospect of public funds being used to finance such a contentious project, which a substantial body of councillors had originally opposed, caused probing questions to be asked about how precisely the Corporation was endeavouring to protect ratepayers'

interests.²⁷² Moreover, as the municipal year 1896-97 wore on, there were ominous signs that other "faddist" schemes were being nurtured by Progressive councillors, in concert with the Stalwarts. The provision of free libraries was perceived as one such issue, raised by James Shaw Maxwell of the ILP, and a lively campaign ensued to belatedly implement the Public Libraries Act in Glasgow.²⁷³ On the motion of another Stalwart, John Ferguson, councillors agreed by a majority vote that the Corporation should promote its own Parliamentary Bill for the taxation of land values in Scotland.²⁷⁴ There was also much talk of introducing the "living wage" and generally improving the conditions of the municipal workforce, to the extent that employees from the larger departments like Cleansing, Gas and Tramways began to make concerted moves to boost trade union organisation.²⁷⁵

However, it must not be construed from these joint initiatives that the relationship between Progressives and Stalwarts was to be mutually reinforcing. The Stalwarts were themselves a mixture of conflicting political interests, constituting radical Liberal, Irish nationalist and ILP elements.²⁷⁶ Sometimes they shared the same objectives as the Progressives, at other times their views clashed, for reasons that were not always to do with essentially "labour" issues. The circumstances surrounding the 1897 election in the Springburn Ward have been described elsewhere in this thesis,

where Stalwart and Progressive candidates confronted each other in an acrimonious contest, soured by controversy over temperance and religion.²⁷⁷ The subsequent Stalwart victory was bitterly resented by Progressives, not least Samuel Chisholm, who resolutely believed that the Stalwarts had colluded with his publican arch-enemies to secure the defeat. Nor were Chisholm's suspicions wholly unfounded; evidence suggests that there was substance to the claim that the labour ranks were being deliberately "nobbled" by the drinks' trade - as the Glasgow Observer bluntly put it - in a bid to play off populist candidates against Progressives, and weaken the latter's position within the municipality.²⁷⁸

The Springburn election had one long-term result; it was an important catalyst for the formation of the Citizens' Union, about which a good deal has been written in relation to its rôle in the crusade against municipal socialism in Glasgow.²⁷⁹ Yet while there can be no doubt that the Union was latterly a tenacious watchdog in defence of its own ideas of "good government", with a strong sense of purpose, it had not always been so positive in its objectives.²⁸⁰ This was because the Union's original rationale was based on the sole desire to eliminate the disreputable Stalwart presence from the City Chambers, to be replaced by men who were vaguely described as manifesting more "suitable" characteristics.²⁸¹ The organisation was deliberately conceived of as "non-political and

unsectarian", and the list of individuals attending the inaugural meeting of the proposed "Citizens' Committee" reflected this ideal, as far as was possible under the circumstances of overwhelmingly middle-class collaboration.²⁸² Accordingly, Progressives were to the fore in the Union's early days, including Peter Burt and William Cochran, the defeated municipal candidates in Springburn.²⁸³ Burt went so far as to accept one of the Vice-Presidencies, and bearing in mind that he was an ardent single-taxer and one of Chisholm's closest henchmen, it can be seen that at this stage the Union was scarcely in a position to turn on the policies of some of its leading lights, and risk losing its self-proclaimed "unsectarian" image.

Another enthusiastic supporter of the Citizens' Union was the doyen of municipal socialism in Glasgow, Robert Crawford. In a rally prior to the 1898 elections, where the Union was supporting assorted "respectable" candidates in opposition to the Stalwarts, the Glasgow Herald reported the former councillor as saying:²⁸⁴

They had in the Council what might be called the Socialistic group, whose object it was to municipalise everything. He [Crawford] had every sympathy with the idea of advancement in line with municipal progress, but he looked upon the Socialistic movement as being the worst enemy of municipal progress.

Crawford was echoing the sentiments of his great political leader, Joseph Chamberlain, who by now had thrown in his lot

with the Conservative Government and was firmly ensconced in the Colonial Office. Chamberlain, who had done so much to promote municipal socialism in the 1880s, looked askance at the "new Radicals" who were emerging from the Labour ranks. Showing perhaps a touch of jealousy, he disdainfully dismissed their philosophy as sterile, aiming to:²⁸⁵

... merge the individual in the state, to
reduce all to one dead level of uniformity,
in which the inefficient, the thriftless and
the idle are to be confounded and treated
alike with the honest and the industrious and
the capable.

In a volte-face which would seem remarkable in anyone else, Chamberlain's view had come to encapsulate the main argument of the anti-municipalisers, whose voice throughout the United Kingdom was being heard with increasing stridency.

In order to fully appreciate the context of the anti-municipal debate, the focus must be briefly shifted from the particular experience of Glasgow to the general economic climate of the times. Various writers have cogently demonstrated that the late 1890s represented "the last great tide of pre-war urban investment", stimulated by rapid developments in the application of electricity, particularly as a source of motive power.²⁸⁶ Indeed, electrical energy now had revolutionary implications as the industry entered into the "take-off" stage, with the potential for creating a much larger market than the limited demand for lighting could have allowed.

One result was that between 1898 and 1902 an increasing number of local authorities exercised the option to generate their own electricity, to the extent that public supply connections soon came to be overwhelmingly from the municipal sector.²⁸⁷ Understandably, the rapid consolidation of the municipal position was viewed with dismay by private entrepreneurs, who felt squeezed out from the opportunity to take advantage of the new technological conditions. Electricity had become a resource which was better suited to large-scale generation, and it made sounder economic sense to operate from one centrally-located power station than from a plethora of costly smaller units.²⁸⁸ By the 1900s, the basis of control in the industry needed to be radically readjusted to reap maximum returns, and it was the battle over the future of electricity - whether in the public or private domain - which stimulated heated discussion as to the whole nature of municipal ownership.

Developments in London graphically illustrated the direction that the anti-municipal debate was taking. Ken Young, the LOC's historian, has explained in detail of how Moderate fears of Progressive power were rooted in the latter's strong centralising impulse, which subsequently came to be refined into what H.G. Wells described as "delocalization".²⁸⁹ In a push against this trend, and after bitter propaganda warfare, the Conservative Government created twenty-eight new borough councils for London in 1899; a realisation, incidentally, of the

Chamberlainite ideal of localism within a centralist framework, which was never to be implemented in Glasgow.²⁹⁰ However, the Moderates remained thoroughly alarmed that the Progressives might still have the opportunity to introduce some of their pet projects, particularly as these entered into the contentious area of electricity supply. The awesome prospect that some four million Londoners could fall prey to monopoly municipal control was enough to prompt a vigorous campaign against the notion of "London, Ltd.", led by Lord Avebury, a former LCC Chairman and director of the City of London Electric Lighting Company.²⁹¹ Along with powerful allies, notably in the Liberty and Property Defence League, Avebury was eventually successful in securing a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee into municipal trading, with a remit to determine whether local government activity actually was destabilising the free market and overburdening unwilling ratepayers.²⁹²

As one of the largest municipalities in the British Isles, Glasgow Corporation made an important contribution when the proceedings of the Select Committee were held during the summer of 1900. The city's principal witness was Lord Provost Samuel Chisholm, who only a few months previously had won the Civic Chair, with the reluctant support of the Stalwarts.²⁹³ In order to ascertain whether local authorities had embarked on a deliberately obstructive policy towards private industry, Chisholm was probed about Glasgow's previous sluggishness in the

exploitation of its powers to supply electricity; a point which he was forced to concede, although he did stress that electrical power "was a comparatively untried enterprise in 1890".²⁹⁴ He was then cross-examined about a contentious area of municipal trading in Glasgow, which had been very recently given Parliamentary sanction; the provision of a Corporation-run telephone service, covering a massive area of 143 square miles.²⁹⁵ This new enterprise was in direct competition with the long-established National Telephone Company, which bitterly resented the intrusion of local government into its near-monopoly domain. While Chisholm claimed that the Corporation had taken on its new task for the sake of efficiency, the witness for the National Telephone Company bluntly accused the Corporation of empire-building.²⁹⁶ Fears of creeping centralisation only compounded the anti-municipal argument against Glasgow's telephone system, although it should be added that the Government had long favoured a State-run service to operate in tandem with the electric telegraph, which had been nationalised as early as 1870.²⁹⁷

The outcome of the 1900 Select Committee was inconclusive, despite the submission of weighty evidence from assorted interest groups expressing the pro- and anti- point of view.²⁹⁸ Committee members felt unable to define the precise limits of municipal trading, believing that the question had to be considered in more depth before the Government could take

appropriate action. Yet the clamour against municipalisation did not die down as a result of this setback. Instead, the campaign was conducted with renewed vigour, using every possible device to impress the menace of municipal socialism on the public consciousness. The aggressive mood of patriotism which had been fostered by the Boer War helped considerably; socialism could be depicted as alien and subversive, an easy target for the barbs of the anti-municipalisers. Moreover, there were clear signs that organisationally the movement was aiming to sharpen its profile, and co-ordinate anti-municipal activity within the localities. In this context, the exploits of Emile Garcke have been well-documented; a German-born electrical engineer, he held an influential position within the London Chamber of Commerce, and was the driving force behind the Industrial Freedom League, formed in 1902 as a municipal pressure group.²⁹⁹ North of the border the activities of Arthur Kay are not so well-known, but this noted patron of the Scottish arts was undoubtedly the lynchpin in Glasgow's anti-municipal movement, and remained a trenchant critic of Corporation policy for nearly forty years.

A Glaswegian, born and bred, Kay was connected with the extensive city warehousing firm of Arthur & Co., where his father was a partner.³⁰⁰ However, like several Glasgow businessmen of his generation, he devoted much of his time to the fine arts, becoming an acknowledged expert in the early

Dutch school and a noted connoisseur.³⁰¹ During his youth he had acquired a buccaneering image, travelling extensively in the wilder parts of Africa and Australasia. In later life, Kay's fearless qualities stood him in good stead, and he was looked upon as a likely candidate for high municipal honours. Yet he resolutely refused to stand as a councillor, preferring to channel his formidable organisational energies into exerting pressure from outside the Corporation. His father, John R. Kay, had been associated with the formation of the Citizens' Union in 1898, and Kay, junior, continued the family connection.³⁰²

He soon came to appreciate that the Union's rather muddled sense of identity was causing problems in the electoral sphere, despite its committed anti-Stalwart stance. This was especially so after Samuel Chisholm became Lord Provost, and Glasgow's reputation as a bastion of Progressivism intensified. Critics found difficulty in reconciling the Union's stance as protector of "good government" with continuing endorsement of Progressive candidates in elections. Attempts were made in 1900 and 1901 to promote rival pressure groups, with more clearly stated aims against the spread of municipal trading.³⁰³ While these were dismal failures, Kay realised that for the Citizens' Union to survive, it had to determine the exact nature of its relationship with the Progressives. His own instincts were strongly antipathetic to the Chisholmite ethos, and he therefore started to pull the organisation in the direction of outright

opposition to the Lord Provost's policies.

Towards the end of 1901 Kay was helped enormously in his endeavours by revived talk of housing action by the Corporation. As in 1896-97, the new strategy was the brainchild of Lord Provost Chisholm, who still retained the Convenership of the City Improvement Trust. Commencing his campaign in the forum of a Corporation lecture on the topic of "Our Nether City and Its Needs", Chisholm made an emotional appeal to the audience:³⁰⁴

There were growing up in our midst hundreds of thousands who would become, not our future paupers, but our future criminals, who would display, if they were permitted so to grow up, a barbarism equalling anything that the world has ever seen ... The question would come to be whether they [Glasgow's citizens] were to allow things to go on as they are, and to wait until a slow, sluggish, landlord-ridden Parliament altered the law. He believed they would say - "No, we shall put our hands in our pockets and pay that which we shall be compelled to pay, rather than to permit families to live, children to be born and die in the condition of things which now exists".

However, Arthur Kay was determined that Glasgow's ratepayers should not be compelled to dig into their pockets, in order that Chisholm could realise the Progressive vision of the regenerated city. In April 1902 his counter-campaign swung into action, following the Corporation's firm decision to promote a Provisional Order allowing borrowing powers of up to £750,000 for the construction of working-class housing.³⁰⁵ Not that Kay suggested the Order be immediately rescinded; instead, he

diplomatically advocated delay, pending the outcome of a proposed Municipal Commission on Housing, which would thoroughly examine the needs of the community and all the options for improvement.³⁰⁶

In more ways than one, April 1902 marked a turning point in the municipal fortunes of Samuel Chisholm, and the extraordinary events leading to his defeat in the November elections have been documented elsewhere in this thesis.³⁰⁷ Yet for the meantime, one important point should be stressed; it was not the housing question which caused the voters of Woodside Ward to reject Chisholm as their municipal candidate, nor did the Citizens' Union openly campaign against him, despite strong misgivings.³⁰⁸ The evidence points to the drinks' trade as the principal architect of the Lord Provost's downfall, in retribution against the ostentatious prohibitionist tendencies manifested by some of Glasgow's more zealous Magistrates. Nevertheless, Arthur Kay and the Citizens' Union did play a part in the destabilisation tactics which ultimately led to the Woodside débâcle. In particular, the Union supplied information to the writer of the infamous articles on "Municipal Socialism" which appeared in The Times between August and November 1902, and which singled out the Glasgow administration as an extreme example of civic collectivism.³⁰⁹ The controversy generated by the articles was personally damaging to Chisholm, because in his capacity as Lord Provost it focused attention on him as

leader of what was allegedly the most municipalised local authority in the United Kingdom.³¹⁰ There were also political overtones to the affair; in a veiled attack on Liberal policy, The Times suggested that the Stalwarts - and their subversive Georgeite ideas - could not have won a power-base without Progressive encouragement.³¹¹ Accordingly, the Stalwarts had been helped by: "... political sentimentalists who coquetted with the theories and principles advanced, and became more or less active helpers in the general movement".³¹²

Chisholm's defeat was to have important implications both for the future direction of Corporation policy and for perceptions of municipal socialism in the city. In the first instance, Parliament rejected the Chisholm-inspired Provisional Order, interpreting the Woodside defeat as a signal that the scheme did not have the confidence of ratepayers.³¹³ The sudden failure of Progressive housing policy and Corporation reluctance to revive such a contentious issue meant that the initiative on this subject passed decisively into Labour hands; or - more precisely - ILP hands, as the Stalwart alliance was beginning to fracture irredeemably.³¹⁴ Secondly, the Corporation was seen to adopt a lower municipal profile, in a bid to exorcise some of the more lurid claims made by The Times in 1902. The barely concealed political rivalry which had entered civic affairs during the 1890s was regarded as having seriously tarnished the city's image, and so a partial truce was

called by the two main interest groups on the Corporation. It was not coincidental that thereafter the Lord Provostship rotated between one side or another, in order to demonstrate that Glasgow's prime municipal position was not the monopoly of a single party.³¹⁵ Paradoxically, the conscious need to display such non-partisanship was an indication that by the 1900s the city's social élites were no longer sure of their ground. The rise of Labour had shown that a substantial body of the electorate was quite prepared to go against the unspoken rules which had hitherto governed the municipal power-base, and so Glasgow's Progressives and "Moderates" drew steadily closer in an attempt to fend off the Labour challenge.³¹⁶

In November 1902, John Ure Primrose summed up the prevailing mood of caution, immediately after his election as Lord Provost to succeed the ill-fated Chisholm:³¹⁷

Might I suggest a period - not of lethargy,
not of indifference to pressing progressive
work - but a period mainly devoted to
consolidation, reorganisation and - subject
to these - economy.

Primrose was a close friend and confidant of Robert Crawford, from the same radical background and sharing similarly idealistic views about the nature of local government.³¹⁸ In some ways, therefore, Lord Provost Primrose was riding the tide of the times, in order to appease the more influential ratepayers' opinion. In reality, the previous municipal programme had built up a momentum that was not readily

stoppable, as the Corporation had invested too much in the existing enterprises to abruptly call a halt. Accordingly, the capital-intensive public utilities - notably water, gas and tramways - were regarded as sacrosanct, with standards of excellence that had to be consistently maintained. Above all, Glasgow Corporation had a long-standing policy of territorial expansionism, which councillors were reluctant to relinquish. A policy of wholesale retrenchment was consequently impracticable, even if it had been desired by the majority of civic representatives.

Arthur Kay was someone who fully understood the difference between Corporation pronouncements and intentions in 1902. Although Kay and the Citizens' Union had dissociated themselves from the highly questionable tactics which were used to unseat Chisholm, the Lord Provost's departure and the demise of his "wild-cat" housing scheme did show that organised municipal pressure could yield fruitful returns, both in practical terms and by raising the public consciousness. During 1902, Union representatives had been in contact with the Industrial Freedom League, and it was this connection which seems to have inspired Kay to extend the anti-municipal sphere of activity in Glasgow.³¹⁹ In January 1903 he was instrumental in forming the Ratepayers' Federation Ltd., an organisation with which he was to be closely identified until his death in 1939.³²⁰ The Federation was emphatically not a rival to the Citizens Union,

as Kay intended that the two should operate in tandem, the one representing residential ratepayers' interests, the other acting on behalf of business ratepayers. The Union and Federation were effectively Siamese twins, and under Kay's strict co-ordination the organisations shared such common cause that they eventually merged during the 1920s. However, prior to this time, the Federation was always the more powerful of the two, because Kay was able to attract wealthy and influential support from Glasgow's business community, particularly property, coal, shipping and railway interests.³²¹

Without question, there was a strong ideological dimension to the Federation's activities, and it performed so well in producing anti-socialist propaganda that its leaflets were distributed by the pro-Moderate London Municipal Society during LCC elections.³²² This was all part of its consciousness raising rôle; the spectre of socialism was a useful expedient for determining loyalties and sorting out the "responsible" from "irresponsible" citizens. Yet the fear of municipal expansionism, rather than the simplistic threat of "municipal socialism", was the prime rationale behind the Federation. Echoing the sentiments of LCC Moderates - with whom the Federation's leaders seem to have had a warm relationship - centralisation was perceived as the thin edge of a monolithic wedge, with the potential to encourage civic self-determination on the large-scale.³²³ In Scotland, such a prospect raised

the complicating devolution factor, especially after the Liberal Government was elected in 1906. Robert Bird - the Federation's Secretary - made his views on the matter quite clear, when the Corporation was actively promoting boundary expansion in 1907:³²⁴

Mr. CHAMBERLAIN, the greatest municipal genius that ever took a hand in civic affairs, has given his ... opinion that "a population of more than 500,000 cannot be governed to the best advantage from one centre"... Why should we seek to spread our skirts over green fields and pastures new, when at the heart of our city there are plague spots neglected and untouched? There is no command to the citizens of Glasgow to go forth and possess the earth until, like the soldiers of Xenophon, at length they behold the sea!

The sustained Corporation campaign to integrate the "ring of Burghs" surrounding the city reached a climax in 1911-12, and the Ratepayers' Federation Ltd. was to the fore in opposing the proposed Annexation Bill. Messrs. Bird and Kay liaised with burghal representatives from Partick and Govan in an effort to pressurise the Corporation, arguing that increased taxation and an over-centralised administration would inevitably result from boundary expansion.³²⁵ The Federation was particularly concerned that business interests were losing their grip on civic affairs, and that the annexation decision had been taken without due attention to the needs of commercial ratepayers. Part of the problem was attributed to the rise of limited liability companies, whose directors did not have the same

municipal voting rights as partners in private companies.³²⁶ This represented a mirror image of the situation identified by Albert Shaw in 1889, where Glasgow's restricted electoral system had ensured that "the whole body of men who are ignorant, vicious and irresponsible is practically outside the pale of politics".³²⁷ The wholehearted support of the ILP in favour of the Corporation's annexation strategy only added to the fears that the municipal power-base was undergoing an irreversible eroding process.

Of course, the Federation could not prevent the creation of the enlarged municipal entity of Glasgow. This tactical failure conformed with the general experience of the anti-municipal movement, which Richard Roberts suggests decisively "lost the argument" over public ownership prior to 1914.³²⁸ According to Roberts, the threat of socialism in the local government sphere was at this time negligible, and the debate was actually conducted between vested entrepreneurial interests, representing the municipal and private sectors. As the municipalities were deeply entrenched in their commitment to preserve existing services, while at the same time keen to take advantage of more favourable economic conditions, they mustered sufficient strength to win out over assorted external challenges. Bearing in mind that Glasgow Corporation did not succumb to Labour control until 1933, the city's reputation as the citadel of "municipal socialism" can therefore be placed in context.³²⁹

Moreover, the man who came to be identified as Glasgow's foremost practitioner of the municipal socialist ethos - Samuel Chisholm - was himself strongly anti-socialist.

This is not to suggest that the Labour impact during the pre-war period was insubstantial; indeed, as a disturbing presence in municipal affairs, labour representatives were able to exercise an influence which belied their numerical shortcomings. Yet - as has been shown - the links between Labour and a positive programme of "municipal socialism" in Glasgow were highly ambiguous, bound up with considerations which had as much to do with a personal and political power struggle among the ranks of the city's élites, as with increased social expectations within the wider community.

References

1. The Bailie, 27th October 1897.
2. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., page 7. Stevenson was writing in June 1914.
3. Ibid., pages 7-8. Although a Liberal, Stevenson referred to "drastic devolution or Home-Rule-All-Round" rather than make any specific reference to self-determination in the Scottish context. He was thus careful not to alienate Unionist sympathies by arousing overt nationalist sentiments, and disavow the Chamberlainite concept of local autonomy within the "imperialist" framework. See pages 178-182 for a fuller examination of the Unionist stance.
4. See, in particular, Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Boundaries Bill, 1912: Brief and Proofs, House of Commons, vol. II, SRA A3/1/255, for John Lindsay's painstaking comparative analysis of Glasgow and the outlying Police Burghs.
5. For more about Stevenson's background and ideology, see pages 554-555. A founder member of Glasgow's Fabian Society, and always on the fringe of socialist circles, Stevenson said in 1912, "... it ought to be admitted that it is very largely by members identified with the Socialist movement that the Corporation has been kept alive for years to the need of forward policy in various directions". Quoted in Forward, 9th November 1912.
6. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., page 2.
7. See Bernard Aspinwall, "Glasgow Trams and American Politics, 1894-1914", in Scottish Historical Review, vol. LVI, 1977, pages 64-84, for a detailed discussion of the cross-fertilisation of views and policies between Glasgow and the United States. Much of the substance of this article is repeated in Aspinwall's Portable Utopia, op. cit., pages 151-184.
8. Shaw, op. cit., page 127.
9. Aspinwall, Portable Utopia, op. cit., page 152. For Boss Tweed's significance to Glasgow, refer back to page 325 of this thesis.
10. G.R. Searle, The Quest for National Efficiency: a Study in British Politics and Political Thought, 1899-1914, (Oxford, 1971), pages 86-92.
11. Quoted in Aspinwall, Portable Utopia, op. cit., page 155.

The statement was first made by F.C. Howe in "Municipal Ownership in Great Britain", Bulletin of the Bureau of Labor, (Washington D.C., 1906), page 2.

12. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 302.

13. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., page 76.

14. Charles A. Oakley, The Last Tram, (Glasgow, 1962), page 79. Dalrymple increasingly came into conflict with town councillors during the 1920s, particularly as the Labour Group was growing in strength. It would be interesting to know how he survived in São Paulo, where there was an armed revolt against the Government in 1932. (This may, however, have been grist to his mill.)

15. 33 & 34 Victoria, cap. 175, [1870], "An Act to authorise the Construction of Street Tramways in certain parts of the City of Glasgow and its suburbs, and for other purposes".

16. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 1st October 1840, pages 419-421, SRA C1.1.62. This early public transport provision does not appear to have been followed through.

17. See Oakley, op. cit., pages 12-15, for the background to Andrew Menzies' "Tartan" omnibus service from the late 1840s.

18. See Charles Klapper, The Golden Age of Tramways, (London, 1961), pages 16-24, for an account of Train's sojourn in the United Kingdom.

19. Shaw, op. cit., page 127.

20. John P. McKay, Tramways and Trolleys: the Rise of Urban Mass Transport in Europe, (Princeton, 1976), page 17.

21. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 3rd December 1869. The speaker was Bailie William Millar.

22. Glasgow Town Council, General Minute Book of Committees, 1851-1871, 2nd February 1870, pages 395-396, SRA C2.2.3.

23. Glasgow Herald, 22nd November 1869.

24. Ibid., 25th November 1869.

25. Ibid.

26. Ibid.

27. 33 and 34 Victoria, cap. 78, [1870], "An Act to facilitate

the Construction and to regulate the Working of Tramways".

28. Alexander Donaldson Ochojna, Lines of Class Distinction: An Economic and Social History of the Tramcar, with Special Reference to Edinburgh and Glasgow, (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1974), page 222. Morton Coates Fisher and Dilwyn Parish, two of "Tramway" Train's American associates, were behind one of the syndicates. The other was headed by William Morris - not the Arts and Crafts exponent!

29. The full terms of the lease can be found in Robert Anderson (publisher), Jubilee of Glasgow Tramways, 1872-1922, (Glasgow, n.d., but c. 1922), pages 17-21.

30. Ochojna, op. cit., pages 223-224.

31. Oakely, op. cit., page 20. Andrew Menzies was the Managing Director of the Glasgow Tramways and Omnibus Company.

32. Ibid.

33. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 294.

34. Glasgow Town Council, Tramway Committee Minutes, 31st December 1883, pages 50-56, SRA C2.23.2.

35. Klapper, op. cit., page 32 and McKay, op. cit., page 168. See also Hugo Richard Meyer, Municipal Ownership in Great Britain, (London, 1906), pages 21-22, for a highly critical American interpretation of the 1870 Act, and its effect on "paralyzing" private initiative".

36. Quoted in McKay, op. cit., page 19.

37. Glasgow Herald, 23rd September 1871.

38. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 297.

39. Glasgow Town Council, Tramway Committee Minutes, 7th October 1884, pages 67-70, and 21st January 1885, page 98, SRA C2.23.2.

40. Under 48 and 49 Victoria, cap 156, [1885], "An Act to authorise the Lord Provost, Magistrates and Council of the City of Glasgow to construct additional Tramways, and for other purposes".

41. Glasgow Town Council, Tramways Committee Minutes, 28th April 1887, pages 248-250, SRA C2.23.2.

42. Oakley, op. cit., pages 35-38. A photograph shows the town

councillors inspecting the new electric trams, covering the Mitchell Street-Sprngburn route.

43. Ochojna, op. cit., pages 310-313.

44. The Tramways Company was required to run special "workmen's cars" at half-fare, between five and seven o'clock, mornings and evenings.

45. J.J. Bell, I Remember, (Edinburgh, 1932), page 20.

46. Oakley, op. cit., pages 22-23.

47. See Ochojna, op. cit., page 259, for a table of all dividends paid out by the Glasgow Comany between 1870 and 1894. A percentage of 10.5 was paid out in 1888, and thereafter dividends dropped to 3.75 per cent. in 1894.

48. Glasgow Town Council, Tramway Committee Minutes, 31st December 1883, pages 48-49, SRA C2.23.2.

49. Ibid., 29th November 1883, page 46.

50. Ibid., 27th December 1883, page 47.

51. McKay, op. cit., pages 35-83, goes into the technical details.

52. Ibid., page 168.

53. Ibid., page 171.

54. See Ochojna, op. cit., page 86, where he argues that municipalisation, "... made electrification viable several years ahead of demand conditions Municipalisation, at the very least, coincided with electrification, it may have hastened it, and it certainly did not retard it".

55. Oakley, op. cit., page 31. The majority of the horses acquired by Young were Irish-bred. Young himself had considerable knowledge of the beasts, being a farmer's son.

56. See McKay, op. cit., pages 25-27, and Klapper, op. cit., page 35.

57. McKay, op. cit., page 52.

58. Glasgow Town Council, Tramway Committee Minutes, 10th December 1884, pages 91-92, and 26th March 1885, pages 106-107, SRA C2.23.2.

59. Ibid., 25th June 1885, page 114.
60. Ibid., 3rd October 1890, pages 327-330.
61. Ibid., page 329.
62. Ibid., 29th January 1891, page 352. The Glasgow and Ibrox Tramways Company, dating from 1877, was never profitable, and was bankrupt by the 1890s.
63. Ibid., page 353.
64. Ibid., 27th November 1884, page 82, and 9th September 1885, page 119.
65. Ibid., 29th March 1890, page 316.
66. Ibid.
67. See W. Hamish Fraser, "Labour and the Changing City", in George Gordon (ed.), Perspectives of the Scottish City, (Aberdeen, 1985), pages 166-177.
68. See the Glasgow Herald, 23rd September 1889, for a detailed and colourful description of the Trades' Council demonstration against the revival of the tramway lease, held on 21st September. In an editorial, the Herald was fulsome in its praise, "... for once trade unionism seems to have been altruistic".
69. See ibid., 13th November 1891, for the debate over the decision to municipalise. In 1890, legal counsel - in the persons of the Attorney General and Lord Advocate - gave opinion that under the terms of the 1870 local Act, the Town Council had the right to work the tramways. See Glasgow Town Council, Tramway Committee Minutes, 22nd August 1890, pages 324-326.
70. Glasgow United Trades' Council, Annual Report, 1888-89, page 9.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid., page 10.
73. See ibid., 1887-88, page 10, where it is argued that if Town Council meetings were held in the evening, "bona fide working men" would be unable to attend.
74. Glasgow Herald, 6th November 1889.
75. Ibid.

76. Quoted in *ibid*, 2nd October 1889.
77. For more about Caldwell, see pages 798-799.
78. In addition to James Martin, Archibald C. Holms, James McLennan, Hugh Mayberry, Alexander Osborne, Walter Paton and Thomas Watson voted to defer the decision to municipalise. Paton, it should be added, was Convener of the Tramways Committee in 1894, when the Council took over the lease for operating the system.
79. See pages 304-305.
80. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 13th November 1891.
81. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, *op. cit.*, page 70. Charles Oakley, *op. cit.*, page 28, repeats the "official" view that the tramways had been a source of contention during the 1890 and 1891 elections.
82. Glasgow Herald, 4th November 1891.
83. *Ibid*.
84. *Ibid.*, 24th October 1891.
85. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 299.
86. Oakley, *op. cit.*, page 29.
87. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, pages 299-300.
88. Glasgow Corporation, Tramway Committee Minutes, 7th February 1894, pages 227-228; 25th September 1895, page 368; 29th January 1896, page 339. SRA C2.23.3.
89. Forward, 22nd April 1911, outlines the background to the tramway workers' grievances.
90. Herman Finer, Municipal Trading: A Study in Public Administration, (London, 1941), page 36.
91. Finer makes particular reference to "water-supply, the conduct of markets and the management of harbours and docks". All were areas of municipal interest in Glasgow even in the eighteenth century. See *ibid*.
92. The story of the Birmingham gas municipalisation is told in two studies by Asa Briggs, viz. History of Birmingham, Volume II: Borough and City, 1865-1938, (Oxford, 1952), pages 72-74, and Victorian Cities, *op. cit.*, pages 219-223. See also

Hennock, *op. cit.*, pages 117-121. However, there is a distinct impression that both writers have viewed events through Chamberlain-tinted spectacles, as references to contemporary doubts or opposition to the project are suspiciously muted.

93. In this context, Douglas Knoop's, Principles and Methods of Municipal Trading, (London, 1912), which has been identified as "the first academically reputable survey of the subject". See P.J. Waller, Town, City and Nation: England, 1850-1914, (Oxford, 1983), page 312.

94. The Glasgow Gas-light Company handed over its properties as from 1st June 1869, while the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow did so from 1st July 1869. The Birmingham (Corporation) Gas Act received the Royal Assent on 2nd August 1875.

95. Hennock, *op. cit.*, pages 120-121.

96. *Ibid.*, pages 118-119.

97. Malcolm Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", in Business History, vol. XIX, no. 2, 1977, page 152, for a statement of the number of municipal corporations adopting water and gas supplies before 1914. Prior to 1866, the number of publicly-owned gas undertakings was twenty-eight, but between 1866 and 1875 thirty-eight additional undertakings came under municipal control.

98. Glasgow Corporation, Glasgow Corporation Gas Department: A Brief Account of the Inauguration and Development of the City's Gas Supply until its Absorption in the Nationalised Gas Industry on 1st May 1949, (Glasgow, 1949), page 9.

99. *Ibid.* Apparently grandfather Lumsden, "... made gas in a small retort heated in his fireplace, and lighted his shop with it". His well-known descendants were responsible for respectively (a) promoting the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow in 1843; and (b) holding the first Convenership of the municipal Gas Committee in 1869.

100. There would appear to be some dubiety as to the spelling of the "Glasgow Gas-light Company". Several variations exist, eg. "Gaslight", "Gas Light", "Gas-Light", but "Gas-light" has been used in this thesis, as it was the favoured version in the 1869 Glasgow Corporation Gas Act.

101. Formed under 57 George III, cap. 41, [1817], "An Act for Lighting the City and Suburbs of Glasgow with Gas, and for other purposes relating thereto". For the background to the Company's formation, see Michael Stuart Cotterill, The Scottish Gas Industry up to 1914, (unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of

Strathclyde, 1976), pages 1007-1008. Kirkman Finlay and Henry Monteith were the driving forces in encouraging municipal support for the venture.

102. Malcolm Falkus, "The British Gas Industry before 1850", in Economic History Review, 2nd Series, vol. XX, 1978, page 495.

103. Two innovations helped to encourage the domestic use of gas; the gas mantle and the slot meter. See Waller, op. cit., page 304.

104. Some background to the Company's financial affairs is given in Glasgow Town Council, First Report of the Commissioners for the Examination of the Glasgow Gas Light Company's Books and Accounts, loc. cit.

105. 6 George IV, cap. 35, [1825], "An Act for enabling the Glasgow Gas-light Company to raise a further sum of money, and for other purposes relating thereto".

106. Glasgow Town Council, First Report of the Commissioners for the Examination of the Glasgow Gas Light Company's Books and Accounts, loc. cit.

107. 6 and 7 Victoria, cap. 59, [1843], "An Act for the better supplying and lighting with Gas the City and Suburbs of Glasgow and Places adjacent, and for other purposes".

108. See the Glasgow Herald, 17th March 1843, for the debate within the Town Council over whether to support the Parliamentary application of the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow.

109. For the Anderson-Bankier water interest, see pages 239-240.

110. Glasgow Herald, 14th March 1845. See also the First Report of the Commissioners for Inquiring into the State of Large Towns and Populous Districts, vol. II, PP., 1844, XVII.I, pages 89-98, for the evidence of Thomas Hawksley, which so influenced Messrs. Anderson and Bankier. Intriguingly, Hawksley used the Glasgow example pre-1843 to show that gas monopoly had resulted in a price diminution, which was threatened by the advent of competition.

111. Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", loc. cit., page 146.

112. Finer, op. cit., page 45. For Greenock, see the New Statistical Account of Scotland, Volume VII: Renfrew-Argyll, (Edinburgh & London, 1845), page 442. Other Scottish pioneers

of municipal control included Paisley, Port Glasgow, Renfrew and Rothesay.

113. Glasgow Herald, 17th October 1845.

114. For the prospectus of the Glasgow and Suburban Consumers' Gas Company, see *ibid.*

115. *Ibid.*

116. Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", *loc. cit.*, page 147.

117. *Finer, op. cit.*, page 47.

118. Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", pages 139 and 147-150.

119. Comparisons made in *ibid.*, page 152.

120. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, pages 264-265.

121. See Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 16th October 1856, pages 507-508, SRA C1.1.67, for the decision to meet with the gas proprietors. According to Councillor James Martin, (the leather merchant, who should not be confused with "Jeems" of East End fame), the question had never been properly put before the Council, and he raised strenuous objections to the terms subsequently agreed. See *ibid.*, 28th May 1857, pages 625-626. Lord Provost Orr, it would seem, had been authorised to enter into discussions, but not to propose any settlement.

122. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 265. The terms provisionally agreed were fixed at perpetual annuities of eight per cent. on the nominal amount of shares, or a money payment to individual shareholders double the nominal amount of each share. The failure of the 1857 proposals meant that each Company was immediately able to increase its capital by £50,000.

123. See the Glasgow Herald, 21st August 1857, for Lord Provost Orr's explanation of the decision to come to terms.

124. Quoted in *ibid.*

125. See *ibid.* While David Dreghorn steadfastly stood by the Lord Provost in supporting the gas acquisition, allies like Peter Clouston, James Couper, Andrew Gemmill and James Moir voted against.

126. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 20th August 1857, page 644, SRA C1.1.67.

127. See the pamphlet, Glasgow Gas Consumers' Committee, The Cheap Gas Movement: Report by the Committee appointed at the Public Meeting, held in the City Hall [14th September 1859] to Consider the Best Means of obtaining a Reduction in the Price of Gas, (Glasgow, 1861), SRA D-TC 14.1.18, MP18-228. The original meeting had resolved to investigate the financial affairs of the two Companies, and the pamphlet gave an up-to-date report of developments. Included were the recommendations of John Cox, a consultant engineer, who advised the Consumers' Committee that his preferred solution to Glasgow's gas problem was the creation of a third Company.
128. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 5th September 1867, pages 290-291, SRA C1.1.67.
129. Glasgow Herald, 6th September 1867.
130. Quoted in *ibid*.
131. See the Glasgow Herald, 16th December 1868, for a report of the debate over the submission of the two Bills.
132. In the House of Commons, Session 1869, Glasgow Corporation (New Works, &c): Petition of the Glasgow Gas-light Company, Against, By Counsel, in SRA D-TC 14.1.15, MP15-424.
133. A formal offer was made to the Companies on 11th March 1869, but was refused. However, terms were finalised by May, following the Town Council's decision not to proceed with the "New Works" provisions. See the Minute of Agreement between the Committee of Directors, the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow and the Committee of the Town Council of Glasgow, 13th May 1869, in SRA D-TC 14.1.15, MP15-238.
134. 32 and 33 Victoria, cap. 58, [1869], "An Act to transfer and vest in the Corporation of Glasgow the Undertakings of the Glasgow Gas-light Company and the City and Suburban Gas Company of Glasgow, and for other purposes". See clause XI for the terms of the purchase. The Act is contained a compilation of relevant gas legislation prepared by James D. Marwick, Acts of Parliament and other Documents relating to the Glasgow Corporation Gas Works, with the Several Acts incorporated therewith, or having Reference thereto; Explanatory Notes and Cases, etc., and Index, (Glasgow, 1892).
- It should be noted that James Salmon recorded his dissent over the sale terms as being "unreasonable and unheard of", because of the cost involved. Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 1st April 1869, page 460, SRA C1.1.69.
135. Martin insisted that his dissent be recorded against the proposed acquisition of the Gas Companies, and his reasons are

inscribed in *ibid.*, 7th January 1869, pages 426-428. The quote is taken from the last page. Councillors John Chalmers and John Mitchell endorsed Martin's stance.

136. Glasgow Herald, 17th December 1868.

137. See the editorial in *ibid.*, 21st December 1868, where it is stated, "We daresay it is the opinion of most people now that gas comes under the list of those articles which a community may with utmost safety supply for itself, and be both better and cheaper served. The Corporation have been too long in making up their minds to take this step, and will have to pay for the delay".

138. *Ibid.*, 16th December 1868. The taxation clause in the Gas Bills prompted a division in the Council, but was carried by twenty-six votes to eleven. See also *ibid.*, 27th January 1869, where George Jackson spoke out against the proposed taxation at a "numerously attended" joint meeting of the Ward Committees.

139. For Collins's role in municipal temperance affairs, see pages 628-632. For his precise objections to the gas taxation clause, see William Collins, A Few Facts and Figures bearing on the Glasgow Corporation Gas Works Purchase Bill, (Glasgow, 1869), in SRA D-TC 14.1.18, MP14-252.

140. Reported in the Glasgow Herald, 9th January 1869. Appropriately enough, the dinner took place in the McLellan Galleries. Bailie William Taylor - who in 1878 was to be one of the disgraced City of Glasgow Bank Directors - took the Chair.

141. Quoted in *ibid.*

142. Quoted in *ibid.*

143. *Finer*, *op. cit.*, page 39.

144. *Ibid.*

145. See, for instance, the remarks of Lord Provost Samuel Chisholm in the Report from the Joint Select Committee of the House of Lords and House of Commons on Municipal Trading, together with the Proceedings of the Committee, Minutes of Evidence and Appendix, PP., 1900, (305), VII, page 215. In response to a question, "Do you conduct these undertakings for trading purposes?", Chisholm's brief, but effective answer was, "No, not for trading purposes, we conduct them simply in the interests of the citizens". [Q. 2653.]

146. For a discussion of the prevailing attitudes in Scotland at the turn of the century, see *Atkinson*, *op. cit.*, pages

294-300, where Chisholm's altruistic sentiments (above) are referred to, and the Glasgow experience is dealt with at length.

147. Bell and Paton, op. cit., page 273. Birmingham made much of its new Art Gallery, built in 1885 and funded by the gas profits. Symbolically, the Gallery was located in the same building as the municipal Gas Offices. It was - and remains - famous for its collection of pre-Raphaelite drawings and paintings. See Briggs, History of Birmingham, op. cit., pages 112-113.

148. See pages 167-168.

149. For the debate over whether the clause should be amended, see the Glasgow Herald, 16th December 1868.

150. Ibid.; also Cotterill, op. cit., page 1039, and E.P. Hennock, "Finance and Politics in Urban Local Government in England, 1835-1900", in the Historical Journal, vol. VI, no. 2, 1963, pages 222, for some background to Manchester's use of the gas profits for "improvement" purposes.

151. See pages 143-145. In 1869, the newly-municipalised Gas Trust covered the following areas beyond the city boundary: Partick, Hillhead, Kelvinside, Yoker, Redtown, Maryhill, Springburn, Hogganfield, Bishopbriggs, Auchinairn, Parkhead, Westmuir, Tollcross, Shettleston, Baillieston, Rutherglen, Strathbungo, Langside, Crossmyloof, Old Cathcart, Govan, Three Mile House and Eastwood.

152. Under clause 84 of the 1869 Glasgow Corporation Gas Act, the relevant sentence reading, "And may carry any balance thereof to the credit of the Corporation for their general purposes".

153. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 268-269.

154. Cotterill, op. cit., page 1041. Output had increased to 8,000,000 cubic feet per day by 1883.

155. The Partick, Hillhead & Maryhill Gas Company was effectively administered by the Burghs of Partick, Hillhead and Maryhill, although as such a collective arrangement was illegal under the Police Acts, the undertaking remained nominally in private hands. Because of general Government policy favouring municipal control, the Company was never incorporated under Act of Parliament. Becoming operational in 1873, part of the rationale behind its formation was to provide a cheaper service for suburban consumers, who had been compelled to pay a differential price for gas by Glasgow Town Council. Although the practice was soon stopped as a result of suburban pressure,

the Company's strong anti-annexationist stance caused many headaches for Glasgow town councillors until 1891. The legal firm of James Muirhead, Clerk to Hillhead Burgh, also acted for the Company, which by 1890 was the fifth largest gas supplier in Scotland behind Glasgow, Edinburgh, Dundee and Aberdeen. For some background information, see Glasgow Town Council, Partick, Hillhead and Maryhill Gas and Electricity Bills, 1890, SRA A3/1/131.

156. See the feature article about the Scheme's inauguration in the North British Daily Mail, 1st May 1885.

157. Ibid.

158. Ibid.

159. 39 and 40 Victoria, cap. 49, [1876], "An Act to make provision for lighting Burghs in Scotland with Gas". Short title, "The Burghs Gas Supply (Scotland) Act, 1876".

160. Ibid., clause 41.

161. Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", loc. cit., page 138.

162. Hennock, "Finance and Politics in Urban Government", loc. cit., page 221. See also Atkinson, op. cit., page 296.

163. Glasgow Herald, 21st August 1857.

164. Quoted in *ibid.*

165. Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 272-273.

166. John R. Hume, The Industrial Archaeology of Glasgow, (Glasgow and London, 1974), page 139. St. Enoch Station was opened in 1876.

167. Leslie Hannah, Electricity before Nationalisation: A Study in the Development of the Electricity Supply Industry in Britain to 1948, (London and Basingstoke, 1979), page 4.

168. Ibid., pages 4-5.

169. Part of the rationale behind the Report from the Select Committee on Schemes by Local Authorities for Lighting by Electricity, PP., 1878-79, XI.375 (224), had been to consider the need for regulatory measures in electricity supply.

170. 45 and 46 Victoria, cap. 56, [1882], "An Act to facilitate and regulate the Supply of Electricity for Lighting and other

purposes in Great Britain and Ireland".

171. The influence of the anti-municipalisers will be dealt with in detail in the next section of this thesis. However, the classic argument against public control of the electricity industry is contained in Emil Garke's The Progress of Electrical Enterprise, (London, 1907).

172. Robert P. Porter, The Dangers of Municipal Trading, (London, 1907), page 212.

173. See clause 27 of the 1882 Electric Lighting Act; also, Hannah, *op. cit.*, pages 5-6, and I.C.R. Byatt, The British Electrical Industry, 1875-1914: the Economic Returns to a New Technology, (Oxford, 1979), page 199.

174. *Ibid.*, page 7. See also Samuel Chisholm's evidence to the 1900 Select Committee on Municipal Trading, *op. cit.*, page 219, where he admitted that the Town Council had not initially treated electricity as a priority. [Q. 2731-2733.]

175. Hannah, *op. cit.*, pages 6-9.

176. See the "Statement on behalf of Corporations and Local Boards supplying Gas within and beyond their Boroughs and Districts in support of Application for Referring the Bill to a Select Committee", in Glasgow Town Council, Electric Lighting Bills, 1882, pages 249-250, SRA A3/1/171. The local authorities which co-ordinated the movement to safeguard municipal gas interests were Aberdeen, Belfast, Birkinhead, Birmingham, Blackburn, Bolton, Glasgow, Leicester, Leeds, Manchester, Nottingham, Oldham, Salford and Wigan.

177. See *ibid.*, page 286, for a copy of correspondence between Messrs. Sharpe & Co., acting as solicitors for the local authorities, to Joseph Chamberlain, President of the Board of Trade, dated 1st August 1882. Paragraphs 3 (7) and 4 of the Act were later inserted at the behest of the municipalities.

178. Brian Bowers, A History of Electrical Light and Power, (London, 1982), page 155. Among the local authorities already supplying gas were Aberdeen, Blackburn, Bolton, Dundee, Glasgow, Greenock, Hull, Macclesfield and Manchester.

179. *Ibid.*

180. See Glasgow Town Council, Electric Lighting Bills, 1882, *op. cit.*, pages 1-78, for the municipal case against Siemens Brothers & Co.; the British Electric Light Company (Ltd.); the Electric Light and Powers Generator Company (Ltd.); and the Anglo-American Brush Electric Light Corporation.

181. For some background to the abortive 1883 Provisional Order, see Town Clerk Marwick's statement to the Gas Committee, reported in the Glasgow Herald, 22nd June 1889.

182. Ibid.

183. See the article by William W. Lackie, Chief Engineer to the Electricity Department, in *ibid.*, 14th December 1909.

184. *Ibid.*, 22nd June 1889; also, Glasgow Town Council, Minutes, 4th July 1889, page 407, SRA C1.1.73. Following the application by Messrs. Muir, Mavor & Coulson, seven other companies had applied for the right to supply electricity to Glasgow.

185. See pages 382-384.

186. Bowers, *op. cit.*, pages 158-159.

187. Glasgow Herald, 22nd June 1889. Marwick took an active role in promoting the 1890 Provisional Order.

188. Glasgow Town Council, Police Committee: Overhead Electric Wires Sub-Committee Minutes, 9th December 1889, SRA D-TC 14.1.22, MP14-184. Letter from William Paterson, Inspector of Fires, dated 6th December 1889.

189. *Ibid.*, page 185.

190. Part of Cardew's report is reproduced in the Glasgow Herald, 18th February 1890.

191. 53 and 54 Victoria, cap. 199, [1890], "Provisional Order made by the Board of Trade under the Electric Lighting Acts 1882 and 1888 relating to Glasgow".

192. Glasgow Herald, 25th June 1890.

193. *Ibid.*, 6th December 1890. Concern was expressed at the time over the small attendance at the tail-end of the meeting.

194. The ceremony is described in *ibid.*, 27th February 1893. See also Glasgow Corporation, Electricity Department: Description of Works for Lighting and Power, (Glasgow, 1906), page 14.

195. See pages 186-188.

196. Bell and Paton, *op. cit.*, page 274.

197. *Ibid.*

198. See the Glasgow Herald, 4th July 1897, for the statement of William Maclay, Convener of the Electricity Committee, about excessive price levels.
199. Sir Samuel Chisholm, "Municipal Enterprises", in Angus McLean (ed.), Local Industries of Glasgow and the West of Scotland, (Glasgow, 1901), page 223.
200. See the Glasgow Herald, 20th July 1897, for the debate over the proposed merger.
201. In this connection, the role of the Association of Municipal Corporations, established in 1872, was an important forum for co-ordinating activity. Although Glasgow was not formally involved, this did not prevent connections being made.
202. Quoted in Falkus, "The Development of Municipal Trading in the Nineteenth Century", loc. cit., pages 137-138.
203. "House of Lords, Session 1882, Electric Lighting Bill: Petition of Municipal Corporations and Local Boards who now Supply Gas both within their own Boroughs and Districts and also within other Districts, Against, by Counsel", in Glasgow Town Council, Electric Lighting Bills, 1882, page 292, SRA A3/1/71.
204. Finer, op. cit., page 57.
205. Porter, op. cit., pages 211-231.
206. Glasgow Herald, 23rd August 1888. See also *ibid.*, 22nd August 1888 for an extended centenary feature about the City Chambers in George Square. For the general background to the various "homes" of the Town Council before 1888, see Bell and Paton, op. cit., pages 76-86.
207. The 1888 International Exhibition is described in detail in Perilla and Juliet Kinchin's Glasgow's Great Exhibitions: 1888; 1901; 1911; 1938; 1988, (Bicester, 1988), pages 17-53.
208. Quoted in *ibid.*, pages 48-49. The original reference appeared on page 6 of the Art Journal, Glasgow Exhibition Special Number, July 1888. It should be added that electricity, and its technological applications, was a prominent feature of the Exhibition.
209. Albert Shaw, "Municipal Government in Great Britain", in Political Science Quarterly, vol. IV, no. 2, June 1889, pages 197-229. Shaw's views were later expanded into Municipal Government in Great Britain, op. cit., where he compared the civic administrations of Glasgow, Manchester, Birmingham and London.

210. See the Glasgow Herald, 27th May 1890, where Shaw's public relations efforts on behalf of the city are referred to with appreciation. The American journal which defended Birmingham's claim to hold unrivalled standards of municipal excellence was Harper's Magazine.

211. Glasgow Herald, 27th May 1890.

212. Quoted in *ibid.*, 19th February 1890.

213. *Ibid.*

214. For Crawford's personal background, see the biographical information contained in the Evening News and Star, 3rd November 1886; Glasgow Echo, 13th January 1894; George Eyre-Todd (ed.), Who's Who in Glasgow in 1909, (Glasgow, 1909), pages 51-52; the Glasgow Herald and the Glasgow News, 8th March 1915. For Crawford's own views about local government in Glasgow, see the two articles which he wrote for the Glasgow Herald on "The Principles of Municipal Reform", 22nd and 28th March 1893.

215. See the Glasgow Echo, 13th January 1894, for the claim that Crawford was the power behind the Civic Chair between 1889 and 1892.

216. Ruskin and Chamberlain came from a secure commercial background, and experienced much unhappiness in their personal lives. They shared the common experience of having been committed evangelicals, but later lost their religious faith. Like Chamberlain, Ruskin latterly had a dual ideological commitment, calling himself both "Tory and Communist". For Ruskin, see Joan Abse, John Ruskin: the Passionate Moralist, (London, 1980); for Chamberlain, there are numerous biographies, eg., Denis Judd, Radical Joe: a Life of Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1977), and J. Enoch Powell, Joseph Chamberlain, (London, 1977).

217. John Ruskin, "Unto This Last", (1862), appearing in the collection of essays, Unto This Last; The Political Economy of Art; Essays on Political Economy, (London, 1968), pages 108-193.

218. Quoted in the Glasgow Echo, 13th January 1894.

219. See *ibid.* Crawford and Cunninghame Graham were both prominently in attendance when Chamberlain delivered his famous "Radical Scotland" speech in September 1885.

220. Glasgow News, 8th March 1915.

221. David Whitham, Whatever Happened to Municipal Socialism?, (unpublished MA dissertation, Middlesex Polytechnic, 1989), page

103.

222. Sue Laurence, "Municipal Socialism, Municipal Trading and Public Utilities", in Bulletin of the Society for the Study of Labour History, vol. 52, no. 1, 1987, page 46.

223. Ibid. See also, William A. Robson, "The Public Utility Services", in Harold J. Laski, W. Ivor Jennings and William A. Robson (eds.), A Century of Municipal Progress: the Last Hundred Years, (London, 1935), pages 299-300.

224. See page 387.

225. H.M. Hyndman, "The Radicals and Socialism", in The Nineteenth Century, vol. XVIII, November 1885, pages 835-836.

226. Robert Keith Middlemass, The Clydesiders: A Left-Wing Struggle for Parliamentary Power, (London, 1965), page 24. As William Knox has pointed out, Middlemass's book is much flawed, and it is perhaps unfair to cite this reference. See Knox (ed.), Scottish Labour Leaders, 1918-39: A Biographical Dictionary, (Edinburgh, 1984), page 15. However, the notion of Liberal invincibility in Glasgow prior to 1914 is enduring, and Joan Smith has recently pursued this argument with far more sophistication than Middlemass. See Smith, Commonsense Thought and Working Class Consciousness: Some Aspects of the Glasgow and Liverpool Labour Movements in the Early Years of the Twentieth Century, (Unpublished Ph.D thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980).

227. "Truth Stands", Scathing Exposure of Scott Gibson, (Glasgow, 1902), page 10. Andrew Scott Gibson was Lord Provost Chisholm's successful opponent in the 1902 municipal elections; a good deal more about him will appear in these chronicles.

228. Linda J. Jones, "Public pursuit of Private Profit? Liberal Businessmen and Municipal Politics in Birmingham, 1865-1900", in Business History, vol. XXV, no. 3, 1985, pages 240-259.

229. The "Men of Mystery" flit in and out of the Glasgow Echo's biographical profiles of Glasgow town councillors, which appeared between January 1893 and August 1895. The Echo, it should be added, was a strongly pro-Liberal newspaper.

230. Glasgow's Lord Provosts during this period were: Sir William McOnie, 1883-86, Conservative; Sir James King, 1886-89, Conservative; Sir John Muir, 1889-92, Unionist; Sir James Bell, 1892-94, Unionist; Sir David Richmond, 1896-99, Unionist.

231. There had been adjustments to the Ward boundaries in 1869

and 1872, but these were not substantial.

232. The six Conservatives and Unionists were James Bell, Alexander Cuthbert, Robert Murdoch, John E. Nelson, Robert Sorley and Thomas Watson; the three Liberals were Samuel Chisholm, William Pettigrew and Daniel M. Stevenson.

233. Shaw, Municipal Government in Great Britain, op. cit., page 53.

234. Ochojna, op. cit., page 310.

235. Glasgow Trades' Council, Annual Report, 1894-95, pages 10-11.

236. Mitchell and Stewart were the first ILPers - as opposed to "Lib-Labs" - to be elected to Glasgow Town Council.

237. Ibid., 1895-96, pages 12-13.

238. The involvement of the SDF was not mentioned by the Trades' Council in the aforementioned Annual Report; however, The Bailie, 17th June 1896, does make reference to the SDF presence at the inaugural meeting of the Workers' Municipal Committee, held on 12th June.

239. See *ibid.*, 16th December 1896, where it is stated: "The Labour Party in the Town Council are elated with the position they have gained in that body. They certainly hold the balance of power, and in their hands practically lies the destinies of the city for the next three years".

240. A clean sweep of nine Liberal councillors were returned for the three wards in 1891.

241. The councillors were: Matthew Algie, Robert Anderson, John Breeze, James W. Dick, John Garey, William Hamilton, Archibald J. Hunter, John King, Alexander McCutcheon, William Maclay, Alexander Murray, James R. Paton, Alexander Sinclair and James Steele.

242. See pages 640-642 of this thesis. Sir William Collins was very much the driving force behind the Liberal campaign in the 1891 municipal elections.

243. The first poll for the newly-established London County Council was held in January 1889, and from the outset Progressives contested the elections. This radical coalition inherited the mantle of the London Municipal Reform League, which had been largely instrumental in securing the LCC's creation. See Ken Young and Patricia L. Garside, Metropolitan

London: Politics and Urban Change, 1837-1981, (London, 1982), pages 59-60. For the London Progressive programme, see Shaw, Municipal Government in Great Britain, op. cit., pages 349-353.

244. The Bailie, 28th October 1896. Woodside Ward was a stronghold of the Progressive Union.

245. John Burns, "Let London Live!", in The Nineteenth Century, vol. XXXI, April 1892, pages 673-685.

246. The Fabian influence in LOC became more marked during the 1900s. See Young and Garside, op. cit., pages 107-111.

247. Anthony Slaven and Sydney Checkland (eds.), Dictionary of Scottish Business Biography, 1860-1960: Vol. 1, The Staple Industries, (Aberdeen, 1986), page 293. Born in 1843, Overtoun was made a peer by Gladstone in 1893. A prominent supporter of Glasgow's United Evangelistic Association, he was subsequently to achieve notoriety for Keir Hardie's exposure of working conditions at his Shawfield Chemical Works in Rutherglen. An perceptive analysis of his "Jekyll and Hyde" qualities appears in The Bailie, 21st June 1899, but see also Donald Carswell, Brother Scots, (London, 1927), pages 191-211, for a more sympathetic view.

248. The obituary of White, senior, appears in the Glasgow Herald, 8th March 1884. Along with Sir William Collins he was to the fore in organising the City of Glasgow Bank Relief Fund.

249. The Bailie, 20th May 1896.

250. See pages 647-648.

251. The Bailie, 28th October 1896.

252. Again, see pages 633-664.

253. John Burns, "The London County Council: Towards a Commune", in The Nineteenth Century, vol. XXXI, March 1892, pages 496-514; Burns, "Let London Live!", op. cit.

254. Burns, "The London County Council: Towards a Commune", op. cit., page 513. The Moderate response to Burns was made by R.E. Prothero, "The LOC: Towards Common Sense", *ibid.*, vol. XXXI, March 1892, pages 515-524.

255. The Bailie, 18th November 1896.

256. The problems experienced by the Trust after 1886 are discussed in detail in Bull, op. cit., pages 49-62. For Chisholm's own interpretation, see "The History and Results of

the Operations of the City Improvement Trust", loc. cit., pages 39-56.

257. Public concern during the 1880s is graphically illustrated by the series of articles which appeared in the Evening News and Star, during October and November 1886. The problem over accounting irregularities almost resulted in the dismissal of John Nicol, City Chamberlain; see pages 530-541.

258. Chisholm, "History and results of the Operations of the City Improvement Trust", loc. cit., page 51.

259. see The Bailie, 21st November 1888, for comments on Chisholm's likely stance as a brand-new municipal member. In total contradiction to its later depiction of him as an uninhibited spendthrift, the prediction was that: "He is bound to uplift his voice in favour of economy - cheese-paring some might term it ...".

260. Glasgow Corporation, Municipal Glasgow, op. cit., pages 58-59.

261. Ibid., pages 54-56.

262. Chisholm, "History and Results of the Operations of the City Improvement Trust", loc. cit., pages 52-53.

263. The most thorough examination of George's impact on British politics is contained in Elwood P. Lawrence, Henry George in the British Isles, (East Lansing, Michigan, 1957).

264. Quoted in Avner Offer, Property and Politics, 1870-1914: Landownership, Law, Ideology and Urban Development in England, (Cambridge, 1981), page 185.

265. This point is made in *ibid.*, page 184. George consciously identified with the "free trade in land" pronouncements of Richard Cobden and John Bright.

266. Prominent Progressive "single-taxers" on the Town Council included Peter Burt and David McLardy.

267. Glasgow Corporation, Minutes, 8th April 1897, page 367, SRA C1.1.75. Petitions were also presented by the Association of House Factors and Property Agents in Glasgow, Wine and Spirit Merchants in Glasgow, assorted railway companies and ratepayers' groups.

268. "Proceedings and Minutes of Evidence taken before the Select Committee on Police and Sanitary Regulations", in House of Commons, Session 1897: Glasgow Corporation Improvements Bill,

volume I, page 214, [Q. 2112], SRA A3/1/176.

269. Ibid., pages 226-235.. Angus Campbell, erstwhile town councillor and lawyer to the "trade", represented the interests of wine and spirit merchants likely to be displaced by the proposed Improvement Act.

270. Glasgow Town Council, Public Houses in Corporation and Trust Property: Minutes of Town Council and Committee with Reference Thereto, March 1890 and April 1890, SRA D-TC 6/26.

271. 60 & 61 Victoria, cap. 215, [1897], "An Act to enable the Corporation of Glasgow to effect further Improvements within the City; to lease and work the Vale of Clyde or Govan Tramways, and the Glasgow and Ibrox Tramways; and for other Purposes".

272. Glasgow Herald, 9th April 1897.

273. Joseph D. Hendry, A Social History of Branch Library Development: with Special Reference to Glasgow, (Glasgow, 1974), pages 99-110.

274. Glasgow Observer, 13th March 1897.

275. Ibid., 5th December 1896 and 13th February 1897.

276. The "Stalwarts" were acknowledged as comprising nine representatives during the year 1896-97. Of these, Boyd S. Brown, John Cronin, John Ferguson, James Shaw Maxwell, George Mitchell and P.G. Stewart have been positively identified, all but Ferguson belonging to the ILP. Another "Stalwart" seems to have been David Willox, an East Ender from a radical background, but who was personally close to the Martin family (of "Oor Jeems" fame), and whose "labour" credentials are thus highly suspect. Other "Stalwarts" were John Battersby, Archibald J. Hunter and possibly James M. Jack. All were active Liberals, but with intimate trade union connections. Battersby was Samuel Chisholm's right hand man in the trade unions; Hunter seems to have shared the same political sympathies as Battersby; Jack was another who had connections with the Martin family, and was believed by the Chisholmites to have had tacit drinks' trade support. Of course, this gives a total of ten, rather than nine; a figure which indicates the fluidity of allegiances on Glasgow Corporation during the 1890s. For the purposes of Table 4.4, Jack has been excluded from the list of "probables".

277. See pages 648-650.

278. Ibid. Also, see the pro-temperance Glasgow Observer, 13th March 1897, for the curious claim made in the newspaper that the "Glasgow whisky gang" were actively attempting to undermine

Progressive support by supporting "labour" candidates in elections. According to the Observer, this objective was to be achieved: "1st - By nobbling the Irish vote in the interests of whisky; 2nd - By doing this under the guise of the "interests of labour"; 3rd - By this means getting the Irish vote to go to the Independent Labour Party ...". This statement was made well before the Springburn election, which was to cause such friction between the Stalwarts and the Progressives. Apart from the third point, it is an accurate prediction of the tactics which were used to unseat Chisholm in 1902.

279. Hamish Fraser, "Labour and the Changing City", loc. cit., pages 170-172; William Miller, "Politics in the Scottish City, 1832-1982", in *ibid.*, page 191; Sean Damer, "State, Class and Housing: Glasgow, 1885-1919", in Joseph Melling (ed.), Housing, Social Policy and the State, (London, 1980), pages 84-85.

280. For the original aims of the Citizens' Union, see its Minute Book, 1898-1903, 12th May 1898, unpaginated, SRA TD 488/9. The inaugural meeting had been called: "... to form an influential Committee, on non-political and unsectarian lines, for furthering the good municipal government of the City by securing the election of suitable persons to the Town Council".

281. *Ibid.*

282. *Ibid.* From the list of those in attendance, the range of views included Conservative supporters (J.O. Mitchell); Unionists (Robert Crawford); "wavering" Liberals (Michael Simons); Chisholmites (David Morrin). William Jacks, former Liberal MP, was elected as the Union's President.

283. *Ibid.* The list of Vice-Presidents is contained in the Minutes for 1st July 1898.

284. Glasgow Herald, 25th October 1898.

285. Quoted in Powell, *op. cit.*, page 23.

286. Offer, *op. cit.*, pages 231-234; Hannah, *op. cit.*, pages 14-28; Richard Roberts, "Business, Politics, and Municipal Socialism", in John Turner (ed.), Businessmen and Politics: Studies of Business Activity in British Politics, 1900-45, (London, 1984), pages 20-32.

287. Fabian Society, Fabian Tract No. 119: Public Control of Electric Power and Transit, (London, 1905), pages 4-5. By the end of 1903, it was reported that 468 electricity undertakings were either working or constructing as against eight originally working in 1888.

288. Hannah, op. cit., page 22.
289. Young and Garside, op. cit., pages 109-110.
290. See pages 178-182.
291. Offer, op. cit., pages 235-236. Avebury - the former Sir John Lubbock - set out his views on municipal ownership in his book, On Municipal and National Trading, (London, 1906). From his pronouncements therein, and the copious writings of Arthur Kay, the two men seem to have shared much in common, particularly a commitment to Unionism.
292. Report from the Joint Select Committee ... on Municipal Trading, op. cit. The Select Committee's remit was: "... to consider and report as to the principles which should govern powers given by Bills and Provisional Orders to municipal and other local authorities for industrial enterprise within or without the area of their jurisdiction ...".
293. See page 652.
294. Report from the Joint Select Committee ... on Municipal Trading, op. cit., page 219, [Q. 2731-33]. Chisholm's evidence is also reported in detail in the Glasgow Herald, 11th July 1900.
295. Report from the Joint Select Committee ... on Municipal Trading, op. cit., page 219, [Q. 2747].
296. Glasgow Herald, 28th July 1900.
297. For the background to the debate on public ownership of telephones, see Porter, op. cit., pages 232-247, and Knoop, op. cit., pages 43-45. Glasgow Corporation was the first local authority to avail itself of legislation passed in 1899 authorising municipal telephone systems. Only Portsmouth, Hull, Brighton and Swansea followed suit. In 1912 the British telephone system was nationalised, and Glasgow Corporation relinquished its interest. See Glasgow Corporation, Souvenir: The Opening of the Glasgow Corporation Telephone System by the Hon. the Lord Provost, Samuel Chisholm, Esq., LL.D., August 29th, 1902, SRA D-TC 14.1.31, for an illustration of Glasgow's system in operation.
298. Roberts, op. cit., page 29. The Select Committee was reappointed in 1903, and while making certain recommendations, made little additional progress.
299. Ibid., pages 22-24, and Offer, op. cit., pages 236-237.

300. Biographical information about Kay appears in The Bailie, 20th March 1901, and the Glasgow Herald, 2nd January 1939.

301. In 1908 Kay founded the Scottish Modern Arts Association, which aimed to encourage the work of contemporary Scottish artists. He had studied art on the Continent, and was himself a keen painter.

302. The name of Kay, senior, appears as a supporter of the Union at its inaugural meeting. See Citizens' Union, Minute Book, 12th May 1898, op. cit.

303. See *ibid.*, 12th September 1900, for reference to Alfred Wilson Buchanan's Municipal League, and page 652 of this thesis for reference to the Taxpayers' Defence League, again created by Wilson.

304. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 18th November 1901.

305. Arthur Kay, Money Without Enquiry - £750,000 Required on a Blank Cheque by Glasgow Town Council: A Speech delivered at the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce, on 30th April, (Glasgow, 1902), SRA TD 488/8.

306. *Ibid.*, pages 8-9.

307. See pages 653-660.

308. The notion seems to have been fostered by Forward, after the ILP had taken the initiative on the housing question in Glasgow. See Smith, op. cit., page 308. However, it would also have suited the anti-municipalisers to perpetuate the idea that Chisholm's downfall was due to the housing plan, in order to create the impression that he did not command public support on this issue.

309. The Times, 19th August to 11th November 1902. Articles about Glasgow appeared on 30th September and 6th October. The Citizens' Union Minute Book, 10th July 1902, op. cit., confirms that a Times correspondent had interviewed Thomas M. Semple, Secretary to the Union.

310. Chisholm's reply to The Times was appeared in the newspaper on 24th October 1902. It was subsequently published in pamphlet-form, "The Times" and Municipal Socialism: Reply by Lord Provost Chisholm (Glasgow), (Glasgow, 1902), SRA PA 11/2.

311. The Times, 6th October 1902. There remains dubiety as to who actually wrote the articles; however, the political affiliations of the anonymous scribe can be in no doubt. The glowing reference to Birmingham's municipal experience under

Joseph Chamberlain, appearing on 25th September 1902, says it all.

312. Ibid., 6th October 1902.

313. Glasgow Herald, 11th November 1902.

314. See the ILP pamphlet by William C. Anderson, Municipal Homes for St. Mungo's Sons: An Appeal to the Workers, (Glasgow, 1902), which urged support for Chisholm's housing plan, but went onto advocate more adventurous policies for tackling the problem.

315. After Chisholm, the Lord Provostship rota ran thus: John Ure Primrose (Unionist); William Bilsland (Liberal); Archibald McInnes Shaw (Conservative); Daniel M. Stevenson (Liberal); Thomas Dunlop (Conservative).

316. An organised anti-socialist alliance had emerged on Glasgow Corporation by 1913. See Forward, 15th November 1913, for references to the "Liberal-Tory Combine".

317. Quoted in the Glasgow Herald, 8th November 1902.

318. Both men were leading lights in the so-called "Young Party", active on the Corporation during the early 1890s.

319. Citizens' Union, Minute Book, 10th July 1902, op. cit.

320. See the Minute Book of the Directors of the Ratepayers' Federation Ltd., 29th January 1903 to 12th October 1922, 29th January 1903, page 1, SRA TD 488/1, for the Federation's inaugural meeting. Malcolm Pearce Campbell and Francis Henderson - both future Deans of Guild - were in attendance.

321. By 30th October 1903, 122 businesses had affiliated to the Federation. In the interim, the Directors had declined to amalgamate with the Industrial Freedom League, preferring to operate independently.

322. Ibid., 5th March 1907, page 66.

323. The Federation seems to have been behind moves to establish a "Moderate" grouping within the Corporation during 1904, with the help of councillor William Fleming Russell. At least twenty-one town councillors made a commitment to adhere to such an organisation. Ibid., 16th March 1904, page 25.

324. Federation leaflet, "Is Glasgow Not Large Enough?", pasted into ibid., between pages 74 and 75.

325. Federation leaflet, "Glasgow's New Annexation Bill: Report by the Ratepayers Federation", pasted into *ibid.*, between pages 118 and 119.

326. *Ibid.*, 4th April 1911, pages 106-107.

327. Shaw, "Municipal Government in Great Britain", *loc. cit.*, page 201.

328. Roberts, *op. cit.*, pages 31-32.

329. Michael Keating, The City That Refused to Die: Glasgow - the Politics of Urban Regeneration, (Aberdeen, 1988), page 10.