

Chapter Five

Evaluating the initial impact of the Watergate investigation on journalism in the UK and USA

Ben Bradlee, the Executive Editor of *The Washington Post* decided that the August 1974 resignation of President Richard Nixon had, in a sense, marked the beginning of the end of the professional journey he and his journalists had been on for the previous two years.

Consequently, the gruff, hard-driving Bradlee, chose to go on holiday to a location where he believed it was unlikely he'd be asked about how his paper had reported the scandal. He chose the rainforests of Brazil in the belief he might get some time to himself to gather his thoughts and plan his next professional move. Bradlee takes up the story about what happened next:

The plane landed in some goddamned remote spot and I disembarked and started gathering up my luggage. The next thing I know I'll be damned if some guy with a recorder didn't walk straight up to me, shove the thing in my face and start asking me in a foreign accent - I think he was German or something - about the taping system in the Nixon White House. I mean so much for 'getting away' from everything! Not a chance, not a chance!¹

This kind of non-stop and indeed growing, attention on the whole Watergate phenomenon and the *Post's* intimate involvement in it was to become even more intense in the following three decades. This chapter looks at the initial impact the investigation had on journalism as a practice in the UK and USA and the more complex outcomes which followed.

By 2009 the generic term 'Watergate' throws up an astonishing 3,550,000 relevant sites on the Google search engine; the more narrowly defined 'Woodward and Bernstein'

¹ Ben Bradlee's interview with Eamonn Q'Neill in June 1992 for *The Herald's* article '*All the President's Mendacity*,' Bradlee himself also wrote a version of the same recollection in June 14th, 1992 article 'Watergate: The Biggest Story' for *The Washington Post*. Interestingly, almost two decades after fleeing to Brazil to get away from the Watergate story, he travelled to the former Soviet Union in part to try and interview former President Nixon who was also visiting. Bradlee's fascinating article describes how he waited in vain for his old quarry to show up at a press conference hoping to throw some Watergate-related questions at him: unfortunately for him – and students of journalism and Watergate – Nixon backed out at the 11th hour. Bradlee was interviewed by the author of this thesis whilst he stopped in London with his family, en-route to Russia.

request using the same online search tool, returns 912,000 possible sites to visit. The internet bookseller Amazon.com produces a possible 21,148 titles on its virtual shelves relating to 'Watergate'. This crude - but very modern - search technique is used deliberately to illustrate how the average, everyday student of modern history or recent journalism, would find themselves adrift in a veritable 'wilderness of mirrors'² containing material connected to what was in its genesis, just one news project pursued by one newspaper about one scandal.

The massive online presence of 'Watergate' and 'Woodstein' clearly indicates how the 'story' and the reporters have broken through the boundaries of normal journalistic history and entered the much more difficult-to-quantify realms of popular culture and even modern mythology.

In 2007, as interest and research into the whole topic continued unabated, Bob Woodward remarked that the 'theme' of the collection of Watergate papers he and Bernstein sold to the University of Texas four years previously might be dubbed, "Watergate never stops..."

The Impact of Watergate

One strand of media analysis contends that the overall impact of Watergate on journalism in the United States was overwhelmingly positive. One media commentator, for example, stated that: "[Woodward and Bernstein produced] the single most spectacular act of serious journalism [of the 20th] century."³

The decades since 1974 have produced countless articles which build on this assertion and lead irresistibly to the assumption is that *The Washington Post's* coverage led to a series of government and legal investigations which, in the final endgame, produced the real

² 'Wilderness of Mirrors', popular term of unknown origins used by authors of non-fiction works focusing on the intelligence community, usually used to denote the multitude of options and choices faced by spies who are completely and usually terminally, cut adrift by their masters when circumstances dictate it .

³ Ben Bagdikian, quoted in *Watergate Revisited* The American Journalism Review [June/July 2004].

possibility of impeachment by the US Congress and thus left President Nixon with no option other than that of resignation. This reading is, for some, a triumph of the US' First Amendment right to free speech and a free press⁴, since it showed the press in full watchdog mode during the 'milestone' of Watergate, operating as a part of the public system of checks and balances on the powerful elected representatives of the citizenry.⁵

Others have argued the opposite, believing Watergate to have been little more than, for example, '[a] witch-hunt run by liberals in the media...' led by the likes of Bradlee, a friend of the late Democratic President John F. Kennedy, against Republican President Nixon, a sworn Kennedy-enemy.⁶This so-called analysis by revisionist historian Paul Johnson chimes, oddly enough, with an eerily similar statement regarding alleged hidden-motives of the *Post's* staff: "[Ben Bradlee was] self-appointed leader [of a] tiny fringe of arrogant elitists who infect the healthy mainstream of American journalism with their own peculiar view of the world."⁷ That summation was delivered by Charles 'Chuck' Colson, former Chief Counsel to Nixon, who was sentenced on an obstruction of justice charge and served seven months behind bars his role in the Watergate scandal.

The political impact of the scandal and the ensuing press investigation into it was revisited by reporter Woodward for his 1999 publication *Shadow Five President's and the Legacy of Watergate*. Its most crucial findings were, in summary, related to the press scrutiny which now routinely faces every aspect of presidential actions and which he feels were an inevitable consequence of the Watergate scandal and which have somewhat redefined the Presidential role. He states:

⁴ US Constitution, First Amendment: 'Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.' Ratified 15th December, 1791.

⁵ Marvin Kalib, Senior Fellow, Harvard University, quoted in *Watergate Revisited* The American Journalism Review [June/July 2004].

⁶ *Modern Times: The World from the Twenties to the Nineties* (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Classics; Revised edition 2001) by Paul Johnson.

⁷ *A Good Life* by Ben Bradlee, (New York: Touchstone, 1995) pp.342-3.

After Watergate I never expected another impeachment investigation of a president in my lifetimes... Nixon's successors, I thought, would recognise the price of scandal and learn the two fundamental lessons of Watergate. First, if there is questionable activity, release the facts, whatever they are, as early and completely as possible. Second, do not allow outside inquiries, whether conducted by prosecutors, congressmen or reporters, to harden into a permanent state of suspicion and warfare. But the overwhelming evidence is that five presidents after Nixon didn't understand those lessons... Why did they not see that they would be held fully accountable for their exercise of power? Historians and psychiatrists will have their own answers to that question...⁸

Woodward argues the men who have inhabited the Oval Office since Nixon's resignation, were all seduced by the notion they could be what he terms 'big-time' presidents. This evaluation is, the reporter argues, a historical legacy from pre-Watergate days, when the president could comprehensively and effectively stamp his authority, control and vision on the country. Woodward asserts that that job-description evaporated after the fall-out from the Vietnam War and the Watergate crisis. He says:

The men who followed Nixon are like addicts who have been denied their supply of drugs, the alluring narcotic of presidential power. The myth of the big-time president persists, the longing for someone with heroic energy, someone who can take the air out of a room, who can define an era worth living in. That is not only what these presidents hope to see in themselves, it is what the public holds up as the standard against which they will be judged. But the post-Watergate conditions have made the emergence of such a leader increasingly unlikely, and the presidents, in frustration, have been in rebellion.⁹

Presidents pre-Watergate, were in 'rebellion' as well of course. But tellingly, whatever their misdemeanours, few of them were subjected to the press scrutiny which Nixon was after the Watergate burglary. This seems to suggest that one of the main elements of the Watergate legacy for the press was a sense that they had a professional duty to scrutinise the

⁸ *Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1999) p514 by Bob Woodward.

⁹ From *Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate* (New York: Touchstone Books, 1999) p514 by Bob Woodward pp.514-515.

President and the Executive in a way and with an intensity which previous occupants of the White House had escaped.

The classic example of this was the 35th President of the United States, John F. Kennedy. His well-documented extra-marital affairs, his father's [former US Ambassador to the Court of St. James, Joseph P. Kennedy] alleged connections with organised crime and his own well-concealed array of serious, indeed life-threatening range of illnesses before and during his presidency were hidden – for the most part – from public scrutiny. The reason these issues were concealed, was because the press was, to a large extent, unwilling to expose the President's private life in the belief it was 'not their job' and also because, to an extent, many were reluctant to endanger their access to tight-knit Kennedy White House court. There was also a lack of moral justification in this kind of journalism. Post-Watergate the public were inured to presidential laundry being washed in public.¹⁰

It has also been claimed by at least one author that Kennedy's own press secretary, the jovial Pierre Salinger, assured JFK that the journalists he knew would never write anything salacious about him since most of them were, he claimed, sleeping around themselves.¹¹ Such a relationship revealed as much about Kennedy's early schooling in power-relations, as it did about his sexual adventures. One author of a much-praised recent study of the brief Kennedy presidency recounted a telling anecdote, which illustrated the nature of his relationship with the press a full four years before he assumed the office of president:

Kennedy also believed reporters liked him and would be reluctant to embarrass him by publishing stories about his sex life. Of course, he understood that a president's relations with the press are always to some degree adversarial. But throughout his political career and even more so when he began running for president, he made himself available to the press, and by doing so created subtle ties that reporters were loath to undermine. At the 1956 convention, when Kennedy, in T-shirt and

¹⁰ When Woodward and Bernstein published their follow-up work on Nixon *The Final Days* few believed their claim that Nixon had fallen to the floor of his study in tears whilst attempting to pray. It was literally seen as unseemly and unlikely behaviour for the Commander-in-Chief. The only witness to the scene, Henry Kissinger, later confirmed the accuracy of this intimate breakdown.

¹¹ *An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy 1917-1963* by Robert Dallek (London: Little Brown and Company, 2003) p.477.

undershorts, began to leave his hotel bedroom to take a phone call in the sitting room, an aide said, ‘You can’t go out there in your shorts, there are reporters and photographers there.’ ‘I know these fellows,’ Kennedy replied loudly enough for them to hear. ‘They’re not going to take advantage of me.’¹²

Kennedy’s self-confidence was well-founded. In notes taken by Woodward and Bernstein during their Watergate investigation, which only came to light in 2005, they recorded comments made by Joseph Alsop, a well-known member of the Washington DC press corps and a noted gossip columnist. Alsop told the duo simply that:

If Jack Kennedy had gotten caught with his cock in a wringer we [the press corps] would have covered it up and our business [the wider press and owners] would have helped him.¹³

Contrast JFK’s ease with the press and the way he confidently enjoyed their trust about his private life – albeit one smoothed by style and polished power-wielding -with the post-Watergate vision of President Nixon being interviewed in April 1977 by well-known broadcaster David Frost:

As we [Frost and Nixon] walked across the kitchen for the start of our sixth day of discussions, Mr Nixon turned to me and quite casually asked, ‘Well, did you do any fornicating this weekend?’ For a moment, I could not believe my ears. Richard Nixon didn’t say that, did he?... I had to smile at the clumsiness of Nixon’s question. He was indeed trying to be one of the boys and he got the word wrong. After all, lovers call themselves fornicators about as often as freedom fighters call themselves terrorists... I think Nixon probably did like to fancy himself one of the boys. Even his most loyal friends, however, remember the man as physically clumsy and verbally stiff. ‘I remember one of his jobs was to decorate soldiers – to pin medals on them,’ Brent Scowcroft said in an interview years later. ‘He was so physically awkward, that he couldn’t pin a medal on anyone. The first time he did it, he tore right through the jacket. So I had a clip-on version made. And still, he was always fumbling [and] I was always picking up medals.’¹⁴

¹² Ibid. p.478

¹³ ‘Beyond Deep Throat’ by David Greenberg in *Columbia Journalism Review*, September/October 2005.

¹⁴ *Frost Nixon* (London: Macmillan, 2007) by David Frost. pp.75-6.

The singular awkwardness of Nixon however, does not fully explain why the press decided to pursue him with the energy it did during Watergate. A clue to the reason why this vigour appeared comes from Editor of *The Washington Post* Bradlee who stated in 1992 that:

No news story has ever grabbed and held Washington by the throat the way Watergate did. No news story in my experience ever dominated conversation, newspapers, radio and television broadcasts the way Watergate did. There were times when you could walk whole city blocks and ride taxis all around town and never miss a word of the hearings.¹⁵

Even allowing for Bradlee's memory to be biased in favour of the story he was an integral part of, his assertion is revealing. Firstly, the story itself was something which transfixed the political classes of Washington DC and in that sense, might have taken on a profile and significance which might have been unlikely had another newspaper based in another US city pursued the story. Secondly, Bradlee's use of the phrase 'news story' is important given his journalistic credentials. In the previous chapter of this study, it was argued that the Watergate investigation was by and large a series of news articles, instead of one or two large, landmark in-depth investigative articles. This meant it was an unusual and lengthy news story for a single newspaper to follow for so long. Only with hindsight however, have historians like Johnson and sociologists like Schudson¹⁶ arrived at their conclusions which label Watergate a 'witch-hunt' and a partial 'myth', respectively. The author of this study would argue that the participants who actually did the reporting and the editing, no such hindsight 20/20 vision existed and they were simply doing their journalistic jobs. The mythology was later created by Hollywood it was they who sprinkled the magic-dust on what was a chronicle of an extraordinary story on one hand but a laborious journalism project on the other. Instead of seeing a clear way to, for example as Johnson would have us believe, castigate and denounce, Nixon and his administration, the journalistic players in this

¹⁵ Ben Bradlee's 'Watergate: The Biggest Story' *The Washington Post*, June 14th, 1992.

¹⁶ See, for example, Schudson's article 'A Study in Mythology' in *The Columbia Journalism Review* (May/June 1992).

drama were often groping around on a daily and weekly basis trying to uncover new information, make sense of the scraps they already had and write articles which merited editorial backing and public attention. Two decades later Bradlee would note in a Watergate anniversary piece for the *Post* that:

Looking back, it is easy to forget that *The Post* published more than 300 Watergate stories. Each was a comparatively small bite of an apple whose size we were to recognise only later. During that first summer (1972), we felt lonely. Few of our colleagues outside *The Post* were with us, and in the great American tradition, many newspapers seemed to be trying to knock our stories down. We did everything but keep Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein's heads in a pail of water until they produced more stories – as they did week after week. But we waited in vain for other papers to pick up the story. Only toward the end of October 1972, when Walter Cronkite devoted two consecutive broadcasts to Watergate, did many editors begin to take *The Post's* Watergate coverage seriously. I remember the day that Gordon Manning, then a big cheese at CBS News... called up with the good news. Cronkite was going to make us famous, Manning said. He was going to pull our chestnuts out of the fire.¹⁷

If Bradlee's claim is to be accepted as true, then it squarely challenges the analysis that he was the leader of some kind of witch-hunt. In fact, by relying upon the growing television audiences of the era, and by accepting the professional benediction of a Walter Cronkite presentation of the *Post's* print stories on air, he was clearly more desperate than scheming.¹⁸

The initial impact of the Watergate investigation on US and UK journalism

The initial impact of *The Washington Post's* decision to give Woodward and Bernstein the time and resources to follow the Watergate scandal was to isolate the newspaper amongst its US peers. It was, to an extent, out on a limb for a number of months following the June 1972 burglary.

¹⁷ See Ben Bradlee's 'Watergate: The Biggest Story' *The Washington Post*, June 14th, 1992.

¹⁸ Bradlee did however, gleefully note that Cronkite's story was illustrated on TV 'almost entirely of montages of *Washington Post* front pages.'

However, as the story began to gain credence and prominence with other news outlets, the most notable change was the simple fact that more journalists started to look at the issue more closely and with an increasing sense of professional urgency.

Notably, the only other major East-Coast newspaper in the USA *The New York Times* was the market-leader in newsstand sales. But in the first year after the burglary in June 1972, its coverage of the Watergate issue during that timeframe was roughly one-third of the *Post's* in terms of stories and even less in terms of actual word-count of those articles. One leading journalist from the *Times*, investigative reporter Seymour Hersh, characterises the *Times* as being 'overwhelmed'¹⁹ by the *Post's* duo's reporting in 1973. Hersh has explained how he was literally 'trying to catch up' with Woodstein's reporting, so far behind was the venerable *Times* on the Watergate case.²⁰ Hersh soon got into the thick of the reporting scrum on the story and started breaking his own exclusives. One revealing episode involved Hersh writing a piece for the *Times* which disclosed the president's National Security Adviser, Henry Kissenger, had been instrumental in bugging reporters, fellow administration members and also members of the National Security Council. Kissenger's deputy, Alexander Haig, called and applied pressure to Hersh to desist from printing the story. The nature of the pressure was chilling. Hersh says that:

[Haig] called a few times during the day to beat back the story. At around seven o'clock, there was a final call. 'You're Jewish aren't you, Seymour?' In all our conversations, I'd been 'Sy'. I said, 'Yes,' "Let me ask you one question, then," Haig said. "Do you honestly believe that Henry Kissenger, a Jewish refugee from Germany who lost thirteen members of his own family to the Nazis, could engage in such police-state tactics as wiretapping his own aides? If there is any doubt, you owe it to yourself, your beliefs, and your nation, to give us one day to prove your story is wrong." That was Watergate, circa 1973. The *Times* printed the story the next day, and Kissenger did not resign.²¹

¹⁹ 'Watergate Days' by Seymour Hersh, *The New Yorker*, (June 2005).

²⁰ Hersh was notoriously unkempt. In an effort to spruce him up and make acceptable for the kind of door-to-door Washington DC reporting Woodward and Bernstein were fast making a trademark of their own, a distraught editor at *The New York Times* bought Hersh a box of expensive Brooks Brothers shirts and sweaters.

²¹ 'Watergate Days' by Seymour Hersh, *The New Yorker*, (June 2005).

Once Hersh began serious work however, he added to this scoop and brought in several more in the following weeks and months. On more than one occasion he worked over journalistic-ground already explored by the Washington duo, Woodward and Bernstein. This is a familiar problem encountered by many investigative journalists, including the author of this study.²²Hersh explains that on at least one occasion he turned up at a source he was checking out to find a sign literally saying ‘Kilroy was here’ – meaning, he’d been beaten to the source by Woodward and Bernstein a matter of hours before.²³

This scene reinforces the notion that there was simply no concerted US east-coast witch-hunt, and, upon reflection of the evidence, instead suggests a scenario where newspapermen were more inclined to compete with each other (i.e. checking out each other’s findings and sources for mistakes), as opposed to loyally participate in an organised, politicised and focused attempt to besmirch a president based on political hatred.

In the book *All the President’s Men*, Woodward and Bernstein recount one instance where a Democratic Party press secretary calls them and asks for an early version of another Watergate article they’re working on so that Presidential candidate George McGovern can review it before its seen publicly.

Rather than cooperate with Nixon’s political enemies, as some might unrealistically have expected them to, the two reporters had an immediate gut response, as journalists, in entirely the opposite direction. The authors say:

Woodward blew up and said *Post* stories on Watergate were not written for Democrats or McGovern or anyone else in particular, and that he resented the request. Jones [press secretary] seemed stunned. He didn’t see anything unreasonable about it,

²² On more than occasion I have had to arrange rather awkward ‘summits’ with fellow-journalists working on the same story. These meetings are designed to give us the opportunity to lay out our findings and discuss our conclusions. Very occasionally some material and contacts are shared. Invariably they can allow journalists to swap anecdotes about their disastrous efforts. Sometimes these can result in tense professional stand-offs, but more often than not they’ve resulted in life-long professional friendships based on mutual respect. Once in a while they can lead to lifelong professional animosity too.

²³ ‘Watergate Days’ by Seymour Hersh, *The New Yorker*, (June 2005).

especially since the paper would be out in a few hours. Woodward said that he and Bernstein were having enough trouble already with accusations of collusion. He told Jones to get his own copy of the paper at the newsstand, like everyone else, and slammed down the phone.²⁴

This reveals their lack of political-drive and conveys the important lesson from Watergate of avoiding political contamination of projects, one of the key fifteen-points mentioned elsewhere.

Neither Woodward nor Bernstein was out to target the President during Watergate. Neither were they acting on someone else's political agenda. They were following the story where it led them.

Journalists like Woodward, Bernstein and indeed, Hersh, did have a 'mission' though. But their mission was *not* politically motivated, as posited by Professor Johnson: rather it was focused on the day-to-day delivery of revelatory, powerful and relevant journalism to the millions of readers of their publications based upon the normal professional ethics and aims of their profession and craft.

One commentator has, in my view, identified the central motivating factor behind the *Post's* and eventually other publications' coverage of Watergate: journalist Robert Novak, argued that the reason for the *Post's* energetic coverage of the Watergate story was simply a newspaper fulfilling its mission to report an incident of 'lawbreaking' to its readers. With impressive clarity Novak states that as reporters, Woodward and Bernstein's minor reporting mistakes would hardly compare to 'the cold-blooded lawbreaking in high places they were exposing.'²⁵

It has been estimated that, apart from Woodward and Bernstein, at least three dozen journalists eventually 'made equally great contributions to the success of the Watergate

²⁴ See *All the President's Men* by Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward (New York: Touchstone, 1994 edition) p181.

²⁵ Quoted in 'Sweat not Melodrama' by Bonnie Brennan (London: SAGE Publications, 2003)

probe'.²⁶ These journalists wrote for newspapers across the USA and were not geographically limited to one area. The probable significance of the *Post's* coverage was threefold in my view: firstly, it was the newspaper which first covered the burglary on June 17th 1972 and therefore, in actual and metaphorical terms, could claim 'ownership' of the investigation; secondly, it was located near the scene of the crime itself and also near the centre of the nation's political power (i.e. White House and Congress); thirdly, through the persistence of editors managing 'Woodstein' and the eventual support of *Post* Editor Bradlee, the story moved onto the front-pages early on in the life-cycle of the whole scandal. Eventually, most national US papers would follow this trend, but they did so, not because they were led by the *Post* but through their own hard-won efforts at producing powerful journalism which merited equal coverage and exposure, and allowed them to compete in the newsstand marketplace on equal footing with competitors.

Bradlee himself, the editor of the *Post* and something of a father-figure to 'Woodstein', stated that the quality which underpinned the whole project wasn't a new one – in fact, it was old-fashioned hard work:

The boys had one unbeatable asset: they worked spectacularly hard. They would ask 50 people the same question, or they would ask one person the same question 50 times, if they had reason to believe some information was being withheld.²⁷

Most newspapers in the USA would have already had many of these approaches in place prior to Watergate. Moreover, many publications which already had an 'investigative' background in place (e.g. Greene at *Newsday* mentioned in chapter three of this study) would consider most of these techniques as standard. However, what was unusual about them in relation to Watergate was the conjunction of two relatively young and inexperienced reporters, the high stakes of investigating the President of the United States and his

²⁶ See 'Watergate Revisited' by Mark Feldstien in *The American Journalism Review* (June/July 2004).

²⁷ Ben Bradlee's *A Good Life* (New York: Touchstone, 1995) p364.

administration, and, finally, the global exposure afforded this investigation following Nixon's August 1974 resignation and the saturated media coverage via the newspaper articles in the *Post* and the book and film versions of *All the President's Men*.

In the UK, there seems to have been a muted and mixed initial reception to the whole Watergate investigation phenomenon. There are possibly several understandable reasons for this.

To begin with, reports only filtered through the press and broadcast reports, unlike today there was no internet service and the notion of a freely available, on-demand and accessible US paper was remote, if not simply impossible. The Woodstein double-act was only known by the select few who travelled regularly to the USA and by those who regularly examined US-published periodical magazines like *Newsweek* or bought newspapers like *The International Herald Tribune*.

By the time the President resigned, then the book and film version of the story arrived, it had a dual impact. Firstly, younger journalists who I have interviewed tended to cite the impact via the entertaining Hollywood-version as being significant and career-changing. To this kind of demographic, the movie version was the 'truth' and the crusading duo of Woodward and Bernstein really made them feel as though social change and other lofty causes could be brought about via the tool of investigative journalism. Many that were only starting out in the industry or even studying at university at the time, now claim that the movie was their main inspiration and to them, it feels like it gave birth to the modern concept of what investigative journalism as a genre and tradecraft has come to be known. One former BBC Head of News and Current Affairs told me:

My memory might be faulty but it wasn't known as Investigative Journalism. I think people only started using that phrase after Watergate and I preceded Watergate by a couple of years. So for me when I started you were aware of things like the Insight team on the Sunday Times, and their ability to get underneath a story. So you're

aware of that kind of more in-depth journalism going on. But I think I am right in saying that the idea of the journalist as an investigator, was very much post-Watergate in the UK.²⁸

Another journalist, Gavin MacFadyen, who worked on *World in Action* during the height of Watergate notes:

I think it played a big part in public appreciation of journalism and very little in terms of its finance. There's still a lot of romance in America about investigative journalism.²⁹

But another, less receptive audience also existed. Those who had already been working on serious, long-running and difficult investigative projects in places like *The Sunday Times* or in Granada's *World in Action* office, tended to look askance at the whole Watergate phenomenon. To them, it was a three-ring-circus, an entertainment-world Canonization of a genre of journalism and tradecraft which they took very seriously indeed. Some felt that Hollywood was simply playing catch-up, and that what they were doing was too important and complex to be reduced to a two and a half hour slice of filmmaking. Whilst the on-screen sight of Woodward and Bernstein, dressed in lightweight chinos and button-down Brooks Brothers shirts, driving around the scrubbed streets of Washington DC, flying to Miami on a whim and sipping coffee on a terrace café overlooking a sun-bleached Potomac river – not to mention being portrayed by two of the most sought after and charismatic leading men of their generation, Hoffman and Redford – certainly attracted many to the profession, it also left more than a few unimpressed. The social realism doctrine of the time at Granada TV and the painstaking document-chasing and source-seeking engaged in by *Sunday Times* reporters, seemed very far removed from all this. To them, in the UK, where unemployment under Conservative Prime Minister Ted Heath, had reached 1.2 million for the first time since the 1930s, investigative journalism was tied to issues of more street-level

²⁸ Interview with Blair Jenkins by Eamonn O'Neill 20/8/05

²⁹ Interview with Gavin MacFadyen by Eamonn O'Neill 21/7/05.

importance – housing problems, financial scams aimed at the working class, being part of the European Common market, Oxfam, the growth of supermarkets, guns in society, smuggling, bronchitis and the like – rather than politically-motivated break-ins at rather plush buildings in apparently spotless capital cities. Moreover, in the UK investigative journalism world, it wasn't enough to merely *report* the news, the idea seemed to be to *engage* headlong with the powerful – whether business leaders or politicians – who were either responsible for the problems or could be part of the solution. Some felt that Woodward and Bernstein's efforts failed this test. Former *Sunday Times* 'Insight Team' reporter Phillip Knightley, for example, told me that:

Similar things were going on here.... [and] I don't know if it is right to call Watergate an investigative journalism story... there were only two reporters on it, they were both local roundsmen, they got lucky in many respects, there's still some doubt about the role of Deep Throat in it all, so I hesitate to call that IJ. If you try to define IJ as a newspaper investigation that takes on somebody of substance or an organization of substance and leads to something publicly shocking about it and leads to public reform, then I am not sure – apart from taking on somebody of substance like the President of the United States – that Watergate conforms to that [model]. It didn't as far as I can remember cause any major reforms in the US system. If you take some of the things the ST did, Thalidomide, DC10 etc.. it did lead to major reform.³⁰

Knightley's opinion is not unusual but, in terms of the tone and content, it is not representative either. In the UK, the initial impact of Watergate is best summed up as 'mixed'. It depended on the beholder whether they felt the Watergate story – in print and on the silver screen – contributed something positive to their situation or not. For some, like Blair Jenkins, the well-told Hoffman-Redford film was a youthful call-to-arms. For other more seasoned professionals already in the business, like Knightley, it was the story of two young reporters who were in the right place at the right time and who essentially got lucky.

³⁰ Interview with Phillip Knightley by Eamonn O'Neill 30/8/005.

To one audience, being part of the process that brought down the President was significant; to another UK audience, it was insignificant because, they felt, the system remained.

To others however, the story was unique and they learned much about a previously-hidden profession and craft, from its rendering. In that sense, its qualities remain timeless and instructive to each new generation of casual viewers and beginning-journalists who encounter it on the page or on the screen. Macdonald, for example, then Editor of *World in Action* at Granada, recalls a very positive impact of Woodward and Bernstein's work. He told the author that:

We at *World in Action* were amongst the first to start digging when Watergate broke... and we did a number of programmes about the affair. *Insight Team* on *The Sunday Times* had been going ten years before Watergate. In fact Ben Bradlee invited the team working to Harry Evans/Bruce Page to come over in late 60s or early 70s to explain how it was done. From that grew the contact that involved Ben in the Lawrence Stern Fellowship which we at Granada helped launch and fund (first Brit to Washington Post attachment was {BBC's] Jim Naughtie!). So Brits may have been catalysts for Woodward and Bernstein and later great surge of interest in 'investigative journalism'.³¹

If accurate, and there's no reason to doubt it is, then Gus Macdonald's recollection offers an insight into the exchange of ideas and techniques on investigative journalism between the UK and USA, and adds an intriguing dimension to the story of the roots of *the Washington Post's* involvement and management of Woodward and Bernstein's reports under the auspicious of editor Ben Bradlee.

Watergate, 'Deep Throat' and the continuing debate on using sources

Perhaps the main aspect of the techniques revealed in the movie version of Woodward's investigations to capture the popular imagination was the journalists' use of the high-level source known only as 'Deep Throat'. In many ways, the popular attention initially and subsequently afforded to this source was indeed warranted. The chances that a reporter under

³¹ Interview with Gus Macdonald by Eamonn O'Neill 11/4/08.

30 years of age – as Woodward was in 1972 – would actually know someone in the executive branch of the US government, and would be able to utilise this individual as a genuine and fertile source for his stories, was remote in the extreme. Guessing the identity of ‘Deep Throat’³² became a Washington parlour game for the next three decades. In 2005, Woodward explained:

Only six people knew Deep throat’s identity besides Deep Throat himself: me, Carl, my wife Elsa Walsh, former *Post* executive editor Benjamin C. Bradlee and later his successor, Leonard Downie Jr., and a Justice Department lawyer who discovered the secret in 1976... Despite all these guesses and speculation, articles and books, no one else had pinned down his identity. The more names and lists that had been floated over the decades, the more clouded the trail seemed to become. Systematic, meticulous analysis, even books by Nixon Watergate lawyers John Dean and Leonard Garment, had failed to illuminate because Deep Throat himself had embedded part of his identity in *not* being such a source, not the man in the underground garage portrayed by actor Hal Holbrook in the movie *All the President’s Men*. Wise, almost Delphic, but convoluted, creepy and angry, Holbrook had captured the real Deep Throat’s side one of the most clandestine relationships in American journalism. In our conversations at the time, the real Deep Throat had clearly been torn, and even uncertain – not fully convinced that helping us was the proper course, wanting both to do it and not to do it. Like many if not most confidential sources he wanted to be free of the ramifications of his actions and words. He wanted to be protected at nearly any cost, and he had gone to extraordinary lengths to conceal his identity. As best as I could tell he had lied to his colleagues, friends and even his family. He had been in hiding and still was.³³

On May 31st, 2005, the July edition of *Vanity Fair* magazine revealed in an article entitled “I’m the guy they called Deep Throat’, that the secret source was former Deputy Director of the FBI, William Mark Felt Sr.

Subsequently, Woodward and the five other individuals who had known Felt’s identity were forced into publicly acknowledging his role as Deep Throat within the hours that followed the publication of the *Vanity Fair* article. Initially, Woodward, Bernstein and Bradlee hesitated in doing so. Like many journalists, they’d given their professional word that they would never identify their source unless he died. This was an agreed stance and one

³² Named after a porn film starring ‘Linda Lovelace’ in 1972.

³³ *The Secret Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005) by Bob Woodward.

they felt they'd literally go to the wall for should an outside party try and force their hand.

Carl Bernstein later explained:

Until the call came from *Vanity Fair* that morning, I had been fairly certain the secret would hold until Felt's death, and Woodward had, too. In our smugness about having kept Deep Throat's identity concealed for more than 30 years, we had forgotten an essential rule of journalism: reporters may believe they control the story, but the story always controls the reporters... We still thought we could respond to *Vanity Fair's* account the same way we had too many other educated guesses about Deep Throat's identity – some focusing on Felt, others on Nixon-administration officials from Henry Kissinger to Patrick Buchanan to Leonard Garment to William Rehnquist. We had always cited a deeply held conviction as to why we wouldn't disclose the secret until the individual's death. The most basic of journalistic principles were involved: never betraying the identity of a confidential news source, even under threat of jail.³⁴

What the reporters hadn't foreseen – and what Bernstein alludes to in terms of the claiming 'the story always controls the reporters' in the above quote – was the fact that Felt might reveal *himself* one day to be the famous source known as Deep Throat. In the end this was what almost *seems* to have happened. A further complication in this particular instance was that Felt had been in declining mental health in the years running up to a family lawyer preparing the *Vanity Fair* article revealing his identity. Consequently, there was some debate inside the *Washington Post* about whether Felt had the mental ability to understand what was happening and thus to officially release Woodward and Bernstein from their ethical undertaking as reporters to not reveal their source. According to Bernstein, it was Bradlee – their old boss from the height of Watergate, and in recent years the *Post's* Executive Editor At Large – who finally decided it was time to hold their hands up and publicly confirm that Felt was indeed the source known as 'Deep Throat':

'Well, how 'bout them apples?' is my memory of what he [Ben Bradlee] said... And then Bradlee addressed the real question. Not even a close call, he said. No way to go but to confirm it. We got beat on our own story. And we had gotten lucky – again. The denouement was good for the things we cared about the most: the profession, the principle, the paper, and what we'd tried to maintain together these 33 years of

³⁴ 'Watergate's Last Chapter' by Carl Bernstein *Vanity Fair* October 2005.

silence. The secret had held for almost a generation and a half. Nobody had ever seen anything like it in this town, Bradlee said, and nobody would ever again.³⁵

The practice of cultivating and maintaining a source's confidence was, of course, not unique to the Watergate inquiry. Kovach and Rosensteel argue that anonymous sources are useful but should be treated with great care.

As citizens we rely on other sources of information for most of what we know. The journalists monitoring the world on our behalf also most often depend on others for the details of their reporting... Such dependence on others for information has always required a sceptical turn of mind for journalists. They early on adopt the reminder: "If your mother says she loves you, check it out." If the source of the information is fully described, the audience can decide for itself whether the information is credible. In recent years as dependence on anonymous sources for important public information has grown – as in the case of the Clinton-Lewinsky story – journalists learned the importance of developing rules to assure themselves and their audience they were maintaining independence from the anonymous sources of their news.³⁶

Trainee reporters – at colleges and engaging in early professional 'on-the-job' learning – are instructed that they must strive at all times to get 'on-the-record' quotes from their sources. This means that they must obtain attributable-quotes from a named individual, complete with that person's professional credentials. By identifying the individual, readers can judge for themselves how important and relevant their comments are on the issue at hand. 'Non-attributable' sources are sometimes quoted but without attribution as to who the individual is making the remarks. British parliamentary reporters have had to use the 'Lobby' system of reporting whereby politicians and their staffs would speak on an 'off-the-record' basis (i.e. anonymously and without any form of attribution unless agreed beforehand) about the story of the day. Speaking with total anonymity (i.e. 'off-the-record'; 'on-background'; on 'deep background' to mention just three descriptors of this arrangement) is something which requires trust and arrangement between interviewer and subject.³⁷

³⁵ 'Watergate's Last Chapter' by Carl Bernstein *Vanity Fair* October 2005.

³⁶ From *The Elements of Journalism* (Crown, 2001) New York by Bill Kovach and Tom Rosensteel pp:90-91.

³⁷ These terms vary from country to country. In the UK tabloid reporters and broadsheet reporters on individuals newspapers also have 'house' rules to follow. Editors sometimes have input into these arrangements, depending

Kovach and Rosensteel's point about reporters making ground-rules for dealing with anonymous sources is important and that it is valuable for readers to know professionalism exists. For the trust to remain intact between readers and a newspaper or any other organ of journalism, the news consumer must believe that reporters do have a professional mechanism by which they judge and handle an anonymous source's material. In Kovach and Rosensteel's work, they cite, for example, *The New York Times*' two-question rule: How much direct knowledge does the anonymous source have of the event? Does the source have an axe to grind which might lead them to exaggerate or conceal important information? Even when these questions have been answered, reporters and editors will still attempt to signal to readers 'who' this source is, whilst still maintaining anonymity. This can be done by asking a source to consider a description of their insight (e.g. 'a source close to the administration' or 'a legal source that is familiar with the meetings' etc.) Many newspapers dislike using anonymous source's quotes in opening sentences or even opening paragraphs of articles. The usual reason for this rule is that readers will think too much of the story is relying upon that central anonymous source. Instead, anonymous sources are sometimes used as back-up for on-the-record sources quoted earlier in the piece.

In legal terms it is normally accepted that reporter's notes from meetings with sources should be of an excellent standard. In court cases involving reporters, it is expected that notes, records of meetings and recordings of meetings, should be maintained to a legal standard of proof.³⁸ Even the social context of the encounters between a reporter and source

on who that editor is and what their own professional career history and understanding of the situation is. The only basic principle which applies in all countries is the unwritten but widely acknowledged ethical rule which binds all professional reporters to keep their sources anonymous if that agreement was reached during the early stages of their encounter.

³⁸ This would mean there can be no doubt about the accuracy and meaning of the exchange between reporter and source which occurred. Transcripts of meetings are valuable but often the standard of proof that's expected involves recordings since these can reflect speech patterns and meanings that reveal emphasis and nuance. The example cited earlier in this study involving BBC reporter Andrew Gilligan and his anonymous source, the late Dr David Kelly, which hung on the form of words *and* their meaning, is a case in point.

can be important to anticipate, note in detail and describe for readers.³⁹ Relationships between sources can also be important to probe and identify.

The author has investigated, for example, alleged abuses of power which were occurring at a US military base in Georgia. The allegations were supported by documents supplied by two females from a protest group which had obtained the papers through various means including Freedom of Information laws and also from sources within the establishment. In order to closely examine the whole issue it was necessary for me to interview one of these females face-to-face. However, due to her protests on this issue, the individual in question had been arrested and was incarcerated in a low-security State Correctional Facility in the State of Virginia. The second, younger, female was in charge of making arrangements for the ground-rules for me carrying out this interview. Only at the last minute, hours prior to setting foot inside the prison, did I discover that the two females involved in this campaign against the abuses at the military base were, in fact, a mother and her daughter.⁴⁰

Readers and viewers always need to understand the context of the use of all sources, but especially anonymous sources. The motives which an anonymous source can have might vary on the spectrum from straightforward ‘whistleblowing’ altruism, to embittered, selfish and poorly-judged views reflecting serious imbalance. Reporters can only judge which sources are best positioned to help them based on experience, knowledge and, it has to be said, luck.

³⁹ In one case the author of this study was involved in researching for television, colleagues had to describe to lawyers the setting of the interview and also the order in which they entered the room in which the subject was interviewed. This was both a test of their memory and also a challenge to their belief that they’d accurately recalled every single aspect and detail of the encounter.

⁴⁰ The article was examining the alleged human rights abuses perpetrated by former attendees of the so-called ‘School of the Assassins’ – or ‘The School of the Americas’ to use its more formal and former, title. The author of this thesis spent two weeks interviewing campaigners who wanted to close this facility and I went undercover to infiltrate the base to understand what its workings and relationship to the wider military Fort Benning base were. I also interviewed leading Washington politicians who were involved in the campaign against the school. The article was not published for legal reasons, since some of the sources interviewed had supplied me with documents, information and photographic images obtained when they had illegally entered the school’s offices during a ‘direct action’ protest.

One of the most famous cases in recent years involving a whistleblower centred on Dr Jeffrey Wigand a former Vice President of Research and Development at Brown and the Williamson Tobacco Company, in Louisville, Kentucky, USA. Dr Wigand engaged in a ‘source’ relationship with well-known American investigative journalist Lowell Bergman, who persuaded the corporate executive to appear on CBS’ network ‘60 minutes’ show. On-screen, Wigand revealed the company’s use of ‘impact boosting’ techniques in cigarettes, which effectively meant nicotine levels were manipulated during interviews with CBS in 1994. He also stated on the record that he felt the CEO of the company he worked for had perjured himself when he’d testified in front of a US Congressional Committee – along with six other tobacco company executives – that nicotine was not addictive. An article about the case, which appeared in *Vanity Fair* magazine and eventually became a critically-acclaimed film *The Insider* starring Al Pacino and Russell Crowe in dramatic roles as Bergman and Wigand respectively, explains how the journalist and the source initially met each other:

For weeks Bergman tried to get Wigand on the telephone. Each time a woman answered, and she would tell him, “He is not home.” Finally she said, “He doesn’t want to talk to you.” Bergman had become fascinated by the court papers involving Philip Morris, and was convinced he needed this particular chemist to make sense of them. He wanted a scientist, not an anti-tobacco advocate. In February 1994, he decided to go to Louisville. “I did the old ‘call him at midnight’ maneuver. He answered the phone and I said, ‘If you are curious to meet me, I’ll be sitting in the lobby at the Seelbach Hotel tomorrow at 11 A.M.’”

At 11 a.m. a gray-haired man in a windbreaker appeared and said, “Are you Lowell?” Bergman looked up to see a portrait of middle-aged anxiety. “I said to him, ‘Let’s go have a coffee.’”

It was the beginning of an extraordinary relationship. Bergman’s presence in Wigand’s life would eventually inspire him to come forward as a whistle-blower. For Bergman, Wigand would become a source who needed unusual protection and hand-holding—a fact which would ultimately jeopardize his position at CBS. “As a person, the guy I met had been raped and violated,” Bergman said. Wigand told Bergman that he was suffering a “moral crisis.” He said that he had always considered himself a scientist, and he called the type of research that went on at B&W “a display of craft.”⁴¹

⁴¹ ‘The Man Who Knew Too Much’ By Marie Brenner, *Vanity Fair*, May 1996.

The use of Wigand as a source took an enormous toll on the scientist. When lawyers became involved and threatened him with legal action, Wigand's personal life suffered terribly. Eventually he lost his marriage and found himself literally homeless:

All through dinner, Wigand keeps his cellular phone on the table. It rings as we are having coffee. He explodes in anger into the receiver: "Why do you want to know where I am? What do you want? What do you mean, what am I doing? It is 10 o'clock at night... What do you need to connect with me for? I am not a trained dog. You are going to have to explain to me what you are doing and why you are doing it so I can participate." Wigand narrows his eyes and shakes his head at me as if to signal that he is talking to a fool. He is beyond snappish now. I realize that he is speaking to one of his legal investigators, who has been putting in 16-hour days on his behalf, mounting a counterattack against his accusers. "You can't just drop into Louisville and have me drop what I am doing. No, you can't! I AM NOT LISTENING. O.K.? FINE. YOU TELL HIM TO FIND SOMEBODY ELSE."

Wigand slams the telephone on the table. "Everyone on the legal team is pissed off because I am in Louisville. You know what the team can do! If he was going to come down today, why didn't he tell me he was coming?" We walk out of Kunz's and trudge back through the snow toward the Hyatt. Across from the hotel is the B&W Tower, where Wigand used to be a figure of prestige, a vice president with a wardrobe of crisp white shirts and dark suits. "I am sick of it. Sick of hiding in a hotel and living like an animal. I want to go home," he says with desperation in his voice.⁴²

The tobacco company which Wigand formally worked for, Brown and Williamson, did not sue CBS for telling untruths, or indeed with libelling the company, instead they sued for the legal concept known as 'tortious interference' between Wigand and B&W, relating to a 'confidentiality agreement' the scientist had signed with them. They also claimed that CBS had paid him to 'induce' him to speak out publicly and had indemnified him against any subsequent legal action which might follow his comments being aired.⁴³

An edited form of Wigand's interview was finally broadcast in an edited form on the CBS investigative show after the media corporation backed down in the matter of airing his unedited comments. However, some criticism has been levelled at the decision to use him as single 'whistleblowing' source, without additional multiple sources to support his claims.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ From: 'Is it a crime? An overview of Recent Legal Actions Stemming from Investigative Reporting' in *The Big Chill: Investigative Reporting in the Current Media Environment* (Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 2000) Marilyn Greenwald and Joseph Brent, Eds. Pp:150-1.

However, in an interview with the author of this thesis, Wigand explained that he willingly participated in the sourcing of the stories and investigations because of a moral imperative to do so. He also explained that his insight meant he was an unusual source, inasmuch as he alone was in a position to make the serious allegations he did. In that sense multiple sourcing would have been difficult:

I have been a confidential source to a number of journalists over the years and in particular during the 1993-1997 period when tobacco industry documents were being “leaked” to various print media outlets. I provided the journalists with an interpretation of the documents and authenticated them. One journalist won a Pulitzer Prize with my help.

I would NOT have helped any of them if I was identified by name and therefore the basis of my cooperation and assistance. They also agreed to hold my name secret as a confidential source for their reporting. Helping the journalists at this time period was personally risky and would have put me and my family in harms way. The first set of anonymous death threats directed at my daughters came in April 1994 after I reported to the company that the US Congress had asked for my help in developing questions and background information prior to the seven [major tobacco] CEO’s testimony. My severance agreement which afforded me and my family with salary continuation and most importantly health care coverage for my daughter was already terminated once on the bogus assertion that I violated my confidentiality agreement by disclosing my salary. I was sued for this bogus assertion and forced to sign a more Draconian agreement while being held hostage for health care coverage and salary continuation. Leaking my name would have caused me and my family significant harm particularly living in ‘tobaccoville’ [Louisville] USA.

When I first worked with CBS/60 Minutes on the fire safe cigarette (Jan 04), DC Thomson (Paul) and ultimately with the FDA (Federal Drug Authority), DOJ (Department of Justice) and FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation) (5/94) was all done with complete secrecy. CBS’ ’60 Minutes’ [source agreement] was by written contract and the others by the honor of their word.

The people I worked with honored their pledge of secrecy and only on this basis did I help so many get the truth out. I was the only competent knowledgeable source at the time and my name spread like wild fire. I worked with reporters at the ABC News, LA Times, NY Times, Wall Street Journal....highly reputable organizations and people who I carefully checked out before committing to help them. Even today I have not been identified as a source to any of them with the exception of the FDA....that I disclosed during 12 days of forced depositions on Louisville, KY.

I also felt compelled to help and to get the truth out as it was linked to saving lives of 1000’s. A moral duty to public health and safety with knowledge that was pivotal in the saving of innocent lives and unearthing the decades of lies, obfuscation and deceit

of the industry that lacked any semblance of moral fiber. I had a conflict of two duties...truth and my family's safety. Confidentiality allowed for both!⁴⁴

Wigand is clear, it would seem, that as a source under the most extreme form of pressure, it was vital for him to be extended anonymity by the investigative journalists he was working with. He believes the moral mission he felt he was undertaking, could not have happened had he been forced to go 'public' with his true identity. He explains:

I believe that keeping sources confidential is critical to getting the information correct and accurate, especially when there is an intrinsic risk to the source. It is also the journalists ethical and moral duty to protect a source if that source is put in harms way for helping.

Will sources speak openly and candidly with reporters without the guarantee of secrecy.....I doubt it.⁴⁵

Another controversial case with a source and journalist carrying our investigations at the centre of it involved *New York Times* reporter Judith Miller. She had met with an unnamed Bush administration official on July 8th, 2003 to discuss claims made in her paper by a former US that the US government had little in the way of solid evidence to support its claims that Iraq under Saddam Hussein, was close to developing weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). At this meeting, Miller's source – later identified as former Vice Presidential Chief of Staff, Lewis 'Scooter' Libby – apparently discussed the fact that the Ambassador's wife – Valerie Plame – was an undercover CIA agent working on the WMD issue for the government. Although Miller didn't use this information from her source for a published article⁴⁶, she was subpoenaed by a Special Prosecutor to discuss her meetings. She refused. Even when her source signed a waive releasing her from any journalistic ethical agreements, she still maintained her right to silence. This eventually led to her being sentenced to prison

⁴⁴ Excerpt from Dr Jeffrey Wigand interview carried out by Eamonn O'Neill, 18/07/05.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Another journalist with *The Washington Post*, Robert Novack, did this on July 14th, 2004. He refused to reveal his source(s) for the claim and asserted under the First Amendment of the Us Constitution the right of free press and also to 'shield his source. In September 2007 former US Dep. Sec. Of State, Richard Armitage, admitted that he was Novack's original source.

in July 2005 after being found a year earlier of being in contempt of court for refusing to testify before a Special Counsel. She was released after 85 days behind bars. Even upon release and after obtaining permission from her source to fully discuss the case, she still kept her silence.

Miller's tenure at the *Times* was controversial. She was criticised in the run up to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, for writing articles which erroneously claimed the Hussein regime had, or were close to developing, WMDs. Subsequently, several factual inaccuracies in these articles were identified. Critics suggested she's been used as an echo chamber by her Bush administration sources, who leaked her hyped-evidence of WMDs, which she dutifully printed, allowing them to then cite her supposedly well-researched findings as a reason to go ahead with their war plans. She eventually left the *New York Times* under private agreement in November 2005. The paper later apologised for its poor analysis of the WMD situation before the Iraq war. In January 2007 she was cited and appeared as a prosecution witness against her source, Lewis Libby. She gave information about three meetings she had with him between June-July 2003. Mr Libby was later found guilty on federal obstruction of justice and perjury charges.⁴⁷

In relation to this study however, one of the most important remarks made by Miller in connection with her reporting debacle on the alleged build-up of Iraqi WMDs, was the following: “[M]y job isn't to assess the government's information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job is to tell readers of *The New York Times* what the government thought about Iraq's arsenal.”

The author of this thesis would disagree with her fundamentally on this claim. As mentioned in earlier chapters, the investigative journalist's job is *indeed* to assess a source's information and to do one's utmost in obtaining independent expert evaluation of its power.

⁴⁷ He was sentenced to 30 months in a federal prison and fined \$250,000. President Bush later commuted the time in prison using his Presidential 'Grant of Executive Clemency' powers.

Journalists conducting serious investigations are not – nor should they ever allow themselves to become – simply conduits for the unverified *claims* of sources, whether that source is placed low on the rungs of the ladder of power, or at the very top, as was the case in the Miller case.⁴⁸

Ironically, the man who had cultivated and utilised the most famous journalistic source of all time – Bob Woodward and ‘Deep Throat’ – was himself called to testify in November 2005 in front of the same Special Prosecutor in relation to the same CIA leak scandal. He gave evidence explaining that in June 2003 a Bush administration official had told him that Ambassador Joseph Wilson – who later wrote the critical *New York Times* opinion-piece exposing the lack of evidence supporting the claim that Iraq was arming itself with weapons of mass destruction – was married to a female undercover CIA agent. Woodward therefore, had been the first journalist to be the subject of a leak from the White House about Plame, but hadn’t written about it or publicised it because he felt his source had passed the information along in a very ‘casual’ manner. Woodward admitted that he’d also spoken to Lewis Libby on another occasion and might have asked him about the claims regarding the ambassador’s wife. This was a surprising lapse in recollection from the star investigative reporter regarding his conversations with his sources.⁴⁹ Woodward also went on the offensive against the Special Counsel investigating the issue, Patrick Fitzgerald, labelling him a ‘junkyard dog’ prosecutor. Notably, this was before he was called to give evidence in front of the same Special Counsel. Woodward reportedly apologised to his new editor at the *Post*, Downie, for waiting over two years to acknowledge he’d inside knowledge of the matter and that he’d also been briefed – albeit in a ‘casual’ way – about the Ambassador’s wife’s CIA status. Again, this seemed a curious professional misstep for the man regarded as the *doyen* of modern-age investigative reporters.

⁴⁸ This never happened in Woodward and Bernstein’s Watergate investigations. They used to two source rule to ensure that any one source’s claim(s) was supported *independently* by at least two other separate sources.

⁴⁹ His main source, for that initial June 2003 meeting was – once again – Richard Armitage.

Case Study: Scandinavian-Scottish Suicide

One of the key dangers in these situations is that a reporter can make a serious allegation on the basis of spurious and ill-informed comments from a well-intentioned, even ethically-driven ‘anonymous source’. The author of this study, for example, was contacted in 2007 by a well-meaning source in connection with an alleged murder which occurred in Scotland and involving a ‘victim’ from a Scandinavian country.

The source, a close friend of the deceased, presented me with a fully worked-out scenario indicating foul-play in this unfortunate death; images of the deceased in a coffin indicating bruising which was not mentioned in autopsy reports; details of her final movements which pointed to her being murdered en-route home to Scandinavia; and possible sightings of the ‘victim’ which suggested she was in a sound and indeed, highly-positive, state of mind prior to her death. This source felt that the Scottish police force’s strong insinuation that the deceased had taken her own life, was hasty, unprofessional and possibly, negligent. This source was also a dynamic, well-presented and impressive individual. Her findings were presented with a patina of professionalism and imbued with well-informed knowledge of the deceased’s personal life and circumstances. Acting as an investigative journalist, and following steps already mentioned in this study, I endeavoured to fully assess all the information I was presented with independently; all relevant autopsy documents were assessed by recognised UK-based experts in their fields (e.g. forensic pathology); alleged ‘witness’ statements were double-checked and compiled; field-trips to the scene of the alleged suspicious death were undertaken and statements from locals on the scene were recorded; finally, personal emails written by the deceased some 24-hours prior to her death, were obtained from her family and read closely, before professional evaluation of their contents (from a professional therapist) was sought. It became clear to the author that there

was no hard evidence pointing to anything other than a tragic suicide in this matter. The case for ‘murder’ was conspicuous by its absence. Every single point suggesting a suspicious death could be answered by the information vigorous journalism had provided. When this conclusion was relayed to the editor who had commissioned my work, he expressed disappointment in my findings since his hoped-for ‘murder-mystery’ had not materialised. I agreed to accept a ‘kill-fee’ and leave the matter as it stood. Two months after this conclusion was reached, the source and the ‘victim’s’ mother arrived in Scotland to hold a ‘protest for justice’ walk and a ‘memorial service’. Members of the Scottish press were invited and approximately six representatives of national newspapers and the two main television stations attended. All media outlets carried unverified claims – already addressed by this author – in their pages and on their airwaves after this press event. Two additional journalists contacted me to ask for guidance and I privately met them and presented my findings. They withdrew from the case and did not publish any more material on the case. One member of the Scottish Parliament also contacted me for advice. Again, I presented my full investigation and findings privately. I also briefed one of the most senior legal officers in the Scottish legal establishment about my investigation.

Unusually, I was content not to publish my work since I feared for the mental and emotional health of the mother of the deceased. I also arrived at a deeper understanding regarding the motives of the source that had originally approached me and felt that they were driven by grief-fuelled rage towards a private goal which I was not qualified to evaluate. As a journalist undertaking a serious investigation into claims of an overlooked murder, I sought to obtain, what Bernstein labelled, “the best obtainable version of the truth.”⁵⁰ I felt my findings were in keeping with that aim and had abided by one of the key-lessons of the Watergate investigation which is to use a circle-technique when moving slowly in a project. The fact

⁵⁰ Bernstein has used this phrase repeatedly over the last two decades in both public speeches, articles and his books. Its prevalence in the journalistic canon is such that pinning down the first usage of it has proven impossible. His most recent citing of it was in ‘Watergate’s Last Chapter’ in *Vanity Fair*, October 2005.

that these findings of suicide were not enough to satisfy my source, nor the deceased's mother, indicated that were engaged upon seeking a different goal and arriving at a separate destination.

The reality is that sources will sometimes mislead journalists sometimes, but for the best of reasons. Simply accepting claims made by the most impressive, apparently substantial and impressively organised of such sources, is simply not good enough. Wild-claims, dramatic turns of phrases and apparently endless reams of supportive paperwork, are only a starting point for true investigative journalists. They cannot be treated as stories in themselves. To do so would be to create the illusion that journalists are merely megaphones to be used at will by angry and frustrated individuals who feel the need to publicise their cause-of-the-day. The resources at the fingertips of modern-day journalists, means that most spurious claims can be weeded out at an early stage. A good reporter with a skilled approach to news-feature articles can turn such projects to their professional advantage and do a service to their readership, by charting the ups and downs of such cases, and explaining how alarmist allegations – when professionally investigated – can sometimes produce wise, captivating and, more often than not, enlightened narratives which illuminate the lesser-explored areas of the human experience.⁵¹

It is worth noting that one of the unintended aspects of Watergate's legacy is the fact that the highly-entertaining movie-portrayal of the source Deep Throat by the actor Hal Holbrook managed to enshrine the notion of a source as being invaluable, all-knowing, and extremely powerful to a journalist. In the process however, it also fudged the line between fact and fiction. The on-screen words spoken by Deep Throat, the instruction to Woodward to 'Follow the money' in the Watergate burglary were never uttered by the real Felt, for

⁵¹ For example, the author of this study was asked to investigate claims by a mother that her son, who had been convicted of illegally importing drugs to Japan, was in fact innocent. Whilst some of her claims were intriguing, in reality, following a basic investigation, it became clear that this was more a case of 'stand by your man' regarding a mother-son relationship, than it was a true miscarriage of justice. By attempting to lay out the facts and describe the full circumstances, I tried to signpost to readers that this was a story about a mother's love and blindness to reality. In that sense it was certainly not, for me professionally, a 'wasted' investigative experience.

example.⁵² For years there was even a debate that ‘Deep Throat’ never existed and that he was a plot-device suggested by Redford and created as a composite character by Woodward and Bernstein.⁵³ The dramatic usage of Deep Throat in the movie version of the story, and the film-noir lighting and setting of the source/reporter meetings in an underground garage at night, added flair, tension and pace to the story in relation to the character of a ‘source’. It also imbued Woodward’s youthful character with an aura of courage and ingenuity. In a sense the viewer is shown an older, substantial and knowledgeable government figure in Deep Throat, who trusts the younger reporter and thus, arguably, we’re being implicitly asked to go along with Deep Throat’s trust and therefore risk investing our beliefs and faith in the on-screen Woodward’s mission uncover the ‘truth’ behind the Watergate burglary in June 1972. This possibly leads to an understanding that *all* reporters have – or worse still, really need similar sources – and their own Deep Throat-figure locked away in their contact book. In reality, many tough, hard-hitting and revelatory investigations can be conducted without a single secret source being used.⁵⁴ This not always achievable but it is the gold-standard in investigative reporting since it means that the subject of the investigation cannot accuse the reporter or the reporter’s platform, of hiding behind mysterious, unreliable and possibly even manufactured sources.

In the USA state and federal law varies regarding possible protection in cases involving press sources being challenged. The case of Miller cited earlier in this chapter, illustrates how the use of offices, for example, like those of Special Counsels, can

⁵² See *The Secret Man* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005) by Bob Woodward.

⁵³ This theory has been floated for decades by multiple sources. It is claimed that the first draft of *All the President’s Men* didn’t mention ‘Deep Throat’ and that the character was added to spice the story up and allow multiple sources to be added in the form of one composite. Examination of the Watergate notes at the University of Texas, has led to recent claims that remarks later attributed to Deep Throat could not have come from Felt, thus allowing the ‘composite’ theory to persist.

⁵⁴ The author of this thesis, for example, is particularly proud of the fact that in the entire 13 year investigation into the Robert Brown investigation, he relied on very, very few off-the-record sources. Even employees and former employees of government agencies spoke on-the-record, even at the risk of losing their jobs. Their motivations were complex but it was important in such a case that readers understood that many individuals connected with the case, some in positions of considerable authority, felt great disquiet about aspects of the wrongful murder conviction handed down to Brown in 1977.

aggressively curtail the right of sources to feel free to speak privately to journalists and feel assured that guarantees of anonymity given by media organisations (informally by a reporter, for example, or even via lawyers, as in the case of Wigand and CBS) are watertight.

Additionally, in the USA, laws vary regarding ‘whistleblower’ protection for informants who want to emerge⁵⁵ – to the press or even to authorities – to report alleged instances of wrongdoing, crime and malpractice.⁵⁶ Wigand, who has experienced almost every facet of this legal system in the USA as a source faced with lawsuits and court charges, told the author of this work that:

There is no Federal law in the USA that uniformly protects journalists from having to disclose confidential sources - sometimes referred to the "SHIELD LAW". There are some state laws but they vary considerably from state to state. Much of the protection from disclosing sources revolves about a given journalist's integrity to a promise made to a source....when there is no standardized law you have contempt charges and then jail as is the current dilemma with [Judith Miller] Miller and [Matt] Cooper⁵⁷. Miller is in jail and Cooper's organization released his notes over his objections.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ The law in the UK is currently in a state of flux. Under the current European Human Rights Act (1998) confidential press sources are protected, stating that: "Without such protection, sources may be deterred from assisting the press in informing the public on matters of public interest. As a result the vital public watchdog role of the press may be undermined and the ability of the press to provide accurate and reliable information may be adversely affected." How this law ultimately plays out in courts in the UK – including under Scots Law – has yet to be fully tested. As it stands, the Contempt of Court Act (1981) states that secret sources are permissible for reporters 'necessary in the interests of justice or national security, or for the prevention of disorder or crime'. A recent Press Complaints Commission finding rejected a claim against a Scottish newspaper *The Daily Record* in a case where a reporter cited a secret source in an article regarding the birth of an alleged ‘gangster’s’ child. The ‘gangster’ alleged that no source existed and the paper had manufactured the entire claim and quotes up. The PCC rejected the claim that this ‘underworld source’ should be challenged since it felt the paper should abide by the PCC’s code’s which require all journalists to protect their sources. See: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/jan/24/pressandpublishing.medialaw>

⁵⁶ In the case of an investigation into the 1994 RAF Chinook helicopter crash into Scotland’s Mull of Kyntyre, carried out by the author of this work, I had to interview a state-protected whistleblower from the USA who made serious allegations regarding the authenticity of helicopter spare parts used by the Boeing Corporation. This man was only able to speak to me since he was protected by whistleblower legislation and had been awarded tens of millions of dollars, as part of a settlement, which he’d entered into with federal authorities. The law allowed whistleblowers to access agencies, convey secret information on the understanding their claims would be treated seriously and investigated thoroughly – and that they’d share one-third of any and all financial fines which were imposed and paid by the party who had committed the alleged offence in question. No such similar law exists in the UK at the present time.

⁵⁷ Matt Cooper, a former *Time* magazine reporter who also covered the CIA Valerie Plame case. Like the *New York Times*’ Judith Miller mentioned earlier in this chapter, Cooper was held in Contempt of Court for not immediately complying with a court order to testify about his sources – he was also threatened with imprisonment. Cooper avoided jail by saying his source had waived his right to confidentiality. His source turned out to be Karl Rove, former Deputy Chief of Staff to President George W. Bush. He also cited Lewis Libby as a source too. In both cases Cooper maintained that neither of them actually told him Valerie Plame’s name nor mentioned she was an undercover CIA agent.

⁵⁸ Excerpt from Dr Jeffrey Wigand interview carried out by Eamonn O’Neill, 18/07/05.

In fact, as Woodward has explained in his book *The Secret Man*, his relationship with Felt was complex, exciting, dangerous and, at times, uneasy. The following extract from an article written by Woodward in early June 2005, its clear that there was a personal relationship between the two men – one old and experienced, one young and ambitious – based on a certain degree of mutual affection, but also based on power and manipulation. It illustrates, almost perfectly, the relationship that can oftentimes exist between journalist and source:

With a story as enticing, complex, competitive and fast-breaking as Watergate, there was little tendency or time to consider the motives of our sources. What was important was whether the information checked out and whether it was true. We were swimming, really living, in the fast-moving rapids. There was no time to ask why they were talking or whether they had an ax to grind.

I was thankful for any morsel or information, confirmation or assistance Felt gave me while Carl and I were attempting to understand the many-headed monster of Watergate. Because of his position virtually atop the chief investigative agency, his words and guidance had immense, at times even staggering, authority. The weight, authenticity and his restraint were more important than his design, if he had one.

It was only later after Nixon resigned that I began to wonder why Felt had talked when doing so carried substantial risks for him and the FBI. Had he been exposed early on, Felt would have been no hero. Technically, it was illegal to talk about grand jury information or FBI files -- or it could have been made to look illegal.

Felt believed he was protecting the bureau by finding a way, clandestine as it was, to push some of the information from the FBI interviews and files out to the public, to help build public and political pressure to make Nixon and his people answerable. He had nothing but contempt for the Nixon White House and their efforts to manipulate the bureau for political reasons. The young eager-beaver patrol of White House underlings, best exemplified by John W. Dean III, was odious to him.

His reverence for Hoover and strict bureau procedure made Gray's appointment as director all the more shocking. Felt obviously concluded he was Hoover's logical successor.

And the former World War II spy hunter liked the game. I suspect in his mind I was his agent. He beat it into my head: secrecy at all cost, no loose talk, no talk about him at all, no indication to anyone that such a secret source existed.

In our book "All the President's Men," Carl and I described how we had speculated about Deep Throat and his piecemeal approach to providing information. Maybe it was to minimize his risk. Or because one or two big stories, no matter how devastating, could be blunted by the White House. Maybe it was simply to make the game more interesting. More likely, we concluded, "Deep Throat was trying to protect the office, to effect a change in its conduct before all was lost."

Each time I raised the question with Felt, he had the same answer: "I have to do this my way."⁵⁹

In Woodward's case, the use of such a powerful source became, it would seem, invaluable. However, it has been argued, by at least one editor who worked closely with Woodward and Bernstein, that Deep Throat's contribution was 'hyped'. Sussman, who supervised the duo's work, commented that:

Deep Throat was nice to have around, but that's about it. His role as a key Watergate source for the Post is a myth, created by a movie and sustained by hype for almost 30 years...

The story in which Deep Throat was helpful was the one in which we announced the existence of political spy and dirty trickster Donald Segretti. On Sept. 28th, 1972, Bernstein had gotten a call from a government lawyer who said the Watergate break-in might be one of a series of dirty tricks by the Nixon re-election team against the Democrats, and told us how we might uncover others. His tip led to our finding and reporting on Segretti. Bernstein worked on the story for about ten days and had it nailed. But, truth be told, we were a little afraid of it. What if we were over-reaching? On Sunday, October 8th, Woodward met with Deep Throat, at my request, to ask about Segretti. He told Woodward that the FBI had concluded, much earlier on, that the Watergate break-in was one incident in a wide campaign of Nixon re-election political spying and sabotage, and that Segretti was one of a large number of dirty-trick agents. Bingo. The story led the paper on Oct. 10th, along with a report on another dirty trick.

It is such assistance that Deep Throat has gotten so much credit for. The myth is that he helped us like this frequently. But it happened only once in the period of the Post's main Watergate coverage. Even then, it was after we had gotten all the goods on our own.⁶⁰

The identity of powerful source is usually something shared with editors, to ensure that oversight of investigative projects is being professionally and comprehensively undertaken. In the case of Watergate, the popular narrative promoted by both the book *All the President's Men* and film of the same name, is that Deep Throat was so powerful an

⁵⁹ From 'How Mark Felt Became Deep Throat' by Bob Woodward *The Washington Post*, June 2nd, 2005. See: <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/01/AR2005060102124.html>

⁶⁰ From 'Why Deep Throat was an unimportant source and other reflections on Watergate' – Commentary – Neiman Watchdog, by Barry Sussman. See: <http://www.neimanwatchdog.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=background.view&backgroundid=0051>

individual and so central to the progress of the investigation by Woodward and Bernstein, that – even over a 30 year stretch – only a handful of people ever knew he was Felt. Sussman disputes this reading of events. He argues that:

Routinely, I and the editors above me knew the names of confidential sources. Such sources may be anonymous to readers but they rarely are anonymous to the editors involved. The reason Deep Throat remained anonymous, so that even Post editors didn't know who he was, is that his contribution was unimportant. Don't believe for a minute that Bradlee wouldn't have asked his name had the Post's reputation been riding on what he was telling us... Watergate for many years has been hailed as a victory for the American system, and for the press. It wasn't. It was a very narrow miss. Woodward and Bernstein did fine work in helping lay out the scandal as it took place. But they have been riding the myth and hype of Deep Throat Mark Felt for a very long time.⁶¹

If the 'hype' which Sussman refers to is, even in part, true, then it explains why 'sources' in investigative journalism, post-Watergate, have attained a degree of mythology all of their own. For example, the author has lost count of the times highly professional editors have indicated that they don't 'need' to know my source's identity or that my 'Deep Throat' is surely someone to be automatically trusted? This naïve assumption regarding sources is more prevalent than individuals outside the profession of journalism would expect. Some editors *want* to believe that a know-all source, imbued with wisdom and a sense of judgement, as well as purely altruistic beliefs, actually exists.

In my experience, this phenomenon is rare. Most sources are motivated by: revenge; anger; ego; lust for public recognition; money; a perceived positive disruption to their current everyday existence; perceived change in social status.⁶² A few at most, in almost two decades of professional experience, are motivated by: social justice; an understanding of the role of the press; determination to right a wrong; a keenness to address a social-ill and remain private

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² The author was involved in a 2008-9 Channel 4 *Dispatches* project involving a high-level police whistleblower. This individual provided testimony and documents to support his claims, however unease settled on the investigation when multiple sources could not be found to support his claims. He freely admitted he was motivated by 'revenge'. He was dropped from the witness list and the project continued without his input. This move displays the multiple-sourcing technique from Watergate in action.

in their mission; wanting to help a journalist at no profit to themselves. Less than five sources have had any notion of what an experienced investigative journalist actually does or an understanding of the difficult editorial and professional backdrop against which one operates.⁶³

Such a lack of understanding and institutional control over sources leaves their usage wide-open to abuse. The cases of Cooke, Glass and Blair have loomed large in the past two and a half decades for the disproportionate damage they did to themselves, their newspapers and the collective psyche of diligent and professional reporters everywhere who read about their cases. The Cooke case is particularly disturbing since it was supervised by Watergate veteran Woodward and was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize in 1981: Cooke's article 'Jimmy's World' focusing on an eight year-old black child who was a heroin addict, was eventually discovered to be fraudulent and fabricated. Only after ex-colleagues of Cooke's raised concerns about her sources for the story, was it discovered to be 100% false. In Glass' case his magazine *The New Republic* discovered that he'd fabricated at least (in part) 27 out of the 41 articles he'd authored between mid-1996 and May-1998 when he was finally caught. In large part, a systematic failure of senior editors to heed warnings from staff (and in one case an editor's own spouse who had actually stopped reading the magazine since she found Glass' stories too incredible to be true) and to independently check Glass' sources, had led to this catastrophic sequence of events. The case of Blair, a *New York Times* reporter was equally, if not more, disastrous. Reports of his exaggerations and falsifications stretched back to his student journalism days. The *Times*' own internal checking system noted he'd more errors than his peers and one editor even wrote a memo requesting he be dropped from the paper immediately. Yet, time after time, he was promoted. In his almost 48 months at the *Times* he wrote an astonishing total of 600 articles. An ex-colleague of Blair's eventually

⁶³ This is based on diaries, notes and case-studies recorded by the author of this thesis since becoming a full-time professional journalist specialising in investigations for print and broadcast in 1989.

complained when she noted that her story's quotes had been reproduced in a Blair article almost verbatim. The *Times* launched a belated investigation into the case in April-May 2003 and found that multiple Blair articles had been plagiarised or falsified. Senior editors resigned in the wake of the scandal and the paper labelled it 'the low point in the 152-year history of the newspaper'.

Four key issues emerge on closer examination of these cases:

1. These individuals exhibited unreliable traits which were picked up as early as their undergraduate days as student journalists by colleagues;
2. All three were 'needy' individuals, who went out of their way please their immediate editors.
3. They were all under some degree of suspicion in their jobs from more experienced colleague prior to the discovery they were abusing the journalism profession (to varying degrees these colleagues made attempts to alert management about their lack of professionalism).
4. All went to a great deal of trouble to manufacture their stories and attempt to cover their tracks afterwards – in fact, in all cases, if they'd out as much time, effort and creativity into legitimate investigative journalism they'd have had considerable professional success.⁶⁴

It is clear however, that the use of sources by reporters is required and should be respected and protected. The rewards can be high. But editors need to pay close attention to the reporters themselves, their histories, their professional reputation and the inherent risk involved in allowing them to quote unnamed sources. Journalists are only humans, and as such are open to suffer from the same flaws, inadequacies and temptations as members of any

⁶⁴ Glass spent days leaving a convincing trail of 'research' evidence for editors. He persuaded his brother to impersonate a fictional character from his article; he had bogus business cards printed; and he even created Post-It notes written by himself addressed to himself, from 100% fictional 'characters' from his falsified stories. In Blair's case, he wove other journalists' stories into imagined encounters with subjects and described these meetings after scanning photos for details. This sweat and dedication, in pursuit of a legitimate in-the-field mission, might have produced fascinating real, well-researched pieces instead of shameful lies.

other highly-stressful position. Oversight by editors must be strict, well-managed and consistent. The Watergate case might have hyped the use of Deep Throat but it also used other anonymous sources too. We cannot simply ‘throw the baby out with the bath water’ in the aftermath of the Cooke, Glass and Blair scandals because they abused this facility. Instead the profession should learn from their abuses and ensure that procedures and management practices are tightened and enforced to a greater degree. Bernstein has remained solidly in favour of the potential benefits of sources and does not avoid stating their importance in the Watergate investigation:

To be absolutely clear: there is no way our reporting on Watergate could have been done without the use of anonymous sources. In fact, in our first 100 stories, there is not a single named source who revealed anything of substance about the undercover activities of the Nixon White House. Only a few of those stories were based on information confirmed or provided by Deep Throat. And the few individuals in the Nixon administration who were quoted by name were almost always lying or misleading. The basic process of reporting in Washington – good reporting and bad reporting – is dependent on the use of anonymous sources.⁶⁵

Woodward has come in for an immense amount of criticism for using secret-sources throughout this career as an investigative reporter. His writing style – the omnipresent narrator breathlessly leading us through descriptor leading the reader through apparently private scenes, has also been attacked. Yet, he has never been caught out in terms of factual accuracy. Both Woodward⁶⁶ and Bernstein were particularly castigated, for example, for a scene in *The Final Days* in which he recounted how Nixon, in the final hours of his Presidency, broke down, and in the presence of Kissinger, fell to his knees sobbing and praying. Major US news and current affairs magazines criticised the unlikely nature of the scene and questioned how Woodward ever got access to such private actions. Only when

⁶⁵ From ‘Watergate’s Last Chapter’ by Carl Bernstein *Vanity Fair* October 2005.

⁶⁶ Although Woodward and Bernstein are cited as joint authors of this work, It is been suggested by numerous authors and commentators – and never authoritatively denied – that Bob Woodward and assistant Scott Armstrong, were mostly responsible for the finished work. Bernstein was absent for long-stretches of the writing due to personal problems related to divorce, alcohol abuse and professional procrastination.

both Kissinger's and then later Nixon's memoirs hit the bookstands did readers learn that the scene in *The Final Days* had been 100% accurate.

The following chapter will turn its attention to assessing how Watergate affected the longer-term evolution of investigative journalism on both sides of the Atlantic.