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ENTREPRENEURIAL HABITUS AND NUDGING AT MULTI-GENERATIONAL FAMILY FIRMS

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Doctor of Philosophy.

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DECLARATION OF AUTHENTICITY

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ABSTRACT

Parent family firms engage in corporate venturing (CV) as a strategy for renewal and competitive advantage. As part of the venturing process, they provide organisational sponsorship to imbue capital and resources to their new ventures. For this study, I investigated seven parent family firms and their new ventures in order to generate a set of research questions that outline a framework for discussion and analysis. Given the exploratory nature of my research, I adopted an abductive multiple case study method at five parent family firms with family ventures and two parent family firms with non-family ventures. At each parent family firm I created case histories, data tables and event histories while also performing open coding and selective coding of data to provide within-case and cross-case analyses in order to reveal patterns in the data. Finally, I created a visual representation of the propositions in a model of a more nuanced theory of organizational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation among parent family firms.

In this study I explored paradigms of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship to show that parent family firms imbued their new ventures with dispositions and resources. I propose that over generations parent family firms imbue long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions while gently steering only family ventures toward available opportunities and resources. Parent family firms put opportunities and strategic resources in entrepreneurial capital within 'easy reach' and 'full view', allowing family ventures to more easily overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy by choosing what is best in order to achieve power over their individual fields.

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“I would like to say in passing that, among all the dispositions that I would wish to be capable of inculcating, there is the ability to apprehend research as a rational endeavour rather than as a kind of mystical quest, talked about with bombast for the sake of self-reassurance but also with the effect of increasing one’s fear or anguish.”
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992)

This achievement is the fulfilment of a long-standing goal, originally conceived long ago, after graduation from business school. Many urged me to remain focused on my goal, and while many have supported me along this journey of thought and action, I will forever owe a debt of gratitude to the people of Glasgow, including faculty and staff at the University of Strathclyde. I wish to thank my first supervisor, Jonathan Levie; without his guidance, patience and persistence, the topic of this thesis would be significantly less substantial – in fact, it would not exist. I would also like to extend thanks to my second supervisor, Sara Carter, for her concise insight, perception and family business knowledge. Among the Hunter Centre staff, I’d also like to thank Niall MacKenzie and Erik Monsen, who provided gentle support and guidance along with good fun while I was studying in Glasgow. I would also like to extend sincere thanks to faculty and staff at Babson College. Candy Brush, Heidi Neck, Bill Bygrave and Matt Allen have all acted as role models in their dedication to entrepreneurship research, entrepreneurship education and commitment to Babson. Last, but certainly not least, I wish to thank Stuart Harvey, who introduced me to the people and character of Glasgow. Stuart reminded me that life should always be full of fun, friends, competitive games and hearty laughter. I will always associate my time while a student in Glasgow with my friend, Stuart Harvey.

Rest in peace, Stuart.

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CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY

1.1 Thesis Topic

The purpose of this thesis is to explore the process of corporate venturing at parent family firms – specifically, organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. Previous studies have not fully investigated an entrepreneurial process perspective at parent family firms (Nordqvist et al., 2013). I do this by employing an abductive, multiple case study method at seven parent family firms to investigate how these firms ‘sponsor’ both family and non-family new ventures. I ask the following research questions to uncover possible patterns in the data on sponsorship and transfer of capital/resources from parent family firms to family and/or non-family ventures:

RQ1: How do parent family firms sponsor family and non-family venture(s), and do they sponsor them differently?

RQ2: How do they transfer different types of capital/resources to their new ventures, and do they transfer capital/resources to different types of ventures differently?

The first question pre-supposes existing literature that parent family firms act as incubators for nascent entrepreneurs starting a business. The question asks ‘how’ parent family firms sponsor their ventures and specifically asks whether there are different types of ventures – family vs. non-family – which they sponsor differently. I asked this question in response to GEM Scotland 2014 survey data which deduced that,

“The higher percentage of nascent entrepreneurs reporting a family business as an incubator than existing entrepreneurs suggest that either family businesses are particularly prolific incubators of spinoffs, of that family business spinoffs have higher attrition than other start-ups.”

RQ2 asks about munificence, mechanisms and resources with which a parent family firm transfers types of capital/resources to types of ventures. This question responds to Amezcua et al. (2013) who investigated whether a resource munificent environment could increase rather than decrease exit rate of new ventures. The authors (2013: 1646) found a “*lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms and activities by which sponsorship influences new organisational survival;*” and they further suggest that the ability of a new organisation to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy is “*highly contingent on the types of services offered as well as the environment within which they operate*” (Amezcua et al., 2013, Stinchcombe, 1965). Using their framework of sponsorship activities in field-building, networking and direct support, I asked how parent family firms might utilize different types of mechanisms and activities to transfer different types of capital/resources for different types of ventures to provide a more-nuanced theory of sponsorship at parent family firms.

From the case data, first, I derive a set of propositions that relate firm-specific constructs to the process of providing resource munificence in the context of new

business incubation. Second, I propose a new construct in entrepreneurial habitus to explain the long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial disposition that a parent family firm imbues to its new venture(s) (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). Third, I borrow from extant literature in Thaler and Sunstein (2003) to suggest that the parent family firm gently steers or ‘nudges’ its new venture(s) toward opportunities and strategic resources in entrepreneurial capital. Finally, I suggest a model of munificence proposing parent family firms provide an entrepreneurial habitus and gentle ‘nudging’ only to family ventures so they might overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965). As a result, this study proposes a model for further testing to understand whether parent family firms ‘sponsor’ their new venture(s), how parent family firms ‘sponsor’ their new venture(s) and how they ‘sponsor’ different types of ventures in different ways.

Parent family firms may enable an entrepreneurial orientation and entrepreneurial legacy at their new ventures; they may also enable sponsorship mechanisms and sponsorship activities to help their new ventures overcome a liability of newness (Amezcuca et al., 2013). However, this study suggests that a parent family firm imbues an entrepreneurial habitus only to family venture(s) in long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions while it ‘nudges’ only family venture(s) toward opportunities and strategic resources by putting opportunities within ‘full view’ and ‘easy reach’ of their family venture(s) (Bourdieu, 1971, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Thaler Richard and Sunstein Cass, 2008).

Habitus is a Latin translation of the ancient Greek term, *hexis*, which directly translates as a verb indicating *having* or *possessing* as in having a constitution for or possessing a character of etc. (Klein, 1992). While habitus is commonly translated in modern texts as ‘habit’, it is more precisely translated ‘state’ or ‘disposition’ by which the individual might realize moral virtue or excellence at one’s designated function (Nederman, 1990, Ross, 1956). Aristotle developed the term in a contemplation of two kinds of virtue or excellence – intellectual and moral (Ross, 1956). Intellectual virtue (or excellence) develops as a result of teaching; moral virtue develops as a result of habit or practice, and in the middle ages philosophers including Anselm and Buridan resurrected the term, habitus, to reflect on it as a stable disposition to act or think in a certain way (Faucher and Roques, 2018)

Present day philosophers continue to contemplate its meaning in relation to virtue or excellence. In his early writings Bourdieu (1971a: 83) describes habitus as,

“A system of lasting, transposable dispositions which integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations, and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems.”

A ‘nudge’ according to Thaler and Sunstein (2003, 2008) is paternalistic by nature, but it is paternalism which has great, positive effects upon those it acts upon while it has little or no ill effects upon those who provide the action. As such, the authors introduce the term libertarian paternalism for a ‘nudge’ (Thaler Richard and Sunstein Cass, 2008, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). By placing opportunities and resources within ‘full view’ and ‘easy reach’, libertarian paternalistic interventions ‘nudge’ individuals

toward what is best for them without restricting their choices and without coercion; the action should ‘nudge’ them towards what they would have chosen had they not been subject to the specific limitations of rationality (Sugden, 2009, Simon, 1972).

This study contributes to the literature on family business, corporate entrepreneurship, resource transfer, resource munificence, organisational sponsorship and trans-generational entrepreneurship from parent firms. In this study, I refer to the construct of organisational sponsorship to provide a framework for understanding resource transfer and munificence in the context of new business incubation by parent firms (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). However, I investigate paradigms of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship to challenge existing theory which suggests that the construct of organisational sponsorship singularly defines and delineates the process of resource transfer and munificence from all types of parent firms to their new ventures. Consequently, this study uses a multi-level approach to assess systemic influences at parent family firms and their new venture(s) to generate a set of research questions that outline a framework for discussion and analysis for this study. Further, this study (1) attends to a resource-based view (RBV) of the firm, (2) reviews corporate venturing at the firm, (3) reflects on social construct theory, (4) builds on recent methodological work on organisational sponsorship and (5) links recent philosophical work on soft paternalism from the behavioural economics and legal fields (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Flynn, 1993a, Barney, 1991, Wolcott and Lippitz, 2007, Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Bourdieu, 1986).

The study also develops a model for further testing on the relationships which parent family firms, types of resource capital, phenomenon of resource transfer and type of new venture - both family and non-family ventures – have with each other. Finally, this study discusses the limitations of the research, avenues for further research and implications for entrepreneurs, family firms, non-family firms and educators wishing to consider the multi-faceted phenomena of resource transfer and munificence among parent firms with new venture(s).

This study proposes that parent family firms imbue lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to non-coercively ‘nudge’ only family venture(s) toward opportunities and strategic resources which are best for the family venture(s) to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965, Bourdieu, 1971, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). As a result, this study challenges existing assumptions and paradigms of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship; it introduces a new construct in entrepreneurial habitus, and it borrows from behavioural economics and legal theory on libertarian, asymmetric or ‘soft’ paternalism to investigate the process of trans-generational entrepreneurship at parent family firms (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Bourdieu, 1989, Camerer et al., 2003).

Flynn (1993b: 20) defines ‘organisational sponsorship’ as,

“... a deliberate attempt to make available a significantly higher and more stable level of resources for new organisations ... when organisations are sponsored, their environment is enriched, providing legitimacy.”

The premise is that resource munificence in an entrepreneurial context should always benefit a new venture that is attempting to overcome a liability of newness

(Castrogiovanni, 1991, Stinchcombe, 1965). Studies have focused on types of sponsorship in various contexts, including university incubators, venture capital, franchising, etc., but few have focused on sponsorship mechanisms and sponsorship activities general to all types of sponsorship to understand the complexities associated with the phenomenon (Stinchcombe, 1965, Flynn, 1993a, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Suchman, 1995). Amezcua et al. (2013: 1646) investigated organisational sponsorship among university incubators and found a “*lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms and activities by which sponsorship influences new organisational survival*”; they further suggest that the ability of a new organisation to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy is “*highly contingent on the types of services offered as well as the environment within which they operate*” (Amezcua et al., 2013, Stinchcombe, 1965). In other words, too much sponsorship in certain environments is not necessarily a good thing for new ventures and may lead to an increase in exit rates. Consequently, Amezcua et al. (2013: 1628) suggest,

“... a need for a more-nuanced theory of sponsorship that attends to the mechanisms and conditions by which resource munificence is likely to alter new organisation survival rates.”

While Amezcua et al. (2013) only consider sponsorship in the context of university incubators, organisational sponsorship also occurs when a parent firm creates new ventures (Reynolds et al., 2000). Cooper (1985) suggests that the role of universities in the process of incubation and organisational sponsorship appears to be less direct than is often assumed, and it is parent firms that have served as incubators in many industry categories.

In this thesis, I extend research by academics, including Flynn (1993a; 1993b), Amezcua et al. (2013), Bourdieu (1986) and Sunstein and Thaler (2003), from the context of universities, university incubators, behavioural economics and legal theory to the context of corporate entrepreneurship and corporate venturing at parent family firms that engage in corporate entrepreneurship as a strategy for renewal and competitive advantage and seem to ‘sponsor’ their new entrepreneurial ventures (Zahra, 1993, Zahra and Sharma, 2004, Sharma and Chrisman, 2007). This thesis thus investigates corporate entrepreneurship and venturing at parent family firms and asks, ‘Do parent family firms sponsor family and non-family entrepreneurial ventures the same or differently?’

This thesis extends theory proposed by Amezcua et al. (2013) on varying empirical mechanisms and activities of sponsorship from the realm of ‘university incubators’ and ‘new organisations’ to the realm of ‘parent family firms’ and ‘new ventures’. First, I focus on sponsorship mechanisms and sponsorship activities from parent family firms to understand sponsorship as a process involving resource transfer between a parent firm and one or more new ventures. Second, I briefly investigate whether parent family firms transfer different types of capital and transfer capital differently to family and non-family new ventures. Third, I propose a new construct in an entrepreneurial habitus, with which only a parent family firm transfers lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions to only family venture(s). Fourth, I propose that only parent family firms gently steer or ‘nudge’ their family new venture(s) toward opportunities and strategic resources. Finally, with entrepreneurial capital. I propose a

theoretical model of munificence which illustrates how the parent family firm imbues an entrepreneurial habitus over generations while it gently ‘nudges’ only family ventures toward available opportunities and strategic resources.

The objective of this study is to explore family and family entrepreneurship and build on previous work by exploring entrepreneurial behaviours, entrepreneurial processes, entrepreneurial resources and entrepreneurial opportunities at family firms because as Rogoff and Heck (2003: 233) note, family is, “*the oxygen that feeds the fire of entrepreneurship.*” By doing so this study contributes to the literature in three different ways. First, through the concept of family entrepreneurship this study attempts to untangle complex and long-term relationships that characterize family and family business. Second, trans-generational entrepreneurship as a strategy for succession may result in habitual entrepreneurship occurring at the family and family firm level (Habbershon and Williams, 1999). Third, while research in the study of entrepreneurship and family business has increased dramatically over the past decade, there are still significant gaps in the literature (Bettinelli et al., 2017). This gap is continually important to reduce, because as most firms are family businesses, family business founders are entrepreneurs. The family business must continually demonstrate entrepreneurial behaviours and processes throughout its life cycle (Hoy & Sharma, 2010).

This thesis attends to Dyer and Handler’s (1994) call to integrate entrepreneurship and family business research by understanding cognition, process and behaviour in the family and non-family firm contexts and by investigating how parent family firms mediate or moderate the relationship between their new ventures and their environment by creating a resource-munificent context to increase legitimacy and growth at the new ventures. Further, this thesis attends to McKelvie et al. (2014: 340) who propose there is a need to increase research on corporate entrepreneurship strategies in family business because, “*family involvement can result in the development of resources unique to family businesses*” and relevant to corporate entrepreneurship within the family firm. As previously noted, Nordqvist and Melin (2010) propose entrepreneurship in family firms as the firm-level entrepreneurial attitudes and activities that occur when a family is considerably involved in an established organization (Bettinelli et al., 2017). According to Randerson et al. (2015: 146) corporate entrepreneurship in family businesses brings to light the intersection where family business and entrepreneurship overlap, and they note,

“Recently, the intersection of family business and entrepreneurship research has led to some interesting results that refer to analysis of corporate entrepreneurship in family firms.”

The authors (2015) note several streams of research relevant to family business and entrepreneurship in corporate entrepreneurship already exist in a resource-based view in familiness, trans-generational entrepreneurship in entrepreneurial succession, family entrepreneurial orientation (FEO) and value creation frameworks in resource transfer (Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Habbershon et al., 2010, Zellweger et al., 2010, Barney, 1991). In familiness Habbershon and Williams (1999) suggest a resource-based framework for investigating the ‘family stuff’ relevant to the family firm. In trans-generational entrepreneurship Nordqvist and Zellweger (2010)

combine a resource-based view in familiness with entrepreneurial behaviours in EO and FEO in order to explore the entrepreneurial process in corporate entrepreneurship and succession at business families across the globe. Their research efforts have arguably sparked international collaboration in entrepreneurial family business research manifested in the STEP Project and similar collaborative efforts (Nordqvist et al., 2008). In the role of resources and the transfer of resources as drivers of entrepreneurship and corporate entrepreneurship at family firms, Sieger et al. (2011) found that a firm's human capital, social capital and reputation were positively related to portfolio entrepreneurship and that their relevance changed along the various stages of the portfolio entrepreneurship process suggesting that varying levels of resources play a part in venturing at the family firm.

Taken as a whole, this research is important because it proposes several factors that make family firms more effective at generational influence, opportunity recognition, resource transfer and new venture legitimacy; upon further testing, it may explain how a family firm might remain entrepreneurial across multiple generations – especially, as Jaskiewicz et al. (2015: 32) suggest, the founder's influence, "*dissipates in later generations.*" This study introduces the construct of an entrepreneurial habitus to account for long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions as a function of systemic family and systemic family firm influence. This study attempts to benefit from an integrated approach through a multi-level research agenda by taking individual traits measured in constructs and approaching the traits in terms of their social construction through in-depth interviews (Forson et al., 2014).

1.2 Key Concepts and Constructs

Below I describe the key concepts and constructs to which I continually refer in this thesis. In the following chapters, I provide a more thorough analysis of each concept along with a discussion of its significance.

- ***Abduction***

In this study, abduction plays the role of explorer of viable paths toward a discovery of meaning (Yu, 1994). Peirce (1998) noted that it is abduction – not induction or deduction – that can help to unveil the internal structure of meaning.

- ***Corporate Entrepreneurship***

Wolcott and Lippitz (2007: 75) define corporate entrepreneurship as "*the process by which teams at an established company conceive, foster, launch and manage a new business that is distinct from the parent company but leverages the parent's assets, market position, capabilities or other resources.*" While this study follows definition proposed by Wolcott and Lippitz (2007) there are many and often conflicting definitions of corporate entrepreneurship in the literature (Sharma and Chrisman, 2007).

- **Fields**
 Fields are relational, dynamic social microcosms that include both the totality of actors and organisations involved in an arena of social or cultural production and the dynamic relationships among them (DiMaggio, 1979, De Clercq and Voronov, 2009b, Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). In this study, I incorporate Bourdieu's (2005b) concept of a field in an organisational context to provide a framework that distinguishes between dominant and dominated agents who attempt to usurp, restrict or monopolize power.

- **Firm / Organisation**
 Stinchcombe (1965: 142) defines the organisation as "a set of stable social relations deliberately created with the explicit intention of continuously accomplishing some specific goals or purposes" (Stinchcombe, 1965). I use Stinchcombe's definition in this study, and I use the terms 'firm' and 'organisation' interchangeably.
 - **Parent**
 I use the term 'parent' in this study to imply a generative relationship between a late-stage parent firm and an early-stage new venture (Reynolds et al., 2000). This relationship may or may not include a transfer of resources.

 - **Parent Family Firm**
 This study follows Chua et al. (1999: 25) in defining a family business as a "business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families."

 To operationalize the concept, I use the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) definition of a family firm: "if there is an existing business in which one or more family members, including by blood, marriage, or adoption, together own and control more than 50% of the business" (Reynolds et al., 2000).

- **Forms of Capital**
 I refer to Bourdieu's (1986) conception of cultural, social, economic and symbolic capital and to Becker's (1974) human capital.
 - **Entrepreneurial Capital**
 I operationalize Firkin's (2001, 2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital, which combine constructs created by Bourdieu (1977) and Becker (1974). Firkin's (2003) forms of capital include economic, social, cultural and human capital.

- **Legitimacy**
 Legitimacy is the appraisal of or consent to action in terms of shared or common values in the social system (Parsons, 1960). Research suggests that legitimacy is a resource that the new venture must acquire (Zimmerman and

Zeitz, 2002). I use the term ‘legitimation’ in reference to the process by which a new venture acquires legitimacy (Beetham, 1991).

- ***New Venture***

A venture is a structure including objective form and subjective dispositions that may “bind time and space - conceptualized as including not only rules but resources as well” (Giddens, 1979, Sewell, 1992). Gartner (1984) provides context for a venture in the individual, environment, process and organisation.

To operationalize the term ‘new’, as in new venture or new business, this study refers to the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor term for ‘new business’ as, “an established business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners of the firm for more 3 months but less than 42 months” (Reynolds et al., 2000).

- ***Paternalism***

In this study, a policy or practice counts as paternalistic if it is selected with the goal of influencing the choices of the affected parties. Paternalism suggests a degree of both agency and coercion. Recent research suggests that ‘soft’ forms of paternalism exist within social structures.

- ***Asymmetric Paternalism***

Paternalism is asymmetric if it creates large benefits for those who make errors, while it imposes little harm to those who are fully rational (Camerer et al., 2003).

- ***Libertarian Paternalism***

In some situations, an agent must make a choice that will affect the choice or direction of others. If there is no coercion and the choice makes individuals objectively ‘better off’, then the paternalism is libertarian in regards to power (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003).

- ***Choice Architect***

A choice architect is an individual or organisation that has the responsibility for organising the context in which people make decisions. According to Sunstein and Thaler (2014), choice architects are “self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make their lives better – they nudge.”

- ***Nudge***

A ‘nudge’ in this study refers directly to libertarian or asymmetric paternalism. It consists of any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behaviour in a particular way without coercion and without forbidding options or significantly changing their economic incentives (Thaler Richard and Sunstein Cass, 2008).

- ***Power***
Power is the social construct that allows organisations and families to be ranked relative to one another because they control substantial resources/capital with which they may engage in political competition (Stinchcombe, 1965). Bourdieu suggests that power is culturally and symbolically created and re-legitimized through the interplay of agency and structure (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977).
- ***Resource / Capital***
Throughout this study, I use the terms ‘resources’ and ‘capital’ interchangeably, and I reference Sewell’s (1992: 9) definition of resources as “anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions.”
- ***Resource-based Theory***
I use a resource-based view of the firm to include a range of financial and non-financial assets a new venture may acquire and accumulate to overcome the liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Barney, 1991, Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Firkin, 2001, Stinchcombe, 1965, Bourdieu, 1986).
- ***Spinoff***
A spinoff is “*a new legal entity founded by one or more individuals seconded or transferred (sometimes part-time) from a parent organisation*” (De Cleyn and Braet, 2009).
- ***Sponsorship***
Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 420) suggest that the concept of sponsorship is a derivative of patronage. Sponsorship suggests the notion of a special relationship with an individual of power and influence who protects the sponsored entity from a hostile environment.
 - ***Organisational Sponsorship***
In this study, I reference Flynn’s (1988; 1993a; 1993b) construct of organisational sponsorship, which he defines as the mediation of new organisations and their environments through the application of new resources.
 - ***Sponsorship Mechanisms***
Sponsorship can buffer a new venture from its environment or serve as a bridge to its environment. Buffering mechanisms protect a new venture and limit its dependence on external resources (Hall, 1982). Bridging mechanisms connect a venture to its environment providing connections, alignment and legitimacy (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Baum and Oliver, 1991).40T
 - ***Sponsorship Activities***
Sponsorship activities buffer and/or bridge the new venture. Amezcua et al. (2013: 1634) analyse sponsorship activities in the literature and consolidate them into (1) networking activities, (2) field-building activities and (3) direct

support activities. This study operationalizes Amezcua et al.'s (2013) forms of sponsorship activities.

Networking links new ventures with external resource providers via structured programs;

Field-building connects ventures to similar and new organisations in a field;

Direct support involves the direct transfer of knowledge, capital and labour to new ventures.

1.3 Background

Fewer than 50% of new ventures last more than 5 years, yet entrepreneurial new venture activity remains an important source of new economic activity among nations (Aldrich Howard and Ruef, 2006, Astrachan et al., 2003). Universities, governments and organisations have established initiatives and incentives, including incubators and accelerators, that support, nurture and protect new ventures. These initiatives and incentives act as forms of sponsorship (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). Sponsorship focuses on increasing the survival rates and decreasing the exit rates of new ventures, and there is a general consensus around a causal model that suggests that a resource-munificent context created via sponsorship decreases exit rates (Castrogiovanni, 1991). However, there is a lack of clarity in the literature concerning the heterogeneity of sponsorship types, contexts and environments. Castrogiovanni (1991: 548) warns, “*Researchers should examine munificence separately for each of several relevant resource pools or sub-environments wherever possible.*” Yet since Flynn’s (1993a, 1993b) pioneering work on organisational sponsorship, relatively little work has been conducted on resource transfer and munificence as they relate to sponsorship.

One exception is the work by Amezcua et al. (2013) that focuses on the inter-organisational phenomenon of sponsorship. Their study investigates the buffering and bridging mechanisms at work in all contexts of sponsorship that allow new organisations to acquire valuable resources and overcome a liability of newness (Stinchcombe, 1965). They demonstrate that a ‘fit-based’ approach that accounts for the heterogeneity of activities in the context of sponsorship and the heterogeneity of environments more accurately predicts the success of sponsorship initiatives for new ventures (Amezcua et al., 2013). In other words, they suggest that more munificence does not equate to lower exit rates among new ventures. Amezcua et al. (2013: 1630) focus their research on university incubators because they believe that university incubators “*have achieved significant attention and considerable support as vehicles for developing high potential firms.*” However, Cooper (1985) suggests that the role of universities in the process of incubation appears to be less direct than is often assumed, and it is business firms that have served as incubators in many industry categories. Parent firms, whether family-owned or not, foster economic activity by promoting and sponsoring entrepreneurial activity via new ventures (Astrachan et al., 2003, Reynolds et al., 2000, Levie and Hart, 2008). Consequently, this study focuses on the phenomenon of organisational sponsorship and how parent family firms ‘sponsor’ their new venture(s) toward legitimacy.

1.4 Research Gap and Research Questions

Though the concept of sponsorship is well established and the construct of organisational sponsorship has become more established in the literature, researchers have developed the concept in solitary contexts isolated from other forms of sponsorship (Amezcua et al., 2013, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). Consequently, while there is an abundance of research on individual types of sponsorship, including but not

limited to venture capital, business incubation and franchising, Amezcua et al. (2013: 1646) note that, “*few attempts have been made to bridge the conversation by delving deeper into the mechanisms of sponsorship more generally,*” to understand taken-for-granted notions about the direct association between a resource-munificent environment and new venture entry or exit rates within the context of venture capital, new business incubation or franchising (see also Amezcua et al., 2013 and Castrogiovanni, 1991). The result has been differentiation and fragmentation in the ways organisational sponsorship actually works. As Amezcua et al. (2013: 1645) state, “*While the mechanisms are generally applicable to all types of sponsorship, the empirical manifestations likely differ, depending on context.*” Consequently, there is a gap in our understanding of how sponsorship manifests at parent family firms and their new venture(s). Further, sponsorship among parent family firms is not well understood from a process perspective. Do all parent family firms provide sponsorship? Do parent family firms provide different types of sponsorship to different types of ventures?

This study addresses the hitherto unanswered questions of ‘how’ parent family firms sponsor new ventures, ‘why’ they sponsor new ventures and ‘what’ resources they use to sponsor them. It does so by delving into individual mechanisms (i.e., buffering and bridging) and the associated activities (i.e., field-building, direct support, networking) of organisational sponsorship, using a framework suggested by Amezcua et al. (2013). I investigate the empirical manifestations of sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at parent family firms. Amezcua et al. (2013) consider only the special case of university incubators, yet organisational sponsorship also occurs when parent family firms sponsor one or more new ventures (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). In this study, I extend sponsorship theory from the realm of university incubators to the realm of ‘parent family firms’ and their ‘new venture(s)’ to suggest that bridging and buffering mechanisms, along with specific sponsorship activities, help only family ventures acquire financial and non-financial resources to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Amezcua et al., 2013, Stinchcombe, 1965).

Castrogiovanni (1991), Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) and others suggest that an intensive case study method might prove useful for a deep understanding of munificence and legitimacy. Therefore, this study uses an intensive case study method among five parent family firms with family ventures and two parent family firms with non-family ventures located in the UK and the US to answer the following research questions:

RQ1: How do parent family firms sponsor family and non-family venture(s), and do they sponsor them differently?

RQ2: How do they transfer different types of capital/resources to their new ventures, and do they transfer capital/resources to different types of ventures differently?

I ask research question (1) to determine how parent family firms provide organisational sponsorship to their new venture(s) – both family and non-family ventures, and I ask whether they sponsor different types of ventures differently. I ask research question (2) to understand how the sponsorship process works at parent family firms and how it differs between family and non-family ventures. These research questions establish

a framework for understanding entrepreneurial orientation (EO) and entrepreneurial legacy (EL) from a process perspective (Miller, 1983, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). If there is EO at the parent family firm, how does the entrepreneur become ‘oriented’? If the parent family firm benefits from an entrepreneurial legacy, what dispositions and resources are transferred and how are they transferred to the entrepreneur (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Bourdieu, 1986)?

1.5 Research Design and Methods

Few empirical studies have attempted to investigate organisational sponsorship by a family firm as a process by which a new venture overcomes the liability of newness and acquires legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965). In addition, few studies have attempted to investigate whether parent family firms sponsor different types of new ventures in different ways. Over many years, academic research in strategy and entrepreneurship has tended to focus on the numbers, evolving into what Pettigrew (1992: 5) describes as “*an exercise in comparative statistics*” rather than an investigation into the processual nature of corporate entrepreneurship, incubation and sponsorship (see also (Corbett et al., 2013)817). In this study, I consider epistemological, philosophical and methodological questions as well as assessing and analysing the data (Crotty, 1998, Creswell et al., 2003). My research was driven largely by the question of ‘why’ parent family firms sponsor their venture(s) and ‘how’ parent family firms sponsor their venture(s). The exploratory nature of the study required data collection methods that include questionnaires, interviews, observations and archives. These combined data collection methods made it possible to use triangulation to substantiate my research propositions and proposed model (Eisenhardt, 1989). To make sure I understood the phenomenon of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation, I drew from a selection of seven firms to collect abductive data.

To give a detailed perspective on how sponsorship activities vary at parent family firms, I chose a micro-level abductive and interpretive approach to investigate the theory relating parent firm typology, resource transfer, munificence, sponsorship, forms of capital and legitimacy and to suggest a model for testing around organisational sponsorship, entrepreneurial capital and the legitimacy of new ventures (Gephart, 2004, Flynn, 1993b, Flynn, 1993a, Meyer and Rowan, 1977, Bourdieu, 1986, Eisenhardt, 1989). This approach is often applied to historical events to identify chronological structure and causal relationships over time (Kimberly and Bouchikhi, 1995, Suddaby and Greenwood, 2009).

Because sociologists attempt to uncover social structures in hierarchies and explain social space and asymmetries, I chose several sociological theories to guide me on both an ontological and epistemological level and to ground my research in my investigation of what structure is, what social structures exist, why they exist and what might interfere with my analysis or interpretation of them. Because I believe interference by the sociologist in the design, gathering, interpretation and analysis of the data is dangerous, I chose a philosophy of social constructionism supported by a reflexive sociology as an integral part of my examination of the ‘epistemological

unconscious' and the 'social organization' of the disciplines because I believe there might be the possibility of interference by the researcher in the design, gathering, interpretation and analysis of the data (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, Özbilgin et al., 2005). As part of this effort, I strove to judge each context by effectively removing the sociologist from sociology, because, as Bourdieu (1977: 10) notes:

[I]t is not sufficient for anthropology to break with native experience and the native representation of that experience; it has to make a second break and question the presuppositions inherent in the position of an outside observer, who in his preoccupation with interpreting practices, is inclined to introduce in the object the principles of his relation to the object, as is attested by the special importance he assigns to communicative functions.

Given my personal involvement in the green industry over many years, it was often difficult to remove myself from the conversation while conducting semi-structured interviews over a period of 36 months. However, I believe it was my association with the green industry field combined with my ability to, as Bourdieu (1992: 10) notes, "break with native experience" which provided unusual depth and guidance.

Over a period of 36 months, I conducted 55 interviews at seven firms in the UK and the US with CEOs, family owners, family members, employees and industry experts. To organise and analyse the qualitative data, create case histories and tables and link data to a particular case, I used NVIVO software. Within and cross-case analyses were performed to induce propositions, and I collected additional data from archival publications, documentation and personal histories to ensure the consistency and quality of the data. In addition, I chose family firms entering at least their third generation to control for founder influence at parent family firms.

Initially my research consisted of a 'pilot' case study that looked at trans-generational entrepreneurship at a US parent family firm with several new ventures created over three generations. The creation of this case study allowed me to see patterns in the data that suggested that family firms might be proactive and strategic in how they created and sponsored their new ventures. I refined this case study over a period of 24 months with additional interviews and data collected from a wider circle of family members and critical players. This case study contributed to refining my data collection, especially pertaining to the content and process to be followed in later cases (Yin, 1981). The subsequent 'main' case study (Case A) represents 36 months of a combined compilation of semi-structured interviews among family members at a single-family firm who had founded more than eleven new ventures over three generations.

I conducted my analysis in six steps. First, I conducted a search of the green industry field and construction field to find firms which had engaged in corporate entrepreneurship activities. This data set of seven firms included individuals trying to start both family and non-family new ventures. Second, I structured case study data into an event history database to present a chronology of events and details about the parent family firm and its venture(s) (Garud and Rappa, 1994). Third, through coding and textual analysis of individual interviews, I identified the mechanisms used by the parent family firm to bridge the new ventures to the environment and/or buffer the new ventures from the environment (Gephart, 2004, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Hall, 1982). Fourth, I dug more deeply into the coding and textual

analysis to investigate whether specific sponsorship activities were associated with buffering and bridging mechanisms. In line with the literature on sponsorship activities associated with buffering and bridging mechanisms, I looked for activities of field-building, networking and direct support (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Fifth, I separated codes into dispositions imbued by the parent family firm to its new venture(s) and munificence transferred by the parent family firm to its new venture(s). I searched for codes that reflected dispositions in an EO and EL (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). I also searched for codes that reflected organisational sponsorship in field-building, networking and direct support activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013). In both searches I documented data in uncategorised dispositions and uncategorised munificence for further analysis.

1.6 Structure of the Dissertation

This chapter has introduced the general concepts and constructs associated with this research on the intra-organisational phenomenon of organisational sponsorship and the question of how parent family firms sponsor their new venture(s). In this chapter, I described gaps in the organisational sponsorship literature, briefly described the key concepts and constructs of this study, listed the study's research questions and identified my research design and methodology.

Chapter Two reviews the literature in three parts. First, I review the literature on family firms and their definition in the literature. There are many other definitions, but for this study I operationalize the term 'parent family firm' using a Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) measure originally developed for the Raymond Family Institute that defines the family firm as,

“an existing business that the respondents and one or more family members, including by blood, marriage, or adoption, together owns and control more than 50% of the business” (Astrachan et al., 2002).

Second, I review the literature on ventures and venturing which, according to Gartner (1986) is synonymous with the definition of the new organisation. For this study I use the Strategic Planning Institute (SPI) (1978: 2) definition for a new venture to suggest the new organisation must be an independent entity, or a new profit centre within a company that has other established businesses. Third, I review the literature on social space and social structures to present a framework for this study in the seminal work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1973, 1977) outlines the search by individuals to competitively accumulate cultural resources which establish the asymmetries upon which social class and distinctions are based, and he argues that symbolic systems are anchored in pre-existing culture – they shape our understanding of reality by influencing our interactions and communications (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, DiMaggio, 1979). Further, individuals multiply and intensify symbolic systems and asymmetries in order to increase their power over a field. I also review the literature on 'habitus' and forms of capital within social spaces and social structures as each concept relates to what Bourdieu (1977: 37) refers to as *“aces in the pack”* and what Wacquant (1993: 19) definitively calls *“power over the field.”*

Chapter Three reviews the literature on old and new concepts and constructs of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship. I start my review by presenting Abercrombie and Hill (1976) and others who concisely define each concept of paternalism, patronage and the associated concept of sponsorship. Next, I review the literature on organizational sponsorship and reference the work of Flynn (1993a,b). For a review of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation, I frequently refer to Amezcua et al. (2013) who hypothesize that resource munificence from organisational sponsorship does not necessarily guarantee new venture survival. To provide a framework for analysis, the authors suggest that parent organisations provide sponsorship mechanisms and associated activities with which to sponsor new organisations. In the following sections I review the literature on entrepreneurial attitudes or dispositions in an entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996) and entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a) at family and non-family firms. Further, I review behavioural economics and legal theory to understand whether ‘sponsorship’ is the appropriate term for consideration of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. Specifically, I review Thaler and Sunstein (2003) who propose the construct of libertarian paternalism in a ‘nudge’ and Camerer (2003) who proposes a similar construct in asymmetric paternalism. In the following section, I review the literature on resource-based theory and forms of capital at the firm (Firkin, 2001, Barney, 1991). Finally, I present a summary of dispositions and resources at the parent family firm.

Chapter Four presents the study’s research philosophy, research design and research setting. In this chapter, I report on the procedures used to gather, collect and measure the data. Further, I discuss issues with respect to the quality of the data collected and the ethical considerations around collecting data. Chapter Five reports the results of my analysis after data collection, transcription and organisation. This chapter summarizes individual cases as they relate to the thesis topic. Chapter Six presents an analysis of the individual cases and a thematic structure that fits the data into organisational nodes relevant to this study. Chapter Seven offers a discussion of the data and presents a synthesis of the findings. It discusses applications of the findings relevant to the literature on entrepreneurship, family business, entrepreneurial approaches to succession, strategic management and general management. Finally Chapter Eight discusses practical implications for entrepreneurs, family businesses and policy makers. This chapter also presents the limitations of the study and makes suggestions for future research.

CHAPTER TWO - THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING

2.1 Introduction to the Chapter

The previous chapter presented an introduction to the thesis topic of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation while it also introduced research gaps and questions for investigation and analysis. The previous chapter also offered a brief overview of research design and methods while it also presented the reader with the structure of the dissertation. This chapter continues the literature review with references to typology, theory and context of family firms, ventures and venturing as well as social spaces and social structures to familiarize the reader with the existing literature on topics which provide the framework for this dissertation.

2.2 Typology, Theory and Context of Family Firms

A firm is a business organisation that exists to make profits, and the general theory of the firm suggests that it exists to maximize profits (Penrose and Pitelis, 2002). In this study, I use the terms 'firm', 'company', 'business' and 'organisation' interchangeably in reference to an organisation that exists to maximize profits. The GEM definition of a firm is,

“... an established business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners of the firm for more than 42 months” (Reynolds et al., 2000).

The GEM definition suggests that the firm exists not only to make profits but to also pay salaries and wages to owners and employees. Consequently, it is in the best interest of those who are owning and managing a functioning business to maximize profits and sustain operations into the future.

I use the term 'parent' to denote an established firm of business in existence for more than 42 months that begets a new business venture with similar knowledge and resources available to that parent firm. Organisations can become parent firms by many different means, but the most common ways are through the acquisition of smaller companies, spinoff of subsidiaries or the creation of new venture(s) (Chrisman et al., 2007).

This study attends to the type of resource capital that a parent family firm imbues to its new venture(s) to suggest that parent family firms sponsor their new ventures differently. However, I distinguish between family ventures and non-family ventures to investigate the type and level of sponsorship activity, and I investigate the process by which parent family firms imbue resources to family and non-family ventures. In the following sections, I discuss the literature that supports this distinction.

Definition of the Family Firm

Family businesses provide a winning mix of social, economic, cultural and symbolic capital that gives them unique characteristics of structure and stability (Firkin, 2001, Astrachan and Shanker, 2003). A popular definition by Chua et al. (1999: 25), which I use in this study, defines the family firm as,

“... a business governed and/or managed with the intention to shape and pursue the vision of the business held by a dominant coalition controlled by members of the same family or a small number of families in a manner that is potentially sustainable across generations of the family or families.”

Family firms' structure and stability allow them to take the risks necessary to start new businesses and create employment (Astrachan et al., 2003, Davis and Tagiuri, 1989, Litz, 1995).

While there are many other definitions in the literature that reflect the various complexities and contexts in which family businesses are born, thrive and survive, in this study I operationalize the term 'parent family firm' using a Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) measure originally developed by Astrachan et al. (2002: 3) for the Raymond Family Institute that defines the family firm as,

“... an existing business that the respondents and one or more family members, including by blood, marriage, or adoption, together owns and control more than 50% of the business.”

This GEM measure defines a business owned and managed by a nuclear family or small group of families as a family business (Chrisman et al., 2003b, Reynolds et al., 1999).

While there appears to be agreement among scholars that a business owned and managed by a nuclear family is a family business, there is disagreement about what makes a family business unique. Researchers believe that family firms exist because of the economic and non-economic value created through the combination of family and business systems (Chrisman et al., 2003a, Habbershon et al., 2003, Chrisman et al., 2005). However, family members shape the family business in a way that the family members of executives in non-family firms do not and cannot (Chua et al., 1999, Lansberg, 1983). Chua et al. (1999) suggest two approaches to defining a firm as a family business: according to the 'components of involvement' and according to its 'essence'. The 'components of involvement' approach means that family involvement in the business is what makes a family business different from a non-family business. A different approach based on 'essence' suggests that family involvement is only a necessary condition, and two firms with the same degree of family involvement may not both be family firms if either lacks intention, vision, familiness and/or the behaviour that constitutes the essence of family business (Chrisman et al., 2005, Habbershon et al., 2003, Chua et al., 1999). In this study, it is the 'essence' of family business that provides the theoretical basis for investigating the typology, sponsorship, resources and legitimacy of the family firms and new venture(s) associated with it.

An additional question is how to distinguish firms that are family-owned but not managed by family, or family-managed but not family-owned. Further, there is the question of ownership as it relates to the definition of a family firm. If a firm is wholly owned by a family but treated as a passive portfolio investment, is it a family business? As Chua et al. (1999) suggest, some firms behave like a family firm managed by a nuclear family and some do not, but it is necessary to make a distinction to study family firms. In this study, Case B for example, is a parent family firm majority-owned by a nuclear family but managed by a non-family agent. It is my determination and the determination of the family that Case B is a family business, based on the components of its involvement and essence. I determine that Case C is a family firm based on both components of involvement and essence, but the firm has created new ventures that are both family-owned and non-family-owned. As a result, Case C may be classified as a parent family firm, but it attends to resource transfer like a parent family firm in accordance with the venture type.

Framework for Assessing Parent Family Firms and Their New Venture(s)

This study examines the transfer of resources from a parent family firm to its new venture(s) – both family and non-family ventures. A firm's resources include all of the assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm (Barney, 1991). While a parent firm's resources may function as strengths that it can use to conceive and implement strategies, the new venture seeks to accumulate resources in an attempt to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Porter, 1981, Stinchcombe, 1965).

Resources underlie the sustained competitive advantage of organisations such that (1) the firms within an industry may be heterogeneous with respect to the strategic resources they control, and (2) the resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms (Barney, 1991). A resource-based view (RBV) of the firm includes resources and forms of capital that are valuable, rare, imitable and substitutable and that protect the firm from environmental threats (Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001, Barney, 1991). Based on Barney's (1991) assumptions that strategic resources are heterogeneously distributed across firms and these differences are stable over time, he suggests a link between firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. The RBV model of the firm examines the implications of both assumptions in order to analyse the sources of sustained competitive advantage. The RBV of the firm suggests that all firms attempt to protect themselves from environmental threats. However, an established organisation attempts to protect itself from environmental threats to achieve a sustained competitive advantage, while a new venture seeks protection from environmental threats to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy among shareholders (Barney, 1991, Stinchcombe, 1965).

While this study references an RBV framework for assessing the firm, it focuses on the process by which a parent family firm transfers different types and levels of resources to a new venture to 'buffer' it from environmental threats or to 'bridge' it to resources. Further, the parent family firm may enact the activities associated with the buffering and bridging mechanisms, including field-building, networking and direct support, to imbue resources into their new ventures (Amezcuca et al., 2013). An

explanation of why a parent family firm might activate mechanisms and associated activities to transfer resources to a new venture might seem somewhat redundant, since a new venture needs all the help it can get to overcome a liability of newness; however, Amezcua et al. (2013) suggest that resource munificence does not always improve the chances of new venture survival; in fact, it might increase exit rates. While there is an apparent competitive advantage conferred by transferring resources from the parent family firm to their new venture(s), the transfer is conditional on how resources get transferred.

2.3 Typology, Theory and Context of Ventures and Venturing

Entrepreneurship is often considered to be within the purview of individuals, since it is often associated with the creation of something new and innovative (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Kilby, 1971). Alternatively, entrepreneurship is considered to be within the purview of small businesses and corporations (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). More recently, entrepreneurship has been considered in the context of the parent family firm in the form of trans-generational entrepreneurship (Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Zahra and Sharma, 2004, Nordqvist et al., 2008).

As Lumpkin (1996: 138) suggests, new entry or venturing is “*the essential act of entrepreneurship and is primarily a firm-level phenomenon.*” New entry or venturing may refer to actions initiated by individuals, small businesses, units of large corporations or parent firms, including parent family firms (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). New entry or venturing may materialize as part of a start-up organisation, through an existing firm or, as Burgelman (1983) suggests, by ‘internal corporate venturing’. This study follows Schumpeter (1942), who argued that entrepreneurship is dominated by firms with more resources to devote to the act of innovation. In consequence, this study analyses entrepreneurship at the firm/business unit level in the form of venturing at a parent firm.


Ventures and Venturing

This study shares Gartner’s (1985: 697) perspective that,

“... there are many different kinds of entrepreneur and many ways to be one, and that the firms they create vary enormously as do the environments they create them in.”

Figure 2.1 presents Gartner’s (1985: 698) framework for describing new venture creation across four dimension – individual, environment, organisation and process.

Figure 2.1: Gartner's Framework for Describing New Venture Creation



Source: Gartner (1985)

Researchers must consider how one new venture differs from another and how different combinations of variables make up each new venture (Van de Ven et al., 1984). This study attends to the different combination of resources that allow the new venture to overcome a liability of newness and achieve sustained competitive advantage from within a parent family firm.

Definitions of the venture and venture creation often limit propositions to how all things entrepreneurial differ from all things non-entrepreneurial (Gartner, 1985). This duality, according to Giddens (1976), suggests a structure that opposes rather than presupposes. While Giddens (1976) only warns about the dangers of duality, Bourdieu (1977: 4) proposes that,

“... the objective-subjective duality might be overcome given a thorough investigation of objective structures and subjective dispositions within which these structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them.”

Accordingly, Bourdieu (1977: 4) establishes a “*third way*” by introducing the concept of habitus that escapes from “*the ritual either/or choice between objectivism and subjectivism in which the social sciences have allowed themselves to be trapped.*” Fowler (1997: 17) notes that Bourdieu “*locates the role of objective structures in setting limits to agents’ choice of goals as well as blinkering their perceptions of reality.*” Sewell (1992: 4) also warns of the dangers of duality, but he suggests that any structure (e.g., entrepreneurship or venturing) “*must be regarded as a process – not as a steady state.*” I suggest in this study that the venture is a structure including objective form and subjective dispositions that may, according to Sewell (1992: 6), “*bind time and space, [and] it must be conceptualized as including not only rules but resources as well*” (Giddens, 1979).

According to Gartner, the definition of the new venture is synonymous with the definition of the new organisation. The Strategic Planning Institute (SPI) (1978: 2) suggests the new organisation must be an independent entity, or a new profit centre within a company that has other established businesses, or a joint venture that satisfies the following criteria:

- i. founders must acquire expertise in products, process, market and/or technology;
- ii. results are expected beyond the year in which the investment is made;
- iii. it is considered a new market entrant by its competitors;
- iv. it is regarded as a new source of supply by its potential customers.

This definition is important because (1) it recognizes that individuals within the organisation have expertise, (2) the organisation evolves over a period of time – typically beyond a year, (3) the new venture is recognized within the context of its environment, and (4) it is forced to seek out resources (Gartner, 1985). In this study, I attend to all four points. With regard to the first point, I investigate the transfer and munificence of resources in the context of a parent family firm’s incubation of a new venture, thus satisfying the condition that individuals within the organisation have and/or gain expertise. Referencing the second point, I investigate the evolution of the

parent family firm and the new venture over time, and I operationalize the parent firm using GEM definitions that satisfy the second condition. Referencing the third point, I investigate the field of family business and individuals operating and creating new ventures in the green industry field and construction field. Finally, I refer to Stinchcombe (1965) to suggest that the new venture must overcome a liability and acquire legitimacy; it does so by seeking out resources. Consequently, the definition of the new venture is synonymous with the SPI definition of a joint venture, and this study references the SPI definition of a joint venture in reference to the creation of a new venture from within a parent family firm.

For this study, I operationalize the terms ‘new venture’ and ‘new business’ using the GEM definition to suggest that a new venture is,

“... a running business that has paid salaries, wages, or any other payments to the owners for more than three months, but not more than 42 months” (Reynolds et al., 2000).

Critical to this study and referenced within the GEM operationalized definitions is the suggestion that the individual entrepreneur and the new venture are more or less the same in terms of the resources they possess and the resources they must acquire to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Reynolds et al., 2000, Stinchcombe, 1965).


Corporate Venturing

As Sharma and Chrisman (2007) suggest there are many and varied definitions that refer to the process of creating a new business from within an established firm. These terms include corporate venturing (Parsons, 1960), internal corporate venturing (Burgelman, 1983), corporate entrepreneurship (Jennings and Lumpkin, 1989, Zahra, 1991), internal corporate entrepreneurship (Schollhammer, 1982) and intrapreneurship (Pinchot III, 1985), to name a few. While they all may seem to refer to the same animal with different stripes, subtle and strategic differences differentiate the terms and suggest a hierarchy of terminologies. This study investigates sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at a parent family firm. In other words, this study investigates sponsorship in the context of corporate entrepreneurship, more narrowly defined as internal and external corporate venturing. It does not investigate strategic renewal at the parent organisation.

The academic literature investigating the creation of new organisations within established firms arguably surfaced when Peterson and Berger (1971) introduced it as a strategy and leadership style adopted by large organisations to cope with increasing levels of market turbulence (Peterson and Berger, 1971, Sakhdari, 2016). However, it wasn't until the 1980s that corporate entrepreneurship research and all its variations became a topic of continued academic interest (Burgelman, 1983; Miller, 1983; Pinchot, 1985). Initially, the concept of corporate entrepreneurship as a stand-alone topic of research had a mixed reception because it was never differentiated from the phenomena of innovation, new product development and renewal (Corbett et al., 2013). Guth and Ginsberg (1990) and, more recently, Wolcott and Lippitz (2007) have provided a widely agreed-on definition of corporate entrepreneurship and delineated

the academic approach to research on the birth of new businesses within established organisations (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990, Wolcott and Lippitz, 2007). Figure 2.2 depicts Guth and Ginsberg's (1990: 7) suggestion that the *de novo* development of new businesses within established firms is a process of corporate entrepreneurship; the renewal of the key ideas on which organisations are built also reflects a process of corporate entrepreneurship.

Figure 2.2: Research Framework for Corporate Entrepreneurship



Source: Guth & Ginsberg (1990)


Corporate entrepreneurship thus encompasses (1) the birth of new businesses within existing organisations (i.e., corporate venturing) and (2) the transformation of organisations through the renewal of the key ideas on which they are built (i.e., strategic renewal) (Guth and Ginsberg, 1990). According to Sharma (2007), a typology of the literature suggests that separate concepts of corporate venturing and strategic renewal exist within the broad category of corporate entrepreneurship. Each concept may stand alone depending on context, and Sharma and Chrisman (2007: 93) note that strategic renewal and corporate venturing connote changes in either the strategy or the structure of an existing corporation; the difference between the two is that,

“corporate venturing involves the creation of new businesses whereas strategic renewal leads to the reconfiguration of existing businesses within a corporate setting.”

This study examines only corporate venturing that results in the creation of organisational entities within a parent family firm. Corporate venturing includes dimensions and examples of internal and external corporate venturing. The dimensions of internal corporate venturing, according to Sharma and Chrisman (2007), include structural autonomy, the degree of relatedness, the extent of innovation and the nature of sponsorship, while examples of external corporate ventures include joint ventures,

spinoffs and venture capital initiatives. The hierarchy of terminology suggested by Sharma and Chrisman (2007) in Figure 2.3 summarizes each concept.

Figure 2.3: Hierarchy of Corporate Entrepreneurship Terminology



Source: Sharma and Chrisman (2007)

Corporate Venturing at Parent Firms

As previously stated, this study investigates sponsorship in the context of internal and external corporate venturing at parent family firms; in other words, this study investigates the process of corporate venturing and how it works at parent family firms. The level of analysis is the parent family firm, since, as Miller (1983: 770) states,

“The entrepreneurial role stressed by Schumpeter . . . is socially vital but it can be performed by entire organisations which are decentralized” (Miller, 1983).

To survive and transition, firms must engage in continuous cycles of internal creative destruction (Schumpeter, 1942; Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). Covin and Slevin (1991) suggest that the entrepreneurship paradigm may extend to the firm, and Zahra (1991) argues that entrepreneurship within a firm is part of its “*generative capability*.” Therefore, entrepreneurship is a driving force for renewal as part of a firm’s internal generative capability (Zahra, 2005). Generative capabilities may determine the longevity and dynastic succession of the family firm; failure to initiate a ‘generative capability’ may lead to what Miller (1993: 116) refers to as “*strategic simplicity*” (Miller, 1993; Zahra, 2005). Strategic simplicity suggests a comfort level present at most organisations in which cultures, systems and routines narrow to “*mirror the views and practices of a single group*” (Miller, 1993). According to Miller (1993: 274), “simplicity may trigger ultimate failure” at such an organisation. While the

organisation is the unit of analysis for Miller and for this study, it would not be a leap to suggest that the parent family firm as an organisation may exhibit the characteristics of ‘strategic simplicity’ that might signal its demise (Sharma and Manikutty, 2005). However, Patel and Fiet (2011) argue that family firms are in a better position than other firms to discover new opportunities that exploit existing resources, while Sharma and Salvato (2011: 1201) suggest that long-lived family firms “*explore new opportunities while simultaneously exploiting the ones they already discovered or created.*”

Corporate Venturing at Parent Family Firms

This study contributes to an ever increasing scholarly interest in research integrating entrepreneurship and family business because for a long period, each field developed independently (Nordqvist and Melin, 2010). While Patel & Fiet (2011: 1180) note that,

“The unique positioning of a family firm allows it to engage in a more systematic practice of innovation than can be accomplished by a non-family firm,”

Nordqvist and Melin (2010: 214) further specify,

“We can identify two separate, yet related dimensions that are important in the study of entrepreneurship and family businesses – the dimensions of the entrepreneurial family and the entrepreneurial family business.

Kellermanns et al (2006: 809) note that family firms must develop an entrepreneurial mind-set and be willing to pursue opportunities through organisational change, and the authors state that, “*entrepreneurial activities promote the continuity and success of the family firm by contributing to growth in employment and wealth*” (Kellermanns, 2006: 809). Further, Eddleston, Kellermanns and Zellweger (2012) contribute to the literature on corporate entrepreneurship at family firms by suggesting stewardship culture determinants positively affect corporate entrepreneurship at family firms.

Framework for Assessing Parent Family Firms and Their New Ventures

Determination must be made in this study to understand where the parent firm ends and the new venture begins. GEM views entrepreneurship as a process rather than as an event, and new business activity in venturing may be manifested in entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al., 2000). Further, GEM collects data on the proportion of individuals (1) expecting to start a new business, (2) actively trying to start a business, (3) running their own young business, (4) running their own established business, or (5) who have recently closed a business (Reynolds et al., 2000).

While nascent entrepreneurs according to GEM expect to own a share of the business they are starting, they must not have paid wages or salaries for more than three months. Alternatively, new business owners act as owner-managers of a new business that has paid wages or salaries for more than three month but less than 42 months (Reynolds et al., 2000).

While it is difficult to classify individuals as nascent entrepreneurs or new business entrepreneurs in a study situated in the context of parent family and parent non-family firms, this study considers only active managers of new business that has paid wages or salaries for more than 3 months but less than 42 months while operating at the parent firm.

Spinoff and Spin-out Ventures

Spinoff and spin-out ventures often reflect the dynamics of external corporate ventures, and this study investigates spinoffs and spin-outs in the context of new business incubation. However, there is some confusion in the literature between the definitions of a spin-out and a spinoff; according to the literature, both are a distinctive class of entrepreneurial entrants that inherit knowledge from public or commercial incumbents through their founders (Agarwal et al., 2004). Spinouts are existing entrepreneurial ventures by ex-employees of an incumbent firm and concern the separation of an existing entity from the parent firm. Spinouts reflect a type of corporate restructuring that occurs when a corporation breaks off parts or divisions of itself to form a new corporation. The new company that is spun out typically brings with it some of the parent company's assets and equipment. When a parent firm has a stake in the equity of the newly formed company, the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) determines that the new venture is a spinout company.

In contrast, a spinoff is a type of divestiture that includes the creation of an independent company through the sale or distribution of new shares of an existing business or division of a parent company. For the purposes of this study, I use the definition proposed by De Cleyn and Braet (2009: 2): a spinoff is *“a new legal entity founded by one or more individuals seconded or transferred (sometimes part-time) from a parent organisation.”* New ventures are completely new entrepreneurial ventures created outside an existing organisation, and spinoff ventures can originate from either academic research institutions or from business organisations. Wright et al. (2007) distinguish among three types of spinoffs: (1) the venture capital-backed spinoff, (2) the prospector spinoff and (3) the lifestyle spinoff. The authors argue that VC-backed spinoffs look mainly for investor acceptance and prioritize value creation and the tradability of their assets over selling products or services in the short term; lifestyle spinoffs typically seek market acceptance, and they usually bootstrap and look for minimal costs and a fast time to break even; finally, prospector spinoffs seek investor acceptance, market acceptance, or both (Wright et al., 2007)..

There is significant heterogeneity in types of new ventures; the best known among spinoff types is arguably the academic research spinoff from a public research organisation (PRO); such spinoffs originate from research institutions that wish to commercialize their research results (Pirnay and Surlemont, 2003). The main characteristic of the direct transfer spinoff is the formal transfer of a patent or intellectual property from the parent institution to the spinoff venture (Yencken et al., 2002). Closely related to the direct research spinoff investigated by Amezcua et al. (2013) is the ‘tacit knowledge spinoff’, in which a new company is created out of and with the support of a parent organisation. De Clyn and Braet (2009: 12) suggest that with the tacit knowledge spinoff, there is no formal transfer of intellectual property or

patents, and this type of spinoff primarily focuses on providing services. Consequently, the investment in machinery and equipment is typically low, but training and education costs are usually high (Pirnay and Surlemont, 2003, De Cleyn and Braet, 2009). While this study extends theory proposed by Amezcua et al. (2013), it investigates the business incubation of a tacit knowledge spinoff by a parent family firm.

Family Business Spinoff Context

Family businesses create new businesses (Astrachan and Shanker, 2003). The GEM UK 2014 data suggests that a family business background significantly increases (1) the likelihood that an individual knows someone else who has started a business in the last two years, (2) the likelihood that an individual believes there will be good opportunities to start a business in the local area in the next 6 months and (3) the likelihood that an individual believes that he or she has the skills, knowledge and experience to start a business. It also (4) significantly lowers the fear of failure, conditional on seeing opportunities (Levie, 2015). The GEM UK data report for the 3-year period between 2012 and 2014 that 20% of new business owner/managers, 10% of nascent business entrepreneurs and 13% of established business owner/managers in the UK starting a new business reported that their business was developed by or separated from an existing business controlled within their family. The equivalent percentages for Scotland were 20%, 14% and 17% (Levie, 2015). The GEM UK 2015 data also report that these effects are stronger if the individual has worked in the family business (Hart et al., 2015).

2.4 Typology, Theory and Context of Social Space and Social Structures

This section categorises and explains several theories on social space and social structures. Bourdieu (1977) argues that all human action and interaction are interest-driven and profit-driven, regardless of context, because individuals attempt to maximize the accumulation of resources to acquire symbolic profits; their social struggles to accumulate resources may increase their social standing and power over the field. Therefore, the search by individuals to competitively accumulate cultural resources establishes the asymmetries upon which social class and distinctions are based, and he argues that symbolic systems are anchored in pre-existing culture – they shape our understanding of reality by influencing our interactions and communications (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, DiMaggio, 1979). Further, individuals multiply and intensify symbolic systems and asymmetries in order to increase their power over a field. As such, language, knowledge, networks, skills, financial capital, etc. which have been imbued to the individual via families, groups and/or institutions over years or generations, allow the individual to increase his/her economic and cultural capital while consolidating his power over a field at the expense of individuals without the codes or dispositions to make possible the acquisition of cultural and/or economic capital (DiMaggio, 1979). To understand this discriminatory system, Bourdieu (1977) introduces the ancient Greek notion of ‘habitus’ to define the transfer of schemes which allow divisions and power hierarchies in social space and social structures. Bourdieu suggests in an interview with Wacquant (1993: 19) that discriminatory practices at France’s Grand Écoles lead not only to a cultural elite with favoured status but a system of practices and structures which reproduces ‘differences and distances’ for children from this class.

“I suspected from the outset that there exists a structural homology between the Grand Écoles and what I call the ‘field of power’, and that the originality of these Grand Écoles consists not in the mere fact that they reproduce the ruling class by ensuring favoured access to positions of leadership for the children from this class . . . but that their main function is to reproduce a structure, that is, a system of differences and distances.”

Bourdieu (1971a) suggests a break from the objective-subjective duality and offers a ‘third way’ or ‘middle ground’ by introducing ‘habitus’ to suggest lasting and transposable dispositions prescribed by social rules and structures and imbued to individuals over time. Habitus provides a platform from which social laws and human agency can be joined to present a middle ground from which to view the objective of human activity which, according to Bourdieu (1971; 1977), is to monopolize different kinds of capital and achieve power over a field.

For Bourdieu, social laws and individual mind-sets are linked relationally, and he does not offer a theory of fields, a theory of capital, or a theory of habitus as stand-alone concepts or perspectives (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, Swartz, 2008). I review his ethnographic and literary works on capital theory, habitus and fields within social structures in relation to a struggle for power and creation of a system of ‘differences and distances’ because they are central to this study (Navarro, 2006). Each concept works with the others to generate social reality and capture social, economic and symbolic positions. Bourdieu is best seen as a theorist of culture and stratification, and, according to Lizardo (2004: 375), *“class as lifestyle of subcultures that attempt to sustain status through strategies of social closure.”* This study attends to Bourdieu’s complex thinking on habitus, forms of capital, field and symbolic power and links it to the study of organisations – in particular, to the study of parent family firms and their new venture(s). This study attempts to describe the unity of Bourdieu’s approach as it relates to the creation of a social structure for symbolic power over a field and the retention of power over a field by particular families, groups and/or institutions because Bourdieu often warned of the appropriation and misrepresentation of his theory, particularly by American and British sociologists, as an attack of the ‘French Flu’ (Swartz, 2008, Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008, Lizardo, 2004).

While Bourdieu conducted his ethnographic research among Algerian tribesmen and their families who struggled for power in their communities, Bourdieu (1973) grounds much of his theory in the context of the French education system, and he identifies a stratified education system that exacerbates class inequality from generation to generation. As a result, he suggests linguistic and cultural capital varies among children of different class backgrounds (Bourdieu, 1971). Those who possess the necessary linguistic and cultural capital typically find academic socialization to be a simple extension of their early socialization and awareness, and those who do not possess such capital are unable to according to Bourdieu (1977: 8) *“crack the code”*, which often consigns them to circumstances similar to those of the rest of their class. Following Bourdieu, this study treats the family firm’s early and sustained socialization of the individual (family and non-family) imbued with ‘differences and distances’.

Bourdieu (1990: 21) also notes that it is the individual's ability to have a "*feel for the game*" through acquired dispositions passed down over time that allows him/her to play his hand freely to acquire capital and convert capital to other forms of capital in order to become rich in economic and cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1990a, Bourdieu, 1986, DiMaggio, 1979). Academic qualifications, money, awards, networks, friends, etc. become a convertible currency by which a group or society (rather than an individual agent) may exchange power, position or prestige in the form of symbolic, economic, social or cultural capital; as such, generalized success and power within a culture become the privilege of the individual dealt the best hand or as Bourdieu (1986; 1990a; 1990c) suggests – holding the "*aces in the pack.*"

Just as economic wealth cannot function as capital until it is linked to an economic apparatus, cultural competence (e.g., education, intellect, style of speech) cannot be constituted as cultural capital until it is inserted into the objective relations between the system of economic production and the system of producing the producers (Bourdieu, 1986, Bourdieu, 1993a). As a result, when a society lacks the literacy and educational system that would give its agents the histories, aptitudes and dispositions that would allow the agent to have a 'feel for the game', then the resources that are available to the agent can only be imbued in an incorporated state (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). This study attends to the creation of a sponsorship model that suggests an apparatus in which a parent family firm confers relative competence on the individual agent and presents a system of economic production in the new venture within which the individual agent might transform relative competence into varying forms of capital traded or transformed for power within a field. Further, this study attends to 'differences and distances' imbued by the parent family firm to new ventures.

Fields

The concept of 'field' represents another pillar of Bourdieu's extensive work on social space and social structures. According to Bourdieu, a field is a relational and dynamic social microcosm that is ever-changing, and when Bourdieu (1992: 22) suggests the agent must have a "*feel for the game*", it is the 'game' that suggests the field (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). The concept refers to both the totality of actors and organisations involved in an arena of social or cultural production and to the dynamic relationships among them (DiMaggio, 1979). Bourdieu (1971a: 161) notes that the agents constituting the field may be described as "*so many forces which by their existence, opposition, or combination determine its specific structure at a given moment in time.*" A field is according to Dewey (1998: 250) a context in which "*singular things act, but they act together . . . nothing acts in entire isolation.*"

In an organisational context, a field may be characterized as a configuration of relationships between nodes rather than just concrete entities to suggest there is increased complexity in understanding a 'field' (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). As an example, this study reflects a theory of practice within the green industry field – specifically, organizational sponsorship in the context of new business within the green industry field. Case C or Case D may represent 'concrete entities', but to understand the structure and power relations within which Case C and Case D operate, this study contemplates nodes which exist consisting of contributing structures and/or

individuals within fields and between fields constituting structures (eg. governments, lawyers, banks, consultants, employees etc).

Bourdieu's proposed social system exists among fields within hierarchies. Hierarchies depend on the social arrangements and social structures that sustain and reproduce them among individuals (Bourdieu, 1977a, b). For Bourdieu, the social world can be conceptualized as a group of fields of production, circulation and consumption of cultural and material resources; examples of fields include arts, education, religion, law, etc., each with its own set of rules, logic and forms of capital, and each with individual struggles for power and position.

Power over a Field

The concept of wielding power over a field is important for Bourdieu, since every aspect of social life is a constant struggle, but conscious and unconscious, for position and power within a field (Bourdieu, 1986). Therefore, it is the primary interest of the individual to accumulate, maximize and monopolize various resources and forms of capital within a given field in an effort to amass power and position (DiMaggio, 1979). Monopolization of power portends violence but according to Bourdieu (1973a: 73), there is "*the legitimate violence which is characteristic of the field in question*" (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008, Bourdieu, 1993b). Bourdieu sees power as culturally and symbolically created; further, it is constantly re-legitimized through the interplay of agency and structure, or habitus (Wacquant 2005: 316, cited in Navarro 2006: 16).

Organisational Fields

Emirbayer and Johnson (2008) examine Bourdieu's work as a framework for inter-organisational relations, and they reference earlier field and capital as familiar concepts in organisational studies. For example, Scott (1994b: 206-7) claims like previous claims about 'nodes' that "*organisations are in the same field if they take one another into account*"; further, the author suggests the concept of an organisational field,

"... attends to organisations that are operating under similar conditions and are for this reason likely to display similar characteristics and relationships – structural equivalence and isomorphism – whether or not they engage in direct exchanges."

For this study, organisational fields exist not just in network relations of interactions, but also in structural relations to create structures of power over the field.

Organisational Fields as Structures of Power

Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 11) refer to a power struggle in organisational fields in which different organisations,

"... can be said to engage in the struggles ongoing within that field as bearers of different amounts and combinations of resources, some of which yield greater advantages within that particular field than do others."

As an example of structures of power within an organisational field, Hall (1951: 643) notes that medical field specialists develop their own distinctive training, formal associations, codes of ethics, language and distinctive prestige symbols as part of an

institutionalized effort that reflects a model of the medical practitioner for each distinctive field. Their institutionalized effort transmits a structure of “*differences and distances*” only accessible to those who possess the codes to interpret the symbols, language and cultural capital thus constructing what Dimaggio (1979) suggest is a differential and asymmetric construct of power over the field. As a result, specialized training, specialized associations and special limitations on recruitment, etc. according to Hall (1951: 643), reflects the mutually beneficial relationship supporting a hierarchy of medical practitioners that is “*by no means unique to medicine.*”

This study focuses on the construction and green industry fields in which there are different relations to power enabled by structural ‘differences and distances’ that reflect gross and subtle differences in power (Hall, 1951). Over generations parent family firms operating in the construction and green industry fields create mutually beneficial relations to allow them to acquire power over the field. Accumulation of power, variations in power and transfer of power with the creation of structural ‘differences and distances’ arguably lead to power over the field with the accumulation and transfer of forms of capital.

Forms of Capital

Capital theory is the ‘third pillar’ of Bourdieu’s work on social theory and structure. In an organisational context according to Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 8),

“The weapons used in a constant struggle for power and the imposition of organising principles within a social structure are resources distributed across the structure of the field in question.”

Bourdieu (1986) suggests that the individual mobilizes resources in the form of social capital (e.g., networks and friendships), cultural capital (e.g., credentials and education) and economic capital (e.g., money and property) to assure his or her position in the social order. Bourdieu (1990) conceives of symbolic capital (e.g., legitimacy and prestige) as the legitimated result of all other forms of capital. Symbolic capital reflects the resources available to an individual based on honour, prestige and recognition, thus making symbolic capital according to Navarro (2006: 17), “*a subjective resource.*” Bourdieu (1990) sees symbolic capital as a critical source of power; when an agent holds symbolic capital and seeks to influence or alter the actions of an agent who has less power, the first agent uses symbolic violence to impose symbolic control and alter the hierarchical structure in which they operate (i.e., the field).

This study suggested earlier in Section (2.2) that resources underlie the sustained competitive advantage of organisations (Barney, 1991). Consequently, the idea of capital can be extended to all forms of resources, and Navarro (2006: 16) reflects on Bourdieu to comment, “*Resources function as capital when they are a social relation to power.*” According to Bourdieu (1986) there is no dominant form of capital; in fact, he suggests that all forms of capital are exchangeable and interchangeable and serve to structure a social order in which individuals or groups may accumulate (and/or transfer) varying types and levels of capital and, as a result, achieve varying types and

levels of power and position within the social hierarchy with individual acts of symbolic violence (Navarro, 2006).

This study considers how specific forms of capital function as resources that structure and support an entrepreneurial context in new venture creation. Specifically, it is entrepreneurial capital (a derivative of Bourdieu's forms of capital) that a new venture must acquire to achieve legitimacy (Firkin, 2001, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002).

Entrepreneurial Capital


Understanding the role of the entrepreneur and the new venture in relation to resources can be challenging (Brush et al., 2001). While it is often assumed that the essential resource for any entrepreneurial event is financial, the most critical resources are typically non-financial, such as people and information (Morris, 1998, Brush et al., 2001). The various forms of entrepreneurial capital have been conceptualized in the literature in relation to Resource-based Theory (RBT) and reflect a Resource-based View (RBV) of the firm; this study does not deviate in this respect from the literature (Firkin, 2001, Barney, 1991, Alvarez and Busenitz, 2001, Firkin, 2003).

While the practice of using individual forms of capital in the context of entrepreneurship is not new, the introduction of entrepreneurial capital as a concept is relatively new (Levie and Lerner, 2009). This study refers to Firkin's (2003) conception of entrepreneurial capital, yet there are variations on entrepreneurial capital in the literature. Audretsch and Monsen (2008) call entrepreneurial capital a subset of social capital, while Erikson (2002: 276) suggests that entrepreneurial capital is a "multiplicative function of entrepreneurial competence and commitment." Firkin (2003) defines entrepreneurial capital as a derivative of Bourdieu's (1986) forms of capital. As discussed above, Bourdieu's (1986) forms of capital include economic, social, cultural and symbolic capital; as a result, Firkin's (2003: 59) concept of entrepreneurial capital includes economic, social, and cultural capital plus Becker's (1993) human capital, despite Bourdieu's (2005a) assertion that this last form of capital is "*vague and flabby.*"

Firkin's (2001) entrepreneurial capital transposes Bourdieu's sociological perspective to an organisational context and builds on the RBT proposed by Barney (Barney, 1991; Alvarez & Busenitz, 2001). Entrepreneurial capital, then, captures the significance of entrepreneurial access to both financial and non-financial resources (Erikson, 2002, Firkin, 2003). Depending on the amount and level of the capital that the entrepreneur already possesses or can acquire, capital may either expedite or impede the entrepreneur's success (Harvey, 2011). Entrepreneurial capital influences strategies, which in turn bear upon the capabilities developed in the young firm; thus, knowledge bases, financial capital, social structures, goodwill, etc. influence the new venture's ability to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Cooper et al., 1994, Cooper, 1985, Stinchcombe, 1965). However, this study reflects on recent findings by Amezcua et al. (2013) that suggest that capital in certain amounts and forms of capital may impede growth and success at the new venture and in turn increase exit rates among new ventures in the context of new business. Figure 2.4 presents Firkin's (2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital while the following sections review the various forms of entrepreneurial capital as a prelude to an analysis and understanding of their

significance in the process of resource transfer from a parent family firm to its new venture(s).

Figure 2.4: Firkin's Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital



Source: Firkin (2003)

Cultural Capital

Bourdieu (1986) proposed cultural capital to extend the logic of economic analysis to non-economic goods and services; the concept covers a variety of resources representing symbolic elements and associated with social class, such as skills, tastes, verbal capacity, mannerisms, aesthetic preferences, educational credentials, social class attributes, and types of expertise. Bourdieu (1986) defines cultural capital as existing in three states: (1) an objectified state, (2) an institutionalized state and (3) an embodied state.

In an objectified state, cultural capital exists as cultural goods that have worth because of how they are viewed in their material condition (Bourdieu, 1986, Firkin, 2001). Cultural capital in an institutional state refers to educational certification (Firkin, 2003) and qualifications that suggest to others that the entrepreneur has achieved a level of competence. Firkin (2003) suggests that several forms of cultural capital in its institutional state are similar to human capital, but as cultural capital, they exist in an embodied state (Firkin, 2001, de Bruin, 1999). In an embodied state, cultural capital exists as “*long lasting dispositions of the mind and body*” (Firkin, 2005: 5). Bourdieu’s (1977: 50) construct of habitus is the physical embodiment of cultural capital, and he notes that “*habitus is the source of these series of moves which are objectively organised as strategies without being the product of a genuine strategic intention.*” Habitus is passed along through shared and tacit knowledge, common language, etc., often through the family (DiMaggio, 1979, Bourdieu, 1986).

Bourdieu (2005b: 2) developed the concept of cultural capital and its physical embodiment in habitus to account for the practices of men and women who found themselves thrown into a capitalist colonial world with only pre-capitalist economic

dispositions. The systematic inculcation that occurs through literacy and education enables, according to Bourdieu (1977: 140), particular groups to practice a “*primitive accumulation of cultural capital*.” However, Bourdieu asserts (1977: 142) systematic inculcation through education may also serve to systematize and stereotype the advantages of education such that “*academic qualifications – like money, have a conventional, fixed value*,” which has the effect of objectification among groups. In other words, the individual with socially acceptable academic qualifications, status, achievements, etc. may accumulate forms of capital in currency form (i.e., money, connections, degrees, etc.) far faster than the individual agent without socially acceptable forms of capital.

Human Capital

Becker (1993) argues that human capital is the accumulation of knowledge as a means of production into which additional investment leads to additional output. Its meaning is often associated with formal qualifications, skills and work experience (Firkin, 2001, Becker, 1964, Becker, 1993). The concept of human capital was developed about the same time as Bourdieu’s (2005: 2) concept of cultural capital, but in the context of entrepreneurship, the concepts are inclusive of one another (Firkin, 2003). Human capital portrays the outcome of education as a return on an economic investment, while cultural capital includes how the family, through its class, standing, attitudes, knowledge, resources, networks, etc., influences the process and outcomes of education (Firkin, 2001).

In an entrepreneurial context, Bruderl (1992) and Becker (1993) propose that there exist (1) a general form of human capital conferred by an individual’s work experience and education; (2) an industry-specific human capital consisting of knowledge, training, experience and skills related to a particular social field or industry, and (3) an entrepreneur-specific human capital that includes an individual’s previous experience and family background in entrepreneurship (Becker, 1993, Firkin, 2001, Brüderl et al., 1992). This study attends to all three forms of human capital in an entrepreneurial context to investigate how parent firms sponsor their new ventures. Acquiring more human capital provides individuals with increases in their cognitive abilities, which suggests that the more the individual or group invests in human capital, the greater the rate of return (Becker, 1964, Becker, 1993). Once individuals with high human capital are part of the entrepreneurial process, it is assumed that they will have a superior ability to exploit opportunities (Patel, 2011). As discussed above, however, it is not always the case that more human capital results in better outcomes for new ventures (Bourdieu, 1986, Hannan and Freeman, 1977, Castrogiovanni, 1991, Amezcua et al., 2013).

Human capital is usually associated with various forms of knowledge. Davidsson (2003: 306) asserts that previous knowledge plays a critical role in intellectual performance, and tacit and explicit knowledge further define the construct (Polyani, 1976). Analysis by Davidsson and Honig (2003) suggests that while formal education is a critical component of human capital, it is not the defining factor in entrepreneurial growth or success. Rather, non-formal education in the form of labour experience, management experience and entrepreneurial experience are significantly related to entrepreneurial activity when controlling for industry and gender. Knowledge allows individuals to increase their cognitive capabilities to produce efficient and productive

activity (Mincer, 1974). Therefore, in the workplace, an individual with greater human capital in the form of education or prior work experience should be more adept at recognizing, accepting and/or exploiting resources and opportunities (Schultz, 1959, Mincer, 1974, Davidsson and Honig, 2003).

Recognizing the significance of new ventures from parent organisations, Zahra, Van de Velde and Larraneta (2007) empirically quantify the Knowledge Conversion Capability (KCC) of new ventures' potential among corporate spinoffs and university spinoffs. KCC combines knowledge resources inherited from the parent firm with others accumulated in the course of operations (Zahra et al., 2007). It is knowledge transfer that binds the parent family firm to the new venture(s) while imbuing the new venture(s) with knowledge (both tacit and explicit) to overcome a liability of newness (Zahra et al., 2007, Reynolds et al., 2000).

Sirmon and Hitt (2003: 341) examine family firms and non-family firms to explore how resources are managed to create a competitive advantage, and they suggest that the integration of family and business “*creates several salient characteristics,*” yet the effects of altruism in the family firm extend the cognitive abilities of successful family members with education and knowledge (Schulze et al., 2002). Sirmon & Hitt (2003) also suggest that family firms' human capital is complicated by the close proximity of a complex ‘dual relationship’ among and between family members, thus creating a different context for the development of human capital than that found in non-family firms (Dunn, 1995, Sirmon and Hitt, 2003). Given this complex relationship and unique context, this study attends to all forms of human capital – general, industry-specific and entrepreneurial – that exist at parent family firms. This study also examines the interplay between human capital and social capital. Coleman (1988) suggests that social relations within the family and the wider community have been shown to be an important factor in the development of human capital.

Social Capital

According to Coleman (1988: 98), social capital is defined by its function, and as a result,

“... it is not a single entity but a variety of different entities with two elements in common – they all consist of some aspect of social structures, and they facilitate certain actions of actors.”

Bourdieu (1986: 245) links social capital “*to membership of a group*”; the amount of social capital a person has depends on the size of his or her networks and on the volume of capital that members of that network possess. In this way, social capital provides both an individual and a communal good. In the context of new business incubation by a parent firm, this study considers both the individually oriented view of social capital as a bonding mechanism and the externally oriented view that it serves to bridge social actors (Bourdieu, 1986, Adler and Kwon, 2002).

In an entrepreneurial context, Firkin (2001) finds that social capital is most commonly used to accrue resources and benefits from wide-ranging relationships outside the family dynamic, but he also suggests that relationships within the family provide a second way that social capital is used in relation to entrepreneurial activity. Arregle et al. (2007: 75) find that social capital falls into two broad categories, family and

organisation, and they show that new venture firms take the parent firm's organisational social capital (OSC) and link it with the firm's family social capital (FSC) "through the mechanisms of isomorphic tendencies, shared organisational identity, human resource practices and overlapping networks." Measures of social capital measure the content and flow of social capital both within the family and business system and between the family and the business system. Referring to economic ends, Arregle et al. (2007) and Adler and Kwon (2002) define social capital as the relationships between individuals and organisations that facilitate action and create value. Their perspective on social capital includes three dimensions: (1) structural social capital – the network connections between actors, (2) cognitive social capital – shared representations, interpretations and systems between actors, and (3) symbolic social capital – durable connections (Granovetter, 1992, Yli-Renko et al., 2001). Critical to this study is the structural factor, since it refers to the transfer of network connections between the parent firm and the new venture(s). The relational factor is relevant to this study because the better the connections, the more likely it is that the new ventures will survive uncertainty and overcome a liability of newness. The cognitive factor is more difficult to quantify, but is important in this study for understanding how social capital affects the growth and survival of the new ventures. Nahapiet & Ghoshal (1998) suggest that the cognitive dimension consists of shared language and shared narrative.

The perspective described in the preceding paragraph is a content perspective on social capital. This study uses a process perspective because organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation is by definition dynamic and process-oriented. Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) propose a process perspective for investigation that includes four dynamic factors: (1) stability, (2) interaction, (3) interdependence and (4) closure (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007).

By enhancing the quantity and quality of relationships between organisations, sponsorship increases organisations' social capital; in turn, social capital increases the likelihood of inter-organisational exchanges of resources and knowledge that sponsored organisations can use to improve their competitive positions and survival chances (Amezcue et al., 2013, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998). The process of new business incubation provides specific ties to the sponsoring organisation that contribute to the selection process within the environment (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991, Flynn, 1993b). These ties, both strong and weak, exist in the structural relationships between individuals and act as a form of social capital (Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Adler and Kwon, 2002). Social capital is a powerful resource for the new venture, along with human, financial and symbolic capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Flynn, 1993b). Flynn (1998a, 1998b) notes that while financial and human capital may depreciate as a resource, social capital continuously accrues to the new venture. Research suggests that entrepreneurs must develop and promote networks of all kinds, and a parent firm must help in this endeavour through sponsorship activities (Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Amezcue et al., 2013).

Economic Capital

Of all the social constructs defined by Bourdieu (1986), economic capital is the most liquid and most easily converted into human, cultural or social capital (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Bourdieu (1986: 242) defines economic capital as financial assets of any

form that are “*immediately and directly convertible into money and may be institutionalized in the form of property rights.*” Cooper (1985: 371) argues that economic capital in the form of financial capital is one of the most visible assets, and it can, “*create a buffer against random shocks and allow the pursuit of more capital-intensive strategies, which are better protected from imitation;*” as a result, it represents both tangible and intangible assets, and it is critical for growth and survival of the new ventures. Currency, equipment, materials and stock are examples of tangible assets for new ventures, while intellectual property rights in the form of trademarks or patents are intangible assets. Firkin (2001) notes that sources of economic capital for new business typically include family, friends, business associates and institutional partners. A lack of economic capital is often implicated in the closure of businesses (Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003).

Habitus

To explain the environment in which histories, aptitudes and dispositions are inculcated to allow the individual or agent to “*play his hand freely*”, Bourdieu (1977: 83) introduces the concept of ‘habitus’, which he defines as,

“... a system of lasting, transposable dispositions which, integrating past experiences, functions at every moment as a matrix of perceptions, appreciations and actions and makes possible the achievement of infinitely diversified tasks, thanks to analogical transfers of schemes permitting the solution of similarly shaped problems.”

Habitus completes Bourdieu’s ‘theoretical triad’, which also includes fields and forms of capital. Habitus refers to the physical embodiment of cultural capital and to the deeply ingrained habits, skills and dispositions that we possess due to our life experiences (Navarro, 2006). When Bourdieu (1971a) suggests that an agent must have a “*feel for the game*”, it is the habitus that allows the agent to ‘feel’. Habitus is a by-product of socialization that reinforces what DiMaggio (1979) refers to as a “*theoretical deus ex machina*” that mediates societal structure and agency. Habitus, according to Bourdieu, is the mind-set formed as the result of habits and dispositions developed and modified with every life experience; it develops an individual’s attitudes towards society and influences the way an individual reacts to the world (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977).

Wacquant in Beckert et al. (2005:316) interprets habitus as,

“... the way society becomes deposited in persons in the form of lasting dispositions or trained capacities and structures propensities to think, feel and act in determinate ways, which then guide them in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu.”

As Navarro (2006: 16) suggests, “*Through habitus, social practices are neither the mechanical imposition of structures nor the outcome of the free intentional pursuit of individuals.*” Therefore, habitus is not a structure but a set of durable dispositions that form human behaviour and vary according to the social environment from which they develop. Habitus is weighted towards the past in such a way that previous structures

and rules are reinforced and conserved; habitus predisposes the individual to gravitate towards that which is a best fit, and conversely, habitus predisposes the individual to avoid environments and/or situations for which he is not well adapted (Lizardo, 2012: 4). While habitus may reinforce adherence to rules and structures previously established, Navarro (2006: 16) asserts that in a given environment “*it also stimulates change and innovation,*” particularly when it does not fit the social world in which it finds itself (Lizardo, 2012).

Organisational Habitus

DiMaggio and Powell (1991b: 25-6) argued more than 25 years ago that the power of habitus is that it “*links micro- and macro-level process in organisational theory.*” Advancing their discussion, Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 4) note that an organisational habitus,

“... is a mechanism linking individual action and the macro-structural settings within which future action is taken. The habitus also links past fields to present fields through the individual actors who move from one to the next.”

Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 4) further note that,

“... the role of the habitus in organisational life promises to shed considerable light on how organisation structure is built up from the micro-processes of individual behaviour.”

While the present study is not a theoretical exegesis of Bourdieu’s work, it offers an empirical understanding of organisational habitus in the context of parent family firms’ incubation of their new ventures to arguably suggest that parent family firms may incubate their family venture(s) differently from non-family venture(s).

Entrepreneurial Habitus

In the literature, De Clercq and Voronov (2009: 395) consider an entrepreneurial habitus in the context of a practice perspective to draw from Bourdieu’s work and suggest the gaining of legitimacy by a new entrant in a field is the enactment of an ‘entrepreneurial habitus’ in that an individual must be ‘legitimized’ within a socially embedded process which includes expectations about “*fitting in*” with field rules and “*standing out*” as a rule breaker (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). While De Clercq and Voronov (2009) examine the gaining of legitimacy by newcomers entering a field as a socially embedded process which depends on how others view legitimacy, this study views habitus in the context of entrepreneurship based on the existence and level of capital that the individual and new venture possess relative to the field (Stringfellow et al., 2014, Pret et al., 2016). As such, this study references Stringfellow et al. (2014) in consideration of levels of capital which ‘legitimize’ the individual and their new venture to suggest the construct of an ‘entrepreneurial habitus’ arguably represents different constructs in different contexts.

Legitimacy and a Liability of Newness

The literature on the concept of legitimacy draws from the efforts of Parsons (1960) and Weber (1960) to address the forces that shape and empower individuals as they navigate social norms and values. Parsons (1960) defines legitimacy as the,

“... appraisal of action in terms of shared or common values in the context of the involvement of the action in the social system” (Parsons, 1960).

However, definitions and concepts of legitimacy have been reified over many years and have come to mean many things.

This study attends to the organisational significance of the concept of legitimacy that Stinchcombe (1965) describes as an antidote to a new venture's liability of newness, and which Starr and MacMillan (1990: 83) refer to as *“a critical ingredient for new venture success.”* This study also attends to the organisational construct of legitimacy in terms of its symbolic power – capital in any of its forms as it is recognized in terms of positive recognition, esteem, or honour by the relevant actors within a field (Bourdieu, 2005a, Bourdieu, 1990b). Stinchcombe (1965) proposes that there is a liability of newness at new organisations because a high degree of uncertainty and vulnerability is associated with new ventures. He reflects on the challenges involved when a new venture must consolidate resources and relationships while establishing itself among existing organisations with more resources, more relationships and more knowledge of the competitive landscape. Legitimacy acts as an antidote to a liability of newness simply because it allows the new venture access to resources, effectively acting like a resource itself (Stinchcombe, 1965, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). A lack of resources, as Romanelli (1989: 370) points out, *“restricts the amount of power that an organisation can exercise over market and competitive conditions.”* The new venture may have limited ability to improve its environment, alter its course, and establish legitimacy simply because it has limited power or no track record of success (Hannan and Freeman, 1984, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). However, the parent organisation – be it an accrediting group, a relational group, a regulatory group, or a family group – may exert influence on another group, suggesting asymmetry, power and the probability of interdependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Pfeffer and Salancik (2003: 49) state,

“It is the fact of the organisation's dependence on the environment that makes the external constraint and control of organisational behaviour both possible and almost inevitable,”

finding that groups that control vital resources or reduce the uncertainty of other organisations hold the most power. The environmental resources and competitive conditions at the time of founding and the strategies an organisation uses during its early years to exploit environmental conditions to achieve legitimacy affect the likelihood that a new venture will overcome difficulties (Romanelli, 1989).

Like the concept of organisational sponsorship, most treatments of the legitimacy construct cover a divergent aspect of the phenomenon without defining it in context (Suchman, 1995, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). As a result, the construct means many

different things in many different contexts to many different scholars (Hybels, 1995). The construct of legitimacy and the process by which a new venture acquires legitimacy have arguably developed, as Suchman (1995: 571) states, into an

“... anchor-point of a vastly expanded theoretical apparatus addressing the normative and cognitive forces that constrain, construct and empower organisational actors.”

However, researchers understand that legitimacy, as highlighted by its foundation in institutional theory, is necessary for the acquisition of resources at the new venture; as a result, legitimacy is also necessary for the survival and growth of the new venture (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Starr and MacMillan, 1990).

Legitimacy is usually viewed retrospectively (e.g., the new venture has survived; therefore, legitimacy must be present). Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) suggest, however, that it might be viewed pro-actively (e.g., the new venture must acquire legitimacy to survive). Consequently, Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002) propose that legitimacy is a resource crucial for new venture growth and enhanced by strategic action taken by the new venture. Along with Scott (1995a), the authors outline an environmental framework from which a new venture can derive and acquire four forms of legitimacy: regulative, normative, cognitive and industry. While this study investigates legitimacy in all its forms, there are no specific propositions related to legitimacy except to note that it is an important resource that the new venture acquires through the phenomenon of incubatory sponsorship.

Following Zimmerman and Zeitz (2002: 416), this study holds that legitimacy is a relationship

“... between the practices and utterances of the organisation and those that are contained within, approved of, and enforced by the social system in which the organisation exists.”

Consequently, legitimacy is a social construct. A new venture attempts to acquire legitimacy with symbolic violence, within the constraints of standard societal procedures, norms of behaviour and rules of the game (Stinchcombe, 1965, Suchman, 1995, Bourdieu, 2005b). Systems of accounting, inventory control and other similar activities reduce a liability of newness for the new organisation. Possibly more important, as Stinchcombe (1965: 149) proposes, is the *“degree of initiative and sense of responsibility”* at the new venture for getting the job done in a timely and efficient manner. Systems and disciplines signal to other organisations that the new venture is legitimate and to be trusted, given their acceptance of similar systems and disciplines that the field promotes. Legitimacy according to De Clerq and Veranov (2009a: 399) *“is in the eye of the beholder”*, and it is something a new venture must acquire because new organisations rely on social relations – specifically, trust among strangers – for payment and fulfilment of promises (Stinchcombe, 1965).

Studying legitimacy might require a reflexive turn, since research suggests according to Suchman (1995: 571) that it can be viewed either from the outside ‘looking in’ or from the inside ‘looking out’ (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). A societal perspective ‘looking in’ at the new venture might consider how the new venture subscribes to

societal and business norms; these are the ‘constitutive beliefs’ from which the new venture constructs its cultural definitions (Suchman, 1995, Meyer and Rowan, 1977) Dimaggio & Powell, 1983, 1991). Alternatively, a managerial perspective from within the new venture ‘looks out’ at the environment. The manager, as an agent, attempts to recognize and extract resources from the environment to achieve survival, sales growth, profitability and/or increased legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). The process of achieving legitimacy is purposeful, calculated and strategic (Suchman, 1995) Pfeffer, 1981; Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975). Consequently, the managerial perspective depicts legitimacy as an operational resource that begets more resources in an effort to achieve more legitimacy (Suchman, 1995, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Ruef and Scott, 1998). The duality of strategic legitimation efforts by new venture managers ‘looking out’ and structural/institutional efforts by society ‘looking in’ reinforce the definition of legitimacy as a resource that begets more resources (Suchman, 1995).

This study studies how the new venture acquires legitimacy through the acquisition of types and levels of capital from a parent firm (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). Suchman (1995: 572) argues that organisations “*instrumentally manipulate and deploy evocative symbols in order to garner societal support*”, and Zimmerman & Zeitz (2002: 421) give a name to the process of garnering societal support in ‘strategic legitimation’. They find that organisations can exercise strategic choice to alter the type and amount of legitimacy they possess by altering the type and level of resources they acquire (Suchman, 1995). Further, they argue that organisations can take proactive steps to acquire legitimacy.

Summary of Social Structures

A new venture’s acquisition of the precise type and amount of capital required within an organisational field may determine legitimacy of the new venture(s). Different organisational actors may operate differently within their fields, but according to Bourdieu (1992: 108), they operate according to the “*specific logic of the field*” as a determinate of legitimacy. As a result, they attempt to preserve a dominant hierarchy that is most favourable to them in order to secure or supplement their position within that hierarchy; alternatively, they attempt to use their resources to transform the system – in effect according to Bourdieu (1992:109), “*to change the rules of the game*” (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). However, it is habitus in the form of lasting and transposable dispositions that dictates the actions of individuals and organisations in their attempts to acquire capital with which to exert power (Bourdieu, 1971).

According to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992b), a distinction must be made between the structure of the distribution of resources and capital in a field and the interactions among organisations within that field (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Emirbayer and Johnson (2008: 18) argue that,

“... researchers have failed to elaborate on this distinction, instead imposing their own understanding of what counts as relevant and real for the organisation and so limiting their discussion of relations of interaction and relations of structural force.”

To avoid this shortfall, this study examines organisational fields of business in the context of parent family firms, new venture creation and strategic legitimation. Specifically, it focuses on the green industry and the construction industry to investigate the interplay of field-specific habitus with varying types and levels of capital. Most importantly, this study takes a reflexive turn to go beyond observing and recording at face value the interplay and interaction of individual actors and organisations within a given field, aiming to furnish a complete and unbiased understanding of the social relations of interactions and the social relations of structural forces at the parent firm and its new venture(s) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter reviewed the literature on definitions of family firms, ventures and venturing; this chapter also reviewed the literature on social space and social structures to provide the reader with context for this study. While family firms provide the unit of analysis for this study, different types of ventures provide the backdrop for investigation. Social structures in fields, forms of capital and habitus provide the pillars upon which the parent family firm sponsors their venture(s) to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy in order for the family firm to achieve power over the field (Bourdieu, 1989, Stinchcombe, 1965, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b).

Chapter 3 continues the literature review for the reader to reflect on constructs of organisational sponsorship and munificence which a family firm provides to its new venture(s) – both family and non-family ventures.

CHAPTER THREE - SPONSORSHIP AND MUNIFICENCE

3.1 Introduction to the Chapter

This chapter reviews the literature on sponsorship concepts and draws on fundamental constructs associated with sponsorship and other initiatives intended to provide a resource-munificent context because as Castrogiovanni (1991: 543) suggests there are gaps in the study of munificence, and they note, “*The resources available within an environment influence the survival and growth of firms sharing that environment.*” This chapter also presents the literature to provide a structured presentation of various constructs related to sponsorship in the context of new business incubation to investigate how parent family firms sponsor their new ventures and identify whether parent family firms sponsor different types of new ventures differently.

3.2 Typology, Theory and Context of Paternalism and Patronage

In this study, I refer to the concept of sponsorship and the construct of organisational sponsorship to provide a framework for understanding how new business incubation is provided by a parent family firm (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b, Amezcua et al., 2013). In doing so, I challenge the assumption that ‘organisational sponsorship’ is the appropriate construct for new business incubation provided by a parent family firm.

The concept of sponsorship, which reflects inter-organisational and beneficial relationships, remains somewhat inadequate and confusing to this day (Amezcua et al., 2013). According to Abercrombie and Hill (1976), there has been insufficient discussion and categorisation in the academic literature of phenomena related to inter-organisational and beneficial relationships that emphasize efforts to resolve structural imbalances of power and resources. The authors suggest that the categorisation of the phenomena of paternalism, patronage and the associated concept of sponsorship is often ‘slipshod’, possibly due to the lack of a systematic framework that could identify the formal characteristics and contexts of each phenomenon (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a, Camerer et al., 2003).

Paternalism

According to their definition of paternalism, Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 418) propose,

“Paternalism pre-supposes unequal access to resources, which reflects differences in the power of the various parties. The paternalist provides resources which subordinates would be unable to find on their own which is the basis of their dependence.”

The justification for paternalism arose in the early nineteenth century due to scepticism about the abilities of certain categories of people to contract for themselves and make decisions in their best interest (Camerer et al., 2003, Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a). Paternalism was thought to be the appropriate way to protect ‘idiots’ or ‘minors’ who

might otherwise do harm to themselves (Zamir, 1998). According to Thaler and Sunstein (2003: 1162), *“a policy counts as paternalistic if it attempts to influence the choices of affected parties in a way that will make choosers better off.”* The authors assert that at times individuals make poor choices given limited information, limited cognitive abilities and/or lack of willpower; in other words, they are at times *“boundedly rational”* in their ability to make decisions (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Simon, 1972).

The research on paternalism in a management or economic context dates back to Weber (1968), who considered economic paternalism a form of legitimated authority (Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008, Weber, 1968). However, the concept typically elicits criticism and scepticism from historians, economists and social scientists depending on whether the use of the concept is normative or structural (i.e., descriptive) (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Dworkin, 2002, Fleming, 2005). As Fleming (2005: 1471) explains,

“Ever since industrial paternalism became a phenomenon of analysis, it has been understood as both a structural and normative system of workplace control.”

This system is ‘structural’ in the sense that paternalism involves a set of relationships in which the employer is in a position of intimate domination and the employee is in a position of strong dependence (Bendix, 1956). It is ‘normative’ according to Newby (1978: 29) in that paternalism,

“... creates a tendency to identify with a particular institution and its strength lies in the fact that as subordinates come to accept these relationships as legitimate so the prevailing ethos increases in strength.”

According to Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 413), paternalism in its normative form is primarily an economic institution,

“... concerned with the manner of organising a productive unit and regulating relationships between subordinates and the owners of the means of production or their agents.”

This common understanding of paternalism holds that paternalism is negative because it involves coercion; in other words, according to Cornell (2015: 1298), *“it is bad because it denies individuals the ability to make choices about their own lives.”*

While I refer to the normative definition that is commonly used, I adopt a less commonly used definition of paternalism as an economic and non-coercive construct concerned with the organisation of production (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a, Fleming, 2005, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). It is a term that economists reject in its relation to efficiencies, freedom of choice and bounded rationality, but that has received renewed scrutiny in academic literature over the past decade (Simon, 1972, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Zamir, 1998, Pellegrini and Scandura, 2008).

Paradigms of Paternalism

In recent years, novel constructs of paternalism have emerged from the field of law and behavioural economics to reflect the ways policy and strategy may help humans

who deviate from pure rationality. To the extent that individuals often suffer from a lack of self-control, excessive optimism, or a 'status quo bias' (i.e., a preference for the current state), a soft paternalistic intervention in the form of a 'nudge' promises to help them make better decisions consistent with their own interests (Whitman, 2010, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). This emerging paradigm in new paternalism is referred to in different forms, including 'asymmetric paternalism', 'libertarian paternalism', 'cautious paternalism' or 'soft paternalism', and different names typically apply to different contexts (Camerer et al., 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Policies that reflect this new paradigm in paternalism interfere only minimally or not at all with individuals. Policies that reflect libertarian or asymmetric paternalism, for example, change the presentation of choices or 'nudge' the individual in such a way that individuals who are less informed might choose an option deemed better for them (O'Donoghue and Rabin, 1998, Camerer et al., 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Brock et al., 1988, Dworkin, 2002, Zalta et al., 2003). Cornell (2015: 1299) suggests,

“By altering the conditions under which choices are made, we can encourage people to make better choices – thereby improving their lives without coercing them at all.”

For Thaler and Sunstein (2003: 1162), paternalism is wrong because it violates the principle that one should respect individual freedom of choice; it is a coercive act. Therefore, if coercive paternalism is wrong, then by extension, non-coercive paternalism is not wrong according to the authors (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Cornell, 2015).

Asymmetric or libertarian paternalism is paternalistic because it helps individuals achieve their own goals by essentially protecting them from themselves and 'nudging' them towards an option that promotes their welfare (Zalta et al., 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2008, Camerer et al., 2003). In reference to the new paternalism, Sunstein and Thaler (2003: 1162) state:

“Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak and nonintrusive type of paternalism, because choices are not blocked or fenced off. In its most cautious forms, libertarian paternalism imposes trivial costs on those who seek to depart from the planner's preferred option. But the approach we recommend nonetheless counts as paternalistic, because private and public planners are not trying to track people's anticipated choices but are self-consciously attempting to move people in welfare-promoting directions.”

It is asymmetric in terms of power and in the sense that it helps individuals who are prone to making irrational decisions while not harming those making informed, deliberate decisions, and it differs from heavy-handed paternalism in attempting to help individuals without limiting their freedom of choice (Loewenstein et al., 2007). Asymmetric or libertarian paternalism is a weaker form of paternalism because choices made by the individual or organisation are never blocked or prevented by the paternal planner; the individual or organisation can always choose something else or 'opt-out' of a decision (Camerer et al., 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). Replacing 'paternalism' with 'benevolence' leaves nothing out of the definition, as 'asymmetric'

or 'libertarian' rounds out the construct to suggest an absence of coercion or restriction on choice (Zalta et al., 2003)

According to Camerer et al. (2003), people exhibit 'systematic mis-predictions' in terms of the costs or benefits of choices such that the degree of loss aversion seems inconsistent with the actual experiences of gains and losses (Camerer et al., 2003). In reference to Simon (1972), Camerer (2003) suggests these people are 'boundedly rational' in their abilities: their rationality is limited by the information they have, the cognitive limitations of their minds and the finite amount of time they have to make a decision. Camerer et al. (2003) suggest a design of paternalistic policy that might counteract the mistakes of the boundedly rational individual or organisation without coercing or affecting free will. Such a policy or plan is 'asymmetrically paternalistic' if it creates large benefits for those who are boundedly rational and imposes little or no harm on those who are fully rational (Camerer et al., 2003, Simon, 1972). Camerer et al. (2003: 1211) summarize three policies that exist to (1) redistribute wealth (e.g., we tax the rich and give to the poor); (2) impose harm on the individual but provide net social yields (e.g., eminent domain); (3) force or prevent choice for an individual's own good (e.g., we prevent children from eating candy for dinner every night). Their primary interest is in the third policy, as they believe "*it is possible to have one's cake and eat it too*" if we replace paternalistic policies that prevent individuals from behaving in their best interest with new policies that are asymmetrically paternalistic if they create large benefits for those who make errors in behaviour (e.g., eating candy for dinner every night) and impose little or no harm on individuals who are fully rational (e.g., eating a balanced meal every night) (Camerer et al. 2003: 1212).

New paternalists often present their position as a middle ground between 'hard' paternalism and anti-paternalism (Whitman, 2010). The debate for new paternalists like Camerer, Sunstein and Thaler is not whether paternalism should exist as a social construct but how much paternalism should exist. Consequently, new paternalism often exists on a spectrum or continuum ranging from strict to mild based on the cost of the choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Whitman, 2010). With reference to libertarian paternalism, Sunstein and Thaler (2003) note, "The libertarian paternalist insists on preserving choice, whereas the non-libertarian paternalist is willing to foreclose choice, but in all cases a real question is the cost of exercising choice."

This study acknowledges the similarities between Camerer's (2003) asymmetric paternalism and Thaler and Sunstein's (2003) libertarian paternalism. For the purposes of this study reference is typically made to Thaler and Sunstein's (2003) libertarian paternalism.

Patronage

According to Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 414), patronage is a special relationship with someone of superior power or influence who serves to protect against an insecure or hostile environment. While paternalism is primarily an economic institution, patronage is typically not. Patronage, which has long been associated with arts, literature and medicine, is usually characterized as a non-economic 'exchange of favours' and as a resource for networking and consulting when services are needed (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a, Hall, 1951). Patronage is based upon a personal

relationship between two individuals, and true patronage according to Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 425) may be found where there are,

“... sharp and contrasting differences in access to resources such that a patron with ascribed, general values of prestige, generosity or kinship works to reduce asymmetries and differences in access to resources.”

However, patronage relations vary in the degree of asymmetry; Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 416) state that,

“... the more symmetrical is the exchange, the more equal are the parties in access to power and resources, to the point at which, what appears to be a patronage relation is in fact more like a market relation.”

Paradigms of Patronage

Abercrombie and Hill (1976) specifically suggest that sponsorship serves to protect or preserve an individual or organisation from a hostile environment. Accordingly, sponsorship reflects both social structures and organisational responses to structural differences in access to resources and opportunities (Amezcuca et al., 2013). In professional careers, Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 423) assert that,

“... patronage – normally called sponsorship – is a central facet of an institution that is sometimes thought to be dominated by the principles of technical competence and achieved status.”

Consequently, the construct of sponsorship is closely associated with patronage. Hall (1951: 336) discusses the professional patronage of interns by doctors in which *“sponsorship is the major social facet of a medical career;”* sponsors (doctors) control access to prestigious appointments at the best hospitals and thus control the ability to select members to succeed in their own environment. .

Table 3.1 below summarizes varying constructs, relations and sources of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship according to Abercrombie and Hill (1976b).

Table 3.1 Constructs and Sources of Paternalism, Patronage and Sponsorship

	<i>Social Construct</i>	<i>Economic Construct</i>	<i>Power Relation</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Paternalism	Collective; regulates social relations; provides normative legitimacy; connective form of social organisation; diffuses social relations; 'whole man'; total involvement	Normative & structural; primarily an economic institution; asymmetry of exchange favouring employer; inefficient; limited involvement; institutionalized & normative as system matures; tending toward organisational rule	Strong power in the hands of paternal patron	(Abercrombie & Hill, 1976a; Bendix, 1956; Brock et al., 1988; Camerer et al., 2003; Dworkin, 2002; Feinberg, 1986; Fleming, 2005; Newby, 1978; Pellegrini & Scandura, 2008; Sunstein & Thaler, 2003; Thaler & Sunstein, 2003; VanDeVeer, 1980; Weber, 1968; Zalta et al., 2003; Zamir, 1998)
Patronage	Highly personal; individualistic; face to face; interstitial; personal bond; protects individuals against insecurity; partial rather than long term	Not an economic institution; characterized by an exchange of favours; reduces asymmetries and access to resources; asymmetry of exchange favours client; depends on inadequacy of formal institutional framework	Less power than is present in the context of paternalism	(Abercrombie & Hill, 1976a; Amezcua et al., 2013; Hall, 1951; Wolf, 1966)
Sponsorship	Reduces asymmetries and access to resources; highly personal; individualistic; face to face; interstitial; personal bond; protects individuals against insecurity	Mixed evidence of effectiveness; inter-organisational phenomenon	Less power than is present in the context of patronage	(Amezcua et al., 2013; Castrogiovanni, 1991; Flynn, 1993a, c)

Source: (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976b)

Organisational Sponsorship

Flynn (1993a: 129) proposes the construct of organisational sponsorship to suggest a mutually beneficial relationship that “*is a deliberate attempt to make available a significantly higher and more stable level of resources to selected firms.*” While Flynn’s (1993a, b) studies provide a comprehensive investigation of the process of

organisational sponsorship, there is only a brief and limited discussion of the construct in the literature. According to Flynn (1993a: 129-130), organisational sponsorship exists in the context of government agencies, business firms and universities that establish a support structure for new ventures “*with the aim of increasing the likelihood of their survival.*” In the nascent stage of organisational development, sponsorship from a parent firm may provide resources and protect the new venture from environmental threats. Organisational sponsorship is an organisation’s attempt to mediate the relationship of a new venture to its environment by providing resources, and Flynn (1993b: 52) notes, “*when organisations are sponsored, their environment is enriched, providing legitimacy*” (Flynn, 1993b, Stinchcombe, 1965). Flynn (1993b) suggests that sponsorship (1) supports the initial development of industries compatible with the local infrastructure; (2) enriches the local infrastructure through direct and indirect support and (3) requires firms to include mechanisms for organisational learning to overcome benevolent dependence resulting from sponsorship. Organisations recognize sponsorship as an antidote to a liability of newness at a local level because sponsorship increases the amount and level of resources available to an entrepreneur, and resources are important in helping a new venture survive if those resources are valuable, rare and imperfectly imitable (Barney, 1991, Stinchcombe, 1965). Further, those resources may provide a strategic and sustained competitive advantage, especially during the early development of the new organisation. Organisational sponsorship suggests an allocation of resources in response to asymmetric differences in access to resources – typically scarcity; as a result, organisational sponsorship is consistent with a tenet of the population ecology literature that suggests that certain mechanisms of sponsorship mediate the relationship of a new organisation and its local environments (Flynn, 1993b, Flynn, 1993a, Castrogiovanni, 1991, Hannan and Freeman, 1977).

Perhaps surprisingly in the light of the above discussion, recent research reveals that resource munificence from organisational sponsorship does not guarantee new venture survival, and in fact a resource-rich environment created by sponsorship may increase rather than decrease the exit rate of new ventures (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Amezcuca et al. (2013: 1629) suggest there is a “*lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms by which sponsorship influences organisational survival*” and they reference Castrogiovanni (1991: 548) to assess munificence relevant to the particular resource pool or sub-environment most relevant to a specific research purpose.

Organisational Sponsorship in the Context of New Business Incubation

Staw and Sz wajkowski (1975) argued that munificence in all its forms is an important variable that affects organisations and that more research examining munificence as an independent variable is needed. Since their suggestion, researchers have examined munificence concepts and contexts, but their research is based on the assumption that more munificence is always better. However, Castrogiovanni (1991) and more recently Amezcuca et al. (2013) contend that a lack of research in the study of munificence has limited theoretical development, and Castrogiovanni (1991: 542) suggests that “*over abstraction and conceptual ambiguity continue to cloud research on munificence.*” While Castrogiovanni (1991) notes that the application of new and additional resources in an entrepreneurial context should always benefit new firms, Amezcuca et al. (2013: 1629) suggest that existing theories overlook heterogeneity, and they hypothesize that resource munificence “*is not necessarily predictive of*


organisational survival,” and they suggest a ‘more-nuanced’ theory of organisational sponsorship including specific mechanisms and activities that, “*attends to the mechanisms and conditions by which resource munificence is likely to alter new organisation survival rates.*”

Munificence as an act of organisational sponsorship is intended to buffer a new venture from a hostile environment while providing the new venture with external resources. Organisational sponsorship thus becomes synonymous with incubation (Flynn, 1993a; 1993b). Access to business incubators is typically limited to local entrepreneurs with ideas for new ventures.

Mechanisms of Organisational Sponsorship

Sponsored organisations may be temporarily protected from competition so that they may, according to Flynn (1993b: 54), stabilize and develop resources to allow ventures to “*stand on their own.*” Management may ‘buffer’ the new organisation from competition and/or ‘arrange smooth adjustments’ (i.e., ‘bridge’) the new organisation based on environmental conditions (Hannan and Freeman, 1984). Hall (1951) suggests that buffering is an action by which a sponsor protects a new venture or spinoff and reduces dependency on the environment. Alternatively or together with buffering, sponsorship can ‘bridge’ a new venture or spinoff to provide connections and relations as a support activity for early development (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Hall, 1951). Flynn (1993a) finds that both the bridging and buffering mechanisms mediate the relationship of new organisations to their local environment; these mechanisms increase the probability of new venture survival. In population ecology literature, sponsorship buffers the organisation from environmental pressures, thus allowing ‘blind variation’ to occur while providing access to resources that would otherwise be unavailable to the new organisation (Fichman and Levinthal, 1991, Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Sponsorship also bridges the new venture by encouraging it to actively engage with the environment in ways that attract resources and knowledge and allow resources to flow to the organisation. Initially, buffering and bridging sponsorship mechanisms enable new organisations to overcome a liability of newness and small size (Stinchcombe, 1965). Amezcua et al. (2013) hypothesize that the buffering and bridging mechanisms, in conjunction with field-building, networking and direct support activities, facilitate the active transfer of resources and opportunities to a new venture, and they provide a theoretical framework for investigation of organisational sponsorship depicted in Figure 3.5.

Figure 3.5 Model of Organizational Sponsorship and New Organisation Survival



Source: Amezcua et al. (2013)

Their causal model depicts hypothesized interactions between geographic founding density and each sponsorship activity; interaction between geographic founding density and sponsorship services relate to new organisation survival (Amezcua et al., 2013).

However, the authors consider organisational sponsorship mechanisms and activities only in the context of new business incubation at college-based incubators, while the present study considers sponsorship mechanisms and associated activities in the context of parent family firms and their new venture(s). Extrapolating from the domain of college incubators to parent family firms, these mechanisms and activities might allow parent firms to buffer and/or bridge their new venture(s) from or to the environment to allow them to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Flynn, 1993a, Amezcua et al., 2013). As Amezcua et al. (2013: 1632) state,

“Regardless of its form (e.g. small business loans, venture capital, incubation) sponsorship focuses on increasing survival rates. In other words, sponsorship varies most critically in regard to the mechanisms by which it mediates the relationship between new organisations and their environment.”

And the authors (2013: 1632) further explain,

“Each mechanism is distinguishable by its assumptions related to the relationship of founding environment to new organisations and the role that sponsorship must play to mediate that relationship.”

Local governments and institutions have supported a bustling industry that incubates and sponsors new business development. Local incubators base their model of sponsorship on the assumption that more is better in terms of resources. Amezcua et al. (2013: 1492) propose that there is a direct relationship between sponsorship activities, geographic founding density and survival rates among sponsored new ventures, and they conclude that assumptions related to the utility of the sponsorship associated with new venture survival require *“a more-nuanced theory of*

sponsorship,” which suggests that existing theories of resource munificence do not adequately consider resource types or contexts. Moreover, Castrogiovanni (1991: 548) argues that “*researchers should examine munificence separately for each of several relevant resource pools.*”

In the context of the inter-organisational phenomenon of sponsorship, Amezcua et al. (2013: 1629) note that,

“ . . . there is a lack of clarity regarding the mechanisms by which sponsorship influences organisational survival and the environmental conditions . . . under which those mechanisms are most appropriate.”

They offer a nuanced theory of organisational sponsorship that examines munificence in relation to the mechanisms by which new organisations develop, and they suggest that sponsorship mediates the relationship between a new organisation and its environment relative to the individual mechanisms used by a parent firm. Policies such as training, loans, office space, tax shelters, etc. serve to buffer a new organisation from its environment. Policies such as networking, knowledge-gathering, facilitating relationships, etc. serve to bridge a new organisation to external resource providers to attract resources and knowledge. Table 3.2 below summarizes the differences between mechanisms.

Table 3.2 Sponsorship Mechanisms

	Buffering Mechanism	Bridging Mechanism
<i>Sponsorship Environment</i>	Potential competition	Potential stakeholders
<i>Sponsorship Role</i>	Provide protective environ.	Provide connective environ.
<i>Sponsorship Activities</i>	Tax shelter, office space, training, consulting, loan, etc.	Memberships, associations, networking, investments, etc.

(Amezcuca et al., 2013)

Activities of Organisational Sponsorship

Specific sponsorship activities are associated with buffering and bridging mechanisms. These include networking, field-building and direct support activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Networking refers to the activity of connecting organisations via sponsorship to external resource providers. Field-building activities connect organisations with other like-minded organisations, and direct support refers to the transfer of knowledge (both tacit and explicit), capital and labour to new organisations. These activities combine to enhance the nascent organisation's legitimacy and probability of survival (Weber, 1978, Stinchcombe, 1965). Table 3.3 summarizes individual sponsorship activities and provides their source.

Table 3.3 Activities of Organisational Sponsorship

<i>Service</i>	<i>General Assumptions</i>	<i>Mechanism Assumptions</i>	<i>Sources</i>
Networking	connecting organisations via sponsorship to external resource providers	Bridge	(Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998; Sorenson & Stuart, 2001b)
Field-building	connect organisations with other like-minded organisations	Bridge	(Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Rao, Morrill, & Zald, 2000; Wry, Lounsbury, & Glynn, 2011)
Direct Support	transfer of knowledge (both tacit and explicit), capital and labour to new organisations	Buffer and/or Bridge	(Baum & Oliver, 1991; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990; Phan, Siegel, & Wright, 2005)

(Amezcuca et al., 2013)

Summary of Paradigms and Perspectives on Paternalism and Patronage

According to Abercrombie and Hill (1976: 413), there has been a failure in the literature to develop a comprehensive and analytical framework that identifies the formal characteristics of the relationship between paternalism and patronage, “*in such a way that each can be categorised.*” The authors also lament a lack of appreciation for the extent to which relationships of paternalism and patronage can be found in a variety of cultural settings. Jackman (1994: 10) suggests that “*paternalism is a time-worn term that has had indefinite meaning in common usage.*” Because the definitions of paternalism and patronage are based on simple and self-evident qualities, the categorisation of the phenomena according to Abercrombie and Hill (1976b: 413), “*is often somewhat unsystematic and slipshod.*”

This study refers to paternalism and patronage as they relate to resource munificence in the context of new business incubation. Amezcuca et al. (2013) hypothesize that buffering and bridging sponsorship mechanisms, along with the associated activities of field-building, networking and direct support, facilitate the active transfer of resources to a new venture. What remains unknown is whether these same mechanisms and associated activities of organisational sponsorship also serve to actively transfer entrepreneurial dispositions from a parent family firm to its new venture(s).

3.3 Typology, Theory and Context of Entrepreneurial Dispositions

This section discusses several dispositions in mind-set which reflect an entrepreneurial orientation of the venturing individual and organisation. Dispositions suggest the


tendency of an individual or organisation to act in a particular way, and this study is specifically concerned with whether there are lasting and transposable dispositions which exist in the individual and at the organisation.

Entrepreneurial Orientation

To understand how entrepreneurship functions within social spaces and social structures, this sub-section reviews entrepreneurial orientation (EO) at parent firms. According to Lumpkin & Dess (1998: 136), venturing and new entry explain what entrepreneurship consists of, whereas EO describes how venturing is undertaken. EO is an important concept for addressing how parent firms engage in change and strategic renewal to maintain their strategic competitive advantage (Serrano et al., 2006). According to Lumpkin and Dess (1996: 136), EO “*refers to the processes, practices and decision-making activities that lead to new entry*”, and EO can be successfully undertaken by “*purposeful enactment.*” EO is contingent upon external factors, including the industry field and/or business environment, and internal factors, including the organisation structure (as in the case of a parent firm). Thus, EO involves the intentions, actions and behaviours of key players functioning in a dynamic, generative process aimed at new-venture creation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Gartner, 1985). Some of the factors associated with EO when a firm engages in new entry are autonomy, innovativeness, risk-taking, pro-activeness and competitive aggressiveness. This is consistent with Gartner’s (1985) suggestion that EO is within the purview not only of the individual, but also of the new venture and the corporate venture.

The literature on entrepreneurial orientation (EO) has been widely acknowledged since Lumpkin and Dess (1996) arguably revived and revised Miller’s 1983 article to propose the theoretical model depicted in Figure 3.6. For the investigation of entrepreneurial dispositions and to understand ‘how’ new entry is undertaken at parent family firms, this study considers only Miller’s (1983) dimensions of an EO in autonomy, innovativeness and risk-taking.

Figure 3.6 Theoretical Model of an Entrepreneurial Orientation (EO)



Source: (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996)

This study considers only three dimensions of entrepreneurial orientation as proscribed by Miller (1983) in that individuals and firms may be (1) innovative, (2) pro-active and (3) risk-taking (Covin and Slevin, 1991, Jennings and Lumpkin, 1989, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). The parent firm is risk-taking in that it is willing to support high-risk ventures in regard to investment decisions; it is innovative in that the parent firm tends toward innovative leadership, and it is proactive in that the parent firm may aggressively compete with rivals (Covin and Slevin, 1991, Miller, 1983, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996).

Cruz and Nordqvist (2012) hypothesize that while entrepreneurial families need to have an entrepreneurial orientation toward their business activities, EO is subject to generations (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002). The authors (2012: 33) suggest that while EO is strong in the first generation, EO is,

“more subject to interpretations of the competitive environment in the second generation and that the third generation and beyond, access to non-family resources drives EO to a greater extent.”

To account for this change at the family firm, Zellweger et al. (2012: 136) introduce the construct of family entrepreneurial orientation (FEO) to shift level of analysis from the firm to the parent family firm and find evidence of extended entrepreneurial activity across generations, “. . . which is missed when focusing exclusively on the firm level.” According to the authors, FEO may exist as a family firm level construct to understand attitudes and mind-sets of the parent family affect entrepreneurial activity at the family firm level (Zellweger et al., 2012). In short, the authors build on

Habbershon and Pistrui (2002) to focus on the family as the engine for entrepreneurial activity and trans-generational wealth across generations.

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) state that no behavioural theory to date explains how families nurture entrepreneurship across generations, and they suggest that the imprinting of an entrepreneurial legacy provides an entrepreneurial process. Entrepreneurial legacy is the rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial experiences to engage next-generation owners in strategic activities that foster entrepreneurial action (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). Further, the authors suggest that entrepreneurial legacy has implications for imprinting through story-telling and/or active involvement in order to nurture trans-generational entrepreneurship. In their theoretical framework depicted in Figure 3.7 family members in entrepreneurial firms expressed how narratives about the family’s entrepreneurial history “*motivate and give meaning to entrepreneurship*” (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015: 36). The authors categorised narratives into three dimensions: (1) strategic education, (2) entrepreneurial bridging and (3) strategic transition, to suggest large and cohesive families with an entrepreneurial legacy imprint their EL on the next generation, provide their children with a strategic education and engage in entrepreneurial bridging to help their successors seize entrepreneurial opportunities (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). Figure 3.7 presents their theoretical model of an entrepreneurial legacy.

Figure 3.7 Theoretical Model of an Entrepreneurial Legacy (EL)




Source: Jaskiewicz et al. (2015)

Strategic education is the education and work experience that may be strategically relevant to entrepreneurial opportunities at the parent family firm. The authors argue that in families that possess an entrepreneurial legacy, “. . . children receive a strategic education – both formal and experiential that helps them recognize entrepreneurial opportunities” (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). Entrepreneurial bridging allows the younger generation to apply their strategic education working side by side with an older generation. Entrepreneurial bridging thus allows “*entrepreneurial leaps*” that allow successors to engage in multiple entrepreneurial behaviours in a short amount of time. According to Jaskiewicz et al. (2015: 42), families that possess an entrepreneurial legacy of bridging overcome the problems of overcapacity suggested by Penrose (1959) to provide business model change at the parent family firm. Finally, strategic transition is defined as a formal transition of ownership that protects the valuable and rare key resources needed for entrepreneurship.

Theory suggests that early environmental influences remain imprinted into adulthood, and family firms have the opportunity to imprint entrepreneurial behaviours and beliefs on the next generation (Marquis and Tilcsik, 2013). While some families engage in entrepreneurship, they may lack a reputation for engaging in entrepreneurial behaviour (Bertrand and Schoar, 2006, Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). In Figure 3.8 Jaskiewicz et al. (2015: 45) introduce the construct of entrepreneurial legacy and dimensions associated with the construct in a model to help explain trans-generational performance at parent family firms.

Figure 3.8 Dimensions of an Entrepreneurial Legacy



Source: Jaskiewicz et al. (2015)

3.4 Typology, Theory and Context of Firm Resources

This study draws on resource-based theory (RBT) and considers a resource-based view (RBV) of parent firms and their new ventures (Barney, 1991, Levie and Lerner, 2009). It attends to (1) the type of resources that a parent firm transfers to a new venture, (2) the type of munificence with which a parent family firm might gently steer or ‘nudge’ a new venture toward legitimacy and (3) the ‘field’ in which a parent family firm operates (Bourdieu, 1986, Firkin, 2001, Abercrombie and Hill, 1976a, Barney, 1991).

This study uses Barney's (1991) definition of an RBV of the parent firm and new venture to examine the process of resource transfer and munificence from a parent firm to new venture(s), suggesting that firm resources allow the new venture(s) to overcome a liability of newness and sustain a competitive advantage (Stinchcombe, 1965). However, theories that reflect an RBV of the firm must be reviewed in context. This section (1) provides a brief review of definitions of resources in the literature, (2) reviews the closely related constructs of RBT and 'familiness' to suggest that they both provide a competitive advantage for a new venture in the transfer of resources, and (3) reviews the context in which RBT operates (Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Barney, 1991).

Resources

I use the terms 'resources' and 'capital' interchangeably, and I reference Sewell's (1992: 92) definition of resources as "*anything that can serve as a source of power in social interactions*" (Sewell, 1992, Giddens, 1979). The reason I use Sewell's (1992) definitions and not Daft's (1983) definition (which defines firm resources as including all of the assets, capabilities, organisational processes, firm attributes, information, knowledge, etc. controlled by the firm in order to improve its efficiency and effectiveness) is that Daft's (1983) definition is firmly rooted in strategic management theory and makes no reference to power. While the present study makes clear reference to strategy, it leans heavily on Bourdieu's forms of capital with reference to the accumulation of power and 'power over the field' (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Bourdieu, 1986). This study also makes reference to the population ecology of organisations as suggested by Hannan and Freeman (1977); in their recent study, Amezcua et al. (2013) refer to Hannan and Freeman (1977) to develop a set of hypotheses relating organisational sponsorship, geographic founding density and the survival rates of sponsored organisations to show that the social conditions of resource munificence and high founding density may increase rather than decrease exit rate of new ventures.

This study adopts an RBV of the firm which includes the financial and non-financial assets a new venture may acquire and accumulate to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Barney, 1991, Habbershon and Williams, 1999, Firkin, 2001, Stinchcombe, 1965, Bourdieu, 1986). While Barney (1991) refers to forms of capital or resources in organisational capital, physical capital and human capital, I use Firkin's (2001) definition of entrepreneurial capital because it suggests a direct link to Bourdieu's (1986) forms of capital in cultural, social, economic and symbolic capital and to Becker's (1974) human capital.

RBV of the Firm

It is arguably the work of Penrose (1959) that introduced the theory on firm resources and a resource-based view of the firm; the theory introduced after Penrose (1959) attempted to understand and explain how firms could sustain superior performance. Since Penrose (1959), theoretical work on resources at the firm has been positioned relative to a (1) strategic competitive performance (SCP) (Porter (1979), (2) neo-classical micro-economics (Ricardo, 1982) and (3) evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982). While these three theories differ in their assumptions, they share the assumption that resources and capabilities "*. . . may be heterogeneously distributed across firms and ... these differences may be long lasting*" (Barney, 2001: 644).

Porter's (1979; 1985) work in strategic competitive advantage draws from industrial economics and focuses on market power and industry structure to provide an explanation of sustained superior performance at the firm. He suggests that firms obtain sustained competitive advantages by implementing strategies that exploit their internal strengths and resources by responding to environment opportunities while neutralizing strategies that expose the firm to external threats and internal weakness.

The work of Ricardo (1821) in neo-classical economics and neo-classical price theory focuses on how market forces determine the quality, quantity and price of goods and services in a market. His work suggests that resources or 'factors of production' are elastic in supply and respond to principles of supply and demand, and when demand for a particular resource increases, the price for the resource will also increase.


The work of Nelson and Winter (1982) in evolutionary economics suggests that competition is a selection mechanism in which only effective and efficient routines generate competitive advantages for the firm; routines that are not efficient or effective are abandoned. Consequently, routines are an example of firm resources and capabilities. Based on the assumption that capabilities are the ability of the firm to use its resources to generate competitive advantage, then definitions of routines and capabilities are indistinguishable (Barney, 2001).

Empirical research on resource-based theory is typically performed in the domain of strategic management, and Barney (1991) examines the link between firm resources and sustained competitive advantage to identify the attributes that resources must possess to be considered a source of sustained competitive advantage (Barney, 1991: 105). While his theory has been positioned relative to other theories on resources over the years, including neo-classical and evolutionary economics, he positions his resource-based view of the firm relative to SCP-based models of competitive advantage (Porter, 1979; 1985). This view begins with the assumption that firm resources may be heterogeneous and immobile; however, not all firm resources hold the potential for sustained competitive advantage. According to Barney (1991) and Barney and Clark (2007: 57), to have this potential,

"A firm resource (1) must be valuable, in the sense that it exploits opportunities and/or neutralizes threats in a firm's environment, (2) must be rare among a firm's current and potential competition, (3) must be imperfectly imitable and (4) must be able to be exploited by a firm's organisational processes."

Figure 3.9 presents Barney's (1991: 112) assumptions about the relationship of a firm's resource heterogeneity and immobility to sustained competitive advantage given firm resources that are valuable, rare, imperfectly imitable and sustainable.

Figure 3.9: Resource Heterogeneity/ Immobility and Sustained Competitive Advantage



Source: (Barney, 1991)

A Resource-based Framework for Assessing Parent Family Firms

In that the resources and capabilities, a firm controls or seeks to control can be viewed as bundles of tangible and intangible assets, Habbershon et al. (1999: 5) suggest that “*family stuff*” provides a lens through which an RBV approach establishes a proper framework for understanding the competitive advantages of family firms. The “*family stuff*” includes a firm’s management skills, its organisational processes and routines and the information and knowledge it controls. The competitive advantage of family firms thus cannot be discussed without reference to a firm’s strategies, resources and capabilities (Habbershon & Williams 1999: 5). While Habbershon et al. (1999: 12) consider the socially complex resources found in family firms, including (1) deeply embedded informal and formal decision-making processes in family management, (2) mentoring between parents and children and/or (3) stakeholder relationships in families, they state that,

“The most ironic category of resource advantage found in family firms is that associated with causal ambiguity. Causal ambiguity exists when the link between the resources controlled by a firm and a firm’s sustained competitive advantage is not fully understood” (Habbershon & Williams 1999: 12).

Causally ambiguous resources bundled together in familiness may only be identified with systematic analysis of the change that took place (Habbershon and Williams, 1999). Missing from the literature is an in-depth understanding of how new venture creation and familiness at the parent family firm are linked. This study conforms to a ‘familiness’ model in that it considers the individual resources that a parent family firm transmits to a new venture for sustained competitive advantage and trans-generational success.

A Resource-based Framework and Organisational Sponsorship

Ulrich and Barney (1984) note that organisational success in a resource dependent perspective allows the organisation to modify its power relations with other organisations. While Barney's (1991) resource-based view of the firm borrows heavily from and extends the literature on the strategic management of the organisation, this study assumes that a resource-based view of the firm must also support the concepts of organisational sponsorship and the related notion of patronage at the parent firm since, according to Amezcua et al. (2013: 1631) "*both allude to resource-based social arrangements.*" A resource-based social arrangement in an organisational context suggests the accumulation of capital in an effort to achieve power over a field as discussed in Section 2.4 (Weber, 1947; Bourdieu, 1977).

3.5 Summary of Dispositions and Resources at the Parent Family Firm

In summary, dispositions and resources combine at the parent family firm to achieve performance and competitive advantage across generations. Dispositions may exist in behaviour of an EO and EL of the family firm while resources may exist in forms of capital and familiness at the family firm. However, as Serrano et al. (2006: 3) suggest, to combine family business and entrepreneurship views about performance and to capture the essence of entrepreneurial activity at family firms there must be an understanding as to, "*who is evaluating the performance and [understanding] differences between performance assessments by family and non-family stakeholders.*" To provide researchers a framework from which to measure performance Serrano et al. (2006) build on earlier work from Habbershon and Pistrui (2002) to create a model of trans-generational entrepreneurship at the family firm which is the subject of the next sub-section.

Trans-generational Entrepreneurship

Trans-generational entrepreneurship according to Habbershon and Pistrui (2010) refers to a family's mind-set and capabilities that allow it to continue their entrepreneurial legacy of social and economic wealth creation across generations. As such, the trans-generational approach provides researchers with a framework according to Serrano et al. (2006: 3), "*. . . to capture the essence of entrepreneurial activity and the resulting performance in family firms in terms of monetary and non-monetary performance.*" The authors suggest this construct may carry a competitive advantage in that it creates family-influenced social and economic wealth across future generations of family. In their analysis entrepreneurial mind-sets are seen as attitudes and beliefs orienting an individual toward entrepreneurial activities while capabilities refer to the resources which the parent family may possess to enhance entrepreneurial activity and create a competitive advantage for the parent family firm (Habbershon and Pistrui, 2002, Zellweger et al., 2012). As mentioned at the beginning of Section 3.4 Habbershon et al. (1999: 12) consider the socially complex resources found in family firms, and they label causally ambiguous resources bundled together as 'familiness'.

Causally ambiguous resources bundled together in familiness may only be identified with systematic analysis of the change that took place (Habbershon and Williams,


1999). Missing from the literature is an in-depth understanding of how new venture creation and familiness at the parent family firm are linked. This study conforms to a 'familiness' model in that it considers the individual resources that a parent family firm transmits to a new venture for sustained competitive advantage and trans-generational success.

3.6 Conclusion

This chapter summarized the concepts of paternalism, patronage and the associated concept of sponsorship to suggest that patronage is a response to a liability of newness, while paternalism is typically a coercive act meant to protect those who are less informed and/or less capable (Abercrombie and Hill, 1976b). This chapter also reviewed the construct of libertarian or asymmetric paternalism to show it gently steers or nudges individuals toward a better alternative without affecting their free will (Camerer et al., 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Finally, this chapter characterized organisational sponsorship as an inter-organisational and mutually beneficial relationship with less asymmetry in power than patronage (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). Organisational sponsorship may provide buffering and/or bridging mechanisms that mediate the relationship between new organisations and the environment (Flynn, 1993a). Noted in Section 3.2 Amezcua et al. (2013: 1632) reflect on buffering and bridging mechanisms as they relate to sponsorship activities; according to the authors, sponsorship activities include field-building, networking and direct support activities. However, Amezcua et al. (2013: 1298) considered only the context of university incubators to suggest "*the need for a more-nuanced theory of sponsorship that attends to the mechanisms and conditions by which resource munificence is likely to alter new organisations survival rates.*"

Figure 3.10 presents a conceptual model of extant literature explained in Chapter Two and Chapter Three to suggest that parent family firms imbue dispositions of an EO and an EL while they also imbue munificence through field-building, networking and direct support sponsorship activities.

Figure 3.10 Conceptual Model of Extant Literature



Sources: (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Amezcua et al., 2013)

While Amezcua et al. (2013) consider heterogeneity in types of applied resources and founding environmental conditions, this study extends their theory to heterogeneity in types of parent firms, types of ventures, types of dispositions as well as types and levels of applied resources. This study attends to limitations in the literature surrounding processes and practices with which a parent family firm sponsors their venture(s) and provides trans-generational entrepreneurship with a thorough investigation of existing constructs in dispositions of an EO and an EL at seven parent family firms and their associated family and non-family venture(s) (Habbershon et al., 2010, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Further, this study attends to the provision of types and levels of applied resources with a thorough investigation of the provision of entrepreneurial capital at seven parent family firms and their associated family and non-family venture(s) (Firkin, 2001, Bourdieu, 1986).

While the literature presented in Chapter Three is heavily weighted towards studies of incubational sponsorship at university incubators, this study considers heterogeneity in types of firms and types of ventures and focuses on the process and practice by which a parent family firm imbues long-lasting entrepreneurial dispositions as well as varying types and levels of resources to both family and non-family new venture(s) to

help them overcome a liability of newness, acquire legitimacy and achieve power over the field (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b, Stinchcombe, 1965, Bourdieu, 1989). Consequently, Figure 3.10 as a model of extant literature arguably raises more questions than it answers for the purposes of this study. Some of the questions that it raises include process and practice with which a parent family firm might imbue dispositions such that they are long-lasting and entrepreneurial over generations. Is there something more substantial than an orientation or legacy with which a parent family firm imbues long-lasting and entrepreneurial dispositions? In terms of resources, are there types and levels with which a parent family firm supports their new venture(s)? When a parent family firm imbues resources to their new venture(s), do they purposefully steer their venture? And, what type of venture do they steer? Does the parent family firm steer their family and non-family venture with similar resources toward similar goals?

To answer these questions and other questions in this study, the following chapter presents a methodological framework to (1) present an investigation of organisational sponsorship at parent family firms, (2) distinguish between family ventures and non-family ventures operating at parent family firms, and (3) investigate how parent family firms sponsor their family and non-family ventures.

CHAPTER FOUR - METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction to the Chapter

“Methodological objectivism . . . is necessary to pass from the opus operatum to the modus operandi, from the statistical regularity or algebraic structure to the principle of the production of this observed order, and to construct the theory of practice, or, more precisely the theory of the mode of generation of practices, which is the precondition for establishing an experimental science of the dialectic of the internalization of externality and the externalization of internality, or, more simply, of incorporation and objectification.” (Bourdieu, 1977:49)

This section explains the research methodology of this study for the investigation of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation in this study. It also explains why specific concepts and constructs were chosen to examine resource transfer. First, this chapter identifies the research aims and objectives of the study by examining the relevant philosophical paradigms (Section 4.2). The following section (4.3) details the study’s research philosophy in social constructionism while Section 4.4 discusses research perspectives and paradigms informing methodology. Section 4.5 in Research Strategy discusses methodology in grounded theory, and Section 4.6 informs on research process. Section 4.7 provides careful consideration of both research setting and case selection while Section 4.8 explains the data collection process and describes how the pilot interviews and main case study were conducted. Section 4.9 details how the relevant constructs for data sampling and analysis were operationalized, and Section 4.10 provides an overview of the data analysis process which centred on qualitative data gathered using semi-structured interviews. Section 4.11 gives the reader a brief overview of the quality of the data and ethical considerations while the following section (4.12) provides a summary of the chapter in conclusion.

4.2 Research Aim and Objective

This research investigates organisational social structures in habitus, forms of capital and power over a field that parent family firms imbue to their family and non-family venture(s). This research also investigates paradigms of paternalism, patronage and sponsorship with which a parent family firm may buffer and/or bridge family and non-family venture(s) from or to its environment. By asking each research question presented in Section 1.1 and Section 1.4, the overall purpose of this research is to understand whether parent family firms provide sponsorship to all their venture(s), understand what kind of sponsorship parent family firms provide their new venture(s), understand how this process works at parent family firms, and understand how this process works between family and non-family ventures. Consistent with the aims of this research, the objectives of this study are to extend the construct of organisational

sponsorship to parent family firms and their new venture(s), uncover types of sponsorship provided by a parent family firm, and determine whether the sponsorship process differs between family and non-family venture(s) at the parent family firm.

4.3 Research Philosophy

This section describes the philosophical assumptions behind the approach taken by this study. For reference there are three principal concepts for consideration: the first is ontology which addresses the nature of organizational phenomena. The second is epistemology which addresses the nature of knowledge about the phenomena, and the third is methodology which addresses the ways of studying the phenomena. Combining these philosophical assumptions provides the reader with an understanding how the researcher approached the research of the phenomena.

Guba and Lincoln (1989: 83) suggest that ontological assumptions are those that ask, “*What is the nature of reality?*” However, entrepreneurship research has often been said to lack paradigms on which to base research and a philosophical identity of its own (Mayfield and Weaver, 1997). An ontology that views the world as “unchanging and immutable” as Pittaway (2005: 18) suggests, presents a problem because of the pre-paradigmatic position of entrepreneurship research, even as terms including ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘small business’ and ‘family business’ are still somewhat unresolved in the literature (Grant and Perren, 2002).

This study suggests an ontology which consists of a social world of meanings in which individuals inhabiting this world have their own thoughts, interpretations and meanings. Investigation of this world by the researcher is manifested in the use of research methods and techniques of an interpretive design such as interviews in order to interpret the respondents’ feelings and inner thoughts.

Epistemology is according to Crotty (1998: 3), “*a way of understanding and explaining how we know what we know.*” Epistemology is also “*concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for deciding what kinds of knowledge are possible and how we can ensure that they are both adequate and legitimate*” (Maynard, 1994:10) in Crotty, Ibid, 8). The epistemological stance used in this study is constructionism. Constructionism is defined by Crotty (1998: 42) as,

“the view that all knowledge and therefore, all meaningful reality as such is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interactions between human beings and their world and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context.”

Entrepreneurship in a family firm context is an emerging academic field which also draws on theoretical frameworks from other disciplines. Further, it may be depicted as a disruptive social force focused on the social transfer of power at the individual level and at the organisational level through the accumulation of resources (Firkin, 2001). Within this context, individuals create, modify and interpret their world as they act and interact within and outside social spaces, social structures and their social reality (Schumpeter, 1942). To reflect an individual’s ability to create, modify and interpret their world, this study incorporates a philosophical framework of social

constructionism to provide an understanding that society is created within the structures, institutions and meaning of everyday life (Peirce, 1998, Schumpeter, 1942, Yu, 1994, Crotty, 1998).

Philosophy of Social Constructionism

Knowledge in the social world is arguably intangible and reflects the consciousness of that which constructs it; from this perspective knowledge is created within the structures of everyday life, which implies that reality is socially constructed (Crotty, 1998). Where knowledge in an objective reality and a subjective interpretation merge into a single perspective, Crotty (1998: 42) introduces a ‘constructionist’ lens with which to interpret interactions between human beings and the world, and he proposes,

“ . . . all knowledge, and therefore all meaningful reality as such, is contingent upon human practices, being constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and the world and developed and transmitted within an essentially social context.”

Consequently, any object (e.g. a degree, a euro, a tractor, etc.) may be interpreted as such only if other beings agree to the interpretation, and generations of interpretation create a social meaning (Crotty, 1998, Goethals and Sorenson, 2007). Activities of interpretation and meaning take place through a ‘socio-cultural process’ and require what Berger and Luckmann (1966, 1991: 13) called a ‘social constructionist’ perspective that emphasizes the shared processes by which individuals and groups construct their reality (Dodd and Anderson, 2007, Morgan and Smircich, 1980).

Entrepreneurship as Social Constructionism

Social constructionism has become increasingly emergent in the social sciences as an important philosophical perspective in which as Alvesson and Karreman (2011: 15) note,

“reality is precisely socially constructed, [and] the important thing for research therefore, becomes to explore how these social constructions happen.”

Recent research situates the practices of the entrepreneur within a ‘socio-cultural process’ (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000, De Clercq and Voronov, 2009c). Critical to an organisational understanding of socially embedded practices in entrepreneurship, De Clercq and Voronov (2009b) added an organisational dimension to a social constructionist epistemology to examine entrepreneurs’ attempts to respond to the circumstances imposed by their surrounding social reality. Drawing from Bourdieu, the authors discuss an entrepreneur’s ability to conform or ‘fit in’ with social reality with their ability to innovate or ‘stand out’ from social reality suggesting to De Clercq and Voronov (2009b: 398), “*A possible tautological relationship*” which the entrepreneur must meet. Accordingly, the authors envision entrepreneurship as a socially embedded process in which the entrepreneur must manage objective realities and subjective interpretations while connected to their position in structures of power relations (De Clercq and Voronov, 2009a). To do this De Clercq and Voronov (2009c: 395) propose that cultural and symbolic capital may shape abilities of the entrepreneur to attain legitimacy, “*and, in turn, how the interplay between newcomers’ legitimacy*

and success influences the extent to which the structure of fields becomes reinforced or transformed.” These intertwined practices encompass the essence of the entrepreneurial act while providing legitimacy for the ‘newcomer’ entering a new field (De Clercq and Voronov, 2009c). This practice perspective of entrepreneurship embedded in social constructionism enriches entrepreneurship research by allowing an examination of the social processes that constitute an entrepreneurial undertaking (Hjorth and Steyaert, 2004, De Clercq and Voronov, 2009c).

Also critical to a philosophical understanding of entrepreneurship as a social discipline is an understanding of the agency/structure dualism, which has generated substantial debate in the social sciences (Downing, 2005). While this study investigates the agency/structure dualism as it relates to entrepreneurship in the context of parent family firms and their new venture(s), it also challenges this dualism with the help of Bourdieu and his reinterpretation of the Aristotelian concept of habitus. According to Bourdieu (1986), habitus provides the researcher a ‘third way’ or ‘middle ground’ situated somewhere between agency and structure that makes it possible to investigate both individual minds and social laws that connect the entrepreneur with social reality in their attempt to acquire legitimacy (Bourdieu, 2005a, Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Stinchcombe, 1965). De Clercq and Voronov (2009: 396) posit that, *“Gaining legitimacy requires an artful navigation of rules, norms and objective conditions that facilitate some actions while inhibiting others”*, and they propose habitus as a ‘third way’ to navigate. To develop legitimacy, ‘newcomers’ enact field-specific habitus (De Clercq and Voronov, 2009c).

Lindgren and Packendorff (2009: 34) state that *“entrepreneurship emerges dynamically in social interaction between people,”* and Fletcher (2006: 433) urged researchers to recognize that entrepreneurs often give *“an expression of relationship to the culture, society and the institutions (of capitalism, family, market, economy, enterprise discourse) in which they have been produced.”* According to Steyaert and Horjt (1997: 30), the entrepreneurial process is *“a complex web of reciprocal interactions between closely connected, culturally embedded actors,”* and social constructionism provides an opportunity to explore its complexities (Lindgren and Packendorff, 2009). Fleetwood (2005: 203) summarizes the ontological concept supporting social constructionism for this study suggesting, *“Because I believe organisations are socially constructed via discourse etc. I will use a method that deconstructs this discourse.”*

4.4 Research Paradigms and Perspectives informing Methodology

As Kuhn (1962: 10) pointed out,

“Normal science means research firmly based upon one or more past scientific achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for its further practice.”

There are generally accepted scientific paradigms that reference paternalism and patronage; few recognize patronage and paternalism in the context of entrepreneurship. And fewer still recognize entrepreneurship in the context of parent family firms as they provide sponsorship to their new ventures (Flynn, 1993a). As such, research questions and research methodologies in this study reflect on existing

paradigms of sponsorship (Kuhn, 1962). According to Kuhn (1962) paradigm shifts are the consequence of a series of conscious decisions to pursue a neglected set of questions, and this section elaborates on the methodology behind the research which challenges existing paradigms of sponsorship at parent family firms and their new venture(s).

In their 2013 article Amezcua et al. (2013, p. 1629) called into question many taken-for-granted assumptions and paradigms about entrepreneurship – specifically, the effectiveness of sponsorship mechanisms and activities that support entrepreneurship – to suggest that a resource-munificent environment created via sponsorship may increase rather decrease the exit rate of entrepreneurial new ventures. Further, they suggested a more-nuanced view might be necessary to understand resource transfer among incubated ventures. This study uses a social constructionist perspective and the practice of reflexive sociology to understand the vagaries, complexities, processes and paradigms associated with sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at parent family firms (Bourdieu, 1990b, Bourdieu, 1990a, Berger and Luckmann, 1991)


By defining entrepreneurship as starting a business, GEM researchers have treated entrepreneurship in a functionalist manner, which implies that research often takes an objectivist view of the world as if it consists of objective reality, when in fact entrepreneurship is concerned with causing disruption and ‘creative destruction’ and is more concerned with changes in social spaces, social structures and social reality (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Schumpeter, 1934, Reynolds et al., 2005). Entrepreneurship research has often been said to lack paradigms on which to base research and a philosophical identity of its own (Mayfield and Weaver, 1997). As an emerging academic field lacking established paradigms, research in entrepreneurship borrows from other more established academic fields and, according to Brush et al. (2003, p. 311), “*can be characterized as multi-disciplinary and application-oriented.*” As a multi-disciplinary domain, it draws on theoretical frameworks from many other disciplines (Grant and Perren, 2002).

Entrepreneurship in a family firm context is also an emerging academic field which also draws on theoretical frameworks from other disciplines. Further, it may be depicted as a disruptive social force focused on the social transfer of power at the individual level and at the organisational level through the accumulation of resources (Firkin, 2001). Within this context, individuals create, modify and interpret their world as they act and interact within and outside social spaces, social structures and their social reality (Schumpeter, 1942). To reflect an individual’s ability to create, modify and interpret their world, this study incorporates a philosophical framework of social constructionism to provide an understanding that society is created within the structures, institutions and meaning of everyday life (Peirce, 1998, Schumpeter, 1942, Yu, 1994, Crotty, 1998).

As Pittaway (2005: 18) suggests, functionalist and realist beliefs “*provide little opportunity for the ‘entrepreneurial’ function to change society in unpredictable ways.*” An ontology that views the world as “*unchanging and immutable*” as Pittaway (2005: 18) suggests, presents a problem because of the pre-paradigmatic position of

entrepreneurship research, even as terms including ‘entrepreneurship’, ‘small business’ and ‘family business’ are still somewhat unresolved in the literature (Grant and Perren, 2002). An interpretive approach to entrepreneurship research might address the shortcomings of a functionalist approach by introducing what Pittaway (2005: 19) describes as “*greater diversity in social meaning.*” While a positivist epistemology may be more appropriate to the ‘hard’ sciences, in which things often interact with mathematical precision, the reality of social spaces and social structures in which individuals act and react is usually subjective and messy (Burrell and Morgan, 1979, Benton and Craib, 2010). Burrell and Morgan (1979) present a matrix of sociological paradigms presented in Figure 4.11 which arguably suggests entrepreneurship research may exist in all four paradigms, but the analytical tools used for this study suggest a more ‘interpretive’ paradigm.

Figure 4.11: Burrell and Morgan (1979) Matrix of Sociological Paradigms



While Burrell and Morgan (1979) characterize the functionalist paradigm as an objectivist view of the world with an orientation toward stability, the interpretivist view of the organizational world is characterized by a more subjectivist view of the world subject to change (Morgan and Smircich, 1980). An interpretive approach to entrepreneurship research might address the shortcomings of a functionalist approach by introducing what Pittaway (2005: 19) describes as “*greater diversity in social meaning.*” The focus of interpretive research is to arguably provide new ways to understand a social phenomenon; as in this study on entrepreneurial dispositions and paradigms of paternalism at family firms, research generates new or conceptual understanding (Hall and Nordqvist, 2008, Nordqvist et al., 2009). Consequently, interpretive research ‘generalizes’ in an analytical and theoretical sense (Yin, 1994).

Regarding family firm research, Nordqvist et al. (2009: 295) suggest,

“Many aspects of family business which make them unique are appropriately rendered comprehensible through in –depth and detailed interpretive research.”

The authors note that methods which allow for in-depth investigation are important for a richer and deeper understanding of family businesses because of their inherent heterogeneity and complexity (Nordqvist et al., 2009). Further, Nordqvist et al. (2009) note that an interpretivist perspective may provide insight not only on interactions

between business development and family complexities but also interpret the how and why this is the case (Nordqvist et al., 2009).

4.5 Research Design

This study was a qualitative analysis of detailed, qualitative data gathered using semi-structured interviews, open-ended questions and historical data on the phenomenon and processual nature of organisational sponsorship at parent firms in the context of new business incubation.

Miles and Huberman (1979) suggested that the collection of qualitative data may provide rich, holistic and contextualized information, but the authors also noted the pitfalls of strictly qualitative analysis for certain types of evidence. Further, they warned that qualitative research often does not transcend simple storytelling (Miles, 1979). However, Yin (1994) pointed out that through systematic methodology, qualitative research may overcome these shortcomings. This study therefore, used qualitative analysis to develop a theory about how organisational sponsorship unfolds and progresses and whether it does so differently at different types of parent firms (Edmondson and McManus, 2007, Flynn, 1993a).

The purpose of acquiring qualitative data is to establish meaning from the view of the participants, to identify shared patterns and to explore the perspectives and judgments of individuals within their environments (Creswell et al., 2003, Creswell et al., 2007). The choice of qualitative analysis is justified by the adoption of (1) a social constructionist philosophical paradigm, (2) this study's need for reflection on the objective-subjective duality and the "collective unconscious", and (3) a call for rich, detailed and qualitative data to shed light on the phenomenon of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation (Bourdieu, 2005a, Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Flynn, 1993a).

It is also significant that most quantitative studies collect data that refer to a fixed point in time, while the present study investigated the impact of time and change in time on firm creation and firm performance and considered how dispositions and capital change over time (in degree of disposition, amount of available capital, type of capital etc.) (Bourdieu, 1986; Shaw, 2008, p.137). Qualitative analysis was appropriate for analysing these changes, and Table 4.4 below arguably justifies this choice by comparing quantitative and qualitative research approaches (Mack et al., 2005).

Table 4.4 Comparison of Qualitative and Quantitative Research Methods

	Quantitative	Qualitative
General framework	Seeks to confirm hypotheses about phenomena	Seeks to explore phenomena
	Instruments use a more rigid style of eliciting and categorising responses to questions, surveys, and structured observation	Instruments use a more flexible, iterative style of eliciting and categorising responses to questions
	Quantifies variation	Uses semi-structured methods such as in-depth interviews, focus groups, and participant observation
Analytical objectives	To predict causal relationships	To describe variation
	To describe the characteristics of a population	To describe and explain relationships
	Closed-ended Numerical (obtained by assigning numerical values to responses)	To describe individual experiences
Question format		Open-ended
Data format		Textual (obtained from audiotapes, videotapes, and field notes)
Flexibility in study design	Study design is stable from beginning to end	Some aspects of the study are flexible (for example, the addition, exclusion, or wording of particular interview questions)
	Participant responses do not influence or determine how and which questions researchers ask next	Participant responses affect how and which questions researchers ask next. Design is iterative - data collection and research questions are adjusted.
	Study design is subject to statistical assumptions and conditions	

Source: (Mack et al., 2005)

However, interpreting other people's articulation of memories of past events, subject as these are to faulty memory, self-censorship in the presence of non-family members, self-censorship to preserve relationships with family members, and other biases there

is acknowledgement of the weaknesses of this method. Using case evidence, construct tables and testability measures to build a strong bridge from qualitative evidence to theory-testing research, this study makes every attempt to include rigorous focus and methods in research design and methodology (Eisenhardt, 1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). From qualitative data rigorously gathered and analysed, this study seeks to understand organisational sponsorship for the introduction of a more-nuanced theory of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation by starting with the following research questions:

RQ1: How do parent family firms sponsor family and non-family venture(s), and do they sponsor them differently?

RQ2: How do they transfer different types of capital/resources to their new ventures, and do they transfer capital/resources to different types of ventures differently?

4.6 Research Strategy

Methodology, according to Crotty (1998: 3) is,

“the strategy, plan of action, process or design lying behind the choice and use of particular methods and linking the choice and use of the methods to the desired outcomes.”

Methodology aims to describe, evaluate and justify the use of particular methods, and this study incorporates a grounded theory methodology in strategy and plan of action as a process to interpret theoretical outcomes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Strauss and Corbin, 1994). Grounded theory methodology derives its theoretical underpinnings from Pragmatism and the writings of Dewey (1925) and Mead (1934) suggesting change in phenomena. Therefore, change through process is an important phenomena built into the method (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). To analyse data this study adopted a research strategy which reflected more constructionist assumptions that something is going on and based on existing definitions, understandings and vocabularies, there might be a better way of understanding them.

Strauss and Corbin (1994: 275) suggest that *“theory should be grounded in interplay with data and developed through the course of actual research”* and this analytic approach also known as the ‘constant comparative method’ is, according to Glaser and Strauss (1967: p. vii) *“a general method of [constant] comparative analysis.”* An important distinction between grounded theory and more ‘general’ theory development rests in the abductive nature of grounded theory development specifically due to the interplay with data collected in the actual research (Strauss and Corbin, 1994, Glaser and Strauss, 1967, Cassell et al., 2017). Strauss and Corbin (1990) suggest the following assumptions summarized below on which grounded theory methodology is predicated:

- i. The need to go to the field to discover what's really going on;
- ii. The relevance of theory to the development of a discipline;
- iii. The complexity and variability of phenomena and of human action;
- iv. The belief that persons are actors responding to problematic situations;
- v. The assumption that persons act on the basis of meaning;
- vi. The understanding that meaning is defined and redefined through interaction;
- vii. A sensitivity to the evolving and unfolding nature of events (process);
- viii. An awareness of the interrelationships among conditions (structure), action (process), and consequences (Moghaddam, 2006).

Critical to the methodological structure of this study is the ability to introduce existing theory into the analysis, and Strauss (1987: 72) suggests,

“Theory may be generated initially from the data, or, if existing (grounded) theories seem appropriate to the area of investigation, then these may be elaborated and modified as incoming data are meticulously played against them.”

Further, Strauss and Corbin (1994: 273) comment,

“Researchers can also usefully carry into current studies and theory based on their previous research, providing it seems relevant to these – but again, the matching of theory against data must be rigorously carried out”

From qualitative data this study seeks to understand organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation, and this study includes the use of semi-structured interviews as well as documented reports, reviews and company histories available to the researcher to provide data for analysis. Theory-building from cases fundamentally depends on cases (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994, Yin, 2009). Yin (1981, 1984) described the design of case study research, and he has described a replication logic which stresses validity and reliability in research design to case study research. Building theory from case study research Eisenhardt (1989: 536) comments, *“A priori specification of constructs can also help to shape the initial design of theory-building research.”* The use of the case study methodology provides a comparative method for developing grounded theory which relies on a continuous comparison of data and theory beginning with collection of the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007).

This study involves multiple case studies and numerous levels of analysis (Yin, 1981, Eisenhardt, 1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). While single case studies describe the instance of a phenomenon, multiple case studies provide a stronger base for theory building (Yin, 1994, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This method is valuable because it permits researchers to measure existing constructs more accurately, and she (1989:536) notes that if these constructs become more important as the study progresses, *“then researchers have a firmer empirical grounding for the emergent theory.”*

In theory building from cases, researchers explore multiple cases, and their analysis typically begins with a longitudinal history of each case as in Chapter 5 of this study. Following longitudinal histories, there is cross-case analysis of the cases as in Section 5.9 and 6.2 of this study. Eisenhardt (1989) notes, confusion remains as to distinctions among qualitative data, abductive logic and case study research. In response to this confusion, she (1984) and others developed cross-case analysis techniques which are arguably ubiquitous in the design of research strategies. To further segment the data, separate tables in this study summarize evidence for each theoretical construct. These ‘construct tables’ as Eisenhardt (2007: 29) calls them, indicate how the focal construct is ‘measured’ to increase the testability of the theory and bridge the data from qualitative evidence to ‘theory-testing research’.

Critical during the development of measures is a commensurate thought-process around emergent theory as Eisenhardt (1984: 2018) suggests. Finally, as theory develops the researcher incorporates other literature. Like Eisenhardt (2018: 287), I believe in

“knowing the literature, and then, looking for a problem or question where there’s no known answer. It’s almost impossible to find those problems without knowing the literature.”

It is in the interplay with the data collected in the actual research during this study that certain patterns developed such that existing (grounded) theories seemed appropriate to the area of investigation (Strauss, 1987). Some patterns presented what this researcher interpreted to be existing theory while other patterns introduced a mystery; at no point did the research subscribe to an assumption of non-theoretical naiveté as a means of being open (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007, Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Eisenhardt (2007: 25) emphatically states that, *“while laboratory experiments isolate the phenomena from their context, case studies emphasize the rich, real world context in which the phenomena occur.”* It is precisely the ‘rich, real world phenomena’ which suggests that existing literature plays a significant part in the abduction of data and isolation of existing constructs in the data. In fact, existing theory in an EO and an EL played a significant part in theoretical abduction given the existence of their dimensions in the data. Appendix 9.3 lists data in dimensions of an EL and an EO for reference (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Miller, 1983, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). I strongly believe that it is only through the categorization of existing data that one can ‘zero in’ on unsubstantiated data (or as I call it in this study – ‘uncategorized data’) in order to understand a problem for which there is no answer; I believe Eisenhardt (1989: 536) reflects a somewhat similar belief suggesting, *“A priori specification of constructs can also help to shape the initial design of theory-building research.”* Consequently, I do not profess ‘enforced ignorance’ of prior constructs as Gioia and Pitre (1990) recommended, and I do not profess pure inductive and linear reasoning as Eisenhardt (1989) and many others recommended in early literature on qualitative positivism. Instead, I profess Peircian logic in abductive linking of theory and data as part of this study because as Eisenhardt (2018: 287) suggests, *“I believe in knowing the literature,*

and then looking for a problem in which there is truly no known answer.” According to Piekkari and Welch (2017: 345),

“The process of abductive inference is triggered by a surprising observation that we make. It is surprising because our existing frames and preconceptions do not seem to offer an adequate explanation for it. Abduction is the process of finding a theoretical explanation for this empirical puzzle.”

To justify abductive linking of theory and data for this study, I dug deeper into Eisenhardt’s methodology and logic and came to understand that in more recent literature she arguably presents evidence of abductive reasoning in methodology to explain new phenomena. A strong example includes MacDonald and Eisenhardt (2019) in which the authors utilize the existing construct of “*parallel play*” from child development literature in order to isolate and understand why their data indicated that some entrepreneurs effectively designed business models while others did not (MacDonald and Eisenhardt, 2019). The authors (2019: 29) note,

“Our core contribution is the dynamic process of parallel play by which entrepreneurs effectively design business models in nascent markets. In the child development literature (Parten, 1932; Rubin, Bukowski, and Parker, 1998), parallel play is a way that pre-schoolers learn about a new world.”

Another example of abductive reasoning in methodology from Eisenhardt is in Graebner and Eisenhardt (2004) in which the authors utilize the existing construct of “*courtship*” to isolate and understand the data suggesting organizational acquisition as courtship. Therefore, theory-method fit in this study follows more recent work of Eisenhardt et al. (2004, 2019) to reflect a qualitative and abductive methodology. As such, I challenge the dichotomy of induction/theory-building and deduction/hypothesis testing with abductive reasoning as a foundation for inquiry in which the abductive process reinforces the significance of a theoretical background and beginning of the research process (Cassell et al., 2017). In other words a priori knowledge and linkage of existing theory introduces a flexible research design to allow the researcher to capture surprises and follow ‘ah ha’ moments as they arise from the data (Cassell et al., 2017). As Piekkari and Welch (2017: 354) in *The Sage Handbook of Qualitative Business and Management Research Methods* suggest,

Abduction is the process of providing a theoretical explanation of this empirical puzzle. According to this model of inquiry, it is precisely our existing theories and conceptualizations that enable us to be surprised, and to seek an explanation for the observations that do not fit.

Van Maanen et al. (2007: 1149) point out that,

As a foundation for inquiry, abduction begins with an unmet inquiry and works backward to invent a plausible world or a theory that would make surprise meaningful.

Consequently, a starting point of abduction allows the researcher to utilize existing theory and build from there to, according to Piekkari and Welch (2017: 355) “*capitalize on surprises*”.

This study has been an exhaustive but effective exercise in a back and forth between data and literature. In the data I discovered existing constructs of an EO, EL and organizational sponsorship while in the literature I discovered constructs of habitus, libertarian paternalism and organizational sponsorship (Bourdieu, 1994, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Flynn, 1993b, Flynn, 1993a, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). Categorizing data into existing constructs of an EO, EL and organizational sponsorship allowed me to more effectively isolate and understand ‘uncategorized data’ and piece them together with my reading and understanding of Bourdieu, Sunstein, Thaler and others for that ‘ah ha’ moment that led to new constructs in an entrepreneurial habitus and ‘nudging’ at parent family firms. Therefore, I strongly believe this study reflects abductive reasoning and a qualitative and abductive methodology in research design and strategy. However, to help with the flow of data analysis of ‘categorized’ data can be found in Appendix 9.3.

In this study both an EO and EL were existing theories which dominated the data as interviewees repeatedly referenced innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking as well as other dimensions of EO (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Miller, 1983). In addition, interviewees referenced dimensions of EL in strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning activities (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). A part of methodology included identification of ‘categorized’ data as well as identification of data which did not ‘fit’ existing constructs. ‘Categorized’ data did not propose answers to the research questions, but the understanding and identification of ‘categorized’ data did suggest that there was something beyond existing dimensions of an EO and an EL. I classified this data as ‘uncategorized’ data since it didn’t fit with existing literature, but it seemed to clarify propositions for ‘how’ and ‘how do things happen’ research questions. Chapter 6 presents ‘uncategorized’ data for each case, and it is precisely this data which led to the identification of new theory.

4.7 Research Process

This project involved multiple case studies in the United States, Scotland and England among parent family firms to prevent the possibility of institutional bias, country bias and storytelling (Miles, 1979, Yin, 2009). This research strategy promised to be the most appropriate method for capturing the nature of the phenomenon of organisational sponsorship in the context of business incubation, exploring the dynamic aspect of informal and formal relationships, and providing an environment that would foster a practice of reflexive sociology (Yin, 1981, Yin, 1994, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, Miles and Huberman, 1994, Cassell et al., 2017, Eisenhardt, 1989).

According to Eisenhardt (1989b), there are several advantages to using the multiple case study strategy to build theory. A multiple case study strategy includes a replication logic that makes it possible to systematically identify patterns and relationships in the research data (Yin, 2003, Yin, 2009). Such logic, in which multiple

case studies either refute or support inferences, generates a more robust and generalizable theory than would be possible with a single case study (Yin, 2009, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). This study also included cross-case analysis to reveal patterns in the qualitative data while avoiding what Eisenhardt (1989: 540) suggested might be “*an information-processing bias.*”

Units of Analysis

Critical to this study was an understanding of units of analysis. This study of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation considered the individual entrepreneur as the originator of ideas and innovation but focused on the firm/business-unit level because the venture is simply an extension of the firm (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Levie, 2015). Further, using a firm/business-unit level of analysis is consistent with Schumpeter’s (1942) argument that entrepreneurship would eventually be dominated by firms capable of devoting resources to innovation.

The parent family firm of each new venture was chosen as the unit of analysis because it allowed for replication logic in multiple new ventures from the same parent firm (Yin, 2003). Further, using the parent family firm as the unit of analysis allowed for a qualitative research design focused on the parent/sibling dyad and/or the owner/employee dyad. However, the pitfall in studying the parent/sibling dyad is the inherent inclination of the genetic parent to buffer and/or bridge a sibling from or to the environment (Hannan and Freeman, 1977). Buffering and bridging mechanisms, like resource munificence, may be directly associated with individuals rather than organisations, and this study draws from the literature of organisational sponsorship. Therefore, only multi-generational parent family firms entering at least third-generation involvement in new venture activity were considered. It was thought that third-generation involvement or greater would provide sufficient data to answer the research questions while minimizing data noise from the parent/sibling dyad. Of the five parent family firms with family venture(s) that participated in this study, four were entering third-generation involvement, two were entering fourth-generation involvement and one was entering sixth-generation involvement.

Operationalization of Constructs for Sampling and Analysis

This section explains the operationalization of core constructs for this study in entrepreneurship, entrepreneurial orientation, entrepreneurial legacy, sponsorship mechanisms and activities, forms of capital and legitimacy for the purpose of theoretical sampling and data analysis to prepare the protocol for semi-structured interviews (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Amezcua et al., 2013, Schumpeter, 1934, Firkin, 2003).

Operationalization of Entrepreneurship

The operationalization of entrepreneurship required the identification of behaviours as indicators of entrepreneurial activity. According to Schumpeter (1934), entrepreneurial behaviours includes (1) creating new products and services, (2) entering new markets, (3) adopting new technologies, (4) developing new raw materials and (5) implementing new ways of organising business activities (Schumpeter, 1934, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). To operationalize individual behaviours, determine their number and assess the speed and degree to which entrepreneurial

ventures acquired legitimacy at the parent firm, the following questions referring to dimensions of entrepreneurship were used, taken from the Babson STEP Interview Questionnaire Format listed below.

- i. Describe the parent firm ability to take new action and support new action.
- ii. Describe the skills and capabilities necessary for the new venture to succeed.
- iii. Would you describe the owner/family as entrepreneurial?
- iv. Why or why not?
- v. Would you describe the business unit you're involved in as entrepreneurial?
- vi. Why or why not?
- vii. Describe your business capabilities to take new actions ahead of your competitors.
- viii. To what extent would you describe the organisation as innovative and generating new ideas, experimentation and creative processes that may or may not result in new initiatives/strategic actions?

Operationalization of Sponsorship Mechanisms and Activities

The operationalization of the construct of sponsorship was based on a comprehensive review of the literature and by an analysis of the sponsorship mechanisms and activities proposed by Amezcua et al. (2013), who suggested that organisational sponsorship by way of bridging and/or buffering mechanisms exists in particular activities associated with sponsorship (Flynn, 1993a, Amezcua et al., 2013). Sponsorship activities include (1) networking activities linking new ventures with external resource providers via structured programs etc., (2) field-building activities connecting new ventures to other similar and new organisations in a field, and (3) direct support activities that transfer knowledge, capital and labour to new ventures (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Stinchcombe, 1965, Baum et al., 2000, Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988, Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998, Rao et al., 2000).

To operationalize sponsorship mechanisms and activities, each semi-structured interview questions (or variations of them) included questions to operationalize organisational sponsorship activities and mechanisms. Table 4.5 below reflects questions relating to sponsorship mechanisms and scholarly references which provided guidance on understanding dimensions for each question.

Table 4.5 Sponsorship Questions and Scholarly References

<i>Sponsorship Activities & Mechanisms</i>	<i>Scholarly References</i>
Did the parent firm conceive original products or services for the new venture?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990)
Did the parent firm help analyse different combinations of attributes for your new venture?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990, Phan et al., 2005)
Did the parent firm help transfer product or service knowledge to the new venture?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990, Phan et al., 2005)
Did the parent firm help apply different skills to develop new venture products or services?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990, Phan et al., 2005)
Did the parent firm loan skilled personnel?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990, Phan et al., 2005)
Did the parent firm loan funding or assets?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990)
Did the parent firm provide a formal transfer of technology?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum et al., 2000, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Miner et al., 1990, Phan et al., 2005)
Did the parent firm improve the environment for active engagement and alignment for the new venture among stakeholders?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Sorenson and Stuart, 2001)
Did external networks and personal connections help in the discovery of new opportunities?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Sorenson and Stuart, 2001)
Did external networks and personal connections help in generating new venture activity?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Sorenson and Stuart, 2001)
Did the parent firm improve the environment for collaboration and knowledge sharing leading to industry awareness?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013)ra(Rao et al., 2000, Rao et al., 2003, Lounsbury et al., 2003)
Did the parent firm help provide access to existing markets?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013)ra(Rao et al., 2000, Rao et al., 2003, Lounsbury et al., 2003)
Did the parent firm help identify new markets?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013)ra(Rao et al., 2000, Rao et al., 2003, Lounsbury et al., 2003)
Did the parent firm offer business networking groups or clubs for the new venture?	(Amezcuca et al., 2013)ra(Rao et al., 2000, Rao et al., 2003, Lounsbury et al., 2003)
Did the parent firm offer business networking among close business associates?	(Rao et al., 2000, Rao et al., 2003, Lounsbury et al., 2003)

Operationalization of Forms of Capital

Firkin's (Firkin, 2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital include human capital, social capital, cultural capital and economic capital. To operationalize these forms of capital and account for the transfer of individual resources from the parent firm to its new venture(s), questions in the interviews reflected the literature on each form of entrepreneurial capital to understand how and whether there might be resource transfer between the parent family firm and its venture(s). For example, to reflect the relational and structural dimensions of social capital transferred to new ventures and to reflect organisational social capital among family firms there were frequent references for operationalization to Nahapiet and Goshal (2008) and to Arregle, Hitt and Sirmon (2007). References to Becker (1975) address general and specific human capital, and references to Davidsson and Honig (2003) address the tacit and explicit human capital transferred to new ventures. The list of questions below for operationalization of Firkin's forms of entrepreneurial capital reflects the dimension and scholarly references relating to the formation of each dimension.

Table 4.6 Questions on Forms of Capital and Their Scholarly References

<i>Entrepreneurial Capital</i>	<i>Scholarly Reference</i>
Did the parent firm provide access to existing markets for your spinoff venture? (structural)	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm identify new markets for your spinoff venture? (structural)	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm identify customer groups that might have an interest in spinoff products/services? (relational)	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm offer business networking groups or clubs for your spinoff venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm offer business networking among close business associates? (relational)	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm continue to talk business after working hours? (cognitive)	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm suggest outside assistance for your spinoff venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Nahapiet and Ghoshal, 1998, Arregle et al., 2007, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm transfer competencies or knowledge to help the new venture?	(Becker, 1993, Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003, Davidsson and Honig, 2003, de Bruin, 1999, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm help the knowledge or competencies of the new venture?	(Becker, 1993, Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003, Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm help conceive original products or services for the new venture?	(Becker, 1993, Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003, Davidsson and Honig, 2003, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm transfer funding to the new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Morris, 1998, Light et al., 1994, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm expect payback of funding for your new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Morris, 1998, Light et al., 1994, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm invest tangible assets in equipment or stock in your new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Morris, 1998, Light et al., 1994, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm invest intangible assets in trademarks or patents in your new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Morris, 1998, Light et al., 1994, Bourdieu, 1986)
Did the parent firm provide history, reputation or goodwill to the new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Bourdieu, 1986, Aldrich Howard and Ruef, 2006, de Bruin, 1999)
Did the parent firm provide increased industry standing for the new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Bourdieu, 1986, Aldrich Howard and Ruef, 2006, de Bruin, 1999)
Did the parent firm provide increased industry awareness for the new venture?	(Firkin, 2001, Bourdieu, 1986, Aldrich Howard and Ruef, 2006, de Bruin, 1999)

Operationalization of Entrepreneurial Dispositions

The goal of this study was to understand sponsorship activities as they relate to venturing and entrepreneurial activity at the parent family firm. However, there is contextual differentiation between ventures. Zellweger et al. (2013: 144) stated,

If the goal is to study family businesses through the lens of entrepreneurship, the appropriate approach will have to define what actually is relevant to study given the characteristics of the family firm context.”

As such, scholars including Nordqvist, Habbershon, and Melin (2008), Zellweger and Sieger (2010) and Lumpkin et al. (2010) suggest entrepreneurial dispositions exist within reified constructs such as EO and arguably FEO in dimensions of autonomy, innovativeness and pro-activeness along with dimensions of competitive aggressiveness and risk-taking (Zellweger et al., 2012). According to Zellweger et al. (2013: 145) the construct of family entrepreneurial orientation (FEO) “*combines attributes that are prototypical of the family and the business domain*” because the family has an impact on firm-level behaviours, and because business families as we understand in this study controlled more than a single firm (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). This study included exploratory, empirical survey items suggested by Zellweger et al. (2013) to operationalize entrepreneurial dispositions and attitudes for this study questions that were asked as part of semi-structured interviews:

- i. Does the family strive to preserve existing businesses or create new businesses?
- ii. Does the family make decisions with success of the current generation in mind?
- iii. Does the family pursue opportunities paying attention to currently controlled resources?
- iv. Does the family favour strong internal processes (innovativeness)?
- v. Is the family the first to introduce new products or services? (pro-activeness)
- vi. Is the family resistant to change?
- vii. Is the family dependent on relationships with external stakeholders?

Operationalization of an Entrepreneurial Legacy

Legacy exists to explain how multi-generational family firms nurture rhetorical reconstruction of historical events, and Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) suggested second-hand imprinting of an entrepreneurial legacy can transcend generations and nurture trans-generational entrepreneurship among entrepreneurial families in (1) entrepreneurial behaviors, (2) awareness, pride and resilience of past entrepreneurial behaviours of the family, (3) cohesion of the family, (4) involvement and education in the family business, (5) education and induction and transition in the family business.

To understand an entrepreneurial legacy that might exist at parent family firms and their new venture(s) and operationalize dimensions, the list below represents questions asked (or similar variants) as part of semi-structured interviews. Scholarly reference for each question typically refers to Jaskewicz et al. (2013).

- i. Among family members is there awareness of past entrepreneurial behaviours of family?
- ii. Among family members is there pride of past entrepreneurial behaviours?
- iii. Among family members is there mutual support of family members?
- iv. Among family members is there involvement in each other's lives?
- v. Did family members work after school, during holidays, etc.?
- vi. Did family members graduate from university/college?
- vii. Did family members study subjects relevant to the family business?
- viii. Did family members get work experience in the industry or field?
- ix. Did family members get resources to start projects in firm?
- x. Did family members get power to lead new projects?

4.8 Research Setting & Case Selection

To collect codes and analyse data for a comprehensive process of theoretical sampling, this study included careful consideration of both research setting and case selection in order to be theoretically sensitive to theory that might emerge from data collected.

Since the area of inquiry included venturing activity and more specifically, organisational sponsorship in the context of new venture incubation, research setting included a cross-cultural dimension and multi-generational dimension while case selection included cases in multiple industries.

The research setting for this study was parent family firms and their new venture(s) located on the East Coast of the United States, Scotland and England. Cases from these countries were selected to provide a cultural dimension reflecting GEM US and GEM UK survey results, which suggested that the general population's positive attitudes towards entrepreneurs tend to be very similar in in Scotland, UK and US (Ali et al., 2013, Levie and Hart, 2008).

The case selection was influenced by Yin (2009: 54), who advised that each case, *"be carefully selected so that either (a) predicts similar results (a literal replication) or (b) predicts contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons (a theoretical replication)."* Although all of the firms selected for case studies were in the green industry or the building industry, the new ventures varied in the level and type of ownership. Further, the cases varied in the level of family engagement in the business.

For this study individual parent family firms were chosen from the green industry and the construction industry in the eastern United States, Scotland and England because of the author's knowledge of these industries and frequent visits to the UK and US. Several criteria were used to select firms. First, to prevent small business bias, parent firms were selected that reported a range of revenues from \$3M to £65M and between 15 to 350 employees. Second, the parent firms had to include family and non-family executive management to prevent family bias in decision-making. Third, the parent firms chosen represented production, distribution and/or placement of product within the green industry and construction industry to provide perspective across two industries. Fourth, parent family firms had to be entering at least third-generation involvement to prevent founder bias for entrepreneurship (Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012).

Fifth, parent family firms were selected in which senior management was considering succession to allow for the investigation of trans-generational entrepreneurship (Cruz and Nordqvist, 2012, Miller et al., 2007).

The research began with pilot interviews and two pilot case studies that looked at trans-generational entrepreneurship at two US family firms as part of the Babson College Successful Trans-generational Entrepreneurship Practices (STEP) Project. The Babson STEP Project is a global applied research initiative that explores the entrepreneurial process within business families and generates solutions that have immediate application for family leaders. It develops theory-driven, evidence-based research in the areas of entrepreneurship, innovation and strategic change. Both case studies were published for reference in the STEP library.

The pilot interviews and the development of Case A revealed patterns in the data that suggested that family firms could be proactive and prolific in starting new ventures and strategic in how they ‘sponsored’ their new ventures. Case A was refined over a period of 24 months with additional interviews and data collection from a wider circle of family members and critical players along with the third generation of family members who were also creating new ventures at the parent family firm. This case study contributed to refining the data and the process by which data were collected in the other cases (Yin, 1981). The subsequent ‘main’ case study represents 24 months of semi-structured interviews with Case A family and non-family members who founded eleven new ventures at a single-family firm over three generations.

To continue and refine the investigation into organisational sponsorship of new ventures, the search was expanded to include parent family firms with one or multiple new ventures. Ultimately, all cases included (1) parent family firms in the green industry and construction industry, (2) parent family firms that introduced new ventures before and after the 2008 recession. Table 4.6 lists the new ventures associated with each parent firm, suggesting that parent family firms can be prolific incubators of new business, as found in the GEM UK 2015 survey results (Levie, 2015). Table 4.6 reflects data only on family and non-family ventures which family members recalled in interviews.

Table 4.6 List of Parent Family Firms and New Ventures

Parent Family Firm	New Family Ventures	New Non-family Ventures	Generations	Industry	Location
Case A	11	0	3	Green	US
Case B	8	3	6	Construction	UK
Case C	11	3	4	Green	US
Case D	4	1	3	Green	US
Case E	5	?	4	Green	US
Case F	2	0	2	Construction	UK
Case G	1	1	1	Green	US


This study reflects data on five parent family firms with family ventures (eg. A, B, C, E, F), and two parent family firms with non-family ventures (eg. D and G). Section 2.3 explains how parent family firms are defined, and Section 2.4 explained how new ventures – both family and non-family ventures are defined. However, there is variation in that a parent family firm in Case B included a non-family director but family majority ownership; Case D included family venturing and non-family venturing at the same firm. It is also interesting to note that at Case E one brother imbued sponsorship to the family venture while another brother withheld sponsorship from the family venture.

Profile of the Environment

This section profiles the industries examined in this study. The green industry and construction industry were chosen because both industries arguably lend themselves to family business and offer a platform for studying the vagaries of succession and entrepreneurial approaches to succession. Further, the author's personal knowledge of and practical experience in both industries facilitated understanding of their language and terminology.

The green industry, also referred to as the environmental horticulture industry, consists of many types of businesses involved in the production, distribution and service associated with ornamental plants, landscape and garden supplies and equipment. Segments of the industry include wholesale nurseries, greenhouse growers, sod growers, landscape architects, contractors and maintenance firms, retail garden centres, home centres and mass merchandisers. Figure 4.12 below outlines distribution channels in the United States green industry as product progresses from seedling to finished product. At various stages in product development there are intermediaries, including brokers, horticultural distribution centres and re-wholesalers which channel the product to end users.

Figure 4.12 Green Industry Distribution Channels



Source: (Hall et al., 2005)

The green industry is one of the fastest-growing segments of the agricultural economy in the United States. It often experiences growth and expansion during recessionary periods as individuals and families choose to stay home and invest in outdoor living. Strong economic conditions have allowed the green industry to expand considerably over the past 20 years despite recent downturns in the economy.

The green industry has a relatively complex structure of production due to the nature of the product and the need to rapidly ship the product. Economic reports segment green industry firms into input supply firms, production firms, wholesale distribution firms, horticultural service firms, retailers and end users. The industry's product distribution practices have their roots in the period just after WWII, when a sustained building boom in the suburbs fuelled an increasing demand for green product while a sophisticated highway and shipping network facilitated the movement of green product over long distances in relatively short periods of time. West Coast horticultural product, which was grown relatively efficiently and inexpensively, could now be shipped east for installation. Similarly, producers of soils and fertilizers could now manufacture products nearer the source of materials and ship longer distances to their customer base. However, over the past two decades, transportation costs have risen significantly due to the increase in oil prices. Transportation costs represent up to 50% of the cost of green product. Therefore, a desire to reduce transport costs in recent years has forced growers to change their production methods and shipping practices. Regional firms that take advantage of their proximity to customers while shipping small orders have benefitted in recent years. By shipping a diverse mix of product more frequently to local customers, the firm in Case A1 has expanded and benefitted accordingly. However, the industry has developed and responded; for example, many growers have adapted their operations to ship more frequently. Several growers also now offer 24-hour delivery.

Green industry trends in recent years include horticultural marketing to end users. Propagators of new plants over the past two decades have used professional marketing campaigns to reach the end user. The effort is somewhat similar to the pharmaceutical industry effort to market new drugs to their end users in patients. To this end, plant propagators have marketed exciting new plant cultivars with television advertising and magazine articles read by end users. The result has been a boon to individual plant propagators who produce and license production for advertised plant product (Henry Huntington, personal communication).

4.9 Data Collection Methods

This study focused on naturally occurring behaviours among individuals in their usual contexts within existing social structures. Selection of family members for semi-structured interviewing required at least a brief history working at the parent family firm. Selection of family members for semi-structured interviewing did not require evidence of an entrepreneurial mind-set or involvement in venturing or venturing activity. In keeping with Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007), informant bias toward data collection was minimized by the inclusion of at least two non-family informants working at each Case E viewed the phenomena from an outside perspective. Selection of non-family members working at the parent family firm also did not require evidence of an entrepreneurial mind-set or involvement in venturing.

For the qualitative analysis, micro-level abductive and interpretive approaches were used to understand the process of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation (Gephart, 2004, Eisenhardt, 1989). The research took a micro-level abductive and interpretive approach to building theory on organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation through participant observation and in-depth interviews, and the semi-structured interview protocol included both close-ended and open-ended questions. Each interview was conducted on site and usually required 60-90 minutes to complete. All interviews were transcribed and formatted. Follow-up data was acquired no later than 1 year after the final interview. This information clarified previous information from core interviews; however, follow-up interviews continued over a 24-month period beyond the initial interviews to clarify inconsistencies and inquire about the legitimacy of the new venture.

The interviews were supplemented by multiple data collection methods, including archival information about each firm, archival information about the family representing parent family firms, historical information from each firm and financial information if it became available. These methods made it possible to triangulate the data and capture different dimensions of the same phenomenon in organisational sponsorship in the context of business incubation from a parent firm (Eisenhardt, 1989). Archival research data was found on several parent firms, and one parent family firm provided published histories of the firm dating back to its founding in the 17th century. In certain cases in which the data was irrelevant or too sensitive to the purpose of understanding organisational sponsorship at the parent family firm, the author chose to hide the data from publication.

4.9 Data Collection Process

The following sections outline the data collection process carried out for the purpose of this investigation. Table 4.7 summarises steps in collection of cases and collection of information in preparation of semi-structured interviews as part of a study of seven parent family firms and their venture(s).

Table 4.7 Steps in the Data Collection Process

<i>Steps</i>	<i>Description</i>
Initial Investigation	Website review; online research; affiliated organisation research; industry conversations
Case Selection	# of ventures; # of generations; # of family employees; # of years in industry;
Initial Contact	Telephone request for interview; follow-up eMail for additional contacts
Documentation / Archival Data Collection	Collection of media documents and family documents relevant to venturing activity. Internal: reports, business plans, documents External: print articles, online articles, online references, databases, public filings
Interviews	1 st interview always with primary informant and organiser to gather information on structure of family firm. Secondary interviews with earlier generations if available on start of organisation. Additional interviews to gain additional insights or clarify information.

Fifty-five interviews at five parent family firms with family venture(s) and two parent family firms with non-family venture(s) in the UK and US were conducted over a period of three years with CEOs, family members, non-family employees and industry experts. Table 4.8 lists the number of respondents for each case along with the number of non-family respondents for each case.

Table 4.8 Number and Type of Case Respondents

Respondents	Case A	Case B	Case C	Case D	Case E	Case F	Case G
Family	7	5	5	2	3	3	2
Non-family	2	2	2	1	2	1	2

For data collection a semi-structured interview protocol was used. The protocol included objective indicators including the number of years in business, the number of active ventures at the parent firm and the number of generations of the parent firm. Protocol also included subjective behavioural indicators including spirit, innovation, initiative, tolerance for risk etc. The close-ended questions typically referred to the founding date of the firm, its age, the number of children in the business, the number of employees, etc. The open-ended questions allowed the interviewer to learn about the history of the firm, personal experiences at the firm, innovations at the firm, attitudes towards innovation at the firm, the level of support provided for innovation at the firm, and the reasons for providing help to innovators within the firm. The open-ended questions also asked about transfer of skills, transfer of employees, social connections, business connections, financial and economic resources, and the power of the parent brand name and reputation. The inclusion of both objective and subjective questions represented a holistic attempt to collect data.

Table 4.9 lists all of the data sources and pages of data for each data source by individual case. It should be noted there is no correlation between number of interviews or the pages of transcription or the length of interviews since several interviews were relationship-based which allowed for in-depth analysis quickly. As an example, Michael at Case A was very forthright about his relationship with his father and brothers and gave information freely and quickly likely because of a pre-existing relationship with the interviewer. Further, Michael sons also gave information freely and quickly because they all believed they might develop a trans-generational awareness as part of the interview process. Alternately, Allen at Case B was reserved and hesitant to provide information because he believed his answers might damage relations with his family company and/or with his siblings.

Table 4.9 Data Sources and Transcribed Pages of Data

Case	Case A	Case B	Case C	Case D	Case E	Case F	Case G
Interview Pages**:							
1 st gen.	75	0	0	0	0	65	46
2 nd gen.	240	0	135	0	0	87	95
3 rd gen.	124	0	110	0	88	0	N/A
4 th gen.	N/A	20	0	95	43	N/A	N/A
5 th gen.	N/A	122	N/A	35	0	N/A	N/A
6 th gen.	N/A	178	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Internal Sources:							
Websites	12	27	10	25	15	12	10
Presentations	3	4	1	3	6	4	0
Historical	37	187	20	43	48	16	0
External Sources:							
Media/News	57	198	28	85	68	33	12
Profiles	35	47	18	42	35	15	5

** Number of pages transcribed double-spaced and 12 point

Main Case Study

The main case study extended Case A from a study of trans-generational entrepreneurship to an investigation of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. Following the pilot interviews, specific ventures at Case A were chosen for further study, because both first- and second-generation family members could be considered prolific incubators of new ventures from the parent family firm, and third-generation family members seemed eager to follow in the family's footsteps. To supplement semi-structured interviews with family owners, family managers and non-family managers, archival data was collected from internal sources, including financial reports, company website updates, management videos, and 5-year expansion plans. Interviewing started in 2011 for the STEP Project initial case study, but for the purposes of this study, interviews began in spring 2014 and continued through spring 2016. All of the interviews were either videotaped using a hand-held video recorder or audiotaped in person or over the phone using iPhone Quick Record. The initial transcription of Case A's semi-structured interviews and all

case interviews was performed by an outside firm, but the author confirmed all transcriptions to gain a deeper immersion in the data.

In Case A, there was considerable variation in storytelling among family members, requiring frequent requests for archival information or restatement to confirm the data. The first-generation CEO at Case A could be considered a prolific entrepreneur, but interview records suggested many discrepancies between his accounts of his successes and failures and those of other informants. While his personal initiative in at least 12 ventures was confirmed, most of these ventures met with only modest success or no success at all, and several businesses he claimed to have started were, in fact, started by family members. Triangulating the data from these initial interviews made it possible to identify and reconcile such discrepancies.

In Case A, the choice was made to focus on existing new ventures that accurately and independently indicated organisational sponsorship in the context of business incubation. At times, discerning between (1) existing, (2) in the works, and (3) potential new ventures was difficult, and clarification was requested in all Case A interviews and all subsequent interviews. Because Case A was a particularly rich source of information on new ventures, it surfaced issues and led to methodological solutions that made subsequent case replication much easier.

4.10 Data Analysis

This section provides an overview of the data analysis process which centred on an abductive linking of theory and data incorporating qualitative data gathered using semi-structured interviews. Table 4.10 presents the steps in the analysis process with a brief description of each step. The following sub-section explains all steps of qualitative analysis in detail for reference.

Table 4.10 Steps and Associated Descriptions of the Data Analysis Process

<i>Steps</i>	<i>Description</i>
Data Transcription	Organisation and review of the data; Professional transcription of the data; Reviewed professional data transcription.
Date Reduction	Eliminated redundancies in documentation from internal and external sources
Case Description	Wrote narratives about parent family firms and venture(s) including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Family history, - Generations in family business, - Generic information, - Number of ventures, - Actors involved in ventures, - Other relevant events / dimensions.
Structuring the Data	Developed structured tables with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Generic within-Case information, - Chronology of key events within-case, - Cross-case data structuring.
Coding and Annotating Data	First level open coding (paper and pen); First level open coding (QSR nVivo 11); First level selective coding; Second level coding to aggregate codes.
Matching Theoretical Concepts	In-depth analysis of each case; Cross-case Analyses comparing findings; Working iteratively with theory and data; Identified relationships and patterns in data.

Source: Adapted from Costa, 2015

Qualitative Analysis

Case histories, chronological timelines and tables were created to link data to a particular case using QSR NVIVO Version 11 software. The case study data was entered into an 'event history database' (Garud and Rappa, 1994) to present a chronology of events and details related to the parent family firm and its venture(s). Within and cross-case analyses were performed to induce propositions, and additional data was collected from archival publications, documentation, and personal histories to ensure consistency and high data quality.

Data Transcription

As noted in Table 4.9 approximately 800 transcription pages were professionally transcribed upon completion of all interviews. A professional transcription service transcribed most interview data, but analysis of the data included a second pass to correct inaccuracies, redundancies and translation errors due to volume level and/or accents. Despite every attempt to conduct interviews in English, transcription often proved difficult due to strong Scottish and American accents. Further complicating data transcription, interviewees often turned away from the microphone or spoke in low tones. However, audio interviews and transcription pages were reviewed repeatedly and independently to reduce the possibility of misunderstanding, inaccuracies and translation errors.

Data Reduction

Data reduction included the elimination of unnecessary pauses in reflection, personal comments and general comments about the weather or similar. This provided a better flow to the transcription while reducing the data that had to be searched and sort for keywords and comments using nVivo Version11 software. Transcribers also eliminated background comments from others in the room, and the transcription focused on the language of the interviewee to make the data more manageable (Miles and Huberman, 1994).

Case Description

To provide a more holistic approach to case description, additional dimension including (1) profile of the firm, (2) profile of the industry, (3) profile of the environment, and (4) profile of interviewees improved the data structure for each case.

A profile of the firm provided an objective view of the firm in terms of its history, longevity, management structure and venturing activities. Longevity was described in both years and generations, depending on the context. Further, distinctions were made to indicate family and non-family executive management and whether family or non-family individuals were venturing at the parent firm.

A profile of the industry included an overview of the green industry or construction industry with a focus on the parent family firm. Several parent firms included in this study were leaders in their individual fields. As a leader in the green industry, the parent firm in Case A reflected innovation and leadership in nearly every aspect of the green industry. As a leader in the construction industry, the parent firm in Case B arguably reflected the social consciousness of a country over six generations.

A profile of the environment provided context about the economic landscape and competitive landscape that existed at the founding of each individual venture. To reduce data noise from economic aberrations and unusual crises, the legitimacy of the new ventures before and after the economic recession of 2008 was emphasized.

A profile of interviewees provided a structural and personal understanding of the individuals who took part in this study. The profiles presented their standing in and knowledge of their respective fields.

Data Structuring


Efficient data structuring made it possible to develop keywords and primary codes that identified relevant factors in the identification of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation for this study. Data structuring included four steps: (1) identification, (2) analysis, (3) interpretation and (4) evaluation (Nordqvist and Zellweger, 2010). Data structuring started with the identification of keywords which reflected entrepreneurship, venturing and entrepreneurial behaviour in dimensions of an entrepreneurial legacy and an entrepreneurial orientation (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Miller, 1983, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Schumpeter, 1934, Gartner, 1985). Data structuring continued with the identification of keywords which reflected munificence in organisational sponsorship activities and mechanisms (Amezcuca et al., 2013).

As mentioned earlier in Section 4.6, this study has been an exhaustive but effective exercise in linking abductive theory and data in a back and forth between data and literature. In the data I discovered existing constructs of an EO, EL and organizational sponsorship while in the literature I discovered constructs of habitus, libertarian paternalism and organizational sponsorship (Bourdieu, 1994, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Flynn, 1993b, Flynn, 1993a, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). Categorizing data into existing constructs of an EO, EL and organizational sponsorship allowed me to more effectively isolate and understand ‘uncategorized data’ and piece them together with my reading and understanding of Bourdieu, Sunstein, Thaler and others for that ‘ah ha’ moment that led to new constructs in an entrepreneurial habitus and ‘nudging’ at parent family firms. Interpretation, classification and collapse of keywords reflecting entrepreneurial dispositions and behaviours exposed similarities in constructs of an EO and EL at each parent family firm while interpretation of keywords reflecting munificence and resources exposed existing constructs in forms of entrepreneurial capital (Firkin, 2001, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Amezcuca et al., 2013). The following paragraphs explain a determination and structuring of ‘categorized’ data. Appendix 9.3 references all ‘categorized’ data.

In Table 4.11 the first column introduces measures used to identify processes, practices and decision-making activities that lead to new entry to introduce ‘categorized’ data from semi-structured interviews. The second column consolidates measures and suggests, in an abductive linking of theory and data, constructs in existing dimensions of risk-taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness. The third column consolidates keywords and secondary codes into an existing construct relating to behaviours and dispositions of an entrepreneurial orientation at parent firms which engage in corporate venturing (Miller, 1983, Schumpeter, 1934, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). Below, Table

4.11 includes scholarly sources in coding from which several authors referenced assumptions about keywords associated with entrepreneurial behaviours and dispositions. Appendix 9.3 provides data reflecting ‘categorized’ data in an EO.


Table 4.11 Data Structure Reflecting Entrepreneurial Dispositions



Sources: (Khandwalla, 1977); (Collinson and Gregson, 2003); (Miller, 1983); (Schumpeter, 1942); (Khandwalla, 1977); (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996); (Normann and Normann, 1977); (Mintzberg, 1978); (Shapero, 1975); (Cole, 1946); (Knight, 1921); (Redlich, 1949)

In Table 4.12 the first column introduces measures reflecting determination of a family’s legacy as it relates to behaviours and/or dispositions enacted by individuals at the firm. Sources listed below include scholarly references of keywords associated with an entrepreneurial legacy at the family firm. The second column collapses and consolidates keywords to suggest several dimensions similar to those of a construct in an entrepreneurial legacy (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). While legacy is a broad term in the literature, Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) propose dimensions of an entrepreneurial legacy in strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transition which support a family’s rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial achievements in each of the three dimensions. The third column consolidates keywords and dimensions into an abductive linking of theory and data construct which strongly references an entrepreneurial legacy (EL) at family firms which engage in corporate venturing. Appendix 9.3 provides data reflecting ‘categorized’ data in an EL.

Table 4.12 Data Structure Reflecting an Entrepreneurial Legacy



Sources: (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a), (Amezcuca et al., 2013), (Kellermanns and Eddleston, 2006), (Zahra and Sharma, 2004)


In an EL Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) theorize that families motivate incumbent and next generation owners with rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial achievements and resilience. The authors (2015: 31) suggest dimensions in strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transition to support an EL at the family firm, “binds the next generation’s entrepreneurial spirit to (stories about) their entrepreneurial acts.” As such, EL is a rhetorical reflection in story-telling at the parent family firm for the purpose of trans-generational entrepreneurship. In strategic education the family firm according to Jaskiewicz et al. (2015: 41), “nudges” family members toward education and work experiences related to business at the firm and future possibilities with the firm. While ‘nudge’ is an interesting choice of words in the context of an EL at the parent family firm, the authors use the term only once and only in the context of steering family members toward a strategic education. In entrepreneurial bridging Jaskiewicz et al. (2015: 42) suggest “trans-generational collaboration of at least 2 generations over several years to foster entrepreneurship.” Finally, in strategic transition the firm provides formal transition and control in a way that protects resources for entrepreneurship.

To identify sponsorship activities of firm level entrepreneurship at each of seven parent family firms engaged in corporate venturing, I referenced existing constructs in organisational sponsorship (Amezcuca, 2013) and entrepreneurial forms of capital (Firkin, 2001). Introducing both constructs in this study allowed me to investigate practices and resources imbued in organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. To identify dimensions of organisational sponsorship, I undertook data structuring of individual interviews to identify mechanisms used by the parent firm to bridge and/or buffer a new venture to or from its environment (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Digging deeper into the codes provided specific sponsorship activities and

what Amezcua et al. (2013: 1295) identified as activities of ‘field-building’, ‘direct support’ and ‘networking’ which buffer and/or bridge the new venture to its environment (Gephart, 2004, Baum and Oliver, 1991, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Hall, 1982).

In Table 4.13 the first column introduces keywords as primary codes for a determination of resource munificence related to sponsorship activities. The second column consolidates and collapses keywords and introduces dimensions of Amezcua et al.’s (2013) determination of resource munificence related to sponsorship in activities of networking, field-building and direct support. The third column consolidates keywords and secondary codes into aggregate dimensions of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. Appendix 9.3 provides data reflecting ‘categorized’ data in sponsorship mechanisms and activities.

Table 4.13 Data Structure Reflecting Sponsorship Mechanisms and Activities



Sources: (Amezcua et al., 2013); (Flynn, 1993a); (Flynn, 1993b); (Baum and Oliver, 1991); (Baum et al., 2000); (Bergek and Norrman, 2008); (Brüderl et al., 1992); (Brüderl and Preisendörfer, 1998); (Lumpkin and Ireland, 1988); (Miner et al., 1990); (Ram, 1994); (Rao et al., 2000); (Eisenhardt, 1989)

To identify available forms of capital available at a parent family firm, this study references Bourdieu’s (1986) forms of capital and Firkin’s (2001, 2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital. To further refine my definition and interpretation of individual sources of capital, I referenced existing literature in Light and Karageorgis (1994), Lin (2001), Portes (2000a, b) and Becker (1993) to refine my search. Table 4.14 provides a brief definition of each form of entrepreneurial capital and a list of scholarly sources which reflect definitions of individual forms of capital.

Table 4.14 Firkin's (2003) Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital

Forms	Definition	Sources
Economic Capital	Financial assets of any form convertible into money. The equity people have in their business and borrowings they will make.	(Bourdieu, 1986); (Morris, 1998); (Light, Karageorgis, Smesler, & Swedberg, 1994); (Reynolds, 1997)
Social Capital	The aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to the possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationship of mutual acquaintance or recognition – to membership of a group” (Bourdieu, 1986: 248).	(Bourdieu, 1986); (Lin & Zhu, 2001); (Portes, 2000); (Portes & Landolt, 2000); Bourdieu (1986); Lin (2001); (Brüderl & Preisendörfer, 1998)
Human Capital	It is the compendium of all traits and abilities that make human beings economically productive in a society.	Becker (1973); Shanahan & Tuma (1994); Nafziger et al. 1996); Gilbertson et al. (1994); (Shanahan & Tuma, 1994; (Aldrich, 1990; de Bruin, 2000; Gilbertson, 1997; Jary, 1995; Nafziger, 1996; Reynolds, 1997; Shannahan, 1994)746)
Cultural Capital	Defined by Bourdieu (1986) in three states: embodied, objectified and institutionalized. Cultural capital can bridge individual and social in that long-lasting dispositions of body and mind are embodied in people . . .” (Firkin (2003: 5).	Bourdieu (1986); Aldrich & Waldinger (1990); de Bruin & Depuis (1995)

Sources: (Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003, Firkin et al., 2003)

A review of the literature in Bourdieu (1986) and Firkin (2001, 2003) reveal that entrepreneurial capital embodies the significance of entrepreneurial access to both financial and non-financial resources. To identify which forms of entrepreneurial capital parent family firms imbue to their new venture(s), this study includes coding and lengthy textual analysis which identifies each form of capital at each parent family firm for each case in the appendices.

Following these data structuring steps provided a framework to identify, categorise and code entrepreneurial behaviours, dispositions and sponsorship activities in the data

to understand organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. Investigation of existing constructs in the literature allowed me to categorise much of the data. However, in the process of categorising data referencing entrepreneurial disposition and sponsorship activities, there were references in the data corresponding to sponsorship dispositions and/or sponsorship activities which did not fit existing constructs and individual dimensions established in organisational literature. As an example some of the data in interviews referenced long-lasting entrepreneurial dispositions which the parent firm imbued upon their venture. Another example of uncategorised data referenced a gentle push or steering from the parent firm toward available resources similar to the specific instance of nudging that Jaskiewicz et al. (2015) found in relation to strategic education, but in this study, nudging took on many other forms of resources. I labelled this data, 'uncategorised' and left it for further analysis and introduction into a new model of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation in Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.

4.11 Data Quality and Ethical Considerations

This section reflects on the quality of the research and ethical considerations relating to research design in order to confirm the creation of a holistic study which supports existing literature on organisational sponsorship, and theory building, and I borrow from Yin (2003) and refer to Costa (2014) in Table 4.15 to assess the quality of exploratory case studies in tests of construct validity, external validity and reliability of research design. According to Yin (2003), construct validity tests identify correct operational measures for the concepts being studied, external validity tests define a domain to which a study's findings can be generalized, and reliability tests show that operations of the study can be repeated.

Table 4.15 Test for Quality of Exploratory Case studies

Test	Case study tactic
Construct validity (triangulation)	Use of multiple sources of evidence, i.e., triangulation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - of data sources (<i>data triangulation</i>): archival data and interviews - among different evaluators (<i>investigator triangulation</i>): conversation with research colleagues, presentations in conferences - of perspectives to the same data set (<i>theory triangulation</i>) - of methodology (<i>methodological triangulation</i>): combination of longitudinal and retrospective interviews - of different informants for the interviews (<i>informant triangulation</i>)
External validity (longitudinal design)	Establish a chain of evidence Have key informants review draft case study report; Prolonged engagement with the field (<i>longitudinal design</i>).
Reliability (replication logic)	Use of multiple case studies (<i>replication logic</i>) Thorough report of all steps performed case study database (records, transcriptions, etc.)

Source: (Yin, 2003)

Construct Validity

Yin (2009) suggested three tactics to test construct validity: (1) using multiple sources of evidence, (2) establishing a chain of evidence and (3) having key informants review case study reports. Triangulation provides multiple sources of evidence, and according to Yin (2009), four types of triangulation are useful: data triangulation, investigator triangulation, theory triangulation, and methodological triangulation.

To produce data triangulation, multiple sources of information and evidence were used, including published company histories, archival data, personal data, financial data and published business listings. The necessity of data triangulation was made obvious in the preparation of Case A, as interviews often produced conflicting data. Case B, in contrast, offered a comprehensive and structured set of data, including published family business archives, published articles, previously published case studies and corroborating facts from interviews.

Investigator triangulation involves, according to Eisenhardt (1989: 538), the use of multiple investigators to increase “*the creative potential of the study . . . [and] confidence in the findings.*” This study involved frequent conversations with other researchers about appropriate questions for interviews and concerns about the interviews given the often-personal nature of family business. Conversations among researchers took place at Babson College and University of Strathclyde. At Babson College the Successful Trans-generational Entrepreneurship Practices (STEP) framework provided the basis for many questions reflecting entrepreneurial dispositions presented to respondents in semi-structured interviews (Habbershon et al., 2010). At University of Strathclyde GEM UK items provided the basis for many questions reflecting entrepreneurial attitudes in the process of new venture activity (Levie, 2015).

This study provided theoretical perspectives from several fields including social science, law, behavioural science and behavioural economics to provide theory integration across disciplines. Theory integration arguably provides theory triangulation which reflects research and findings across several fields. Section 8.4 reflects fully on theory integration because it forms the basis of this study.

Methodological triangulation reduces noise in the study and, according to Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007: 28) provides “*a key approach to mitigating bias.*” A pilot case study was revised and restructured and was followed up with multiple longitudinal case studies that included a reflexive sociology.

Given the often eccentric and erratic behaviour of several individuals interviewed for this study, informant triangulation was used to limit bias in the interview data. This effort resulted in corrections in several cases, as older informants often confused dates, sources and responsibilities for the creation of the new ventures.

External Validity

Testing for external validity assumes, according to Yin (2009: 43) that “*The investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to a broader theory.*” While qualitative studies are often faulted for unwarranted generalization, this study included extensive theoretical layering in combination with a multiple case study strategy to strengthen its external validity (Eisenhardt, 1989). However, this study also included an abductive and qualitative analysis of the data to reflect the mystery of new theory in conjunction with existing theory (Cassell et al., 2017).

Reliability

Reliability suggests that any researcher attempting to duplicate the research strategy and design of the study should come to the same conclusions (Yin, 2009). As an aid in possible duplication of the research strategy, this study includes adequate references noted in-case and referenced in a bibliography. Further, this study includes a case study database documenting evidence of the study’s reliability in annotated research papers as part of a literature review, references using EndNote software, extensive data files, notes on methodologies from colleagues, advisors and conferences, and versions of the final document (Eisenhardt, 1989).

Table 4.16 presents data configured in matrix format listing directories, size of files and a brief description of files for the reviewer to follow in order to retrieve relevant and detailed information pertaining to individual cases and/or the theoretical framework for this study.

Table 4.16 Case study Database

Device	Directory – Abstract/	Size (Mb)	Description
Apple iPad & Lenovo PC	/Literature Review	2,307Mb	Annotated research papers using iAnnotate 4 v3.2 software to save documents in PDF format for referral and cross-reference. Documents organised by author, subject and year; documents saved primarily on Apple iPad.
Lenovo PC	/EndNote.enl	16Mb	Endnote X ver. 8.2 for in-document reference and bibliography creation and continual update.
Lenovo PC	/Methodology	3Mb	Notes from multiple conferences and PDW's reviewing different methodologies and reviews on methodologies chosen for this study
Apple iPad & Lenovo PC	/Interview questions	1MB	Interview questions and survey items for reference during interviews
Apple iPad & iPhone	/Data Collection	93Mb	Interview audio and video using Apple iPad or iPhone Voice Memo app. Ver. 11.1 recorded in B4a format.
Lenovo PC	/Transcription Data	18Mb	Data of individual interview transcriptions before creation of queries, nodes, coding stripes etc. using nVivo 11 software
Lenovo PC	/Coded Data	100Mb	Coded data using QSR nVivo ver. 11 software for creation of interview queries, nodes, coding stripes, text searches, word frequencies, etc. for referral and cross-reference for each case.
Lenovo PC	/Sponsorship	17Mb	Microsoft Word 2013 for updating versions of PhD dissertation and preparation of final version of PhD dissertation for defence.
Lenovo PC	/Sponsorship/Conferences	2Mb	PowerPoint for slides and tables for use in conferences and advisor

Source: Adapted from Costa, 2014

Use of a Reflexive Sociology

Scholars are responsible for stepping outside their understanding of reality and exploring what is un-thought or unthinkable within a new field of inquiry such that, according to Bourdieu (1977: 3),

“The objective-subjective duality might be overcome given a thorough investigation of objective structures and subjective dispositions within which these structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them.”

Accordingly, the author of this study took every opportunity to reflect upon his personal and scientific paradigms and the lasting and transposable dispositions that support them.

This study relied heavily upon Bourdieu’s theory of practice, his theory on forms of capital and his theory on a reflexive sociology. The realist tradition of the social sciences in which Bourdieu worked assumes that social reality is layered, complex, and interwoven in a way that transcends the traditional dualisms of macro versus micro perspectives, objectivism versus subjectivism, agentic versus structural explanations, or qualitative versus quantitative insights (Archer, 2000; Bhaskar, Archer, Collier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Bourdieu, 1977; Giddens, 1984; Layder, 1993). Bourdieu suggested a ‘third way’ that, according to Fowler (1997: 17), “*locates the role of objective structures in setting limits to agents’ choice of goals as well as blinkering their perceptions of reality.*” Schwarz (1997: 10-11) also commented that,

“[Bourdieu] sees a sociology of sociology as a necessary means for freeing the social scientist from the constraints of symbolic struggle in the field of science – the practice of genuine science requires a ‘reflexive turn’ upon itself.”

It seems likely that Bourdieu would agree that the social contexts and social constructs that reflect resource transfer and resource munificence in the context of new business incubation from a parent firm vary according to the dispositions of the individuals involved, the resources available to the individuals and organisations, the field in which the individuals and organisations operate, and the interpretation held by the individuals who wield power over the field (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992). Consequently, this study took a subjectivist approach to reflecting upon these four conditions. However, many have pointed out that Bourdieu was not a subjectivist; in fact, DiMaggio (1979: 1461) comments,

“Any social science based on the subjective perceptions of participants, or on common sense classifications of social groups, can only confirm and reinforce the very domination he regards as problematic.”

Bourdieu built hierarchies that depended on social arrangements, and he implied a structural dimension to social arrangements that indicated a realist perspective (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, DiMaggio, 1979). Therefore, Bourdieu’s reflexivity did not simply refer to the unconscious dispositions of the individual researcher, but, as Özbilgin (2005: 859) suggested, to an examination of the “*epistemological unconscious*” and the “*social organisation*” of the disciplines (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, Özbilgin et al., 2005).

Bourdieu argued that both social rules and the individual as agent are critical to the investigation of social structures, and he proposed that dispositions provide a middle ground and suitable object of analysis. Along with an investigation of resources, the object of analysis in this study was dispositions in an entrepreneurial context. This study investigated the totality of the process by which parent firms transfer resources and provide munificence to new ventures. It also investigated the social order and the social interactions involved in the everyday process of resource transfer and munificence from a parent firm, including the activities and shared process by which individual agents construct their reality. Lastly, this study included a reflexive stance on the part of the researcher. In these respects, this study took a subjectivist and reflexive approach to research on the transfer process by systematically examining the context of knowledge construction.

Ethical Considerations

Ethical considerations were given paramount consideration given the sensitivity of the information supplied by the individuals and the organisations they represent. Several steps were taken to assure the participants of the purpose and direction of this study: (1) a formal request was issued for an initial meeting with each participant; (2) each participant was informed before and during the first meeting that the information would be used only for the purpose of this study; (3) the participants were repeatedly informed that the researcher would protect their privacy and confidentiality by changing names and limiting the inclusion of data unrelated to the case; (4) the participants were informed that they would have the opportunity to review a draft before its publication. By adhering to these ethical standards in case study reporting, the research upheld the interests of interviewees and the interests of the University of Strathclyde.

4.12 Conclusion

This chapter summarized the project's qualitative methodology and its abductive, multiple case study design. It summarized the economic and social conditions related to the green industry and construction industry in the United States, Scotland and England. This chapter also described how existing constructs were operationalized and how the data was collected from documents, archival data and in-depth interviews over 36 months with family firm founders, successors, managers, family members, family firm executives, family firm and non-family executives, and non-family firm executives to provide informant and informational triangulation.

The following chapter describes individual cases, following the research strategy and design in an abductive linking of theory and data detailed in this chapter (Cassell et al., 2017). The chapter after next includes a cross-case analysis based on data from individual interviews, archival information, family histories and documents compiled over 36 months to present the reader with a holistic view of the social space and social structures that change as a parent family firm attempts to sponsor its new venture(s).

CHAPTER FIVE - RESULTS

5.1 – Introduction to the Chapter


This chapter presents the results of this study by describing in detail organisational sponsorship at five parent family firms with family ventures and two parent family firms with non-family ventures. To provide context and perspective for each case study, the same basic structure was used to report on each parent family firm and their respective venture(s), starting with a case summary followed by data relevant to the operationalized drivers discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter provides profiles of the individual interviewees interviewed for this study along with a brief profile of the parent family firm. This chapter also provides profiles of family and non-family ventures at parent family firms.

While nearly all of the participants and parent firms in this study agreed to the use of their individual names and organisations, each case has been coded to prevent the identification of individuals who were revealing personal and private information. In several cases, individuals revealed information that was subsequently determined to be too sensitive to reveal; this information has been deleted from case transcripts and case studies in consideration of the privacy of individuals. The promise of confidentiality during interviews allowed for the collection of a richer set of data and more open narratives from participants. Unless otherwise indicated, all of the quotes in this chapter are from interviews.

5.2 Case A (United States)

Data presented in Case A includes interviews, documentation and family histories of three generations of family members who have worked in the green industry. Figure 5.13 below presents a family tree of Case A at the time of interviewing beginning with Mathew who started the firm.

Figure 5.13 Case A Family Tree



When Luke gave up his corporate job to move his family of four children and a wife from a comfortable setting less than an hour from New York City to a remote farmland in north-eastern Connecticut in 1978, Luke had already invested years of his time, talent and treasure in a wide and eclectic range of businesses, including cashmere goat farming, trailer park development, garlic propagation, evergreen cultivation, and worm composting, to name a select few. Luke moved his family to Connecticut farmland country to cultivate hothouse tomatoes because in his words he, “liked a good tomato, but you can’t find one here during the winter.” Each of Luke’s ventures had met with either modest success or no success at all by the time Luke started Case A in 1978. Case A was no exception, but Luke maintained a strong “*passion for growing things,*” along with a strong conviction that “*no one should fear failure*” and that “*everyone should run their own business.*” Luke continually acted on his strong conviction in order to provide his three sons and daughter with structure and opportunity to develop and grow their own businesses because, in his words, he “*didn’t want to raise spoiled Darien [Connecticut] brats.*” Each of his children – Michael, Mathew, Thomas and Maura – would respond to his culture, his behaviour, his dispositions, his passions, and his beliefs with their individual successes and setbacks at more than eight new ventures and start-ups of their own. Luke’s grandchildren would also respond to family culture, dispositions, passions and beliefs with their own ventures and start-ups even at an early age. Table 5.17 below lists the ventures developed from the parent family firm, and following it is a brief summary.

Table 5.17 Case A Ventures

Case	Type of Venture	Family Member	Generation	Founding Date
Case A	Hothouse tomato propagation	Luke	1 st	1979
Case A1	Horticulture propagation	Michael & Luke	2 nd	1982
Case A2	Soil composting	Mathew & Luke	2 nd	1983
Case A3	In-vessel composting	Mathew	2 nd	1989
Case A4	Methane sequestration	Mathew	2 nd	2008
Case A5	Hydroponic tomato farms	Mathew	2 nd	2009
Case A6	Hydroponic lettuce farms	Mathew	2 nd	2016
Case A7	Organic horticultural distribution	Thomas	2 nd	1989
Case A8	Ironwood furniture	Maura	2 nd	2002
Case A9	Horticulture shipping logistics	Andy	3 rd	2014
Case A10	Horticulture distribution centre	James	3 rd	2016
Case A11	Horticulture sales & distribution	Robert	3 rd	2017

Despite his almost immediate failure at Case A (by 1980), Luke convinced his first son, Michael, to take advantage of an opportunity in horticultural propagation and sales to local garden centres, and they worked together to develop Case A1. Around the same time in 1983, Luke convinced his second son, Mathew, of an opportunity in industrial composting, and they worked together to launch Case A2 in 1983. His third son, Thomas, joined Case A2 in 1985 but left the firm shortly afterward to start his own venture in Case A3 at the urging of his father. Cases A4 and A5 represent Mathew's additional ventures in organic sequestration and hydroponic lettuce propagation. Luke's daughter, Maura, complained that he had partnered with all her brothers in new business but not with her, so he responded in Case A6 by presenting an opportunity to make furniture from 300-year-old Georgia ironwood dumped during the revolutionary war and recently recovered from Boston Harbor.

Luke's grandchildren have also acted on their entrepreneurial passion. Michael's sons, Andy, Robert and James, have developed their own interests and ventures in the green industry while working at Case A1. Andy has developed his own venture in logistics in Case A9; youngest brother, James, has taken the lead venturing in horticultural distribution centres; after some time working in farm credit banking, Robert is venturing in the development of more horticultural distribution centres. At the time of interviewing only Michael's 3 sons had finished college and entered the job market as employees of Case A1. As such, this study only considers new venture activity among grandchildren at Case A1. However, casual conversations during interviewing suggest nearly all grandchildren profess their interest in venturing and entrepreneurial activity.

The next sub-sections include an in-depth profile of the parent family firm in Case A and venturing at the parent family firm in Cases A1 through A11. Luke has arguably presented opportunity while imbuing dispositions and capital for more than 6 ventures to his sons, daughter and grandsons.

5.2.1 Profile of Interviewees at Case A

Following is a brief description of individual interviewees at Case A, and they represent key players in the creation of Case A and nearly all ventures associated with Case A. Table 5.18 lists all cases and family members associated with the founding of each case. The table also lists interview age when they ventured and age and education at time of interview. Last, the table provides number of core interviews and follow-up interviews for this study.

Table 5.18 Interviewee Information

Case	Founder	Family	Generation	Age at Interview	Education	Age at Venturing	# of Core Interviews	Follow-up Interviews	Total Interviews
Case A	Luke	Family	1 st	86	B.A.*	50	2	1	3
Case A1	Michael	Family	2 nd	58	M.S.**	23	3	3	6
Case A2	Mathew	Family	2 nd	57	B.S.***	22	-	2	5
Case A3	Mathew	Family	2 nd	57	B.S.	27	-	-	
Case A4	Mathew	Family	2 nd	57	B.S.	32	-	-	
Case A5	Mathew	Family	2 nd	57	B.S.	44	-	-	
Case A6	Mathew	Family	2 nd	57	B.S.	54	-	-	
Case A7	Thomas	Family	2 nd	54	B.S.	57	0	0	0
Case A8	Maura	Family	2 nd	49	B.A.	47	0	1	1
Case A9	Andy	Family	3 rd	27	B.A.	25	3	2	5
	Tim K.	Non		43	B.S.		2	1	3
Case A10	James	Family	3 rd	21	B.S.	22	1	2	3
Case A11	Robert	Family	3 rd	24	B.S.	26	2	1	3

*B.A. Bachelor of Arts

**M.S. Masters in Science

***B.S. Bachelors in Science

Luke (family – 1st generation)

At the time of this interviewing in 2015, Luke was 86 years old. In 1952, he graduated from the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania upon completion of his dissertation in entrepreneurship. His dissertation expounded upon the notion of regional food distribution in local food markets. Despite his interest in new business,

he worked at the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston and established a career on Wall Street and various corporations just outside NYC over 30 years as an accountant. During his early years, he admits that he “couldn’t stand working for big corporations,” and he continually pitched his father with new business ideas. His father worked as a senior executive at a large fish distribution facility on the north shore of Massachusetts. Luke believed his father was a corporate thinker afraid of failure, and it was his uncle, an academic at Yale Sheffield School, who encouraged Luke’s entrepreneurial tinkering with motivation, support, and limited financing.

Over a long life, Luke started no fewer than 15 ventures, ranging from Cashmere goat farming to garlic propagation to trailer park development. His entrepreneurial interests are still evident despite his late age with the recent creation of a new venture and partnership with his daughter in furniture-making.

Michael (family – 2nd generation)

Michael is Luke’s first son and the father of Andy, Robert and James. He graduated with a degree in plant science from White University in 1978 and continued to work and research at the University for a short time based on his assumption that he would get his PhD in plant physiology and likely work for a large corporation like Monsanto. Luke introduced the opportunity of horticultural production at Case A and convinced his son to join Case A in 1980 because there was disagreement between Luke and investors in the firm. Michael returned to the family firm in the summer of 1980 and decided to leave Ithaca, New York and join the family firm. Over 30 years Michael would completely transition Case A from hothouse tomato production to horticulture production in Case A1. He continues to lead the firm as of this case study.

Mathew (senior) (family – 2nd generation)

Mathew, Luke’s second son, completed his education in agricultural economics and plant science at White University in 1980 but pursued an initial career in professional basketball. As a professional athlete, he travelled around the world playing for Argentinian, Italian and Belgium teams for three seasons. Traveling in Australia, he initially developed a desire to pursue macadamia nut farming. However, in partnership with his father, Mathew became interested in the idea of large-scale organic waste composting at nearby Connecticut mushroom farms which produced more than 2000 tons of spent mushroom waste each week. Luke recognized the opportunity that these farms couldn’t process the organic waste, and Mathew accepted the challenge. Mathew developed Case A2 to prepare and bag organic waste at an industrial scale for retail sale to home centres and garden centres initially in partnership with his father, Luke, and younger brother, Thomas. In 1986 Mathew sold the company to investors for a reported \$50,000,000US. However, he retained the rights to use his own technology to develop new businesses in methane sequestration and in-vessel composting in the 1990’s. Mathew ventured again in the early 2000’s with additional ventures in hothouse tomato production, tilapia fish farming, hydroponic lettuce propagation and several more ventures that he either closed or sold to interested venture groups for consolidation in larger businesses.

Mathew has two sons with whom he hopes to start new businesses upon their graduation from White. At the time of this study, his sons were second- and third-year

students at the White School of Agriculture. In interviews, Mathew comments that he has no interest in passing any of his ventures to his sons. Instead, he wants to directly partner with each son to build new ventures, quite likely focused on the green industry field, because he believes he has developed an enviable reputation within the field.

Tim K. (non-family)

Tim K. is a non-family employee of Case A1 who joined the firm in 1997. Tim joined Case A1 as an inventory manager, and since that time has assumed the titles of Marketing Manager and Sales Manager. His job in both positions is to know horticultural product that is saleable during the production process. Tim also supports sales with various marketing programs.

Laura (family – wife of Michael)

Laura is Treasurer of Case A1 and the wife of Michael. Michael and Laura met while students at White University, and during the 1980s, when Michael stepped into an overall leadership role at Case A1, Laura supported the family with her job in investment banking. In 1995, she joined the firm and has played an active role in the development of the parent family firm.

Andy (junior) (family – 3rd generation)

Andy is Michael's first son. In 2014, Andy was 27 years old and joined his father at Case A1. He is responsible for sales in the Massachusetts territory, while he develops new business and efficiencies for the firm in logistics and production in Case A9.

Robert (family – 3rd generation)

Robert is Michael's second son. In 2014, Robert was 24 years old and a graduate of White University College of Agriculture and Life Sciences. Robert studied horticulture and agriculture economics while a student at White. Immediately after graduation, he gained experience and knowledge in the banking industry as a credit analyst at Farm Credit East. He has recently joined Case A1 support sales and support venturing activity in horticultural distribution in Case A11.

James (family – 3rd generation)

James, Michael's third son, studied ornamental horticulture at White University and upon graduation, worked in Washington, DC as a lobbyist for the green industry. He recently began his tenure at the parent family firm by venturing in horticultural distribution. James has assumed responsibilities in horticultural distribution at Case A10.

5.2.2 Profile of Case A

After a long corporate accounting career combined with various start-up ventures, Luke started Case A in 1978 by acting on his "*passion for growing things.*" He was 50 years old, his three sons were attending college, and a daughter was preparing for college when he abruptly left his corporate job outside New York City, bought a

bankrupt tomato growing operation and moved his family to a farming region in the neighbouring state. Recounting his decision to make these abrupt changes, his sons, Michael and Mathew, suggest in interviews that, “*Case A was [Luke’s] mid-life crisis.*” Combining his familiarity with bank-owned property from years of accounting with his love of tomatoes and farming, Luke purchased defunct hothouse tomato growing operations from a local Connecticut bank and the Meshantucket Pequot Indians in 1978 after he discovered the sale in a local newspaper. At the time, it was a ½-acre greenhouse operation in a remote farming region of the state, owned by local banks. He named the business, but in short order realized that hothouse tomato farming was a difficult, expensive and time-consuming proposition. He also recognized that there was competition from much larger and more established tomato growing operations in upstate NY, but in an interview, Luke admitted that he “*never walked away from something that didn’t work... he changed it!*” His son suggests that “*With Luke it was all about if you want it bad enough you can make it happen... if there’s a will there’s a way.*”

Luke changed course at Case A with the production of ornamental plants given his own understanding of tax codes and upon the advice of a close friend and mentor. Luke admits in interviews,

I got into the horticulture business because there’s something in the tax code that says if you’re growing plants, you can expense everything – you don’t need inventory – it’s a deferred tax shelter.

His knowledge of the tax code along with his knowledge of investor sentiment and university research presented an opportunity to change Case A from growing tomatoes to growing horticultural product. He presented his idea to a small group of investors and cobbled together \$1M to grow ornamental plants as a tax deferred investment. Investors were initially positive about their investment and tax shelter in the horticultural operation, but their sentiment changed quickly when they realized Luke didn’t know how to operate a larger horticultural production facility. They demanded their money back, a return on their investment and an immediate accounting of all inventory.

At the time, Luke’s first son, Michael, was finishing his degree at White University in Plant Science when Luke called with a desperate proposition to legitimize operations and calm investors at Case A. Michael joined operations at Case A after graduating from White University but before starting his master’s program in Plant Physiology at White. He accepted his father’s urgent request to save the farm and develop an opportunity in horticultural production while transitioning Case A to Case A1. In an interview, Michael recalls,

[Case A] was still something I came to help him out with, I wasn’t sure I was going to stay, and in my view my father was going through a midlife crisis, and you know, what the hell is he doing up in northeast Connecticut? We were living comfortably near New York City, you know?

Michael quickly became the voice of credibility as he transitioned the company away from tomatoes and focused operations on the production of ornamental plants. Michael remembered this situation as precarious, but he believed his father’s idea of

horticultural production was ‘sound’. At the urging of investors, Luke completely stepped away from Case A1 to start Case A2 in 1983 with his second son, Mathew, because he noticed an opportunity in organic waste across town at a nearby mushroom farm.

5.2.3 Profile of Venturing at Case A

Table 5.19 summarizes the general characteristics of Case A and all associated ventures from Case A. For the purposes of brevity in this study, there was only consideration of select ventures among family members. Luke founded more than 15 ventures. While they all reflected various dispositions and munificence toward family members, most met with either immediate failure or modest success. Luke’s 1st son, Michael, founded several ventures, and most have met with modest success or no success, but they have all reflected various dispositions and munificence toward Michael’s sons who have ventured in Cases A10 and A11. Luke’s 2nd son, Mathew, founded more than 8 ventures. Again, most have met with modest success or no success, but several were sold to larger organisations for a significant financial gain, but they have all reflected various dispositions and munificence toward family members including Michael’s sons. At the time of interviewing, Mathew’s sons continue to complete their education. However, Mathew repeatedly commented he wants to partner with his sons upon graduation.

Table 5.19 General Information for Case A

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case A	Luke	founder	1978	Non-active	Hothouse tomato production
Case A1	Michael	son	1981	Active	Horticultural propagation
Case A2	Mathew	son	1983	Sold	Industrial scale composting
Case A3	Mathew	son	1985	Sold	In-vessel composting
Case A4	Mathew	son	1990	Sold	Methane sequestration
Case A5	Mathew	son	2004	Sold	Hothouse tomato production
Case A6	Mathew	son	2015	Active	Hydroponic lettuce
Case A7	Thomas	son	1985	Active	Horticultural distribution
Case A8	Maura	daughter	2010	Non-active	Ironwood furniture
Case A9	Andy	grandson	2013	Active	Horticultural shipping logistics
Case A10	James	grandson	2015	Active	Horticultural distribution centre
Case A11	Robert	grandson	2016	Active	Horticultural distribution centre

Table 5.20 reflects opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members at Case A. Industry of all ventures can be classified as agriculture while specific industry domain reflecting ventures relevant to this study can be classified in the green industry or composting industry. Table 5.20 also reflects context of the initial idea. At Case A every family member generates ideas for venturing, but Luke has arguably created the environment for idea generation while presenting opportunity and resources with which to venture.

Table 5.20 Opportunity Identification and Development at Case A

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case A	Agriculture	Produce	The venture is the result of Luke's desire for a 'good tomato but you can't get one here in the winter.'
Case A1	Agriculture	Horticulture Propagation	Luke introduced the opportunity, but Michael developed the venture by calming investors and professionalizing operations.
Case A2	Agriculture	Organic Waste Management	Luke introduced the idea to Mathew of composting spent mushroom waste at nearby farms. Luke and Mathew partnered in the venturing process, but Mathew developed the venture, and sold operations in 1985.
Case A3	Agriculture	Composting	Mathew travelled to Japan and returned with in-vessel composting systems. He re-engineered systems for sale to farms for methane sequestration.
Case A4	Agriculture	Bio-fuel	Mathew developed industrial-scale composting "with the vision of helping communities meet challenges."
Case A5	Agriculture	Produce	Mathew developed hothouse tomato operations built on geo-thermal vents in northern Maine to grow local tomatoes for distribution to local markets in the northeaster US.
Case A6	Agriculture	Produce	Mathew developed hydroponic lettuce production from mechanized glasshouse facilities in Massachusetts. Lettuce grows locally for local distribution.
Case A7	Agriculture Distribution	Horticulture Distribution	Luke suggests to his 3rd son, Thomas, to leave Case A2 and venture with college friends in horticultural.
Case A8	Agriculture	Timber	Luke partners with his daughter in ironwood furniture after he reads about timber availability in a local Boston newspaper.
Case A9	Agricultural Logistics	Horticultural Shipping	Michael ventures with his son, Andy, in the development of live-shipping green goods.
Case A10	Agriculture Distribution	Horticultural Distribution	Michael ventures with his son, James, in the development of re-wholesale distribution centres.
Case A11	Agriculture Distribution	Horticultural Distribution	Robert ventures with his father, Michael, and his brother, James in the development of additional re-wholesale distribution centres.

Case A1

In 1980, Michael fully grasped the complications of hothouse tomato production and transitioned operations to the production of ornamental plants to rescue his father, realize an opportunity, satisfy investors and run his own business while calming

investors. Over 10 years, Michael grew his business at Case A1 without taking pay or vacation. Michael's brother, Mathew, recalls the transition from Luke to Michael and the transition from growing tomatoes to growing ornamental plants:

Case A had real issues when Michael came there, right? And so Michael had to really stabilize and transition the tomato business into a new business in horticulture production, and it was trial by fire. It was sink or swim, and to Michael's credit he did it, and it was tough work. Luke is a tough guy.

It was the early ethos of Luke and his sons to “*put the shoulder to the wheel*” to solve any problem and move their venture forward. Every family member in every interview echoed or repeated this ethos.

Under Michael's leadership, Case A1 grew slowly in the '80s in accordance with his father's vision as a boutique grower of specialty horticulture. As Michael recalls, the early years at Case A1 were building years:

The first 15 years it was strictly a very start up kind of venture. It took us a long time to sort of get our feet on the ground. I remember I said – if we get to \$2M I will have ‘arrived’ or even \$1M. As you know, you’ve got to be a lot bigger than that on the production side to really be relevant in the marketplace.

However, in 1982, after multiple visits to customer sites at his father's repeated request that he “Get out of the office and see the customer!” Michael discovered that “*There was competition in the horticulture industry*” and that customers were looking for something quite different than what his father initially perceived. Customers of ornamental plants were searching for someone who could deliver a broad selection of product quickly and could do so frequently. Just-in-time inventory was a revelation in the horticulture industry; it had previously been considered an unachievable goal. Michael overcame production and logistical problems by realizing a family disposition to solve problems.

Michael also believed, like his father and family, that partnerships could provide profits. They were “*not always easy, but the potential for revenues and profitability could drive the relationship.*” He initiated partnerships with other growers, partnerships with genetic labs and partnerships with his customers in consignment sales. For example, the ‘Fall Is Fantastic’ program took cancelled inventory and gave it to proven customers on consignment. Again, this had never before been done in the industry. Previously, horticultural growers would ship to customers in spring and then “*wave goodbye until fall*”, but again, Michael “*put his shoulder to the wheel*” and innovated to solve a very large inventory issue in fall 2008. His effort strengthened partnerships with customers while providing profitability for the company.

In 2016, Case A1 recorded \$34M in sales with approximately 450 employees. Michael and his wife, Laura, have begun transitioning Case A to their sons, Andy, James and Robert, to manage and grow existing operations while developing their own ventures within existing operations.

Case A2

In 1982, just after he transitioned hothouse tomato production to his first son, Luke recognized another opportunity just up the street in industrial-scale organic waste composting at a nearby mushroom farm. Luke presented the idea of large-scale organic waste composting to his second son, Mathew, and they created a new venture in Case A2. At Case A2, Mathew comments, “*at the start-up there was not a lot of particular innovation around the product line or the packaging of it, it was all fairly standard.*” Case A2 packaged organic soils from organic yard waste in combination with commercial farm production waste and sold more than 50 million bags of compost, marketing it as a soil amendment. Case A2 was a family venture, as they introduced Luke’s third son, Thomas, into the business to develop sales and marketing. Mathew comments, “*We ended up having 400-500 employees when we sold Case A2 in 1998. Thomas deserves the credit for building the sales; he did a great job.*” However, Mathew states emphatically that he found all the technology, financing and customer base, suggesting his father was only the ‘idea guy’ and Thomas was the ‘sales and marketing guy’. In 2005, Case A2 sold to a multi-national fertilizer group for a reported \$50M.

Case A3

Luke and his second son, Mathew, continued “*figuring out larger-scale industrial-level composting*” at chicken farms where waste is toxic, at breweries where waste is hazardous, and at pulp mills where waste is flammable. Mathew comments,

Luke and I learned as we grew and developed the business and as recycling mandates came in . . . so, then we leveraged that into figuring out larger-scale industrial-level composting.

Technology, equipment and logistics suitable for large-scale commercial composting didn’t exist before 1982. Case A3 introduced the idea, the technology, the standards and the networking to provide organic waste composting and disposal on an industrial scale. Further, Case A3 introduced technology for in-vessel composting systems that farmers could operate on their individual farms for efficient and environmentally friendly organic waste disposal, fertilizer production, and power generation from farm waste.

Case A4

Methane sequestration is the process of isolating methane produced by organic waste as it decomposes. It has long been known that methane is a valuable source of energy but capturing methane from decomposing waste has always been challenging as a business proposition. Case A4 was in response to government regulation mandating proper organic waste disposal and economic conditions of high energy costs in the late 1980s. In his travels around the world while playing professional basketball after college, Mathew recognized an opportunity in in-vessel composting systems while in Japan, and he began experimenting with existing systems that the Japanese had pioneered. In-vessel composting, created as a new venture between father and son, developed methane sequestration systems for harnessing power from methane gases released from decomposing farm waste to allow local farms to purchase in-vessel composting units and power operations from their farm waste. In interviews, Mathew

commented that he brought the technology back to the States only to find it was inefficient and inadequate for commercial use. Both father and son “*put [their] shoulder to the wheel,*” believing that even a problem that was initially thought to be unsolvable could be solved. Case A4 was purchased by a large multi-national several years after its introduction. However, Mathew retained the rights to license the technology for his own purposes.

Case A5

As previously noted in the introduction to this section, Luke “*liked a good tomato*” but frequently bemoans that he “*couldn’t get one here in winter.*” However, in Case A5 in 2004, Luke and Mathew, in partnership with a Boston area investor-built greenhouse in northern Maine that grew tomatoes hydroponically. Briefly stated, hydroponic farming is typically the production of vegetables or fruit without soil.

Luke and Mathew solved the problem of high energy costs by building greenhouses over thermal vents; they solved production issues with state-of-the-art greenhouses, and they solved distribution issues by working with a Boston investment group that also owned retail markets. In an interview, Luke proudly comments,

So, he gave us our ten or fifteen-million-dollar investment in that, and we built this greenhouse, state-of-the-art greenhouse at Madison, Maine. Madison, Maine is nowhere in Maine, pretty far out, to grow tomatoes, vine ripened tomatoes.

But again, as in Case A, operations proved difficult and the partnership between the family and investor posed a problem. Luke comments,

So, boy was he hard to deal with because he wanted everybody, like in a uniform, and he wanted to take a picture of every tomato we grew; so, if anybody ever had a problem, we could track it.

At the time of interviewing, Mathew grew hydroponic tomatoes under glass covering more than the equivalent of five American football fields.

Case A6

Typical lettuce farming requires expensive land and water to produce, and it is typically expensive to ship and bring to market. Mathew introduced hydroponic lettuce farming outside Boston in Case A6 at facilities that could produce an edible product every 2 weeks and ship it to local markets daily. Case A6 solved the problem of expense, freshness and proximity to markets in Case A6. Within 24 hours of harvest, the product gets placed on market shelves for sale to retail customers. Hydroponic lettuce production is new and innovative, and many challenges come with this innovation. Mathew at Case A6 has met many of these challenges by arguably, “*putting his shoulder to the wheel.*”

Case A7

Thomas is Luke’s third son. He joined Case A2 after he graduated from White behind both his brothers. Thomas was not interviewed directly for this study, but he

represented venturing at the parent family firm because he supported venturing at Case A2, and he also ventured on his own in the green industry in Case A6 with the development of organic and all-natural solutions for the lawn-and-garden industry. His venture is now part of a larger group that distributes a range of products to the lawn-and-garden industry. Thomas's children are still continuing their education, and they were not interviewed for this study.

Case A8

Maura is Luke's youngest child, and like her brothers, she gravitated toward new business. Maura was briefly interviewed for this study, but she also partnered with Luke in the production of wood furniture from reclaimed ironwood recovered from Boston Harbor. Luke remembers,

"I read something...oh my God, I read the excerpt in Wooden Boat Magazine. I saw the hole in Boston Harbor and there's all this wood in it. I said, 'my God, that's got to be worth a fortune' and the contractor in Boston wants to get rid of it!"

Maura had vociferously complained to Luke that he had partnered with his sons in new business creation, but he had never partnered with his only daughter. In interviews Luke humorously commented,

"It was my idea and then [...] she wanted to come and help me so that's how that happened. My daughter and I are doing really good - she's doing really good."

Case A9

Andy, son of Michael and grandson of Luke, joined the parent family firm's horticultural growing operation in 2014. His primary focus has been sales and management, but he has quickly come to understand the need for efficiencies at Case A1, and he has ventured in effective logistics and lean shipping with his father to enhance shipping at the parent family firm while providing a model for other industry growers. Andy has also come to understand the strong value of partnerships for Case A1 and for the green industry. He works with his father to develop innovative partnerships with other growers for the introduction of new horticultural cultivars, new growing techniques, and the effective branding of horticultural product. Partnerships in the green industry are new and typically met with cynicism, and Andy comments that partnerships are *"not always easy,"* but Andy believed they are a source of information and profit that will benefit those in the industry who take part.

Case A10

James is the third son of Michael and the grandson of Luke. He recently joined the parent family firm after his graduation from White School of Agriculture because, in his words, *"I'm very interested in starting my own business."* He comments, *"Me and my brother, Robert, see an expansion of the wholesale distribution centre model to northern Virginia."* By venturing in horticultural distribution centres, both brothers

believe they can leverage capital that Case A1 has established in the green industry while adding economic capital back to the parent family firm. James states confidently, *“I feel I have an ability to take an idea, turn it into a project then turn it into a business.”* While a student at White, James developed his strong desire to *“wake up every morning and make a project a success.”*

Case A11

As of this study, it is unclear whether Michael’s second son, Robert, will join the parent family firm. Since graduating from the White University School of Agriculture, Robert has committed to a position with a large agricultural credit association, where he helps manage a \$47,000,000US portfolio of loans to agriculture businesses. However, his true interests lie in the development of new business in horticultural distribution at Case A1, like his brother James. His entrepreneurial nature is fostered by his father, grandfather and uncle, Mathew, who repeatedly asks, *“Hey, when are we going to start a business together?”* Robert has taken note of venturing success among family members and commented in interviews that they’re all *“rock stars”* in their respective businesses.

5.2.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case A

This section presents examples of forms of capital at Case A. The within-case display in Table 5.21 presents example data from interviewees reflecting Firkin’s (2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital indicated family and non-family employees working at Case A. This data reflects resources imbued to individual ventures so that they might overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe and March, 1965). This section also presents a brief explanation of individual forms of capital at Case A.


Table 5.21 Entrepreneurial Capital at Case A

Construct	Case A → A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8	Case A1 – A7 → Case A9, A10, A11
Human Capital	<p><i>Economic [Mathew]: "Luke gave us opportunity while mentoring and supporting us which was way more valuable than money."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Michael]: "But I got into the Agriculture School at Ezra, so I had you know, and that was, I think you know, much to his direction you know, and I got the plant knowledge there and I got the agriculture knowledge there."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Mathew]: "Luke and I learned as we grew and developed the business, as recycling mandates came in and leaves didn't go to the landfill"</i></p>	<p><i>Social [Robert]: "I walked around the trade show with my dad today. He's a rock star here, man!"</i></p> <p><i>Human [Robert]: If there is one thing I've learned from being in the banking industry, it's the bottom line that matters."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Robert]: The good thing about Farm Credit is I really get to see every aspect of the industry."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Robert]: "I help the guys load the plants on to the loading belt and made sure we were getting the right orders and the right numbers and counts for each order."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Luke]: ". . . I have 3 sons and 4 grandchildren at Ezra."</i></p>
Social Capital	<p><i>Social [Michael]: "Yeah, Mathew and I shared customers; we shared people. Those were tough and tumultuous times in the 80s."</i></p> <p><i>Social [Luke]: "Thomas made a lot of friends up at Ezra that are very successful in the farming business."</i></p>	<p><i>Social [Michael]: "Robert and James continue to communicate with advisors and friends at Ezra."</i></p> <p><i>Social [Michael]: "You have to have a collaborative attitude. A lot of these nurseries are very 'it's all about me' and 'I've got to create it myself'."</i></p>
Economic Capital	<p><i>Economic [Michael]: "He had gotten some money - about a million bucks - and we had put some product on the ground that actually wasn't really even owned by us."</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Mathew]: "Yeah, the investor I found for the company was the father of a family friend from my basketball network - he was a minority shareholder - and the other two shareholders were my father and I."</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Mathew]: "I found the investor in [A2] myself - a friend of mine's father-in-law who I played basketball with at Ezra."</i></p>	<p><i>Economic [James]: "[A1] gives us the opportunity to have a capital background - to have money to invest in maybe something we are passionate about."</i></p>
Cultural Capital	<p><i>Cultural [Mathew]: "Luke showed, emotional capital - intellectual capital of what it takes to succeed in your own business."</i></p>	<p><i>Cultural [Robert]: "I think having the [A1] name on the business is important."</i></p>

5.3 Case B (Scotland)

Case B represents a parent family firm that has survived more than seven generations in various iterations, but always as a parent family firm. It was a privately held family firm for four generations and a public company under the auspices and majority ownership of the parent family firm for three generations. Figure 5.14 presents a diagram of family relations at Case B over the previous three generations.

Figure 5.14 Case B Family Tree



While there is evidence that the family firm was founding and venturing actively in the late 1600s, this section considers the ‘present’ iterations of the firm since the late 1800s under the auspices and control of Adam and his wife Agnes. In the early 1900s, the firm was a partnership among two families that engaged in home construction for returning soldiers in Scotland after WWI. In the early 1940s, the partnership dissolved; Adam and his wife purchased 100% ownership of the firm. Since that time, multiple generations have been in leadership positions while venturing at the firm, but since 1965, the directors at the parent family firm have been non-family members. Presently, the firm takes direction from a non-family director who is supporting the next generation in venturing at the firm.

Case B’s ability to take and support new action is made possible in part by a good but informal vetting process for new ventures. This vetting process is supportive and engaging, but support with Case B capital resources requires board approval. The board members provide an opportunity for family members or line workers talk about ideas or initiatives; if the idea or initiative is approved, it is supported with resources from Case B. The ideas and initiatives approved over the past 15 years include the letting program/properties division (B6), the buyback program (B7) and the timber frame business (B7). This section investigates B7 under the leadership of a seventh-generation family member, Ray.

5.3.1 Profile of Interviewees at Case B

Table 5.22 presents interviewee information for reference in Case B profiles and analysis of data. The table include case founder, birth, education, generation, estimated age at venturing and number of interviews conducted for this study. Following Table 5.22 is a brief description of family and non-family interviewees at Case B who were available at the time of this study.

Table 5.22 Interviewee Information at Case B

Case	Founder	Birth	Education	Generation	Age at Venturing	Position at Firm	Core Interview	Addtl Interviews
Case B3	Daniel	1911	n/a	5 th	n/a	Director Board member	Edinburgh Councillors Transcript	0
Case B4	Brad	1945	Architecture	6 th	69	Architect Board member	2	1
Case B5	Dirk	1935	Architecture	6 th	78	Architect Board member	0	0
Case B6	Allen	1972	A Level and Masters in Town Plan	7 th	44	Town Planner	2	0
Case B7	Ray	1978	College	7 th	35	Division Manager	2	1
Case B8	Stephanie	1971	College	7 th	43	Marketing Manager	1	1
	Ed	1964		Non-family		Non-family Director Board member	2	0

Brad (family – 6th generation)

Brad belongs to the third generation at Case B but the seventh generation in the building industry. At the time of this report, he was the chairman of Case B but was planning to retire in three and a half years. Brad's children are Ray and Stephanie, who are involved in operations and plan to lead the home building and charitable trust divisions, respectively.

Edward (non-family director)

Edward is an outside director at Case B. He has over 35 years of experience in the industry as a tradesman and then a board member at Case B. He started as an apprentice painter/decorator on site and worked at the site level for a few years while attending night school to achieve his certification in building management. At present, he is the chief executive of Case B, chair of the Construction Scotland Industry Leaders Group and a member of the CBI Construction Council.

Ray (family – 7th generation)

Ray is Brad's son and is part of the fourth generation at the parent family firm. After a number of years working for a marquee developer in London, Ray joined the parent family firm in 2007. He worked as a labourer and then moved his way to the top of

timber systems under the guidance of family members and mentors within the organisation. He is the managing director of the new venture in timber systems.

Allen (family – 7th generation)

Allen is Dirk's son and Ray's first cousin. He is part of the fourth generation at the parent family firm. He is the chairman of the homes division at Case B, and he is the group director or land director at Case B, managing land matters. He started with the firm in 2000 after working in London for a land surveying firm.

Stephanie (family – 7th generation)

Stephanie is the daughter of Brad and is part of the fourth generation of the family to take an active role in the organisation. For the past four years, she has been the chair of the family fund, which is a philanthropic venture capital fund. While she is a shareholder and trustee of the parent family firm, she does not currently work in the commercial arm of the business. Stephanie organised and coordinated the semi-structured interviews for this case report.

5.3.2 Profile of Case B

Case B represents more than seven generations of builders in Britain. In the 1700s, Robert B. & Sons was a timber importing company in Bo'ness at a time when sailing ships brought building products from distant parts of the British Empire to supply the growing building trade in England. The family founders of Case B were house builders during Queen Victoria's long reign in nineteenth-century England, and later, as the company's prospectus proudly states,

'The opportunities offered by governments to be involved in a housing boom following the First World War were not missed'.

A strong collaboration with the government continues into the twenty-first century with seventh-generation family members and outside management in senior positions at the firm.

Case B has a long and distinguished formal history in the building and construction industry in Scotland, beginning in the late 1880s with timber production and home construction by two brothers, Robert and Thomas. The brothers came from a family that for generations worked as wrights, joiners and builders, but Robert began as a timber merchant at operations located between Glasgow and Edinburgh. Throughout the history of the firm, the import or introduction of raw materials provided the impetus for change and venturing at Case B while Robert built a financially sound company. As its prospectus states,

'The story of [Case B] is a true testament to the unique combination of innovation and tradition, delivered strategically by a financially sound company'.

Robert's son Adam worked with his father and transitioned into leadership at the firm while also partnering with another family firm to provide a competitive advantage and stability to the parent family firm. As a Case B prospectus details,

'By the early 1900's, [2 families] had come together, and with others who would later establish their own shorter-lived building companies, were constructing tenements in the West End of Glasgow' (Case B Published History, 1998).

The partners from two families, Adam and John, worked separately as developers in Glasgow before WWI. Adam ventured in building cottages for sale, while John M. continued to build tenements to rent. In the four years after 1922, they built over 3000 houses for local authorities with more than 2000 employees before dissolving their partnership and registering Case B as a limited company in 1925, with Adam buying all of the outstanding shares from his partner. While the separation was amicable, it required a significant amount of cash, and Adam's grandson Brad recollects,

'I just remember hearing the family tales of my grandfather wearing patches on the elbows of his jacket and stuff like that'.

Between 1930 and 1939, Case B realised Adam's conservative ideal of building for home ownership rather than tenement letting with the construction of 3,808 homes built for sale (Case B Published History, 1998).

Growth at Case B into the 1950s assured a dominant position for the firm in the housing industry in and around Scotland. The sons of the elder Adam, Fred and Daniel, assumed leadership positions upon the death of their grandfather. Family records suggest that Daniel and Fred

'adhered to the core competency of the firm which included speculative house building and a "hands-on" approach to management and building'.

However, in 1961 Fred died suddenly of a heart attack, and Daniel introduced non-family leadership at Case B for the first time because he believed his sons, Dirk and Brad, did not have the business acumen to run the company without guidance. In 1965, James G. assumed the position of Chairman, with family members reporting to him. Case B. family members credit the success and growth at Case B during the late '60s and early '70s to the 'thoughtful leadership' of James G. along with the creative leadership of the trained architects, family members and cousins, Brad and Dirk. However, ill health forced James G. to retire in 1970. Dirk assumed a leadership role with his cousin Brad, who joined the firm after completing his degree in architecture in 1975. Cousins, Dirk and Brad undertook leadership roles at Case B as registered architects and continued the policies and practices of their non-family predecessor. Late in the 1970s, a recession in England and restrictive environmental legislation presented challenges for Case B, but the parent family firm survived by venturing in shared equity home purchases and new material and new structures for home building. Most or all of these innovations represented new venturing at the parent family firm.

While much of the 1980s was profitable, given the friendly environment of a conservative government, Dirk believed that

'... profit swings were partly attributable to planning delays on the minus side and improvements in efficiency on the plus side' (Case B Published History, 1998).

Case B continued to make improvements to efficiencies with a computer house-costing system in the late 1980s, despite the recession. The parent family firm also innovated with the Major Ownership Scheme (MOS), introduced in 1982, which allowed staged home purchases in which the firm retained 20% of the value in a home at its initial sale. The purchaser agreed to pay no interest on the 20% but to pay back the 20% when the home was sold. According to Jim G, the Case B non-family director at the time,

‘The scheme required a healthy cash flow to sustain it, but it had enormous competitive benefits’ (Case B Published History, 1998).

He estimated that over 15 years, more than 85% of the purchasers bought under the MOS scheme, and he suggested in an interview that

‘. . . to the customer, Case B is a company that puts its money where its mouth is and shows confidence in the enduring value of the building and its location’ (Case B Published History, 1998).

In the early 1990s, Case B experienced its worst-performing years as the result of a national recession that forced many builders in Scotland out of business. The recession forced severe cutbacks and layoffs at the parent family firm, but it also enabled the firm to entertain innovative ideas; for example, the firm stopped its 40-year practice of selling its Edinburgh properties in favour of rental income. Also, the firm disengaged from land speculation and bidding on properties as part of a bidding war with wealthier London-based firms entering the Scottish housing market. In the late 1990s, Case B embarked on innovative designs under the guidance of Brad and Dirk to bring urban regeneration and a more architecturally sensitive method of environmentally friendly building to Glasgow.

Edward joined Case B as a non-family tradesman and apprentice painter with limited education and a need to support his despondent mother after the tragic loss of his father. He became General Manager in 1995, and as another non-family member, he was appointed Case B’s Managing Director in 2004 at the age of 40. His position allowed him oversight and direction of the parent family firm. As of the time of the case study interviews, Ed was still the Case B Director and an integral part of the family transition at Case B. In an interview, he stated,

‘I was doing this before Allen joined us ten years ago and Ray joined us six or seven years ago. So there was no anticipation when I started doing what I do, and still doing, that this would become part of the job albeit it’s a family business and therefore you recognise that there’s going to be change down the line’.

Case B has survived into the seventh generation with new leadership from the great-great-grandsons and cousins, Allen and Ray, who joined the firm in 2000 and 2005, respectively. Allen entered the firm at the non-family director Jim G.’s request that he bring his knowledge and experience to establish strategic land purchases, while Ray entered the firm at the non-family director Edward’s request that he bring his

knowledge and experience to establish timber building. At present the firm has four divisions and a charitable trust overseen by a great-great-grand-daughter, Stephanie, who joined the parent family firm in 2002. Each division has the backing of family and/or direct leadership by a family member. Decisions about ventures and venturing are taken among family members. However, the day-to-day leadership continues to be provided by a non-family director.

5.3.3 Profile of Venturing at Case B

Table 5.23 presents general case information of venturing activity at the parent family firm. Information in the table includes case founder, approximate date of founding and a brief business description of each case for later reference. Following the tables is a brief description of each venture.

Table 5.23 General Case Information for Case B

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case B	Robert & Thomas		1846	Non-operational	<i>Timber distribution and home construction</i>
Case B1*	Adam	Son	1913	Sold	<i>Cottage building over tenement design</i>
Case B1	Adam	Son	1925	Partnership	<i>All-in-one house purchase scheme and family partnership</i>
Case B2	Fred	Grandson	1948	Operational	<i>Municipal construction - Glasgow</i>
Case B3	Daniel	Grandson	1948	Operational	<i>Letting and rental – Edinburgh</i>
Case B4	Brad	Great grandson	1975	Operational	<i>Bespoke home construction & luxury home design</i>
Case B5	Dirk	Great grandson	1965	Operational	<i>Speculative home-building Commonwealth games contracting</i>
Case B6	Allen	Great-great grandson	2007	Operational	<i>Land development and letting in Glasgow and Edinburgh</i>
Case B7	Ray	Great-great grandson	2009	Operational	<i>Timber systems distribution and construction</i>
Case B8	Stephanie	Great-great grand-daughter	2016	Operation	<i>Building Communities Fund</i>

Table 5.24 shows the opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members at Case B. All the ventures can be classified as belonging to the building and construction industry, and the specific industry domain of the ventures relevant to this study is various types of construction (e.g., tenement housing, commercial contracting, speculative home-building etc.). Table 5.24 also shows the context of the initial idea. At Case B, both family members and non-family members generate ideas for venturing. In an interview, Ray noted,

'I think there's no one in the company who [would] be afraid to step forward and say look, I wouldn't mind doing it this way, what do you think?'

Ed rose to his present position as non-family director at Case B arguably because of his ability to generate ideas for growth. He expects family members and non-family members to generate ideas for venturing activity to sustain the growth of the company.

Table 5.24 Opportunity Identification and Development at Case B

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case B	Timber	Timber distribution and home construction	Robert and his brother, Thomas, ventured in timber distribution and timber frame development to supply their own construction and construction by competitors.
Case B1*	Construction	Homes for Heroes	Adam ventured in cottage home construction between WWI and WWII as part of the Homes for Heroes program
Case B1	Partnership	Tenement housing partnership	Adam partnered in business with a competing family to provide more depth in commercial construction.
Case B2	Construction	Municipal construction	Fred ventured in municipal construction of tenement housing in Glasgow at the urging of his father
Case B3	Letting	Home rental	Daniel ventured in Edinburgh at the urging of his father
Case B4	Home-building	Speculative home-building	Brad ventured in bespoke luxury homes to offset the legacy of tenement housing at Case B
Case B5	Commercial contracting	Commercial development	Dirk took on Commonwealth Games contract and ventured during a difficult period to offset slow home-building.
Case B6	Development	Land development and lease programs	Allen adapted the venture to promote land development in England
Case B7	Timber	Timber frames	Ed developed the idea for timber frames and promoted venturing at Case B. Ray developed the venture under auspices of Ed.
Case B8	Family Foundation	Charitable and educational	Stephanie undertook venturing in charitable services and foundation work at the parent family firm

It is the nature and responsibility of family members and non-family members of the parent family firm to suggest new ideas in venturing. From its early years, Case B family members have ventured in all aspects of building, construction materials and land development, even before the formal founding of the firm in 1925. One example is the first-generation family members who, as wrights, joiners and proprietors of homes in late seventeenth-century Scotland, imported raw material for home-building. By the late eighteenth century, family members were well established as builders in central Scotland. Formal family records began in the late nineteenth century, with Robert in partnership with his brother, Thomas as home builders and merchants shipping timber for building and construction. Robert and Thomas focused on tenement design for public housing schemes promoted by the local Glasgow authorities. However, records of Scottish home-building and a published history of the

parent family firm in Case B suggest that the brothers' firm "*acted as an incubator*" for two young entrepreneurs and their families who succeeded the brothers and laid the foundations for succession over generations in the present family business (Case B Published History, 1998).

By 1913, Robert's son Adam was venturing by realising an opportunity in an architectural preference for cottage building over tenement design, endorsed by the local Scottish government at the time. However, a difficult economy and burdensome regulation and tax duties forced Adam to combine his solo venture in home construction with a competing family firm that both rented and sold property. By 1925, there was a formal partnership between two families to create Case B1. Since its formal founding in 1925, growth at Case B1 as a parent family firm has been largely situated in Scotland and has been the result of venturing by family members who have cultivated their social connections and legacy in Scottish home building. By 1932, under Adam's leadership, the firm was employing 2,000 workers on its construction sites and advertised '*The Most Modern House in Glasgow*' and an '*All-in-one House Purchase Scheme*' as Case B1 transitioned from a traditional rental business to a commitment to home building and home ownership (Case B Published History, 1998). In 1943, the partnering families severed their relationship, and by 1947, Adam controlled all outstanding shares in Case B1 and had inserted his sons, Fred and Daniel, into leadership positions and venturing opportunities at Case B's offices in Glasgow and Edinburgh. Upon the introduction of his sons into the parent family firm, his grandson Brad recollected in an interview,

'My grandfather, when he had two sons Fred and Daniel (Daniel is my father), he said to them, "We cannot have both of you in Glasgow – I can't have it. So one of you has to go somewhere else and start a business." So my father said, "I'll go to Edinburgh and start in the letting business." That would have been 1950-ish'.

In Edinburgh, Daniel ventured at Case B3 in the letting or rental of existing and new residential developments at the parent family firm, while his brother Fred ventured at Case B4 in the municipal sector, developing large-scale commercial housing in partnership with local governments and their authorities, as Scottish troops were returning from war and needed housing.

In 1965 and 1975, Fred's and Daniel's sons Dirk and Brad joined Case B as trained architects and changed the focus of the parent family firm once again with a decision to venture further into speculative home building and innovative design in luxury housing, inspired by their education in architecture and a previous legacy at the firm in municipal sector design, which many considered a blight on the land. Brad ventured in the design and development of luxury homes in Case B4, while his cousin Dirk, as chairman of the group, ventured in Case B5 in municipal building and the construction of Commonwealth Games housing in Scotland.

In the late '00s, Dirk and Brad introduced their sons Allen and Ray into leadership positions at the parent family firm, so they too could venture. The cousins were integral in the decision to venture and transition the parent family firm towards strategic land purchases in Scotland and England in Case B6. Ray ventured in timber framing in

Case B7 to sell to other construction firms. In 2007, Case B purchased a timber framing manufacturing facility to innovate and improve efficiencies while providing its own raw materials to its building unit. In an interview, Allen recalled,

'In 2007 we were informed by our bank that they would put a timber frame company up for grabs. We decided at that point, "You know what, we've had such a terrible let-down from our supply chain, and we want to build these units; so, let's purchase it and develop it"'.

In an interview, Brad recalled that it was Ed, a non-family director, who initially decided to venture in timber framing:

'I think Ed actually in this particular Case E was initially the person that wanted us to create [B7] because Dirk and I did not, and Ray was not with us yet'.

Several variables led to the creation of the new venture in timber systems. Case B had always been a traditional house builder, using brick and block instead of steel frames or wood because, as Brad and Dirk suggested, *'brick dust [is] running in our veins'*. However, in 2007 the board decided to increase the number of units built every year, from 120–130 up to 500 over a five-year period, and to venture towards timber systems as an efficient and fast building material. Case B saw the potential to double home production by changing its technique and resources. A change to timber framing in Case B7 represented a drastic departure from traditional brick and mortar building techniques and was a difficult venture for board members to accept. In an interview, Ray suggested,

'So that was an eye opener for quite a few of the board members at that point as well to say well, actually, it's different to what we do. This is completely new, and this is a completely different model and different commercial venture'.

Ray joined the firm in 2009 and since then has worked to develop and expand the new venture in timber framing at Case B7. While the decision to use timber was a board decision, the responsibility for venturing and development was given to Ray. In an interview, Ray reflected on the development and growth of B7 with his comment,

'However, I decided that no, I want this to grow more, it needs to be self-sufficient; it needs to be a stand-alone company...'

Nearly 300 years after Case B began operations in Bo'ness, the family ventures Cases B5, B6 and B7 transitioned the parent family firm back to its roots in letting, land purchases, timber sales and timber framing, along with a dedication to home building.

5.3.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case B

This section presents individual examples of forms of capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital indicated family and non-family employees working at Case B (Firkin, 2003). The within-case display in Table 5.25 presents example data from Case B interviewees. This data reflects resources imbued or transferred to family and non-family venture(s) so that they might overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe and March, 1965).

Table 5.25 Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case B

Construct	Case B → Cases B4, B5	Case B → Cases B6, B7
Human Capital	<p><i>Human [Brad]: "I think the skills I missed, or I don't have are the investigative financial skills that people possess now, in fact many of the entrepreneurs I know don't either for some reason."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Brad]: "And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we'd built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Brad]: "And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we'd built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor."</i></p>	<p><i>Human [Brad]: "Ed is a fantastic example of internal promotion while Ross actually knows what happens on site."</i></p> <p><i>Human [Brad]: "So, Ross came back, and I think he's probably the first member of the family that had to start at the bottom of the pile."</i></p>
Social Capital	<p><i>Social [Brad]: "I think they are very important, and I think you develop them; I think one of the things you get from the generation before is their networks."</i></p>	<p><i>Social [Brad]: "Ross has got a very good man skills, he's very good. I used to say that you seem to get people to do what you want without them knowing that they are doing it, and I think that's actually a part of – it's probably built in with him."</i></p> <p><i>Social [Brad]: "So, I think something that you can pass on to the next generation is contacts, but they are not formal, it's not a book. It's just when it's appropriate."</i></p>
Economic Capital	<p><i>Economic [Allen]: "I think in some cases there are decisions that are made particularly on creativity that don't always have, I suppose, the numbers at the fore."</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Ed] "to the customer, Case B is a company that puts its money where its mouth is, and shows confidence in the enduring value of the building and its location"</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Brad]: And, for many years we weren't controlled by finance - we had enough money. We didn't borrow money, we had loads of money!"</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Jim G.] "The scheme required healthy cash flow to sustain it, but it had enormous competitive benefits"</i></p>	<p><i>Economic [Ed] "Yes. So, I think the company, the main company, would fund everything he did."</i></p>

5.4 Case C (United States)

Over three generations, starting with George, Case C has established power over the field of agricultural distribution in Canada and the northeastern United States with strong human, cultural, social and economic capital in the green industry, fruit and produce industry and outdoor living industry. George established a reputation for and a legacy of partnering with customers and vendors to profit and expand his businesses. His son Arthur recalled in an interview,

'He had the meat market, and the grocery store, and the wholesale, yeah. And he located his businesses where both customers and vendors could load and unload quickly'.

Similarly, his sons built on his reputation and legacy as they partnered with customers and vendors while pursuing multiple ventures in agricultural distribution, like their father. Both of George's sons recalled his legacy by commenting,

'[George], my father, was quite a good businessman, and he owned [Case C] and operated it since he was a child and lived to 102 years old'.

George's grandchildren also extended his reputation and legacy by partnering with customers and vendors as they ventured in agricultural distribution in Cases C6 through C11.

5.4.1 Profile of Interviewees at Case C

Table 5.26 presents interviewee information of both family and non-family survey participants at Case C and ventures associated with Case C. The information in the table includes case, founder, birth dates, education, approximate age at founding and number of interviews conducted at the parent family firm.

Table 5.26 Interviewee Information at Case C

<u>Case</u>	<u>Founder</u>	<u>Birth date</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Gen.</u>	<u>Age at Venturing</u>	<u>Position at Firm</u>	<u>Core Intervw</u>	<u>Addtl Intervw</u>
Case C	George	1897		1 st	23	Owner	0	0
Case C1	Chris	1927	College	2 nd	25	Owner	2	1
Case C2	Arthur	1929	College	2 nd	22	Owner	2	0
Case C3	Arthur & Chris							
Case C4-C6	Arthur	1929	College	2 nd	35	Owner		
Case C7	Laura	1957	College	3 rd	34	Owner	1	0
Case C8&C11	Greg	1958	Masters	3 rd	25	Owner	2	2
Case C9&C10	Steve	1964	Masters	3 rd	28	Owner	1	2
	Tom	1952		Non-family		Employee	1	0
	Hal	1950	CPA	Non-family		Financial consultant	1	1

Interviews with individuals involved in all of Case C's operations were conducted over a period of three years, with the exception of Arthur, who had passed away in 2011. Arthur was interviewed in 2009 for a proposed case study on entrepreneurial approaches to succession. Many or most of the quotes Arthur provided for the proposed case study reference answers to existing items for this study.

Chris (family – 2nd generation)

Chris is George's first of two sons. During his years at Syracuse University, Chris studied biology with the assumption that he would become a medical doctor. His father persuaded him that a doctor worked long nights with low pay, whereas '*a businessman could pick up the phone and make \$1000 with one phone call*'. Chris chose business and is still in blueberry production and distribution from Canada in his 90th year.

Arthur (family – 2nd generation)

Arthur is George's second son. He pursued business from an early age, working in Case C's operations and working for himself. After starting with Christmas tree distribution from Case C's operations in Boston, Massachusetts, he quickly understood the potential for direct distribution from operations in Canada, and George encouraged him to pursue operations. Arthur graduated from Lehigh University in 1951 with a concentration in business administration, and he married Connie in 1957. Arthur continued to venture throughout his life with Cases C2, C3, C4, C5 and C6, and he encouraged his children Laura, Greg, Marina and Steven to venture as well. Arthur died in 2011.

Connie (family – 2nd generation)

Connie was married to Arthur for 50 years. She was an integral part of operations at Case C6 between 1975 and 1990, when her first daughter, Laura, assumed control of its retail operations.

Greg (family – 3rd generation)

Greg is Arthur's first son, and upon his graduation from the University of Vermont in 1981, he established himself in Christmas tree distribution from Nova Scotia while venturing in Case C8 in Christmas tree distribution from Quebec, Canada and venturing in Christmas wreath production in Maine, US. Greg also oversaw operations at Cases C4 and C5 as Arthur entered retirement. In 2011, Greg ventured in food distribution from Vermont in Case C11 with a mission to,

'... prove how a holistic partnership between farmers and families can thrive environmentally and economically'.

Steven (family – 3rd generation)

Steven is Arthur's second son and fourth child. He spent his early years unloading nursery trucks at various Case C operations, gaining an understanding of nursery operations. Upon his graduation from White University School of Agriculture with specialisation in applied economics and plant biology, he spent a short time in sales training and then entered Case C4 as a purchasing manager and location manager in 1991. Steven ventured in horticultural distribution direct from horticultural growers in 1998 (Case C9). He ventured in Case C10 with an online horticultural platform to provide landscape design, delivery and installation to retail homeowners, commercial contractors and real estate professionals.

Tom C. (Non-family)

Tom C. was a valued employee to Arthur in several ventures, working as a sales manager and general manager in both wholesale and retail operations. Upon his release from the Marine Corps, Tom began his 10-year tenure at Case C2 under Arthur's guidance. Over 10 years, Tom served many roles under Arthur, and he credits Arthur with devotion and commitment to his employees. However, believing that family members would transition into operational and senior management roles in all Case C ventures by 1986, Tom C. chose to partner and venture on his own in the green industry. Tom has ventured in the green industry for more than 35 years; he established his own power in the field with the dissolution of many Case C operations.

Hal R. (Non-family)

Hal R. maintained a close relationship with Arthur as an accountant and financial advisor for 35 years. While he was not an employee of any Case C venture, he maintained an instrumental role in family transitions. Hal also served as a family consultant during the transitional years and during the dissolution of Cases C2, C4, C5 and C8 between 2001 and 2004.

5.4.2 Profile of Case C

George started Case C with limited funds and limited social networks after emigrating from Greece in the early 1900s. He pushed a small cart through Boston neighbourhoods to sell fruit and vegetables door to door. His business grew rapidly, gaining a reputation for reliability and quality, according to his first son, Chris. Soon George became an established fixture at the fruit and produce markets at Haymarket Square and Quincy Market in Boston, where restaurants, markets and factories procured local fruit and produce on a daily basis. George also ventured with meat markets and a grocery store for local customers. His sons Arthur and Chris recalled his business acumen and business locations as exceptional.

It was not a coincidence that George selected a location that catered to growers, truckers, distributors and customers; he believed that business should be a partnership among those who grew the product, those who shipped the product, those who distributed the product and those who bought the product. According to his sons, George was known for his ability to create partnerships and help others in business, believing what was good for others in business would be good for him. George went further than most in his ability to partner with growers by partially financing their operations and/or supplying them with what they needed to get their product to market. His second son, Arthur, recalled in an interview,

'He helped finance the growers by getting their fertiliser, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that. He was a real organiser – a great planner'.

George was also known to support his growers and customers in good times and bad, believing that his commitment to their longevity and success would benefit both their organisations and his and build his business. In interviews, Chris remembered his father stepping in to help a grower without distribution:

'And it was good for his business, because the growers and the farmers that shipped him merchandise depended on him to get the right market price and get a good return on their merchandise, whatever they're growing. For years, he was the strawberry king'.

5.4.3 Profile of Venturing at Case C

Table 5.27 exhibits general case information about Case C, beginning with George, who ventured in fruit and produce distribution from wholesale markets at Quincy Markets in Boston, Massachusetts. He also ventured in a retail meat market and a retail grocery market in Brookline, Massachusetts, but their operations were short-lived. As noted above, George established a reputation for partnering with vendors and customers to establish and build his wholesale business while partnering with his sons to develop their own ventures. These ventures are listed below, but the family members continue to venture in agriculture and horticulture.

Table 5.27 General Case Information for Case C

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case C	George		1920	Closed	<i>Distribution of fruit and produce to local Boston restaurants and markets.</i>
Case C*	George		1930	Closed	<i>Retail meat market and retail grocery store in Brookline, Massachusetts</i>
Case C1	Chris	Son	1949	Operating	<i>Wholesale blueberry distribution from Canada</i>
Case C2	Arthur	Son	1952	Sold 2001	<i>Wholesale Christmas tree export from Canada</i>
Case C3	Chris & Arthur	Son	1954	Closed	<i>Marshmallow production in partnership with George and cousins</i>
Case C4	Arthur	Son	1975	Sold 2004	<i>Wholesale horticultural distribution centres (3) in New England</i>
Case C5	Arthur	Son	1965	Sold 2001	<i>Sod and shade tree propagation and production in New Hampshire</i>
Case C6	Arthur	Son	1975	Transferred to daughter, Laura	<i>Outdoor furniture and Christmas retail centres (3) in Boston area</i>
Case C7	Laura	Grand-daughter	1985	Operating	<i>Outdoor living centre in Boston area</i>
Case C8	Greg	Grand-son	1982	Sold 2001	<i>Christmas trees & wreath production and distribution from Canada to big box stores</i>
Case C9	Steve	Grand-son	1998	Operating	<i>Horticultural direct distribution to northeast retail and distribution centres</i>
Case C10	Steve	Grand-son	2014	Operating	<i>Online platform for horticultural design, delivery and installation</i>
Case C11	Greg	Grand-son	2007	Operating	<i>Farm to family table online distribution</i>

Table 5.28 displays the opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members at Case C. All of the ventures can be classified as belonging to the agriculture or horticulture industry. The specific industry domain is wholesale or retail in fruit/produce or horticulture. Table 5.28 also shows the context of the initial idea.

Table 5.28 Opportunity Identification and Development at Case C

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case C	Agriculture	Fruit & Produce	George began peddling a cart door to door but realized opportunity and ventured in wholesale distribution to local restaurants and markets
Case C*	Distribution	Retail meat market & grocery	George realized an opportunity and ventured in retail markets which could satisfy retail customers outside Boston with fresh meat and groceries.
Case C1	Agriculture	Blueberry production	Chris realized an opportunity with help from George and ventured in wholesale blueberry production and distribution from operations in Canada directly to large customers (e.g. pie makers)
Case C2	Agriculture	Christmas tree distribution	Arthur realized an opportunity with help from George and ventured in Christmas tree consolidation and distribution from shipping facilities in Canada
Case C3	Production	Marshmallow production	Chris and Arthur followed George's lead and ventured with their father in marshmallow production when they were not working in Canada
Case C4	Distribution	Horticultural distribution centres	Arthur ventured in (3) wholesale horticultural distribution centres (HDC)
Case C5	Agriculture	Sod & shade tree production	Arthur vertically integrated by venturing in sod and shade tree production for New England area customers and his wholesale HDC's
Case C6*	Distribution	Retail horticulture distribution	Arthur partnered with others to oversee and operate 21 retail garden centres
Case C6	Distribution	Retail home centres	From his experience in Case C6* Arthur ventured in (3) retail furniture and garden centres in New England
Case C7	Distribution	Retail home centres	Laura transitioned operations from Arthur and ventured in outdoor living centres
Case C8	Distribution	Christmas tree distribution	Greg transitioned operations from Arthur and ventured in wholesale distribution to big box stores
Case C9	Direct distribution	Horticultural distribution	Steven transitioned operations from Arthur and ventured in direct distribution with contract growing
Case 10	Online distribution		Steve ventured in online horticultural distribution offering retail customers online design, delivery and installation.
Case C11	Online distribution	Agricultural distribution	Greg offered online agricultural distribution connecting Vermont farmers to Boston area retail customers

While George partnered with his vendors and customers, he also partnered with his sons in the development of their own ventures in Cases C1 through C6. His first son, Chris, discussed in interviews the logistics of the relationship between Case C and his blueberry venture in Case C1:

'So I would talk to my father and I'd ship the blueberries to him, and he would unload the trailer truck and get it transferred to another truck. ... And so, we worked that way'.

Arthur also remembered the transfer of capital and resources to encourage the development of his individual ventures. In interviews, Arthur remembered the Christmas tree distribution from his venture in Canada (Case C2) to Case C locations at Quincy Market in Boston, where his father would distribute the product to local restaurants and merchants.

George ventured with both his sons in marshmallow candy production in 1950, forming Case C3. The marshmallow venture was a joint venture among family members while they pursued their individual ventures. In an interview, Chris remembered Case C3:

'Well, George thought [marshmallow manufacturing] was a good opportunity to get into a different kind of business. ... But we could assume to some extent that he was trying to set up a business for his family – for his two boys'.

Both sons developed Case C3 with their father while they simultaneously developed their own ventures (Case C1 and Case C2) because, as Arthur recalled in an interview, *'Christmas trees are – you know, it's a one-month, three-week business. You're very looked down on'.*

Marshmallow production represented an off-season opportunity for both sons; it also involved a significant investment on George's part. In an interview, Arthur remembered:

'Oh yeah, the candy business. My father put a lot of money into it. At that time, I had just got out of college; it was 1951, when he put in at least \$100,000'.

Although Chris and Arthur gave their best effort to develop the family venture in marshmallow production, Case C3 failed when mould entered the factory and required an additional large investment.

Chris and Arthur continued with their individual ventures, Case C1 and Case C2. Both sons drew on their father's entrepreneurial legacy and entrepreneurial orientation and used entrepreneurial capital provided by Case C. However, upon their father's advice, their individual ventures distributed trailer load quantities rather than the small quantities that Case C distributed. In Case C1, Chris ventured in blueberry production and distribution from Canada by shipping his product to large factories for the production of blueberry pies, desserts etc. Arthur ventured in Christmas tree production and distribution directly from Canada in Case C2 by shipping product directly to retail distributors and chain stores throughout the United States both sons

developed power in their respective fields by gaining a solid reputation for reliability, honesty and fair play. Chris recalled in an interview,

‘Arthur was doing well with his Christmas trees, shipping all over the United States, and I was satisfied. I was making good income in the blueberry industry ... truckloads of blueberries delivered to them’.

While Chris maintained and expanded his venture in blueberry production and distribution, Arthur developed additional ventures in horticulture distribution by establishing wholesale horticulture distribution centres (Case C4). He believed that horticultural distribution centres (HDCs) could provide a local outlet for Christmas trees from Canada and provide one-stop shopping for landscape contractors and developers in New England. To supply his HDCs as they expanded throughout New England, Arthur vertically integrated with sod farms and shade tree production (Case C5). In Case C6, Arthur acquired a large retail centre and ventured in outdoor furniture and garden centres in New England. He expanded his retail centres to three stores in Massachusetts that offered outdoor furniture and landscaping products in the spring and summer months and became Christmas tree shops in the winter months.

George’s grandsons and granddaughters also ventured in the green industry. Arthur’s first son, Greg, managed the horticultural distribution centres while also venturing in Christmas tree and wreath distribution and production (Case C7) in 1982. Arthur’s first daughter, Laura, updated the existing retail operations by venturing in outdoor living centres (Case C8) in 1989. Arthur’s second son, Steve, ventured in horticultural distribution by shipping from horticultural growers directly to wholesale customers (Case C9) in 1998. In Case C9, Steve maintained strong partnerships between horticultural growers and wholesale customers to *‘create partnerships for success’*. In 2016, Steve also ventured in the creation of an online horticultural platform for landscape design, delivery and installation (Case C10). He created C10 to transform landscaping from a process to a product. In Case C11, Greg ventured again in agriculture after the sale of the parent family firm in 2004. His venture as an online, cooperative food distributor was an attempt to create *‘a community of families and farmers’* in the production and distribution of food.

5.4.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case C

Table 5.29 presents examples of forms of entrepreneurial capital at Case C. This data reflects resources imbued or transferred to family and non-family venture(s) by parent family firms.

Table 5.29 Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case C

Construct	Case C → C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6	Case C thru C6 → Case C7, C8, C9, C10, C11
Human Capital	<p>[Chris]: "Yes, I think we learned a lot from our father, and in his own way he made sure that we understood."</p>	<p>[Tom C]: "And the Christmas business I learned 45 years previous from Arthur. I didn't know anything about Christmas trees and all that until he sent me out with Herb."</p>
Social Capital		
Economic Capital	<p>[Arthur]: "Oh yeah, the candy business. My father put a lot of money into it. At that time, I had just got out of college; it was 1951, when he put in at least \$100,000."</p> <p>[Chris]: Yeah, but he didn't supply the money. We had to do that -- I know we had to do that . . . I don't think he financed Arthur's business either. But I'm not sure.</p> <p>[Arthur]: "You know, I had to go find my way, but I remember he gave me \$5000 bucks to go buy trees, because the wholesale market was selling to smaller, more local people - small quantities."</p>	<p>[Greg]: "While it may not have boiled down to a financial support, what it really was almost like a co-signing on a loan, where suppliers felt comfortable that [Steve] had the support if [he] needed it and if [he] didn't need it, then that was fine."</p>
Cultural Capital	<p>[Arthur]: "And you know, Tony C. from the bank liked what I was doing - working, and hustling, and he knew [George]; he didn't know him, but he knew of him in the produce business."</p>	<p>[Greg]: "I think the main thing was the reputation and the track record and the purchasing power of the parent company . . . so that had been developed over quite a number of years."</p> <p>[Greg]: "I think the only support mechanism was one of networking and relationship whereby the nurseries felt, whether it was true or not, that this venture in [Case C10] kind of had the backing of the parent company. Maybe it did, maybe it didn't."</p>

5.5 Case D (United States)

Case D reflects data accumulated on family and non-family ventures from both family and non-family employees. This case study considers both family and non-family venturing activity at Case D but focuses on non-family venturing activity for further analysis and reference in Section 6.6, and at the end of this study.

5.5.1 Profile of Interviewees at Case D

Table 5.30 below lists interviewee information including case founder, birth date, education and approximate age at founding. Table 5.30 also includes information on number of interviews for this study.

Table 5.30 Interviewee Information at Case D

Case	Founder	Birth date	Education	Gen.	Age at Venturing	Position at Firm	Core Intervw	Addtl Intervw
Case D2	Clint	1945	College	4 th	25	Manager & Board member	2	2
Case D4	John	1950	College	Non-family	50	Owner	2	1
	Bill	1975	College	Non-family		Employee	2	1

This section presents a profile of the interviewees who either worked at the parent venture or provided organisational sponsorship to the venture. At the time of this study, Clint operated Case D2, from which John at Case D4 independently ventured. Before John independently ventured, John and Clint repeatedly expressed in interviews that they liked each other on a professional and personal level. However, by 2006 the relationship had soured, apparently due to John's independent venturing. At the time of interviewing, John and Clint had reconciled, but they continued to run separate and distinct operations in the northern neck of Virginia. Both Clint and John will soon plan for their succession.

Clint (family – 4th generation)

Clint is part of the fourth generation of family at Case D since agricultural operations began in the northern neck of Virginia in 1890. He was born in 1946, and he is the oldest son of Carl, who transitioned the parent family firm away from dairy farming towards horticultural production while Clint was attending college. Clint went to William & Mary College for two years and spent two years at North Carolina State, where he completed his education in business and horticulture. Clint commented in interviews that he '*grew up in the business*', but the family business maintained dairy farms and horticulture operations. In this section, Case D2 represents the horticultural operations that the New Jersey cousins facilitated and sponsored. Clint is the president of Case D2's operations, which include horticulture operations and wineries.

John (non-family)

John graduated from college in 1971. After college, he worked in the horticulture field in Europe for four years before going out to the US Midwest to expand his horticultural knowledge. He claimed in an interview that *'horticultural knowledge accumulated throughout [his] professional career'*. In 1977 John began growing perennials and ornamental grasses that he sold to retail and wholesale distributors along the East Coast of the US. During that time, he was attending horticultural trade shows and regional horticultural meetings, where he developed a working relationship with Clint at Case D2's operations.

In the early 1990s, John, his wife and a partner were still growing container and bare root perennials and ornamental grasses when Clint proposed that Case D2 buy perennial and ornamental grass production and retain John and his partner as Case D2 salesmen in shade and ornamental trees. John accepted the offer and worked at Case D2 for Clint from 1994 to 2000. A dedicated salesman, he sold product but also learned propagation and production techniques while networking with Case D2's customers and vendors.

In 2000, John began planting his own shade and ornamental trees and ventured in Case D4 on his own land. He informed Clint of his production based on the assumption that he would begin to dig his shade and ornamental tree inventory at Case D4 in 2006 and would combine sales with Case D2's inventory. However, by 2006 the relationship between John and Clint had disintegrated, just as production became ready at Case D4. Further, the US economy entered a steep recession the following year, which left Case D2 with excess shade and ornamental tree inventory.

Bill (non-family)

Bill graduated from college in 1994. He had worked summers at Case D4 since he was 12 years old while his older brothers worked full time at the nursery. In college, Bill majored in biology and minored in chemistry, assuming that he would enter chemical sales somewhere in Florida after graduation. John recommended that Bill give sales a try at Case D4 *'to see if [he] liked sales before [he] made the move to Florida'*. Bill transitioned to sales and Case D2 in 1994. Bill is therefore a non-family employee who has worked at Case D4 and Case D2 operations for more than 20 years, and as of the time of this study, he was still in sales at Case D2.

5.5.2 Profile of the Case D

In 1890, Case D began general farming, operating on 500 acres in the Northern Neck area of Virginia to ship milk and vegetables to local markets. Christopher originally bought the operation because he was a retired pharmacist who wanted to live in the country and do some general farming. He and his sons focused their efforts on dairy and vegetable production because of their close access to Washington, DC as the city expanded. Over four generations, the parent family firm transitioned from dairy farming to vegetable farming and nursery production, and most recently to wineries and vineyards.

In 1946, under Carl, the third generation of the family joined the firm and ventured in wholesale horticulture production, initially as an experiment. Carl had already finished his education in horticulture at University of Maryland and the White School of Agriculture when he took note of the successful family operations in horticultural production in Princeton, New Jersey. While it was his decision to venture in horticultural production on family land in Virginia, his cousins in New Jersey provided sponsorship in the form of extensive market and production knowledge and entrepreneurial capital. With this sponsorship, he began growing horticultural crops for markets along the East Coast of the United States. His New Jersey cousins also agreed to purchase his crops and integrate them into their product list for sale to Northeast and Mid-Atlantic customers. As Carl expanded his operations, Case D quickly became known as *'Virginia's largest and finest nursery'*.

In the 1970s, Carl's sons returned to help manage the family operations. Carl's first son, Clint, expanded the operations in horticultural production and distribution at Case D2 as president of the corporation. His younger sons, David and Chris, ventured in vineyards and wineries on available acreage in Case D3.

In 1994, Clint ventured and expanded his horticultural operations with the purchase of perennial operations from nearby growers. In doing so, he acquired several employees, including the owner, John, who joined D2 in sales while helping to integrate the perennial operation. In an interview, John reflected on the union of his perennial business with D2:

'When they hired us to head up their sales, it being obvious that perennials were going to be a good fit for them, they changed the customer base to match theirs.... You could say we got D2 into the perennial business.'

In the 1990s, John and Clint worked closely together to increase D2's sales while making D2 profitable. They did so by hiring a knowledgeable staff while increasing production. In an interview, John remembered,

'I was really working hard for D2 and I was all up and down the East Coast and into the Midwest'.

However, the economy expanded so fast that D2 could not keep up with the demand for shade and ornamental trees. As a direct result, only small shade and ornamental trees were available at D2.

In 2000, after selling for Clint and D2 for approximately six years, John started growing shade and ornamental trees on property where he had previously grown perennials and ornamental grasses. John believed that the production of shade and ornamental trees in larger sizes might fit well with the existing production at D2. John also believed there might be an informal partnership or *'loose agreement'* between the parent family firm in Case D2 and his non-family venture in Case D4. Because John had provided knowledge and resources to D2, he believed that D2 might support his venture with munificence and sponsorship to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy. John recalled in an interview,

'[Case D2] didn't start me in trees. I offered to do that. ... My thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [Case D2] tag on them when they left the door. I decided to do that on our own, but I kept Clint fully informed on all that'.

By 2006, the shade and ornamental trees had grown to size and were ready for sale at Case D4, but at that time, the relationship between John and Clint began to sour. John commented,

'I think [Clint] was blown away with how many trees we had here that we were ready to sell to him'.

In summer 2006, John and Clint parted ways. John recalled in an interview,

'When Case D2] and I parted company in the middle of '06, it forced me to really get serious about [D4] ... I was committed'.

5.5.3 Profile of Venturing at Case D (United States)

Venturing activity at Case D includes family members and non-family members at the parent family firm who initiate ventures at Case D. Table 5.31 provides information on individual ventures including founder, approximate founding date and brief description of the business.

Table 5.31 General Information for Case D

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case D	Christopher	1 st	1890	Transitioned	<i>Dairy production on 500 acres milking 80 cows</i>
Case D1	Kent	3 rd	1946	Transitioned from dairy to horticulture	<i>Carl realized an opportunity from NJ cousins in horticulture</i>
Case D2	Clint	4 th	1970's	Operational	<i>Clint expanded horticultural propagation and distribution</i>
Case D3	David & Chris	4 th	1970's	Operational	<i>David and Chris introduced wineries and vineyards on 80 acres of family land</i>
Case D4	John	Non-family	2000	Operational	<i>John expected a 'loose agreement' and partnership with Clint in his shade tree venture</i>

Table 5.32 shows the opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members and non-family members at Case D. The industry is agriculture, and Case D transitioned from dairy farming to horticulture to vineyards and wineries over four generations. Table 5.32 also shows the context of the initial idea, including the context of Case D4, which was a non-family operation venturing from the parent family firm. John expected a 'loose agreement' to distribute product with Case D2 when he started operations.

Table 5.32 Opportunity Identification and Development at Case D

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case D	Agriculture	Dairy production	Carl partnered with New Jersey cousins and ventured to transition Case D from dairy to horticulture Clint expanded horticultural propagation while venturing in perennial production, pot-n-pot production and distribution centres David and Chris ventured in vineyards and wineries with support from Carl John would venture in shade and ornament tree production on his land adjacent to Case D2. He Thought there would be a 'loose agreement' with Case D2
Case D1	Agriculture	Horticultural propagation	
Case D2	Agriculture	Horticultural propagation	
Case D3	Agriculture	Wineries & vineyards	
Case D4	Agriculture	Horticultural propagation	

Venturing at Case D began with a transition from general farming to dairy farming between the first and second generations. Venturing continued at the parent family firm when the founder's grandson Carl ventured in horticultural production in Case D2 with the help of his New Jersey cousins. Clint, a fourth-generation family member, continued to venture in horticultural production and propagation with a new business in perennials and ornamental grasses along with pot-n-pot production, which allowed the production and shipping of shade and ornamental trees throughout the selling season. Clint's brothers David and Chris ventured in wineries and vineyards on 50 acres adjacent to the horticultural operations since, as Clint recalled,

'My dad said if Thomas Jefferson can grow grapes in Virginia so can we with all the modern technology'.

Employees of the parent family firm also began to venture. John began working at the parent family firm in 1994, when Clint purchased facilities to produce perennial and ornamental grasses, which John and his wife operated on nearby land. While John committed himself to sales at D2, in 2000 he also committed to his own venture in ornamental and shade tree production on nearby land he owned because he believed D2 and D4 could work together in a *'loose agreement'* to produce shade and ornamental trees of all sizes for the Northeast and Midwest horticultural markets. The inventory at D4 would become ready in 2006 and could combine seamlessly with the inventory at Case D2. In an interview, John recalled,

'My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with Case D2; we had the sales force in place, we had the shipping and the production, and we could have easily added Case D4 inventory to inventory at Case D2 ... it was a win-win, for the way the tree business was 10, 15 years ago'.

John believed D4 *'would have been a partnership venture if we had gotten that far'*. In interviews John also recalled his relationship with Clint at D2:

'They were good to me and I think I was very good to them. The easiest thing for me to have done by the late '90s was to go back and just grow corn and soybeans and say the heck with it and then retire from Case D2 and be done with it'.

As of this study, John continues to operate D4, and Clint continues to operate D2. They have repaired their relationship and prepared their operations to facilitate the trans-generational success of their sons and nephews. John and Clint continue to venture in the green industry while steering their sons and nephews towards available resources and opportunities to encourage them to venture as well.

5.5.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case D

Table 5.33 presents examples of forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital at Case C (Firkin, 2003). Interviewees presented this data in their discussion of venturing at the parent family firm. This data reflects resources imbued or transferred to family and non-family venture(s) by parent family firms.

Table 5.33 *Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case D*

Construct	Case D → Case D2 & D3 (family)	Case D, D2 → Case D4 (non-family)
Human Capital		Human [Bill]: "Case D2 also helped John see how a B&B tree operation was run . . . I think it helped D4 get off the ground." Human [John]: "I very freely gave any knowledge I had, and I felt like they opened everything up to me that I would ever need to see, from the books to production to whatever."
Social Capital		
Economic Capital	Economic: "There was transfer of equipment and personnel between [our cousins] and D2." Economic [Clint]: "So, we received a lot of equipment, help, all that; we got their hand-me-downs and bought their second-hand stuff and it helped us tremendously to get started."	Economic [John]: "D2 didn't show us any money, there wasn't anything like that." Economic [Clint]: "There was transfer of equipment and personnel between [our cousins] and D2. There was no transfer between D2 and D4."
Cultural Capital	Cultural [Clint]: But I think we got our standards from growing plants, from [our cousins] that been around a lot longer than we have and had a lot more experience.	Cultural [Clint]: I think people realized and our customers - well he wouldn't be selling me this if it wasn't up to [Case D] standard so to speak. So, I think that was probably a lead out or a help for him.

5.6 Case E (United States)

Case E is a family firm inclusive of four generations starting with Thomas who emigrated from Madonna, Latvia in 1914 to start hybridizing ornamental plants for a burgeoning market in landscape horticulture outside of Boston. Interviews for Case E begin with the third generation and reflect data accumulated from semi-structured interviews among family and non-family employees over a period of 3 months.

5.6.1 Profile of Interviewees for Case E

Table 5.34 provides information on Case E interviewees who participated in this study. The table included information on birth date, education, approximate age at venturing and number of interviews conducted for this study. Below Table 5.34 is a brief description of interviewees and their responsibility with the parent family firm.

Table 5.34 Interviewee Information at Case E

<u>Case</u>	<u>Founder</u>	<u>Birth date</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Gen.</u>	<u>Age at Venturing</u>	<u>Position at Firm</u>	<u>Core Interview</u>	<u>Additional Interviews</u>
Case E4	Warren	1945	Landscape Architect	3 rd	27	Family owner	2	2
Case E5	Tim	1965	College MBA	4 th	35	Family owner	2	1
	Tom S		College	Non-family		General Manager	Kellogg Case Study 2004	

Warren (family – 3rd generation)

Warren, Ed's elder son, graduated from White University in 1964 with an undergraduate degree in economics and in 1966 with an MBA. His father considered him the logical successor to the business because he had dedicated himself to the green industry all his life while educating himself in economics and business. While Warren managed the growing, greenhouse and retail operations, he also ventured in wholesale horticultural distribution. As building outside Boston boomed throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Warren recognised an opportunity in wholesale horticultural distribution to provide contractors and landscape architects with one-stop shopping.

Tim (family – 4th generation)

Tim, born in 1967, spent his childhood working in the business – transplanting, digging, pruning, and fertilising. He graduated from Syracuse University in 1989 with degrees in finance and marketing and joined a start-up closely associated with Case E, selling branded bulk composting. Tim excelled as a salesman, but in 1996 he joined the parent family firm over the objection of his uncle and without a formal position. Nevertheless, he immersed himself in cost-saving and venturing activities, including composting, which quickly became a \$500,000 business.

Tom S. (non-family director)

Tom started at Case E in 1975 as the general manager of operations. He was a certified landscape architect who worked as a garden centre salesman at Case E until he was named landscape manager in 1981, retail manager in 1984, and sales manager in 1988. The semi-structured interviews with Tom S. were conducted as part of a Kellogg School of Management case study under the direction of John Ward in 2004.

5.6.1 Profile of Case E

Over four generations family members have operated Case E since the company was founded in 1923 by Thomas. Thomas who was born in Madonna, Latvia, arrived in the United States in 1914 and pursued his horticulture interests working in greenhouses and propagation facilities outside of Boston, Massachusetts. In 1923 with his wife, Anna, the young couple secured bank funding to purchase an eighty-acre site in Weston, Massachusetts to grow horticultural material. By 1933 Thomas quickly established an enviable reputation for horticultural propagation of fruiting trees and annuals which he sold to the general public from his farm west of Boston. Grandson, Warren recalled in interviews,

Back in '23 when the company started it was a growing, propagating nursery that found out what the customers were looking for and grew them.

Thomas's children, Laura and Ed, developed their own interest for horticulture and both pursued degrees in landscape architecture. Upon graduation in 1938 both married and joined Case E along with their spouses to steadily grow the business. While working with his father, Ed developed an enviable reputation for introducing many new plant varieties that were sought after for New England's difficult terrain and weather conditions. His son, Warren also remembered in interviews,

In the '20s and '30s we were doing mostly perennials and fruit trees and then in the '40s we began to get into woody plants. When my dad came into the business in '37-'38 he brought an interest in woody plants and landscaping design.

With specialized propagation techniques Ed developed the Little Leaf Rhododendron which could withstand harsh New England winters then bloom beautifully in the early spring. The Rhododendron variety was named in honour of his father, Thomas, who had hybridized and propagated many plant varieties before him.

By 1946 success with propagation techniques, retail operations and landscape architecture along with an encroaching big city coerced the family to move operations. They chose three hundred acres of farmland in Western, Massachusetts - about fifteen miles away from Weston operations – on which they could expand growing operations and new ventures. With the additional land Thomas and Ed grew nursery stock but also ventured in vegetable crops for local Boston markets. Again, Warren recalled in interviews,

“We started to produce tomatoes and peppers and things earlier. [Case E] needed to generate cash but of course they were doing the nursery stuff at the same time - bringing trees up from Weston and then propagating them up here too as we built the facilities.”

Ed's children, Warren (born in 1942) and Rodney (born in 1944), also joined the family firm as the 3rd generation, and they worked the land just as their father and grandfather before them.

After graduating from White University in 1964 with a bachelor's degree in economics and an MBA in 1966, Warren returned to the nursery. Company sales surpassed \$1 million for the first time that year. Meanwhile, Rodney attended White for a time, but graduated from Franconia College in New Hampshire with a two-year Associate's degree in 1967. He joined the company in 1970.

Both sons considered themselves 'farmers' despite their education in business and finance. While the brothers oversaw more than 7 distinct profit centres and independent ventures as part of the parent family firm, management was a difficult process, and their relationship was tumultuous and contentious throughout the 1970s and 1980s. However, Warren was the eldest son, had advanced degrees in business and took naturally to horticulture; his father saw him as the natural successor. Rodney focused on labour tasks, such as driving trucks and helping in the shipping yard.

Brothers were often at odds over many or most aspects of sales, production and expansion at Case E and ventures associated with Case E. This contentious relationship was fuelled by a stipulation in Ed's will when he passed away in 1969 that Rodney and Warren could only inherit the nursery's assets if both of them had been working at Case E full time for at least ten years prior to Rodney's fortieth birthday. Rodney believed the stipulations were coercive and manipulative, and resentment boiled between the brothers. When the stipulations were met Rodney became an equal partner with Warren, but brothers maintained different roles - Warren assumed management of nursery production and harvesting, while Rodney ran administration, maintenance and equipment, and construction projects. Warren also assumed the presidency and Rodney became chairman and treasurer. As such, the brothers had to make joint decisions. Despite their strong and acrimonious differences in philosophies and differences in entrepreneurial dispositions. Differences arguably affected leadership at the parent family firm and munificence provided at the parent firm as brothers bitterly fought for control of employees, assets and the future of the firm without their father to guide them. Often, the brothers disagreed "*just for the sake of disagreeing.*"

Despite their differences in philosophies and dispositions, the nursery expanded its business and its landholdings to 960 acres on which it grew horticultural product while retailing to the public, wholesaling to local landscape contractors and landscaping to an ever-growing suburban population in and around the Boston area.

In 1996, Warren's son Tim joined the operations at Weston Nurseries. Like his father and other members of the family, Tim, born in 1967, started at a young age by working in the fields, transplanting, digging, pruning, and fertilising. However, after graduating from Syracuse University with degrees in finance and marketing, he chose a position in sales with a local horticultural distribution company. When Tim decided to formally enter the parent family firm in 1996, the management discussed how the transition should happen. His uncle fervently believed that the company did not have the economic resources to "*just add another body*" at the management level, and that

“Tim didn’t have the skill level” of those who had been there longer. Warren believed that Tim could provide the marketing skills and sales support that Warren and Rodney lacked. Friction escalated between the brothers, and Tim was forced to join Case E without a defined position. He was tasked with finding cost-saving alternatives and ideas for new business. In short order, he was successful in developing new ventures in composting while also professionalising existing ventures in commercial wholesale and later in retail operations.

In the 2000s, Case E prospered but continued to encounter challenges and increasing competition. Competition quickly entered the horticultural distribution field from larger and better-funded firms. Further, improved shipping logistics allowed horticultural product to ship from distant farms quickly, safely and cheaply. Increasing competition along with a severe recession forced Case E and all of the ventures associated with it into bankruptcy and family dissolution. In the early 2000s, Rodney left the parent family firm, causing further tumult. The dissolution of the brothers’ shared ownership increased the pressure on Case E operations to perform.

After 2010, Case E and its associated ventures attempted to survive the recession but struggled with bankruptcy. Warren and Tim worked diligently together to stabilise the business while maintaining their individual ventures, Tim in composting and retail and Warren in wholesale horticultural distribution and design. The parent family firm eliminated several ventures, including growing and propagation.

5.6.3 Profile of Venturing at the Case E

Table 5.35 below provides general information for Case E about founder, approximate date of founding and a brief description of individual businesses represented as ventures.

Table 5.35 General Information for Case E

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case E	Thomas	Founder	1923	Transitioned	Hybridizing fruit trees and annuals for local Boston area customers
Case E1	Ed	Son	1935	Transitioned	Hybridizing woody ornamentals; vegetable production;
Case E2	Ed	Son	1950	Transitioned	Retail operations
Case E3	Ed	Son	1950	Sold	Landscape design
Case E4	Warren	Grand-son	1965	Operational	Commercial wholesale
Case E5	Tim	Great grandson	1985	Operational	Industrial-scale composting and retail operations

Table 5.36 shows the opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members at Case E. The industry is agriculture, but Case E has ventured in areas of horticulture, including horticultural distribution and landscape design, over four generations. Table 5.36 also shows the context of the initial idea, as Thomas ventured in horticultural propagation with his knowledge in propagation and understanding that Bostonians were moving to suburbs and looking for interesting landscape material. His son and grandson also ventured, securing Ed’s legacy. Tim

ventured in industrial-scale composting to meet a need for organic waste management in Case E's operations and in the surrounding cities and towns.

Table 5.36 Opportunity Identification and Development for Case E

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case E	Agriculture	Horticulture propagation	Thomas emigrated and ventured with his talents in horticultural propagation
Case E1-E3	Agriculture	Horticultural propagation	Working with his father Ed realized opportunity in hybridizing, retail operations and landscape design for retail markets moving to Boston suburbs
Case E4	Distribution	Horticultural distribution	Warren realized opportunity in wholesale horticultural distribution centres to contractors and landscapers
Case E5	Agriculture	Composting	Tim ventured in industrial-scale composting while innovating retail operations

In 1923, Thomas and his wife began operations on 10 acres of farmland due west of Boston for the express purpose of propagating and hybridising fruiting trees and annuals for farmers and homeowners. The ground was difficult to grow on, but the business immediately prospered and grew to accommodate an increasing population living outside Boston. Thomas and his wife grew what customers wanted and their small venture prospered quickly, expanding to 80 acres.

In the 1930s, Thomas's son Ed worked closely with his father in propagating fruiting trees, but he quickly developed his own specialty: hybridising woody ornamentals (azaleas and rhododendrons). His hybridising efforts led to the creation of the Little Leaf Rhododendron, which could withstand the harsh New England conditions and bloom beautifully in the early spring. Ed successfully marketed his new plant cultivar at his new venture in retail operations in Case E1, while operations at Case E expanded to 300 acres with a move to land less than 45 minutes from Boston. At the new growing location, the parent family firm ventured in vegetable production, believing the extended growing season in the Northeast US would allow time for horticultural and vegetable production. In the 1950s, Ed ventured in retail operations on new properties to attract homeowners moving away from the city.

In the 1960s, Warren and his brother Rodney joined the operations at Case E. At the time, the operations had a simple top-down structure and every management decision came from Thomas or his son Ed. As an economics student and MBA, Warren provided structure and seemed likely to be Ed's successor. Warren also responded to a booming Boston housing market by venturing in wholesale horticultural distribution (Case E2) while maintaining the existing operations. In Case E2, horticultural distribution provided an outlet for the propagation and horticultural production at Case E, and it also offset the rising competition from the shipment of nursery product from distant states to the New England market, which had long been the domain of Case E.

In the 1980s, Warren's son Tim delayed his decision to join the firm while he worked in the green industry in sales for a Northeast distributor of green goods. Though he had grown up in the fields like his father and grandfather, Tim delayed making a decision to join the parent family firm but believed his input would be more valuable within the family rather than outside. In an interview, his father Warren commented,

'We were pretty enthusiastic that [Tim] was willing to come back after spending five or six, maybe ten years outside of the business and that was something that we thought would be very valuable and it's proved to be'.

Tim soon ventured in composting, which allowed local homeowners, contractors, cities and towns to dump their landscape waste. After a short time, the waste created rich soils that were put back into the fields for internal improvements and plant quality. The venture in composting also created an awareness of the environment. Tim and his father were early believers in environmental awareness, and Warren commented in an interview,

'The term "environment" was something that I was pretty insistent on when I first came into the business because I could see the need for environmental awareness'.

5.6.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case E

Table 5.37 presents examples of forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital at Case C (Firkin, 2003). Interviewees presented this data in their discussion of venturing at the parent family firm. This data reflects resources imbued or transferred to family and non-family venture(s) by parent family firms.

Table 5.37 Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case E

Construct	Case W, W1, W2, W3 → Case W4	Case W, W1, W2, W3, W4 → Case W5
Human Capital	<p><i>Human: 'When my dad came into the business in '37-'38 he brought an interest in woody plants and landscaping and design'.</i></p> <p><i>Human: 'During grade school, I worked here all the time, deadheading plants, pruning, picking stones....'</i></p> <p><i>Human: 'Wayne and Roger worked at the nursery since they were old enough to waddle'.</i></p>	<p><i>Human: 'In terms of helping me with knowledge and capabilities in this bulk composting business, they neither helped nor hindered'.</i></p> <p><i>Human: '[Roger] wanted [Peter] to start right now and learn from the bottom up because he needed to have this understanding of the business, which of course is the old style of thinking'.</i></p>
Social Capital	<p><i>Social: '[Ed] joined the plant propagator's society and got to meet a lot of the innovators in nursery production'.</i></p>	
Economic Capital	<p><i>Economic: 'Through the 1970s and 1980s, the nursery continued to expand its landholdings, eventually becoming a 960-acre complex. During this time many production methods changed, largely in response to competition and rising costs'.</i></p>	<p><i>Economic: '[Wayne & Roger] were already using the equipment on the site and we pretty much kept the same equipment that was used'.</i></p>
Cultural Capital	<p><i>Cultural: 'We're here for the long term, we're stewards of the land, and we want to be good citizens and treat our people well'.</i></p> <p><i>Cultural: 'If [Case W] doesn't have it, no one has it'.</i></p> <p><i>Cultural: 'In 1959 we opened the retail garden centre. Ed's viewpoint that "if we raise the plants, they will come", was largely correct, because the company continued to prosper'.</i></p>	<p><i>Cultural: 'My dad was a landscape architect and studied horticulture, but it was in the design, how to use the plants, point of view'.</i></p> <p><i>Cultural: 'We were not slow to pay, the [Case W] name was good. I think the name is still good, it's a well-recognised brand'.</i></p>

5.7 Case F (Scotland)

Case F reflects data accumulated from semi-structured interviews among family and non-family employees over a period of 2 months. Further, this section considers venturing at the parent family firm over 2 generations.

5.7.1 Profile of Interviewees at Case F

Table 5.38 provides information on individual interviewees who participated in this study. Interviewee information includes birth date, approximate age at venturing and number of interviews conducted for this study. Data below Table 5.38 provides a brief description of individual interviewees for reference.

Table 5.38 Interviewee Information for Case F

Case	Founder	Birth date	Education	Gen.	Age at Venturing	Position at Firm	Core Interview
Case F	Mike	1970	College	1 st	20	Owner	3
	Dave	1972	College	1 st	19	Owner	1
Case F1	Joan	1990	College	2 nd	25	Owner	2

Mike

Mike began his career as a surveyor as a young adult growing up just outside of Glasgow, but gradually developed a technical expertise in home-building in conjunction with population growth in the suburbs of western Scotland where he started Case F in 1990 and worked with his wife and brother, Scott. Case F under his leadership would develop an enviable reputation quickly in the development of custom and bespoke homes as well as commercial properties. Mike believed Case F would always be a family firm as his two children developed their own ventures while they also developed an interest in the home-building business.

Joan

Joan is the 1st child of two children of Mike and Anne, and she graduated from a local Glasgow university in 2014 after some consideration of her career path. Initially, she left school when she was 16 years old from general dissatisfaction and desire to be an actress. She applied to drama school in London and was accepted, but the recession beginning in 2008 started her at drama school but changed her career path back to the parent family firm to assist in 'firefighting' as the business confronted challenges and fought to stay in business. During and after the recession of 2008 Joan worked at Case F providing back office and customer support while her mother managed marketing for the firm and her father and uncle managed sales and construction. While she recognizes technical and marketing support from the parent family firm and parents, she also recognizes her own ability to develop her venture to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy.

Scott

Scott is brother to Mike and manages day to day operations at Case F. Scott also grew up just outside of Glasgow and developed an appreciation for construction and development. With his brother in 1990 Scott would develop the reputation of Case F for bespoke luxury home construction and land development, but in 2008 economic

recession severely curtailed home construction. Home construction dwindled from more than 100 units per year to zero and Scott helped to reduce operating costs at the parent family firm.

5.7.2 Profile of Case F

In 1990 Case F began operations building bespoke and custom homes in an around Glasgow, UK. Mike established Case F with 3 members of his family including wife, Anne and brother, Scott to create value for their customers. To date the family has built more than 1000 bespoke or customer homes and commercial properties in western Scotland. Case F continues to maintain a reputation for quality and integrity within the Glasgow community.

By 2005 business and construction in Scotland were heading in a good direction and Case F had become a strong company with a good reputation under family leadership. To catch a profitable wave of building, the company significantly increased its land holdings and inventory upon which to build speculative houses. But, by late 2008 the parent family firm was still buying land when a severe recession hit Scotland and drastically reduced land values while reducing requests for home-building. Yearly housing starts for the small parent family firm dropped from nearly 100 per year to 0 housing starts, and Mike was desperate to find ideas to bank on and preserve his land holdings. While the parent family firm had embraced an entrepreneurial mindset before the recession, Mike suggested in interviews that during the recession, *“entrepreneurial spirit was directed at keeping the company functioning.”*

By 2013 the parent family firm was still eager to sell many of its land holdings while the economy continued to recover. Meantime, Mike was pushing forward new ideas in home-building including construction of small, modular home which he could build on any site at any location for a small fee. Small modular homes were not a new concept for the Scottish since veterans returning to a war-torn Scotland after WWII lived in small, modular homes during reconstruction. Mike promoted the idea with help from his wife and brother; further, he promoted the idea among local academics and not-for-profit ventures. In 2014 he sought the direction and advice of his daughter to provide ideas and leadership of the new venture in Case F1.

Upon graduation from university Joan would venture in Case F1 with sponsorship and direction from the parent family firm. Upon graduation in 2014 Joan and her boyfriend had hoped to settle in Glasgow but found rents prohibitive without income. To offset costs, they moved into a small modular home built by her father for marketing purposes on family property. She worked with her father at the parent family firm in back office and customer support but quickly understood an opportunity in marketing these small homes given their low cost at £59,000 for 1,500 square feet of living space. These small homes were often starting homes for young adults or aging grandparents; they were also 2nd homes for many families in the countryside in and around Scotland. They could be constructed in family factories and shipped to any site. The fact that Case F1 did not require expensive land purchases was a key economic feature of the

venture because the customer purchased the land on which to build. While the parent family firm provided human capital and very limited economic capital, her parents provided field-building support and networking support to allow Case F1 to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy. As of interviewing Case F1 continues to build small homes in and around Glasgow while seeking new markets in small house-building in difficult to reach areas around Scotland including the Hebrides and Shetland Islands.

5.7.3 Profile of Venturing at the Case F

Table 5.39 provides generation information for Case F including founder information, approximate date of founding and a brief business description for reference.

Table 5.39 General Information for Case F

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case F	Mike	1 st	1990	Operational	<i>Land development and construction of bespoke homes in Glasgow suburbs</i>
Case F1	Joan	2 nd	2014	Operational	<i>Small homes for young or elderly. Also marketed as 2nd homes</i>

Table 5.40 reflects opportunity identification and development of individual ventures among family members at Case F. Development and construction is the classification of industry, and Case F has ventured in land development and bespoke homes in Glasgow suburbs. Table 5.40 also reflects context of the initial idea as Mike initially proposed the concept of small home construction. Joan developed the venture in 2014 after university graduation and marketed the concept to 1st time home buyers with a budget and elderly relative requiring independence but care on family property.

Table 5.40 Opportunity Identification and Development for Case F

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case F	Construction	Home-building and land development	Bespoke and luxury homes in Glasgow suburbs
Case F1	Construction	Home-building	Mike developed small homes concept, but Joan ventured in small home development with support from her father.

The concept for Case F1 was the initial brainchild of Mike who had developed a building skills initiative for students at a local academy in 2010. The initiative taught schoolchildren how to build albeit very small homes, but it was recognized at the highest levels of Scottish government. As such, Mike recognized the profit and production potential for very small homes which were modular and moveable. However, it was the energy and determination of his daughter along with £50,000 in financing from her father, Mike, which guided Joan toward small, modular, timber

homes in Case F1. As testament to the product, Joan moved into a modular home upon graduation from university in Scotland. While she believed she was pursuing her father's vision, both family members agreed that Case F1 existed as a venture under the auspices of Case F.

5.7.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case F

This section presents examples of forms of capital at Case F. The within-case display in Table 5.41 presents example data from interviewees reflecting Firkin's (2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital indicated by family and non-family employees working at Case F. This data reflects resources imbued to individual ventures so that they might overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe and March, 1965).

Table 5.41 Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case F

Construct	Case F → Case F1
Human Capital	<p><i>Human [Joan]: 'Definitely technical knowledge is one of the things that Dad brings'.</i></p> <p><i>Human [Michael]: 'I have a lot of that kind of knowledge and experience on tap that's much more easy to access than it is through another mentor'.</i></p>
Social Capital	<p><i>Social [Joan]: 'We live and work mainly in Ayrshire and as such we see some feedback out of return to the community for their understanding of living and working in this area'.</i></p>
Economic Capital	<p><i>Economic [Michael]: 'If I send a joiner from Case F to work for Case F1 Jennifer's still got to buy that'.</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Michael]: 'I gave her £50,000 to start the business. That gave me 49%, and that gave her 51%'.</i></p>
Cultural Capital	<p><i>Cultural [Joan]: 'They always discuss them as two separate companies, but it's certainly helpful at this early stage to be able to say to people that we subcontract the building lot to Case F, and they've been running for 23 years, and they've built over 1000 new homes'.</i></p> <p><i>Cultural [Michael]: 'I think there's a feeling that if there's a solid company with 23 years' experience ... I think that lends real substance to Case F1'.</i></p>

5.8 Case G (United States)

Case G reflects data accumulated from semi-structured interviews among family and non-family employees over a period of 3 months. While there is venturing activity by family members, Case G represents a parent family firm with non-family venturing activity by non-family members.

5.8.1 Profile of Interviewees

The following table describes interviewee information for Case G including birth dates, education, approximate age upon venturing and number of interviews conducted for this case study. Below Table 5.42 there is a brief description of interviewee for reference in this case.

Table 5.42 Interviewee Information for Case G

Case	Founder	Birth date	Education	Gen.	Age at Venturing	Position at Firm	Core Interview	Additional Interviews
Case G	David	1967	College	1 st	24	Owner	2	2
	Jake	1994	High School	2 nd	26	Asst. Manager	1	1
Case G1	Daniel		College	Non-family	30	General Manager	3	2

David – (family – 1st generation founder)

David graduated from college in NH in the late 1980's and started Case G after initially working in the green industry with a college friend whose family owned a local garden centre and construction firm. While neither of his parents ran their own business, David learned that running your own business in the green industry could provide freedom and economic opportunity. In interviews he commented,

My parents did not run a business. I got into a business of my own probably just because of the freedom and economic opportunities.

With an arguably strong EO and commitment to his growers and his business, he thrived. His wife and children joined in the success of the parent family firm, but they were disenchanted with his level of involvement. In interviews Daniel remarked,

I don't think his kids want to be in the business. The fact that they saw their father bust his butt and never was around and worked so hard to do what he did and his kids don't want to do that.

When Donald encountered health issues in the early 2000's, he discussed ownership transfer with Daniel. While these discussions in 2005 would theoretically transfer ownership, David would continue to receive an income stream along with control over

decision-making. Further, David would control decisions on venturing, and he would control all resources allocated to any venture. By 2015 venturing arguably seemed more talk than substance.

Daniel (non-family director)

Daniel began an appreciation for horticulture from his grandfather at a very young age. In high school he chose an elective in horticulture, and during his high school years worked with a large and well-established re-wholesale horticultural operation in NH which also included a growing operation. While much of his time included sales and inventory management, Donald also developed an appreciation for horticultural propagation of lilacs.

Daniel started with Case G in 1997 and was made general manager in 2005. In his role as general manager he oversaw operations while assisting David in buying and selling. He believed their relationship worked well because as he commented in interviews,

“I feel we balance each other; we work very well together. He thinks one way, I think a different way, and that's why I feel we have worked well together over the past 19 years.”

Over 19 years Daniel supported and supplemented growth at Case G as part of a partnership effort. Both developed a strong partnership that arguably went beyond daily operations to include discussions about horticultural introductions and direction for the future of the business. While David provided sales and finance for the new firm, Daniel provided extensive horticultural knowledge and a calm nature when talking to customers and suppliers which oftentimes offset an aggressive and competitive nature from David. In interviews Daniel commented,

“Donald is a businessman and I'm a nurseryman - I'm more a plant person, and that's why I think that we work . . . I have treated this like my own business, probably for 15 years, and it's not my business.”

Jake (family – 2nd generation)

Jake is the 2nd son of David making him the potential 2nd generation at Case G. While Jake has worked at the parent family firm for more than 10 years, his father has committed to transfer ownership of Case G to Daniel rather than Jake. David continues to run operations, and as of these interviews Jake continues his employment at the nursery. In interviews he commented with frustration that his father continued to control every aspect of the operation and refused to cede control. Jake commented that his future at Case G is uncertain. He may choose to venture from the parent firm in future years.

5.8.1 Profile of Case G

David started Case G in 1991 in order to venture in the green industry. A college friend introduced him to the industry and provided necessary networking and knowledge to start. Local competitors from re-wholesale distributors and retail centres provided

David with a quick study on overhead, purchasing and efficiencies which he arguably believed were secrets to success in the green industry. As he stated in interviews, “*I kept my eyes open to things I saw people doing correctly . . .*”

Case G began with retail sales and wholesale sales to a select few construction firms. He quickly developed an enviable network of green goods suppliers with his reputation for quick payment and he developed a loyal following among his retail and wholesale customers with good service and high-quality plant material. Between 1991 and 2000 the business grew quickly, and he responded to rapid growth with capable employees who could help him grow. His wife joined the firm to help with bookkeeping and invoicing; Daniel joined the firm in 2000 to help with sales and management, and his son joined the firm to oversee operations.

In the early 2000’s and late 2000’s despite severe economic downturns in the northeastern US, Case G continued to grow while many of his competitors met with difficulties or closed their doors. David believed his success was partly due to his strong network of horticultural growers. In interviews he commented,

‘I also try to establish, and I think I’ve succeeded with a lot of my growers - we’ve established fairly good personal relationships.’

David also believed his success was due to a focus on core concepts of the business like purchasing, accounting and personal relationships rather than trade associations or trade shows. As an example, David commented in interviews he eschewed groups and associations.

‘I’ve typically not joined groups. I’ve had people suggest that I should be part of different groups over the years, but I think a lot of it’s a waste of time.’

By 2005 David considered Daniel to be his likely successor at Case G over family members, and both began discussions about transitioning the business. It seemed the correct decision since David had navigated health issues and family members questioned their commitment to the parent firm. Further, they questioned whether their father would ever quit the business. While his sons continued to work in the business, they continued to have reservations about running the business. In interviews Daniel commented,

‘I don’t think his kids want to be in the business . . . I’m assuming Donald wanted his sons to take it over and I can see his kids coming in and just being frustrated with him because he just won’t let go and them just being like, ‘Get out of here!’

Between 2010 and 2015 Daniel became integral to operations and general management at Case G; he provided stability, integrity and reliability to existing operations. Further, his management style offset a competitive and aggressive nature often displayed by David. In interviews David commented,

‘[Daniel] has got unimpeachable integrity . . . It’s long since really been an employer-employee relationship with him; it passed that a long time ago.’

By 2015 transfer of ownership was incomplete, but Daniel continued to have faith and commented in interviews, “*The shifting of reins doesn’t bother me because I’m willing to take on whatever.*” Further, by 2015 Daniel had not ventured in horticultural propagation. While David continually suggested that he would support any direction that Daniel chose for the company, the active transfer of entrepreneurial dispositions and resources from the parent firm toward venturing at the parent firm were arguably unsubstantial and less than significant. In interviews Daniel continued to believe that, “[*David*] *is just going to be for me, a resource.*”

5.8.3 Profile of Venturing at Case G

This section references venturing activity among non-family at Case G, and presents general information in Table 5.43 on venturing activity at Case G. Information includes approximate date of venturing activity, status of the venture at the time of this study, and a brief description of the business.

Table 5.43 General Information on Case G

Case	Founder	Family Position	Date or Founding	Company Status at Interviews	Business Description
Case G	Donald	1 st	1991	Operational	<i>Horticultural wholesale distribution</i>
Case G1	Daniel	Non-family	2015	Operational	<i>Horticultural wholesale distribution and horticultural propagation</i>

Table 5.44 reflects opportunity identification and development of a single venture among family members and non-family members at Case G. Distribution is the classification of industry, and Case G has developed distribution in the horticultural wholesale distribution to the green industry. Table 5.44 also reflects context of the initial idea as Daniel ventures in horticultural propagation realizing an opportunity for Lilac propagation. While David has professed in interviews to support the transfer of ownership and the possibility of venturing to Daniel, this study suggests that he has provided entrepreneurial capital and sponsorship but in limited forms.

Table 5.44 Opportunity Identification and Development at Case G

Case	Industry	Specific Industry Domain	Context of Initial idea
Case G	Distribution	Horticultural distribution	David ventured after college with guidance and support from the family of a college friend.
Case G1	Agriculture	Horticultural propagation	Daniel has proposed venturing in Lilac propagation, but he continues to wait for David to cede control of operations which he promised in 2005.

Since 2005 Daniel discussed venturing in horticultural propagation. His knowledge of horticultural propagation and growing techniques includes a practical education from his grandfather, a formal education in horticulture from high school and a business education in growing from his previous employer while in high school. However, by the time of interviews the venture had never taken form. In interviews Daniel understood that venturing required land, financing, labour and networking among horticultural growers. He admitted in interviews that his strengths lay elsewhere and David had provided limited forms of Capital and sponsorship.

5.8.4 Profile of Forms of Capital at Case G

The within-case display in Table 5.45 presents example data from interviewees reflecting Firkin's (2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital in human, social, economic and cultural capital indicated family and non-family employees working at Case G. This data reflects resources imbued to individual ventures so that they might overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe and March, 1965).

Table 5.45 Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital at Case G

Construct	Case G → Case G1
Human Capital	<p><i>Human [Daniel]: 'His comfort talking with suppliers has a lot to do with me helping him in that area'.</i></p> <p><i>Human [Donald]: 'I think more of where I've helped him is in the buying part'.</i></p> <p><i>Human [Donald]: 'I go to [Wilson] sometimes. His knowledge of plants in general is deeper than mine is. He studies a lot'.</i></p> <p><i>Human [Daniel]: 'I've learned from Dave how to run a business, how to do business smart'.</i></p>
Social Capital	<p><i>Social [Daniel]: '[Donald] is just going to be for me, a resource. If I need help, if I need connections'.</i></p> <p><i>Social [Daniel]: 'I think he would provide me with contacts/resources to help me understand more'.</i></p>
Economic Capital	<p><i>Economic [Donald]: 'What I've taken now and what I have invested and what I have available to invest I want a return on'.</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Donald]: 'Investing in something you know very well is probably one of your better investments'.</i></p> <p><i>Economic [Daniel]: 'I do think he would offer financial support, and he would expect payback/return on that investment'.</i></p>
Cultural Capital	<p><i>Cultural [Donald]: 'I'm using my credibility to give him credibility'.</i></p> <p><i>Cultural [Daniel]: 'The business name would also help with this growing opportunity'.</i></p>

5.9 Cross-case Displays of Case Data

This section presents a cross-case display of the data associated with Case A through G for case reference across cases. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), the presentation of data in this format allows for the identification of similarities and/or differences across all cases. Table 5.46 displays general information about all cases including family structure and venturing activity at each parent family firm. The first column includes only investigated ventures as part of this case study and it should be noted that several firms commented there had been venturing over generations and the number of ventures was too numerous to count. The second column denotes whether the venture was a 'family' venture or 'non-family' venture since this study investigates differing dispositions and munificence as they relate to different types of ventures. The

third column presents field of venturing. It was clear that most or all ventures remained in their original field (e.g. construction, green industry, etc.), and this is consistent with designation of field as described by Bourdieu (1986) since the individual seeks power over the field through the accumulation of forms of capital. Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on this topic. Table 5.46 also provides cross-case information on business activity and influence on individual ventures. Finally, the table includes number of generations working at the parent family firm and its associated venture(s).

Table 5.46 Cross-case Reference

	Case A	Case B	Case C	Case D	Case E	Case F	Case G
Number of Interviews	14	12	24	10	7	11	11
Number of Interviewees	7	5	7	4	3	3	4
Number of Generations	3 generations	7 generations	3 generations	4 generations	4 generations	2 generations	2 generations
Business Description	Case A began operations in vegetable propagation	Case B began operations in home construction	Case C began operations in fruit/produce distribution	Case D began operations in the dairy industry	Case E began operations in horticultural propagation	Case F began operations in home construction	Case G began operations in horticultural distribution
Field of Venturing	Ventures at Case A operate in the composting and green industry field	Ventures at Case B operate in the land development and construction field	Ventures at Case C operate in the fruit/produce and green industry field	Ventures at Case D operate in the green industry and winery field	Ventures at Case E operate in the green industry and composting field	Ventures at Case F operate in the construction field	Ventures at Case G operate in the green industry field
Type of Venture	Family	Family	Family	Non-family	Family	Family	Non-family
# of Investigated Ventures	11	8	11	4	5	1	1

5.10 Conclusion

This chapter presented data from five parent family firms with family ventures and two parent family firms with non-family ventures for a total of seven individual case studies. This chapter also presented cases which included family and non-family ventures within the same parent firm for comparison and analysis in the following chapter. Each of the cases in this chapter was explored and described in detail using descriptive data from interviews with both family members and non-family members of each parent firm. Data includes multiple interviews at each firm conducted on average over a one-year period at each firm. Tables presented as within-case displays provided the foundation for developing a detailed and structured presentation of data of individual cases. Table 5.46 presented as a cross-case reference summarizes the data across all cases.

Chapter 6 provides a detailed analysis of the cases presented in this section to further reflect on the research questions while presenting analysis of categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence in the data imbued by parent family firms to both family and non-family ventures. The next chapter begins with a brief introduction on how the data was structured in primary and secondary codes while the remainder of the chapter expounds on coding and segregating codes into categorised and uncategorised dispositions reflected in the data as well as categorised and uncategorised resources reflected in the data.

CHAPTER SIX - ANALYSIS

6.1 Introduction to the Chapter

This study began with questions and a literature review pertaining to the process of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation. It also began with an investigation of the dispositions and munificence shown by a parent family firm to its new family and/or non-family venture(s). The previous chapter presented data on each of seven parent family firms and their ventures to answer why there might be sponsorship activity at each parent family firm.

This chapter analyses the case data in terms of each construct in the model of existing literature presented in Figure 3.10 in Section 3.6. It begins with a tabular analysis of keywords reflecting dispositions and munificence provided by a parent family firm to its new venture(s). Next, this chapter presents the dimensions and themes that emerged as a result of coding, reduction in coding and presentation of both ‘categorised’ and ‘uncategorised’ data. Data that is ‘categorised’ refers to dimensions of existing constructs in the literature (eg. EO and EL) while ‘uncategorized’ data refers to data that upon extensive analysis does not exist in the literature. As a direct result of open coding for ‘categorised’ and ‘uncategorised’ data presented later in this chapter and in the appendices, the data shows new dimensions in entrepreneurial dispositions and munificence that are not reflected in the model of existing literature presented in Figure 3.10 in Section 3.6. As previously mentioned, ‘categorized’ data in dispositions and munificence reflect dimensions of existing constructs in the literature (eg. EO and EL) while ‘uncategorized’ data reflects what seems to be long-lasting dispositions imbued by parent firms and resource transfer from parent firms in what seems to be a gentle push or steering.

The focus of this study is an analysis and discussion of ‘uncategorized’ data to present new constructs relating to entrepreneurial dispositions and munificence while also presenting a more-nuanced model of organizational sponsorship in the context of new business incubations. This chapter includes textual analysis of ‘uncategorized’ data while for the sake of brevity Appendix 9.3 includes textual analysis of ‘categorized’ data.

Cases analysed in this chapter include five parent family firms with family venture(s) and two parent family firms with non-family venture(s). In-depth textual analysis at each of five parent family firms provides data to explain how the sponsorship process works at family and non-family ventures. Each case description presents data from semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions on various dimensions of venturing, dispositions, munificence and sponsorship. At the conclusion of each section on entrepreneurial dispositions and sponsorship activities, this study provides data that is ‘uncategorised’ in the cases. In this way, this study finds that each case reflects entrepreneurial dispositions that are not reflected in the literature (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996). This study also finds that each case reflects sponsorship activities that are not reflected in existing constructs hypothesized by

Amezcuca et al. (2013). These ‘uncategorised’ entrepreneurial dispositions and sponsorship activities are the main contributions of this chapter.

6.2 Cross-case Tabular Analysis

This section provides an ‘aerial’ view in a tabular analysis of the data. As presented in Chapter 4 Section 4.9, data structuring for the identification of constructs in the literature and individual variables at parent firms and their new ventures included four steps: (1) identification, (2) analysis, (3) interpretation and (4) evaluation (Eisenhardt, 1989). Data structuring started with the identification of keywords which reflected entrepreneurship, venturing, entrepreneurial behaviour, sponsorship mechanisms, sponsorship activities and resource transfer (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Miller, 1983, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Schumpeter, 1934, Gartner, 1985). Data structuring continued with the identification of keywords which reflected munificence in field-building activities, networking activities and direct support activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013).

Using synonyms from Webster’s Thesaurus to compare data across all cases, this section outlines the data in a condensed format in Table 6.47 in order to provide a word frequency display across all cases. Miles and Huberman (2013: 110) also note,

“The researcher has looked at the data segments . . . checked to see whether they co-vary in some patterned way and drawn a second-order generalization.”

Table 6.47 Word Frequency of Keywords Associated with Existing Constructs

connect, share, build, field, combine, organise,	network, connect, engage,	direct, transfer, mentor, support,	mentor, manage, return, venture, power, position,	Education, study graduate, levels, development, construction, experience,	Transition, take over, succession, family, participate, integrated, (no) buyout	Risk, uncertain, expose, borrow, gamble, liability, possibility	Innovate, found, invent, develop, combination, initiate, introduce,	Start, start-up, act, engage, begin, introduce, forward-looking	Case	Case Typology
Field-building	Networking	Direct support	Bridging	Strategic education	Strategic transitioning	Risk-taking	Innovativeness	Pro-activeness		
37	17	24	35	38	18	25	45	110	Case A	Family Venturing
44	23	19	38	35	24	18	45	60	Case B	Family Venturing
15	5	31	9	12	6	6	14	18	Case C	Family Venturing
3	2	21	6	7	1	0	5	20	Case D	Non-family Venturing
8	18	10	12	21	18	9	12	15	Case E	Family Venturing
7	17	18	8	14	16	12	7	9	Case F	Family Venturing
3	2	20	10	2	25	1	7	4	Case G	Non-family Venturing

Interpretation, classification and collapse of keywords reflecting entrepreneurial dispositions and behaviours exposed multiple references to existing constructs in an EO and EL at each parent family firm while interpretation of keywords reflecting munificence and resources exposed multiple references to existing constructs in organisational sponsorship (Firkin, 2001, Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a, Amezcua et al., 2013). Table 6.48 presents textual evidence of first order measures and second order constructs from sample coding revealing categorised dispositions and munificence, and the Appendix 9.3 presents the ‘categorised’ data in a selection of cases.

Significant for this study, the analysis also revealed codes that did not reflect dimensions of existing constructs in the literature. I separated this data for further analysis and labelled it ‘uncategorised’ dispositions and ‘uncategorised’ munificence. This data appeared to reflect much more than dimensions of EO or EL or organizational sponsorship. It reflected more long-lasting dispositions than ‘categorized’ data; this data also appeared to reflect attempts of the parent family firm to actively steer individuals toward available resources at the parent family firm. Table 6.48 presents a brief sample of data relating to first order measures and second order constructs relating to dimensions of existing constructs in the literature. Appendix 9.3 includes an exhaustive textual analysis of ‘categorized’ data.

Table 6.48 Coding of ‘Categorised’ Dispositions and Munificence

2nd Level Codes	1st Level Codes	Sample Interview Transcripts
Entrepreneurial Dispositions & Munificence	Risk-taking	<i>Case D: Carl III 'Well, in 1960 we probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in Princeton nursery.'</i>
	Innovativeness	<i>Case A: Paul 'We got control of the technology; we brought it back to the US, and there were a lot of problems with it . . . we ended up building a new company around that technology in methane sequestration.'</i>
	Pro-activeness	<i>Case F: Ian 'Jennifer's entrepreneurial spirit is immense - her energy. She has huge energy levels; she's young - she'll be a great entrepreneurial spirit.'</i>
	Strategic Education	<i>Case A: Peter 'I have 3 sons and 4 grandsons at Cornell.'</i>
	Entrepreneurial Bridging	<i>Case D: Wayne 'We were farmers and just wanted to grow plants.'</i>
	Strategic Transitioning	<i>Case D: Carl III 'There was a lot of - I wouldn't say pressure, but I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture.'</i>
	Field-building	<i>Case B: Bruce 'The developments built by this company over the last decade are tangible evidence that we, at least, are trying to produce housing that contributes to the environment rather than detracting from it.'</i>
	Networking	<i>Case B: Bruce 'Well some of the people that Ross wanted to supply timber kits, I have to know them.'</i>
	Direct Support	<i>Case E: Wayne 'When Peter first came into the business, we had made the decision to separate the commercial from the retail, physically . . .'</i>

The following sections reflect textual analysis of ‘uncategorized’ data because it is the ‘uncategorized’ data we want to know more about and which is at the heart of this study. This final step included the evaluation of possible relationships between ‘uncategorised’ dispositions and ‘uncategorised’ munificence (i.e. instances of dispositions and munificence not found in existing literature). Coding and analysis of the ‘uncategorised’ data revealed family firms’ practice of inculcating long-lasting entrepreneurial dispositions through communication. For example, case data from semi-structured interviews supported codes that suggested that previous generations communicated (1) support for venturing activity; (2) an expectation to venture, (3) any problem could be solved and (4) a collaborative and supportive family environment in which to venture. As such, Cases A, B, C, E and F responses by interviewees indicated that parent family firms ‘communicated’ venturing behaviours along generational lines. They did not ‘communicate’ venturing behaviour to non-family ventures. Similarly, Cases A, B, C, E and F responses by interviewees indicated that parent family firms ‘presented’ opportunities and resources with which to venture. They did not ‘present’ opportunities and resources to venture to non-family ventures. For example, case data from semi-structured interviews supported codes that suggested that previous generations (1) presented a stable environment in which to venture, (2) presented partnership(s) to venture, and (3) presented opportunities to venture. As such, Cases A, B, C, E and F responses by interviewees indicated that parent family firms ‘communicated’ venturing behaviours along generational lines. They did not ‘communicate’ venturing behaviour to non-family ventures. Case D communicated venturing behaviour and presented munificence to family ventures, but it did not communicate venturing behaviour nor present munificence to its non-family venture. Table 6.49 presents textual evidence of first and second level coding from sample interview transcripts.


Table 6.49 Coding of Uncategorized Data

2nd Level Codes	1st Level Codes	Sample Interview Transcripts
Communication	Communicate expectation next will venture	<i>Case D: Clint ‘Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realized and made known to us – that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business’.</i>
	Communicate support for venturing	<i>Case E: Tim ‘My dad looked at the situation differently, saying, “He’s family. Let’s get this guy in here. I know he has skills and we’re going to have faith in him.”’</i>
	Communicate problem-solving	<i>Case A: Mathew ‘And that’s what Luke eliminated – those sorts of barriers; because, if you have a good enough idea (which Case A2 was) I went and I found some financing.’</i>
	Communicate entrepreneurial environment to venture	<i>Case A: Michael ‘My father wanted his own sons, me and my two brothers (his two other sons) to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well’.</i>

2nd Level Codes	1st Level Codes	Sample Interview Transcripts
Presentation	Present stable environment to Venture	<i>Case B: Ed 'It was Daniel and Fred who really drove the business on through venturing and made probably the biggest inroads into the business's evolution.'</i>
	Present partnership(s) to venture	<i>Case A: Robert 'Uncle Mathew always says, "Hey, when are we going to start a business together?"'</i>
	Present opportunity(s) to venture	<i>Case D: Clint 'Well, we were – so got – so got a lot of support from [their nursery] when getting started; as a matter of fact, that's why we got started in the horticulture business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them'</i>
	Present Emotional Capital to Venture	<i>Case A: Mathew 'It was not economic capital; it was emotional capital – intellectual capital of what it takes to succeed at new business, and oftentimes people use as an excuse – "well I don't have the money to do it, so I can't do it", right?'</i>

Figure 6.15 presents measures and constructs that reflect ‘uncategorised’ entrepreneurial dispositions in the data as a process by which a parent family firm communicates long-lasting and transposable dispositions to family members who venture.


Figure 6.15: ‘Uncategorised’ Disposition Coding



Upon additional coding, reduction in coding and analysis of uncategorised data, the case data from semi-structured interviews also revealed a process practiced over generations by which a parent family firm may steer or gently push family members towards resources with which to venture. For example, the case data from semi-structured interviews supported codes that suggested that previous generations

repeatedly presented opportunities to venture. The same data supported codes that suggested that previous generations presented partnerships to encourage family members to start new ventures and that previous generations provided stability at the parent firm from which to venture. Figure 6.16 presents first order and second order data reflecting ‘uncategorised’ munificence in the data as a process by which a parent family firm may gently steer or guide family members towards venturing.

Figure 6.16 Uncategorized Measures and Constructs in the Data



It may seem somewhat tautological that the ‘uncategorised’ data suggest that family firms support only family ventures with long-lasting dispositions and a gentle push towards venturing. However, there are no constructs in the literature that reflect the dispositions and munificence with which family firms support family and non-family ventures. As such, the remainder of this chapter presents a detailed analysis using textual analysis, within- case and cross-case analysis to show the dimensions that reflect these long-lasting entrepreneurial dispositions and resources from parent family firms that gently steer or guide family members toward venturing over generations. Keywords interpreted in ‘communication’ of venturing behaviours and ‘presentation’ of opportunities and resources provided the basis for the introduction in this study of a new construct and a more-nuanced model of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation (Castrogiovanni, 1991, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b).

6.3 Categorized and Uncategorized Data at Cases A-G

This section provides a textual analysis of the ‘uncategorised’ data at each parent family firm and its individual venture(s) at each of seven parent family firms and associated venture(s) while Appendix 9.3 presents textual analysis of ‘categorised’ data after the identification, initial interpretation and evaluation of the data.

Data in entrepreneurial attitudes and orientations do not fully explain the long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions towards venturing that parent family firms communicate to family ventures. Further, data in sponsorship mechanisms and activities do not fully explain the parent firms' practice of steering or gently pushing family members towards venturing opportunities and resources. This section provides an in-depth, textual analysis of seven case studies to provide the foundation for a discussion and presentation in Chapter 7 of a more-nuanced model of organisational sponsorship inclusive of 'categorised' and 'uncategorised' data from semi-structured interviews and open-ended questions (Flynn, 1993b, Flynn, 1993a, Castrogiovanni, 1991).

By individual case study, the following sections explore and analyse the data in discovery of both 'categorized and 'uncategorized' data.

6.4.2 'Uncategorised' Dispositions at Case A

At Case A and all of the ventures associated with it, there are 'uncategorised' dispositions in the data that do not reflect the dimensions of existing constructs presented in Section 6.4.1 and Appendix 9.3. The data on 'uncategorised' dispositions at Case A suggests the spoken and unspoken communication of an expectation that family members will venture at the parent family firm, and Table 6.51 presents data reflecting 'uncategorised' entrepreneurial dispositions and arguably reflects data which Miles (2012: 590) suggests, "*lend themselves to the production of serendipitous findings and the adumbration of unforeseen theoretical leaps.*"

Table 6.50 'Uncategorised' Entrepreneurial Dispositions at Case A

Construct	Case A → A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8	Case A1 – A7 → Case A9, A10, A11
Communicate an expectation to venture	<p>[Luke] "I think they've picked it up. I don't know that they picked it up from me - maybe the atmosphere that they grew up in or something. I don't know how that happens."</p> <p>[Luke] "everyone should run their own business"</p> <p>[Luke] "They offered me a job in finance, but I couldn't stand working in a big corporation. I couldn't stand that everybody was afraid . . . they were so indebted to the company that there was no independent thought!"</p>	<p>[Robert] "My uncle always says, 'Hey, when are we going to start a business together?'"</p> <p>[Mathew] "I think it was just assumed that everyone would have their own business."</p> <p>[Robert] "I just find it interesting and exciting to start your own business, and I think there's a lot of opportunity here if you stick with a project and see if you can make it successful. There's something about the purpose in that which excites me."</p>
Communicate an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture	<p>[Luke] "I could never understand any culture which promoted fear of failure . . . no one should fear failure"</p> <p>[Mathew] "Luke didn't give us any money. So, you know it was like - it was tough . . . but it was sort of like you know, 'there's a lot of doing, and it's the right thing to do, but you're going to have to step up and do your part as well,' and it was just considered normal."</p> <p>[Luke] "So, if you wanted any new idea, you could go out and buy it from some guys . . . because there's no way that culture - that big corporation culture, is going to create anything."</p>	<p>[Luke] "I want my grandchildren to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well."</p> <p>"You know, it's just a positive kind of feel for the business when they're growing up. It's a great business! When we travel as a family, I stop by a garden centre - we stop in and talk. It's who we are. It's what we do'."</p> <p>[Robert] "I just find it interesting and exciting to start your own business, and I think there's a lot of opportunity here if you stick with a project and see if you can make it successful. There's something about the purpose in that which excites me."</p>
Communicate support for venturing	<p>[Mathew] "With Luke it was all about if you want it bad enough you can make it happen . . . if there's a will there's a way."</p> <p>[Luke] "You know what I think - the Viagra of the plant world is a deer-resistant Rhododendron. If you can do something genetic . . . that would be a grand slam."</p> <p>[Mathew] "Luke struggled, and you know, Luke clearly is the entrepreneur - we get it from Luke. He truly is an entrepreneur in every sense of the word'."</p>	<p>[Robert] "We like to create our own thing. So, there's going to be collaboration, there's going to be team work and there's also going to be time for, 'Hey James, you've always wanted to do this, right? Go do it. Hey Andy, you've always wanted to do this, right? That's your project!'"</p> <p>[Mathew] "I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value", I think it would create a better growth learning for them, but taking that risk and maybe you know, having some success and maybe some failure and you know - I like that."</p>

The following subheadings provide a set of distinct dispositions which relate to the narrative around uncategorized dispositions presented in Table 6.51. These uncategorized dispositions in the data repeatedly reflect over three generations that venturing had been the 'right thing to do' and was 'just considered normal' and 'that's who we are'. Reflection on and analysis of uncategorized data suggests that at Case A

there was communication of (1) an expectation to venture, (2) support for the family to venture, (3) problem-solving at the family venture, and (4) an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture.

Communicate an Expectation to Venture

Luke's first son, Michael, comments tellingly in an interview, *'The desire to run my own business I would definitely say is a family thing'*, and both sons comment repeatedly in interviews that *'Luke is the entrepreneur; we get it from Luke'*. Venturing at Case A was *'just considered normal'* and the *'right thing to do'*. Mathew comments in an interview,

'Luke didn't give us any money. So you know it was like – it was tough ... but it was sort of like you know, 'there's a lot of doing, and it's the right thing to do, but you're going to have to step up and do your part as well', and it was just considered normal'.

Third generation family members, Andy, Robert and James, understand that their grandfather, father and uncle expect them to venture at Case A1. Michael's first son, Andy, reflected communication from the family to venture with his comment, *'I think it was just assumed that everyone would have their own business.'*

Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

In an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture Luke instilled his own beliefs about corporate drudgery and inaction in his children to suggest entrepreneurship and venturing suggested creativity. In his interviews he commented repeatedly,

"So, if you wanted any new idea, you could go out and buy it from some guys . . . because there's no way that culture - that big corporation culture, is going to create anything."

To further his message, Luke also commented, *"I could never understand any culture which promoted fear of failure . . . no one should fear failure."* While his sons often criticized his methods in interviews, they were complimentary of the supportive environment he created, and they recalled, *"With Luke it was all about if you want it bad enough you can make it happen . . . if there's a will there's a way."* Michael recalled,

'My father wanted his own sons – me and my two brothers – to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well'.

However, Luke was often critical of his sons to the point of insult when they didn't subscribe to his methods. Michael remembered,

'My father, to his credit, one of the best things he ever did, he said to me, "You are so stupid, you know – this is how families work!"'

At Case A the family arguably presents an entrepreneurial environment of all or nothing. Luke believes there must be nothing short of total dedication towards the creation of the entrepreneurial environment to succeed at venturing. He commented,

'Total dedication makes something work. You can't do two things at once. But you have to dedicate yourself to the project you're in and make it happen. And don't bitch about anything; that's the job you have. Until you do that, you have nothing'.

Michael stated that he wanted and expected his sons to be 'all in'. In an interview, he comments, *'I'm all in, and my sons at some point are going to have to be all in'*. Similarly, Michael's second son, Robert, stated, *'So if we're going to open up a subsidiary of Case A1 in a new location, I want to go 115% into it'*.

Michael made every attempt to reinforce the uncategorised entrepreneurial dispositions towards venturing passed on by his father, and he continually communicated his passion for business, even while on vacation. In an interview, Michael comments,

Michael's first son, Andy, comments,

'I think my dad supports me in my entrepreneurial thinking ... he wants it to work for me'.

Communicate Support for the Family Venture

Support for the family venture is arguably a family affair at Case A, and in interviews, Mathew recalled:

'Luke basically gave us opportunities and mentored and supported us in our new businesses which was so incredibly valuable ... That's what I got from Luke'.

While Luke provides support for his son's venturing activity in his own distinctive and at times, contentious ways, both sons, Michael and Mathew, support each other with frequent meetings and conversations. They not only discuss supportive efforts of their individual ventures, but they also discuss support for next generation ventures. In interviews Mathew stated emphatically,

'Michael's boys need to have a business to run, and don't put a boy working for the other - it's too early ... give them opportunities to run businesses within the business so they can again have that sense of autonomy and ownership that they built something.'

Third generation family members also support each other in their venturing efforts. Robert commented,

'So, there's going to be collaboration, there's going to be team work and there's also going to be time for, 'Hey James, you've always wanted to do this, right? Go do it. Hey Andy, you've always wanted to do this, right? That's your project!'''

Communicate Problem-solving at the Family Venture

At Case A there was communication relating problem-solving at the family venture. Luke stated his problem-solving philosophy by commenting in interviews, *"I never walked away from something that didn't work ... I changed it!"* In interviews Michael

similarly commented: “*It’s our mantra here – find a better way.*” And, according to his son, Michael, “*Luke was good as far as basically eliminating [mental roadblocks], and if there’s a will there’s a way.*”

Michael’s sons, Andy, Robert and James, expressed admiration and amazement at their father’s persistence in taking Case A1 from a poorly planned and problem plagued idea to a \$35 million leader in the green industry. In an interview while attending a national trade show, Robert commented, ‘*I walked around the show with my dad today. He’s a rock star here, man!*’

6.4.4 ‘Uncategorised’ Munificence at Case A

At Case A and all of the associated family ventures, sponsorship activities are conducted that do not fit within the established categories of field-building, networking and direct support activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013). The following textual presentation in *Table 6.5* presents data reflecting uncategorised sponsorship activities recounted by individual interviewees.

Table 6.51 Uncategorised Sponsorship Activities at Case A

Construct	Case A → A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8	Cases A1 – A7 → Case A9, A10, A11
Present opportunities to venture	<p>[Matthew] 'Luke was good around finding those opportunities and leveraging off what we had developed within Case A to help me realise potential at Case A2.'</p> <p>[Michael] 'And he took all the wood out of Boston Harbor that was buried for 200 years ... and [in partnership with my sister] they are making these very high-end benches, and my sister is out there selling them'.</p> <p>[Luke] 'It was my idea and then I, you know, she wanted to come and help me so that's how that business happened'.</p>	<p>[Matthew] 'Michael's boys need to have a business to run, and don't put a boy working for the other - it's too early ... give them opportunities to run businesses within the business so they can again have that sense of autonomy and ownership that they built something.'</p> <p>[Michael] 'You know what I think - the Viagra of the plant world is a deer-resistant Rhododendron. If you can do something genetic. . . . that would be a grand slam.'</p> <p>[Robert] 'I think his vision is (if we are going forward) to have a base there for his three sons to mould in any way they want. He's very open and excited to have us come to the business and bring our own talents and do what we want.'</p>
Present partnerships to venture	<p>[Matthew] "The genius of Luke is that he truly partnered with his sons."</p> <p>[Matthew] 'Luke was always a good partner, but it needed to make business sense otherwise he'd be the first to shoot it down'.</p> <p>[Michael] 'From my perspective [Case A] was very opportunistic. To this day I think it was the combination of me coming out of college and seeing the opportunity through Luke.'</p> <p>[Michael] "Luke was pretty straightforward - if it made sense, it made sense. Do it!"</p> <p>[Michael] "Get out of the office and see the customer!"</p> <p>[Michael] 'My father wanted his own sons, me and my two brothers (his two other sons) to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well'.</p>	<p>[Luke] 'I asked James to tell me about his exam in plant genetics and half of the exam was on genetic modification. Guys our age will start it, but we can't convince people; they all think we're crazy, but that's a good sign; that's an opportunity'.</p> <p>[Michael] 'I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value". I think it would create a better growth learning for them, but taking that risk and maybe you know, having some success and maybe some failure and you know - I like that'.</p> <p>[Michael] 'You've got to figure it out on your own, but you must have a sense of urgency, and a sense that you've got to get stuff done'.</p> <p>[Robert] 'Uncle Mathew always says, "Hey, when are we going to start a business together?"'</p>
Present stable environment to venture	<p>[Michael] "Luke had a passion for growing things"</p> <p>[Luke] "You are so stupid, you are never going to build anything unless you go see the customer."</p> <p>[Matthew] "Luke didn't want to raise spoiled Darien [Connecticut] brats."</p> <p>[Matthew] 'And that's what Luke eliminated - those sorts of barriers; because, if you have a good enough idea (which Case A2 was) I went, and I found some financing'.</p> <p>[Thomas] "Well, I think they drive the process in that they, for lack of a better way of looking at it, they do not allow people to become comfortable with what they've got."</p>	<p>[Robert] 'I'm definitely interested and passionate about opening up more [horticultural] distribution centres for Case A6 ... We already have the infrastructure in place ... I think it's an unbelievable opportunity having a grower in your back pocket...'</p> <p>[Michael] "So, if [my sons] choose to come here, the only rule I've had is that they have to go work somewhere else."</p> <p>[Robert] "My uncle says, if he could go back to when he was 23 and fresh out of school that working for a lender would have been an invaluable experience."</p> <p>[Thomas] "So, I think as a rule, someone like Michael is a big believer in creating some sort of discomfort or conflict because he feels that's the best way to drive people to keep them from getting complacent."</p>

Presentation of Opportunities to Venture

While there is communication toward venturing at Case A, there is also continual presentation of opportunities to venture. During interviews while in his 86th year of age, Luke continually spouted new opportunities to venture even while interviewing. For his grandchildren he talked about opportunities in plant genetics and deer-resistant horticulture:

'You know what I think - the Viagra of the plant world is a deer-resistant Rhododendron. If you can do something genetic . . . that would be a grand slam.'

All of Luke's children and grandchildren have ventured at the parent firm, and they do so upon presentation of opportunities and ventures from family. In reference to his father's and his own successful venturing, Mathew stated,

'Luke was good around finding those opportunities and leveraging off what we had developed within Case A to help me realise potential at Case A2'.

Upon graduation from White, Michael simply *'wanted to grow the best quality ornamental plants'*, and he wanted to continue his education while searching for work at a large organisation like Monsanto. But his father continually presented Case A as an exciting and innovative opportunity in the green industry field. Michael comments,

'From my perspective [Case A] was very opportunistic. To this day I think it was the combination of me coming out of college and seeing the opportunity through Luke.'

To the completion of this study, Luke incessantly presented his sons and grandsons with opportunities and resources to venture. To Michael, he presented boutique horticultural propagation, and he steered Michael away from academic life and towards business and entrepreneurship. In an interview, Michael ruefully comments,

'I'm still here 33 years later but you know, [Case A1] really was very much a start-up kind of atmosphere and you know, to his credit, Luke's a risk taker, and you know I would not be here if not for Luke. I might be a professor somewhere struggling for some grant money!'

After graduating from White, Mathew was on his way to play professional basketball in Australia when Luke presented an opportunity for industrial composting at a nearby mushroom farm. In an interview, Mathew comments,

'I was really on my way to Australia ... I came home, and at that time there was a large mushroom farm that had an organic waste disposal problem; Luke explained it, and I got interested in it, and basically, put the shoulder to the wheel and got the company organised'.

As these comments suggest, Luke guided and steered his sons with his own enthusiasm and commitment to venturing, but he also guided his sons towards what he believed to be their own best interests. In an interview, Mathew reflects on Luke's guidance that oriented Michael towards the marketplace in support of his new venture, Case A1:

'I was 24 or 25 years old. Luke said to me, "You idiot, you are never going to build anything unless you go see the customer. Here is \$100; go to Maine, and drive up the coast, and just stop in to see these customers." That was my first ever trip'.

In an interview, Michael's brother Mathew reflects on their father's 'engineering' or guidance that oriented Michael towards the marketplace in support of his new venture:

'Michael obviously knew the green business in detail, but the key decision that Luke made was to get Michael out into the market, and so, Luke really, I think, engineered that where Michael might have wanted to put his head down and stay in Lebanon'.

Mathew elaborates,

'I think it was the key thing that Luke oriented Michael out more to the market and then Michael then could see what the customers were buying, and you know of course that's the best way to educate yourself right?'

In interviews, Michael and Mathew suggested they had guided their sons towards new business with opportunities with which to risk, make mistakes and venture. Michael planned to work directly with his sons to venture within Case A1, but Michael hoped the initial idea for venturing might come from his sons when they completed their education. In an interview, he comments,

'I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value", I think it would create a better growth learning for them, but taking that risk and maybe you know, having some success and maybe some failure and you know – I like that'.

Luke continually voiced approval that his grandsons were considering opportunities in the green industry. He also provided support to his youngest grandson, James, who was attending White University when he expressed an interest in plant genetics. In an interview, Luke comments,

'I asked James to tell me about his exam in plant genetics and half of the exam was on genetic modification. Guys our age will start it, but we can't convince people; they all think we're crazy, but that's a good sign; that's an opportunity'.

He believed new introductions resulting from genetic engineering would provide new opportunities and the potential for new ventures.

Third generation family members have subscribed to opportunities Michael presented in horticultural distribution. In interviews, the brothers Robert and James expressed interest in multiple horticultural distribution centres along the East Coast of the United States. Robert also sees his vision for venturing as being in line with his father's vision for venturing:

'I think his vision is (if we are going forward) to have a base there for his three sons to mould in any way they want. He's very open and excited to have us come to the business and bring our own talents and do what we want'.

And Robert responded:

'I'm definitely interested and passionate about opening up more [horticultural] distribution centres for Case A6 ... We already have the infrastructure in place ... I think it's an unbelievable opportunity having a grower in your back pocket...'

Presentation of Partnerships to Venture

While his sons often commented that Luke was a very difficult man to work with, they were emphatic in their beliefs that Luke was a man who partnered with his sons in new venture creation. Mathew commented, *"The genius of Luke is that he truly partnered with his sons."* Brothers repeatedly commented that Luke actively partnered with his sons; Mathew commented further,

'Luke was always a good partner, but it needed to make business sense otherwise he'd be the first to shoot it down'.

But Mathew commented that Luke provided more than just a desire for his sons and grandsons to start their own ventures. While he provided a venturing disposition, suggesting *'it's the right thing to do'*, Luke also provided gentle guidance and steering to *'step up'* and *'do your part'*.

Third generation family members also benefit from partnership activities, and Robert remembered, *'Uncle Mathew always says, "Hey, when are we going to start a business together?"'* Robert also comments that he is included in the details of business and venturing by suggesting that his father,

'My dad has done a great job including us in the problems and successes he has faced in the business.'

While Mathew waits for his sons to graduate from White University, he has already formulated a plan to sell ownership in all his existing ventures and partner directly with his sons in new venture activities. He believes a blank slate is the best environment for his sons to venture. In an interview, he comments emphatically, *'I want to start a business with them!'*

Presentation of a Stable Environment to Venture

Mathew recalled that his father wanted to create an environment in which his sons could venture, and he commented,

'My father wanted his own sons, me and my two brothers (his two other sons) to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well'.

While Luke presented opportunities and presented partnerships to his sons, he was careful, by his own assessment, not to coerce them. In an interview, he reflects on how his first son, Michael, joined Case A straight out of college:

'I didn't pitch him to come to work for me because that's daft! If he wanted to come to work, that's another thing, but I'm not going to try to convince him of that. That's the wrong approach. I found that the good approach – he's got to come to me and – but that's...'

While it was noted in Section 5.2.2 that the economic environment at Case A was extremely unstable when Michael and Mathew partnered with their father to venture, one might argue that there was a very stable environment to venture given a family mantra to 'never fear failure' and 'romanticize business'. In an interview, Luke's second son, Mathew, attempts to summarise Luke's contribution to the creation of a stable environment in which to venture:

'It was not economic capital; it was emotional capital – intellectual capital of what it takes to succeed at new business, and oftentimes people use as an excuse – "well I don't have the money to do it so I can't do it", right?'

When pressed in interviews to discuss what it took to venture and what it took to create an environment for venturing, Michael comments,

'You've got to figure it out on your own, but you must have a sense of urgency, and a sense that you've got to get stuff done'.

Michael's son, Andy, echoes his father's sense of urgency and commitment to solve any problem:

'I just did it. I just do it. It's a desire to get it done'.

To provide a stable environment in which to venture, Michael and his brother Mathew consulted frequently with each other on best practices for each other's businesses and for trans-generational success in order to create a stable environment for their sons to venture. Mathew suggests in an interview that Michael should partner with his sons:

'Michael's boys need to have a business to run, and don't put a boy working for the other – it's too early ... give them opportunities to run businesses within the business so they can again have that sense of autonomy and ownership that they built something'.

In reference to his own sons, Michael commented,

'I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value", I think it would create a better growth learning for them, but taking that risk and maybe you know, having some success and maybe some failure and you know, I like that'.

And finally, Robert describes the logistics of venturing at the parent firm with his brothers as a win-win for everyone in the family.

'I'm definitely interested and passionate about opening up distribution centres for [Case A1] ... I think it's an unbelievable opportunity having a grower in your back pocket...'

Andy, Robert and James have received the same gentle guidance from their father, uncle and grandfather in the development of their individual ventures.

Thus, it appears to be without coercion or force that parents and grandparents at the parent firm continually communicate excitement and challenges of new business, and they present opportunities, partnerships and stability at the parent family firm from which to take risks and venture. At the parent firm, family members put resources and opportunities within easy reach of children and grandchildren to gently steer them towards venturing; they do so in the belief that it is in the child's best interest to venture.

6.5 Categorized and Uncategorized Data at Case B

At Case B and all of the ventures associated with it, the data shows both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence. This section along with Appendix 9.3 presents the data to show existing constructs and possible new constructs presented for further discussion in Chapter 7. Both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence exist in the data at Case B within and across generations of the parent family firm and existing ventures among family members. This section suggests that the parent family firm in Case B imbued both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence to family ventures in order that they overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965). The following section in conjunction with Appendix 9.3 presents an analysis of categorised dispositions in the data at Case B.

6.5.2 Uncategorized Dispositions at Case B

At Case B and ventures associated with Case B there are dispositions in the data not reflected in and EO and EL at the parent family firm. Data exists in long-lasting and transposable dispositions which communicate support for venturing, communication that any problem can be solved and communication of a supportive environment.

Table 6.52 below presents a matrix which displays data as it is transposed from Case B to individual ventures at the parent family firm.

Table 6.52 Uncategorised Entrepreneurial Dispositions at Case B

Construct	Case B → Case B4, B5	Case B → Case B6, B7
Communicate an expectation to venture	<p>Case B Published History (1998) includes Case B, "as an incubator of entrepreneurial ventures"</p> <p>[Brad] 'I just remember hearing the family tales of his patch at the elbows of his jacket and stuff like that.'</p> <p>[Edward] 'It wasn't just made up for the sake of them just being family; they very much had to be under a kind of performance obligation as well by which they'd be considered as if they were any other member of staff'.</p>	<p>[Allen] "It wasn't just made up for the sake of them just being family; they very much had to be under a kind of performance obligations as well which they'd be considered as if they were any other member of staff."</p> <p>[Allen] Yes. I think they've got to remain to the fore otherwise I think we just kind of get preserved in aspic.</p>
Communicate an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture	<p>[Brad] "So there was a kind of willingness to embrace the future"</p> <p>[Allen] "I mean, [Dirk] has never been a letter writer as such or been involved in I'd say probably the cut and thrust of the commerciality of deals, but there's an overseeing enthusiasm and Brad as well."</p> <p>[Edward] 'unique combination of innovation and tradition.'</p> <p>[Ray] 'Let's be here for another 88 years and the only way to do that is by choosing new ventures – that is allowing people to grow but making sure that the company as a whole still has the strength behind it.'</p>	<p>[Brad] "I think I see that in the next generation that they know it's there – brick dust under their skin. Allen and Ray know. They know what they should be doing."</p> <p>[Allen] "again, we were keen on just in the last couple of years on getting shareholder feedback in terms of what people thought of us in terms of performance, and again the opportunities and the potential for new ventures and new profit streams."</p> <p>[Brad] "So I think lots of the new divisions have come out of just not wanting to be boxed in."</p>
Communicate support for venturing	<p>[Brad] "When I went into his office, he would say, 'I don't need you to tell me about it. I really don't. Just do it. You think it's good - it's probably good. If it isn't, you'll come in here on your hands and knees.'"</p>	<p>[Ed] "So we're open but we're just a business which is open to the concept of doing things different from what we currently can. That's our make-up."</p>
Communicate problem-solving for the venture	<p>[Brad] "It's just the scale that was big and we had to put up – we have to make – put up quite a bit of risk money, risk capital at the beginning and we have to agree to underwrite certain things that went wrong. We would pay for it."</p>	<p>[Allen] 'Brad and Dirk tell us, "Nothing's new, we've done all these things before", and we have been I think at the forefront of some of these other things...'</p>

Communicate an Expectation to Venture

In the late nineteenth century, early founders established their construction firm as, according to Case B Published History (1998: 9), '*as an incubator of entrepreneurial ventures*'. This section investigates data that suggests the development of the firm as an '*incubator of entrepreneurial ventures*' through the communication of '*performance obligations*' in an expectation to venture, communication of support for venturing, and communication that a supportive environment for venturing, and communication that any problem can be solved at the parent family firm. In interviews, Edward, as non-family director, commented on the firm's history of '*performance obligations*':

'It wasn't just made up for the sake of them just being family; they very much had to be under a kind of performance obligation as well by which they'd be considered as if they were any other member of staff'.

From the beginning of the modern firm in 1925, Adam ventured by partnering with a competing family to establish the present form of Case B, and he pursued opportunities to venture in commercial development while establishing a mind-set and disposition among family members to also pursue opportunities to venture in tenement housing, commercial development, land speculation, bespoke home-building, architectural development and building systems innovations. While venturing at the parent family firm was apparently a '*performance obligation*', Brad commented in an interview that '*there was a kind of willingness to embrace the future*'. By embracing the future, family members acted on opportunities to provide a better way forward for the parent firm. In an interview, Brad described an embrace of the future to suggest that venturing might be the result of not wanting to be boxed in:

'So I think lots of the new divisions have come out of just not wanting to be boxed in'.

Allen confirmed that venturing had occurred in timber systems because of delays from timber vendors. He commented,

'My understanding or recollection at the time, it was a frustration that we were using other companies and in some cases competitor companies to supply us with timber'.

In an interview, Stephanie talked about her fulfilment of '*performance obligations*' at the parent family firm in 2009:

'So it was thinking about what do people need at the moment? They need money that they can raise from refinancing their properties. So for me it was about how do we put that into marketing terms for people to think it's an attractive enough prospect?'

In an interview, Allen reflected on how he presented his idea of a land bank for the parent family firm to fulfil his '*performance obligation*':

'I was able to kind of work with the board to say here's a few sites we should be looking at and looking to start replenishing a land bank again'.

Stephanie also recounted her brother Allen's venturing in a land bank:

'It's based on something that we know we're good at, and we saw an opportunity because all the big boys and the plc's were looking elsewhere'.

Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

Most family members felt the gaze of previous generations upon them as they risked and innovated in the construction and home-building field. In an interview, Ray stated that he felt his great-great grandfather's gaze every time he stepped into the boardroom to present Case B7 data. However, most family members note a desire to look forward, and Brad commented, *'So there was a kind of willingness to embrace the future'* to arguably suggest an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture. This environment also included, according to Edward, *'unique combination of innovation and tradition'* at the parent family firm. In interviews, Brad suggested, *'So I think lots of the new divisions have come out of just not wanting to be boxed in.'*

According to fifth generation family members, the previous generation in Dirk and Brad continued to communicate an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture with their enthusiasm for innovation and ideas. In interviews, Ray commented,

'Let's be here for another 88 years and the only way to do that is by choosing new ventures – that is allowing people to grow but making sure that the company as a whole still has the strength behind it.'

Communicate Support for Venturing

Direct communication from family members provided a supportive environment in which to overcome new business challenges. In an interview, Brad recalled an early conversation about his new venture with his father:

'When I went into his office, he would say, "I don't need you to tell me about it. I really don't. Just do it. You think it's good – it's probably good. If it isn't, you'll come in here on your hands and knees"'.

Dispositions towards venturing over generations communicated *'just do it'*. Family history also reflected an attitude to *'just do it'* as the parent family firm became an *'incubator of entrepreneurial ventures'* (Case B Published History, 1998: 9).

Family and non-family directors communicated support for venturing by somewhat backwardly commenting that *'nothing is new'*. Edward and Brad credited Dirk with the remark, but family members seem to greet new innovations and venturing by suggesting that family members likely ventured in a similar area before over their 350-year history as merchants and builders. Allen, in interviews, recalled the reminder from his father and uncle.

'Brad and Dirk tell us, "Nothing's new, we've done all these things before", and we have been I think at the forefront of some of these other things...'

The creation of timber systems at Case B7 suggests that indeed nothing is new at the parent family firm since the firm began as timber merchants in the 17th century, but the communication to family members that *'nothing is new'* also suggests that

historical precedent offers support for venturing at the firm. In an interview, the non-family director, Edward, humorously recounted one of several comments from family at the introduction of every new idea and venture at company meetings:

‘We would come to Dirk as we’ve done over the years with what we think is a new idea and of course he’ll listen and say, “Oh yes, yes, yes, we did that back in ’72, great!”’

Communicate Problem-solving for the Venture

Family members at Case B also talked about *‘brick dust running in our veins’*, and it was arguably a mantra at the firm suggesting an environment of not only toughness but also problem-solving and proficiency. In interviews, Brad recalled a conversation with his son and nephew about venturing in the development of company property:

‘I think I see that in the next generation that they know it’s there – brick dust under their skin. Allen and Ray know. They know what they should be doing. They are unlikely to make many wrong decisions’.

In coming back to their company roots in timber frame business, the parent family firm communicated that there will be problem-solving for the new venture coming from the long history of the firm. In an interview, Allen commented,

‘We have certainly come back to our timber frames business. You know, we’ve really challenged the concept of how a home can be built ... so, it changed the whole outlook of how we can build houses’.

6.5.4 Uncategorized Munificence at Case B

Venturing at Case B is inclusive in that family members are directed and guided toward opportunities and resources to continuously innovate and carefully risk at the parent family firm. As such, this section suggests there are activities which do not fit sponsorship activities summarized by Amezcua et al. (2013) and existing in the literature. Table 6.53 below provides a data matrix while in-depth textual analysis provides select data for further analysis.

Table 6.53 Uncategorised Munificence at Case B

Construct	Case B → Case B4, B5	Case B4, B5 → Case B6, B7
Present opportunities to venture	<p>The brothers' firm, "acted as an incubator" for two young entrepreneurs and their families who would succeed the brothers and lay the foundations for succession over generations in the present business (Case B Published History, 1998: 5)</p> <p>[Brad] "My grandfather, when he had two sons Fred and Daniel (Daniel is my father), he said to them, 'We cannot have both of you in Glasgow - I can't have it. So, one of you has to go somewhere else and start a business.'</p>	<p>[Brad] "I think an entrepreneurial jolt makes you see that 'never' is not a good word and we decided to try it."</p> <p>[Brad] "I think timber system side of it - realizing we could be successful in doing different ventures - it spurred on a kind of growth within the company to look outside our quite enclosed area that we're in which is just building homes."</p>
Present partnerships to venture	<p>[Ed] "And in a way it was Daniel and Fred that really, from my perspective, and indeed a lot, my peer group - it was Daniel and Fred who really drove the business on through venturing and made probably the biggest inroads into the business's evolution."</p>	<p>[Allen] "So what I'm kind of keen over the next few years of doing is encouraging them to come up with more new out-of-the-box ideas as to how we might invest monies as well going forward."</p> <p>[Ed]: "No, that's just me looking for a safe pair of hands to make sure that . . . there's somebody in there who's able to do things the Case B way."</p>
Present stable environment in which to venture	<p>[Ed] "particularly keen on keeping to the fore as well. They didn't want us to become too inward-looking or too conservative."</p> <p>[Ed] "Yes, yes, in terms of if [the venture is] a continued problem child what do you do about it? Do you ignore it and hope it will go away or sort itself or do you intervene? I think we're prone to intervening. Intervene and try to resolve it."</p>	<p>[Brad] & [Ed] "the [Case B] way"</p> <p>[Ray] "I reckon it was done this way in order to actually see - can this venture work? And if it does, can we use that style in another venture."</p> <p>[Ed] "That enthusiasm and open-mindedness probably comes from people like Brad and Dirk particularly. You know, they are keen for us to try new ideas and that's not necessarily written down in any business plan anywhere or hasn't come from dare I say it, a lawyer or an accountant."</p>

Present Opportunities to Venture

According to a documented history of Case B, the parent family firm, *‘acted as an incubator’* for two young entrepreneurs and their families who would lay the foundations for generations to venture while maintaining the core business (Case B Published History, 1998: 5). Generations repeatedly provided opportunities to venture. In the 1950s, Allen pushed his sons Fred and Daniel to venture in separate cities. Brad recalled in an interview,

‘My grandfather, when he had two sons Fred and Daniel (Daniel is my father), he said to them, “We cannot have both of you in Glasgow – I can’t have it. So one of you has to go somewhere else and start a business.” So my father said, “I’ll go to Edinburgh and start in the letting business”’.

At the direction of their father, both brothers ventured in commercial building, home building and land development to firmly establish the parent family firm as a dominant player in the construction industry in Scotland and to establish power over the field. Even after their deaths, Adam, Fred and Daniel continue to influence their family members to venture and drive the business forward. In an interview, Ed commented,

‘And in a way it was Daniel and Fred that really, from my perspective, and indeed a lot, my peer group – it was Daniel and Fred who really drove the business on through venturing and made probably the biggest inroads into the business’s evolution’.

The cousins Brad and Dirk also ventured at the direction of their respective fathers, Dirk in commercial development, and Brad in the development of bespoke luxury homes, but the development of timber systems as a venture, *‘spurred on a kind of growth within the company to look outside our quite enclosed area that we’re in which is just building homes’* according to Brad. He also remembered that, *‘an entrepreneurial jolt makes you see that ‘never’ is not a good word and we decided to try it.’*

Present Partnerships to Venture

As part of an informal vetting process for new ventures, board members provide an opportunity for everyone to talk about ideas or initiatives to move the firm forward. At Case B, the data suggests that the parent firm continually sought new ideas for venturing. Edward commented in interviews,

‘I mean I think if we have one thing that makes us rather unique it’s the opportunity to listen to any idea regardless of where it comes from and then deploy it. That’s – that is one of our strengths’.

Andrew also commented with pride that family members and employees alike presented new ideas for venturing at the parent family firm:

‘So what I’m kind of keen over the next few years of doing is encouraging them to come up with more new out-of-the-box ideas as to how we might invest monies as well going forward’.

The idea for timber systems was originally proposed as a partnering venture by Edward and then developed by Ray with the full support and resources of the parent family firm. Brad commented,

'I think Ray developing the business and growing external sales moved Case B forward because internal sales are just a price-related supply chain'.

Present an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

Family and non-family stakeholders and shareholders guide the parent family firm toward venturing. Edward repeatedly commented in interviews that stakeholders and shareholders *'didn't want us to become too inward-looking or too conservative'*.

Venturing energised the parent family firm and family members, and the impetus for change is arguably provided by the enthusiasm and open-mindedness of previous generations. In an interview, Ed commented,

'That enthusiasm and open-mindedness probably comes from people like Brad and Dirk particularly. You know, they are keen for us to try new ideas and that's not necessarily written down in any business plan anywhere or hasn't come from dare I say it, a lawyer or an accountant'.

Future generations at Case B will likely continue to innovate, risk, experiment and venture. In an interview, Brad commented,

'I think timber side of it – realising we could be successful in doing different ventures – it spurred on a kind of growth within the company to look outside our quite enclosed area that we're in which is just building homes'.

6.6 Categorised and Uncategorised Data at Case C

At Case C and all of the ventures associated with it, there are both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence in the data. This section analyses the categorised dispositions and munificence to show the existing constructs. It also analyses the uncategorised dispositions and munificence at Case C to reveal new constructs for further testing.

6.6.2 Uncategorised Dispositions at Case C

At Case C and ventures associated with Case C there are dispositions in the data not reflected in an EO or EL at the parent family firm. Uncategorized data arguably exists at Case C in the form of long-lasting and transposable dispositions which communicate support for venturing, repeated suggestion that any problem can be solved and communication of a supportive environment. The textual table below (Table 6.54) presents a matrix which refers to uncategorized data as it is transposed from Case M to individual ventures at the parent family firm.

Table 6.54: Uncategorized Entrepreneurial Dispositions at Case C

Construct	Case C → C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6	Case C thru C6 → Case C7, C8, C9, C10, C11
Communicate an Expectation to Venture	<p>[Arthur] 'Well, George gave us opportunity . . . he set up the marshmallow business, the Christmas tree business, the blueberry business.'</p> <p>[Chris] 'Anyway, George said, "Go to -- I want you to see a W.B. This man has a lot of blueberries up in Nova Scotia." Well, I knew nothing about Nova Scotia. And we had a customer that my father generated. And the business expanded very quickly.'</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Why? I had 21 stores we were operating. What the hell was it to open up a little, one-store operation? It was nothing!'</p> <p>[Chris] 'There was no interest in Arthur or myself going into his business. And I think he understood that, and he didn't ever talk about taking over his business as he aged because it was difficult -- a difficult business. It was a hard business. It required all your time and all your energy.'</p> <p>[Chris] 'We didn't want to play around with quarts at [Case C], because there are a lot of blueberries. We wanted to move truckloads of them and sell them to manufacturers; food bakeries. And that was our best market, but there were more markets.'</p>	<p>[Tom C] 'He would always get a group together, and the benefit was for all ...'</p> <p>[Greg] 'a trustworthy and sustainable regional food system'</p> <p>[Greg] 'Case C10 is a partnership of Vermont area farmers and Boston area families committed to rebuilding a trustworthy and sustainable regional food system'.</p> <p>[Steven] 'This business is not only about creating success for our growers and customer base, but it's also about creating partnership in the green industry'.</p> <p>"Investment in the land. That's what it was all about - how to get it paid off! The business would pay it off!"</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Dealing with nonlocal suppliers -- in other words, bringing stuff in from a very long distance; you either put it in a freight car, or you put it on a trailer truck depending on what's available, and I was different.'</p>
Communicate Support for Venturing	<p>[Chris] 'Well, I suppose his major thought was to get Arthur established - you know, George wanted Arthur to be in business. Yeah, probably to look after his own business.'</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Well, he invested in his two sons. He thought they knew what the heck they were doing (laughter) . . . He didn't want his sons to take over the fruit and produce. Well, he saw the future in the produce business as not something profitable and a very difficult lifestyle.'</p> <p>[Arthur] "And it was good for [George's] business, because the growers and the farmers that shipped him merchandise depended on him to get the right market price and get a good return on their merchandise, whatever they were growing."</p> <p>[Arthur] 'He helped finance the growers by getting their fertilizer, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that.'</p>	<p>[Tom C] 'He would always get a group together, and the benefit was for all ...'</p> <p>[Greg] 'Case S10 is a partnership of Vermont area farmers and Boston area families committed to rebuilding a trustworthy and sustainable regional food system.'</p> <p>[Steven] 'At Case S9 our mission reads, we are "Creating partnerships for your success" and these partnerships extend to our horticultural growers and customers; they also extend between our horticultural growers and customers.'</p> <p>"Neither one of us really took on the fruit and produce at Case S. Oh, we didn't touch it! No, it was the candy business in Case S3."</p>

<p>Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture</p>	<p>[Arthur] "Well -- but that was the -- we were profitable, but we kept, like, expanding or buying - more land, a little here, a little there - and the trees, the shade trees. And then, you know, you put a little more money into it, make it work, and make it work!"</p> <p>[Chris] 'That's right. Yeah, I think maybe he wanted me and Arthur to love business, not necessarily the business he was in?'</p> <p>[Chris] 'And that's the kind of attitude he had about everything in life - to help other people. And it worked because people were pleased with his attitude - a good attitude - and they had trust and faith in him that way. I found that that was a good way to be...'</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Because his stuff sold more or less most of the time on consignment. And if you did well for your grower and your customer, they keep coming, and they ship more.'</p>	<p>[Arthur] 'I remember that year, and I was busy - Yeah, I was busy, and I said to myself, 'OK, we got that. Now, what's next?' you know?'</p> <p>[Arthur] "And if you did well for your growers and your customers, they keep coming, and they ship more. But if you decide you want to just put a price on the product and say, "Well, I'll only pay you so-and-so," the growers and customers will shrink away and disappear."</p> <p>[Tom C] 'His funeral was a tribute to his legacy. I remember his competitors emotionally commenting that Arthur put them in business or kept them in business with advice, information or even loans. They all offered respect and admiration for the way he conducted himself and his business'.</p> <p>[Tom] 'I thought Arthur made me a pretty independent man'.</p>
<p>Communicate Problem-solving for the Venture</p>	<p>[Arthur] "We had seven profit centers! You know, that's idiotic - getting the management and having enough money to finance what it took to finance all that stuff."</p> <p>[Arthur] And then, after a while - after a few more years, I said, 'Geez, I'm taking my income from one business and putting it in another' Yeah, we were cash poor all the time."</p> <p>[Chris] We just kept buying more land, more operations, more equipment in Canada until we didn't know what to do with it all."</p>	

Communicate Opportunities to Venture

Both sons admitted in interviews,

'George was not talkative. He never talked about his vision, but he had his way of communicating'.

In interviews Arthur stated quite clearly, *'Well, George gave us opportunity . . . he set up the marshmallow business, the Christmas tree business, the blueberry business.'* Chris commented similarly in that George sent him to Nova Scotia when he knew very little about blueberry distribution, but communication of an opportunity established Chris in the Blueberry business and Arthur in the Christmas tree business. Both sons verified that George showed little interest for either to take over his business in local distribution. Chris commented,

'There was no interest in Arthur or myself going into his business. And I think he understood that, and he didn't ever talk about taking over his business as he aged because it was difficult -- a difficult business. It was a hard business. It required all your time and all your energy.'

And while George distributed small quantities from his location in Boston, he urged his sons to 'move truckloads'. Chris remembered,

'We didn't want to play around with quarts at [Case C], because there are a lot of blueberries. We wanted to move truckloads of them and sell them to

manufacturers; food bakeries. And that was our best market, but there were more markets’.

Arthur communicated opportunities to venture to his children. To Steven he presented what he believed to be next generation distribution when he commented,

‘Dealing with nonlocal suppliers -- in other words, bringing stuff in from a very long distance; you either put it in a freight car, or you put it on a trailer truck depending on what’s available, and I was different.’

To this first son, Greg, he communicated opportunity in Christmas trees to mass merchants and ‘big box’ stores that received in large volume. He also communicated vertical integration in the production of Christmas wreaths and other Christmas greens. To his daughter, Laura, he communicated an expansion of outdoor furniture sales from multiple locations.

Communicate Partnerships to Venture

While George never coerced his sons, he was eager for them to join him in agricultural distribution with their own ventures. He was eager to partner with them and he communicated many partnership opportunities in Christmas trees, blueberries and most notably, marshmallow production. Chris believed there was a plan with every communication:

‘Well, I suppose his major thought was to get Arthur established - you know, George wanted Arthur to be in business. Yeah, probably to look after his own business.’

Arthur also assumed his father had a very clear plan to partner in the success of his sons:

‘Well, he invested in his two sons. He thought they knew what the heck they were doing (laughter) . . . He didn’t want his sons to take over the fruit and produce. Well, he saw the future in the produce business as not something profitable and a very difficult lifestyle.’

Chris clearly remembered his blueberry venture was in partnership with his father:

So I would talk to my father and I’d ship the blueberries to him, and he would unload the trailer truck and get it transferred to another truck . . . And so, we worked that way.

George was influential in partnering with growers, and Arthur remembered,

‘He helped finance the growers by getting their fertilizer, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that.’

Arthur and Chris also remembered,

“And it was good for [George’s] business, because the growers and the farmers that shipped him merchandise depended on him to get the right market price and get a good return on their merchandise, whatever they were growing.”

Children and grandchildren of George established their individual ventures based on strong partnerships with their parents and vendors. In interviews Steven commented Case C10 ‘Created partnerships for Success’ while his brother, Greg, established a ‘community of Vermont growers and Boston families’ for the creation of Case C11. All Arthur’s children have arguably established their individual ventures based on family mantra which expresses partnership between customers and vendors.

Communicate an Environment in which to Venture

George communicated an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture at Case C with a genuine ‘love’ for business and a belief that business provided wealth and security. In an interview, Chris commented that George ‘loved business – he liked business, I guess you’d say’, and he elaborated,

‘That’s right. Yeah, I think maybe he wanted me and Arthur to love business, not necessarily the business he was in?’

A disposition reflecting ‘love’ for business arguably imbued upon his sons and grandchildren a desire to continually venture, and George and his sons gently steered grandchildren towards venturing with new ideas, new opportunities and resources. Chris commented again in an interview,

‘Yeah, he was going to train his sons to be like he is, I guess [laughter], and help them out’.

Chris and Arthur continually developed resources and opportunities in the agriculture field. Chris developed a strong reputation for blueberry distribution from Canadian growers directly to manufacturers and producers. Talking about his own venturing efforts in Cases C3, C4, C5 and C6, Arthur recalled the year 1983 to give an example:

‘I remember that year, and I was busy – Yeah, I was busy, and I said to myself, “OK, we got that. Now, what’s next?” You know?’

Arthur was continually curious about additional opportunities and resources, showing an entrepreneurial disposition and desire to discover ‘*what’s next*’. Given an entrepreneurial disposition towards venturing imbued by his father, Arthur believed that one venture could pay the bills for the other to repeat, “OK, we got that. Now, *what’s next?*” In an interview, he commented,

‘One business paid the bills for the other business ... We kept pyramiding, and they weren’t all profitable all at the same time, and we’d rob Peter to pay Paul’.

Communicate Problem-solving at the Venture

With multiple ventures operating at similar times George communicated problem-solving with a facile work force and a strong network of dedicated customers and vendors. Marshmallow production was year-round, and Arthur remembered,

“So then, when the blueberry season came, Chris would go to Canada for the harvest. And when Christmas tree season came around, I’d go to Nova Scotia.”

With his mantra communicating ‘What’s next’, Arthur consistently faced cash crunches in several operations, and he complained, ‘*Yeah, we were cash poor all the*

time,' but he solved the problem by transferring profits from profitable ventures to struggling ventures while relying on local banks and family to provide liquidity. Chris complained of similar problems with his ventures in Canada. He commented,

'We just kept buying more land, more operations, and more equipment in Canada until we didn't know what to do with it all.'

Laura, Greg and Steven also remembered problem-solving for their individual ventures. When cash flow tightened for Case C6 and C10 in 2008 Arthur called Christmas tree growers and horticultural growers to put his credit with his sons' credit.

6.6.4 Uncategorized Munificence at Case C

At Case C and ventures associated with Case C there is data which does not fit within existing dimensions of organizational sponsorship but suggests a new dimension in gentle steering across generations toward new opportunities using existing resources. Table 6.55 presents data for further in –depth analysis in this section.

Table 6.55 Uncategorized Munificence at Case C

Construct	Case C → C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6	Case C thru C6 → Case C7, C8, C9, C10, C11
Present opportunities to venture	<p>[Arthur] "Well, George gave us opportunity . . . he set up the marshmallow business, the Christmas tree business, the blueberry business."</p> <p>[Arthur] "We were only buying day-to-day fill-ins. Yeah - that kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really, is what it did."</p> <p>[Chris]: "There was no interest in Arthur or myself going into his business. And I think he understood that, and he didn't ever talk about us taking over his business as he aged because it was difficult -- a difficult business. It was a hard business. It required all your time and all your energy."</p>	<p>[Steven] 'I saw the opportunity in direct distribution as I noticed our accountants stapling then filing direct ship paperwork – that was it! Case C10 required a phone call to the customer and a phone call to the grower – it was that easy'.</p> <p>[Greg] 'I think there were a lot of horticultural brokers out there, although I know what Steven was doing was different in that he was actually purchasing the material in most cases'.</p>
Present partnerships to venture	<p>[Arthur] "[George] kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really."</p> <p>[Chris] "And I'm not sure what he had in mind, actually; he didn't really discuss what he had in mind. But, we could assume to some extent that he was trying to set up a business for his family - for his two boys."</p>	<p>[Greg] 'This was a piece of the business and an opportunity that really lent itself to further development. It didn't require any complicated sale of assets or any transfer of anything like that, it was basically on a handshake saying "OK"'. </p>
Present a stable environment in which to venture	<p>[Arthur] "Well, he invested in his two sons. He thought they knew what the heck they were doing (laughter)."</p> <p>[Arthur] "He didn't want his sons to take over the fruit and produce. Well, he saw the future in the produce business as not something profitable and a very difficult lifestyle."</p>	<p>[Arthur] 'peace to the family</p> <p>[Greg] 'have their own piece of the pie so that they could pursue and make their own opportunities'.</p>

Present Opportunities to Venture

Uncategorised munificence existed at Case C in the possibility of venturing opportunities beyond local distribution. While his sons repeatedly commented in interviews that 'George was not talkative. He never talked about his vision', both sons commented that he 'invested in his two sons', possibly because 'He thought they knew what the heck they were doing'. It appears that George understood the limitations of his business of day-to-day fill-ins at Case C, and he recognised opportunities for distribution directly from growers. As a result, George presented his sons with opportunities in direct distribution of blueberries and Christmas trees. In an interview, Arthur remembered,

'He didn't want his sons to take over the fruit and produce. Well, he saw the future in the produce business at [Case C] as not something profitable and a very difficult lifestyle – the chain stores were starting to come in, buying directly from the growers'.

George's steering away from Case C's operations and towards venturing in Christmas trees and blueberries effectively positioned both his sons in direct distribution, away from what Arthur called *'Day to day type business'*. In an interview, Arthur remembered,

'Neither one of us really took on the fruit and produce at Case C. Oh, we didn't touch it. No, it was the candy business in Case C3'.

The third generation at Case C also recognized opportunities to venture presented by parents and family. With more than seven profit centres Arthur was eager for his children to venture possibly within the parent family firm. Greg and Laura developed their ventures internally to the parent family firm in Cases C7 and C8. Steven spun out Case C9, but recognized opportunity in contract programs and grower financing. In interviews Greg commented on Case C9:

'This was a piece of the business and an opportunity that really lent itself to further development. It didn't require any complicated sale of assets or any transfer of anything like that, it was basically on a handshake saying "OK"'.

Present Partnerships to Venture

The marshmallow business, Case C3, was a joint venture and a partnership between George and both his sons. Working together, they provided structuring, finance and management. George arguably provided financial, cultural and social capital to the venture while his sons provided human capital in knowledge and management. Arthur remembered the business:

'Oh yeah, the candy business [Case C3]. He put in a lot of money – at that time, I had just got out of college, 1951, when he – he put in at least \$100,000'.

While the marshmallow business was clearly a joint venture between father and sons, George also presented partnership in Christmas tree distribution and blueberry distribution. George's sponsorship activities seem to have guided Arthur and Chris to venture in Cases C1, C2, C3, C4, C5 and C6. Arthur remembered in an interview,

'Yeah, that kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really, is what it did. And at the same time, when Chris and I weren't busy with our separate businesses in blueberries or Christmas trees, we helped establish the marshmallow thing in [Case C3]'.

With Arthur's partnership efforts, his children ventured in several green industry categories in Cases C7 through C11. Arthur understood that Christmas tree distribution was changing once again, and he commented in an interview,

'Yeah, Christmas trees are – you know, it's a one-month, three-week business now. You're very looked down on. Yeah, and I was trying to elevate myself out of that too'.

In Case C7, Arthur partnered with his first son, Greg, and focused on ‘drop-ship’ Christmas tree distribution to the ‘big box’ retailers that were quickly establishing power over retail distribution in the US and Canada. In Case C9, Arthur initially partnered with his second son, Steven, to buy rather than broker horticultural product to gain better margins and better relationships with growers. With his father’s help Steven recognized that Case C9 could be profitable and scalable with initial support from his father support from the parent family firm. He remembered,

‘I saw the opportunity in direct distribution as I noticed our accountants stapling then filing direct ship paperwork – that was it! Case C9 required a phone call to the customer and a phone call to the grower – it was that easy.’

Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture

George clearly espoused venturing activity at Case C to the detriment of Case C. it was by design that George presented opportunities and partnered with his sons in their venturing activity. As Arthur remembered,

‘He didn’t want his sons to take over the fruit and produce. Well, he saw the future in the produce business as not something profitable and a very difficult lifestyle.’

George established an environment supporting hard work and innovation, and he supported his sons within the environment he created. Arthur also recalled, *‘Well, he invested in his two sons. He thought they knew what the heck they were doing (laughter).’*

While Arthur made every attempt to present a stable environment in which to venture, it was often the economic and emotional instability of the environment which introduced venturing activity for his children. In 1998 Steven ventured at Case 9 due largely to disagreement about debt levels at the parent family firm. In 2004 Greg ventured at Case C11 after debt levels restricted operations at the parent family firm.

6.7 Categorized and Uncategorized Data at Case D

At Case D and all of the ventures associated with it, there are both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence in the data because Case D represents a parent family firm with both family (Cases D – D3) and non-family ventures (Case D4). The following sections along with Appendix 9.3 analyse categorised dispositions and munificence to show existing constructs at Case D. However, additional sections related to Case D also analyse uncategorised dispositions and munificence at all ventures associated with Case D to understand whether they reflect dispositions and munificence related to family venture(s) and/or non-family venture(s). The following sections referencing Case D include data that indicates that entrepreneurial dispositions exist at Case D2, D3 and Case D4 in an EO and an EL. The following sections also include data that indicates Case D provided organisational sponsorship activities to Cases D2, D3 and D4. However, the following sections argue that Case D did not imbue long-lasting and transposable dispositions to Case D4 and it did not gently steer Case D4 toward available opportunities or resources.

6.7.2 Uncategorized Dispositions at Case D

This section argues that there are uncategorised dispositions in the data that reflect specific communication among family members at Case D about keeping it a family business while continually venturing in agriculture. Further, this section argues that similar specific communications reflecting long-lasting and transposable disposition never occurred at Case D4. The textual table below categorises data in family communication from Case D to Cases D2 and D3. Table 6.56 also categorises data in communication from Cases D and D2 to non-family venture in Case D4.

Table 6.56 Uncategorised Dispositions at Case D

Construct	Case D → Case D2 & D3 (family)	Case D & D2 → Case D4 (non-family)
<p>Communicate an Expectation to Venture</p>	<p>[Clint] "We wanted to keep it a family business."</p> <p>[Clint] "There was a lot of - I wouldn't say pressure, but I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture."</p> <p>[Clint] "Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realized and made known to us - that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business."</p> <p>[Clint] 'And John said 'Well, I need to get rid of this perennial business', and we were looking to get in the perennial business; so, we just bought his production.'</p> <p>[Clint] 'Some, they don't have any control over [or] want to take control over their destiny - at least not leaving it to the hands of one of the markets so to speak.'</p> <p>[Clint] 'It was the influence of Cousin Bill in New Jersey that got my dad involved. And the two of them were great communicators and decided [nursery] was the best way to go.'</p> <p>[Clint] 'There was a lot of - I wouldn't say pressure, but I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture.'</p>	<p>[John] "When [Case D2] and I parted company in the middle of '06, it forced me to really get serious about [D4] . . . I was committed."</p> <p>[Clint] "And it's hard - it's hard to put all that together in one generation. You have to work at it."</p> <p>[John] "You could say we got [Case I2] into the perennial business. It was our knowledge and competencies that pushed [Case I2] forward."</p> <p>[Clint] "[Case I2] didn't start me in trees. I offered to do that . . . My thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [Case I2] tag on them when they left the door. I decided to do that on our own, but I kept Clint fully informed on all that."</p> <p>[John] "I didn't count on Clint for anything. My idea was to sell these trees back to him and take a cut of them for producing them, but it didn't work out - it never came to that."</p>
<p>Communicate Support for Venture</p>	<p>[Clint] "And certainly if you want to look at acre return, nursery acreage return is much better than from farming or from the dairy business."</p> <p>[Clint] "So, we received a lot of equipment, help, all that; we got their hand-me-downs and bought their second-hand stuff and it helped us tremendously to get started."</p> <p>[Clint] "Well, in 1960 [my father] probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in New Jersey."</p>	<p>[John] "I think [Clint] was blown away with how many trees we had here that we were ready to sell to him."</p> <p>[Bill] "not that Jim didn't know these guys -- but [Case I2] helped cultivate these relationships as Jim did sales for Case I2."</p> <p>[John] "Case I4 went out on its own, and Case I2 didn't show us any money. There wasn't anything like that!"</p>

<p>Communicate Problem-solving at Venture</p>	<p>[Clint] "And John said well, I need to get rid of this perennial business and we were looking to get in the perennial business; so, we just bought his production . . . We had nothing to do with perennials until we actually made the acquisition where we bought the product line hook, line and sinker."</p>	<p>[John] "the perennial business was expanding at that time and that was an easy way for [Case I2] to access the perennial business"</p> <p>[Bill] 'John knew who [Case I2] got their material from each and every year, he saw the liner sources Clint would put out.'</p>
<p>Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture</p>	<p>[John] "[Case I2] was a very well-established, very successful nursery in the state of Virginia and that's how I got to know Clint through socializing together at tradeshows all throughout the '80s."</p> <p>[Clint] "So got a lot of support from [New Jersey] when getting started; as a matter of fact, that's why we got started in the business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them that they couldn't grow there . . . that was part of our production."</p> <p>[Clint] "Since the '60s we went out of the dairy business and went full-time in nursery; In 1980 we started the vineyard and then the winery - did that commercially and we've been in that ever since 1980."</p>	<p>[Clint] "I mean he had land and actually a farming operation going over there and owned a lot of nursery land. And he had a son, and he probably thought it would be a good thing."</p> <p>[John] "When [Case I2] and I parted company in the middle of '06, it forced me to really get serious about this . . . I was committed."</p>

In interviews, Clint commented emphatically that, "We wanted to keep [Case D] a family business." Further, Clint suggested that agricultural knowledge lay at the core of the parent family firm, and previous generations arguably pressured Clint and his brothers to continue venturing in nursery. Clint commented in interviews,

"I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture . . . and we wanted to keep it in the nursery business . . . there was a lot of, I wouldn't say pressure, but . . ."

However, generations ventured in both dairy and nursery to transition the business to nursery and vineyards because, as Clint noted,

'The dairy business and general farming was only so-so through the years – some years good years'.

In interviews, Clint discussed influence and communication from previous generations about a decision to expand the core business by venturing from general farming to dairy farming and from dairy farming to horticulture and wineries. He commented,

'Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realised and made known to us – that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business'.

Communication to keep venturing from family members and cousins in New Jersey led to a full commitment and multiple ventures in nurseries and vineyards. In an interview, Clint noted the economic impact of the transition:

‘And certainly, if you want to look at acre return, nursery acreage return is much better than from farming or from the dairy business’.

Communication and support for venturing over generations were critical to success at the family firm and the ventures associated with Case D, because, as Clint noted,

‘And it’s hard – it’s hard to put all that together in one generation. You have to work at it’.

At Case D4, John began operations with resources and opportunities that he had recognised while he was a non-family employee at Case D3. As the economy and home construction continued to expand in the early 2000s, John prepared to venture in shade tree propagation and production. As Clint noted in an interview, John ventured at Case D4 because of the possibility of a *‘loose agreement’* with Case D3 to market shade and ornamental tree inventory, but he also ventured at Case D4 knowing that his son would enter the green industry field. In an interview, Clint remembered,

‘I mean he had land and actually a farming operation going over there and owned a lot of nursery land. And he had a son, and he probably thought it would be a good thing’.

The data suggests that Clint and the family operations at Case D3 did not provide dispositions to venture or any communication about venturing, nor did Case D3 provide the possibility of a partnership between John and the family members. A *‘loose agreement’* that John had hoped the family might provide never formed, as the economy entered a recession in 2008. As a result, dispositions suggesting support for the non-family venture at Case D4 were not found in the data. Further, the environment at Case D3, which could have supported John’s non-family venture, became non-communicative as the economy entered the recession.

6.7.4 Uncategorised Munificence at Case D

At Case D, there is evidence of munificence in sponsorship activities that does not fit within the established categories of field-building, networking and direct support activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Uncategorised activities appear to steer family members at Case D ventures: people at Case D present opportunities to venture, propose partnerships in venturing and provide stability at the parent firm that makes venturing possible. However, at Case D4, there is only limited data to suggest that the parent family firm actively steered John towards venturing with field-building, networking, direct support activities and uncategorised data. The parent firm did not present opportunities to venture, propose a partnership or provide stability at the parent firm for John to venture. Table 6.57 below summarizes the data for reference.

Table 6.57 Uncategorised Sponsorship at Case D

Construct	Case D → Case D2 & D3 (family)	Case D, D2 → Case D4 (non-family)
Present Opportunities to Venture	<p>[Clint] "[My grandfather] turned the dairy over to my father, and it was up to my dad when actually it was the influence of [cousins] that got my dad involved, and the two of them were great communicators and decided [nursery] is the best way to go."</p> <p>[Clint] "We're still trying new products, new plants, new ways of growing them ... and trying new things like container and pot-and-pot production"</p> <p>[Bill] It was not a situation where Clint said "Hey, grow 3" trees because we need them to augment our inventory." This was John's idea. I think there was a little trepidation on Clint's end at first. He worried about it.</p>	<p>[John] "[Clint] did push me forward in the industry, but he didn't have to because we both knew so many of the same people, and there were some people that he knew, and I didn't, and vice-versa."</p> <p>[John] "They didn't start me in trees. I offered to do that; my thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [D2] tag on them when they left the door."</p> <p>[Clint] "We were looking to get in the perennial business; so, we just bought [John's] production ... we bought and transported their entire production down to D2 to get in the perennial business."</p>
Present Partnerships to Venture	<p>[Clint] 'Well, we were – so got – so got a lot of support from [their nursery] when getting started; as a matter of fact, that's why we got started in the horticulture business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them'</p> <p>[Clint] 'There was no formal agreement between the two nurseries. I think my dad and cousin just met and talked about what the availability of the inventory was and what they could use'.</p>	<p>[John] "D4 went out on its own and D2 didn't show us any money; there wasn't anything like that. I just told Clint inventory at some point would be available which it did in '06, and of course, that's when we parted company."</p> <p>[John] 'It would have been a partnership if we had gotten that far.'</p> <p>[Clint] "It wasn't a partnership; it just never developed that way ... And I'd be, you know – I would be surprised if John said that there was any input on our part."</p> <p>[Clint] 'Yeah, when he had product ready for the market, we were pretty adamant that we were not going to suggest to any of our customers look at them, obviously they did and all that, but it didn't come from us'.</p>
Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture	<p>[Clint] 'Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realised and made known to us – that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business'.</p> <p>[Clint] 'In theory it was good because it was what my dad had been doing so hopefully I was going to do better so'.</p>	<p>[Clint] "Yeah, I think he was picking that up on his own; he realised what we were doing and what other nurseries were doing. So, ..."</p> <p>[John] 'In 2000 we started lining out trees, but I didn't do it thinking that it would cause a separation between us in 2006'.</p> <p>[John] 'My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with D2. We had the sales force in place; we had the shipping and the production, and</p>

In interviews, Clint discussed the influence of generations of family members on the decisions to venture from general farming to dairy farming and from dairy farming to horticulture and wineries, and their communication about these decisions:

‘Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realised and made known to us – that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business’.

The desire for economic stability among family members at Case D and the gentle steering from family members and cousins in New Jersey led to a change from dairy farming and a full commitment to venturing in horticulture over generations. Clint remembered,

‘So, my dad was – his dad was already out of it; he turned the dairy over to my father and it was up to my dad when actually it was the influence of cousins in New Jersey that got my dad involved in horticulture’.

In interviews, Clint elaborated on the support and guidance provided by cousins in New Jersey:

‘Well, we were – so got – so got a lot of support from [their nursery] when getting started; as a matter of fact, that’s why we got started in the horticulture business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them’.

While Clint recognised the support of his cousins in New Jersey in venturing in horticulture, he also recognised that it was a challenge for the family firm to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy after its transition to the horticulture field in the late 1950s. In an interview, he commented,

‘And it’s hard – it’s hard to put all that together in one generation. You have to work at it’.

Clint worked diligently to achieve power in the horticulture field, and he facetiously commented in an interview that he *‘drew the short straw’* and stayed in horticulture while his brothers ventured in vineyards:

‘I – we just knew one of us had to do it, and I had the long tenure in the nursery and was more interested in it. I think David was very much more interested in the winery so – and so that’s how we decided’.

However, Clint ventured at Case D2, combining his personal disposition towards risk-taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness with guidance from family members. He reflected in an interview,

‘In theory it was good because it was what my dad had been doing so hopefully I was going to do better so’.

Clint also recalled early venturing activity in the 1980s when he decided that Case D3 should get involved in perennial production to augment its shade tree production:

'We were looking to get in the perennial business; so, we just bought [John's] production ... we bought and transported their entire production down to D2 to get in the perennial business'.

Clint also ventured in new horticultural techniques, plants and pot-n-pot production, which provided Case D3 with shade tree inventory throughout the selling season. In short order, pot-n-pot production represented a significant percentage of sales for Case D3. He commented,

'We're still trying new products, new plants, new ways of growing them ... and trying new things like container and pot-and-pot production.'

Carl's brother David ventured in vineyards in partnership with his father and his brother. Clint remembered,

'My dad said if Thomas Jefferson can grow grapes in Virginia so can we with all the modern technology. So, ...'

While the data suggests that the communication, partnerships and stability at Cases D2 and D3 supported venturing activity among family members, at Case D4 there is limited data to suggest that Clint, his family or the parent family firm provided John with guidance or direction towards venturing. John commented repeatedly in interviews that Clint was *'very giving'* of his time, and John initially believed that Case D2 and Clint supported his venturing activity in the form of a *'loose agreement'*. John remembered,

'I offered to do that because there were no bigger-sized trees ... my thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put an [D2] tag on them when they left the door'.

Clint remembered there was a shortage of larger shade trees in the early 2000s as the economy expanded, and he initially supported the venturing activity at Case D4. In an interview, Clint recalled,

'We did have very few 3' shade trees when D4 had all this land, and John said, "Well, I think I'll start growing some trees." I said, "That's fine." It was really not going to affect our market at that time'.

However, John expressed disappointment that by 2008 the support and *'loose agreement'* between D2 and D4 did not materialise as his product came to market and the economy entered a recession. Clint confirmed,

'It wasn't a partnership; it just never developed that way ... And I'd be, you know – I would be surprised if John said that there was any input on our part'.

In interviews, John noted repeatedly that *'It would have been a partnership if we had gotten that far'*. Thus, it is assumed that John expected a *'loose agreement'* might provide him with resources and opportunities from Case D2. John also recalled his intent in starting D4 on available land nearby, suggesting,

'My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with Case D2'.

Instead, John alone recognised the resources and opportunities for the production of larger shade trees. While Clint understood that this was a *'niche'* that John could fill,

he did not offer communication, partnerships or the stability of the parent family firm to John. In an interview, Clint remembered,

'It was only through D2 that John realised there was a market for trees out there, and they were larger than what we were able to produce enough of. So, we felt that that was the niche that he could fill.'

In effect, Clint agreed there was an opportunity in the production of larger shade trees. However, the parent family firm in Case D2 neither steered John nor offered resources to help him overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy. In an interview, Clint recalled that John picked up resources simply from his long tenure in the green industry and his employment at Case D2:

'Yeah, I think he was picking that up on his own; he realised what we were doing and what other nurseries were doing. So...'

In an interview, Bill confirmed that

'It was more of a daily knowledge that John soaked up at [D2] ... It was more absorption just through osmosis – being down there on a daily basis – than it was an official transfer of anything.'

John also commented that there was no formal transfer of resources:

'Case D4 went out on its own and [D2] didn't show us any money; there wasn't anything like that. I just told Clint inventory at some point would be available which it did in '06, and of course, that's when we parted company.'

6.8 Categorized and Uncategorized Data at Case E

At Case E, dispositions and munificence on the part of early-generation leadership pointed the firm and family members towards venturing. These dispositions imbued family members with risk-taking, innovativeness, pro-activeness and an entrepreneurial legacy (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Bourdieu, 1989, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a). Further, munificence at the firm created a process and practice of field-building, networking and direct support activities. However, by the third generation, because of differences in philosophy, dispositions and the munificence provided to each brother, there was dysfunction among the leaders of the parent family firm. The brothers Warren and Rodney battled for power and forcefully disagreed with each other, reportedly just *'for the sake of disagreeing'*. By the fourth generation, the dysfunction in communication and leadership at the family firm presented serious challenges for incoming family members who desired to venture.

This section along with Appendix 9.3 suggests that disagreement and disunity among third-generation leadership limited the communication, process and practice of venturing at the firm. It also limited munificence from the family firm. For further testing, this section suggests that there is a cause-effect relationship between the bankruptcy at the firm in the late 1990s and the dysfunction between the brothers that limited the communication, process and practice of venturing at the firm.

6.8.2 Uncategorized Dispositions at Case E

Table 6.58 in this section presents uncategorized dispositions reflecting conflicting generational communication from Case E, E1, E2, E3 to Case E4 in the first column and Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 to Case E5 in the second column. This section continues with textual analysis of the data to suggest there was conflicting communication across generations.

Table 6.58: *Uncategorized Entrepreneurial Dispositions at Case E*

Construct	Case E, E1, E2, E3 → Case E4	Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 → Case E5
Communicate an Expectation to Venture	<p>[Warren] <i>When my dad came into the business in '37-'38 he brought an interest in woody plants and landscaping and design.</i></p> <p>[Warren] <i>It was successful, and he built on that because as you know, every time we have a success it sort of makes you enthusiastic to try it again.</i></p> <p>[Ed] <i>When [Thomas Sr.] first came to this country from Latvia, he worked on a farm and he always wanted to improve himself and figure out how to make things work better and work with plants."</i></p>	<p>[Tim] <i>That saw a need for this aspect to be built out and they figured out a way to make it happen.</i></p> <p>[Warren] <i>"When my dad came into the business after graduating in the late '30s, he was able to expand into those areas."</i></p> <p>[Ed] <i>was not interested in talking; he was interested in doing'</i></p>
Communicate Support for the Venture	<p>[Thomas] <i>'if we raise the plants, they will come'</i></p> <p>[Warren] <i>'Since my dad died, Rodney and I have had diverging philosophies. Rodney's philosophy was that we had to work harder and do things better. My philosophy was that we had to learn what the market wanted and spread out and do what we needed to do to stay competitive. So, it was very different'</i></p>	<p>[Tim] <i>'There were some really dumb decisions that [Rodney] made out of vengeance along the way. My uncle would just say "no" for the sake of, "I want the upper hand" even though it made total sense to do, I felt'.</i></p> <p>[Warren] <i>'Of course, just do it'</i></p> <p>[Tim] <i>'There were some really dumb decisions that [Rodney] made out of vengeance along the way. My uncle would just say "no" for the sake of, "I want the upper hand" even though it made total sense to do, I felt'.</i></p>
Communicate Problem-solving at the Venture	<p>[Warren] <i>I think these business ideas all came from within the family; they saw a need for this aspect to be built out and they figured out a way to make it happen'.</i></p>	<p>[Warren] <i>So during the 1950s and '60s, '70s, '80s we weren't focusing much. We were in six or seven different businesses. Retail, landscaping, landscape design, compost. I think these business ideas all came from within the family /</i></p>

Communicate an Expectation to Venture

At Case E and several ventures associated with it, uncategorized dispositions arguably appear to have worked at cross-purposes to support and/or derail venturing activity among family members. As a result, generational influence communicated an expectation for some family members to venture while it restricted other family

members from venturing. From the interview data, it appears that Thomas expected and professed strong support for his son's effort to venture at the parent family firm by hybridising new plant cultivars, expanding retail sales and providing landscape design for Boston-area customers. Father and son developed an enviable but somewhat haughty reputation in the green industry; as Ed suggested, *'If [Case E] doesn't have it, no one has it'*.

Communicate Support for the Venture

According to the Ward (2004a) in his case study of Case E, Thomas and Ed appeared arrogant to their customers and employees, but they appeared to have believed in their individual superiority and power within the green industry field. While employees commented that in meetings, Ed *'was not interested in talking; he was interested in doing'*, Thomas communicated his support for Ed's viewpoint and venturing commenting, *'if we raise the plants, they will come'*. Both of them seem to have been correct, because the company continued to prosper throughout the 1960s and 1970s (Ward, 2004a: 7). Ed continued to hybridise popular new plant varieties while venturing at the firm with support from his father. Ed's son Warren noted in an interview,

'I think these business ideas all came from within the family; they saw a need for this aspect to be built out and they figured out a way to make it happen'.

In an uncategorised disposition, Warren and Rodney diverged in their organisational philosophy, which often disrupted communication about venturing at the parent family firm. Warren provided communication and an enthusiastic support for venturing at the parent firm, while Rodney, communicated a faith in slow progress and resisted new venture activity at the firm. In an interview, Warren commented prophetically,

'Since my dad died, Rodney and I have had diverging philosophies. Rodney's philosophy was that we had to work harder and do things better. My philosophy was that we had to learn what the market wanted and spread out and do what we needed to do to stay competitive. So it was very different'.

While Tim clearly understood that his father and many employees communicated a supportive environment in which to operate and venture, he also understood that his uncle stood in his and his father's way. He angrily communicated in interviews that,

'There were some really dumb decisions that [Rodney] made out of vengeance along the way. My uncle would just say "no" for the sake of, "I want the upper hand" even though it made total sense to do, I felt'.

Communicate Problem-solving for the Venture

Like his father and grandfather, Warren was volatile and impulsive, and he was often challenged to overcome obstacles for the benefit of the parent family firm. His father and grandfather also imbued him with a sense of infallibility, and his employees noted he would go to the *'ends of the earth to prove you wrong if you disagreed with his idea'* (Ward, 2004a: 3). However, Warren also supported new ideas and venturing among employees because he believed business ideas came from within the family environment, and *'they saw a need for this aspect to be built out and they figured out a way to make it happen'*.

Problem-solving was arguably a key aspect of venturing activity at Case E.

Rodney was conservative and cautious by nature and never wanted to make a decision for fear it would be wrong or unsolvable. He often communicated his dislike or disdain for an idea or venture with inaction and/or sabotage (Ward, 2004a: 3).

Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

While Thomas and Ed created an environment for ideas and innovations, Warren and Rodney let their conflicting dispositions polarise their relationship and arguably stagnate business operations. Warren commented,

'We couldn't make a decision. It got to the point where whenever I said something to my brother, he wanted to do the opposite. It was very detrimental. He wanted to prove me wrong and vice versa' (Ward, 2004a: 7).

Warren's son, Tim, also felt frustrated by the wrath of his uncle, which began when Tim rejected his offer of pest control management at the parent firm. Tim felt frustrated by Rodney's inability to communicate support for his nephew or the possibility of venturing activity for the benefit of the parent family firm. In an interview, Tim commented,

'I could never communicate with my uncle because he was just thinking of rejection at the pest-control position, and he did not see me as a family member. If anything, he said, I should receive less preferential, harder treatment'.

As Tim persevered and ventured at the parent family firm without a formal title or position, he understood that his uncle's disposition prevented any possibility of venturing again. He confirmed, *'He just made it very difficult'*. He also stated in an interview,

'I persevered, I fought through it and then won the arguments, or sometimes I did it and proved to him that it was worth it only to have him say, "OK, whatever"'.

As Warren and Rodney rejected each other's vision for where the organisation should go, Tim was caught in the middle of their personal struggle. Tim remembered,

'With my dad this happened frequently, he was always in tune with what was good for the company and what I wanted to do that I thought could help the company, he's well-connected, so I would say that happened fairly often'.

6.8.4 Uncategorized Munificence at Case E

The textual presentation of data in Table 6.73 provides uncategorized munificence not expressed in organizational sponsorship at Case E. The data in this section reflects uncategorized munificence from Case E, E1, E2, E3 to Case E4 in the first column and Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 to Case E5 in the second column. This section continues with textual analysis of the data Table 6.59 to argue that uncategorized munificence at Case E arguably provided and simultaneously restricted munificence for venturing activity across generations.

Table 6.59: Uncategorized Sponsorship Activities at Case E

Construct	Case E, E1, E2, E3 → Case E4	Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 → Case E5
Present Opportunities to Venture	<p>[Warren] When [Ed] came into the business, I think my grandfather welcomed him to bring some new ideas and expanded the scope of the business, so I think they worked pretty well together.</p> <p>[Warren] "I was struggling to move the organization away from a production orientation and toward a market-driven focus."</p>	<p>[Tim] 'My dad looked at the situation differently, saying, "He's family. Let's get this guy in here. I know he has skills and we're going to have faith in him." But he couldn't make the call because he and Rodney had to decide mutually'.</p> <p>[Warren] The fact that we were able to do things that other businesses couldn't, it was fundamental to our business to deal with the environment.</p>
Present Partnerships to Venture	<p>[Warren] So [Ed] had enough successes so he started building on this and I worked with him for years hybridizing. We grew hundreds of thousands of seedlings to select maybe half a dozen for further evaluation</p>	<p>[Rodney] He held it up; in the end he didn't prevent it from happening altogether.</p> <p>[Tim] I think my uncle saw me in a different light but he's just too stubborn to admit it. Things were too difficult at the time. My uncle is a strange guy ... But I think the rest of the family who knew what was going on, they looked at it favourably for me taking it on'.</p>
Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture	<p>[Warren] 'I just couldn't believe it was happening, but we dug in our heels, and said, "We're doing things right." Some said we weren't giving customers what they wanted, but we thought, "Yes we are; they should want these things"'</p>	<p>[Tim] 'My dad would try to support it as much as he could, but he knew it would be the wrong move if he just went after it with his brother, so he left that up to me most of the time. He'd provide the tiebreaker sometimes'.</p>

Present Opportunities to Venture

What began as a small 10-acre growing operation just before the US Great Depression of 1929 successfully expanded over the years under the leadership of various family members. Thomas passed along his love for the business to his children, Ed and Laura, as they fulfilled their education in landscape architecture and returned to the nursery to venture in horticulture in their own right. In short order, Cases E2 and E3 propagated thousands of new plant cultivars and arguably solidified power over the nascent green industry field in the Boston area to suggest, 'if Weston Nurseries doesn't have it, no one has it' (Ward, 2004a: 7). Father and son partnered in expanding their growing operations and venturing in retail operations.

For Rodney, the parent family firm presented an opportunity to work with his hands in the field and satisfy his conservative nature while Warren believed there were opportunities in commercial distribution and environmental products. He commented
'The fact that we were able to do things that other businesses couldn't, it was fundamental to our business to deal with the environment.'

Tim responded to similar concerns about the environment and ventured in composting.

Present Partnerships to Venture

Case E presented partnerships to venture since its early founding in 1929. Ed worked side strong partnerships and respect for their natural abilities in propagation.

Warren worked with his father and grandfather to venture at the parent family firm by expanding retail operations and introducing commercial sales to keep up with local competition. Meanwhile, Rodney expressed indecision about not only returning to the family firm but also expanding operations by venturing, and he was a thorn in his nephew's side as Tim attempted to partner with his father in composting. Tim remembered,

'My dad would try to support it as much as he could, but he knew it would be the wrong move if he just went after it with his brother, so he left that up to me most of the time. He'd provide the tiebreaker sometimes.'

Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture

Stories abound about the stubborn and insulting nature of Thomas and Ed as they snubbed customers and denigrated employees. However, their individual love for the green industry and propagating new varieties of plants arguably presented a stable environment in which to experiment and venture. The cost to create a new plant cultivar was excessive but tolerated. The result was many new and wonderful plant varieties for sale to the public as a result of this propagating partnership between Ed and his father.

Warren and Rodney continued the somewhat insulting and denigrating environment at Case E4. Further, their personal spite and philosophical differences introduced a toxic environment at all operations. When Warren forged ahead with his commercial venture in Case E4, Rodney resisted. And, when Tim forged ahead with his composting venture, Rodney resisted again by restricting funds, including the funds to hire and provide health insurance. Tim recalled,

'I think my uncle saw me in a different light but he's just too stubborn to admit it. Things were too difficult at the time. My uncle is a strange guy ... but, I think the rest of the family who knew what was going on, they looked at it favorably for me taking it on.'

Warren and Rodney denied and resisted changes in consumer tastes, pricing, and quality and *'dug in [their] heels.'* Warren remembered,

‘I just couldn’t believe it was happening, but we dug in our heels, and said, “We’re doing things right.” Some said we weren’t giving customers what they wanted, but we thought, “Yes we are; they should want these things”’.

Warren and Rodney arguably combined to communicate a ‘go’ and ‘no go’ disposition towards venturing which arguably presented a very unstable environment in which to venture.

6.9 Categorized and Uncategorized Data at Case F

This section along with Appendix 9.3 reveals that the parent family firm in Case F imbued both categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence to their family venture in order that they overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965). The following sections in conjunction with Appendix 9.3 presents an analysis of dispositions and munificence in the data at Case F.

6.9.2 Uncategorised Dispositions at Case F

This section argues that there are uncategorised dispositions in the data that reflect specific communication between family members at Case F about venturing at the parent family firm. Further, this section argues as part of textual analysis that there are specific communications reflecting long-lasting and transposable dispositions at Case F and Case F1. Table 6.60 below present uncategorised data for further analysis.

Table 6.60: Uncategorised Disposition at Case F

Constructs	Case F → Case F1
Communicate an Expectation to Venture	<p>[Joan] 'Yeah, I think Mom and Dad made a conscious effort to include John and I in things to do with the business.'</p> <p>[Mike] 'We like embracing ideas; we try to take advantage of opportunities as they come our way.'</p> <p>[Joan] Yeah, they thought it was a good idea for us to have our own business, whether it was in-house building or not.</p> <p>[Joan] "I mean I never had any intention of - I always wanted to start my own business, but I never had any intention of house building . . . I wouldn't say I was totally enthusiastic about learning about building when I was younger."</p>
Communicate Support for Venturing	<p>[Mike] We have always been open as a company to embrace different ideas.. </p> <p>[Joan] "And Dad was also really keen for it to work as a business."</p> <p>[Mike] I think we're still looking at the imaginative - embracing new ideas.'</p> <p>[Joan] "And I think they just wanted both my brother and I to kind of get an idea of what it was like to run your own business and the pitfalls and anything that's going on."</p>
Communicate Problem-solving at the Venture	<p>[Mike] "Just the idea that you can always look into opportunities, and there's thinking that we can overcome any obstacles. I'm never going to throw my hands up and say, 'Oh, I just can't do this anymore'. I've never met a problem yet that was insurmountable."</p> <p>[Joan] "I think both Dad and I always have the kind of outlook like it will always be alright in the end."</p> <p>[Mike] 'And just in the past couple of weeks, we're kind of just struggling and rethinking things a wee bit about the Case F1 just because the way we're doing things at the moment, there's just not enough margin in it. But I think we can fix it.'</p>
Communicate an Environment in which to Venture	<p>[Joan] We're embracing different principles, for example, we won awards for the best UK-build for a passive house and that was just an opportunity that came along.</p> <p>[Joan] "They always discuss [Case F and Case F1] as two separate companies, but it's certainly helpful at this early stage to be able to say to people that we subcontract the building lot to Case F."</p> <p>[Joan] "Dad was putting in £50,000 into the business to get started, and obviously I had just finished, and I didn't have any money to put into it."</p> <p>[Mike] "but there was one other thing about this - it's great fun. It's great fun . . . it's great fun, ave!"</p>

Communicate an Expectation to Venture

In a communication of an expectation to venture Joan's parents reinforced their personal commitment to entrepreneurship with honest communication about the successes and pitfalls of business ownership. Joan noted in interviews,

"I mean I never had any intention of - I always wanted to start my own business, but I never had any intention of house building . . . I wouldn't say I was totally enthusiastic about learning about building when I was younger."

Joan also noted that her parents reinforced her desire to venture and have her own business, but never pushed the building trade.

"Yeah, they thought it was a good idea for us to have our own business, whether it was in house-building or not."

Further, Joan humorously reflected that family vacations or trips typically included a site visit to, "A piece of land or a house somewhere" where she and her brother could understand and appreciate the family business while considering opportunities within it. Joan also commented,

"Yeah, I think Mom and Dad made a conscious effort to include John and I in things to do with the business."

Communicate Support for Venturing

Joan also noted that her father continuously communicated his support for venturing. She commented about Case F1, "And Dad was also really keen for it to work as a business." While Mike was positive about business and venturing, he and his wife also attempted to communicate that there were successes and pitfalls in business and venturing.

"And I think they just wanted both my brother and I to kind of get an idea of what it was like to run your own business and the pitfalls and anything that's going on."

Communicate Problem-solving at the Venture

At the parent family firm there is communication that any problem can be solved. At the height of the recession in 2009 when building starts dropped to zero at Case F, Mike remained positive that there would be opportunities to overcome any challenge, and he communicated positive reinforcement to his daughter. In interviews Joan recalled, "I think both Dad and I always have the kind of outlook like it will always be alright in the end." Mike recalled her own disposition toward challenges suggesting,

"Just the idea that you can always look into opportunities, and there's thinking that we can overcome any obstacles. I'm never going to throw my hands up and say, 'Oh, I just can't do this anymore'. I've never met a problem yet that was insurmountable."

During interviews Mike expressed concern about profitability of the venture in Case F1. Before interviewing he had just completed meetings with his daughter and site managers about fixing expense issues. He commented,

'And just in the past couple of weeks, we're kind of just struggling and rethinking things a wee bit about the Case F1 just because the way we're doing

things at the moment, there's just not enough margin in it. But I think we can fix it.'

Communicate a Supportive Environment in which to Venture

At the parent family firm Mike communicated a supportive environment in which to venture with an unrestricted loan, mentoring, support of the parent firm, technical support and separation of companies for the new venture. Joan remembered,

"Dad was putting in £50,000 into the business to get started, and obviously I had just finished, and I didn't have any money to put into it."

Joan also commented there was separation between the parent family firm and new venture. She believed separation allowed her to develop her venture while it also allowed her to market reputation at Case F. In interviews she commented,

"They always discuss [Case F and Case F1] as two separate companies, but it's certainly helpful at this early stage to be able to say to people that we subcontract the building lot to Case F."

To communicate a supportive environment, Mike also expressed satisfaction and enthusiasm about his daughter and her venturing activities at Case F1. He commented enthusiastically and repeatedly in interviews, *"but there was one other thing about this - it's great fun. It's great fun . . . it's great fun, aye!"*

6.9.4 Uncategorized Munificence at Case F

At Case F data suggests uncategorized munificence not reflected in sponsorship activities of field-building, networking or direct support. Uncategorized munificence at Case F acted to gently steer venturing toward available opportunities in home-building and construction of small homes. Table 6.61 below presents uncategorised munificence for further analysis in this section.

Table 6.61: Uncategorised Munificence at Case F

<p>Provide Opportunities to Venture</p>	<p><i>[Mike] I think it's difficult for any young person to start a company unilaterally . . . I would like to think that I was offering some wherewithal mentoring to try and help develop ideas.</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] Yeah, I think Mom and Dad made a conscious effort to include John and I in things to do with the business.</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] And we were always, like we would make jokes that whenever we're heading on a family date or if when I was younger, there would always be a detour to look at whatever site we were working on at the time.</i></p>
<p>Provide Partnerships to Venture</p>	<p><i>[Mike] "It's very much Joan's venture . . . It's a spin-out in terms of support but it's very much Joan's business. Does that make any sense?"</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] "Dad and I decided to set the business up as a partnership, a limited partnership. The two of us were shareholders, and Dad has 49% and I've got 51%."</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] "Like, they never kind of forced upon us that maybe we should take over the business someday."</i></p>
<p>Provide a Stable Environment in which to Venture</p>	<p><i>[Joan] "I think through my life, my mom and dad have always been quite keen to talk about what's happening in the business at the dinner table or whatever. And just in general conversation with them, they never tried to hide anything that's going on."</i></p> <p><i>They kind of shaped my attitude and knowledge in a way that would let me run [Case F1] effectively.</i></p>

Present Opportunities to Venture

Data suggests that Mike and his wife presented ideas for new business at every opportunity to arguably sustain their legacy at Case F. In interviews, Joan reflected, "Like, they never kind of forced upon us that maybe we should take over the business someday."

While Mike and his wife never forced the future of Case F upon Joan or her brother, they did present opportunities to venture, and construction of small homes clearly represented an opportunity to venture. Mike started the venture, but he fervently believed,

"It's very much Joan's venture . . . It's a spin-out in terms of support but it's very much Joan's business. Does that make any sense?"

Present Partnerships to Venture

At Case H Mike also proposed partnerships in venturing with his daughter. Joan understood that Case F1 represented a partnership with her parents, and she commented in interviews,

“[Case F] is run by my father, my mother and my uncle. They are directors of [Case F]. I run another company called [Case F1] in partnership with my father, Mike, and I am the managing director of that company.”

To complete the partnership Mike commented, *“She brings communication skills and I essentially bring a technical back-up.”* Mike also envisioned Case F1 as a partnership with his daughter. In interviews, Joan recalled,

“Dad and I decided to set the business up as a partnership, a limited partnership. The two of us were shareholders, and Dad has 49% and I’ve got 51%.”

While Case F1 presently existed as a limited partnership within Case F, Joan and Mike both believed Joan would retain 100% ownership of Case F1 in the near future. Joan commented in interviews,

“But really, Dad and I both wanted it to be my business rather than something that was part of Case F or something that was just kind of a pet project for Dad, and that’s how people saw it.”

Similarly, Mike commented in interviews,

“Yes, we do, but what I would like to see is that eventually [Case F1] will stand entirely as a separate unit.”

Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture

Case F experienced serious disruption to business practices as a direct result of recession in 2008. Land rich and cash poor, Mike recalled the perilous financial condition of the parent family firm during that time.

“So, we were buying into land in advance and of course we were – we were building on the land, but that recession hit overnight, and we’d invested that money in land to buy upfront.”

At the time of the recession Mike reflected on profitability at Case F in interviews as a period of stability and growth. During and immediately after the recession Mike reflected on the perilous condition of the parent family firm, and Joan noted in interviews that he never tried to hide problems at the firm.

“I think through my life, my mom and dad have always been quite keen to talk about what’s happening in the business at the dinner table or whatever. And just in general conversation with them, they never tried to hide anything that’s going on.”

Since the recession, Mike hoped to re-build housing starts to 100 homes per year, and his plan to increase housing starts included construction of small homes to first time home-buyers and seniors aging out of larger homes. Small home construction at Case F1 increased stability of the parent family firm while providing a platform to venture at the parent family firm.

6.10 Categorised and Uncategorised Data at Case G

At Case G there is data to support categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence at the parent family firm. Further, there is data supporting potential for family and non-family venturing activity. However, this section along with Appendix 9.3 suggests that Case G arguably did not provide communication toward transition or venturing activity at the parent family firm. As such, dispositions toward transition and venturing are neither lasting nor transposable. This section also suggests that the parent family firm did not provide munificence. Donald neither guided nor steered family members nor non-family members toward venturing.

6.10.2 Uncategorised Dispositions at Case G

This section argues that like many of the previous cases there are uncategorised dispositions in the data that reflect general talk about venturing among family and non-family members, but unlike previous cases discussed in this study there is talk but little action. Table 6.62 below presents uncategorised data representing communication from the parent family firm in Case G to a non-family member for further analysis.

Table 6.62 Uncategorised Entrepreneurial Dispositions at Case G

Construct	Case G	Case G → Case G1
Communicate an Expectation to Venture	<p>[Donald] "It wasn't until a year or so ago that we had an explicit conversation where I said I could sell this place, but on the other hand if I hang onto it, I can continue to pull money out of it."</p> <p>[Donald] I said I could sell this place, but on the other hand if I hang onto it, I can continue to pull money out of it</p>	<p>[Jake] "It's not [my father's] priority to expand or let Daniel expand through venturing."</p> <p>[Daniel] "I'm assuming Donald wanted his sons to take it over, and I can see his kids coming in and just being frustrated with him because he just won't let go and getting angry and just being like, 'get out of here!'"</p>
Communicate Support for Venturing	<p>[Jake] "My father's first priority is making money for himself"</p> <p>[Jake] "My dad offers prospective ideas, but he never goes through with them. I would like to see more than ideas."</p>	<p>[Daniel] "He seems very open to it, but when it comes down to brass tacks, he - it never happens."</p>
Communicate Problem-solving at Venture		
Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture	<p>[Donald] "'I think I can serve both needs if we go this route. You can become owner of this place and I can meet my financial objectives.' I thought that was very achievable."</p>	<p>[Daniel] 'I don't mind working hard to build something. I have treated this like my own business, probably for 15 years, and it's not my business. People tell me all the time, 'It's not your business, I don't understand why you feel like you have to do that?'"</p>

Communicate and Expectation to Venture

While Donald frequently communicated his desire that his son, Jake, and general manager, Daniel, could innovate and experiment at the parent family firm with his support, there is arguably little data to suggest Donald formally communicated opportunities to venture at the parent family firm. Donald did communicate in interviews his desire to retain control of operations and venturing at Case G for the foreseeable future. In interviews he commented somewhat ambivalently,

"It wasn't until a year or so ago that we had an explicit conversation where I said I could sell this place, but on the other hand if I hang onto it, I can continue to pull money out of it."

While Donald expressed desire that non-family employee, Daniel, would control operations in the distant future, he seemed unwilling to communicate time and date for transitioning or venturing at the parent family firm.

Communicate Support for Venturing

Both Daniel and Jake arguably understood that Donald had a different set of priorities for the future of his firm. Jake understood that, *"My father's first priority is making money for himself."* Jake also believed that, *"It's not [my father's] priority to expand*

or let Daniel expand through venturing.” To the frustration of Daniel and Jake, Donald reflected further in his conversation with Daniel,

“‘I think I can serve both needs if we go this route. You can become owner of this place and I can meet my financial objectives.’ I thought that was very achievable.”

Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

Despite ambivalent, confusing and often conflicting communication coming from Donald, Daniel and Jake worked hard for success of the parent family firm, but they arguably repressed their desire to risk, innovate or be pro-active at Case G. There is arguably resignation in his voice when Daniel commented during interviews, “*Whatever Donald wants to do is fine with me.*” In interviews Daniel suggested friends and family criticized his commitment to the firm given conflicting communication and commitment by Donald. Daniel defended his hard work suggesting,

“I don't mind working hard to build something. I have treated this like my own business, probably for 15 years, and it's not my business. People tell me all the time, ‘It's not your business, I don't understand why you feel like you have to do that?’”

6.10.4 Uncategorized Munificence at Case G

At Case G there is data which suggests a high level of control over existing operations at the parent family firm and limited support for venturing at the parent family firm. This section provides data to suggest Donald intended to transition Case G to non-family employee, Daniel, but provides neither a time frame for transition nor support for venturing. Table 6.63 lists data while textual analysis provides further evidence.

Table 6.63 Uncategorised Sponsorship Activities at Case G

Construct	Case G	Case G → Case G1
Present Opportunities to Venture	<p>[Donald] "Probably three, four years ago I started thinking [Daniel] should take the company into a new area."</p> <p>[Jake] "I think my dad should have gotten out of the mainstay a long time ago and expanded elsewhere into tree service, lawn care, anything to bring in more."</p> <p>[Daniel] "[Donald] thinks growing is a headache, and it's easier to bring in native shrubs from wherever. He doesn't want to have that kind of overhead."</p>	<p>[Jake] "Donald has nudged things in certain directions when he wants that."</p> <p>[Jake] "If there were a growing field more than 10 miles away from the nursery, he couldn't keep that under his thumb."</p> <p>[Jake] "I believe the service part of the nursery should have expanded."</p> <p>[Daniel] "But I wouldn't be able to do it in the beginning right away if the business was taken over. It's going to have to be down the road."</p> <p>[Jake] "[Donald] thinks growing is a headache, and it's easier to bring in native shrubs from wherever. He doesn't want to have that kind of overhead."</p>
Present Partnerships to Venture	<p>[Donald] "I see Daniel taking the business in whatever direction he chooses to. I don't know what that might be. Fine with him choosing a new direction. I'm going to continue to service his back."</p>	<p>[Jake] "I wouldn't say that we're at odds over the future of the company, but we think differently. My dad is very interested in making money for himself. But, it is his business. He's tough."</p> <p>[Daniel] "For the new [growing] business it's a question of when, and I don't have any issues or regrets, there are just certain things that Donald still just won't let go of."</p>
Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture	<p>[Donald] "I think the biggest thing we did and the reason we're still here is you can't play the same game as the box stores do because you're going to get your head handed to you."</p> <p>[Donald] "It was more about being able to increase my purchasing power, storage area and be able to buy in volume. From that, things kind of evolved."</p>	<p>[Daniel] "I will continue the path that this nursery is going in, both wholesale and retail. I will continue what Donald has done with the business."</p> <p>[Daniel] "Donald's a control freak and it's tough sometimes with him . . . but he needs to step to the side as far as I'm concerned."</p> <p>[Daniel] "There's things I know he does that I don't even know that he does; so, that's where I feel like I'm unprepared."</p> <p>[Daniel] "Donald is the owner, and as long as he's the owner I will be by his side and I will do whatever he asks me to do, but until he actually let's go or says 'okay, this is you', I'm going to sit on the side lines."</p>

Present Opportunities to Venture

At the start of operations at Case G, Donald focused on construction but ventured in wholesale/retail operations to create a stable environment for Case G to venture for himself. In interviews he commented,

“It was more about being able to increase my purchasing power, storage area and be able to buy in volume. From that, things kind of evolved.”

He quickly understood that his new venture in wholesale/retail operations must diversify and sell product unavailable at local big box stores. He commented,

“I think the biggest thing we did and the reason we're still here is you can't play the same game as the box stores do because you're going to get your head handed to you.”

Data at Case G arguably suggests Donald limited venturing opportunities and actively steered Daniel and Jake away from venturing activity. Jake commented in interviews that, *“Donald has nudged things in certain directions when he wants that.”* As such, it might be suggested that Donald maintained control at the parent family firm to serve his purposes which included his financial security. Intensive scrutiny and control arguably intimidated Daniel and Jake while limiting venturing activities at the parent family firm; Daniel commented repeatedly about his concerns,

“For the new [growing] business it's a question of when, and I don't have any issues or regrets, there are just certain things that Donald still just won't let go of.”

In interviews Jake spoke hypothetically but problematically about his father's need to control a growing venture,

“If there were a growing field more than 10 miles away from the nursery, he couldn't keep that under his thumb.”

At an early age Donald provided himself with opportunities to venture within his own firm, and venturing activity in wholesale/retail arguably secured the future of the parent family firm. However, data suggests that Donald limited venturing activity since inception of the firm, and Daniel and Jake suggested as much by providing examples. Jake suggested in interviews, *“I believe the service part of the nursery should have expanded.”* Later in interviews, Jake commented similarly but somewhat caustically,

“I think my dad should have gotten out of the mainstay a long time ago and expanded elsewhere into tree service, lawn care, anything to bring in more.”

Present Partnerships to Venture

At Case G data suggests that Donald rarely presented partnerships to venture. Employees at the family firm presented ideas to venture, but ideas were typically met with a lukewarm reception. In interviews Daniel and Jake commented with resignation that they shelved their plans to venture. Daniel commented,

“Donald is the owner, and as long as he's the owner I will be by his side and I will do whatever he asks me to do, but until he actually lets go or says ‘okay, this is you’, I'm going to sit on the sidelines.”

Both Jake and Daniel repeatedly suggested that Donald arguably lost his desire to venture, and both commented on their individual desire to venture with Donald or without Donald. In interviews, Daniel commented,

“If Donald was here right now and doing what Donald still is doing and then we took on that venture, would I do it? Yes, I would.”

As example, Jake commented on his personal success updating irrigation systems. Further, he believed this update might be in partnership with his father. According to Jake, his father greeted his success with a lukewarm reception, and it is interesting to note that Donald talked about updates to irrigation as his own idea. Donald commented,

“I kept my eyes open about things I saw people do correctly, like going over to drip irrigation . . . it made total sense. Took less water - plants are better.”

Jake and Daniel arguably believed that the future of Case G belonged to each of them in partnership, but they also argued that Donald curtailed their interests in venturing at the parent family firm. In interviews, Daniel commented about the growing venture suggesting,

“But I wouldn't be able to do it in the beginning right away if the business was taken over. It's going to have to be down the road.”

Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture

At Case G there is financial stability at the parent family firm. Donald believed that stability existed because of his established mantra that, *“It's the bottom line that matters. Gross means nothing; it's net. That's what it's all about.”* In interviews, Donald rarely mentioned venturing activity except to suggest that venturing in growing operations added overhead and expenses to existing operations. For Donald, overhead existed as an evil to financial stability and profitability of the firm. As such, venturing activity existed as overhead and additional expense. Long held beliefs in the evils of overhead existed since he began the firm in 1991. In interviews, he remembered,

“So, I became friends with the guy who had the garden centre and learned a fair amount from him, especially how to keep control of your overhead and all that sort of thing.”

Donald imbued his mantra toward Daniel and Jake, and both employees maintained his belief that overhead imperilled the future of the parent family firm. As such, they committed to maintain existing operations and direction at the firm. In interviews Jake arguably expressed some frustration as he recalled his father's reluctance to support venturing in growing operations given his fear of overhead.

“[Donald] thinks growing is a headache, and it’s easier to bring in native shrubs from wherever. He doesn’t want to have that kind of overhead.”

Jake elaborated and commented somewhat caustically,

“I wouldn’t say that we’re at odds over the future of the company, but we think differently. My dad is very interested in making money for himself. But, it is his business. He’s tough.”

Similarly, Daniel expressed his understanding that Donald controlled operations at the parent family firm.

“I will continue the path that this nursery is going in, both wholesale and retail. I will continue what Donald has done with the business.”

6.11 Cross-case Analysis

Textual analysis in previous sections and Appendix 9.3 presented ‘categorised’ data to establish dimensions in existing constructs in EO, EL and organisational sponsorship at parent family firms and their new venture(s) while it also proposed ‘uncategorised’ data in new dimensions. Textual analysis of data in previous sections suggested that parent family firms imbued categorised and uncategorised data in dispositions and munificence to only family ventures (e.g. Case A, B, C, F) and not to non-family ventures (e.g. Case D, G). Case E represented a hybrid case since Warren offered sponsorship toward venturing at the parent family firm with categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence, while Rodney, withheld sponsorship toward venturing at the parent family firm. This section presents data across cases to propose that over generations parent family firms communicate various dispositions over generations to their family ventures. This section also presents data across cases to propose that over generations parent family firms act to gently steer or nudge family venture(s) toward available resources.

6.11.1 Communicate an Expectation for Family to Venture

Parent family firms communicate an expectation over generations that the next generation will venture from within the parent family firm. Case A family members communicated their expectation that the next generation would venture starting with Luke suggesting that, *‘Everyone should run their own business!’*

Michael recalled,

‘My father wanted his own sons, me and my two brothers (his two other sons), to be able to have an opportunity to start a business as well.’

In interviews Mathew remembered,

“Luke didn’t give us any money. So, you know it was like – it was tough . . . but it was sort of like you know, ‘there’s a lot of doing, and it’s the right thing to do, but you’re going to have to step up and do your part as well,’” and it was just considered normal.’

Michael communicated an expectation to his sons commenting,

'I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value"'

In Case B the parent family firm communicated an expectation that the next generation would venture in 'performance obligations'. Further, a family history of the firm suggests the parent family firm began, "as an incubator of entrepreneurial ventures" (Case B Published History, 1998). In interviews Allen at Case B suggested support from the parent family firm,

"I was able to kind of work with the board to say here's a few sites we should be looking at and looking to start replenishing a land bank again."

And in Case C there is a desire that the next generation should venture in a recollection from Chris that his father, "Yeah, he was going to train his sons to be like he is, I guess [laughter], and help them out."

Proposition 1a: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation communicate an expectation that the next generation will venture.*

In Case D there is an expectation that family should venture in Cases D and family ventures associated with Case D. However, data suggests that Clint at Case D2 resisted attempts by non-family to venture in Case D4. John remembered,

'Clint at [Case D2] knew exactly what I was putting in the ground for inventory every evening. It was based more on items we knew we could sell ... Clint pulled back from what might have been a loose understanding'.

Further, John commented,

'My idea was to sell these trees back to him and take a cut of them for producing them, but it didn't work out; it never came to that'.

In Case E there are conflicting messages about venturing. While data representing a history of the firm supported family venturing, Rodney resisted attempts to expand and venture. Tim recalled,

'There were some really dumb decisions that [Rodney] made out of vengeance along the way. My uncle would just say "no" for the sake of, "I want the upper hand" even though it made total sense to do, I felt'.

At Case G Donald did not communicate an expectation for Daniel to venture. Jake commented, "It's not [my father's] priority to expand or let Daniel expand through venturing."

Proposition 1b: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions do not communicate an expectation that non-family members should venture.*

6.11.2 Communicate Support for the Family Venture

Parent family firms communicate their support for venturing across generations in long-lasting and transposable dispositions. At Case A Mathew recounted support from his father to push his venture forward.

'And that's what Luke eliminated - those sorts of barriers; because, if you have a good enough idea (which Case A2 was) I went and I found some financing.'

Michael also recalled support from his father.

'With Luke it was all about if you want it bad enough you can make it happen . . . if there's a will there's a way.'

Michael repeatedly commented to all his sons as they structured individual ventures at the parent family firm,

"You've got to figure it out on your own, but you must have a sense of urgency, and a sense that you've got to get stuff done."

And Michael's son, Andy, reflected his father's communication when he commented on his own family venture, *"I just did it. I just do it. It's a desire to get it done."*

At Case B Brad commented on venturing among family, *"They know what they should be doing. They are unlikely to make many wrong decisions."*

At Case C Chris believed his father wanted his sons to 'love' business.

That's right. Yeah, I think maybe he wanted me and Arthur to love business, not necessarily the business he was in?

Proposition 2a: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation communicate support for the family venture.*

At Case D there is data supporting next generation family to venture. However, Clint did not communicate support for the non-family venture that John created. John remembered,

'Case I4 went out on its own, and Case I2 didn't show us any money. There wasn't anything like that!'

At Case G data suggests Donald communicated very little support for Daniel to venture in Lilac hybridization and/or cultivation. Daniel remembered, *'He seems very open to it, but when it comes down to brass tacks, he - it never happens.'*

Proposition 2b: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation do not communicate support for the non-family venture.*

6.11.3 Communicate Problem-solving at the Family Venture

Parent family firms communicate problem-solving for the family venture. At Case A Luke recalled, *“I never walked away from something that didn’t work . . . I changed it!”* Luke, Michael and Mathew communicated frequently about their collective, *“ability to solve problems”* and family to, *“put the shoulder to the wheel.”*

At Case B Brad communicated, *“So I think lots of the new divisions have come out of just not wanting to be boxed in.”* His son, Allen recalled problems leading to the creation of the timber division,

“My understanding or recollection at the time, it was a frustration that we were using other companies and in some cases competitor companies to supply us with timber.”

At Case C George and his sons communicated that problems existed in small pick-ups and local distribution. To overcome the problem family communicated direct distribution, and in interviews Chris commented,

“We didn’t want to play around with quarts at [Case C], because there are a lot of blueberries. We wanted to move truckloads of them and sell them to manufacturers; food bakeries. And that was our best market, but there were more markets.”

Propositions 3a: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation communicate problem-solving initiatives to the family venture.*

While data suggests there was a dearth of information provided to Case D and Case D2 from family cousins in New Jersey, at Case D there was no formal transfer of information or problem-solving to John at Case D4. What John learned and solved was a result of his own education in the industry or on the job at Case D2. In interviews Bill remembered,

‘John knew who [Case I2] got their material from each and every year, he saw the liner sources Clint would put out.’

At Case G Donald arguably provided Daniel more promises than answers, and he commented with some frustration,

‘I’m assuming Donald wanted his sons to take it over, and I can see his kids coming in and just being frustrated with him because he just won’t let go and getting angry and just being like, ‘get out of here!’”

Propositions 3b: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation do not communicate problem-solving initiatives to the non-family venture.*

6.11.4 Communicate an Entrepreneurial Environment in which to Venture

Parent family firms communicate an entrepreneurial environment for family to venture. At Case A Luke promoted a culture of success or failure rather than fear of

failure. He commented, *'I could never understand any culture which promoted fear of failure . . . no one should fear failure.'*

Luke also commented on an environment of risk-taking, innovativeness and proactiveness at Case A.

'I think they've picked it up, I don't know that they picked it up from me - maybe the atmosphere that they grew up in or something. I don't know how that happens.'

Michael communicated an entrepreneurial environment for his sons at Case A by communicating,

'I think initially, I think that it would almost be better to do the "Hey, I got an idea Dad, let me add value", I think it would create a better growth learning for them, but taking that risk and maybe you know, having some success and maybe some failure and you know, I like that.'

Robert also communicated an entrepreneurial environment to his brothers suggesting,

'We like to create our own thing. So, there's going to be collaboration, there's going to be team work and there's also going to be time for, "Hey James, you've always wanted to do this, right? Go do it. Hey Andy, you've always wanted to do this, right? That's your project!'"'

At Case B seven generations promoting 'performance obligations' provide an entrepreneurial environment in which *'Nothing is new'* as Dirk suggested. Brad commented on the, *'Unique combination of innovation and tradition'* at Case B suggesting family commitment to innovate but also maintain legacy and dividends at the parent family firm. At Case B Brad commented, *'So there was a kind of willingness to embrace the future'*.

At Case C George communicated an entrepreneurial environment in the hard work of others. 70 years after they were made, Chris still remembered his father communicating,

'Studying medicine would be a big mistake. He used to say, "A doctor goes on house calls and makes \$20 out of the house call . . . a businessman can make a telephone call and make \$1,000 by following his contacts and doing business.'

Chris also remembered,

'So, that's what [George] called a businessman -- somebody who does something on his own. He didn't have it in mind to work for a corporation or anything like that.'

Propositions 4a: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to the next generation communicate an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture to family ventures.*

At Case D there was continual confusion about the entrepreneurial environment in which Case D4 ventured. John believed Case D4 had a 'loose agreement' with Case D2 to venture with the understanding that Case D4 trees would sell through Case D2 sales channels. While family and cousins provided Clint and his brothers with a supportive entrepreneurial environment in which to venture, Clint did not provide the same supportive entrepreneurial environment to John at Case D4. John remembered,

“When [Case I2] and I parted company in the middle of '06, it forced me to really get serious about this . . . I was committed.

At Case G Donald did not provide a supportive entrepreneurial environment in which to venture, and Daniel remembered,

‘I don't mind working hard to build something. I have treated this like my own business, probably for 15 years, and it's not my business. People tell me all the time, ‘It's not your business, I don't understand why you feel like you have to do that?’”

Propositions 4b: *Family firms that imbue long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions do not communicate an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture to non-family ventures.*

6.11.4 Present opportunity(s) to venture

Actions at parent family firms serve to present family members opportunities to venture. At Case A Michael commented, *‘Luke had a passion for growing things’*, and he imbued his passion to his sons with the presentation of various opportunities in the green industry. Mathew remembered how his father presented an opportunity in industrial-scale composting at Case A2.

‘So when I came home, you know prior to going to Australia, that's where this opportunity was there and Luke explained it and I got interested in it and basically put the shoulder to the wheel and got the company organised, financed and started.’

Similarly, Michael remembered how his father presented an opportunity in horticultural propagation at Case A1.

‘I left White on '80, in that February of 1980 and decided to come home for a couple of months. ... [Case A] really was very much a start-up kind of atmosphere and you know, to his credit, Luke's a risk taker and you know I would not be here if not for Luke.’

Michael presented opportunities to venture for all his sons, but he believed they should come to him with their ideas for venturing. Further, Michael believed,

'So, if [my sons] choose to come here, the only rule I've had is that they have to go work somewhere else.'

At Case B while generations communicated *'performance obligations'* they also presented *'freedom'* and *'opening up'* opportunities to venture. Brad recalled his grandfather presenting opportunities for his sons to venture in leasing and land development in separate cities.

'My grandfather, when he had two sons Fred and Daniel (Daniel is my father), he said to them, 'We cannot have both of you in Glasgow - I can't have it. So one of you has to go somewhere else and start a business.'

Ed commented in interviews about *'freedom'* at the parent family firm to develop your own job and develop jobs out-with the organisation.

"[The family] gave you a lot of freedom to develop your own job and bits out-with your job. They certainly gave you a lot of freedom - even in Daniel's latter years."

Similarly, Ray commented,

"The previous generation has been very open to myself and Allen the last two years, have done a lot of work about our assets and making sure we get the best use of them to open up what we've got and put it on the table and say, 'right, we don't use that enough', or 'let's use this more'."

And similarly, Allen commented,

'But since I've joined, there's a lot more from what I perceived to be – not freedom with the company but a lot more room to stretch your legs – [Case B3] is a prime example.'

Brad also commented on the recognition of timber systems as an opportunity to venture.

'I think timber system side of it - realizing we could be successful in doing different ventures - it spurred on a kind of growth within the company to look outside our quite enclosed area that we're in which is just building homes.'

At Case C George presented opportunities in his existing business of day-to-day fill-ins, but he also presented opportunities in direct distribution. Arthur remembered in interviews,

'Well, George gave us opportunity . . . he set up the marshmallow business, the Christmas tree business, the blueberry business.'

Similarly, Chris remembered that George provided opportunities for his two boys to venture.

“We were only buying day-to-day fill-ins. Yeah - that kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really, is what it did.”

Proposition 5a: *Parent family firms gently steer or nudge family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by presenting opportunity(s) to venture.*

At Case D Clint’s cousins gently steered his parent family firm from dairy production to horticulture production with a gently steering toward more southern grown horticultural material. Alternately, Clint did not steer or guide John at D4 toward shade tree production despite John’s understanding that there was a ‘loose agreement’ between Case D2 and Case D4.

At Case G Donald did not steer Daniel toward Lilac propagation or production despite promises to venture. Daniel arguably provided little of no guidance to his most important non-family employee.

Proposition 5b: *Parent family firms do not steer or nudge non-family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by presenting opportunity(s) to venture.*

6.11.5 Present Partnership(s) to Venture

Parent firms gently steer or nudge their family ventures toward available resources and opportunities by presenting partnerships to venture. At Case A Mathew remembered emphatically, ‘*The genius of Luke is that he truly partnered with his sons*’. Mathew also remembered that Luke was a good partner if the venture made business sense.

“Luke was pretty straightforward - if it made sense, it made sense. Do it! He was always a good partner, but it needed to make sense - it needed to make business sense; otherwise he'd be the first to shoot it down.”

Mathew repeated the tradition with his nephews and planned to partner with his sons when they graduated college. In interviews Mathew’s nephew, Robert, remembered his uncle always asking, ‘*Hey, when are we going to start a business?*’

At Case B Ed recalled the presentation of partnerships toward venturing,

“I think I tried to weigh the responsibility of making the success of the next generation in the context of ‘No, no, no - let us help you make that a success, and actually make sure that you still enjoy what you do.’”

Ed also recalled enthusiasm and open-mindedness from Brad and Dirk to partner with present generation family members in new concepts and new construction methods.

“That enthusiasm and open-mindedness probably comes from people like Brad and Dirk particularly. You know, they are keen for us to try new ideas and that’s not necessarily written down in any business plan anywhere.”

At Case C George repeatedly partnered with his sons in marshmallow production and direct distribution of blueberries and Christmas trees. Chris recalled, *'And I'm not sure what he had in mind, actually; he didn't really discuss what he had in mind. But, we could assume to some extent that he was trying to set up a business for his family - for his two boys.'*

Chris specifically remembered that the marshmallow business was a partnership in venturing for father and sons. *'Well, he thought it was a good opportunity for his sons to get into different kind of business, and he joined us in the business.'*

With more than seven profit centres within Case C3, Arthur partnered with his first son, Greg, to develop Christmas distribution in wreath factories; he partnered with his first daughter, Laura, to develop seasonal retail stores, and he partnered with second son, Steven, to develop direct horticultural distribution among east coast horticultural distributors. Greg remembered,

'The direct business that Steven developed included the major suppliers of the parent company; so that had been developed over quite a number of years, and then that direct business was a part of the parent company before it was spun-off.'

Proposition 6a: *Parent family firms gently steer or nudge family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by partnering with the venture.*

At Case D there was never a need to establish a formal partnership between family and cousins, and Clint remembered,

'There was no formal agreement between the two nurseries. I think my dad and cousin just met and talked about what the availability of the inventory was and what they could use.'

Alternately, there was an assumed partnership between Case D2 and Case D4 that never developed, and Clint remembered,

"It wasn't a partnership; it just never developed that way ... And I'd be, you know – I would be surprised if John said that there was any input on our part."

At Case G there is limited data to suggest that Donald ever desired to partner with Donald in the creation of any new venture associated with growing or lilac production despite Daniel's wishes to venture and partner with Donald. In interviews Daniel commented,

"For the new [growing] business it's a question of when, and I don't have any issues or regrets, there are just certain things that Donald still just won't let go of."

Proposition 6b: *Parent family firms do not steer or nudge non-family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by partnering with the venture.*

6.11.6 Present a Stable Environment in which to Venture

Parent firms gently steer or nudge their family ventures toward available resources and opportunities by presenting a stable environment in which to venture. At Case A Luke presented a stable environment in which to venture given available resources in human capital and social capital. Luke recalled his social capital at White University where 3 sons and 4 grandson attended college.

‘Well, you know I know a lot of people in research at White University because of work I’ve done in the horticultural business, and you get to know these guys, and you get to know the guys that are interested in the same things you’re interested in.’

However, both Michael and Mathew recalled lack of economic capital and symbolic capital from the parent family firm. Mathew commented in interviews, *I found the investor myself, a friend of mine's father-in-law who I played basketball with at White.*”

James reflected on his father’s explicit horticultural knowledge at Case A8 by commenting, *“He’s always bringing in new products and initiating new research.”*

At Case B seven generations provide a stable environment providing cultural, economic, human and social capital for venturing at the parent family firm. Suggesting generations of human capital Brad noted in interviews that family building history dates back to housing in Bo’ness, Scotland from the 1600’s which still stands. His great-great-great grandfather in James was a *‘wright and proprietor of houses’* in the late 17th century, and it’s noted in historical records that the family has been wrights, joiners or builders generation to generation since that time (Case B Published History, 1998). Brad also noted that support for ventures in land surveying came from years of experience.

“And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we’d built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor.”

Allen commented on the significance of cultural capital for the creation of new business and venturing in land development and timber systems.

“I’m not going to control every business aspect, but whatever the venture, you still have the Case B brand name behind it, and that to me is one of the most important things - is the name. What it stands for has to go with the new ventures and new idea.”

In interviews Brad commented frequently on the importance of networks and social capital.

“I think they are very important, and I think you develop them; I think one of the things you get from the generation before is their networks.”

In conversations about economic capital and venture funding, Ed commented, *‘Yes. So I think the company, the main company, would fund everything he did.’*

At Case C Arthur remembered George provided economic capital for several ventures including the marshmallow business.

‘Oh yeah, the candy business. [My father] put a lot of money -- at that time, I had just got out of college, 51, when he -- he put in at least \$100,000.’

Chris remembered human capital from his father in the education he and his brother received in the fruit and produce business.

‘Well, my brother Arthur and I, we used to go to help out, I guess George wanted to get us acquainted with the fruit and produce business.’

Arthur provided similar human capital to his children in the green industry as he supported Case C9, C10 and C11. Greg recalled in interviews,

“And the Christmas business I learned 45 years previous from Arthur. I didn’t know anything about Christmas trees and all that until he sent me out with Herb.”

George believed in reputation which arguably translated into cultural capital for Case C and ventures associated with Case C. Chris recalled,

‘Well, yeah. It’s your -- if you have a good reputation, that’s the most valuable asset that you have. And George believed in that. And that’s the kind of attitude he had about everything in life - to help other people.’

In interviews Greg remembered cultural capital extended from Case C3 to his venture in Christmas tree distribution and his brother’s venture in horticultural distribution.

‘I think the main thing was the reputation and the track record and the purchasing power of the parent company . . . so that had been developed over quite a number of years.’

Proposition 7a: *Parent family firms gently steer or nudge family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by presenting a stable environment in which to venture with available entrepreneurial capital.*

At Case D family and cousins provided a stable environment in which to venture by endorsing and supporting the environment in which Clint and his father ventured in horticulture with New Jersey cousins. In interviews Clint commented,

‘Something [my great-grandfather and grandfather] realised and made known to us – that this was probably the best way to keep, you know, to keep going and to expand the nursery and not the dairy business’.

For John at Case D4 he began shade and ornamental shade tree production based on the assumption there would be a ‘*loose agreement*’ with Case D2 and an environment that supported his venturing activity. In interviews he commented,

‘My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with D2. We had the sales force in place; we had the shipping and the production, and we could have easily added D4 inventory to D2 inventory’

But, by 2006 the environment had changed or never existed, and he commented,

‘In 2000 we started lining out trees, but I didn't do it thinking that it would cause a separation between us in 2006’.

Proposition 7b: *Parent family firms do not steer or nudge non-family ventures toward available opportunities and resources by presenting a stable environment in which to venture with available entrepreneurial capital.*

6.12 Capital Transfer in Forms of Capital

The following display in Table 6.64 presents a cross-case display of data from Cases A-G reflecting transfer of Firkin’s (2003) forms of entrepreneurial capital from seven parent family firm to their family and non-family venture(s). While Table 6.84 presents a positive transfer of entrepreneurial capital from the parent family firm in Cases A,B,C, E and F, it is notable that the cross-case display reflects only limited or no data at all in a transfer of capital from the parent family firm in Case D and Case G to their non-family venture in Case D4 and Case G1. However, in Case D there is data which reflects a transfer of capital from Case D to family ventures, Case D1-D3. Interestingly, at Case E there is data which reflects a transfer of capital to Case E5.

Table 6.64 Examples of Transfer of Entrepreneurial Capital at Cases A-G

	Human Capital	Social Capital	Economic Capital	Cultural Capital
Case A	<p>[Michael]: "But I got into the Agriculture School at Ezra, so I had you know, and that was, I think you know, much to [Luke's] direction you know, and I got the plant knowledge there and I got the agriculture knowledge there."</p>	<p>[Michael]: "Yeah, Mathew and I shared customers; we shared people. Those were tough and tumultuous times in the 80s."</p> <p>[Robert]: "I walked around the trade show with my dad today. He's a rock star here, man!"</p>	<p>[Mathew]: "Luke gave us opportunity while mentoring and supporting us which was way more valuable than money."</p> <p>[James]: "[A1] gives us the opportunity to have money to invest in maybe something we are passionate about."</p>	<p>[Mathew]: Luke showed, "emotional capital - intellectual capital of what it takes to succeed in your own business."</p> <p>[Robert]: "I think having the [A1] name on the business is important."</p>
Case B	<p>[Brad]: "And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we'd built up over the years."</p> <p>[Brad]: "Ed is a fantastic example of internal promotion while Ray actually knows what happens on site. I never worked on a site, not one of our own."</p>	<p>[Brad]: "I think they are very important, and I think you develop them; I think one of the things you get from the generation before is their networks."</p> <p>[Brad]: "I think they are very important, and I think you develop them; I think one of the things you get from the generation before is their networks."</p>	<p>[Brad]: And, for many years we weren't controlled by finance - we had enough money. We didn't borrow money, we had loads of money!"</p> <p>[Ed]: "Yes. So, I think the company, the main company, would fund everything he did."</p>	<p>[Ed]: "Going back to your question - yes, our contacts helped, but it was definitely the name that allowed us to open doors."</p> <p>[Ray]: "We've been here 88 years why do you want to ruin that now."</p>
Case C	<p>[Chris]: "Yes, I think we learned a lot from our father, and in his own way he made sure that we understood."</p> <p>[Tom C]: "And the Christmas business I learned 45 years previous from Arthur. I didn't know anything about Christmas trees and all that until he sent me out with Herb."</p>	<p>[Greg]: "I think the only support mechanism was one of networking and relationship whereby the nurseries felt, whether it was true or not, that this venture in [Case C10] kind of had the backing of the parent company. Maybe it did, maybe it didn't."</p>	<p>[Arthur]: "You know, I had to go find my way, but I remember he gave me \$5000 bucks to go buy trees, because the wholesale market was selling to smaller, more local people - small quantities."</p> <p>[Greg]: "While it may not have boiled down to a financial support, what it really was almost like a co-signing on a loan"</p>	<p>[Arthur]: "And you know, Tony C. from the bank liked what I was doing - working, and hustling, and he knew [George]; he didn't know him, but he knew of him in the produce business."</p> <p>[Greg]: "I think the main thing was the reputation and the track record and the purchasing power of the parent company . . . so that had been developed over quite a number of years."</p>

Case D	<p>[Bill]: "Case D2 also helped John see how a B&B tree operation was run . . . I think it helped D4 get off the ground."</p> <p>[John]: "I very freely gave any knowledge I had, and I felt like they opened everything up to me that I would ever need to see, from the books to production to whatever."</p>	<p>[Clint] "So got a lot of support from [New Jersey] when getting started; as a matter of fact,[that's why we got started in the business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them that they couldn't grow there . . . that was part of our production."</p> <p>[Bill] "not that John didn't know these guys -- but [Case D2] helped cultivate these relationships as John did sales for Case D2."</p>	<p>[Clint]: "So, we received a lot of equipment, help, all that; we got their hand-me-downs and bought their second-hand stuff and it helped us tremendously to get started."</p> <p>[Clint]: "There was transfer of equipment and personnel between [our cousins] and D2. There was no transfer between D2 and D4."</p>	<p>[Clint]: But I think we got our standards from growing plants, from [our cousins] that been around a lot longer than we have and had a lot more experience.</p> <p>[Clint]: I think people realized and our customers - well he wouldn't be selling me this if it wasn't up to [Case D] standard so to speak. So, I think that was probably a lead out or a help for him.</p>
Case E	<p>[Warren] 'During grade school, I worked here all the time, deadheading plants, pruning, picking stones....'</p>	<p>[Warren] '[Ed] joined the plant propagator's society and got to meet a lot of the innovators in nursery production'.</p>	<p>[Warren] 'During this time many production methods changed, largely in response to competition and rising costs.'</p>	<p>[Thomas] "if we raise the plants, they will come"</p> <p>[Ed] "If [Case E] doesn't have it, then no one does."</p>
Case F	<p>[Joan] 'Definitely technical knowledge is one of the things that Dad brings'.</p> <p>[Michael] 'I have a lot of that kind of knowledge and experience on tap that's much more easy to access than it is through another mentor'.</p>	<p>[Joan] 'We live and work mainly in Ayrshire and as such we see some feedback out of return to the community for their understanding of living and working in this area'.</p>	<p>[Michael] 'I gave her £50,000 to start the business. That gave me 49%, and that gave her 51%'.</p> <p>[Michael] 'If I send a joiner from Case F to work for Case F1 Jennifer's still got to buy that'</p>	<p>[Joan] 'They always discuss them as two separate companies, but it's certainly helpful at this early stage to be able to say to people that we subcontract the building lot to Case F, and they've been running for 23 years, and they've built over 1000 new homes'.</p>
Case G	<p>[Donald]: 'I think more of where I've helped him is in the buying part'.</p> <p>[Daniel] 'I've learned from [Donald] how to run a business, how to do business smart'.</p>	<p>[Daniel]: '[Donald] is just going to be for me, a resource. If I need help, if I need connections'.</p> <p>[Daniel]: 'I think he would provide me with contacts/resources to help me understand more'.</p>	<p>[Donald]: 'What I've taken now and what I have invested and what I have available to invest I want a return on'.</p> <p>[Daniel]: 'I do think he would offer financial support, and he would expect payback/return on that investment'.</p>	

6.12.1 Transfer of Human Capital at Cases A-G

At Case A Luke had a lifelong “*passion for growing things.*” Despite comments from his sons that Case A was “[Luke’s] *mid-life crisis,*” he cultivated and tapped knowledge networks at the White University School of Agriculture. Luke effectively utilized his knowledge networks at White to answer his questions and educate his sons and grandsons in agriculture. His sons and grandsons continually benefit from his association with White and continually strengthen this long association with gifts, donations and lectures. Luke provided the tacit knowledge in his understanding of business opportunities, investors, tax codes, and policies while establishing avenues for his sons and their employees to develop explicit knowledge in their education and experience.

At Case A, Luke lacked the knowledge to grow tomatoes, grow ornamental plants, or compost organic waste, but he persisted by incorporating general industry and entrepreneurial human capital from others. In interviews, Michael recalls,

“I got into the Agriculture School at [White] ... and I got the plant knowledge there, and I got the agriculture knowledge there.”

Similarly, at Case A2, Mathew reflected on the human capital Luke provided:

“From a technical standpoint, [Luke] didn't really as far as how to do industrial-scale composting, he didn't bring any of those skills to the table; those were what I had to learn just from doing and also observing other operations that were doing the same thing.”

In additional interviews, Mathew continued his thoughts about the acquisition of human capital suggesting,

“if you have any brains and competencies on your own, the technical aspects of what you have to learn to succeed, you will learn that on your own.”

In the third generation, James reflects on his father’s explicit horticultural knowledge by commenting, “*He’s always bringing in new products and initiating new research.*” But James understands that both tacit and explicit knowledge are key ingredients in new venture legitimacy. He comments, “*I take all the knowledge and resources I know and do the best I can.*”

Human Capital plays an integral part in the development and growth of Case B over generations. Early generations were ‘*wright and proprietor of houses*’ in the late 17th century, and it’s noted in historical records that the family has been wrights, joiners or builders generation to generation since that time (History of Case B, 1999). The previous two generations have secured advanced degrees in architecture while the present generation has extensive human capital in surveying, geography and land planning. As Brad commented in interviews,

“And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we’d built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor.”

At Case C Arthur and Chris recalled that George was a man of very few words who naturally created a learning environment within and out with the business. Chris recalled, “*Yes, I think we learned a lot from our father, and in his own way he made sure that we understood.*” Chris also commented that George provided an environment in which his sons could learn agriculture distribution at the source.

Well, my brother Arthur and I, we used to go to help out, I guess George wanted to get us acquainted with the fruit and produce business. We’d assist in the way of helping some of the buyers that would come by, and we’d quote them a price that we were told to offer for whatever we had. But he never told us what to do.”

In interviews Arthur recalled that the transfer of human capital from George to his sons served a dual purpose of training and education in the business and training and education for future venturing. He commented, “*Yeah, he was going to train his sons to be like he was I guess (laughter), and help them out.*”

Like his father, Arthur was instrumental in the transfer of human capital to his sons and daughter. In interviews, Greg recalled Arthur introduced mentors for his sons among senior managers at all locations. When Greg decided to venture in Christmas wreath production and sales, Arthur again introduced mentors in senior managers running operations in the United States. When Steve decided to venture in direct distribution, Arthur provided his own knowledge of vendors and distributors with frequent trips to nurseries and customers. Arthur remembered,

“Steven changed how things were done but there was a system in place at the parent company that got transferred over.”

At Case D both tacit and explicit human capital on agriculture and shade/ornamental tree production existed at Case D over generations. During that time human capital in the form of knowledge skills, and techniques passed from generations and between generations as New Jersey cousins imbued human capital to the new venture in Case D2. Clint commented in interviews,

“[My grandfather] turned the dairy over to my father, and it was up to my dad when actually it was the influence of [cousins] that got my dad involved, and the two of them were great communicators and decided [nursery] is the best way to go.”

Alternately, John entered the horticultural field with knowledge gained from extensive travel to Europe and western states to improve his understanding of horticultural. John commented in interviews,

“I worked in Europe for four years before going out to the Midwest and so the knowledge had accumulated throughout my professional career.”

In 1977 John and his wife independently ventured in field grown perennial and grass propagation based on his existing knowledge in the green industry. John developed the venture as a family operation until 1993 when Clint at Case D2 suggested John sell his perennial production and join Case D2 in selling shade and ornamental trees. John commented in interviews,

“You could say we got [Case D2] into the perennial business. It was our knowledge and competencies that pushed [Case D2] forward.”

John imbued his own knowledge about perennial production upon Case D2 between 1994 and 2000 and commented in interviews, *“I very freely gave any knowledge I had. . .”* By 2000 he used his accumulated industry knowledge to grow trees on available land where he had previously grown perennials. John commented in interviews,

“We went out and did it because I had the basics and you're always picking up new information in this business whether you think you are or not, it's just the way it works.”

However, John arguably believed that human capital in horticultural knowledge at Case D2 was something he had to either take or learn elsewhere. He commented,

“I didn't learn from Case D2. It's just something we picked up as we got in the tree business from people that were supplying us.”

At Case E human capital is perceived to be the cornerstone of horticultural plant propagation given that the propagator must continually learn from trial and error. To formulate their education in the field, Thomas invested tremendous time and effort teaching Ed the art of propagation which his son decidedly learned quickly and grew to decidedly master the art. To further his education Thomas also invested in his son's agricultural education with a degree in horticulture and landscape architecture from White College for both his children. As such, Warren remembered,

‘When my dad came into the business in '37-'38 he brought an interest in woody plants and landscaping and design’.

Ed invested in the education of his children as well. School days and summers the children worked in the fields *“since they were old enough to waddle”* as their mother remembered. Warren recalled,

‘During grade school, I worked here all the time, deadheading plants, pruning, picking stones....’

While Warren would continue his education with a degree in architecture from White his brother, Rodney, began his education at White but finished at a local college in New Hampshire.

Warren and Rodney differed on the education they supported for Tim. While Warren wanted Tim to complete his formal education and start in management at the nursery, Rodney wanted his nephew to start at the bottom. Warren remembered,

'[Rodney] wanted [Tim] to start right now and learn from the bottom up because he needed to have this understanding of the business, which of course is the old style of thinking'.

At Case F Joan expresses her satisfaction that here father passes technical knowledge to her venture. She commented, *'Definitely technical knowledge is one of the things that Dad brings'*. Michael fully understands that his talent in building is a benefit when he has direct contact with his daughter. He suggested,

'I have a lot of that kind of knowledge and experience on tap that's much more easy to access than it is through another mentor'.

At Case G the parent family firm contended that the foundation of the business is knowledge of the horticulture industry, but the knowledge that Donald professed does not transfer to ventures that Daniel intended to start. While Daniel commented, *'I've learned from [Donald] how to run a business, how to do business smart,'* the business clearly belongs to Donald and will belong to Donald for the foreseeable future. Transferring of knowledge is for the benefit of the parent family firm rather than non-family venturing activity. Donald commented in interviews, *'I think more of where I've helped him is in the buying part'*.

6.12.2 Transfer of Social Capital at Cases A-G

It is family at Case A that drives the recognition of new resources and opportunities and drives the development of new ventures, and it is family that creates a network of associations and affiliations that further each new venture. However, over generations it is the family business that generates social capital for individual new ventures, given its growing power in the green industry field. Paul maintains financial connections and partnership connections at White. For example, the Dean of the Agriculture School teamed with Mathew to farm fish in upstate New York, and the father of an White classmate provided funding for Case A2. Mathew remembers in interviews, "I found the investor myself, a friend of mine's father-in-law who I played basketball with at White." Tim also maintains strong social ties at White. In interviews, his father comments, "Tim made a lot of friends up at White that are very successful in the farming business." His grandsons, James and Robert, maintain an academic connection with their advisor in the School of Agriculture and fraternity friendships that provide support and opportunities to acquire other forms of capital if needed. Social connections and social capital continue to grow in the third generation. In an interview, Ben commented that his dad is a "rock star" as he walks the floor of any horticultural trade show meeting and greeting customers and vendors; that "rock star" status will arguably pass to his children as they walk the show with their father. In their individual new ventures, they understand and leverage the social connections that their father and family developed.

Case B can boast direct relationships with building councils in and around Glasgow and Edinburgh. It was council funding rather than central government funding which allowed social networks to grow over generations. Brad also notes in interviews,

“My father established connections, and I know that all the people that he met socially, and I met as a child would be people who had an important position in Edinburgh.”

Social networking worked well for Case B during recessionary periods and growth periods. Commenting specifically on the value of social networks, Brad states,

“I think they are very important, and I think you develop them; I think one of the things you get from the generation before is their networks.”

Imbuing the next generation with social capital Brad notes,

“So, I think something that you can pass on to the next generation is contacts, but they are not formal, it’s not a book. It’s just when it’s appropriate.”

At Case C George also established strong social capital by maintaining friendships and relationships with Case C customers and suppliers. George arguably strengthened social capital for Case C and Case C ventures by effectively partnering with his customers and growers believing what’s best for them would be best for Case C. In interviews Chris, remembered,

“And he was a very smart man. He helped finance the growers by getting their fertilizer, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that. He was a real great planner.”

While George worked to help establish Chris in blueberries, Chris passed along his social connections to help his brother establish himself in Christmas tree distribution.

“I introduced Arthur to an agent that I had in the blueberry business towards Antigonish, and his name was Lowell M..”

At Case D cousins in New Jersey provided social capital to Case D2 assuming both operations would share resources and share inventory. As such, New Jersey cousins imbued social capital on Case D2 to assure that Kent and his family at Case D2 would grow using similar irrigation techniques, similar fertilizing techniques, similar lining-out stock, etc. that an existing customer base would expect. As such, imbuing social connections on Case D2 could serve to produce similar inventory for sale in either northeast or southern markets while providing legitimacy to operations in Virginia. In interviews Clint commented,

“So, got a lot of support from [New Jersey] when getting started; as a matter of fact that’s why we got started in the business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them that they couldn’t grow there . . . that was part of our production.”

John recognized firm resources in social capital from his long association within the horticulture field as well as his association with vendors and customers between 1994 - 2000. In interviews Bill commented somewhat reticently,

“not that John didn't know these guys -- but [Case D2] helped cultivate these relationships as John did sales for Case D2.

John was aware of who supplied D2 as well as what they supplied to D2 operations, and he cultivated social connections to provide legitimacy and overcome a liability of newness at I4. Bill further commented in interviews that,

John knew who [Case D2] got their material from each and every year, he saw the liner sources Clint would put out.”

At Case E quotes from employees suggest that family members at the parent family firm were neither warm nor easy to work with. However, social capital arguably grew the business as Ed continued what his father started and developed social acumen for pleasing landscape architects and horticulturalists with exciting plant varieties and introductions. Warren recalled,

‘[Ed] joined the plant propagator’s society and got to meet a lot of the innovators in nursery production’.

While Warren did not propagate, he understood that Boston suburbs were expanding, and with expansion cities, towns and their developers required plant material. He made a conscious effort to develop relationships with city and town wardens who made decisions on what to plant and where to plant it.

Tim would use his father’s connections in every city and town to develop his social connections for composting in Case E4.

At Case F Michael has endeared the local community to his efforts, and it has paid dividends in social capital for Case F and Case F1. Joan suggested the same in interviews:

‘We live and work mainly in Ayrshire and as such we see some feedback out of return to the community for their understanding of living and working in this area’.

At Case G social capital like human capital is available but never transferred. Daniel commented, *‘[Donald] is just going to be for me, a resource. If I need help, if I need connections.’* In additional interviews Daniel also commented, *‘I think [Donald] would provide me with contacts/resources to help me understand more’.*

6.12.3 Transfer of Economic Capital at Cases A-G

At Case A Luke arguably funded ventures creatively, and with little personal economic capital to transfer to his sons, they did the same. His sons remember the early funding at Case A:

“He had gotten some money – about a million bucks, and we had put some product on the ground that actually wasn't really even owned by us. It was owned by these New York investors, people that he had known from his prior career at Grolier Company.”

Near foreclosure when Michael stepped into the business, he recalled,

“I didn't take any money out of this place for ten years to build the horticulture business. Again, we built it like a tortoise really – incrementally.”

Mathew recalled,

“And so, [Luke] was completely tied up and also financially tied up at Case A growing tomatoes and starting the transition to horticulture.”

Michael remembered,

“Anyway, we got through that, and my father in his entrepreneurial way couldn't wait to get rid of this business. He sold me the business like I said at that point about 1983-84.”

The third generation believes the economics of the business is like a pie; Robert worries

“But I see Case A1 as one pie, and if more people start coming back, the slices gets smaller right? And right now, my dad and my mom are comfortable sharing the pie but my older brothers [are] coming back to the family business.”

In Case B Allen suggested there was always a solid economic platform to allow the firm to venture and grow in different directions over several generations. He comments,

“Yes, great-grandfather I think. So that was, I guess, kind of a great platform for which the company is probably still taking benefits on. And, for many years we weren't controlled by finance - we had enough money. We didn't borrow money, we had loads of money!”

Recessionary periods arguably forced the firm to re-think existing business and commit financial assets to new ventures including the Timber Systems division. Ray recalls the economic decision to purchase an existing timber framing facility in receivership by commenting,

“That was in 2007 and they put their timber frame company up for grabs. We decided at that point, you know what, we've had such a terrible let down from our supply chain and we want to build these units so let's purchase it.”

Brad recalls the timeline and decision from board members and family members to commit to timber systems and provide Ross the economic resources to develop the business.

“We stopped using timber frame before the recession, but the economy went off the edge of a cliff. We were building brick and mortar houses until our fingers bled; so, I think Ed M. said, ‘We need to try timber frame, it's quicker, although it's not necessarily cheaper’. So that gave us the incentive and we gave [Ray] the resources and opportunity to take [B7] business on.”

And Ed M. notes in interviews that, *“Yes. So, I think the company, the main company, would fund everything [Ray] did.”* Ed M. also notes the economic commitment Case B made to the Timbers Systems upon the purchase of a factory:

“But once we had our factory we went from not being a great advocate of timber frame to being great promoters of timber frame. We'd seen the benefits, our homes went up quicker, we were able to offer product to market in a shorter period of time, and the benefits just rolled on from there.”

In Case C George established a solid economic base from which to venture because of his parsimonious nature likely due to his early years escaping war torn Greece. In interviews both his sons noted:

“He was very prudent and didn't waste money and didn't -- and just was not a big spender. And that made it possible for him to be able to use the money where he earned it and invest accordingly.”

Financial assets which Case C accumulated over 30 years were often re-distributed by George to support existing and new ventures. In 1951 George determined that there might be an opportunity in the production and distribution of marshmallow candy given the popularity of candy in the States during the Korean War. His first son, Chris, recalled the decision George made to invest in Case S1 and partner with his sons.

“Oh yeah, the candy business. My father put a lot of money into it. At that time, I had just got out of college; it was 1951, when he put in at least \$100,000.”

However, George established distinctions in allocation of economic capital believing that the marshmallow business was a joint venture with his sons while Christmas tree distribution and blueberry distribution represented individual ventures by his sons. Chris recalled in interviews,

Yeah, but he didn't supply the money. We had to do that -- I know we had to do that . . . I don't think he financed Arthur's business either. But I'm not sure.

By the late 1980's both sons were forced to react to high inflation, high interest rates and a changing economic landscape by retreating from existing ventures. In interviews

Arthur recalled the necessity and relative pointlessness of transferring economic capital from one venture to another for economic survival.

“In ’83, we made a million bucks, and you know we had seven profit centres. But by the late ’80s and starting in the ’90s our profit picture dropped And then, after a while - after a few more years, I said, ‘Geez, I’m taking my income from one business and putting it in another’ Yeah, we were cash poor all the time.”

The third generation would arguably react to the perilous profit picture presented during their formative years. Several would curtail their venturing activities given their experiences in the 1980s. Steven remembered in interviews,

“Those were bad times that I don’t like reflecting on. Every day I entered the offices with pain in my stomach wondering if the banks would take our business and houses away. I think it affected my appetite for risk, but I decidedly ventured.”

At Case D Clint commented that the family firm venture from dairy farming to horticulture production was an expensive proposition as Kent continued to buy land and establish Case D in the horticulture field. By the 1960’s production acreage had increased from 500 to 1800 acres. However, during that time cousins who were financially and economically established in the horticultural field in New Jersey shared economic resources. In interviews Clint remembered,

“So, we received a lot of equipment, help, all that; we got their hand-me-downs and bought their second-hand stuff and it helped us tremendously to get started.”

Alternately, Case D4 operated without income from 2000 to 2006 while waiting to harvest and sell inventory of ornamental and shade tree production. He commented in interviews,

“Case D4 went out on its own, and Case D2 didn’t show us any money. There wasn’t anything like that!”

At Case E economic success came relatively quickly to Thomas at his small growing location just outside Boston. His economic success provided opportunities for his son and daughter who would expand propagation, launch a retail garden centre and expand landscape services. Though the 1970s and 1980s, Case E continued to expand becoming a 960-acre nursery encompassing several horticultural businesses. However, family transition, competition and economic recession combined to limit economic resources built up through generations. Warren recalled.

‘During this time many production methods changed, largely in response to competition and rising costs’.

Tim joined the parent family firm during tumultuous times that included family infighting between Warren and Rodney and eventual filing for US Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. With limited economic resources, Tim would expend all his effort to succeed with his individual family venture.

At Case F Michael has invested heavily in economic capital in his daughter's venture. He commented,

'I gave her £50,000 to start the business. That gave me 49%, and that gave her 51%.'

But Michael also understood that her venture in wee homes existed as a separate business with separate responsibilities and balance sheets. Michael also commented, *'If I send a joiner from Case F to work for Case F1 Joan has still got to buy that.'*

At Case G there is no data referencing transfer of economic capital except for vague references from Donald pertaining to a 'return' if he invested economic capital in Daniel or Jake's proposed venture. Donald commented,

'What I've taken now and what I have invested and what I have available to invest I want a return on.'

However, upon venturing Daniel believed that Donald would offer economic capital. He commented,

'I do think he would offer financial support, and he would expect payback/return on that investment.'

6.12.4 Transfer of Cultural Capital at Cases A-G

Cultural capital at Case A arguably exists in the notion that family members "romanticize business" and Michael and Mathew frequently comment that Luke would *"romanticize business when he hadn't quite analysed it."* A romance with business is arguably passed down through generations in an entrepreneurial disposition. Sons and grandsons often reflect on their love for business. Luke also passed along cultural capital in the form of emotional capital and intellectual capital. According to Mathew,

"[Luke] showed, emotional capital - intellectual capital of what it takes to succeed in your own business."

While Luke's sons and grandsons often admonish him for his lack of determination for starting and exiting so many ventures, they arguably admire the cultural capital he has transferred to their individual ventures in emotional and intellectual capital.

Case B has arguably established history, traditions and techniques which suggests objectified cultural capital in the Scottish building trade as timber merchants, home builders and developers for seven generations. In [1999] authors published a history of parent family firm to chronicle and compare social structures in Scotland with the development of building practices and rise of the parent family firm. Brad recalls

family history in Scotland from the late 17th century in north eastern Scotland where the family began a culture of quality and craftsmanship in building. In an objectified state many family members comment in interviews that, mentioning the parent company name, “. . . will get you in anywhere. It opens doors so easily.” Ray comments,

“So, basically the name got us in the door. Without [Case B] backing of the [B7] venture, that part of the market – if we go on the door at AB Smith, for example - it wouldn’t have gotten off the ground.”

Allen similarly commented,

“I’m not going to control every business aspect, but whatever the venture, you still have the Case B brand name behind it, and that to me is one of the most important things - is the name. What it stands for has to go with the new ventures and new idea.”

At Case C George believed in business, and he believed that to be successful in business required a reputation for hard work, reliability and honesty, and he extended the significance of a reputation for hard work, reliability and honesty by imbuing the importance of reputation to his sons and grandchildren. Chris recalled in interviews,

“And he was always trying to help people. He was quite an individual. It was good for his business, because the growers and the farmers that shipped him merchandise depended on him to get the right market price and get a good return on their merchandise - whatever they were growing: tomatoes, apples, whatever.”

Both of George’s sons would establish their own businesses in the agricultural sector and espouse their father’s appreciation and respect for business and reputation in business. Chris recalled,

“I found that that was a good way to be, and people would talk well about you, and they would hear about you, and you can do almost anything in business and get by very well.”

Cultural capital would extend to children and grandchildren of George as they individually ventured in agricultural distribution. Arthur recalled in interviews that his father’s strong reputation in fruit and produce presented opportunities in venturing and partnering.

“And, you know, Tony C. from the bank liked what I was doing - working, and hustling, and he knew [George]; he didn’t know him, but he knew of him in the produce business.”

Arthur’s first son, Greg, would extend cultural capital from all Case C ventures in order to expand Christmas tree distribution beyond Nova Scotia into Quebec. In interviews Greg recalled,

“I think the main thing was the reputation and the track record and the purchasing power of the parent company . . . so that had been developed over quite a number of years.”

At Case D establishment of cultural capital arguably started well before Kent in 1946 positioned Case D1 operations in the horticulture field. Cousins in Princeton, NJ had operated in the horticultural field as pre-eminent growers in northeastern United States for more nearly 200 years. As such, Case D1 under the leadership of Kent arguably leveraged cultural capital from New Jersey family operations to quickly become established and successful in horticultural distribution in the southeastern US. As a nurseryman and family member, Clint leveraged cultural capital established by his family and his father for family operations at Case D2. As an employee John P. remembered, *“Case D1 was a very well-established, very successful nursery in the state of Virginia.”*

When he established Case D4, John P. as a non-family employee did not actively capitalize on cultural capital established by Case D1 or I2. Instead, John arguably attempted to establish cultural capital in the quality of product he produced. John commented in interviews,

“I was not trying to grow an inferior tree and I would say Case D2 had the same strategy. They're not trying to grow an inferior tree.”

Data in interviews suggested that cultural capital at Case D4 existed due to Case D4 efforts rather than Case D4 association with Case D2. However, in interviews Bill commented,

“I think the association with Case D2 didn't hurt. Case D4 was good enough to stand on its own, but it certainly didn't hurt John to be able to go in while he represented Case D2 . . .”

Further, Bill noted in interviews that,

“I think the association with Case D2 helped with the launch of trees. The association helped solidify and launch Case D4 to get off the ground.”

At Case E the parent family firm established a reputation for horticultural innovation and excellence. Thomas began growing fruit and ornamental trees to a dedicated following while his son, Ed, propagated woody ornamentals in unusual, small-leaf rhododendron varieties to an even larger following. Thomas and Ed always commented, *“If [Case E] doesn't have it, then no one has it.”* And Warren remembered,

‘In 1959 we opened the retail garden centre. [Ed's] viewpoint that “if we raise the plants, they will come”, was largely correct, because the company continued to prosper’.

Cultural capital in horticultural hubris was well known in the industry, and it transferred to both Warren and Rodney. With it they established their individual ventures in commercial re-wholesale and growing operations. However, competition in the early 1980s suggested that many other could supply the same plants, better quality and at cheaper prices. While Warren and Rodney feuded, Tim attempted to find his way in the organization and utilize what was left of cultural capital from earlier generations to return the parent family firm from bankruptcy and support his venturing activities in composting and retailing in the 1990s and 2000s. He remembered, *'The [Case E] name was good. I think the name is still good, it's a well-recognised brand'*.

At Case F cultural capital exists in 23 years of quality and craftsmanship in the building of bespoke homes around Glasgow, and Joan believed her association with Case F and utilization of cultural capital from Case F1 has been 'helpful'. She commented in interviews,

'They always discuss them as two separate companies, but it's certainly helpful at this early stage to be able to say to people that we subcontract the building lot to Case F, and they've been running for 23 years, and they've built over 1000 new homes'.

Michael echoed his daughter's thoughts:

'I think there's a feeling that if there's a solid company with 23 years' experience ... I think that lends real substance to Case F1.'

At Case G there are arguably no references to cultural capital or transfer of cultural capital to new ventures of venturing activity on the part of family or non-family.

6.13 Conclusion

Qualitative data guided the analysis in previous sections including analysis of five parent family firms with family ventures as well as two parent family firms with non-family ventures. The analysis presented in previous sections revealed patterns in the data reflecting categorised and uncategorised dispositions and munificence not existing in the literature. This revelation proved somewhat intriguing given there are constructs existing in habitus and asymmetric paternalism not reflected in literature referring to family firms and family firm venturing. As such, the analysis of data presented the possibility of exciting new constructs while it also presented opportunities for construction and clarity in undetermined dimensions of habitus and asymmetric paternalism (Bourdieu, 2005a, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Further, this section suggested examples of capital transfer in human, social, economic and cultural capital from the parent family firm to family ventures. Just as important, this section suggested limited or no capital transfer from to non-family ventures.

The following chapter provides discussion and conclusion to propositions which suggest further testing of communication in an entrepreneurial habitus and ‘nudging’ in asymmetric paternalism between parent family firms and their new ventures. While suggestion of each new construct may seem somewhat obvious, these new constructs do not exist in the literature and potentially explain process and practice at parent family firms as they successfully transition between generations. Further, the following chapter includes a suggestion for further discussion and analysis of entrepreneurial capital at the parent family firm. Does the parent family firm provide higher/lower levels of entrepreneurial capital to their family ventures? Finally, the following chapter reflects on the significance of an entrepreneurial habitus and asymmetric paternalism as it might apply to academic research relating to entrepreneurial transition at parent family firms, individual entrepreneurs at the parent family firms, parent family firms and economic development given success of parent family firms.

CHAPTER SEVEN - DISCUSSION

7.1 Introduction to the Chapter

This study began with questions focused on sponsorship and venturing at parent family firms. I asked how the venturing process unfolds at parent firms – do parent family firms randomly create new venture(s) and provide a resource-munificent context haphazardly to family and non-family ventures? Or, do parent family firms introduce new venture(s) generation after generation and sponsor these venture(s) in similar ways suggesting the need for a more-nuanced theory of sponsorship among parent family firms as Castrogiovanni (1991) suggests (Flynn, 1993a, Amezcua et al., 2013, Castrogiovanni, 1991)? To answer these questions, this study sought to understand prevalence, process, practice, dispositions and acts of organisational sponsorship at parent family firms and their new family and non-family new ventures.

To advance theory which might fully answer my research questions and propose a model for further testing, I examined five parent family firms with family venture(s) and two parent family firms with non-family venture(s). Each case varied in terms of number of ventures, number of generations, and number of interviewees at parent firms. The findings from cases research as noted in Chapters 5 and 6 are that parent family firms sponsor their family ventures in the context of new business incubation; they do not typically sponsor non-family ventures. Furthermore, parent family firms imbue long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions while gently steering ventures toward available opportunities and resources. Finally, parent family firms sponsor different types of ventures differently; they imbue only family ventures with long-lasting, transposable and entrepreneurial dispositions while gently steering family venture(s) toward available opportunities and resources. This implies that a more-nuanced approach to dispositions and munificence is necessary for a complete understanding of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation in order to understand how the venturing process unfolds at parent family firms (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b).

7.2 Overview and Discussion of Findings

All the data gathered over a period of 36 months and presented in the previous chapters provided a chronological order of key events and allowed for the presentation of in-depth textual analysis of entrepreneurial dispositions and organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at each parent firm. The information provided additional, new constructs for further testing. Among dispositions and sponsorship activities, textual analysis of the data in Section 6.3 through 6.9 pointed to new constructs in long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions along with gentle steering in a nudge from a parent family firm to family ventures. Data collected and analysed also pointed to the fact that parent family firms provide long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions along with gentle steering in a nudge only to family ventures. This study, therefore, demonstrates not only that family firms treat family and non-family ventures differently, but do so in particular ways that have not been documented before. Uncategorised data in long-lasting and

transposable entrepreneurial dispositions points to a new construct in an entrepreneurial habitus while uncategorised data in a gentle push or nudge from a parent family firm to family venture(s) points to an existing construct from behavioural economics literature in libertarian or asymmetric paternalism.

Chapter Three presented existing literature reflecting both constructs while Chapters Four presented methodology and data to prepare for the introduction of both constructs to family business literature. Chapter Six along with Appendix 9.3 presented textual analysis of the data supporting secondary codes which reflected dimensions in an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism. This chapter attempts to draw implications from the results, analysis and presentation of propositions from previous chapters for theory (this section) and for practitioners (in subsequent sections). While the previous chapter uses abductive reasoning to induce propositions, this section deduces hypotheses for further testing. While the previous chapter structured the data, this section links the inadequacy of existing constructs with the adequacy of new constructs in family firm literature. In other words, this chapter compares and links existing constructs in an EO, EL and organisational sponsorship to new constructs in an EH and libertarian paternalism to determine whether new constructs are additive or stand-alone constructs in the family business literature.

7.2.1 Long-lasting, Transposable Dispositions in an Entrepreneurial Habitus

Bourdieu (1977: 83) describes the concept of habitus as ‘*A system of lasting and transposable dispositions . . .*’. Section 2.4 of this study explains variations on the concept in detail to suggest habitus is not a structure but a set of durable and long lasting dispositions which (1) form human behaviour, (2) vary according to the social environment from which they develop, and (3) allow the individual or agent according to Bourdieu (1990a: 122) to “*play the hand that he is dealt*” and “*play his hand freely*.” As Dimaggio and Powell (1991b: 25-6) explain, the power of habitus is that it links micro and macro-level process in organisational theory. Furthering their discussion, Emirbayer (2008:4) notes that habitus in the context of organisational theory,

‘ . . . is a mechanism linking individual action and the macro-structural settings within which future action is taken. The habitus also links past fields to present fields through the individual actors who move from one to the next.

Emirbayer (2008) also notes that the role of habitus in an organisational context may shed light on how structure within the organisation builds from micro-processes of individual behaviour (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008).

As it was presented in Section 2.4 De Clercq and Voronov (2009) discuss a practice perspective of entrepreneurship leading to an entrepreneurial habitus (EH). The authors (2009: 395) question whether a newcomer entering a field can be legitimized as an entrepreneur, “*by enacting taken-for-granted yet conflicting expectations about ‘fitting in’ with field rules or ‘standing out’ as a rule breaker.*” This study suggests that an EH in the context of organizational sponsorship at the parent family firm is a zebra of a different stripe in that EH is not necessarily an “*artful navigation of rules, norms and objective conditions*” in the beliefs of others as De Clercq and Voronov

(2009: 396) propose but rather a compilation of resource capital and communication over generations which imbue long-lasting and transposable dispositions (1) in an expectation to venture, (2) in support for the family venture, (3) in problem-solving at the family venture and (4) in the existence of an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture (Eisenhardt, 1989, Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007, Yin, 1994).

It is tempting to suggest that EH is simply an extension of the EL construct in added dimensions that Jaskiewicz et al. (2013) did not recognize. This study suggests that EH is much more than new dimensions in an EL in that it functions as an overarching construct encompassing dimensions of an EL. For example, in Case A Luke imbued an EH in his children and grandchildren emphatically and repeatedly commenting “*no one should fear failure*” and “*everyone should run their own business.*” In interviews his children and grandchildren continually suggest they have no fear of failure and desire to run their own businesses. In Case B Adam and Fred instilled “*performance obligations*” to venture. Their children, grandchildren and great grandchildren assess their entrepreneurial performance on the performance obligations. In Case C George and Arthur imbued an EH in a constant search for ‘*what’s next*’. Their children and grandchildren continually search for entrepreneurial activity and venture accordingly. As such, this study proposes that dimensions of an EL exist as a proper sub-set of an EH such that $EH = \{EL\}$ since all elements of EL are in EH, and EH contains at least one element that is not in EL. While this study suggests that the parent family firm imbues an EH in communication over generations leading to the creation of entrepreneurial dispositions as well as entrepreneurial practices. In other words, this study provides data which supports dimensions of strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning in an EL but data also includes an EH in a conscious and continual practice of communication among and between generations (Burgelman, 1983, Bourdieu, 2005a, De Clercq and Voronov, 2009b, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a).

It is also tempting to suggest that EH is an extension or sub-construct of EO in the context of organizational sponsorship at parent family firms in which, according to Burgelman (1983), the essential act of entrepreneurship can be establishing a new venture either by a start-up, an existing venture, or by internal corporate venturing. Yet Miller (1983) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996: 136) suggest that,

“New entry explains ‘what’ entrepreneurship consists of, and entrepreneurial orientation explains ‘how’ new entry is undertaken . . . An EO refers to the processes, practices and decision-making activities that lead to new entry . . . Thus, it involves the intentions and actions of key players functioning in a dynamic generative process aimed at new venture creation.”

As such, the intentions and actions of key players in dimensions of an EO involve environmental and individual attributes (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Miller, 1983). There is arguably no long-term dimension in EO in terms of venturing. As such, this study proposes that dimensions of an EO exist as a proper sub-set of an EH such that $EH = \{EO\}$ since all elements of EO are in EH, and EH contains at least one element that is not in EO.

However, Lumpkin et al. (2010: 241) considered long-term orientation (LTO) in the context of family business to suggest,


“The tendency to prioritize the long-range implications and impact of decisions and actions that come to fruition after an extended time period.”

Zellweger et al. (2012) also considered long-term orientation in the context of family business in a family entrepreneurial orientation (FEO) to suggest trans-generational entrepreneurship at parent family firms (Zellweger et al., 2012). According to Zellweger et al. (2012: 137) FEO introduces a family-level construct to understand, “. . . how the attitudes and mind-sets of the controlling family affect entrepreneurship.”

In both constructs the authors attempt to answer ‘how’ family firms enact entrepreneurship at the family firm, but they do not answer for long-lasting dispositions transferred over generation through communication (1) in an expectation to venture, (2) in support for the family venture, (3) in problem-solving at the family venture and (4) in the existence of an entrepreneurial environment in which to venture.

Figure 7.17 summarizes the analysis of uncategorised dispositions previously described by textual analysis in Section 6.3 through 6.9 of this study by showing progression from measures to dimensions and from dimensions to new construct derived after (1) identification of dispositions, (2) analysis of the data, (3) interpretation of the data, and (4) evaluation of existing constructs in the literature and individual variables at parent firms and their new venture(s) (Yin, 1994, Eisenhardt, 1989, Nordqvist et al., 2009, Cassell et al., 2017). This uncategorised data suggests there is (1) communication in an expectation to venture, (2) communication in support for the family venture, (3) communication in problem-solving at the family venture and (4) communication in the existence of an entrepreneurial environment to venture. The process of abduction from codes to construct is shown in Figure 7.17 below.

Figure 7.17: Dimensions & Constructs in an Entrepreneurial Habitus



7.2.3 Capital Transfer in a ‘Nudge’ or Libertarian Paternalism

As explained in Section 2.2, paternalism is an age-old concept with literary roots in Weber (1964). The concept in all forms has typically elicited criticism and scepticism among historians, economists and social scientists depending on whether use of the concept is normative or structural (i.e. descriptive) (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Dworkin, 2002, Fleming, 2005). Abercrombie and Hill (1976:418) propose in their seminal work,

‘Paternalism pre-supposes unequal access to resources, which reflects differences in the power of the various parties. The paternalist provides resources which subordinates would be unable to find on their own which is the basis of their dependence.’


As stated in Section 2.2 asymmetric or libertarian paternalism is paternalistic because it helps individuals achieve their own goals by essentially protecting them from themselves and guiding or steering them towards an option which promotes their welfare (Zalta et al., 2003, Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Paternalism is asymmetric in terms of power and helping individuals who are prone to making irrational decisions while not harming those making informed, deliberate decisions. Asymmetric or libertarian paternalism differs from heavy-handed paternalism in attempting to help individuals without coercing or limiting freedom of choice (Loewenstein et al., 2007). As presented in Section 2.2, Camerer et al. (2003: 1211) support the view that asymmetric paternalism forces or prevents choice for an individual’s own good. Policies which reflect libertarian or asymmetric paternalism change the presentation of choices or ‘nudge’ the individual in such a way that individuals who are less informed might choose a decision better for themselves (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1998, Camerer et al., 2003, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, Brock et al., 1988, Dworkin, 2002, Zalta et al., 2003). Further, policies which reflect libertarian or asymmetric paternalism in a ‘nudge’ neither coerce nor force the individual; whatever the

beneficial item (e.g. fruit, vegetables, financial security), it is placed within 'easy reach' and 'full view' of the individual (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008).

This section suggests 'uncategorised' resource munificence in sponsorship activities, identified in Chapter 6 and described further below, exist as libertarian paternalism or a 'nudge' from the parent firm to the family venture(s) (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). The 'nudge' toward available resources and opportunities is in the form of soft paternalism since the process is non-coercive but attempts to move the new venture in the right direction in order to acquire legitimacy and overcome a liability of newness. As such and as Sunstein and Thaler (2003) might predict, the 'nudge' alters the new venture's path in predictable ways without forbidding options or significantly changing their economic incentives or choices. The 'nudge' is typically cheap and easy to avoid for the new venture; it is also cheap and easy to avoid for the parent family firm since the possibility of new venture exit is easy to economically and socially absorb, but there is no data to support this last claim.

Figure 7.18 summarizes the analysis of uncategorised munificence in the data by showing progression from primary measures to secondary constructs derived after identification of munificence, analysis of the data, interpretation of the data, and evaluation of existing constructs in the literature and individual variables at parent firms and their new venture(s) (Eisenhardt, 1989, Yin, 1994, Nordqvist and Zellweger, 2010). The patterns in Figure 7.18 suggest that the parent family firm (1) presents opportunities to venture, (2) presents partnerships to venture and (3) provides stability at the parent family firm to venture.

Figure 7.18 Dimensions & Constructs of Libertarian Paternalism in an Entrepreneurial Context



7.2.4 Changes to Entrepreneurial Capital resulting from a Nudge

Scholars including Dimaggio and Navarro who reference Bourdieu, repeatedly reflect on the interaction and interdependence of fields, forms of capital and habitus in the daily accumulation of power (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977). As presented in Section 1.6, capital theory represents the third pillar of Bourdieu's work on social theory and structure. In an organisational context, forms of capital are critical resources for new venture growth and survival (Firkin, 2001). Consequently, it is entrepreneurial capital existing as a derivative of Bourdieu's forms of capital which a new venture must acquire to overcome a liability of newness, achieve legitimacy and acquire power over the field (Firkin, 2001, Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002, Stinchcombe, 1965).

As it was presented in Table 6.84 and Section 6.7, data from coding and textual analysis suggests that there is a change in capital transferred from parent family firms to family venture(s) while data suggests there is little change in capital transferred to non-family ventures. In Case A Luke transferred human capital in a 'nudge' with his commitment to provide an education in plant science for his sons at White University School of Agriculture. His sons have similarly 'nudged' their sons toward White University School of Agriculture. In Case A Luke did not 'nudge' with economic capital because none was available. Similarly, his sons have not 'nudged' their sons' ventures with economic capital albeit for different reasons. In Case B generations nudge with cultural capital and social capital to 'open doors' for new ventures. In Case C George 'nudged' Chris and Arthur with social capital and economic capital toward venturing activity while Arthur 'nudged' his children toward venturing with social capital and human capital. In Case D cousins in New Jersey provided Kent, Clint and his brothers with human, social, economic and cultural capital to support their ventures. For John and his non-family venture, Clint and his parent family firm provided little or no capital to John for his non-family venture. In Case E Thomas 'nudged' Ed with human and economic capital while Ed 'nudged' his sons and their ventures with cultural and economic capital. Though Warren and Rodney feuded and limited economic capital at the parent family firm, they provided Tim with some social

capital and cultural capital. At Case F Michael ‘nudged’ his daughter and her venture with economic and cultural capital despite turbulent economic conditions. In Case G Donald held out human, social and economic capital for Daniel and his venture in Lilac propagation but provided little ‘nudging’ in support of the non-family venture.

Proposition 8: With a ‘nudge’ the parent family firm transfers opportunities and strategic resources in entrepreneurial capital from the parent family firm to its family venture(s).


7.2.5 A Model of Organisational Sponsorship at Parent Family Firms

Figure 7.19 presents a visual representation of the propositions to suggest a theoretical model of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at parent family firms. Similar to the model presented in Figure 3.10 parent family firms sit atop the model and represent past and present generations at the parent family firm. Only family ventures sit at the bottom of the model since this research suggests only family venture(s) accumulate forms of capital given dispositions and munificence imbued by the parent family firm over generations. In Figure 3.10 extant literature suggests dispositions and munificence are separate and distinct activities of the parent family firm supporting new venture creation. However, extant literature presented in Figure 3.10 does not include consideration of transfer of capital across generations. In other words, what exactly does the parent family firm imbue in an act of organizational sponsorship in support of family ventures? Figure 7.19 presents a linear model in which dispositions and munificence exist as integrated activities of the parent family firm in support of new family ventures. EH sits atop the activities as a proper subset of EL and EO since data suggests EO and EL are not sufficient for EH to exist and be transmitted across generations. Family firms pass on EH by encouraging EO and building EL but they do more than that; this study provided examples of EO and EL in each case but also other uncategorised forms of dispositions classified as EH transferred only to family ventures. As such, Proposition, 8, 8a and 8b suggest EO and EL exist as proper subset of EH.

Figure 3.10 also includes organizational sponsorship as a distinct activity of the parent firm in support of venturing activity. As it was presented in Section 3.2 and depicted in Figure 3.5 Amezcua et al. (2013: 1628) define organizational sponsorship as, “attempts to mediate the relationship between organizations and their environment by creating a resource-munificent context intended to increase survival rates.” However, this study presented data to suggest organisational sponsorship is just a collective term for the different ways in which entrepreneurial capital gets transmitted or built up in the new venture? This study also suggested that parent firms with an EH build up organizational sponsorship over generations. Consequently arrows in Figure 7.19 lead from EO and EL leading downwards to organisational sponsorship (Flynn, 1993a, Amezcua et al., 2013). In other words, instead of dispositions and munificence as parallel paths, data suggested EH imbued from previous generations in long-lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions directed family venture(s) toward opportunities and resources with a ‘nudge’ as suggested in Proposition 8. Nudging is the mechanism by which the parent family firm gently steered their family venture(s) toward strategic opportunities with available forms of entrepreneurial capital (EK) as suggested in Proposition 9. Upon acquiring legitimacy and overcoming a liability of

newness, the new family venture(s) acquires entrepreneurial capital for power over the field (Bourdieu and Nice, 1977, Firkin, 2001, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b, Stinchcombe, 1965).

Figure 7.19 A Visual Representation of the Propositions



7.4 Theoretical Contributions

This section discusses the theoretical contribution of this study, and in particular the addition of these two new constructs to family firm literature. As noted in Chapters One and Chapter Two, to date no theory fully explains exactly why and how family firms imbue and actively impose entrepreneurial dispositions and resources to engage in the practice of trans-generational entrepreneurship. As reviewed in Section 2.4, previous research has identified attributes that facilitate entrepreneurship among ‘family’ and ‘non-family’ firms (e.g. Chua, 1999; Zahra et al. 2004). But, based on in-depth interviews and textual analysis of seven parent family firms with ‘family’ and ‘non-family’ ventures, this study adjusted the level of analysis to introduce a theory of trans-generational practice proposing some family firms imbue and actively impose entrepreneurial dispositions and gently steer entrepreneurial ‘family’ ventures toward opportunities and strategic resources in the form of entrepreneurial capital. More specifically, as described in Section 7.2 and depicted in Figure 3.10, they imbue family ventures with an entrepreneurial habitus over generations, provide organizational sponsorship activities while gently nudging them toward strategic opportunities and resources in the form of entrepreneurial capital. This study challenges the conceptual model of extant literature presented in Figure 3.10 to suggest there is an overarching construct in EH and a mechanism in ‘nudging’ which arguably explain how family firms imbue and actively impose entrepreneurial dispositions and engage in the practice of trans-generational entrepreneurship. Textual analysis of data and introduction of new constructs constitute the novel theoretical contribution of this study. The following section discusses how new constructs in this study link to other important constructs in family business literature.

7.4.1 Contribution to Dimensions of an EL and an EO

This study contributed to the work of Jaskiewicz et al. (2014) in dimensions of an EL at the parent family firm. The authors noted that EL exists in a rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial events and in dimensions of a strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning (Jaskiewicz et al., 2015b). As noted in Section 7.2.1 this study suggested that EH is much more than a new dimension in an EL in that it functions as an overarching construct encompassing dimensions of an EL. As such, an EL exists as a proper subset of EH such that $EH = \{EL\}$.

This study also contributed to the work of Miller (1983) and Lumpkin and Dess (1996) in dimensions of an EO at the parent family firm. An EO exists in the individual in dimensions of innovativeness, pro-activeness and risk-taking (Miller, 1983). As noted in Section 7.2.1 this study suggested that EH functions as an overarching construct encompassing dimensions of an EO such that an EO exists as a proper subset of EH.

7.4.3 Contribution to Libertarian Paternalism

This study has also contributed to existing literature on libertarian or asymmetric paternalism given the suggestion that parent family firms gently steer their family venture(s) toward available opportunities and strategic resources with a ‘nudge’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008, Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). While Sunstein and Thaler

(2003) proposed a ‘nudge’ in libertarian paternalism in a general context, this study has narrowed the context to parent family firms and their new venture(s) to suggest that the parent family firm provides a ‘nudge’ to only their family venture(s). This study also suggested that a ‘nudge’ is a mechanism and resource utilized by the parent family firm to provide a subtle change to the environment of new family venture(s).

7.4.2 Contribution to Family Firm Resources

This study conforms to a ‘familiness’ model in that it considers the individual resources that a parent family firm transmits to a new venture for sustained competitive advantage and trans-generational success (Habbershon et al., 2003). Noted in Section 3.4, causally ambiguous resources bundled together in familiness may only be identified with systematic analysis of the change that took place (Habbershon and Williams, 1999). Missing from the literature is an in-depth understanding of how new venture creation and familiness at the parent family firm are linked. This study has presented data to suggest that an EH and nudging are a resource which only parent family firms provide their family venture(s), enabling the latter to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965, Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Both new constructs capture what Habbershon et al. (2010: 17) might consider to be, “*idiosyncratic in the resource profile of each family firm.*” As a caveat, Barney (2001: 12) might suggest these idiosyncrasies, “*relate to the ways in which owner and managers of family firms are actually able, or competent, to bundle and leverage their resource bases to create competitive advantages*” (Habbershon et al., 2010, Sharma, 2008).

CHAPTER EIGHT - CONCLUSION

8.1 Introduction to the Chapter

This study has incorporated a breadth of issues and constructs related to the practice of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation at parent family firms and their venture(s). While the previous chapter discussed an overview and discussion of findings expressed in propositions and a theoretical model of organisational sponsorship among parent family firms and their venture(s), this chapter discusses the relevance of the research in terms of its practical implications, issues, limitations and possibilities for exciting new research.

8.2 Practical Implications of this Study

Given the growing interest among researchers to study family firms and their venturing activity, this study has important practical considerations for family firms, policy makers and family business educators to consider. Recently, Journal of Management Studies presented a call for papers on corporate entrepreneurship in family business, and GEM researchers recently completed a global survey of entrepreneurial family ventures. This demonstrates the growing interest in this topic. As such, this study is both timely and relevant for the community of researchers studying parent family firms and the new venture(s).

8.2.1 Practical Implications for Family Firms

Family business consultants and journalist in the US and UK often quote the vagaries of family business. Examples of headlines include, “Lachlan – The Unlikely Winner from the Murdoch Latest Saga” (McDuling, J. Sydney Morning Herald, July 12, 2018) or “Behind Closed Doors, Demoulas Cousins’ Feud Raged” (Ray, C., Boston Globe, Aug. 15, 2014). Relentless headlines referencing family firm woes suggest there is something fundamentally wrong with the family business model of business succession. Ward’s (1987) seminal study on succession of family firms supports the headlines with the often quoted statistic that 30% survive to the second generation, 13% survive to the third generation, and only 3% survive beyond the third generation.

This study presented propositions for further research to suggest there can be successful succession and transition with development of an entrepreneurial habitus over generations and gentle nudging toward available opportunities and resources with each generation. For each proposition the goal is the same – imbue the family firm with entrepreneurial dispositions over generations and nudge entrepreneurial family ventures toward opportunities and strategic resources with available forms of capital. While I understand it is heady stuff to propose that an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism may stop the ugly headlines associated with family business, further research on both constructs might present a practical start to show-case family firms which imbue entrepreneurial attitudes over generations and achieve trans-generational, entrepreneurial success.

8.2.2 Practical Implications for Policy Makers

Under the thoughtful leadership of Bill Bygrave and Michael Hay, the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) began in 1999 as a joint project between Babson College and London Business School. After 20 years operating in more than 50 countries, it is still considered the world's foremost study of entrepreneurship (Reynolds et al., 2000). Despite high quality information, comprehensive reporting, and stories which enhance the understanding of the phenomenon of entrepreneurship around the globe, there is arguably a gap in research undertaken to date. Family business is the most dominant form of business, yet GEM provides limited data and limited reporting on the entrepreneurial phenomena within family firms with the exception of occasional regional reports (eg. GEM UK Scotland 2015) (Levie, 2015). To date, core survey items on family firms are few and far between, yet they potentially offer new insights into frequencies of venturing and overall entrepreneurial activity in family firms around the globe. Researchers could add items that measure whether a parent family firm transferred resources to a new venture in the form of human capital, social capital, economic capital and/or cultural capital. To understand type and level of resources that a parent family firm imbues to its new venture(s), they could measure the degree to which respondents with nascent and new business ventures were helped when a parent firm attempted to transfer resources to the new venture. Such measures were tested in the GEM UK Adult Population Survey over several years and worked well, but small sample sizes reduced the value of the results. What's needed is a survey of firm owners from within existing family business associations including but not limited to the Family Firm Institute (FFI), the Family Business Network (FBN), and/or the Family Business Association (FBA).

8.2.3 Practical Implications for Family Business Educators

For family business educators this study introduces a perspective in portfolio entrepreneurial activities often neglected in family business studies. Too often as Zellweger et al. (2012) note, researchers fail to consider entrepreneurial activities at business families beyond the core company, and it is a likely assumption that family business researchers are also family business educators. Further, researchers – and by association, educators – seemingly fail to focus on multiple and varied forms of succession at family firms. This study has diligently focused on the 'how' and the 'what' of family firm succession with consideration of entrepreneurial approaches to succession in an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism. For family business educators there are practical implications in the introduction of an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism in the classroom. Educators might introduce both constructs as part of a unifying systems perspective for students to understand how family firms pass on entrepreneurial mind-sets, capabilities and resources to enable family firms and individual family members to create new streams of wealth across multiple generations by venturing. This study suggested that EH is an overarching construct which includes dimensions of an EO and EL.

As such, there are learning outcomes which the educator might specify at the beginning of the course. These might include:

1. an understanding of stakeholder perspectives within the family business;
2. an understanding of theoretical perspectives on family firm succession including a unified systems perspective captured through an analysis of the resources and capabilities of the firm;
3. an understanding of succession issues facing family firms and how this can be dealt with strategically given a model of trans-generational entrepreneurship;
4. an understanding of new theory in an EH and 'nudging' which further unifies the family unit with an understanding of the combined effect of dispositions and resources which lead the family members toward strategic opportunities and resources for their venturing activity.

Consequently, this study is arguably an extension of a unified systems perspective developed by Habbershon and Williams (1999) and refined by Cruz, Nordqvist et al. (2010). Habbershon and Williams (1999: 13) apply RBT for competitive advantage to family firms to argue there are systemic family inputs and suggest a new path for research and practice. Further, they integrate entrepreneurial attitudes in their model in EO. In level of analysis Habbershon and Williams (2003: 13) suggest that it's not enough to simply, "*compare family and non-family firms in terms of performance or any other measure.*"

Practical suggestions for educators might include awareness and/or membership in the STEP Project. Founded in 2005 by Tim Habbershon at Babson College, the STEP Project is a global applied research initiative which explores entrepreneurship and the entrepreneurial process at family firms. The STEP Project boasts a library of more than 150 case studies of parent family firms supporting trans-generational entrepreneurship across multiple generations.

8.3 Other Emergent Issues for this Study

Throughout this study issues emerged regarding length and format; attempts to present two new constructs in an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism in fewer than 100,000 words presented a challenge. For the sake of brevity, I chose to abridge descriptions of many constructs and limit presentation of relevant data from data. However, throughout the longitudinal interviewing period interviewees continually reflected on forms of capital – either from or to the parent family firm – to communicate effect of an entrepreneurial habitus and libertarian paternalism.

I believe forms of capital are an emergent issue because too many studies reflect on forms of capital as a stand-alone construct that works to support any field and any disposition. Bourdieu would likely agree that it is the totality of his theory of practice which the researcher must reflect in his/her research. As such, I've included analysis, case summaries, cross-case summary and reflections on forms of capital in this study, but there must be further reflection on forms of capital in the context of organisational sponsorship. Data presented in Chapter Five provides examples of entrepreneurial capital transferred from the parent family firm to their family venture(s). Emergent

issues might include a thorough analysis of the data to determine what type of capital each parent family firm transferred and how much capital a parent family firm transferred to individual family venture(s).

8.4 Limitations of this Study

This study presented interesting and innovative propositions for further research. However, there are limitations to this study given the exploratory nature of the subject matter and attempts to build new theory upon old theory. While writing, my attempts to untangle theory and practice reminded me of Yogi Bera's often quoted, "In theory there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice there is." Although Yogi Bera is best known for his pithy and quixotic statements in the field of American baseball, in a perfect world there is no difference between theory and practice. As such, this section presents limitations of this study which are many and varied. First, there is danger in theory integration across disciplines. Second, there is danger in misappropriation of existing theory. Third, there is danger in not taking oneself out of the equation, and fourth, there is danger in limiting scope.

8.4.1 Note on Theory Integration across Disciplines

In fledgling academic fields including entrepreneurship and family entrepreneurship, scholars have hoped for legitimacy with the use and combination of base discipline theories (Shaw and Tangirala, 2018). In recent years theory development in entrepreneurship and family entrepreneurship has seemingly come of age, but scholars continue to use cross-disciplinary theory integration to offer new and novel insights.

Zhara & Newey (2009:1059) suggest that theory development and/or integration in contexts where management intersects with disciplines and/or fields "*provides an important forum for creative theory building.*" As such, the authors intimate that for cross-disciplinary theory development (1) the missing pieces to a theoretical puzzle must fit together perfectly, (2) new integrative theory must be rich and nuanced, and (3) scholars must accept the theory within established literature for further testing (Shaw and Tangirala, 2018).

This study has made all attempts to make an impact on the literature of organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation with the introduction of new theory in an entrepreneurial habitus and cross-disciplinary theory in libertarian paternalism. Further, this study has attempted to fit pieces to a theoretical puzzle while presenting new theory and cross-disciplinary theory that is rich and nuanced. Last, this study hopes for further testing and acceptance within established literature.

8.4.2 Note on Misappropriation of Theory

This abductive qualitative study generated propositions suggesting parent family firms communicate an entrepreneurial habitus in dispositions which support venturing activity among family members. Bourdieu (1977) developed habitus in conjunction with concepts of field and capital. Concepts of field and capital are widely known but arguably misused in organisational literature because it is habitus which provides relational theory for individual concepts of field or capital to exist. In other words, without thorough analysis of habitus in organisational literature, concepts of field and

capital make little sense (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). This study presents a comprehensive analysis of habitus in organisational literature as it exists over generations among parent family firms and their new venture(s).

In my initial approach to this study, I assumed that I would reflect on Bourdieu's forms of capital or power or fields or habitus and select one or two to investigate variation in their level when a parent firm provided 'organisational sponsorship' to their new venture(s). Accordingly, I investigated Bourdieu's social theory as if each construct could stand-alone because I found that the literature often included Bourdieu's individual constructs as if each could stand alone. I now believe my initial assumptions related to Bourdieu's social theory were incorrect, and I have chosen to include the entirety of Bourdieu's social theory in my investigation and analysis because I believe there is more than just the duality of the subjective or objective interpretation in a philosophy, and I believe there is often something more than just the duality of agency and structure in a methodology. As such, to defend against what Bourdieu (1997: 450) termed, "*French Flu*" and "*problematics specific to the American field*", I have attempted to introduce the foundation of Bourdieu's theory with a literature review and analysis which includes his foundation of social theory in 'field' and 'habitus' along with forms of capital in social, economic, cultural and references to symbolic capital as it relates to 'habitus'. Capital cannot exist without a proper understanding of the habitus of the individual and field in which the individual plays the hand that he/she is dealt. Alternately, an understanding of habitus and field cannot exist without a thorough understanding of each form of capital with which individuals might acquire power over a field. Further exploration of data in this study may reveal how habitus, field and capital help explain the consolidation of power in the hands of trans-generational family firms in their respective industry.

8.4.3 Note on a Reflexive Sociology

In this study I have also included an investigation and methodology dedicated to a reflexive sociology as suggested by Bourdieu, because I believe my age and practical experience arguably give me an unusual and intimate perspective on entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, and family business. Bourdieu (1977: 20) suggests that,

'One is entitled to undertake to give an 'account of accounts,' so long as one does not put forward one's contribution to the science of pre-scientific representation of the social as if it were a science of the social world.'

I am a late stage student with success and failure in several businesses over 25 years, and some would suggest that my age and practical experience have deeply embedded my mind-set in the practical process of entrepreneurship, corporate entrepreneurship, and family business. But I beg to differ, and I take offence to the term, 'prac-ademic' simply because of the suggested duality and implications of the term. At every turn I have taken a reflexive turn on sociology to take 'myself' out of the equation and out of the analysis when I interview my subjects and prepare individual case studies. While I cannot take out the relationships I have developed over the years with many of my subjects, I've made every attempt as part of a reflexive sociology to understand where my relations and friendships may either cloud my analysis and/or add substance to my analysis. An example includes Case A semi-structured interviews with Luke and Michael. Since I had an existing business relationship with both members of the

family, I asked a research colleague to join me at several sessions and either comment or interrupt when I put myself in the equation with personal knowledge or insights about the green industry. As Luke and Michael responded to interview questions, I frequently reminded both that I was not a friend or industry expert. However, the knowledge that I was a friend and industry expert provided deep, rich and often personal insights and answers. Some answers required editing given their very personal nature.

8.4.4 Note on Limitation of Scope

Common to case study research, there are concerns about generalizability of findings to a broader context and broader base of industry. Research for this study was undertaken in the context of seven family firms existing in the green industry and construction fields and operating in the UK and US. While the initial iteration of this study offered a single, in-depth US case operating in the green industry, I believed it necessary to broaden the number of cases, geographic environment of the cases and operating field of the cases to provide the reader with a holistic vision of a theory of practice in an entrepreneurial habitus. Further, Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007: 27) comment that the choice of multiple cases, “typically yields more robust, generalizable and testable theory than single-case research.” However, only further research will determine whether theory and constructs developed in this study might be generalizable and transferrable for paradigm-shifting insights (Kuhn, 1962).

8.5 Further Research

This study presents many opportunities for further research. Further research may include investigation of (1) levels of libertarian paternalism, (2) levels of coercion, (3) levels of acceptable failure in real option reasoning, and/or (4) levels of interaction between entrepreneurial capital, habitus and fields.

8.5.1 Further Research on Levels of Libertarian Paternalism

Further, research may include analysis of levels of sponsorship of liberal paternalism. Does it exist on a ‘u-shaped curve’, and is there an optimal level of sponsorship to reduce the likelihood of coercion or agency issues? Call it the ‘Goldilocks effect’ where too much sponsorship in field-building, networking and direct support activities instils resistance and too little sponsorship instils agency issues at the family venture(s). Just the right amount of sponsorship points the family venture(s) toward legitimacy, ability to overcome a liability of newness and trans-generational success (Stinchcombe, 1965, Flynn, 1993b, Cruz Serrano et al., 2006).

8.5.2 Further Research on Levels of Coercion

Additional research might investigate the effects of coercion in the context of libertarian paternalism. In other words, when does a nudge become a shove? When does a nudge become a controlling effort by the parent family firm to restrict or force venturing activity? An example might be Case G and the theoretical creation of Daniel’s new venture. Controlling efforts by Donald would likely transform a ‘nudge’ to a shove. Another example might be Case E in which Tim developed his new venture almost to spite his controlling and disapproving uncle. Would Tim have developed his new venture if his father and uncle had both provided a ‘nudge’?

8.5.3 Further Research on Failure in Real Options Reasoning

Nordqvist et al. (2012: 1090) propose the family firm to be a bundle of resources for new owners to invest and previous owners to release; the authors state that,

“New owners see the firm as an opportunity for investing resources, and the previous owners see the firm as an opportunity for releasing resources. Both the new and previous owners may use these resources to create new outcomes (eg. new ventures, growth and innovation), allowing the succession of the family firm as an entrepreneurial entry and exit to produce new value at different levels (ie. the individual, the family and the firm).”

Their perspective on the family firm as a bundle of resources providing investment for new outcomes and ultimately succession at the family firm suggests an entrepreneurial initiative in a specific effort by an existing firm or new entrant to introduce a new combination of resources (McGrath, 1999). Given a goal of long-run growth and entrepreneurial succession, failure by definition is an option at the family firm. Permanent failure is likely not an option, but as McGrath (1999: 14) notes,

“It is the idiosyncratic judgement of what constitutes failure that makes real options reasoning attractive.”

McGrath (1999) further notes what matters is that initiatives pursued enhance accumulated resources and knowledge base at the firm. Real options reasoning links value in resources and uncertainty to suggest failure is an option for the ultimate pursuit of knowledge and more resources. As such, a parent family firm which may effectively ‘fall forward’ toward venturing with real options reasoning may benefit not only from the new insight created by venturing but also establish a path for entrepreneurial succession (McGrath, 1999). Combined with an entrepreneurial habitus and nudge from the family firm toward available resources and opportunities, failure can be re-conceptualized toward a positive outcome.

8.5.4 Further Research on Interaction between an EH, Capital and Fields

Future research would benefit from a quantitative investigation of nudging and quantitative measure of forms of entrepreneurial capital and the level to which individual forms of entrepreneurial capital increase or decrease as parent family firms imbue an entrepreneurial habitus and nudge family ventures (Firkin, 2001, Firkin, 2003, Bourdieu, 1994, Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). With succeeding generations reinforcing an entrepreneurial habitus at the parent family firm, does a habitus have a greater/lesser effect on entrepreneurial capital for their family venture(s) and ability to generate power over the field for the parent family firm?

8.5.5 Further Research on Linking Past Field to Present Fields in an EH

In Section 7.2.4 Figure 7.19 presents a visual representation of the propositions. However, future research may determine that indeed there may be a theory of everything in that parent family firms communicate lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions which function as a matrix of entrepreneurial perceptions, appreciations, expectations, actions and environment linking past fields to present fields through individual actors in an entrepreneurial habitus. This study

offers new constructs in an EH and an entrepreneurial ‘nudging’, but it is the holistic interplay of both constructs which might offer researchers the most interesting outcome given full analysis of new and existing data.

8.5.6 Further Research on Proper subsets of EH

Where business families and family businesses over generations communicate lasting and transposable entrepreneurial dispositions to their new venture(s) in an entrepreneurial habitus (EH), EL and EO may exist as proper subsets of EH such that $EH = \{EL, EO\}$.

As noted in previous sections and chapters, organisational sponsorship in the context of new business incubation presents stimulating and complex research opportunities. This study attempted to provide a deep understanding of the phenomenon while simultaneously providing a foundation for rigorous and challenging research on the topic. It is my hope that future researchers will benefit from my work while developing their own constructs in support of trans-generational entrepreneurship.

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APPENDICES

9.1 Interview Guides – Generic Information

General Information

- Name of Interviewee
- Generation
- Position at parent family firm
- Industry
- Name of new venture(s)
- Business description of new venture
- Number of employees
- Relative stage of the new venture (e.g. nascent, NB or EB)

Opportunity ID and development

- Approximate date of new venture idea
- Context of new venture idea
- Direction towards new venture idea
- Approximate date of incorporation
- Resources available to new venture idea
- Sources of competence and resources

Requested Documentation

- Business plan
- Company history
- Presentations
- Reports
- Notes
- Website
- Press releases
- Other

9.2 Interview Guide – Forms of Entrepreneurial Capital

- At your parent family business how much did specific knowledge or competencies help develop your new venture?
- In what ways did your parent family business impact the knowledge and skills in your new venture?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help conceive original products or services for your new venture? (explicit)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help provide a formal transfer of technology or knowledge in the form of a license or patent?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help loan skilled personnel to your new venture?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help lose skilled personnel to your new venture? (explicit)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help provide direct exposure and experience to your nascent venture? (Lane/Lubatkin) (exp)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help determine how customers might use new venture products or services?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help analyse different combinations of attributes for your new venture products/services? (tacit)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help transfer product or service knowledge into your new venture product or service?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help assimilate customers' knowledge into your new venture products or services? (tacit)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help assimilate suppliers' knowledge into your new venture products or services? (tacit)
- When you started your new venture did your parent family business help apply different skills to develop your new venture products or services?
- At your parent family firm did external networks and personal connections help in the discovery of new opportunity?
- At your parent family firm did external networks and personal connections help in generating new venture activity?
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help provide access to existing markets for your new venture? (structural)

- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help identify new markets for your new venture? (structural)
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help identify customer groups which might have interest in your new venture products/services? (relational)
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help offer business networking groups or clubs for your new venture (Lions, Rotary etc.)? (relational)
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help offer business networking among close business associates? (relational)
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help continue to talk business after working hours? (cognitive)
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help suggest outside assistance for your new venture?
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help provide increased industry standing for your new venture?
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help provide increased legitimacy for your new venture?
- When you started your new venture or spinoff venture did your parent firm help provide an awareness of brand for your new venture?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm transfer funding to your new venture?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm expect pay back of funding for your new venture?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm expect pay back of funding between 1-3 years?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm expect pay back of funding beyond 3 years?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm expect to 'call' funding upon poor performance?
- When you started your new venture did your parent family firm invest tangible assets in the form of equipment or stock into your new venture?

9.3 Categorized Dimensions and Munificence in the Data at Cases A-G

9.3.1 Categorised Dispositions at Case A

Case A data reflects dimensions in entrepreneurial behaviour and orientations similar in risk-taking, pro-activeness and innovativeness. Textual analysis suggests there are frequent references in second order constructs at Case A among all of the generations who venture at the parent family firm. As such, the following display and matrix in Table 9.65 reflects dimensions in entrepreneurial behaviour and orientations as expressed directly by the interviewee or expressed about the interviewee by either family members or non-family members working at Case A.

Table 9.65 Dimensions of EO at Case A as Categorized Data

EO	Luke	Mathew	Michael	Andy	Robert	James
Risk-taking	(1) "That was a big, big operation. The bank was taking it over, and I went to the bank and got it. You know, you get it for nothing."	(2) "It was my venture, but I owned this with my father. He came to me with the idea, but I found the financing and technology"	(3) "[Luke] had gotten some money - about a million bucks - and we had put some product on the ground that actually wasn't really even owned by us." (7) [James] "He's always bringing in new products and initiating new research."	(4) "We got control of the technology; we brought it back to the US, and there were a lot of problems with it . . . we ended up building a new company around that technology in methane sequestration."	(5) "Right now, I see these re-wholesalers buying a plant for \$6 from a grower like us . . . taking out barely any risk and almost doubling the price . . ."	(6) "Me and my brother, Robert, see an expansion of the wholesale distribution centre model to northern VA."
Innovative-ness	(8) [Luke] "I never walked away from something that didn't work . . . I changed it!"	(9) "At the start-up there was not a lot of particular innovation around the product line or the packaging of it, it was all fairly standard"	(10) "We are growing plants here. There isn't some moment of great innovation; we are innovating every day - incrementally moving the bar."	(11) "We're always working with our partners to discuss new ways of production and trucking."	(12) [Robert] "My dad had a strategic planning meeting . . . to open up a re-wholesale distribution centre, and that idea came from me!"	(13) [Paul] "I feel I have an ability to take an idea, turn it into a project then turn it into a business."
Pro-activeness	(14) [Mathew & Michael] "Luke was a guy that moved fast, got a good deal and thought he could make it happen"	(15) [Mathew] "We were the founding members of what is now called the US Composting Council . . . when we got started there was none of it out there."	(16) ["I mean entrepreneurial to me is, is being opportunistic and growing the business." (17) [Tim K.] "That's what's so exciting about it - it came from the bottom up."	(18) [Michael] "Well, we've never sat back waiting for orders to come here. We've always been aggressive in getting orders, and we've also been impressive in doing different businesses."	(19) [Robert] "when it comes to collections, dealing with the customers, and relationship management from a finance side, I'm interested in that."	(20) [James]. . . wake up every morning and make my project a success." "I take all the knowledge and resources I know and do the best I can."

Risk-taking

Luke repeatedly commented in interviews that as a young man, he *'could never understand any culture which promoted "fear of failure"'*. In an interview, he emphatically comments, *'When you're afraid of something, that's the stupidity of us'*. His incessant desire for risk-taking is obvious in every venture he undertook in his formative years. His son, Michael, adopted a more cautious approach to risk-taking, given the situation he faced when he joined the parent firm in 1980. Michael commented in an interview that *'these were tough, tumultuous times in the 80s'*. However, Michael introduced risk-taking with a slow and steady expansion of operations at Case A1 that included new venturing based on a solid understanding of the needs of the Case A1 customer. Luke's second son, Mathew, is an incessant but calculated risk-taker with each new venture he undertakes. Mathew risked repeatedly in multiple ventures over 30 years. In interviews, he commented on his plans to risk again by partnering with his sons upon their graduation from White University.

Among third-generation family members, the risk-taking dimension seems to reflect the influence of the first and second generation. In interviews Robert carefully commented on his uncle's incessant need to take risks: *'I'm envious of my uncle, Mathew, being able to just bounce around'*. Michael's youngest son, James, commented in an interview,

'Me and my brother, Robert, see an expansion of the wholesale distribution centre model to northern Virginia'.

Innovativeness

Luke represented innovativeness with the start of many new entrepreneurial ventures from worm composting to alpaca breeding to boutique horticulture often to the consternation and disapproval of his family. Michael has committed his adult life to the growth and innovation of boutique horticulture at Case A with creative applications and innovations that have transformed not only the family firm but also the green-goods industry. In interviews, he comments on his personal philosophy around innovating:

'We are growing plants here. There isn't some moment of great innovation; we are innovating every day – incrementally moving the bar'.

Mathew has continued a legacy of innovativeness from his father with commercial composting, in-vessel composting, methane sequestration, fish farming, hydroponic production etc. In an interview, he comments,

'So I guess the challenge which was exciting for me, was we had to figure out large-scale commercial composting. ... In the process, you know, we figured out composting on an industrial scale'.

The members of the third generation have imbued the parent family firm with their own ideas and innovativeness. Robert believes in innovative distribution, and in an interview, he comments

'My dad had a strategic planning meeting and one of the goals for the coming year was to open up a re-wholesale distribution centre, and that idea came from me!'

Pro-activeness

Over 30 years, the family business has developed a reputation for action and initiative within the green industry. While Luke is pro-active in his ability to envision and start new ventures, his sons are pro-active in their ability to secure new business by pursuing new technology, new partnerships, new branding etc. Like his father, Mathew represents repeated pro-activeness with the launch of numerous ventures in composting, methane sequestration, fish farming and hydroponic farming, to name a few. In interviews, Mathew emphatically stresses that he '*organised, financed and structured*' each new venture.

The third-generation family members are pro-active in providing innovative logistics and distribution to customers with new ventures. James and Robert have been pro-active in starting new horticultural distribution centres, while Andy has been pro-active in lean shipping ahead of the competition.

Dispositions in Entrepreneurial Legacies at Case A

The following display and matrix in Table 9.66 reflects dimensions of entrepreneurial legacies as expressed directly by the interviewee or expressed about the interviewee by either family members or non-family members working at Case A.

Table 9.66 Dimensions of an EL at Case A as Categorized Data

<p>Strategic Education</p>	<p>(Luke) "I have 3 sons and 4 grandsons at Ezra." (Michael) I got into the agriculture school at Ezra; so, I had you know – and that was I think you know, much to [Luke's] direction you know, and I got the horticulture knowledge there and I got the agriculture knowledge there...".</p>	<p>(Mathew) My son Chris is a freshman at Ezra in agriculture, and I have a son Eric who is 16. 'I think they've picked it up – I don't know that they picked it up from me, but maybe the atmosphere that they grew up in or something. I don't know how that happens'. 'I asked James to tell me about his exam in plant genetics [at Ezra] and half of the exam was on genetic modification. Guys his age will start it, but we can't convince people; they all think we're crazy, but that's a good sign; that's an opportunity'.</p>
<p>Entrepreneurial Bridging</p>	<p>[Michael] "Luke romanticized business even though he hadn't quite analysed it." [Luke] "I think people have to have fire in their gut in order to succeed in business today" [Mathew] "Luke couldn't stand working for big corporations"</p>	<p>[James] I'm very interested in starting my own business." [Michael] "A hands-on aspect of what I do must be passed on to my kids."</p>
<p>Strategic Transitioning</p>	<p>[Michael] "legacy is mainly about the business." (Mathew) "Don't put one kid working for the other; it's too early for that. Have them do their own thing."</p>	<p>[Robert]. "... people tear their family apart because of money and that's the last thing I want to happen with my family and family business." [Luke] "Total dedication makes something work. You can't do two things at once."</p>

Luke has left a legacy of resilience at Case A. In an interview, Luke comments, 'I think people have to have fire in their gut in order to succeed in business today', reflecting his disposition towards hard work and total commitment.

While his sons and grandsons praise his entrepreneurial achievements and resilience, they are also keenly aware of the failures, poor planning and reckless risk-taking that are also his entrepreneurial legacy. They recount Luke's ability to 'romanticise business even though he hadn't quite analysed it'. Michael and Mathew suggested that Case A was 'Luke's mid-life crisis'. At the time of this study, Michael had become keenly aware of his own legacy and that of his family business. In an interview, Michael comments that 'legacy is mainly about the business', and he also comments that, 'A hands-on aspect of what I do must be passed on to my kids'.

Strategic Education

Luke's sons and multiple grandchildren attended White University School of Agriculture. White University was an academic hotbed of ideas and opportunities in

the green industry. Michael remembers in an interview that he attended White before joining the parent firm with direction and guidance from his father.

'I got into the agriculture school at White; so, I had you know – and that was I think you know, much to [Luke's] direction you know, and I got the horticulture knowledge there and I got the agriculture knowledge there...'

Luke confirms that Michael attended White at his urging:

'No, that wasn't because I sent him to White School of Agriculture – well maybe a little bit I did – I think maybe you're right. I think I did. I think I was talking to a professor up there and Michael went. Michael did go that route – he did and he, yeah'

Luke continually expresses his excitement and support for a strategic education among his sons and grandsons. He comments about his grandson,

'I asked James to tell me about his exam in plant genetics [at White] and half of the exam was on genetic modification. Guys his age will start it, but we can't convince people; they all think we're crazy, but that's a good sign; that's an opportunity'

As of this study, Michael's sons, Robert and James had completed their education at White University School of Agriculture and Mathew had one son attending White University School of Agriculture and another son finishing high school.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

Upon graduation, Michael and Mathew returned to the parent firm to support the existing ventures and start new ventures in partnership with Luke. Jaskiewicz (2013: 42) described this kind of bridging as 'trans-generational collaboration of at least two generations over several years to foster entrepreneurship'. Both Michael and Mathew have committed to continuing a legacy of independent venturing. Mathew commented,

'Michael's boys need to have a business to run, and don't put a boy working for the other – it's too early ... give them opportunities to run businesses within the business so they can again have that sense of autonomy and ownership that they built something'

Strategic Transitioning

Jaskiewicz (2013) suggested that families recognise entrepreneurial legacy in strategic transitioning before the event of transition and plan accordingly. The data suggested that the transitions from Luke to his sons and daughter proceeded with a simple buyout of shares or a general desire on Luke's part to leave his children with 100% ownership of the individual ventures. As of this study, Michael intended to transition the parent firm to his sons, while Mathew intended to sell all his businesses and fully partner with his sons in the creation of new ventures. In an interview, Mathew comments,

'So ideally, I'd like to have enough capital out of what I have done to basically have the opportunity to basically go into business with my boys'

9.3.3 Categoriised Munificence at Case A

This section along with corresponding analysis of data in Appendix 9.3 considers ‘categoriised’ munificence in the form of sponsorship activities and resources that the parent firm has provided to family ventures at Case A. It includes an analysis of sponsorship mechanisms and the associated activities of field-building, networking and direct support with which Case A supported its new ventures and actively transmitted individual forms of capital (Amezcuca et al., 2013, Flynn, 1993a, Stinchcombe, 1965). As mentioned in Sections 3.2 and 3.4, mechanisms associated with organisational sponsorship act as a buffer to protect the new venture from ‘*running out of fuel*’ in terms of capital and other resources (Flynn, 1993a). Such mechanisms also act as a bridge to facilitate associations such that capital can flow more easily between the new venture and essential resource providers (Amezcuca et al., 2013). In this way, sponsorship activities can buffer, bridge or do both, such that a sponsored new venture may overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Amezcuca et al., 2013, Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b). The textual display for Case A in Table 9.67 presents organisational sponsorship data reflecting sponsorship activities from the parent firm to their new venture(s) (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993c).

Table 9.67 Dimensions of Organisational Sponsorship at Case A

Construct	Case A → A1, A2, A3, A4, A5, A6, A7, A8	Cases A1 – A7 → Case A9, A10, A11
Field-building Activities	<p>Field-building [Luke]: "I saw the hole in Boston Harbor and there's all this wood in it. I said, 'my God, that's got to be worth a fortune' and the contractor Walsh in Boston wants to get rid of it!"</p> <p>Field-building [Mathew]: "Case A under Luke had real issues when Michael came there, right? And so, Michael had to really stabilize and transition the tomato business into a new business in horticulture production . . ."</p> <p>Field-building [Mathew]: ". . . if you have any brains and competencies on your own, the technical aspects of what you have to learn to succeed, you will learn that on your own."</p>	<p>Field-building [Michael]: "Creating an awareness of the business I was worried whether I was doing a good job. So, I raised them in a suburb where they could be little fish in a big pond before becoming big fish in a little pond."</p> <p>Field-building [Robert]: "My dad had a strategic planning meeting and one of the goals for the coming year was to open up a re-wholesale distribution centre, and that idea came from me!"</p> <p>Field-building [Robert]: "But I see [P1] as one pie, and if more people start coming back, the slices get smaller right?"</p>
Networking Activities	<p>Networking [Luke]: "Well, you know I know a lot of people in research at Ezra University because of work I've done in the horticultural business. You get to know these guys, and you get to know the guys that are interested in the same thing you're interested in."</p> <p>Networking [Michael]: "Partnerships . . . were not always easy, but the potential for revenues and profitability could drive the relationship."</p> <p>Networking [Mathew]: "Yeah, the investor I found for the company was the father of a family friend from my basketball network - he was a minority shareholder - and the other two shareholders were my father and I."</p>	<p>Networking [Luke]: ". . . I have 3 sons and 4 grandchildren at Ezra."</p> <p>Networking [Michael]: "The idea of a partnership or collaboration is not a strong tendency in our industry. I think it is changing and you are a fool if you don't have that attitude, in my mind. I feel very strongly about that."</p>
Direct support Activities	<p>Direct support [Mathew]: "Luke was always a good partner, but it needed to make business sense otherwise he'd be the first to shoot it down."</p> <p>Direct support [Mathew]: "From a technical standpoint, Luke didn't really (as far as how to do industrial-scale composting) he didn't bring any of those skills to the table; those were what I had to learn just from doing and also observing other operations that were doing the same thing."</p>	<p>Direct support [Robert]: "No one is better at picking inventory for the next year than my father. He's got a magic touch for this."</p> <p>Direct support [Luke]: "It was my idea and then I, you know, she wanted to come and help me so that's how that happened . . . My daughter and I are doing really good, she's doing really good."</p>

Sponsorship Activities

As it was presented in Section 3.2 there are three sponsorship activities that serve to buffer and/or bridge the new venture from or to its environment so that it can overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Flynn, 1993a, Flynn, 1993b, Amezcua et al., 2013). Direct support activities involve direct transfer of knowledge, capital and labour to new ventures; networking activities link new ventures with external resource providers via structured programs etc., and field-building activities connect ventures to similar and new organisations in a field (Amezcua et al., 2013). Each activity may buffer and/or bridge the new venture from or to its environment by either increasing or decreasing individual forms of capital (social capital, economic capital, cultural capital and human capital) (Firkin, 2003). This section analyses the sponsorship activities conducted by Case A in relation to all of the family ventures associated with Case A.

Field-building Sponsorship Activities

Industry organisations are often a source of competition, but in industry organisations, Luke, Mathew and Michael and Michael's sons, Andy, Robert and James, understand that they have led to venturing opportunities, networking opportunities and effective partnerships that promote new business. Michael championed field-building in the green industry as a vehicle to save costs, introduce new cultivars and support new ventures. In an interview, he comments,

'The idea of a partnership or collaboration is not a strong tendency in our industry. I think it is changing and you are a fool if you don't have that attitude, in my mind. I feel very strongly about that'.

Luke championed field-building in industrial-scale composting when he proposed taking wood waste from Maine saw mills to compost into organic mulch in Case A2. In response to new legislation on commercial composting, Luke humorously remembered,

'So I met with the governor, and we opened up a bagging plant and the Governor of Maine said, "This is the greatest day of my life – we're taking crap here in Maine that people throw out, don't want, and we're putting it in a bag and selling it to people in Massachusetts!"'

Mathew also championed field-building with opportunities in legislation as local government agencies regulated off-shore dumping, fishing limits, methane emissions and water restrictions on crops. As a result, he started new ventures in commercial composting, tilapia fish farming, methane sequestration, hydroponic lettuce production etc. In an interview, Mathew comments,

'As recycling mandates came in, as leaves didn't go to the landfill and as larger and larger livestock farms created waste disposal problems, we were in a position of having the end-product market'.

In response to government agency restrictions on immigration, James spent a year in Washington, DC lobbying on immigration policies while investigating opportunities in labour regulation. Recent immigration raids by local government agencies that

removed more than 50% of the workforce at Case A1 in 2011 prompted his interest. In response to regulation on shipping, Michael's son Andy promoted lean shipping and efficient logistics at Case A1. Field-building among other innovative horticultural growers and consultancies provided Michael and his son with ideas for venturing in lean shipping.

Networking Sponsorship Activities

Networking services link new ventures with external resource providers via structured policies, programs and initiatives (Amezcuca et al., 2013, Collinson and Gregson, 2003). At Case A and the new ventures associated with it, individual and family firm networking is rooted in the ability to leverage individual and collective knowledge networks, financial networks and family networks into partnerships and new business for the family firm, the children and the grandchildren. Luke continually networked with local mentors who offered direction, local news sources that offered information, local banks that offered deals, local government agencies that instituted policies, local colleges that offered education, local clients, local organisations, green industry organisations and multi-national organisations. His son, Mathew, recalled,

'Luke didn't know much about horticulture, but basically he had a mentor of his own, Charlie, who was kind of an innovator in the nursery industry'.

Luke also talked proudly about his networking activities for his own and family education at White University:

'Well, you know I know a lot of people in research at White University because of work I've done in the horticultural business. You get to know these guys, and you get to know guys that are interested in the same thing you're interested in'.

Similarly, in the development of their own ventures, his sons and grandsons connect with local partners, local banks, local government agencies, local organisations and multi-national organisations. Luke and his sons actively engaged networks to continually educate themselves and their children in agriculture, investigate new ideas and new opportunities in the agriculture field, and seek answers to agricultural issues as a buffer and bridge to protect and/or connect their new ventures. Michael remembered,

'But I got into the Agriculture School at White so I had - you know, and that was I think - you know, much to [Luke's] direction - you know, and I got the plant knowledge there and I got the agriculture knowledge there'.

Local news sources and banks sparked Luke's entrepreneurial interest in green industry opportunities and provided him with information on companies in foreclosure or for sale. His networking activities among local banks provided Luke with resources that included assets and initial funding for his green industry ventures. In an interview, he comments on an opportunity provided by his networking activities:

'That was a big, big operation. The bank was taking it over, and I went to the bank and got it. You know, you get it for nothing'.

While his sons and grandsons were more traditional in the way they organised, structured and financed their venturing activities, they all focused on local sources and maintained strong networks with local banks – specifically, local agricultural banks. Mathew engaged his network to find investors who would work with him to start the venture at Case A2 and continue to provide a financial buffer:

‘Yeah, the investor I found for the company was the father of a family friend from my basketball network – he was a minority shareholder – and the other two shareholders were my father and I’.

Michael’s sons, Andy, Robert and James, understand that networking has been an integral aspect of their father’s, uncle’s and grandfather’s success, and in interviews, each of the sons commented repeatedly about the significance of family networks among vendors, customers, banks and universities at Case A1. In an interview, Robert comments,

‘I walked around the trade show with my dad today. He’s a rock star here, man!’

Each of Michael’s sons have begun the process of establishing his own network among friends, family and academics by maintaining and establishing contacts at home and at school. Robert and James continued a strong family legacy as White University graduates.

Direct Support Sponsorship Activities

The story of Case A and every new venture associated with it is a story of direct support through ideas, interest and knowledge of opportunities and resources. In an interview, Mathew comments that *‘The genius of Luke is that he truly partnered with his sons’*, and while both Michael and Mathew state repeatedly that *‘Luke was not an easy man to work with’* and *‘Luke romanticised business’*, they both suggested that his efforts to introduce ideas and generate interest while sharing his knowledge directly supported Case A1, Case A2, Case A3, Case A5 and Case A8 in their efforts to achieve legitimacy and overcome a liability of newness. Both sons also commented that,

‘Luke gave us opportunity while mentoring and supporting us which was way more valuable than money’.

Luke, Michael and Mathew also provided direct support through the parent family firm by immersing their children and grandchildren in the field. Robert proudly states in an interview,

‘I help the guys load the plants on to the loading belt and made sure we were getting the right orders and the right numbers and counts for each order’.

9.3.4 Categorized Dispositions Case B

This study suggests that at Case B a *“unique combination of innovation and tradition”* as Ed suggests, represented dispositions at the parent family firm which family members and executive leadership passed to future generations and their ventures in orientation, legacy and language. These dispositions instilled an EO and an EL in

individual dimensions among individuals and their new ventures (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Bourdieu, 1989, Jaskiewicz et al., 2015a).

Entrepreneurial Orientation

This section presents a textual table and in-depth analysis of Case B data in constructs of an EO and EL. Table 9.68 presents data of an EO in dimensions of individual behaviour in risk-taking, pro-activeness and innovativeness.

Table 9.68 Entrepreneurial Orientation at Case B

EO	Brad (3 rd)	Ed (non-family)	Allen (4 th)	Ray (4 th)
Risk-taking	<p>"I don't think we would have jumped so hard for the Athletes Village contract if we were building 500 units for ourselves. I don't think we would have gone that way."</p> <p>"[Athletes Village] represented a steady pay check when little or no money was coming in"</p>	<p>"Well, we would borrow it for land purchasing, but until two years ago or three years ago we had never borrowed any money from the bank."</p> <p>[Ed]: We decided at that point [in 2007], 'You know what, we've had such a terrible let down from our supply chain, and we want to build these units; so, let's purchase it and develop it'."</p>	<p>"I think in some cases there are decisions that are made particularly on creativity that don't always have, I suppose, the numbers at the fore."</p> <p>In 2007 we were informed by our bank that they would put a timber frame company up for grabs. We decided at that point, let's purchase it and develop it'."</p>	<p>[Ray] "We realized we can do it for homes division and we did it very well, why don't we sell externally as well."</p> <p>[Ray] "So, why wouldn't we want to grow it?"</p> <p>"However, I decided that no, I want [B7] to grow more, it needs to be self-sufficient, it needs to be a stand-alone company"</p>
Innovativeness	<p>[Allen] "My uncles have a kind of love for I think the details of design and the legacy of the firm."</p>	<p>[Brad] "so, I think Ed said, 'We need to try timber frame, it's quicker, although it's not necessarily cheaper'."</p>	<p>"you know, it's still building. It's still related to construction, but it's probably just put down slightly a different way."</p>	<p>[Brad] "Ed is a fantastic example of internal promotion while Ray actually knows what happens on site. I never worked on a site, not one of our own."</p>
Pro-activeness	<p>[Brad] I was chairman of the industry body of Homes of Scotland</p> <p>[Ed] "As a group, we can make decisions very quickly; we can get a board meeting together in an instant to decide on a particular project."</p>	<p>[Ed] I think we're prone to intervening. Intervens and try to resolve it."</p> <p>[Ed] "I've got to balance the custodian role with still maintaining a vision of where we need to go to and what we need to do to make us not just good but great."</p>	<p>"We have certainly come back to our timber frames business. You know, we've really challenged the concept of how a home can be built . . . so, it changed the whole outlook of how we can build houses."</p>	<p>[Ray] "However, I decided that no, I want this to grow more; it needs to be self-sufficient; it needs to be a stand-alone company"</p>

At Case B, there is a careful cultivation of EO among individual family members, but there is cultivation based on the legacy of the family firm and its commitment to shareholders. In interviews, it appeared that the dimensions of innovativeness, risk-taking and pro-activeness as presented in Table 6.54 were active at Case B and in the family members associated with Case B. This section briefly discusses these dimensions within the family and culture of Case B.

Risk-taking

When World War I ended, the Scottish Council demanded large tracts of housing for returning troops, and Adam jumped at the opportunity to extend Case B's resources; he accepted each contract that was offered to him. According to grandsons and family history, Adam understood risk to family capital, but he also understood that risk-taking was a result of his innovativeness and pro-activeness in the building field. His grandson, Brad, recalled in an interview,

'Scotland Corporation in the 1930's would say we want 1500 houses here, and no doubt, my grandfather would say, "I can do that!" for whatever the figure was, and off he would go ... very, very tightly controlled by the company and not so tightly controlled by the authorities'.

By 1947, Adam had purchased all of the shares in the firm from his partner and inserted his sons, Fred and Daniel, into leadership positions at Case B's offices in Glasgow and Edinburgh. His grandsons remembered stories about elbow patches on each of his jackets, suggesting that Adam had risked everything to retain ownership of Case B to provide opportunities for himself and his sons. At the parent family firm, the father and brothers embarked on the construction of tenement housing while continuing in construction for the municipal sector.

The introduction of cousins, Dirk and Brad, in the 1960s changed the focus and risk profile of the parent family firm to speculative home building and innovative design in luxury housing, inspired by Dirk's and Brad's architectural education. Once again, the change risked the reputation and profitability of the family firm. In the 1990s, with the introduction of the cousins Ray and Allen, Case B committed to buying land outside Scotland for development. While this was a return to business conducted 50 years earlier, it represented a risk for the firm. In 2007, Case B committed to timber systems with a transition to timber frames in all of its housing designs. Timber systems represented a calculated risk to the reputation of the firm; however, it also represented significant time and cost savings in the construction of Case B homes. In an interview, Allen noted that the firm,

'... has enough money to be able to go out and buy these very expensive bits of land in Scotland for the future.'

However, land purchases within and outside Scotland required bank funding, suggesting an appetite for greater risk at the firm. Case B began to borrow from banks rather than funding all of its projects internally. As Stephanie states,

'Well, we would borrow it for land purchasing, but until two years ago or three years ago we had never borrowed any money from the bank'.

Innovativeness

Family and non-family employees at all levels of the parent family firm are supported in their ideas about efficiencies and innovation. Starting in the early history of the parent firm, the innovativeness of family members allowed the firm to engage in all forms of building, from tenement housing for returning war troops to bespoke luxury homes. Further, this innovativeness introduced mortgage buy-back schemes to release capital for the homeowner and for the firm. Stephanie recalled the scheme in an interview:

'Let's introduce them to a mortgage broker, help them see that there's an opportunity to mortgage their homes to release some capital for themselves in this difficult financial period for everyone, but also help buy us out of our share to release capital for us'.

Case B's innovativeness included a willingness to challenge building places and building practices for the future of the firm. In an interview, Brad recalled an off-site meeting that requires new ideas:

'One of us had to present something and it had to be something that we had never thought of and mine I remember was building in Montenegro and I produced people from the advisory bodies that advise NATO and all of that stuff, ex-military people'.

In the 1940s, innovativeness allowed Fred to take on government council contracts that only the largest post-war firms could handle. In the 1970s, innovativeness allowed his grandsons Brad and Dirk to create high-density, cluster-patterned layouts and a 'burgh vernacular' approach to housing design (Case B Published History, 1998). In the 1990s, an EO suggesting innovativeness directed the firm towards timber frame housing rather than the traditional brick and mortar perfected by Case B over generations.

Pro-activeness

Case B's family members and directors pride themselves on their ability to listen to any idea from family or non-family employees. When it is decided that an idea will benefit the firm, family members also pride themselves on their ability to come together and make decisions quickly. In an interview, Edward recalls pro-activeness on the part of family members:

'As a group, we can make decisions very quickly; we can get a board meeting together in an instant to decide on a particular project'.

At Case B, there is pro-active planning for building regulation. A case history of the firm presented preparation for a land hoarding tax in 1973. Case B effectively mobilised its own land bank for future projects (Case B Published History, 1998). The pro-active planning also includes planning for succession, involving regular meetings with family members and family business counsellors.

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Table 9.69 presents data of an EL reflecting rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial events in strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning. (Jaskiewicz et al.,2012: 29). The within-case display presents dispositions in an EL transposed and imbued from Case B to ventures B4 and B5 in

the first column and Case B, B4 and B5 to Case B6 and B7 in the second column. As such, the following display and matrix reflects dimensions of an EL imbued from the great-great grandfather (Fred) at the parent firm to his great grandsons (Dirk and Brad) and great-great grandsons (Allen and Ray).

Table 9.69 Entrepreneurial Legacy at Case B

Construct	Case B → Case B4, B5	Case B → Case B6, B7
Strategic Education	<p>[Brad] "I just remember hearing the family tales of my grandfather wearing patches on the elbows of his jacket and stuff like that."</p> <p>[Allen] "My uncles have a kind of love for I think the details of design and the legacy of the firm."</p>	<p>[Stephanie] "I mean there's ninety years of business next year. If we'd had a short term view we'd be out of business by now."</p>
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<p>[Brad] "So we're open but we're just a business which is open to the concept of doing things different from what we currently can. That's our make-up."</p> <p>[Brad] "And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we'd built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor."</p>	<p>(Case B Published History, 1998: 5) "mobility and versatility which could easily exploit 20th century Scotland's mechanisms of public propagandizing"</p> <p>[Brad] "longevity – assuredness of a regular dividend, and a general message that they were supportive of us growing the business but not to the extent where they'd risk the annual dividend return."</p>
Strategic Transition	<p>[Allen] "My uncles have a kind of love for I think the details of design and the legacy of the firm."</p> <p>[Brad] "Well I'm Brad. I am the third generation at [Case B] and I am the Chairman, but I'm the seventh-generation family in the building industry."</p>	<p>[Ed] "It's very difficult because when you get to fourth generation or more we certainly - we become a legacy-type business and we have quite a number of significant external shareholders . . ."</p> <p>[Ed] "adhere to the core competency of the firm which included speculative house building and a 'hands-on' approach to management and building."</p>

Strategic Education

Every family member has received an entrepreneurial legacy in strategic education, and generations have been educated in architecture and construction. The strategic education at the parent firm consists of the training four generations have received in architecture, land planning, surveying etc. In an interview, Brad recalls the purpose of strategic education at the firm:

'And the purpose there was to use our expertise and our knowledge that we'd built up over the years on taking a piece of land, getting the exit and planning consents and then selling it to a competitor'.

Strategic education at the parent family firm includes knowledge and understanding of *'the Case B way'*, and Edward reflected on *'the Case B way'* as,

'... adhere[ing] to the core competency of the firm which included speculative house building and a 'hands-on' approach to management and building'.

Business is a large part of family education at Case B, and Brad recalled his grandfather's purchase of all outstanding Case B shares from a partner in 1942 to retain family ownership of the business:

'I just remember hearing the family tales of his patch at the elbows of his jacket and stuff like that'.

Dirk's and Brad's children also understand that the legacy at the parent family firm has maintained an entrepreneurial dimension and a custodial dimension for the education of future generations. In an interview, Stephanie commented,

'I mean there's ninety years of business next year. If we'd had a short-term view we'd be out of business by now'.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

Education among family members includes not only a formal education in architecture, surveying, planning etc. but also a less formal education in and venturing. In an interview Brad proudly recalled business roots in a small shop in Scotland from nearly 350 years ago:

'Well, it started with Robert B. & Sons which was a timber importing business in [eastern Scotland] and they did that in the days of sailing ships ... that would be back into the late 17th century'.

Brad proudly recalls the legacy of home-building and timber importation by previous generations of family and by the family firm:

'Well, I'm Brad; I am the third generation at [Case B] and I am the Chairman, but I'm seventh-generation family in the building industry'.

But, he also recalled the entrepreneurial bridging which allows family members and non-family members the opportunity to venture:

"So we're open but we're just a business which is open to the concept of doing things different from what we currently can. That's our make-up."

Strategic Transitioning

In interviews Edward suggested an entrepreneurial legacy in strategic transitioning at the parent family firm, and he reflects on his efforts to provide support to the seventh generation:

‘It’s very difficult because when you get to fourth generation or more we certainly – we become a legacy-type business and we have quite a number of significant external shareholders ... ‘

Given it was Edward’s job as non-family director to transition Case B to the next generation, he also commented about transition of the newer venture in timber systems.

‘No, that’s just me looking for a safe pair of hands to make sure that as Ray gets up to speed at Case B6, and there’s somebody in there who’s able to do things the Case B way’.

9.3.5 Categorized Munificence at Case B

This section considers munificence in sponsorship activities that support venturing at Case B. It outlines specific activities of field-building, networking and direct support with which Case B incubates its new ventures and actively transmits capital (Amezcuca et al., 2013, Flynn, 1993a, Stinchcombe, 1965). Venturing at Case B is inclusive in that family members are directed and guided towards opportunities and resources to continuously innovate at the firm. The textual table and textual analysis in Table 9.70 show that Case B provided new ventures with field-building activities to collaborate with peer organisations, direct support activities to align critical resources, and networking activities (Amezcuca et al., 2013).

Table 9.70 Categorised Munificence at Case B

Construct	Case B → Case B4, B5	Case B → Case B6, B7
Field-building Activities	<p>[Brad] "The developments built by this company over the last decade are tangible evidence that we, at least, are trying to produce housing that contributes to the environment rather than detracting from it."</p> <p>[Brad]: "[Athletes Village] represented a steady pcy check when little or no money was coming in"</p> <p>[Brad]: 'My father helped found the NHBC in Scotland, but no I think he just operated.'</p> <p>[Brad] 'You know, it's still building. It's still related to construction, but it's probably just put down slightly a different way.'</p>	<p>[Brad] 'I think Ed actually in this particular Case was initially the person that wanted us to create [B7] because Dirk and I did not, and Ray was not with us yet.'</p> <p>[Ed] 'But once we had our factory we went from not being a great advocate of timber frame to being great promoters of timber frame.'</p> <p>[Ray] 'We realized we can do it for homes division and we did it very well, why don't we sell externally as well.'</p> <p>[Brad] "So, I think Ed said, 'We need to try timber frame - it's quicker, although it's not necessarily cheaper. So that gave us the incentive and we gave Ray the resources and opportunity to take [B7] business on."</p>
Networking Activities	<p>[Brad] 'I think the difference that we had then was that – it was a degree of trust between councils, council officials and the private industry . . . So, it's the old story of you know, what's good for you is good for us.'</p> <p>[Brad] 'My father established connections, and I know that all the people that he met socially and I met as a child would be people who had an important position in Edinburgh.'</p> <p>[Brad] 'I was chairman of the industry body of Homes of Scotland . . . so you're able to kind of have those kinds of discussions one-to-one with Scottish government.'</p>	<p>[Brad] 'Well some of the people that Ray wanted to supply timber kits, I have to know them.'</p>
Direct Support Activities	<p>[Ed] "I was doing this before Allen joined us ten years ago and Ray joined us six or seven years ago . . . it's a family business and therefore you recognize that there's going to be change down the line."</p> <p>[Ed]: "Yes, yes, in terms of if it's a continued problem child what do you do about it? Do you ignore it and hope it will go away or sort itself or do you intervene? I think we're prone to intervening. Intervene and try to resolve it."</p>	<p>[Ed] 'We decided at that point [in 2007], 'You know what, we've had such a terrible let-down from our supply chain, and we want to build these units; so, let's purchase it and develop it'.'</p> <p>[Ed] 'And when we acquired the business, we then - we actually started to change the designs of our homes and today all of our homes are now delivered using timber frames from our own factory.'</p> <p>[Ed] 'No, that's just me looking for a safe pair of hands to make sure that as Ray gets up to speed at [B7], and there's somebody in there who's able to do things the Case B way.'</p>

Sponsorship Activities

Sponsorship activities may buffer and/or bridge the new venture from or to its environment by increasing or decreasing social capital, economic capital, cultural capital and human capital (Firkin, 2003, Flynn, 1993a).

Field-building

Case B can boast the original establishment of many peer organisations and current leadership in several of these organisations. Case B has therefore provided new ventures at the parent family firm with direct alignment to relevant stakeholders in their industry, and

Case B provided field-building sponsorship activities to allow new ventures at the parent family firm to acquire and develop all forms of capital. With the purchase of B7, Ed comments that the parent family firm changed its house designs to timber frame, thus providing direct financial support and legitimacy to the new venture:

‘And when we acquired the [timber] business, we then – we actually started to change the designs of our homes and today all of our homes are now delivered using timber frames from our own factory’

Case B provided field-building activities to Case B7 in the form of sourcing and engagement in multiple markets. In an interview, Allen reflected,

‘We had in the past been supplied I think Canadian timber in the past for one site as I said at Glasgow, and we’ve taken out timber from Russia and the like too, so we’ve done some of those before’.

Further, he noted that field-building for Case B7 happened internally to the parent family firm:

‘And when we acquired the business, we then – we actually started to change the designs of our homes and today all of our homes are now delivered using timber frames from our own factory’.

The internal success of B7 at the parent family firm provided the possibility for engagement without competing firms and external stakeholders. Other builders became customers of B7, and Ray commented in an interview,

‘We then looked from a timber frame perspective into the external market as well. We realised we can do it for homes division and we did it very well, why don’t we sell externally as well’.

Among industry stakeholders, Allen noted in an interview that

‘a few people who are building homes saw our success with timber and realised there’s a safe company to work with ... that’s another strength we try to use – longevity, etc’.

Networking

A long history in home building for Scotland has provided Case B with a strong network in support of existing and new ventures. In an interview, Brad recalled a public meeting between his father, Daniel, and Edinburgh city councillors:

'In 1953, he did a bit of very extraordinary lecturing to the whole council as to what they should be doing'.

In the meeting, Daniel used his power and networking to establish the foundation for future home construction in Edinburgh and beyond by dictating conditions and regulations. Brad continued,

'My father helped found the NHBC in Scotland. ... I think the difference that we had then was that – it was a degree of trust between councils, council officials and private industry ... So it's the old story of you know, what's good for you is good for us'.

More recently, Brad reflected on his own networking in the industry on behalf of Case B and its ventures:

'I was chairman of the NHBC ... we were able to get a faster consent process by getting everybody in the room talking more honestly upfront before the planning application went in'.

Direct Support

Given the directives of shareholders to risk but provide a regular dividend, direct support at Case B appears to have guided the parent family firm towards venturing activity. In an interview, Ed, the non-family director, comments,

'I've got to balance the custodian role with still maintaining a vision of where we need to go to and what we need to do to make us not just good but great'.

Direct support sponsorship activities appear to have provided balance between risk and a regular dividend with intervention if/when things went wrong. In an interview, Ed comments,

'Yes, yes, in terms of if it's a continued problem child what do you do about it? Do you ignore it and hope it will go away or sort itself or do you intervene? I think we're prone to intervening. Intervene and try to resolve it'.

9.3.6 Categorised Dispositions at Case C

This section analyses the dispositions at Case C in an EO and EL. It also investigates and analyses uncategorised dispositions in the data for further analysis.

Entrepreneurial Orientation

At Case C and all of the ventures associated with it, there are dispositions among family members that reflect an EO: innovativeness, risk-taking and pro-activeness. These dispositions are passed from one generation to the next through the expectation that family members will repeatedly venture (Lumpkin and Dess, 1996, Covin and Slevin, 1991). Table 9.71 below provides a textual table for reference in an EO while the remainder of this section provides limited textual analysis referring to each dimension.

Table 9.71: Dimensions of an EO at Case C

EO	George	Chris	Arthur	Greg	Steven
Risk-taking	<i>Risk-taking</i> [Chris]: He had the meat market, and the grocery store, and the wholesale, yeah. And he located his businesses where both customers and vendors could load and unload quickly.	<i>Because</i> sometimes a lot of the stuff was on consignment and you'd take 10% or 12% for product, or for whatever you're handling, depending on the [00:16:00] prior agreement.	<i>Risk-taking</i> [Arthur]: "We didn't want to play around with individual blueberry quarts . . . We wanted to move truckloads of them and sell them to manufacturers like food bakeries. And that was our best market."	<i>Risk-taking</i> [Greg] "Case C10 is a partnership of Vermont area farmers and Boston area families committed to rebuilding a trustworthy and sustainable regional food system."	<i>Risk-taking</i> [Steven]: "In my mind there was no risk starting C9 – there was only opportunity and stability."
Innovativeness	<i>Innovativeness</i> [Arthur] "He helped finance the growers by getting their fertilizer, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that. He was a real organizer - a great planner."	<i>Yeah. I was</i> helping him by getting these growers to ship to South Fruit and Produce Company.	<i>Innovativeness</i> [Arthur]: "Dealing with non-local suppliers . . . you either put it in a freight car, or you put it on a trailer truck depending on what's available, and I was different."	<i>Innovativeness</i> [Greg]: "We started with a belief in our ability to partner with the farmer."	<i>Innovativeness</i> [Steve]: "At [Case C9] we are 'Creating partnerships for your success'. These partnerships solidify a relationship between our horticultural growers and customers. Our job is to facilitate the process."
Pro-activeness	<i>Pro-activeness</i> [Arthur]: "George determined a need for more and better retail distribution. He started the meat market and grocery in Brookline."	<i>I found that that</i> was a good way to be, and people talk well about you, and they hear about you, [00:10:00] and you can do almost anything in business and get by very well.	<i>"So, [Arthur</i> really was in this distribution business acting as a partner and re-distributor almost, for a lot of these growing nurseries who had very poor competency in distribution."	<i>Pro-activeness</i> [Greg]: "The mission of C10 is community – community between grower and consumer."	<i>Pro-activeness</i> [Greg]: "Steven took the direct business and made it his own. There was no special transfer of ownership; it was an agreement that we wouldn't sell these customers any longer."

Risk-taking

For George, risk-taking began at an early age when he left his native country of Greece to seek opportunity in the US. Both Chris and Arthur recounted his ability as a young man to take economic risk. Arthur remembered,

'He helped finance the growers by getting their fertiliser, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that'.

George also took economic risks by funding marshmallow production, an operation that both his sons would manage. Arthur recalled, *'Oh, he put a lot of money into that'.*

Both Chris and Arthur took economic risks by continually investing in land and equipment for their individual operations in agriculture. Both believed that over time, their business would pay for their investment in land. Arthur repeatedly commented in interviews,

'Investment in the land. That's what it was all about – how to get it paid off! The business would pay it off!'

The third generation at Case C limited risk-taking after several economic downturns and the sale of Cases C4, C5 and C8. However, Arthur's first son, Greg, risked limited capital in Case C11 while he organised, structured and financed his agricultural venture in Case C11. In Cases C9 and C10, Arthur's second son, Steven, incurred economic and reputational risks by organising, re-structuring and financing Case C9, which distributed green goods with low margins and complex logistics to wholesale horticultural distributors.

Innovativeness

While George succeeded in the distribution of small orders to local vendors supplying daily fruit and produce, Chris and Arthur innovated by understanding that in the 1950s, interstate highway systems and effective logistics meant that perishable products like blueberries, Christmas trees and other agricultural products could be quickly, cheaply and efficiently transported over long distances. In an interview, Arthur remembered,

'Dealing with nonlocal suppliers – in other words, bringing stuff in from a very long distance; you either put it in a freight car, or you put it on a trailer truck depending on what's available, and I was different'.

In Cases C4, C5 and C6, Arthur innovated by creating marketing and advertising partnerships with his customers and vendors. Tom C. remembered Arthur's innovative approach to marketing:

'So, now, the selling point to them was always, "We can advertise together." And there were five or six of them in relatively distinctive markets where their cost to advertise could be lowered'.

In Cases C7, C8 and C9, George's grandchildren innovated with effective agricultural distribution using the Internet. They also conducted innovative marketing campaigns and connected agricultural growers directly to their end customers. In Case C10, Steven connected horticultural growers directly to homeowners and commercial customers with online horticultural design, delivery and installation. In Case C11, Greg connected Vermont vegetable farms, bakeries, dairy farms etc. to individuals and families in the Boston area to establish an online community of farmers and families.

Pro-activeness

George was pro-active in his ability to venture in agricultural distribution while providing opportunity for his sons. Arthur remembered,

‘Well, George gave us opportunity ... he set up the marshmallow business, the Christmas tree business, the blueberry business’.

His pro-active approach to venturing provided his sons with opportunity and direction because he believed his own venture, involving day-to-day pickups and fill-ins of local fruit and produce, was inefficient and outdated. Arthur recalled, *‘Well, he invested in his two sons. He thought they knew what the heck they were doing (laughter)’.*

Arthur displayed entrepreneurial pro-activeness in multiple ventures he started and expanded over his lifetime. He chose to vertically integrate and start multiple operations (Cases C2, C4, C5 and C6) to provide his customer base with ‘one-stop shopping’ for horticultural supplies.

Arthur’s first son, Greg, was pro-active in his orientation towards the expansion and development of existing operations in Cases C4, C5 and C8. Further, he was pro-active when he moved his family north to Vermont to *‘fix broken systems’* in food distribution at Case C11. Arthur’s second son, Steven, acted on his pro-active orientation when he ventured with Case C9, which provided direct horticultural distribution to re-wholesale distributors. In Case C10, Steven was pro-active in the creation of a complex algorithm and an online horticultural platform for the design, delivery and installation of landscape projects. Case C10 was pro-active in the pursuit of online purchasing of landscape projects directly from horticultural growers.

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Table 9.72 presents dispositions in an EL reflecting generational influence from Case C to Cases C1 through C6 in the first column and Cases C through C6 to Cases C7 through C11 in the second column.

Table 9.72: Dimensions of an EL at Case C

Construct	Case C → C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6	Case C thru C6 → Case C7, C8, C9, C10, C11
Strategic Education	<p>[Chris] "He, [George], was quite a good businessman, and he owned [Case C] and operated it since he was a child and lived to 102 years old."</p> <p>[Arthur] 'George didn't have much formal education, but he made sure Chris and I attended the best schools'</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Yes, I think we learned a lot from our father, and he made sure that we understood . . . Yeah, he was going to train his sons to be like he was, (laughter) I guess, and help them out.'</p> <p>[Chris] "George said, 'a businessman could pick up the phone and make \$1000 with one phone call'."</p> <p>[Chris] 'When I got out of the Navy in 1946 I was going back to go to medical school. Well, then he said, "You can't do that. The doctors are no good. They don't make any money.'</p>	<p>[Arthur] Steven went to college in New York to study plant biology. It was an opportunity of his choice.'</p> <p>[Chris] "I found that that was a good way to be, and people would talk well about you, and they would hear about you, and you can do almost anything in business and get by very well."</p> <p>[Arthur] Well, technology, the computer, I had nothing - didn't want anything to do with them. I didn't know anything about the computers</p>
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<p>[Arthur] "He was very prudent and didn't waste money and didn't -- and just was not a big spender. And that made it possible for him to be able to use the money where he earned it and invest in his two sons."</p>	<p>[Arthur] I liked finding new customers, but not as aggressively as finding new sources.</p> <p>[Arthur] 'All my children worked at Case C operations, but it was not my intent to force them to come back.'</p> <p>[Arthur] Investment in the land. That's what it was all about, how to get it paid off.</p> <p>[Arthur] I always felt that if I had the right material the customer would come, and they did.</p>
Strategic Transitioning	<p>[Chris] "Well, yeah. It's your -- if you have a good reputation, that's the most valuable asset that you have. And George believed in that."</p>	

Strategic Education

As an immigrant from Greece, George had limited education, but he afforded his sons both a formal and informal education. Arthur and Chris enjoyed private school and a business education at college. However, upon his release from military, Chris considered further education to be a medical doctor, but George intervened. Chris remembered:

‘When I got out of the Navy in 1946 I was going back to go to medical school. Well, then he said, “You can’t do that. The doctors are no good. They don’t make any money. ... A businessman can pick up a telephone, talk to your customers [and] can make \$1,000”’.

Arthur offered his children their choice of any private education in the US, but upon graduation they all chose to return to business in the green industry working at Case C2 and their related ventures.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

In entrepreneurial bridging, George worked with his sons toward an entrepreneurial future, and he continually supported his sons’ venturing activities. He also gave his sons the power, resources and support needed to implement entrepreneurial ideas, because as Arthur suggested in interviews, *‘He thought we knew what the heck we were doing’*. George worked with his sons to establish partnerships with growers to reduce costs, to price product more competitively, sell their excess inventory and introduce his sons to marketing the business. In an interview, Arthur remembered,

‘He helped finance the growers by getting their fertiliser, supplying them with plants, and he also would supply them with the baskets and the crates for all that’.

Arthur also recalled his father and brother working together and responding to customers and supporting strong business relationships in a very competitive marketplace:

‘And if you did well for your grower and your customer, they keep coming. But if you decide you want to just put a price on the product and say, “Well, I’ll only pay you so-and-so”, the growers and customers will shrink away and disappear’.

George’s grandchildren in Laura, Greg and Steven worked side-by-side with Arthur and partnered with growers and customers in their ventures. In the case of Case C6 and C10, Greg envisioned his businesses as the creation of a partnership of Christmas tree growers and Vermont-area farmers. At Case C9 Steven was contracting and distributing directly from horticultural grower locations while *‘creating partnerships for success.’*

Strategic Transitioning

In a strategic transition, George promoted direct distribution to his long-standing customers, understanding that his sons would transition these customers away from day-to-day fill-ins at Case C for their individual Christmas tree and blueberry ventures.

To his first son, Greg, he transitioned the Christmas tree operations in Canada. To his first daughter, Laura, he transitioned the retail operations in Case C7, and to his second son, Steven, he offered contacts and support for venturing in the direct distribution of green goods in Case C9. Resources from Case C4, along with a legacy of strong relationships in the green industry, allowed his children to transition his business upon its dissolution to independent and individually operated ventures.

9.3.7 Categorical Munificence at Case C

This section considers munificence in the form of the organisational sponsorship used to support ventures and venturing at Case C. Table 9.73 references data which reflects dimension of organisational sponsorship. This section continues with in-depth textual analysis of the data.

Table 9.73: Dimensions of Organisational Sponsorship at Case C

Construct	Case C → C1, C2, C3, C4, C5, C6	Case C thru C6 → Case C7, C8, C9, C10, C11
Field-building Activities	<p>[Chris]: Well, my brother Arthur and I, we used to go to <u>help out</u>, I guess George wanted to get us acquainted with the fruit and produce business.</p> <p>[Arthur] 'And at the same time, when we weren't busy with blueberries or Christmas trees, we helped establish the marshmallow thing. Christmas trees were seasonal; blueberries were seasonal. The [marshmallow] candy business was not so seasonal'.</p>	<p>[Greg]: "Steven changed how things were done in [Case C10] but there was a system in place at the parent company that got transferred over."</p> <p>[Greg]: "When Steve took on the direct business, he was able to go and to expand the business and to sell that product to pretty much anybody he wanted to . . ."</p> <p>[Greg] "It didn't require any complicated sale of assets or any transfer of anything like that, it was basically on a handshake saying, 'OK, we won't do this business anymore, you're going to do this type of business and we'll push that type of business to you'."</p>
Networking Activities	<p>[Chris]: "I introduced Arthur to an agent that I had in the blueberry business towards Antigonish, and his name was Lowell M."</p> <p>[Chris]: "Well, I got some addresses from my father, and then I called on some of those people, and I kind of lined it up and had addresses too that I worked on, and then I turned it over to Arthur -- told him to follow it up and do it. And he did. He did a nice job."</p> <p>[Tom C] "(Arthur) would always get a group together, and the benefit was for all . . ."</p> <p>[Chris] 'George said, "Well, my son is up there and he's shipping truckloads to pie bakers." They said, "Well, we're looking for blueberries." And they wanted those blueberries!'</p>	<p>[Arthur]: So, now, the selling point to them was always, "We can advertise together, so the cost of putting an ad, say, in The Boston Globe, we can put an ad buy from your local garden centers." And there were five and six of them in relatively distinctive markets where their cost to advertise could be lowered."</p> <p>[Greg]: I think Arthur wanted to be supportive and spoke to the suppliers about what Steven was doing and how he was doing it.'</p> <p>[Greg] 'So he really was in this distribution business – acting as a redistributor almost – for a lot of these growing nurseries who had very poor competency in distribution; they really wanted to ship a tractor-trailer'.</p>
Direct Support Activities	<p>Direct support [Arthur]: "Yeah, he was going to train his sons to be like he was I guess (laughter) and help them out."</p> <p>[Arthur] 'Yeah, well, George could see the decline. I mean, even Stop & Shop, they were going to buy it from the grower. Yeah, that kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really, is what it did'.</p> <p>[Arthur] '[George] didn't really discuss what he had in mind. But we could assume to some extent that he was trying to set up a business for his family, for his two boys'.</p>	

Sponsorship Activities

This section outlines sponsorship activities in field-building, direct support and networking at Case C.

Field-building Activities

With sponsorship field-building activities, George appears to have improved his standing in the agriculture field while connecting his sons to similar businesses. Field-building opportunities existed in Christmas tree distribution and blueberry distribution, which both Arthur and Chris persistently pursued under the direction of their father. But there was also the marshmallow business, which was a joint venture between father and sons. In an interview, Arthur recalled,

‘And at the same time, when we weren’t busy with blueberries or Christmas trees, we helped establish the marshmallow thing. Christmas trees were seasonal; blueberries were seasonal. The [marshmallow] candy business was not so seasonal’.

Arthur’s son Greg remembered sponsorship field-building activities as Arthur consolidated his position within the horticulture distribution field:

‘So he really was in this distribution business – acting as a redistributor almost – for a lot of these growing nurseries who had very poor competency in distribution; they really wanted to ship a tractor-trailer’.

In Cases C7, C8, C9 and C10, the businesses were originally divisions within the parent firm, but Arthur provided sponsorship field-building activities to his children as they ventured in wholesale and retail distribution. In interviews about Case C10, Greg remembered that field-building on behalf of the parent firm in Case C3 provided unlimited opportunities to interact with horticultural growers and customers:

‘When Steven took the direct business, he was able to go and to expand the business and to sell that product to pretty much anybody he wanted to at that point, there weren’t really any restrictions on that, none that were spoken of or placed on that’.

Further, Greg remembered that the sponsorship field-building activities for Case C10 did not include complications or competition from the parent firm; instead, the parent firm actively promoted alignment and engagement with critical stakeholders for the venture:

‘It didn’t require any complicated sale of assets or any transfer of anything like that, it was basically on a handshake saying okay, we won’t do this business anymore, you’re going to do this type of business and we’ll push that type of business to you’.

Direct Support Activities

Sponsorship direct support activities on behalf of Case C’s ventures included opportunities that George directly provided to his sons thanks to his understanding of agricultural distribution and opportunities within the field. In reference to Cases C1, C2 and C3, Chris and Arthur commented repeatedly, *‘Well, George gave us opportunity’*. In reference to venturing, Arthur commented in an interview,

'Yeah, well, George could see the decline. I mean, even Stop & Shop instead of buying in the wholesale market for local distribution, they were going to buy it from the grower. Yeah, that kind of guided us into doing our own thing, really, is what it did'.

In addition, Chris and Arthur gave each other sponsorship direct support while building their individual ventures and while building their joint venture, Case C3. Chris recalled in an interview,

'Well, I got some addresses from my father, and then I called on some of those people, and I kind of lined it up and had addresses too that I worked on, and then I turned it over to Arthur – told him to follow it up and do it. And he did. He did a nice job'.

George also directly supported venturing activity by his sons with financial support, including cash to buy Christmas trees. In an interview, Arthur remembered,

'You know, I had to go find my way, but I remember he gave me \$5000 bucks to go buy trees, because the wholesale market was selling to smaller, more local people – small quantities'.

Arthur also supported his sons and daughter with direct support activities. In an interview, Greg commented,

'I think Arthur wanted to be supportive and spoke to the suppliers about what Steven was doing and how he was doing it at [Case C9]; he wanted them to continue to give him the same terms and the same preferential treatment ... because we're standing behind him'.

Networking Activities

George provided his sons with sponsorship networking activities to help establish their individual ventures, believing that what was best for Cases C1, C2 and C3 might also benefit Case C. Case C was selling small quantities of blueberries and Christmas trees along with other fruit and produce to local grocers and restaurants when Chris and Arthur entered the business. George provided direct support by providing Arthur with Christmas tree sources and suppliers, and he provided Chris with direct support by providing blueberry sources and suppliers. Arthur recalled,

'He had a guy in Nova Scotia and then maybe a couple other people in Nova Scotia that shipped him trees'.

George also directly supported Chris in his venture of distributing blueberries directly to pie manufacturers and local distributors. In an interview, Chris recalled a story of his father providing direct support to Case C1:

'George said, "Well, my son is up there and he's shipping truckloads to pie bakers." They said, "Well, we're looking for blueberries." And they wanted those blueberries!'

Both sons understood the limitations of Case C as a small supplier to local markets, and they established ventures that expanded its distribution with the help of George's existing networks. In fact, George repeatedly provided his network of suppliers to both his sons. In an interview, Chris recalled,

'Anyway, George said, "I want you to see a W.B. Wells. This man has a lot of blueberries up in Nova Scotia."... And then there were other pie companies that were in Chicago and New Jersey, and we were selling blueberries to others. And the business expanded very quickly'.

Arthur used his network of purchasing agents to provide his first son, Greg and Case C8 with sales channels to mass merchants. Sales to mass merchants significantly increased the production and logistics at C8's Canadian and US operations. Arthur and C2 operations provided sponsorship networking activities to Steven and Case C10 by passing along established grower relationships. In an interview, Greg recalled networking to support and sponsor Case C10:

'I think the only support mechanism was one of networking and relationship whereby the nurseries felt, whether it was true or not, that this venture in [Case C10] kind of had the backing of the parent company. Maybe it did, maybe it didn't'.

9.3.8 Categorized Dispositions at Case D

Entrepreneurial dispositions at Case D are evident in the data from immediate family and cousins across generations. Cousins operating in the horticulture field in New Jersey introduced family members in Virginia to the green industry. Cousins in New Jersey also gave their Virginia cousins dispositions and sponsorship to help them overcome a liability of newness in the horticultural field. Dispositions within and outside the family include EL and EO, and in interviews Clint repeatedly references dispositions which his cousins and family provided to support his own and his brothers' venturing activity.

Alternately at Case D4, dispositions arise from the knowledge and experience accumulated by John (non-family employee) during his long tenure in the green industry. While John repeatedly references dispositions in an EO and EL during semi-structured interviews, they arguably reference his personal dispositions in an EO and an EL which he ascribes to the parent family firm in Case D.

Entrepreneurial Orientation

Table 9.74 below categorises EO data reflecting dispositions and behaviour of family and non-family interviewees who venture at the parent family firm. As such, the following display and matrix reflects entrepreneurial dimensions imbued over 4 generations. Further, textual analysis in this section suggests that previous generations imbued an EO upon family members. Analysis in this section also suggests that previous generations did not imbue an EO upon non-family members.

Table 9.74 Dimensions of EO at Case D

EO	Carl II	Clint	John (non-family)
Risk-taking	<p><i>Risk-taking [Clint]: "Well, in 1960 we probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in Princeton nursery."</i></p> <p><i>Risk-taking [Clint]: And my father is the one who added the acreage through the years as the farming came up -- became available for growing nursery stock.</i></p>	<p><i>Risk-taking [Bill]: Clint ended up buying out the re-wholesale operation - all the stock, from [John], and we moved it all down to [Case D2].</i></p> <p><i>Risk-taking [Clint]: In 1980 we started the vineyard and then the winery - did that commercially and we've been in that ever since 1980.</i></p>	<p><i>Risk-taking [John]: "But once we were committed to these trees, we were committed because you don't just get in the tree business overnight, nor do you get out of it overnight."</i></p> <p><i>Risk-taking [John]: "My idea was to sell these trees back to him and take a cut of them for producing them, but it didn't work out; it never came to that."</i></p> <p><i>Risk-taking [Bill]: "John opened up a re-wholesale yard at the D4 facility for local nurseries and landscapers."</i></p>
Innovativeness	<p><i>Innovativeness [John]: "My dad said if Thomas Jefferson can grow grapes in Virginia so can we with all the modern technology."</i></p> <p><i>Innovativeness [John]: "My father loved to innovate. One of the things that he always had in his mind was to mechanize cultivation."</i></p> <p><i>Innovativeness [John]: "[My father] developed the hardening off system so we could dig trees after they came into leaf by putting them under an intermittent mist system."</i></p>	<p><i>Innovativeness [Clint]: "We're still trying new products, new plants, [and] ways of growing them . . . trying new things in container and pot-and-pot production."</i></p> <p><i>Innovativeness [Clint]: Years ago, you know, you took all your product in Spring time when it could be safely dug, and now, you know, we're shipping just as much now as we were in the middle of March because of pot-and-pot.</i></p>	<p><i>Innovativeness [Clint]: "I mean John had land and actually a farming operation going over there and claimed a lot of nursery production land. And he had a son, and he probably thought it would be a good thing."</i></p> <p><i>Innovativeness [Bill]: "It was not a situation where Clint said 'Hey, grow 3" trees because we need them to augment our inventory.' This was John's idea."</i></p>
Pro-activeness	<p><i>Pro-activeness [Clint]: Under [Carl's] direction, the nursery grew to 1,800 acres and became known as "Virginia's largest and finest nursery."</i></p> <p><i>Pro-activeness [Clint]: "Since the '60s we went out of the dairy business, and went full-time in nursery"</i></p>	<p><i>Pro-activeness [Bill]: [John at Case D4] saw a chance for them to come in and help [Clint at Case D2] and help themselves as well. It worked very well.</i></p>	<p><i>Pro-activeness [John]: My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with D2.</i></p> <p><i>Pro-activeness [John]: In 2000 we started lining out trees, but I didn't do it thinking that it would cause a separation between us in 2006."</i></p>

At Case D2 and Case D4, the data suggests that there is an EO at both ventures that leads to repeated ventures in the green industry field. Both Case D2 and Case D4 established an EO in previous ventures. While Clint claimed an EO in nursery and winery ventures, among others, John claimed an EO in the nursery business before he ventured in shade and ornamental tree production.

Risk-taking

Risk-taking at Case D2 is shown in Kent's transition of the family operations from dairy to nursery in the 1960s. His son Clint remembered in an interview,

'Well, in 1960 [my father] probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in New Jersey'.

Carl took an additional risk by increasing the nursery acreage throughout the 1960s and 1970s from 500 acres to over 1800 acres. Again, Clint remembered in an interview,

'And my father is the one who add the acreage through the years as the farming came up – became available from growing nursery stock'.

As the nursery prospered and expanded, the introduction of the winery business to an expanding nursery business in the 1980s brought additional risk. Clint summarised the situation in an interview:

'Since the '60s we went out of the dairy business and went full-time in nursery; in 1980 we started the vineyard and then the winery – did that commercially and we've been in that ever since 1980'.

In the 1990s, Clint began to diversify the operations to include new product lines he could sell to existing customers. Perennial production was a booming but risky business, and at the time, John was looking to get out of the perennial business on nearby land. Clint hoped to get into the business at Case D2. Clint remembered in an interview,

'And John said well, I need to get rid of this perennial business and we were looking to get in the perennial business; so we just bought his production ... We had nothing to do with perennials until we actually made the acquisition where we bought the product line hook, line and sinker'.

After accumulating years of experience and training, John also proved to have an EO towards risk-taking with his initial venture in 1977 in perennials and later in 2000, when he began growing shade and ornamental trees. However, John believed that his venture in 2000 would be part of a 'loose agreement' with Case D2 to grow shade and ornamental trees that were hard to find. John remembered in an interview,

'[Case D2] didn't start me in trees ... my thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [Case D2] tag on them when they left the door'.

Innovativeness

Venturing at Case D appears to have begun with the introduction of horticultural propagation, along with dairy production. With the help of his cousin Bill and others in New Jersey, Carl was innovative in his approach to nursery propagation. In an interview, his son Clint commented,

'My father loved to innovate. One of the things that he always had in his mind was to mechanise cultivation'.

This innovativeness on the part of Carl led him to develop new systems and procedures that had been thought impossible in the green industry. In an interview, Clint remembered,

'[My father] developed the hardening off system so we could dig trees after they came into leaf by putting them under an intermittent mist system'.

John's venturing began with the propagation and production of perennials and ornamental grasses by John and his wife Donna. Both were innovative in their production techniques. In an interview, Bill, an employee of Case D4, commented,

'We did small tray perennials and as time progressed John and Donna saw an opportunity for the business to grow and diversify and start doing smaller containers: ones, twos, threes'.

John also ventured in re-wholesale distribution to local contractors and landscapers. Bill commented,

'John opened up a re-wholesale yard at the D4 facility for local nurseries and landscapers'.

John also innovated in shade and ornamental tree production with drip irrigation, fertilisation techniques etc.

Pro-activeness

Pro-activeness at Case D was shown in all aspects of the parent family firm that involved venturing and diversification, starting with the first and second generations, which ventured in several areas of dairy farming. The third and fourth generations then ventured away from dairy to horticulture and wineries. This pro-active nature appears to be embedded in the culture of the operation, and Clint suggested pro-activeness in his decision to acquire perennial operations while also expanding into pot-n-pot and container production. This pro-active orientation allowed Case D2 to significantly expand its production and sales. Clint recalled,

'Years ago you know, you took all your product in spring time when it could be safely dug, and now, you know, we're shipping just as much now as we were in the middle of March because of pot-and-pot'.

Clint and John were independently pro-active upon the purchase of the perennial and ornamental grass production started by John and his wife in 1977. By 1994, Clint had

integrated perennial and grass production into Case D2's operations. In an interview, Bill recalled,

'Clint ended up buying out the re-wholesale operation – all the stock, from [John], and we moved it all down to [Case D2]'.

John pro-actively believed that Case D4 could venture in a 'loose partnership' with Clint at Case D2. Bill recalled in an interview,

'[John at Case D4] saw a chance for them to come in and help [Clint at Case D2] and help themselves as well. It worked very well'.

Bill also suggested in an interview that Case D4 was a pro-active and independent venture, separate and distinct from the parent family firm. In an interview, he commented,

'It was not a situation where Clint said "Hey, grow 3" trees because we need them to augment our inventory." This was John's idea'.

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Motivation for transgenerational entrepreneurship in an EL is evident at Case D in the rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial events among individual family members but from separate families. Table 9.75 below summarizes data reflecting strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning or lack thereof from the parent family firm. In-depth textual analysis reflects data which suggests lack of EL from Case D to Case D4. However, data arguably suggests the start of EL from John to his son as they transition Case D4 within the family.

Table 9.75 Entrepreneurial Legacy (EL) at Case D

Construct	Case D → Case D2 & D3 (family)	Case D, D2 → Case D4 (non-family)
Strategic Education	<p>[Clint] "We're still trying new products, new plants, [and] ways of growing them . . . trying new things in container and pot-and-pot production."</p> <p>[John] "I very freely gave any knowledge I had. . ."</p> <p>[Clint] 'I completed my education in horticulture at University of Maryland and Cornell School of Agriculture.'</p>	<p>[John] "We started growing shade trees in 2001. By that point I had been in the nursery business since I was out of college."</p> <p>[John] I worked in Europe for four years before going out to the Midwest and so the knowledge had accumulated throughout my professional career."</p> <p>[John] "We went out and did it because I had the basics and you're always picking up new information in this business whether you think you are or not, it's just the way it works."</p> <p>[John] "I didn't learn from Case I2. It's just something we picked up as we got in the tree business from people that were supplying us."</p>
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<p>[Clint]. . . was good because it was what my dad had been doing. So, hopefully I was going to do better so."</p> <p>[Bill] "Case I1 was a very well-established, very successful nursery in the state of Virginia."</p> <p>[John] "I was not trying to grow an inferior tree and I would say Case I2 had the same strategy. They're not trying to grow an inferior tree."</p>	<p>[Clint] "Right. Well, his -- actually his son worked here a couple of years in our general container operation and . . ."</p> <p>[John] "You could say we got [Case I2] into the perennial business. It was our knowledge and competencies that pushed [Case I2] forward."</p> <p>[Bill] '[John] didn't work directly with the grower, but he saw the patterns, growth cycles, things of that nature through Case I2 and his time there, and I think it helped Case I4 get off the ground.'</p> <p>[Bill] "I think the association with Case I2 didn't hurt. Case I4 was good enough to stand on its own, but it certainly didn't hurt Jim to be able to go in while he represented Case I2 . . ."</p>
Strategic Transitioning	<p>[Clint] "We wanted to keep it a family business and we wanted to keep it in the nursery business"</p> <p>[Clint] "There was a lot of - I wouldn't say pressure, but I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture."</p>	<p>[Clint] "And it's hard -- it's hard to put all that together in one generation. You have to work at it."</p> <p>[Clint] "I mean John had . . . nursery production land, and he had a son, and he probably thought it would be a good thing."</p>

Strategic Education

Noting the success of his cousin's large horticulture operation in New Jersey, Kent completed his education in horticulture at University of Maryland and Cornell School of Agriculture. Upon graduation the farm was dairy, and it was his decision to venture in horticultural production like his cousins in New Jersey. His cousins provided sponsorship with extensive market and production knowledge along with entrepreneurial capital to grow southern horticultural crops at Case D in Virginia under Kent. Kent's son, Clint, studied horticulture and has continued a horticultural legacy at Case D. Like his father he has educated himself and he has innovated. In interviews he suggested,

'We're still trying new products, new plants, [and] ways of growing them ... trying new things in container and pot-and-pot production.'

John educated himself in horticulture on nearby land where he began perennial production with his wife in 1977. In Case D4 John absorbed knowledge from Clint and operations at Case D2 to start Case D4 which he expanded with his son.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

Kent responded to bridging from his father who helped transition family operations from dairy to horticulture, but it was cousins in New Jersey who provided Kent resources, education sales channels and close association to bridge their cousin in his new horticultural venture. Kent's son, Clint, would benefit from close association with his father and his father's knowledge of horticulture to expand nursery operations. In interviews Kent responded that horticultural field work,

'was good because it was what my dad had been doing. So, hopefully I was going to do better so'.

John began his operations in perennial production in 1977 and his shade and ornamental tree production years later with very limited bridging activity other than what he took from Clint at Case D2. In interviews Clint admits he knew little about what John was doing in shade trees. He preferred it that way.

Strategic Transitioning

While second-generation family members were beginning the conversation about horticulture with their New Jersey cousins, Carl consolidated the transition at the parent family firm from dairy to horticulture. This early transition suggested that the family would continue the family business and continue to venture in agriculture. Clint confirmed in an interview,

'There was a lot of – I wouldn't say pressure, but I think there was a lot of interest in continuing it the way it was rather than trying to do something else that wasn't involved in agriculture'.

Upon the transition to horticulture, Clint also commented in an interview that

'We wanted to keep it a family business and we wanted to keep it in the nursery business'

But in interviews, Clint also confirmed that it takes more than a generation to transition a legacy.

Strategic transition at Case I4 arguably represented a non-family venture distinct and separate from family operations at Case I2. While Clint was planning for strategic transition to his children and relatives, John was planning for strategic transition to his son. In an interview, Clint confirmed,

'I mean John had land and actually a farming operation going over there and claimed a lot of nursery production land. And he had a son, and he probably thought it would be a good thing'.

9.3.9 Categorised Munificence at Case D

This section qualitatively compares the munificence in the sponsorship activities carried out in favour of the family and non-family ventures associated with Case D by the parent family firm. The sponsorship activities include field-building, networking and direct support activities.

Sponsorship Activities at Case D

While it may seem somewhat tautological to suggest lack of munificence between parent family firm and non-family venture, John believed in a 'loose agreement' between Case D and his non-family venture in Case D4. Table 9.76 below categorises data which arguably suggests that previous generations provided munificence to family ventures while restricting munificence at non-family ventures.

Table 9.76 Organisational Sponsorship at Case D

Construct	Case D → Case D2 & D3 (family)	Case D, D2 → Case D4 (non-family)
Field-building Activities	<p>[Clint]: “As a matter of fact that’s why we got started in the nursery business is because we were growing some more southern crops for [our cousins] that they couldn’t grow there with that winter damage. So, we were growing them here and shipping them to New Jersey; that was part of our production.”</p> <p>[Clint] “And certainly if you want to look at acre return, nursery acreage return is much better than from general farming or from the dairy business.”</p> <p>[Clint] “My dad said if Thomas Jefferson can grow grapes in Virginia so can we with all the modern technology.”</p>	<p>[John] “Clint at [Case D2] knew exactly what I was putting in the ground for inventory every evening. It was based more on items we knew we could sell . . . Clint pulled back from what might have been a loose understanding.”</p>
Networking Activities	<p>[Clint]: “So, my grandad -- his dad was already out of it - he turned the dairy over to my father, and it was up to my dad when actually it was the influence of [cousins] in Princeton that got my dad involved and the two of them were great communicators and decided this is the best way to go.”</p>	<p>[Bill]: John had access to complete contact base from I2.’</p> <p>[Bill]: ‘There was no official Clint handing it over saying, ‘you should use this for your business’, as far as I know, anyway.’</p> <p>[Bill]: John was and is very well liked in the business and [D4] was never presented as a partnership</p> <p>[Clint]: “So, I think at that point John probably had more personal contacts with people in the industry . . . He probably had more contacts than I did.”</p>
Direct support Activities	<p>[Clint] “Well, in 1960 we probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in Princeton nursery.”</p> <p>[Clint]: There was no formal agreement between the two nurseries. I think my dad and cousin just met and talked about what the availability of the inventory was and what they could use</p> <p>[Clint]: Yeah, when he had product ready for the market, we were pretty adamant that we were not going to suggest to any of our customers look at them, obviously they did and all that but it didn’t come from us.</p>	<p>[Clint]: “Case D2 didn’t provide any sponsorship activities per say to the new venture.”</p> <p>[Bill]: “If we had a truck going to New York that was a partial truck, there was talk about maybe stopping at D4, filling up or coordinating deliveries that way.”</p> <p>[John]: ‘Was there direct support from I2? Not for me to be in the tree business . . . D4 went out on its own.’</p> <p>[John] “They didn’t start me in trees. I offered to do that; my thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [D2] tag on them when they left the door . . . We were going to ship it under his name and everything.”</p>

Munificence was evident in the data coming from the parent family firm in Case D and received by the family members at Cases D1, D2 and D3 as they ventured from general farming to horticulture and viticulture. The transition from general farming in 1890 to dairy farming involved the first generation's sponsorship of the second generation. Similarly, the transition from dairy farming to horticulture showed evidence of sponsorship activities carried out by the older generation. Carl made this transition with the help of his cousins in New Jersey. In an interview, his son remembered,

'Well, in 1960 we probably did away with the dairy and went full-time in the nursery business with the help of our cousins in Princeton nursery'.

There is also evidence of sponsorship activities carried out by the parent family firm as family members ventured in vineyards. In an interview, Clint remembered,

'My dad said if Thomas Jefferson can grow grapes in Virginia so can we with all the modern technology'.

Munificence in the form of sponsorship mechanisms and associated activities appears to be lacking in the data at the non-family level in Case D4. John expected to venture at Case D4 as part of a *'loose agreement'* with Clint at Case D2 to grow larger shade and ornamental trees to augment the inventory at Case D2. John also believed he would sell product back to D2 and ship his product with a D2 tag, but he later recalled that he never did so:

'They didn't start me in trees. I offered to do that; my thought was we grow trees to larger than were readily available and then put a [D2] tag on them when they left the door ... We were going to ship it under his name and everything'.

John believed that his long personal and business relationship with Clint would provide the *'loose agreement'* that would allow Case D4 to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy in the green industry. In an interview, he also recalled,

'Clint at [Case D2] knew exactly what I was putting in the ground for inventory every evening. It was based more on items we knew we could sell ... Clint pulled back from what might have been a loose understanding'.

Therefore, John never believed his venture would compete with Clint and Case D2; he thought it would merely augment the existing inventory at Case D2. He stated in an interview,

'My idea was to sell these trees back to him and take a cut of them for producing them, but it didn't work out; it never came to that'.

Bill similarly recalled in an interview,

'[Case D4] was a partnership to grow trees larger than 3 inches, so it was not in direct competition with [Case D2]'.

However, Clint commented,

'[John] had all this land and John said, "Well, I think I'll start growing some trees." I said, "That's fine, it's really not going to affect our market at that time." ... I would be surprised if John said that there was any input from our part'.

After several thousand shade and ornamental trees were cultivated over five years, the first crop was ready for sale at Case D4 in 2006. John commented on the long commitment required for ornamental and shade tree production:

'But once we were committed to these trees, we were committed because you don't just get in the tree business overnight, nor do you get out of it overnight'.

However, in an interview, John remembered that by 2006 the economic environment and his relationship with Clint had changed:

'I think Clint was blown away with how many trees we had here that we were ready to sell to him, but then of course the market was changing; so, it is what it is'.

Case D2 and Case D4 ended their personal and business relationship in 2006. In an interview, Bill recalled,

'The relationship between [Case D2] and [Case D4] ended up being a separation'.

Field-building on behalf of the new venture(s)

With sponsorship field-building activities, Case D supported venturing from generation to generation as the parent family firm transitioned from general farming to dairy farming, and then to horticulture, to vineyards and to wineries. As the parent family firm transitioned, the data suggests that field-building activities supported ventures among family members in their individual alignment and engagement with individual stakeholders. In interviews, Clint recalled his great-grandfather aligning with dairy farmers to focus his early operations around dairy. Later Clint recalled that his grandfather began the transition from dairy to horticulture, created an awareness of land value and guided his sons towards an understanding of real estate. Clint recalled,

'And certainly, if you want to look at acre return, nursery acreage return is much better than from general farming or from the dairy business'.

Clint confirmed that his father added acreage to the nursery operations, going from 500 acres to 1800 acres within a generation. He also recalled that his cousins provided field-building sponsorship activities by aligning the inventory at Case D2 with the New Jersey operations to augment the inventory. In an interview, he remembered,

'As a matter of fact that's why we got started in the nursery business is because we were growing some more southern crops for them that they couldn't grow'

there with that winter damage. So, we were growing them here and shipping them to New Jersey; that was part of our production’.

With sponsorship field-building activities, Case D provided limited munificence to Case D4 as John ventured and attempted to acquire legitimacy and overcome a liability of newness. John incorrectly assumed that a ‘loose agreement’ existed between Case D2 and Case D4, similar to the ‘loose agreement’ between Clint and his cousins in New Jersey. John believed D4 inventory would augment and supplement D2’s inventory. He commented,

‘My intent may have been to be joined at the hip going forward with D2. We had the sales force in place; we had the shipping and the production, and we could have easily added D4 inventory to D2 inventory’.

However, in an interview, Bill commented,

‘It was not a situation where Clint said “Hey, grow 3” trees because we need them to augment our inventory.” This was John’s idea. I think there was a little trepidation on Clint’s end at first. He worried about it. He wanted them to concentrate on selling [D4] inventory’.

John also believed that D4’s inventory of larger shade and ornamental trees could appeal to landscape contractors and distributors in the Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states to increase sales at both D2 and D4. In an interview, he commented,

‘You get these larger landscape jobs coming through and you say, “Shoot, we can’t supply it at Case D2, but D4 has this and we can supply it...”’.

By 2006, when the inventory at Case D4 came ready for sale, Clint seemed to pull back from their ‘loose agreement’, and their personal and economic partnership ended. In summary, John commented,

‘In 2000 we started lining out trees, but I didn’t do it thinking that it would cause a separation between us in 2006’.

To reflect his personal sentiments in 2006, Clint recalled,

‘Yeah, when he had product ready for the market, we were pretty adamant that we were not going to suggest to any of our customers look at them, obviously they did and all that but it didn’t come from us’.

Direct Support Activities

There is a preponderance of evidence in the data to suggest that Case D provided sponsorship in the form of direct support activities to the family ventures associated with it. Most notable is the direct support from the cousins in New Jersey, who supplied knowledge, equipment and sales channels for D2 to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy in the nursery business after the transition from dairy farming. In an interview, Clint stated,

‘So, we received a lot of equipment, help, all that; we got their hand-me-downs and bought their second-hand stuff and helped us tremendously to get started’.

Additionally, there is evidence of direct support activities from direct family members as Case D ventured in wineries and vineyards. Over four generations, the parent family firm has ventured with direct support from the family. The venturing activities have included the purchase of land and assets with economic and/or social capital provided by earlier generations.

At Case D4, John did not expect direct support sponsorship activities from the parent family firm, and it appears that he did not receive them. Clint commented, *'Case D2 didn't provide any sponsorship activities per se to the new venture'*. He also stated, *'There was transfer of equipment and personnel between [our cousins] and D2. There was no transfer between D2 and D4'*.

However, John noted in an interview that *'Anytime I asked Clint for help he was very giving of his time, and helping me get that executed'*.

What John arguably received for his venture was indirect sponsorship activities – especially human capital. He elaborated, *'I very freely gave any knowledge I had, and I felt like they opened everything up to me that I would ever need to see, from the books to production to whatever'*.

Bill confirmed in an interview, *'Case D2 also helped John see how a B&B tree operation was run ... I think it helped D4 get off the ground'*.

When asked directly if D4 received direct support from Clint at Case D2, John emphatically stated, *'Was there direct support from D2? Not for me to be in the tree business ... D4 went out on its own and D2 didn't show us any money, there wasn't anything like that'*.

Additional evidence for indirect sponsorship activities was suggested by Bill in a comment about the parent family firm's shipping activities. He remembered, *'If we had a truck going to New York that was a partial truck, there was talk about maybe stopping at D4, filling up or coordinating deliveries that way'*.

Bill also commented on indirect sponsorship activities in sales and contacts:

'John picked up different customers just from being around it; there was no official Clint handing it over saying you should use this for your business, as far as I know, anyway. It certainly was a help for D4 to have that resource and those names'.

Networking Activities

Networking sponsorship activities carried out by Case D in support of its family ventures are evident in the data as the family farm transitioned over generations from general farming to dairy farming, and then to horticulture and vineyards. Clint recalled in interviews that his cousins in New Jersey were communicating with his father while providing access to critical resources – particularly social capital and legitimacy for family ventures:

‘So, my grandad – his dad was already out of it – he turned the dairy over to my father, and it was up to my dad when actually it was the influence of [cousins] in Princeton that got my dad involved and the two of them were great communicators and decided this is the best way to go’.

The New Jersey cousins also provided alignment with stakeholders, including customers and suppliers who were difficult to buy from. When D2 could not buy what it needed, the cousins supplied the product. Clint recalled in an interview,

‘There was no formal agreement between the two nurseries. I think my dad and cousin just met and talked about what the availability of the inventory was and what they could use’.

Sponsorship networking activities from the parent family firm to D4 existed only indirectly, for example through John’s association with the green industry. As Bill recalled,

‘John was and is very well liked in the business and [D4] was never presented as a partnership’.

Such activities also arose from John’s association with the parent family firm. Bill also commented,

‘There was no official Clint handing it over saying, “you should use this for your business”, as far as I know, anyway’.

He also commented that D2 gave D4 a ‘good base’ in that *‘John had access to complete contact base from D2.’*

However, John continued to develop his own customer base, thanks to his long association within the green industry. He commented,

‘He did push me forward in the industry, but he didn’t have to because we both knew so many of the same people, and there were some people that he knew and I didn’t, and vice-versa’.

While Clint recalled some trepidation about John’s venture when product came ready, he acknowledged John’s networking ability, which he had gained through his association with D2. In an interview, he commented,

‘So, I think at that point John probably had more personal contacts with people in the industry ... He probably had more contacts than I did’.

9.3.10 Categorized Dispositions at Case E

This section argues that in the third generation, Warren displayed a strong EO towards venturing, while his brother Rodney did not. Further, this study suggests that their father, Ed, provided only Warren, who had a strong business education and natural inclination towards horticulture, with EL in the form of strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging, strategic transitioning and direct communication about venturing at the firm. While Ed made Rodney an equal partner at the firm, he provided Rodney with only limited EL. This section suggests that differences in philosophies and dispositions affected the leadership and dispositions at the parent family firm.

Entrepreneurial Orientation

This section presents a textual display in Table 6.83 of an EO among three generations of family members at Case E. While the table presents strong EO among family members over previous generations, this section argues that Rodney arguably lacked an EO. This section continues with textual analysis in dimensions of EO to provide additional analysis.

Table 9.77: Dimensions of an EO at Case E

EO	Ed	Warren	Tim
Risk-taking	<i>Risk-taking: [Ed] brought in the concept of woody ornamentals and horticulture, he made it work because my grandfather couldn't do all of those things</i>	<i>Risk-taking: If we raise the plants, they will come . . .</i>	<i>Risk-taking: I wanted to know so I could show my uncle, mainly, and my dad that it was profitable, or it wasn't.</i> <i>Risk-taking: I think I brought a very good business sense to the operational part of that.</i>
Innovativeness	<i>Innovative: [Ed] loved to innovate. One of the things that he always had in his mind was to mechanize cultivation.</i> <i>Innovative: [Ed] saw something that wasn't there before</i> <i>Innovative: I think [Ed] just sort of adapted it from what he learned.</i>	<i>Innovativeness: Retail was expanded but the growing continued very strong. In fact, the growing was my main love, I love propagation growing.</i> <i>Innovativeness: We didn't have the confidence that they could do the job, so we wanted to make sure that they were doing it the way we wanted it to be done.</i>	<i>Innovative: So, my idea was to turn it into an in-and-out type of operation where you can get paid on both ends.</i> <i>Innovative: I had very good suggestions for what I could do, based on my skill set.</i> <i>Innovative: I brought value to the company; [Rodney] didn't care.</i>
Pro-activeness	<i>Pro-active: [Ed] grew up in the business and he saw the need for expanding the palate of plant material realizing that almost everything was growing from seed back then and the [move to] clonal propagation was just beginning.</i>	<i>Pro-active: "I was struggling to move the organization away from a production orientation and toward a market-driven focus."</i>	<i>Pro-active: So, my ideas that we could make that a profitable part, anything that involved spending a lot of money was not approved by my uncle pretty much. It was to sell the compost in bulk.</i> <i>Pro-active: I consider myself having been a hard-working person and wanting to own that and being in the loader and running the screener for a week.</i>

Risk-taking

At Case E, there is evidence of risk-taking by the first generation: Thomas emigrated from his native country and purchased land in a suburb of Boston for the purpose of hybridising and propagating fruit trees and perennials. As he expanded the nursery, his son Ed joined him in hybridising exotic varieties of Rhododendrons and Azaleas. Ed had a talent for experimenting with new varieties, but hybridising required money and risk; his son Warren commented in interviews,

'He was never afraid to try them, and he wasn't afraid to fail, he just tried again if it didn't work and felt alive, but that's how you learn'.

Ed also expanded the business when the Massachusetts Turnpike took their land. The father and son moved their operations to a large farm located 30 miles outside Boston, where they could continue to hybridise and also produce vegetable crops for early shipment to Boston-area markets. More land was continually purchased adjacent to the original farm property, and in 1959, Case E opened its first retail garden centre.

In the late 1960s, Warren entered the business and introduced commercial distribution and landscape design. It was a risk, but the family produced 90–95% of what they grew for sales to the general public and general contractors building homes in and around Boston. Ed's second son, Rodney, also entered the business, but his appetite for risk-taking was strikingly different from his father's and brother's. Warren had a sense of urgency and was open to trying new things and willing to make mistakes. In contrast, Rodney did not do anything unless there was a carefully considered plan; he was hesitant to try new things, especially if they were proposed by Warren (Ward, 2004a).

Tim, a fourth-generation family member, joined the family firm and like his father he arguably had a sense of urgency and the ability to take risks and try new things. His uncle Rodney demanded that Tim start at the firm by spraying fields and doing manual work, but Tim resisted and ventured in composting and sales. In an interview, Tim commented about the composting venture,

'I wanted to know so I could show my uncle, mainly, and my dad that it was profitable or it wasn't'.

Further, Tim repeatedly suggested that his uncle could not and would not take risks at the parent family firm:

'Rodney was a nervous Nellie and it was his money, and should we spend his money, and he didn't trust me or believe me'.

Innovativeness

At Case E, innovativeness was shown in varieties of plants and variations on business as four generations ventured in the green industry. Thomas is credited with creating one of the earliest propagation nurseries in the US upon his arrival from Latvia. He is also credited with innovative new plant cultivars, varieties and methods to mechanise cultivation. His son Ed excelled in plant propagation and business. Ed's son Warren recalled,

'My father loved to innovate. One of the things that he always had in his mind was to mechanise cultivation ... He developed the hardening off system, so we could dig trees after they came into leaf by putting them under an intermittent mist system'.

Warren also remembered,

'Over the years, Ed introduced many new varieties of mountain laurels and rhododendrons, including a brilliant little dwarf plant he named "Broadleaf.".

While Warren seems to have envied his father's ability to innovate while expanding

operations, he also innovated in the green industry, and his son Tim commented in an interview,

'So he loved to try new ideas ... Sometimes it was a pain in the butt because he gets far-fetched ideas – sometimes, too crazy. He's an idea guy'.

Tim also generated ideas for the parent family firm, but his ideas were grounded in his education and experience away from the parent firm, selling for another horticultural distributor. At Case E, Tim innovated in composting (Case E5). In an interview, he remembered,

'So my idea was to turn it into an in-and-out type of operation where you can get paid on both ends'.

Tim's father, Warren, reflected in interviews on his son's innovation at the parent family firm:

'[Case E5] was an internal innovation for the nursery but it became part of the business as a product in the '90s; it was Tim who brought that to the business because he had enough experience to realise the value of it'.

Pro-activeness

It was arguably Thomas's pro-active nature that was responsible for beginning nursery operations in the 1930s and moving operations in 1946 to 300 acres of abandoned farmland in Hopkinton, about fifteen miles away. It was then Ed's pro-active and innovative nature that expanded horticultural production. His son Warren remembered in an interview,

'When my dad came into the business in '37-'38 he brought an interest in woody plants and landscaping and design'.

Warren also remembered that to expand operations,

'He was pretty innovative, worked hard, he motivated people by showing them what to do and then demand they do it'.

Upon the death of their father in 1986, Warren and Rodney jointly ran the operations at Case E. It was in Warren's nature to be pro-active and venture in the green industry in commercial sales and the expansion of existing operations. It was arguably in Rodney's nature to resist and delay any venturing activity. As his employees suggested, Rodney did not do anything unless there was a well-thought-out plan. The employees also stated that Rodney was,

'... conservative and pensive; he analysed a situation from every potential angle and loathed making a decision for fear it would be wrong'.

Tim, the fourth-generation family member, displayed a pro-active nature in a venture in composting. When he joined the parent firm in 1996, he had no defined position, as

his father and uncle were arguing about whether he should be part of the firm. Despite the delays and indecision, Tim ventured in composting and generated compost sales of nearly \$500,000 for the firm in the subsequent years. In a pro-active retort to his uncle, Tim remembered,

‘You hodgepodge it together, you make it work, you didn’t sit back and say, “here’s the five-year master plan and how are we doing tracking it?”’

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Table 9.78 reflects dimensions of EL in rhetorical reconstruction, strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning over 4 generations at Case E.

Table 9.78: Entrepreneurial Legacy at Case E

Construct	Case E, E1, E2, E3 → Case E4	Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 → Case E5
Strategic Education	<p><i>[Wally] They had both worked at the nursery ‘since they were old enough to waddle’</i></p> <p><i>[Warren] Our grandparents lived right on the farm and we lived across the street. Everything revolved around plants. Even on our vacations we were visiting gardens and nurseries.</i></p>	<p><i>[Warren] ‘Being a family business is just what we did – horticulture was a part of our lives. During grade school, I worked here all the time, deadheading plants, pruning, picking stones, propagating, cutting, growing seeds, putting in drainage’.</i></p>
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<p><i>[Warren] “My father said if we raise the plants, they will come.”</i></p> <p><i>[Warren] “My father was never afraid to try them, and he wasn’t afraid to fail, he just tried again . . .”</i></p> <p><i>[Warren] ‘[Tim] had worked for a number of years outside of the business learning these things and we were pretty enthusiastic that he was willing to come back ... and that was something that we thought would be very valuable and it’s proved to be’.</i></p>	<p><i>[Tim] ‘Everything I did was for the good of this company. What would frustrate me with my uncle is he didn’t trust me, and I felt like I was an extremely deserving-to-be-trusted person. I brought value to the company; he didn’t care’.</i></p>
Strategic Transitioning	<p><i>[Warren] ‘We’re here for the long term, we’re stewards of the land, and we want to be good citizens and treat our people well.’</i></p> <p><i>[Warren] My grandfather was absolutely entrepreneurial.</i></p>	<p><i>[Warren] We were farmers and just wanted to grow plants.</i></p>

Strategic Education

Ed joined the parent family firm in the 1930s, and he built upon the legacy his father had created and with a strategic education in landscape architecture and horticulture at college in New York. Thomas’s grandsons Warren and Rodney both received a strategic education while working at the nursery because, as their mother mentioned, ‘they had worked at the nursery since they were old enough to waddle’ (Ward, 2004a: 2). Warren benefitted from a strategic education while studying for a degree in

landscape architecture combined with an MBA from college in upstate New York like his father. Rodney spent only a short time at college and eventually graduated with an Associate's degree from a college in New Hampshire. Like his father an uncle, Tim remembered,

'Being a family business is just what we did – horticulture was a part of our lives. During grade school, I worked here all the time, deadheading plants, pruning, picking stones, propagating, cutting, growing seeds, putting in drainage'.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

Warren received entrepreneurial bridging from his father in the development of commercial sales and horticultural distribution centres, while his brother worked the fields and resisted attempts at venturing in new and untested areas. When Tim joined the family firm in 1996, he brought knowledge in composting and sales from his previous employment. His knowledge and experience, along with entrepreneurial bridging prompted his venturing activity in Case E5. Warren recalled in an interview,

'He had worked for a number of years outside of the business learning these things and we were pretty enthusiastic that he was willing to come back ... and that was something that we thought would be very valuable and it's proved to be'.

While Tim's father provided entrepreneurial bridging and transitioning to help his son venture at the parent family firm, his uncle made efforts to prevent or delay his entry into the firm and his attempts at venturing within the firm. Tim commented angrily,

'Everything I did was for the good of this company. What would frustrate me with my uncle is he didn't trust me, and I felt like I was an extremely deserving-to-be-trusted person. I brought value to the company; he didn't care'.

Strategic Transitioning

At Case E, there is an entrepreneurial legacy in the form of a rhetorical reconstruction of past achievements: people talk of Thomas's ability to overcome difficulties by emigrating from Latvia and starting his venture outside Boston, where, his grandson commented, the *'weather was always against us'*. Thomas persisted and expanded his operations, while his son continued to innovate in the green industry with the introduction of new cultivars and new ventures in design and retail. The father and son agreed that

'We're here for the long term, we're stewards of the land, and we want to be good citizens and treat our people well',

They attempted to transmit their philosophy to their sons and grandsons (Ward, 2004a: 2).

9.3.11 Categorised Munificence at Case E

Table 9.79 presents dimensions of organizational sponsorship at Case E. The data in this section reflects munificence from Case E, E1, E2, E3 to Case E4 in the first column and Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 to Case E5 in the second column.

Table 9.79: Dimensions of Organizational Sponsorship at Case E

Construct	Case E, E1, E2, E3 → Case E4	Case E, E1, E2, E3, E4 → Case E5
Field-building Activities	<p>[Warren] 'Even back then we were doing composting for the nursery.'</p> <p>[Warren] 'That particular business spread out our offering. We were able to do things in other businesses that we were now in competition with'</p> <p>[Warren] 'The term "environment" was something that I was pretty insistent on when I first came into the business because I could see the need for environmental awareness.'</p> <p>[Warren] 'He saw the need for expanding the palate of plant material realising that almost everything we were growing was from seed back then; clonal propagation was just beginning. He just sort of adapted it from what he learned from others.'</p>	<p>[Tim] 'Sometimes it was a pain in the butt because [Warren] gets far-fetched ideas sometimes, too crazy -- he's an idea guy.'</p> <p>[Warren] 'I was doing some marketing when I first came in and one of the things I had as a slogan was "Working with the environment to improve your lifestyle," . . . Composting was tied into the environment.'</p> <p>[Warren] 'I guess we had 600 or 700 acres when we finally finished the land clearing and kept the nursery operation going, but we were in the growing business, we were in composting -- even back then we were doing composting for the nursery.'</p> <p>[Warren] 'spent four months thinking of cost-saving and revenue-generating initiatives, one of which, a composting program.'</p>
Networking Activities	<p>[Warren] 'He joined the plant propagator's society and got to meet a lot of the innovators in nursery production'</p> <p>[Warren] 'we toured in some of the best nurseries we could find . . . we took Tim on a number of these trips and he could see some of the networks'</p> <p>[Warren] 'Our family, my dad in particular, enjoyed going to visit other places because that's a pretty good idea certainly and that's why we joined these various associations and we did a lot of touring around'</p> <p>[Warren] 'I became involved with the nursery associations and the broader picture type thing.'</p>	<p>[Tim] 'Introductions to wardens, cities and towns, people that they knew? I certainly think the interim CEO Gary Furst did that, my father did that.'</p> <p>[Tim] 'Dad's full of ideas all the time. So, he would definitely give me leads -- so would [CEO] Gary. He's well-connected to higher-up, wealthier-type people. Very helpful.'</p> <p>[Tim] 'Uncle -- definitely no, but my dad would meet somebody at a meeting because he's involved with all these different groups, and he'd pass the lead onto me. "I talked to this guy over dinner last night, he's very interested in compost".'</p>
Direct Support Activities	<p>[Warren] 'The Mass Pike took the nursery land in Weston eventually, and they could see this coming so that's why they knew they had to move out and they found this big farm in Hopkinton.'</p> <p>[Rodney] 'What Tim learned about horticulture he learned through us mostly, so just being here'</p> <p>[Rodney] 'Everything we bought had to have multiple reasons for purchasing it, it wasn't just that this loader would be used exclusively and then it would sit there if it wasn't being used for the composting site.'</p>	<p>[Warren] 'We said "No you don't want to work here right now even though we'd love to have you here. We want to have you get some practical experience outside of this family business because this is the type of thing that you can bring new ideas and different ways of looking at things and getting things done."'</p> <p>[Warren] 'When Tim first came into the business, we had made the decision to separate the commercial from the retail, physically, because we were trying to do commercial business out of our retail center. That didn't make sense.'</p> <p>[Tim] 'But [Warren] was there with me, pushing his network and his connections - trying to help for the right reasons.'</p>

Beginning with Thomas, generations at Case E provided munificence to new ventures. However, the data indicates conflict and disagreement in the third generation. While family and employees suggested that Warren was 'full of ideas' and always eager to sponsor venturing at the firm, Rodney said 'no' to new venture activity because of his conservative and arguably disagreeable nature. This section argues that the third generation's failure to consistently carry out sponsorship activities created a difficult and toxic environment in which to venture.

Field-building

When Ed joined his father in the 1930s through the 1940s, they aligned themselves with and engage with other professional horticulturalists and propagators where none existed before. In an interview, Ed's son Warren remembered his father joining others in the green industry field to venture in clonal propagation of plant material:

'He saw the need for expanding the palate of plant material realising that almost everything we were growing was from seed back then; clonal propagation was just beginning. He just sort of adapted it from what he learned from others'.

In 1984, Warren introduced a commercial yard in which builders and contractors could buy in bulk during a building boom outside Boston. To provide knowledge for new businesses, Warren attempted to align himself with and engage with others in the industry through associations and organisations, many of which he founded and/or presided over. In an interview, Warren remembered, *'I became involved with the nursery associations and the broader picture type thing'.*

Warren provided field-building activities when he introduced Tim to established green industry owners at Case A2 who were active in industrial-scale composting. Tim remembered in an interview,

'We want to have you get some practical experience outside of this family business because this is the type of thing that you can bring – new ideas and different ways of looking at things and getting things done.'

Tim finally joined the family firm in 1996 without a formal position, and Warren noted, he *'spent four months thinking of cost-saving and revenue-generating initiatives, one of which, a composting program'.*

Tim undertook the revenue-generating venture in composting in order to expand operations at Case E5. His uncle resisted, and in an interview, Tim remembered,

'During the time I brought the idea from my previous experiences that the composting could be much bigger ... So, my idea was that we could make that a profitable part, but anything that involved spending a lot of money was not approved by my uncle pretty much'.

Networking

At Case E, the parent firm began operations just before the Great Depression in 1927 and survived with a strong network of loyal customers who believed that *'if Case E doesn't have it, then no one has it'*. Thomas and Ed cultivated their network of wealthy individuals in New England as they expanded their operations and continued to venture. Networking activities on the part of the parent family firm provided munificence for new commercial operations among municipalities and builders who bought in bulk. Warren noted in an interview that Case E had a *'strong reputation'* with which to venture, despite the new competition that had sprung up with a housing boom outside Boston by 1984.

In 1996, when Tim joined the parent family firm and decided to venture in Case E5, he noted that

'Dad's full of ideas all the time. So, he would definitely give me leads – so would [CEO] Gary. He's well-connected to higher-up, wealthier-type people. Very helpful'.

He also noted that his father and others at the family firm made *'Introductions to wardens, cities and towns – people that they knew?'* However, he also commented, *'My uncle really wasn't connected so he didn't do that'*. To emphasise the discrepancies between his father and uncle in the level of networking activities, Tim stated,

'Uncle – definitely no, but my dad would meet somebody at a meeting because he's involved with all these different groups, and he'd pass the lead onto me. "I talked to this guy over dinner last night, he's very interested in compost"'.

Direct Support

According to employees, their style of direct support and management could be *'dictatorial'* at times, but it was always in support of the organisation (Ward, 2004). In an interview, Warren remembered,

'The Mass Pike took the nursery land in Weston eventually, and they could see this coming so that's why they knew they had to move out and they found this big farm in Hopkinton'.

Warren noted that the family firm was continually providing sponsorship in the form of direct support activities to at least seven profit centres by the 1980s. The family recognised the need to keep pace with growing competition in the green industry field, however, and Warren ventured again in commercial sales. Warren noted,

'We were in six or seven different businesses. Retail, landscaping, landscape design, compost. I think these business ideas all came from within the family; they saw a need for this aspect to be built out and they figured out a way to make it happen'.

His father and non-family employees directed support to the new venture, which immediately proved profitable during the building boom in and around Boston, but Rodney resisted. Rodney believed in withholding support for initiatives and ventures that would stretch Case E's assets and employees. In a letter to the board of Case E, Rodney expressed his concern:

'I have a different approach than Warren does to management. I am more conservative and less optimistic. I believe Warren's excessive optimism (especially in terms of sales potential for March) has worked to the Nursery's disadvantage' (Ward, 2004a: 17)

While Warren and Rodney continually bickered and backstabbed each other, Tim found his way at the firm and forged ahead with his venturing activity. His father and employees provided direct support and learning; his father commented, *'What Tim learned about horticulture he learned through us mostly, so just being here'*. Rodney, who believed his nephew had snubbed him when he declined the insect management post, did not support his nephew and often complicated simple issues like equipment purchases. Tim remembered,

'Everything we bought had to have multiple reasons for purchasing it, it wasn't just that this loader would be used exclusively and then it would sit there if it wasn't being used for the composting site'.

9.3.12 Categorized Dispositions at Case F

At Case F categorized dispositions exist in an EO and EL for the preservation of existing operations and development of new ideas and ventures in Case F1. In existing dispositions of an EO and EL at the parent family firm, there is arguably development of both dispositions among the next generation.

Entrepreneurial Orientation

This section suggests that Mike and his wife, Abby, imbued an EO and EL to their daughter, Joan, in the development of Case F1. The textual presentation of data below in *Table 9.80* provides EO data reflecting dispositions and dimensions of an EO among interviewees. Further textual analysis of the data suggests that EO exists within generations at Case F.

Table 9.80: Dimensions of an Entrepreneurial Orientation at Case F

EO	Mike	Joan
Risk-taking	<i>[Mike] Going forwards as a company, we would like to build back up to about 100 units per annum.</i>	<i>[Mike] Joan is the major shareholder in Case F1</i> <i>[Joan] “Dad and I both wanted it to be my business rather than something that was part of Case F.”</i>
Innovativeness	<i>[Mike] So we’re innovating to try and basically meet the marketplace.</i> <i>[Mike] “And looking at what had already been established in wee homes for the Building Skills Initiative, I thought maybe this could work.”</i> <i>[Mike] “[Case F1] is something that we have shared and we have developed the idea.”</i>	<i>[Mike] Well she takes on board what her education has provided her with.</i> <i>[Mike] “We realized that perhaps our main market could be in these more difficult to reach areas like the Scottish Highlands and Islands which are really difficult for people to get houses built at affordable prices.”</i>
Pro-activeness	<i>[Mike] I would have – I’m not that long in the tooth that I’m not wanting to sit up and listen to good ideas.</i> <i>[Mike] It is something that we have shared and developed the idea. Case F1 develops small timber houses and indeed Joan was looking for a place to live and she now lives in one in our garden.</i>	<i>[Mike] And on top of that I just think she’s got this determination to – because I think in business you need somebody that’s really determined. She thinks through to the advantage.</i> <i>[Mike] Joan’s entrepreneurial spirit is immense - her energy. She has huge energy levels; she’s young - she’ll be a great entrepreneurial spirit.</i> <i>[Mike] She applies processes where she will review ongoing progress of projects with a view to improvement, creating and generating improvement, generating improvement in revenues, etc.</i>

At Case F and Case F1 categorized dispositions exist at the parent family firm in an EO of risk-taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness. While father, Mike, has demonstrated dispositions in all dimensions of EO, the data suggests that he has also imbued dispositions in an EO to his daughter, Joan, as she attempted to venture at the parent firm. Joan ventured in marketing and sales of very small homes to Glasgow area residents who have a limited budget or limited need for a large living space.

Risk-taking

While Case F has an established a record for risk-taking in the home-building field, risk presented issues for the parent family firm in 2009 when recession in the UK severely restricted home-building. As Mike noted in interviews, home-building peaked

at about 100 units per year before recession then dropped to fewer than 10 units per year between 2008 and 2014. Since recession the parent family firm has added risk and increased land holdings for development and building activity while increasing building activity to 40 homes per annum. However, in interviews Mike commented, *'Going forwards as a company, we would like to build back up to about 100 units per annum.'*

Upon her graduation she undertook a clerical role with the parent family firm while she developed her father's idea in tiny homes construction. Joan understood she was accepting risk with the new venture, and she commented in interviews, *"Dad and I both wanted it to be my business rather than something that was part of Case F."* Further, in interviews her father, Mike, noted that, *"Joan is the major shareholder in Case F1."*

Innovativeness

In recent years Mike introduced the educational programs to teach Glasgow young adults building skills. British dignitaries visited and expressed approval of the initiative as an innovative program for the local population to learn the building trade. Mike recalled in interviews,

"And looking at what had already been established in Case F for the Building Skills Initiative, I thought maybe this could work."

From this initiative Mike developed the idea for construction of 'tiny' homes; he communicated, *"So we're innovating to try and basically meet the marketplace."* While the market was young adults and senior citizens, he quickly understood that there was a market in hard to reach places with few building alternatives. In interviews he noted,

"We realized that perhaps our main market could be in these more difficult to reach areas like the Scottish Highlands and Islands which are really difficult for people to get houses built at affordable prices."

With an innovative disposition which Mike arguably imbued in his daughter, Joan, father and daughter shared in the innovation and development of the idea in Case F1. As Joan noted in interviews, *"[Case F1] is something that we have shared, and we have developed the idea."* Overall, Joan believed that her family, particularly her father, innovated, and she commented, *"Yes, I would say they are pretty innovative."*

Pro-activeness

In a pro-active nature Mike developed Case F arguably with an entrepreneurial mind set. His daughter, Joan, commented in interviews, *"I would say my dad is probably the most entrepreneurial of the three directors."* In a pro-active disposition, Mike repeatedly ventured to revive existing operations at Case F while developing new opportunities for his daughter to venture in Case F1. In interviews Mike discussed his daughter's pro-active nature by commenting,

"And on top of that I just think she's got this determination too – because I think in business you need somebody that's really determined. She thinks through to the advantage."

Further, Joan commented in interviews that it was arguably her pro-active nature that drew her to business and venturing at the parent family firm. She commented, *“I knew I probably wanted to start up my own business.”*

Entrepreneurial Legacy

While generational data in a rhetorical reconstruction of past entrepreneurial achievements is limited at Case F, there is data in Table 9.81 to support dimensions of strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning for Joan and her venture in Case F1.

Table 9.81: Dimensions of an Entrepreneurial Legacy at Case F

Construct	Case F → Case F1
Strategic Education	<i>[Mike] We have worked to develop a small house-building company and that has been running for approximately 24 years.</i> <i>[Mike] “Well she takes on board what her education has provided her with.”</i>
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<i>[Joan] “I think he’s certainly always looking for new opportunities and thinking about things a wee bit differently.”</i> <i>[Joan] “And I think they just wanted both my brother and I to kind of get an idea of what it was like to run your own business and the pitfalls and anything that’s going on.”</i>
Strategic Transitioning	<i>[Joan] Yes. We’re open to tackling projects that other folk might set aside.</i>

Strategic Education

At Case F strategic education existed in understanding that Joan could find her own way toward the parent family firm. While her education included a strong desire to act in London, she returned to a small university in Glasgow to complete her education in marketing and entrepreneurship. Her father commented, *“Well she takes on board what her education has provided her with.”* Upon graduation her parents provided strategic education in her clerical role at the parent family firm. Joan’s mother offered sales and marketing skills while her father and uncle provided technical and management skills.

Entrepreneurial Bridging

In entrepreneurial bridging Joan’s parents provided her and her brother, John, with a sense of what it was like to venture. In interviews, Joan recalled,

“And I think they just wanted both my brother and I to kind of get an idea of what it was like to run your own business and the pitfalls and anything that’s going on.”

Further, her father, Mike, actively engaged in the development of the venture to provide technological support and direction for Case F1. Joan remembered,

“I think he’s certainly always looking for new opportunities and thinking about things a wee bit differently.”

Strategic Transitioning

In strategic transitioning Joan has borrowed from the legacy of her father while also borrowing from successes and failures at Case F to develop key resources including the parent family firm's desire to, *'tackle projects that other folk might set aside.'* Resources also include knowledge of the local building trade and knowledge of development codes and restrictions to provide Case F1 with the ability to overcome a liability of newness and acquire legitimacy (Stinchcombe, 1965, Flynn, 1993a)

9.3.13 Categorized Munificence at Case F

At Case F organisational sponsorship activities in field-building, networking and direct support arguably acts as a catalyst to propel the new venture forward (Amezcuca et al., 2013). Table 9.82 below presents categorized data in table format for further analysis in this section.

Table 9.82: Dimensions of Organisational Sponsorship at Case F

<p>Field-building Activities</p>	<p><i>[Mike] Field-building: We realized that perhaps our main market could be in these more difficult to reach areas like the Scottish Highlands and Islands which are really difficult for people to get houses built at affordable prices</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Field-building: The business idea evolved from that process and also from a process Hope Homes Scotland are building a traditional village nearby</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Field-building: So that idea has grown between Joan and ourselves and so between Case F and Hope Homes Scotland Limited and that is how the process has evolved and Joan's now taken a lead role in it.</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] Field-building: And I think that gives people a wee bit of confidence that we're not just a start-up company and things could go wrong because, you know, a house is the biggest purchase that most people make in their life; so, it's a big deal.</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] "I'm not that long in the tooth that I'm not wanting to sit up and listen to good ideas from others."</i></p>
<p>Networking Activities</p>	<p><i>[Mike] Networking: We involved the two local academies to send students, and one project we decided to do to create an interest in the project was to build a small timber house that was in modular format and could be transported elsewhere.</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Networking: I would go and help her and introduce her to somebody, and we both sat and discussed the project with him.</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] "So I'm not big on that, I'm not big on networking and that nature like industry conventions, etc. In fact, I don't do it."</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] "I really don't do a lot of that, and I would say that's probably... like Dad's not really into doing stuff like that - industry associations and the like."</i></p>
<p>Direct Support Activities</p>	<p><i>[Joan] Direct support: And that kind of takes a lot of experience that Dad has because they've worked on plenty of different sites like that. And also, he kind of takes care of the building process itself and managing the workforce.</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Direct support: she's asked me to come on board and help with our - well, mainly because of technical knowledge.</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Direct support: Joan had asked me to come along and look at a particular development site. For example, last week we visited a site on the West Coast of Scotland and I was there to one: assess the site technically, two: to gauge the interaction that we can develop between ourselves and the customer</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Direct support: But also, as kind of a sounding board for the strategy for the business, finances, basically everything. I'd say the only thing that I don't really kind of rely on of any sort is to kind of probably the kind of marketing and PR side of it</i></p> <p><i>[Mike] Direct support: I'm there to advise - not to direct.</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] Direct support: It is something that we have shared and developed the idea.</i></p> <p><i>[Joan] "Well certainly he has experience in the building trade, to the hilt. I really don't think that we would have been able to set up a business like this without the backing of Dad's experience and the backing of Case F."</i></p>

Field-building Activities

Data suggests Mike resisted opportunities to align and engage Case F1 with other new organisations in home-building to protect his new and innovative idea; data also suggests that he resisted opportunities to align and engage with other new organisations because he believed Case F1 represented a legacy for himself and his daughter given high accolades from the Prince of England and others. However, in interviews, Mike commented that, *“I’m not that long in the tooth that I’m not wanting to sit up and listen to good ideas from others.”* His daughter, Joan, remembered family weekends visiting competitor custom homes. She commented,

“When I was younger, a lot of the time, there was that kind of period where a lot of weekends we’d go and see all the building companies’ show homes.”

Networking Activities

In interviews, Mike admitted his disdain for associations and clubs when he commented in interviews,

“So I’m not big on that, I’m not big on networking and that nature like industry conventions, etc. In fact, I don’t do it.”

In interviews, his daughter, Joan, confirmed her dislike and her father’s dislike for field-building activities. She commented,

“I really don’t do a lot of that, and I would say that’s probably...like Dad’s not really into doing stuff like that - industry associations and the like.”

Direct Support Activities

At Case F1 direct support activities included a transfer of knowledge from Mike to the new venture. In interviews Joan recalled how important it was to have experience, knowledge and support from her father and the parent family firm. She commented,

“Well certainly he has experience in the building trade, to the hilt. I really don’t think that we would have been able to set up a business like this without the backing of Dad’s experience and the backing of Case F.”

Mike repeatedly commented that his daughter asked for his *‘technical knowledge’*. In interviews he included several examples of transfer.

“Well for example, Joan and I would – Joan had asked me to come along and look at a particular development site. For example, last week we visited a site on the West Coast of Scotland and I was there to number one, assess the site technically.”

While Mike commented emphatically that *“I’m there to advise, not to direct”* at Case F1, he also believed it was his responsibility to act as mentor in the development of new ideas and direction at the new venture. He remembered,

I was offering some wherewithal mentoring to try and help develop ideas, and I don’t think there is any substitute for experience, and hence, I would like to

share that experience as well as opportunities to develop during a period working in the construction industry.”

9.3.14 Categorised Dispositions at Case G

Entrepreneurial Orientation

At Case G categorised dispositions exist at the parent family firm in an EO in dimensions of risk-taking, innovativeness and pro-activeness. However, Donald has arguably restricted dispositions in an EO with tight control and oversight of existing operations and venturing activity at the parent family firm. Table 9.83 presents EO data reflecting dispositions and behaviour of interviewees, this section continues with a textual analysis of the data on EO at the parent family firm.

Table 9.83 Entrepreneurial Orientation at Case G

EO	David	Jake	Daniel
Pro-activeness	<p>[Donald] I kept my eyes open to things I saw people doing correctly . . .</p> <p>[Donald] I think the biggest thing we did and the reason we're still here is you can't play the same game as the box stores do</p>	<p>[Jake] "I wouldn't say that we're at odds over the future of the company, but we think differently.</p>	<p>[Daniel] It's hard to find large lilacs . . . and we can grow lilac around here; it's hardly enough. Why can't I throw in 1000 or 5000 lilacs and turn them around in 3-4 years?</p> <p>[Daniel] Donald doesn't think that way with growing. I think that way.</p>
Risk-taking	<p>[Donald] I got into a business of my own probably just because of the freedom and economic opportunities.</p> <p>[Daniel] "[Donald] doesn't take risk – he tried to avoid that as much as he can."</p>	<p>[Jake] "My dad is very interested in making money for himself. But, it is his business. He's tough."</p>	<p>[Daniel] I would like to buy property, and I would like to grow.</p> <p>[Daniel] it's all part of the nursery - Not a separate name, not a separate profit centre.</p>
Innovativeness	<p>[Donald] I wouldn't say it was planned to be from the start, that's something that just happened almost by chance.</p> <p>[Donald] I took a lot of what I saw that he had done and either adopted it or modified it in some manner.</p>	<p>[Jake] "I've learned a lot more from my father as a son than I have as a boss.</p>	<p>[Daniel] I definitely have interest in doing stuff like patenting day lilies, I just at this time don't have the time to do it or haven't made the time to do it because my energy and everything I have goes into this business.</p>

Risk-taking

In a dimension of risk-taking Donald started Case G with only an idea and some guidance from a college classmate and mentor who owned a garden centre. Donald risked finances and reputation at an early age. Over time Donald expanded nursery operations to service both retail and wholesale customers. He also risked operations by receiving green goods in fall months. Green goods often died during winter months above ground at Case G, but Donald subscribed to the advantage of additional discounting and cost-savings with each fall delivery. As Donald planned transition of the parent family firm, both his son, Jake, and his general manager, Daniel, complained frequently in interviews that Donald seemed unwilling to support their ideas and take risk. In interviews, Daniel commented, “[Donald] doesn’t take risk – he tried to avoid that as much as he can.”

Donald’s son, Jake, returned to Case G from previous work in auto parts inventory and management. Jake returned to the parent family firm with his own ideas about updates to irrigation systems, inventory management systems and existing operations. Further, Jake hoped to partner with Daniel to change and expand operations at the parent family firm in tree services, contracting and growing. With little support toward venturing in tree services, contracting and growing, Jake and Daniel arguably lost their appetite for risk at Case G. In interviews they expressed frustration at lack of support from Donald. Jake pointedly remarked, “My dad is very interested in making money for himself. But, it is his business. He’s tough.”

Innovativeness

In a dimension of innovativeness Donald has developed innovative methods in accounting, purchasing, sales to build his business. In accounting Donald proudly noted, “I do a hybrid cash/accrual-based accounting” to suggest innovative accounting methods in the green industry. In purchasing Donald expressed satisfaction that he received high discounts from vendors for early payment and fall shipping of green goods. In sales Donald formed formal partnership with contractors allowing them to send retail customers to the yard for service. He commented in interviews, “Contractors feel that they can send their customers in here to look at things because everything’s priced retail.”

While Daniel and Jake expressed innovative tendencies in their desire to, “do stuff like patenting Daylilies” and “grow[ing] lilacs around here, it’s hardly enough”, neither acted on their disposition toward innovativeness at the parent family firm.

Pro-activeness

In a pro-active dimension of an EO Donald started Case G, as he suggested, “probably just because of the freedom and economic opportunities.” At the parent family firm Donald was pro-active with an eye toward opportunity for himself. In interviews he commented,

“I kept my eyes open about things I saw people do correctly.” However, Donald’s son, Jake commented that ideas abound at the parent family firm but few are enacted.

“My dad offers prospective ideas, but he never goes through with them. I would like to see more than ideas.”

Donald and Daniel also expressed a pro-active nature, but they arguably seemed reluctant to be pro-active under the auspices of Donald. In interviews both commented that they think differently than Donald, and they are often reluctant to be pro-active given new opportunities. Jake commented, *“I wouldn’t say that we’re at odds over the future of the company, but we think differently.”* Further, Daniel and Jake noted Donald often expressed support but inaction.

Entrepreneurial Legacy

Dispositions also exist at the parent firm in an EL suggesting dimensions of strategic education, entrepreneurial bridging and strategic transitioning; further, there are dimensions of an EL in rhetorical reconstruction of past achievements and failures. However, this section suggests that dimensions of an EL are often reflected in control of operations and venturing. Table 9.84 presents data in EL as it relates to dimensions of the construct. This section presents further analysis of the construct in textual analysis.

Table 9.84 Dispositions in an EL at Case G

Construct	Case G	Case G → Case G1
Strategic Education	<i>[Donald]</i> "If I were a mentor, I'd teach gross/net, one thing that's huge especially if you're trying to buy and sell because that's where the money is."	<i>[Jake]</i> "I've learned a lot of things not to do from my father." <i>[Jake]</i> "I've learned a lot more from my father as a son than I have as a boss."
Entrepreneurial Bridging	<i>[Donald]</i> A certain amount of it is sentiment, I'd like to see the business keep going. <i>[Daniel]</i> "[Donald] likes to keep everything under his thumb."	<i>[Jake]</i> "My dad offers prospective ideas, but he never goes through with them. I would like to see more than ideas." <i>[Daniel]</i> Donald's going to be a huge resource for me . . . All he has to do is say 'no'. If he says 'no', then no is no, and I find another option. I'm not afraid to ask Donald.
Strategic Transitioning	<i>[Donald]</i> "I see the transition as being an evolution where I'm going to evolve out more and more, which I've been doing for several years anyways." <i>[Daniel]</i> "I'm assuming Donald wanted his sons to take it over, and I can see his kids coming in and just being frustrated with him because he just won't let go and getting angry and just being like, 'get out of here!'"	<i>[Jake]</i> "He seems very open to it, but when it comes down to brass tacks, he - it never happens." <i>[Jake]</i> "This kind of thing is more than 15 years in the making that my dad should have stepped away. It baffles me sometimes." <i>[Daniel]</i> "[Donald] needs to step to the side as far as I'm concerned." <i>[Donald]</i> "About six or seven years ago I started turning over bits and pieces to Donald." <i>[Donald]</i> 'I think at some point I will be in the background.'

At Case G dimensions of an EL in strategic education arguably failed when Jake informed his parents that it was his choice to leave college and find his way working as a labourer at local establishments or at the parent family firm. Jake commented, "I've learned a lot of things not to do from my father." Jake also commented with frustration, "I've learned a lot more from my father as a son than I have as a boss." Daniel also left his education to join a competitive nursery then Case G, but he claimed in interviews that strategic education came from his grandfather and his previous employer.

In a dimension of entrepreneurial bridging Donald expressed support for bridging any new venture, but Daniel noted, "He seems very open to it, but when it comes down to brass tacks, he - it never happens." Donald tightly controlled operations and venturing activity at the parent family firm and he greeted new opportunities with lukewarm

enthusiasm and little support. Both Daniel and Jake suggested in interviews that, “[Donald] likes to keep everything under his thumb.”

Strategic transition arguably existed only in promises from Donald. In interviews Donald suggested strategic transition by noting, ‘About six or seven years ago I started turning over bits and pieces to Donald.’ He commented further, ‘I think at some point I will be in the background.’ However, transition timeframes come and go with Donald repeating his assertion that,

“I see the transition as being an evolution where I'm going to evolve out more and more, which I've been doing for several years anyways.”

In frustration Jake commented, “Daniel could have been running this place a long time ago.” In a reflection of long delayed strategic transition Jake also understood that,

“This kind of thing is more than 15 years in the making that my dad should have stepped away. It baffles me sometimes.”

Daniel also expressed hope but frustration in interviews when he commented, “[Donald] needs to step to the side as far as I'm concerned. Daniel elaborated by commenting on the frustration Donald's sons likely felt about strategic transition.

“I'm assuming Donald wanted his sons to take it over, and I can see his kids coming in and just being frustrated with him because he just won't let go and getting angry and just being like, ‘get out of here!’”

9.3.15 Categorized Munificence at Case G

Categorized munificence in activities of field-building, networking and direct support are limited at Case G arguably due to lack of commitment from Donald to formally transition the firm and lack of action from Donald to support venturing at the firm. Table 9.85 provides data of sponsorship activities which arguably support success at the parent family firm and seemingly repress venturing at the parent family firm. This section also includes textual analysis of organisational sponsorship at Case G.

Table 9.85 Organisational Sponsorship at Case G

Construct	Case G	Case G → Case G1
Field-building Activities	<p>[Jake] Field-building: “[Donald] didn’t expand elsewhere because he believed it would compete with his customers.”</p> <p>[Donald] Field-building: I’m trying to involve [Daniel] into more of that but at the same time continue to do a fair amount of it myself because it’s something I enjoy.</p>	<p>[Jake] Field-building: “[Donald] thinks growing is a headache, and it’s easier to bring in native shrubs from wherever. He doesn’t want to have that kind of overhead.”</p> <p>[Donald] Field-building: I use him as a sounding board for some decisions I make sometimes</p>
Networking Activities	<p>[Daniel] Networking: I’m more plant person, and that’s why I think that we work is he’s got the financial part down</p> <p>[Jake] Networking: Donald, “is not a people person.”</p> <p>[Donald] Networking: “I’ve typically not joined groups. I’ve had people suggest that I should be part of different groups over the years, but I think a lot of it’s a waste of time.”</p>	<p>[Donald] Networking: I still enjoy working with the suppliers. I’m trying to bring Daniel into that too and most of my suppliers are familiar with dealing with him also.</p>
Direct support Activities	<p>[Donald] Direct support: I like to buy and I’m good at buying and selling. I think at some point I will be in the background.</p> <p>[Daniel] Direct support: I feel that I’m a very calm person and Donald has learned from me</p>	<p>[Daniel] Direct support: Donald helped me understand sales negotiations. I think Donald can help with growing with his background in real estate</p> <p>[Donald] Direct support: I’m using my credibility to give him credibility.</p> <p>[Daniel] Direct support: “I will take any support or resources Donald will offer, within reason, but Donald’s a control freak and it’s tough sometimes with him.”</p> <p>[Daniel] Direct support: “I feel like if he doesn’t let go of those things while he’s still here (and there’s things I know he does that I don’t even know that he does), that’s where I feel like I’m unprepared.”</p>

Field-building Activities

In field-building activities which align and engage ventures with other ventures, Jake commented in interviews that, “[Donald] didn’t expand elsewhere because he believed it would compete with his customers.” Jake and Daniel also commented that Donald’s competitive nature prohibited alignment and engagement for the firm and possible new ventures. Consequently, Donald arguably limited field-building activities with close-minded communication and a competitive attitude. Jake also commented that his father limited field-building activities by suggesting easier and simpler alternatives to venturing. In interviews Jake commented,

“[Donald] thinks growing is a headache, and it’s easier to bring in native shrubs from wherever. He doesn’t want to have that kind of overhead.”

Networking Activities

In networking activities Donald commented repeatedly that in transition he would pass his grower network to Daniel. Horticultural distribution involves extensive grower networks to provide a wide assortment of green-goods, and Donald possessed a strong but limited grower network which he developed over many years through careful cultivation. Typically, in the green industry operators develop existing business and new business grower associations at networking events, but in interviews Donald commented emphatically,

“I’ve typically not joined groups. I’ve had people suggest that I should be part of different groups over the years, but I think a lot of it’s a waste of time.”

Both Daniel and Jake suggested Donald, *“is not a people person.”* Both also believed grower associations and networking groups were a waste of time, and they have limited inventory possibilities as well as venturing possibilities with their limited networking.

Direct Support Activities

In direct support activities Donald supported Daniel and Jake in existing operations, but a high level of control from Donald created a high level of ‘unpreparedness’ for Daniel. In interviews he reflected,

“I feel like if he doesn’t let go of those things while he’s still here (and there’s things I know he does that I don’t even know that he does), that’s where I feel like I’m unprepared.”

Daniel and Jake also commented in interviews that Donald provides direct support which includes a very controlling nature. As such, Donald provided direct support in resources and opportunities for existing operations, but direct support also included intensive scrutiny and control over existing operations. In interviews, Daniel commented,

“I will take any support or resources Donald will offer, within reason, but Donald’s a control freak and it’s tough sometimes with him.”