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PART IV: TRANSFORMING HEIDEGGER'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

CHAPTER ONE

By degrees, it should become apparent that Heidegger's criticism of Descartes, Kant and Husserl, despite all evidence to the contrary, does not justify the inference that the author of Being and Time, renounced transcendental philosophy. In fact, Heidegger is principally concerned to re-invigorate the dominant tradition by incorporating many of the themes and acceding to many of the criticisms that propelled the immediate intellectual reaction to Hegel's essentialism. With Heidegger's existentialism, an attempt is made, on behalf of the dominant tradition, to address a crop of issues previously placed in parenthesis by transcendental philosophy. Through Heidegger, academic philosophy makes propitiatory gestures towards the rebels and exiles of nineteenth century thought: towards Schopenhauer, Feuerbach, Marx, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche. However, if Heidegger confers a formal philosophic value on the themes of anxiety, resentment, reification and alienation, his main aim in so doing (though this remains to be demonstrated) is to restore the composure, and the hegemony, of transcendental enquiry. In this respect, there is a significant discrepancy that needs to be scrutinized between Heidegger's existentialism and that original revulsion to Hegel's essentialism. At the risk of making the point too stridently, it is as though Heidegger's existentialism was intended to disarm and co-opt certain influential, oppositional undercurrents; it is

as if Heidegger negotiates a trade-off in which the original existentialist impulse gains respectability, while transcendental enquiry, for its part, becomes increasingly representative of the urge to philosophize, to utter the truth.

Reviewing the History of Ontology

The immediate theoretical pretext for Heidegger's Being and Time, was his perception of a need to conduct "a destructive retrospect of the history of ontology."[1] (From an historicist standpoint Heidegger was conducting a post mortem on the remains of the rationalist tradition, as a precondition for the resurrection of transcendental enquiry.) In strictly theoretical terms (in his own terms) however, Heidegger undertook to supply the ontology of the subject which rationalism had neglected to supply. This led him to turn the Cartesian framework, within which his predecessors had been confined, inside-out and upside-down. First of all in this respect, Heidegger's reconstruction depended upon an attempt to undo the mischievous influence of Descartes' misplaced rationalism, of his precept, the 'cogito sum.' "With the 'cogito sum'" says Heidegger, Descartes had claimed that he was putting philosophy on a new and firm footing. But what he left undetermined when he began in this 'radical' way, was the kind of Being which belonged to the res cogitans or - more precisely - the meaning of the Being of the 'sum'."[2] Descartes, and those who subsequently endorsed his position, evaded the

ontological question implicit in the 'cogito sum.' As a result, Heidegger declares: "The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for philosophizing has revealed itself as the implantation of a baleful prejudice, which has kept later generations from making any thematic ontological analytic of the 'mind.'[3]"

Regretfully, for Heidegger, Descartes "leaves the 'sum' completely undiscussed, even though it is regarded as no less primordial than the cogito."[4] With the promulgation of the commonplace misrepresentation of his dictum in the form "cogito ergo sum,' Heidegger further maintains, Descartes' silence has become the source of serious misunderstanding. 'Cogito sum,' the argument runs, cannot support the contention that thought is more fundamental than existence. "Cogito ergo sum" the base conceptual currency, "suggests concerning the relation of subject and predicate "that it is here a question of inference;"[5] it implies that given the possibility of thought, the contingent possibility of physical existence may be surmised. What it is actually reasonable to propose with regard to the relation of cogito and sum, Heidegger suggests is merely this, that :" In 'I posit', the 'I' as the positer is co- and pre- posited as that which is already present."[6] In other words, and this is the principal precept of Heidegger's existential analytic, the precondition of knowledge of the world is the circumstance that Dasein is constitutionally Being-in-the World.

Against Kant, Heidegger's constant complaint is that he appropriated the dualistic Cartesian ontology, uncritically. The upshot was that in Kant subjectivity was equated with the categories of consciousness; and at the same time the Cartesian ontology was retained objectively in that Kant comprehended Nature spatially or as extended matter. Located outside or above the spatial domain was the transcendental subject whose externality, whose noumenal superordinacy, became the basic condition for the possibility of knowledge. What is significant for Heidegger in the Kantian formulation, is its unavoidable collapse, in its extreme form where the mind-body dichotomy is affirmed, into solipsism, and in the less idiotic variant which maintains the distinction between noumenon and phenomenon, into the problem of nominalism. In connection with the fallacy of solipsism, Heidegger says this: "The question whether there is a world at all and whether its Being can be proved, makes no sense at all if it is raised by Dasein as Being-in-the-World; and who else would raise it ?"[7] Dismissing the problem of nominalism, Heidegger reiterates his fundamental principle that: "an understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure."[8] That is, Heidegger repudiates the dualistic ontology which locates the subject of knowledge outside the sphere of phenomenal inquiry; and which condemns it to dependence upon epistemological forms which provide a nomenclature for experience, but which must reluctantly let the material substratum of the world escape comprehension.

It would have been enough in order to avoid the problem of nominalism, Heidegger explains, if Kant had accepted that there is always, and as its indispensable precondition, an ontological premiss for every epistemological subject, and an existential residuum for every ontology.[9]

At its climax, Heidegger's review of the history of ontology takes issue with, and offers an alternative to, Hegel's resolution of the Kantian problem of nominalism. Against Hegel, Heidegger maintains that: "existence is not the realization of an essence."[10] The assault on Hegel, which remains largely implicit in Being and Time and which is elaborated spasmodically later, is nevertheless what provides thematic unity even in Being and Time. For Heidegger, it is in the Hegelian system that philosophy's failure to supply an ontology of Dasein becomes recognizably an existential problem: it is there that logical excesses become implicated in reality and are shown to have historical significance. In other words, in Hegel's philosophy, Heidegger believes, the relation between Dasein and Being established by modern metaphysics, in particular by mathematical science, becomes visibly pathogenic. When Hegel conceptualizes existence as the externalization of an essence, he sanctions the purpose of metaphysics intent upon subordinating Being to the rule of a Concept.[11] Being and Time protested at the incipient reifying tendency in Kant: which lies in the equation of subjectivity and the categories of thought.

(The categories, says Heidegger, encompass things not persons). In his later writings, Heidegger explicitly extended his critique of reification to include the historical tendency of metaphysics (i.e. science and technology) to dictate the structure of the relation of Dasein and Being. Heidegger's existentialism is thus at its most general level of significance, i.e. as an existentialism; an attempt to resolve philosophical difficulties that came to light in the Hegelian camp, where they were designated as reification and alienation. In his critique of instrumental reason, for example, where these themes are brought into alignment, Heidegger means to explain that in imposing an essentialist construction upon the world, rationalist metaphysics had ensured the estrangement of Dasein and Being. Most emphatically, however, Heidegger proposed a resolution of the existential problems in question whose precondition was repudiation of the metaphysics exalted and put into practice from the time of Descartes. For a third time, in fact, Heidegger insists that it is imperative that philosophy should be re-consolidated on the premisses attendant upon the fundamental circumstance of Dasein's Being-in-the-World.

Returning to the problem of Nominalism

Reviewing the history of rationalist metaphysics, Heidegger is perturbed by its persistent reticence with regard to the question of Being. In particular, Being and Time reacts against Hegel and his definition of the objective

correlate of the Category of Being as Nothingness. For Heidegger, however, a truly radical philosophy would be one that posed the ontological question. Accordingly, where Husserl's maxim had been: "to the things themselves;"[12] Heidegger returned to the phenomenological project by announcing: "The question of the meaning of Being must be formulated."[13] Methodologically, Heidegger maintains the theme of Being becomes intelligible where it is appreciated that: "Inquiry itself is the behaviour of a questioner, and therefore of an entity, and as such has its own character of Being."[14] More expansively, the possibilility of addressing the question of Being is made out like this: "The very asking of this question is an entity's mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is enquired about - namely, Being. This entity which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being, we shall denote by the term "Dasein." If we are to formulate our question explicitly and transparently, we must first give a proper explication of an entity (Dasein) with regard to its Being."[15]

In short, Heidegger completely overhauls the dominant tradition from Descartes to Husserl. Most emphatically, however, he returns to the problem of nominalism manufactured by Descartes and Kant and he rejects the solution to that problem proposed by Hegel. In other words, the main intention of Heidegger's critique of the

history of rationalist ontology is to dissolve the Cartesian dualism and to supplant the Hegelian philosophy of history as the most extravagant expression of an original subjectivist conceit. With this purpose in mind, Heidegger reassesses the significance of Descartes' contribution thus: "If the 'cogito sum' is to serve as the point of departure for the existential analytic of Dasein, then it needs to be turned around, and furthermore its content needs new ontologico-phenomenal confirmation. The 'sum' is then asserted first, and indeed in the sense that 'I am in the World'....".[16] For Heidegger, Descartes was correct to ground the possibility of philosophy in the individual, but wrong to minimise the indispensibility, as far as the nature of thought is concerned, of the subject's existential status. Making the same point, at a later date Heidegger declares: "The sum is not a consequence of thinking, but vice versa; it is the ground of thinking, the 'fundamentum.'"[17] The most elementary assertion made by Heidegger is that Dasein is Being-in-the-World. Neglect of this circumstance is characteristic of the whole rationalist tradition. In Descartes' thought, this generic weakness manifests itself as an inability to recognise that what has primacy in ontological terms, where Dasein is concerned, is not the cogito but the sum.

Plainly, for Heidegger, Kant's uncritical assimilation of the Cartesian dualism ensured the germination of the problem of nominalism. Because Kant neglected to

extemporize an ontology of Dasein, opting instead to continue to dichotomize the res cogitans and the world, transcendental enquiry was compelled to relinquish the question of Being: to declare the "thing-in-itself" as ineffable otherness. Kant conceptualized the subject as consciousness and its categorial content. Ontologically, he was equipped to know only what the categories of consciousness could relay and represent: which is to say philosophy was trapped in nominalism. Heidegger's rejoinder is that: "Dasein is never 'proximally' an entity which is, so to speak, free from Being-in, but which sometimes has the inclination to take up a 'relationship' towards the world."[18] Similarly, to restrict the number of instances to two, he says: "a bare subject without a world never 'is' proximally, nor is it ever given."[19] On the one hand, Heidegger is at pains to stress that the knowing subject cannot be situated outside the world, so that:"the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it."[20] On the other hand, whenever some concept of a thinking subject is postulated, some conception of the subject as an existential possibility is, whether explicitly or not, also invoked. Moreover, in Heidegger's estimation it is the very circumstance that the enquiring subject cannot be situated outside the world, but that it must necessarily exist as an entity in the world, that is the real precondition of knowledge.

Knowledge is always the knowledge of Dasein. Being can be comprehended in Dasein, as a consequence of Dasein's Being-in-the-World. The phenomenological question must be pursued by means of an existential analytic of Dasein, or to put it another way: an understanding of Being belongs to Dasein's ontological structure.[21] At this stage Heidegger introduces a major revision to the logic of transcendental enquiry: he relegates the categories of reason, and transfers the role of explanans (explanatory principles) to what he calls "existentialia." By way of definition there is this statement: "Because Dasein's characters of Being are defined in terms of existentiality, we call them 'existentialia.' These are to be sharply distinguished from what we call 'categories' - characteristics of Being for entities whose character is not that of Dasein."[22] The existential analytic of Dasein is therefore to proceed not by preparing a catalogue of rational categories which define a human essence, but by scrutinizing Dasein's existential condition.

Heidegger's position here bears a marked resemblance to Feuerbach's insistence upon the inversion of the Hegelian subject and predicate. In Being and Time, Heidegger says baldly and affirmatively: "The essence of Dasein lies in its existence."[23] Later, however, he takes issue with Hegel directly in his negative judgment, according to which: "existence is not the realization of an essence."[24] It is also important to notice, however, that Heidegger is no

more radical than Feuerbach, in that both look to the predicates of existence to find, in a prioristic terms, the structure of Man or Dasein. For Heidegger, the inversion of the relation of categories and existentialia, is intended to replace the Hegelian notion that reality can be known as substantiated reason, with the idea that we must comprehend Dasein in its essential, invariant, ontological relation to Being. Heidegger's inversion means substitution of the ontological for the historical point of view. In fact, it is permissable to say that where Feuerbach propounded a naturalistic anthropology, Heidegger introduces a linguistic ontology..

The Existential Analytic of Dasein

With his existential analytic of Dasein, Heidegger attempts to embody an ontological rather than an historical solution to the problem of nominalism. His antinominalist thesis rests on two propositions: (1) that Dasein is an entity in the world; (2) that Dasein is an entity for whom knowledge of Being is a constitutional possibility. What Being and Time contains besides these two propositions is what he considers to be overwhelming ontologico-phenomenological confirmation. In other words, in methodological terms, Heidegger means essentially to demonstrate the truth of his philosophy by drawing attention to the self-evident. More accurately, Heidegger's phenomenology proposes only to let Dasein speak for itself. In so doing, Dasein is encouraged to speak against the forms previously prescribed for it by

transcendental idealism: Dasein asserts itself, primordially, to use Heidegger's term, as sum rather than cogito, through its existentialia rather than its categories, even as states-of-mind and moods before it can aspire to theoretical understanding.

Dasein is ontical; it is an entity in the world; what is essential to it is predicated upon its existence; this is Heidegger's point of departure. Descartes and Kant, he complains, subscribed to and propounded an ontology of the phenomenal world from which the epistemological subject, the inquirer, Man, was absent. What the Cartesian ontology recognized as ontical was the substance of the world as extended matter - ontologically, priority was accorded to the category of spatiality. Heidegger, for his part, proceeds to reconstruct that ontology so that it now, for the first time, deliberately includes humanity: which means that he had to construe and subsequently explicate the ontological character of man's existence as a mode of Being-in-the-World, as in the first instance, existence in space. Logically, Heidegger's analysis depends upon an explication of the relation of the categories and existentialia of space and time, or upon his argument that the ontical and subsequently the ontological ground of Dasein's Being and space is his 'primordial' Being-in-Time. Being and Time presents temporality as the ultimate a priori category: except that this category has the status of an existentiale, which makes it determinate

for Dasein's Being, not merely for Dasein's potential to know Being. Temporality defines an existential as well as an epistemological horizon.

In his attempt to dispel the rationalist prejudice which regards the categories of consciousness as essential dimensions of human experience, Heidegger draws attention to the case of left-right orientation, or directionality. In this case, he insists, what is actually determinate for knowledge is not only or even primarily, a categorial framework, 'left-right,' into which experience can be slotted. In fact, the indispensable presupposition, at some stage, is the location of a knowing subject in space. "Left and right" says Heidegger, "are not something 'subjective' for which the subject has a feeling; they are directions of one's directedness into a world that is 'ready-to-hand' already. Whenever Dasein has such a 'mere feeling,' it is in a world already and must be in it to be able to orient itself at all."[25] "Suppose I step into a room which is familiar to me but dark, and which has been rearranged during my absence so that everything which used to be at my right is now at my left. If I am to orient myself," Heidegger continues, the "mere feeling of the difference between my two sides will be of no help at all as long as I fail to apprehend some definite object 'whose position,' as Kant remarks casually, 'I have in mind.' But what does this signify except that whenever this happens I necessarily orient myself both in and from

my being already alongside a world which is 'familiar.'" In short, Heidegger concludes:"That I am already in a world is no less constitutive for the possibility of orientation than is the feeling for right and left."[26] Synoptically, as it were, Heidegger declares: "Space is not to be found in the subject, nor does the subject observe the world 'as if' that world were in space, but the 'subject' (Dasein), if well understood, ontologically, is spatial."[27] Progressively, Heidegger relates the possibility of existence in space and of Dasein's knowledge of that modality of Being-in-the-World to the ultimate precondition of temporal existence, which regards life itself irreducibly as the span between birth and death. Clarification of this relation between space and time is held to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the introduction of an ontology of the 'subject,' Dasein.

The Preconceptual Substructure

Fundamentally and insistently, the existential analytic of Being and Time, develops the neglected theme of Dasein's immediate, pre-conceptual circumstances as the radical-substantial ground of any phenomenological possibility. Comprehension of the nature of Dasein on an ontological level, is shown to begin in and to depend upon the possibilities suspended in an irreducible ontic, substratum. Philosophy, phenomenology, are understood to deliver to Dasein knowledge of the fundamental possibilities of Being-in-the-World. The existential

analytic renders intelligible what is already potentially and proximately understood. In the sense that his preoccupations are continuous with Husserl's, Heidegger expels philosophy from the fastness of transcendental consciousness, and compels it to find its way in the 'lifeworld', in the everyday, run-of-the-mill configuration of things. Heidegger enjoins phenomenology to discover the a priori or ontological in the ontical.

All Dasein's possibilities are presumed to exist in a confused, inchoate form in a kind of existential protoplasm. From the outset, Heidegger maintains, against the conceptualist bias of his predecessors, that the individual is immersed in an undifferentiated impersonal mode of Being, and inextricably 'involved' in the routines of a public world. The individual is involved in a world of things and at the same time is engulfed in a world of other persons. The world of things he enters as a place already overladen with meaning, invested with value, fabricated in compliance with the purposes of Dasein. The world of things is experienced in Heidegger's language as "ready-to- hand": which term reports the fact that we typically encounter roads and fields, not soil and grasses; houses and furniture, not mud and branches; sentences and messages, not words and signs. In general, to use another of Heidegger's terms, we come across 'equipment' not raw material: which means that in the everyday world, what takes precedence (hermeneutically) is not the properties of

things-in-themselves, but their significance for human kind.

With equal inevitability, 'equiprimordially,' as Heidegger puts it, Dasein is involved, prior to any philosophic reflection or introspection, in a public world; more properly, the individual emerges in a domain dominated by a population of Others, whom Heidegger calls the 'They.' It is soon borne in upon the individual that the 'They' exercise a proprietory right over the world and consequently over Dasein's individual existence. Says Heidegger: "Dasein as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection to others. Dasein's everyday possibilities are for the Others to dispose of as they please."[28] This preconceptual involvement of the individual as an emotional, physical being, is characterized by Heidegger at one point as an "inconspicuous domination by Others."[29] The 'They' designates a fundamental existentiale, or mode of Dasein's Being.

Thus Dasein denotes involvement in a phenomenal world: this involvement is the precondition of any detachment and reflection. From an ontological viewpoint, the preconceptual, the somatic as well as the public and impersonal, precede intellectual life. Nevertheless, Heidegger maintains, there is in Dasein's pre-theoretical orientation to Being, a kind of understanding that contains the theoretical possibility. Thus, Heidegger emphasizes

that Dasein is immersed in a world of significance, of signs and language, which means that the possibility of interpretation has been pre-established for the individual. Before the possibility of a theoretically sound phenomenology can be realized, however, theory must, so Heidegger announces, recognize its initial dependence on the pre-conceptual. Phenomenology must know how to extricate itself from the moods and states-of-mind which belong to everyday subordination to things and persons. "Factically," Heidegger writes, "Dasein can, should and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing this may signify a priority of volition and cognition. Only we must not be misled by this into denying that ontologically, mood is a primordial kind of Being for Dasein, in which Dasein, is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and volition, and beyond their range of disclosure. And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood - we are never free of moods."[30] States of mind, which still do not disclose the world theoretically, originate in moods; and theoretical understanding is derivative of less cerebral forms of communication with Being.[31]

Theoretical understanding, a phenomenological hermeneutic of Being, is grounded existentially, in practical forms of engagement. In understanding, says Heidegger, Dasein explores the possibilities of Being-in-the-World. In interpretation, the possibility of understanding, itself,

is fully developed.[32] Above all, Heidegger's analysis stresses that the possibility of interpretation is grounded in public life, or in the existentiale of meaning. Thus he writes: "In interpreting, we do not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing which is present-at-hand, we do not stick a value on it; but when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world, and this involvement is one which gets laid out by the interpretation."[33] Elsewhere he cautions: "a commercium of the subject with a world does not get created for the first time by knowing."[34] The mediation of meaning or significance, that is, is accomplished by a public network which interpretation can employ to explicate Dasein's pre-theoretical understanding of Being, or the way in which Dasein has projected its potential upon Being.

Interpretation explicates meaning, which itself is not a property inherent in things but an existentiale of Dasein.[35] In addition, in interpretation, Heidegger reports, in rendering Being intelligible: "Man shows himself as the entity which talks."[36] And he adds immediately, "This does not signify that the possibility of vocal utterance is peculiar to him, but rather that he is the entity which is such as to discover the world and Dasein itself."[37] The existential analytic of Dasein, therefore, reveals that, ontologically, the fundamental properties of the 'subject'

situated in space and time are: firstly, Being-in-the-World, in the modality that Heidegger designates as "thrownness" to signify Dasein's original subordination in a public world; secondly, "understanding" whose full logical significance is elaborated in interpretation; thirdly, in "discourse", which is "equally constitutive" for Dasein, which again originally implicates him in public life since, "Words are proximally present at hand, that is to say, we come across them just as we come across things."[38]

Fallenness and Authenticity

In a preliminary way, Heidegger aims to divulge the ontical nature of Dasein, the existential precondition of the possibility of phenomenological understanding, on three levels of analysis, or in three dimensions. "Thrownness" he presents as the primordial circumstance of the 'They'; Understanding he explains as the possibility of knowledge that originates in the preconceptual relations of Dasein and Being; Discourse he portrays as a fundamental constitutive capacity of intelligent human life. However, the ontical merely contains the ontological, the truth about Dasein, its a priori structure. Being and Time is "essentially" an existential analytic, whose purpose is to abstract the ontological from the ontic. Accordingly, the preponderant part of Heidegger's theoretical effort is expended in transforming the proximate into the true, the merely existent into the essential. In the context of his

existentialist pretension, the principal task is to distinguish the authentic from the inauthentic.

On the most elemental level, Heidegger discovers in the condition of "thrownness" a difference between "falling" and authentic Being in the World. By "falling" Heidegger means alienation. "This 'alienation'" he explains, "closes off from Dasein its authenticity and possibility, even if only the possibility of genuinely foundering. It does not, however, surrender Dasein to an entity which Dasein itself is not, but forces it into its inauthenticity - into a possible kind of Being of itself."[39] Furthermore, when it has fallen, Dasein remains completely infatuated by the 'They.' It is a condition in which: "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself."[40] Fallenness implies the supremacy of an anonymous Other. "In this inconspicuousness and unascertainability," says Heidegger, "the real dictatorship of the "They" is unfolded."[41] Also, in this alienation, Dasein is lost to itself in the sense that it 'tranquillizes itself.': which it does in the precise sense that it seeks protection and escape from anxiety in "uninhibited bustle."[42][43]

From the structure of "fallenness," however, which is the 'nocturnal' aspect of "thrownness", Heidegger proceeds immediately to deduce the a priori structure of Dasein's Being-in-the-World. Firstly, in this respect, Heidegger maintains that since in its negation of itself, in

"falling", Dasein alienates itself and is lost to itself; then it is reasonable to conclude that, in each case: "Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it is: in each case mine."[44] Secondly, Heidegger maintains that where inauthentic existence connotes subordination to popular opinion, current fashions, etc., authentic existence implies a resolute detachment. Mineness is defined as the antithesis of Otherness, the possibility of mineness can only be fully realized in an individualism. Thirdly, so Heidegger's argument runs, as surely as "fallen" Dasein flees from anxiety; just as surely, "Dasein's Being reveals itself as care."[45] By this Heidegger means that we may surmise from the general tendency for the 'They' to neglect Dasein's fundamental possibilities, that: "Dasein is an entity for which, in its Being, that Being is an issue."[46] In support of this most basic of his propositions Heidegger writes: "our existential interpretation of Dasein as care requires pre-ontological confirmation. This lies in demonstrating that no sooner has Dasein expressed anything about itself to itself, that it has already interpreted itself as care, even though it has done so pre-ontologically."[47]

Due consideration of Dasein's authentic nature gravitates towards a single point. The meaning of "mineness", understanding of what Dasein flees and refuses to look at, and the sense in which Dasein is care: all these things

hinge upon explication of the 'category' of temporality. And in each case temporality implies the fundamental reality of Death. So, with respect to the theme of "mineness", Heidegger means to stress that: "No one can take the Other's dying away from him. By its very essence, death is in every case mine....."[48] In a parallel formulation, he says: "With death, Dasein stands before itself in its ownmost potentiality for Being."[49] By which is meant that an individual's existential potential is absolutely circumscribed by death, which leads Heidegger to assert that "mineness" "exists finitely"[50] or is finally delimited by time. Death both individualizes, and confines Dasein to a temporary existence. The projection of selfhood into space and the possibility of comprehension of the material world, which are fundamental possibilities for Dasein;[51] these are possibilities of temporal existence.

With respect to what Dasein turns away from, Heidegger says: "our everyday falling evasion in the face of death is an inauthentic Being towards Death. But inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity. Inauthenticity characterizes a kind of Being into which Dasein can divert itself and has for the most part always diverted itself; but Dasein does not necessarily and constantly have to divert itself into this kind of Being. Because Dasein exists, it determines its own character as the kind of entity it is, and it does so in every case in terms of a possibility which it itself is, and which it understands."[52]

Putting the matter positively, he observes that, on the contrary, "Authentic Being-towards-Death can not evade its ownmost, non-relational possibility, or cover up this possibility by thus fleeing from it, or give a new explanation for it to accord with the common sense of the 'They.'"[53] Which is to say that what Dasein is irreducibly, and what it can know; or that what Dasein can project into space and time are possibilities encompassed by that which cannot finally be eluded, namely, death. Which further implies that a truthful phenomenology, an irreproachable disclosure of Being, requires as its precondition a proper projection of Dasein towards the possibility of death. What Dasein flees, says Heidegger, is its anxiety in the face of death; what it relinquishes in its flight is a true understanding of its "ownmost possibility" and of Being.

Also, Dasein is revealed fundamentally or ontologically as care, as "a Being for whom that Being is an issue" precisely in the sense that its existential limit is defined temporally, by death. This connection is expressed almost runically at various points in the text of Being and Time. For example, "Being-towards-death is grounded in care";[54] or "Care is Being-towards-death."[55] In the most general terms, it is suggested that Dasein finds its authentic self in a composed "resolute"[56] anticipation of death; so that all the contingent possibilities of Dasein, especially the potential to disclose Being, to understand, become accessible on the basis of "an impassioned freedom

towards death."[57]

Resolution and Understanding

With regard to the condition of "thrownness", then, Heidegger's existential analytic was brought into play to reveal that it contained, essentially, an authentic anticipatory relation to death: in the sense that it can know death as irreducibly personal, as inescapable and as giving rise to the existential project of 'care.' Heidegger describes the notion of his analytic as follows: "Authentic Being-one's-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they': it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' - of the 'they' as an essential existentiale."[58] Similar transformations of the ontic into the ontological, which trace existential (substantive) transformations, occur on the level of understanding, where "concernful circumspection" becomes the foundation of the hermeneutic possibility; and on the level of discourse, where "idle talk "becomes,in the first instance, the ground of truth, and subsequently the house of Being.

It has already been emphasized that the indispensable prerequisite for a correct theoretical attitude is a prior existential rectitude. Says Heidegger: "Dasein's kind of Being thus demands that any ontological interpretation which sets itself the goal of exhibiting the phenomena in

their primordiality, should capture the Being of this entity, in spite of this entity's own tendency to cover things up."[59] Given the requisite, authentic "resoluteness", however, modification of merely existentiell understanding becomes possible. The structure of such pre-theoretical comprehension is explained thus: "When one understands oneself projectively, in an existentiell possibility," Heidegger writes, "the future underlies this understanding, and it does so as a coming-towards-oneself out of that current possibility as which one's Dasein exists. The future makes possible an entity which is in such a way that it exists understandingly in its potentiality-for-Being."[60] In other words, understanding even in pre-theoretical (existentiell) form, involves projection beyond Dasein's immediate circumstances into a prepared ground where there is a recollection or retrenchment: in any case, the sense of 'arriving' at an understanding that is well established semantically, in theory, emerges for Heidegger, pre-theoretically, in practical activity that prepares the way for Dasein's advance into the future. "Factically,"[61] Heidegger declares "Dasein is constantly ahead-of-itself." In "concernful circumspection," which is the proper nomenclature for the pre-theoretical (existentiell) orientation to Being, Dasein attempts, as it were, habitually, to relate to itself understandingly: to anticipate and obviate likely difficulties, to forestall danger, to insure against various accidents, disasters, catastrophes, to protect its future.

From day to day, Dasein is said to remain submerged in its "ownmost inertia of falling."[62] Nevertheless, the argument runs: "This existentiell-ontical turning away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such."[63] Or, more correctly, it is because "concernful circumspection" amounts to "the privation of a disclosedness"[64] that it can afford some insight into the actual a priori structure of understanding. Thus, to begin with, Heidegger maintains, it becomes apparent that understanding, disclosure of the possibilities of Dasein, is grounded in the "basic state of mind of Anxiety."[65] This anxiety, with its disclosive potential, is precisely what is ordinarily turned away from and denied, he argues; and when we refuse anxiety, we relinquish true understanding. By way of pre-ontological confirmation of his assertion Heidegger offers this observation: "What oppresses us is not this or that..... it is the world itself." And he adds immediately: "When anxiety has subsided, then in our everyday way of talking we are accustomed to say that 'it was really nothing.'"[66] The purpose of which observation is to emphasize that, normally, the disclosive capacity intrinsic to anxiety about the world is repressed, and momentary access to understanding is dismissed as "nothing." From this it is clear, Heidegger concludes, that what is required for a sound ontological knowledge is a modification of the pre-ontological relation that eschews an understanding of

Being grounded in Anxiety.

Interpretation and Disclosure

As interpretation represents the logical development of the possibility of understanding, which deliberately addresses a world of significance, which recognizes Dasein as an entity embodied in an network of signification; so, subsequently, discourse is conceptualized as the essence of interpretation. "Discourse," says Heidegger, "is the Articulation of intelligibility."[67] He also says, underlining his meaning: "Discourse or talking is the way in which we articulate 'significantly' the intelligibility of Being-in-the-World."[68] Two inseparable features of discourse have special importance for Heidegger: firstly, the circumstance that discourse is not an innate capacity or private property of the speaking subject, but is a public medium of communication;[69] secondly, consequentially, the circumstance that discourse has already been, from the standpoint of the individual user, so to speak, annexed by the 'They,' whose interests and concerns it principally communicates. It is in the light of these considerations that Heidegger perceives the need for a modification of the pre-ontological form of existence in a linguistic universe, similar to those undertaken on the ontologically prior levels of "thrownness" and "understanding."

In Being and Time, the disclosive potential of discourse is salvaged in "modification" from the "average intelligib-

ility"[70] of "idle talk," which merely relays and perpetuates the "dominance of the public way in which things have been interpreted."[71] Concerning "idle talk" Heidegger says this, among other things: "because this discoursing has lost its primary relationship-of-Being towards the entity talked about, or else has never achieved such a relationship, it does not communicate in such a way as to let this entity be appropriated in a primordial manner, but communicates rather by following the route of gossiping and "passing the word along."[72] Perhaps most disparagingly of all, he adds, "Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one "must" have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is delivered over to idle talk."[73]

All of which is meant to substantiate the criticism that everyday language use, overburdened by public concerns, represents a lost opportunity on the part of Dasein to realize the ultimate possibility of Being-in-the-World, which is made available in discourse. This ultimate possibility of Dasein consists in a capacity to relate truthfully in language to the entities of Being and to the structure of Being itself. The nature of this relation is designated by Heidegger as disclosure. And with the introduction of this concept of truth as disclosure, Heidegger's phenomenology effects a complete rupture with the rationalist tradition whose concept of truth had exerted an unquestioned authority from Descartes to

Husserl. For Heidegger, however, the rationalist tradition had persistently made three interdependent, equally insupportable claims, which in concert may be said to encapsulate the epistemological prejudice: the customary perception of truth in a compelling alliance of knowledge and power.[74] Firstly, Heidegger submits, it has been assumed in the rationalist tradition that truth originates in, or that the 'locus' of truth is to be found in, assertion or judgment: an assumption that defines "truth" as irreducibly "subjective." Secondly, says Heidegger, rationalism from Descartes to Husserl, has held that truth is to be measured by, or that its 'essence' lies in a factor of 'agreement' between concept and object: a formula which openly ascribes the highest philosophic value to the power of the subject to conform its object to the structure of intention or desire. Thirdly, says Heidegger, this school of thought has quite unwarrantably presumed its unanimity with classical Greek thought.

Heidegger examines each of these axiomatic suppositions in turn. Concerning the thesis that the 'locus' of truth is judgment and its corollary, which is that truth is incontestably 'subjective,' Heidegger is first of all inclined to affirm the ontological truth of the matter, rather than to attempt a simple refutation. Thus he says: "There is truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is..... Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor will there be any after Dasein is no more."[75]

Nevertheless, says Heidegger, although in the context of an explicit ontology of Dasein it is correct thus to stress the subjectivity of truth; still it is mistaken to adjudge truth to be 'subjective' in the sense that the subject of knowledge exercises an absolute discretion. "Because" Heidegger writes, "the kind of Being that is essential to truth is of the character of Dasein, all truth is relative to Dasein's Being." But he asks, "Does this relativity signify that all truth is subjective ? If one interprets 'subjective' as 'left to the subject's discretion', then it certainly does not. For uncovering, in the sense which is most its own, takes asserting out of the province of 'subjective' discretion and brings the uncovering Dasein face to face with the entities themselves."[76] The a priori condition of judgment, Heidegger reiterates, is Being in the World. Truth is nothing other than the capacity of the subject, on the basis of submission to that condition of Being in the World, to disclose and bring to light the structure of Being.

In pursuit of a new phenomenological concept of truth, Heidegger also reviews the even more unassailable "epistemological" theorem, according to which truth implies 'agreement' or correspondence between concept and object: which construction, stripped of euphemism, conceives of truth in terms of substantiation of conceptual matrices or categorial frameworks; according to which, more bluntly still, truth resides in a field in which matter has been

subdued by a concept and reorganized under the rule of a symbolic order. In fact, in this phase of his argument, Being and Time (which remains closer to Husserl in conceiving phenomenology as a "science of phenomena)"[77] has the appearance of a preamble to his later, vehement criticism of instrumental rationality or of "the will to power." Nevertheless, already in Being and Time, Heidegger uncompromisingly announces that where a phenomenological concept of truth is concerned: "everything depends on our steering clear of any conception of truth which is construed in the sense of 'agreement.'"[78] Truth as a possible mode of existence of Dasein, Heidegger insists, does not impose itself upon the world; it does not demand conformity; it merely enables Being to make its presence known. Later, in his "Letter on Humanism" for example, the instrumentalist relation to Being is roundly condemned as in this excerpt which states: "by the assessment of something as a value what is valued is admitted only as an object for man's estimation. But what a thing is in its Being, is not exhausted by its being an object, particularly when objectivity takes the form of value. Every valuing" he continues "even where it values positively, is a subjectivizing. It does not let beings: be. Rather, valuing lets beings be valid - solely as the object of its doing."[79] From which point, it was a short step to his characterization of the history of metaphysics as a pathogenic reification process, a violation of the fundamental relation of Dasein and Being founded in Care.

Finally, Heidegger's assault on the rationalist orthodoxy, contests a complacent belief that the ancients, especially Aristotle, subscribed to the instrumentalist concept of truth.[80] For his part, Heidegger proposes to reinstate the ancient, 'apophantic' concept of truth ousted by the instrumentalist, correspondence theory. Once again, as occurred on the more fundamental existential levels of "thrownness" and "understanding", Heidegger means to reclaim as essential a possibility of Dasein passed over in practice. In this case, 'modification' of a fundamental existentiale, consists in his rescue of the apophantic possibility: an artless, disclosive attention, in language, to the nature of Being. To appreciate Heidegger's position, it is necessary to recall first of all that Discourse is a mode of Being-in-the-World. Thus he says, characteristically: "In its essence language is not the utterance of an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it be thought of in an essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps not even in terms of the character of signification. Language is the lighting-concealing advent of Being itself."[81] Language, in other words, is to be understood as an ontological region which man can inhabit authentically or inauthentically, but in either sense, not voluntarily or periodically, but in the sense of an a priori constitutional precondition.

The apophantic concept of truth is simply authenticity in language. What this means may be surmised from the proclamation that it is a mode of thinking that "surpasses all praxis."[82] In precise terms, however, what is implied is avoidance of instrumentalism. To attain such truth, Heidegger advises: "Only the right concept of language is needed. In the current view, language is held to be a kind of communication. It serves for verbal exchange and agreement, and in general for communicating. But language is not only and not primarily an audible and written expression of what is to be communicated. It not only puts forth in words and statements what is overtly and covertly intended to be communicated, language alone brings beings into the open for the first time. Where there is no language, as in the Being of stone, plant and animal, there is also no openness of beings....."[83] As before, authenticity takes the form of a principled refusal of the public way, of the predispositions of the 'they.' In one instance Heidegger discusses the desideratum of apophantic truth, thus: "It is language that tells us about the essence of a thing, provided that we respect language's own essence. In the meantime to be sure, there rages round the earth an unbridled yet clever talking, writing and broadcasting of spoken words. Man acts as though he were the shaper and master of language, while in fact language remains the master of man."[84] The desideratum in other words, is submission to the disclosive possibility inherent in language, which "lies in merely letting something be

seen, in letting entities be perceived."[85]

It remains, therefore, as far as Heidegger's 'modification' of the 'average intelligibility' of 'idle talk' is concerned, to explain apophansis as the ultimate ontological possibility of Dasein. What is implied, here, is that it is in the context of the existential parameters defined by language that reconcilement of Dasein and Being is possible. So that, just as "idle talk" and the instrumental relation of science and technology to the world represent major existential forms of man's estrangement, so apophansis represents the authentic possibility of reconciliation. In fact, says Heidegger, it is precisely because "fallen" man encounters alienation in language, that we may infer that, essentially, language is the original habitat of Dasein. In his own words: "language is at once the house of Being and the home of human beings. Only because language is the home of the essence of man can historical mankind and human beings not be at home in language so that for them language becomes a mere container for their sundry occupations."[86] For Heidegger, in a final reckoning, history is homelessness in language; authentic existence and reconcilement are possible only on the basis of renunciation of the complex of practices that has disturbed the primordial harmony between Dasein and Being.

An Historicist Appraisal

Up to this point, the real (historical) pretext for Heidegger's existentialism has, for the most part,been left out of account. His own perception of the theoretical pretext has been taken at face value. The first requirement for an overall assessment of Heidegger's philosophy, however, is specification of the overriding purpose which integrates the two theoretical tasks into which most of his effort is channelled. These tasks are, in his own terms: deconstruction of the rationalist ontology and reconstitution of the possibility of phenomenal knowledge, elaboration of a phenomenological methodology. To raise the question of real, historical premisses, is, in the manner of ideology critique, to problematize the relation of theory and the imperatives of social reproduction. In the present case, the precise theoretical objective must be to explicate the way in which this relation is registered in Heidegger's discourse; and simultaneously to examine the effect this has on his own estimation of his priorities.

The only way forward, at this stage,is to look more closely at Heidegger's project: which, in one direction, as a deconstruction of rationalist ontology, strives to overcome the dualism of the Cartesian framework; and which, along its other primary vector, as an attempt to reconceptualize the basis of phenomenology, stands as an alternative to the Hegelian sublation of ontological dualism. The first thematic preoccupation contrasts the deficiencies of

dualism from Descartes onward, with the economy of the monistic ontology of Dasein. With the introduction of Dasein as Being-in-the-World, Heidegger maintains, the imponderables of rationalist metaphysics are, effectively, eradicated. The second thematic preoccupation, which soon proves to be the dominant partner, is developed by directly opposing Hegel's thesis that it is Spirit that introduces an essential significance into Existence. Against the Hegelian notion, Heidegger formulates the counter thesis that Existence has an original 'primordial' significance, that it has a structural principle, that not only operates prior to and independently of the intrusion of the subject, of Spirit, but which is, in fact, determinate for the character of the subject, Dasein.

In effect, it becomes apparent that Heidegger's existentialism is at odds, not with Hegel's essentialism (which it surpasses in making Being its highest principle) but with Hegel's historicism. The 'real' target of Heidegger's philosophic criticism (the ideological system and the realist thesis against which he rails) is always Hegel's practical philosophy or philosophy of history. Thus in promoting the category of Being, Heidegger wants to overturn Hegel's jibe that Being minus Spirit leaves Nothingness. Similarly, when he elevates the category of Time, Heidegger wants to subjugate the concept of History. The penultimate section of Being and Time may be summarized with the assertion: history appears only in time, as a

temporalization of Dasein, as Dasein's embodiment in space on the basis of a fundamentally temporal existence. This assertion, however, though it seems unassailable from the standpoint of analytic logic, from another viewpoint, seems mainly to refuse to consider the possibility that 'spontaneous', 'natural' relations may be subverted, transformed, negated, in practice. By preferring the category of Time, Heidegger opts for an abstract formula, an identity thesis: Dasein is Temporality; and rejects the category of History, whose principal role has been to make the relation of form and content permanently problematic for theory.

Which suggests that there is no transcendence of Hegel's position in Heidegger; only an implacable opposition. Heidegger's existentialism does not spring from within the historical philosophy; it does not take root in the faults of that system. Heidegger locates the difference between himself and Hegel exactly when he says: "Hegel's 'construction' was prompted by his arduous struggle to conceive the 'concretion' of the spirit..... Our existential analytic of Dasein, on the contrary, starts with the 'concretion' of factically thrown existence itself in order to unveil temporality as that which primordially 'makes such existence possible'."[87] What is made clear here, though not intentionally, is that for Hegel the all-consuming questions were those which concerned the genesis of the 'concrete,' while for Heidegger, as always for

transcendental enquiry, the question of genesis must be put in parentheses, so that an analytic cross-section can be had. In fact, it remains profoundly significant for an understanding of Heidegger's thought, that methodologically, he closes off the question of genesis with regard both to the forms of thought (language) and to the forms of objective experience (the existentialia) which he defines as primordial, and, consequently, naturalizes or ontologizes.

Where then does ideology critique discover the unifying principle of Heidegger's existentialism ? Firstly, crisply, and negatively, in its principal refusal to entertain the possibility that the existential framework can be exploded, practically transcended, substantially transformed. Instead it confers upon the actual dimensions of the existential configuration a primordial significance, an essentialist structure. Secondly, ideology critique recognizes the same ultimate motivation, positively, in a radical effort to save the premisses of transcendental enquiry, (a prioristic thinking, the ontological standpoint, or the "philosophy of origins,") from the corrosive effect of practical philosophy or the philosophy of history.

The positive aspect of Heidegger's existentialism deserves fuller consideration. Especially if criticism aspires to anything but devastation. And when Heidegger's phenomenology is examined, as a revived transcendental enquiry, at least three methodologically significant innovations swim into view as the indelible traces of his intervention. (Only three aspects of his labour of transcription are considered, which betrays the limit of our attention span without necessarily exhausting Heidegger's achievement). These three aspects are examined separately as if that was more than a methodological subterfuge and a matter of convenience. Each aspect of his innovation which is acknowledged, is, apparently, a concession which is immediately revoked. This procedure indicates prior ideological commitments. But let us proceed, sidestepping the metaphysical cataclysm, by remembering the impossibility of presuppositionless knowledge (of which Heidegger is aware) and by suggesting modestly, that everything may indeed hinge, philosophically, upon a conception of social reproduction: the principal question may after all be whether society obeys immanent laws or men make their social conditions. At any rate, it is possible to 'measure' the progressiveness of Heidegger's existentialism against the theories of society submerged in earlier transcendental philosophies, and in terms of its

intransigence in the face of Hegelian historicism.

Firstly, Heidegger broke through the psychologism that had constrained his predecessors. They, from Descartes to Husserl, had equated subjectivity with the categories of consciousness. Every attempt to extrapolate a philosophical anthropology or sociology on this basis was therefore a creature of the philosophy of mind. Thus, the Collective Subject, the Transcendental or Social Subject was necessarily conceived exclusively in terms of its characteristic rationality: inevitably, the collective self-image, its idealization of existence, would be taken at face value. (Durkheim's view of society as collective consciousness offers in a sense an emblematic, if extreme, extrapolation from rationalist premisses.) Also, however, the philosophy of mind, in its more balanced form, enjoined philosophers to respect the autonomy of the empirical subject and its rational property, so that society was construed, a prioristically, as an association of free thinking individuals. (The monadic conception of society found for example in symbolic interactionist theory or in Garfinkel's ethnomethodology is typically rationalist in this respect.) For his part, Heidegger consistently represents subjectivity as physical, sensual being, which always finds itself plunged in a network of pre-conceptual involvements in a world structured by public affairs. Above all, in rejecting rationalism, Heidegger envisages Thought as overdetermined by the imperatives of material

circumstance, as overshadowed by the distressful conditions of physical existence, especially as intimidated by the prospect of Death. Heidegger's phenomenology, in effect, looks to the structure of physical existence and to the physical experience of the individual. It makes no presumption, jumps to no conclusions, about the rationality of men or objective conditions.

Secondly, Heidegger should be acknowledged as the prime mover in connection with a linguistic turn out of the philosophy of mind. To some extent, this is to reiterate the point already made that Heidegger broke rationalism's stranglehold. The additionally significant factor, the detail not previously explicated, however, is that Heidegger's linguistic philosophy does not depend upon a philosophy of mind. By comparison, the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure, for example, does remain so dependent. With Saussure, la langue, the Collective Linguistic Subject, appears as a purely rational system, a constellation of a priori elements, words; similarly, la parole, the Individual Linguistic Subject, the Empirical Subject, denotes a specific rationality, a competence to deploy the Master System. Significantly, in methodological terms, Saussure's structural linguistics, unintentionally embraces the problem of nominalism intrinsic to the Cartesian ontology. As a result, the problem for structuralism, its Achilles heel, is always the question of reference. Saussure formulated the query:

can a sign truly represent the object to which it makes reference ? As a convinced rationalist, following Kant for instance, he answered sceptically, that the relation between form and substance is entirely arbitrary. Thereafter, he preferred to look at the manageable, because entirely rational, relation between la langue and la parole. In retrospect, it is clear that imprisoned within the philosophy of consciousness, Saussure obtained a beautiful insight into the historical (arbitrary) relation of concept and object. Unfortunately, he was totally at a loss, methodologically, to develop his insight theoretically. Heidegger, in complete contrast, beyond the reach of rationalism, urges both the rootedness of the empirical subject in physical existence and the fundamentally public nature of language. He insists that Reason emerges, if at all, from unreason. The empirical subject can aspire to philosophic comprehension only from a subterranean region of experience dominated by moods, uncontrolled states of mind, and inarticulate, pre-theoretical forms of understanding. Language, in turn, can be delivered, according to Heidegger's view, into reason only where it is rescued from its immersion in a public world of significance, where meaning is obliterated in everyday concerns, where truth is, for the most part, evaded. Heidegger's phenomenology makes no presumption about the rationality of the discourses that ebb and flow across the surface of public life.

Thirdly, Heidegger's existentialism introduces a new concept of truth, the apophantic, which is grounded in a Transcendental Aesthetic. This new concept of truth is aesthetic in the sense that it locates truth not in the alliance of knowledge and power recognized by the epistemological prejudice and its correspondence theory of truth; but in an intuitive communication of knowledge and experience, in "essence perception." For Heidegger, truth arises in submission to the ultimate possibility of Dasein. At the same time, however, (and here we encounter the absolute limit of Heidegger's problematic; the point at which the dialectic of question and answer is foreclosed). Heidegger's existentialism is an unmitigated essentialism (a bogus existentialism ?): it re-establishes the a priori limits of knowledge and experience in language, and the a priori relation of knowledge and practice in the existentialia. Heidegger's Transcendental Aesthetic does not promise synthetic knowledge on the basis of a constitutive subjectivity; truth is never a question of practice (praxis, manipulation). Instead, the hermeneutic possibility presupposes an authentic existential attitude (recognition that Dasein is Care) and a proper, non-instrumental submission to language. These pre-requisites which leave the existentialia and the structure of language intact, combine in a way that proves irresistible to Being, which subsequently makes itself known. What is brought into alignment by the self-effacing aesthetic are the forms of language and the forms of

experience. From the standpoint of the philosophy of practice, the least that can be said about Heidegger's existentialism, in consequence, is that it expects the individual to collude in his own liquidation.

Adorno's Critique

Methodologically, ideology critique integrates two cogitative movements. It aims, analytically, within the context of sociologically naive discourse to consolidate a diffuse but logically indispensable matrix of representations about the structure of social existence. Thus Marx's critique of political economy distilled the rudely formulated sociological premisses of utilitarian theories of exchange and production. Equally characteristically, ideology critique speculates on the implications of a more or less implicit, unacknowledged or repressed theory of society for the exigencies of social reproduction; which implications are held never to be nugatory. Thus Capital may be said to comprise Marx's speculation about the connection between the political economist's social theory and the practical organization of social reproduction. Basically, Marx presented a logical extrapolation of his suspicion that 'concretion' or 'actualization' of the theory of society, of the ultimate constitutive principles of political economy, would engender various forms of alienated existence. The worst findings of the factory inspectorate, the great moral scandal of Victorian society, Marx demonstrated, were at

the very least, entirely commensurate with the most sacred principles of the philosophy of the age, were in some sense attributable to and almost invariably exacerbated by concerted effort on the part of Victorian society to rationalize the economic-practical imperatives that it lived by.

Similarly, to turn to the case in hand, Adorno's critique of Heidegger, discovers the lineaments of a theory of society in Heidegger's ontology of Dasein: which proclaims the structural invariance of the primary forms of representation (of linguistic, symbolic forms) and of the forms of experience (of the relation to nature, of social relations). So, too, Adorno's critique insists on the political significance of Heidegger's 'absent' sociology, though the nature of the connection with the imperatives of social reproduction is more tenuous and requires subtler conceptualization. To begin with, however, Being and Time is understood, not in its own terms as a bare statement of the existential facts of the matter ,but as an exercise in painstaking argumentation. Heidegger's discourse is apprehended as something that not only fails in its aspiration to transcend the tawdriness of polemic and disputation, but as, on the contrary, a major intervention, a monumental example of conviction, commitment and proselytizing zeal. Most specifically, to return to a point made already, Heidegger's existentialism is construed as an implacable refusal of Hegel's historicism, not of

Hegel's essentialism: which Heidegger surpasses. Heidegger's existentialism is understood to have been occasioned by antipathy to the philosophy of practice. From this standpoint, Heidegger effectively closes off those questions concerning the genesis of Ego (the forms of existence) and of the Categories of Consciousness (the forms of representation) so heroically opened out by Hegel. Heidegger lets these: be. And it is in this sense that Adorno's critique casts Heidegger in the role of spokesman for a society that systematically misrepresents historical conditions.

In a kind of overview, Adorno appears intent on evoking all the connotations of the paradox that Heidegger's existentialism is an essentialism. To examine more closely the ways in which Adorno discovers ideology (the non-disclosure of contradiction) in Heidegger, it is convenient to reduce the latter's thought to the dimensions of a weak syllogism. The major premiss of which would be wrought approximately like this: Being must be re-conceptualized not as the ineffable Beyond that eludes human experience and comprehension, but as the absolute pre-condition and hospitable ground for the development of every possibility of human existence. The minor premiss of the same syllogism would be: Human existence must be re-thought not as the irrepressible antagonism of spirit and matter, man and nature, body and mind; but in terms that transcend the familiar dualism as Being-in-the-World,

as Dasein. Together these premisses coalesce (or fail to coalesce) in the conclusion that Being and Dasein are eminently reconcilable on the ground of an original (primordial) equilibrium.

Above all, so this simple tri-partite scheme is meant to suggest, Heidegger's is a philosophy of Being. Adorno expresses his misgivings about this state of affairs by tracing the main structural weaknesses of Heidegger's system along two main axes. On the one hand, he observes, in evacuating the philosophy of mind, Heidegger puts all his trust in the immediate accessibility of Being: in the proposition that the ontic, the pre-conceptual (content) enters of its own volition into the ontological (form). It is by virtue of this unsolicited disclosure, moreover, in which the ontic finds itself fully represented in the ontological, that Being is justified as the ultimate category of Heidegger's phenomenology. On the other hand, Adorno contends, Heidegger hurriedly confers an essentiality, a necessity or intrinsic worthiness upon the merely existent; elevating brute facts to the rank of eternal verities. But with this gesture, which confers ontological significance, Adorno declares, a concept of Being, however ill-defined, subordinates existence in general to its unregulated dominion. In other words, along one axis, the ontic, Heidegger's philosophy both exaggerates the intrinsic intelligibility of things and denies their mutability: forgetting their intelligibility

is introduced into the material environment in practice that transforms or mitigates oppressive circumstances. At the same time, along the ontological axis, the ultimate category of Heidegger's philosophy, Being, is impenetrably opaque, but nonetheless Absolute and no less indifferent to the unrealized potential of its material underpinning than any category of Transcendental Idealism.

In effect, Adorno's analysis highlights four tendencies: mysticism, or elimination of the problem of mediation; identitarian thinking, affirmation of the equivalence of the ontic and the ontological; conceptualism, subordination of the substantial to a formal principle; and irrationalism, proclamation of the Absolute authority of Being, which category remains less than fully rationalized. One of the two major causes of the weakness discussed, says Adorno, is Heidegger's abandonment of the epistemological framework: which arose in the context of the philosophy of mind and which posed the question of the structure of synthetic knowledge; recognizing thereby the irreducible antithesis of form and content, and the centrality of the problem of mediation. With Heidegger, says Adorno: "Discontent with the preliminary epistemological question comes to justify its outright elimination."[88] Consequently: "The difference between the category and the substance of the existential judgment is blurred."[89] And already, with this distinction lost, Heidegger is well on his way to reconciling the ontic and the ontological. The second

factor that explains the shortcomings of Heidegger's position, for Adorno, is the fact that, despite his suspension of the epistemological problem, he offers no resistance to the overriding purpose legitimated by the history of Idealism. At least, if he does not straightforwardly endorse the drive to dominate nature, to subdue existence to the authority of the symbolic; still he advocates submission to the overall process through which Being sustains itself in its present form. And, in recommending resignation, Heidegger releases Being from any obligation to give a rational account of its use of power.

Beneath the surface of anxious questionings, Adorno discovers a sinister complementarity between repudiation of the premisses of critical philosophy as a means to theoretical truth, and renunciation of a practical attitude to existential problems as a means of attaining self fulfilment. What is sinister begins in this, that: "when men are forbidden to think, their thinking sanctions what simply exists."[90] Resignation leaves being, irrespective of its actual impact on the lives of individuals and populations, completely unchallenged. The prevailing forms of representation and of experience are accepted on their own recommendation as absolute forms. So, in the end, Adorno maintains: "It is not sense that inhabits the inmost core of Heidegger's philosophy..... But..... faith in Being."[91] He offers, says Adorno, "the evaporating aura" of religious faith, as protection against the senselessness of

existence. Authenticity, the highest principle of his pseudo-practical teaching, declares itself content in knowledge of the equivalence of the existential and categorial forms, and in its conviction concerning the validity of these forms.

As the syllogism set out above was meant to imply, Heidegger's philosophy is also, more substantively, an ontology of Dasein. In this respect, the butt of Adorno's criticism is a re-invigoration of the perennial compulsion of philosophical anthropology to pre-empt sociological analysis with a romanticized concept of Man. "Such universal humanity, however, is ideology" in Adorno's estimation. "It caricatures the equal rights of everything which bears a human face, since it hides from men the unalleviated discrimination of social power: the difference between hunger and over-abundance, between spirit and docile idiocy."[92] The miserable, unacknowledged truth of the matter, meanwhile, is that: "No elevation of the concept Man has any power in the face of his actual degradation into a bundle of functions."[93] Which leaves Heidegger in the invidious position of attempting to drown out the din created by the orchestrated processes of degradation. "In spite of its eager neutrality and distance from society" Adorno affirms "authenticity stands on the side of the conditions of production, which, contrary to reason, perpetuate want."[94]

Most specifically, the ontology of Dasein, redefines the structure of species-being: it re-discovers the essence of human existence. It awaits the disinherited masses, the collective victim of epochal processes of dissolution and dislocation, with the news that no irrevocable damage has been done. In Heidegger's formulation, says Adorno: "The individual, who himself can no longer rely on any firm possession, holds on to himself in his extreme abstractness as the last, the supposedly unlosable possession."[95] So in spite of the ravages of the process of individuation, a process totally inimical to the notion of an actual commonwealth, every individual is said to retain an inalienable right of disposal over the possibility of remaining authentically himself. "Until further notice, authenticity and inauthenticity have as their criterion the decision in which the individual chooses itself as its own possession."[96] But Adorno immediately adds, this effort of reclamation on Heidegger's part has the unfortunate connotation that: "The subject, the concept which was once created in contrast to reification, thus becomes reified."[97] Dasein, which is "in every case, mine," has been reduced to the status of a coveted possession: a thing. Going even further in his condemnation, Adorno says: "whoever stubbornly insists on his mere so-being, because everything else has been cut off from him, only turns his so-being into a fetish."[98]

At the same time, what is possessed without reservation

remains entirely formal. This is so, firstly, in the sense that selfhood or individuality, conceived in the modality of authenticity, compensates for a lack of content, perhaps for a real impoverishment, rather than guaranteeing any actual proprietary right. So that the individual defends the principle that C.B. MacPherson calls "possessive individualism," before any particular property or possession: "authenticity names no authentic thing as a specific characteristic but remains formal relative to a content that is by-passed in the word."[99] Secondly, what is possessed, is utterly abstract, since it leaves aside consideration of the restraints exercised by concrete determinations. "Subjectivity, Dasein itself, is sought in the absolute disposal of the individual over himself, without regard to the fact that he is caught up in a determining objectivity."[100]

This analysis, concerned to reveal the hollowness of the affirmation of inviolable"mineness" made in the face of the alienating effect of objective conditions, becomes even more compelling when it turns to consider the importance of death in Heidegger's existentialism. "As soon as Heidegger speaks out openly," Adorno contends "his category of Dasein, as in the early period of bourgeois thought, is determined by its self-preserving principle..... But thereby," he continues, "the same position is accorded to death. As a limit it not only determines Heidegger's conception of Dasein, but it coincides, in the course of

the projecting of that conception, with the principle of abstract selfhood, which withdraws absolutely into itself, persevering in itself. .....death becomes the core of the self, as soon as it reduces itself completely to itself. Once self has emptied itself of all qualities, on the grounds that they are accidental-actual, then nothing is left but to pronounce that doubly pitiful truth, that the self has to die; for it is already dead. Hence the emphasis of that sentence, "Death is." For the ontology of Sein and Zeit, the irreplaceable quality of death turns into the essential character of subjectivity itself."[101] And what this dense refutation means is that Heidegger's enunciation of the primacy of mortality is less a discovery of the truth of the human condition, than a reverberation of his metaphysical premisses; which led him to enjoin submission to Being, to relinquish all that has been lost, to surrender the world of praxis; and which also led him to endeavour to save the principle of individuality, whose essence, stripped of all material interest, turned out to be self-preservation: an obsessive concern with the relation to death. Renunciation of the public world and a commitment to be nothing more than self-sameness predisposes Heidegger's existential analytic to "disclose" the ontological significance of Death. Saving the principle of individuality in material conditions which are experienced with a profound sense of loss, means for Adorno, elaborating the theme that: "man is to have his powerlessness and nothingness as his substance."[102]

Heidegger also discovers the ultimate existential possibility of Dasein in his capacity for authentic submission to language. Adorno's criticism in this direction is comparatively sparse: his main target is the existentialist theory of the subject that accommodates itself to self-immolation. Nevertheless, Adorno does iterate the rudiments of a sociological counter-conception of the basis of language. Thus, he says, against Heidegger: "He treats the historic languages as if they were those of Being....."[103] Heidegger is commended for appreciating that language "lies in truth, not truth in language;" effectively for accepting that language does not necessarily contain the truth, but that it may reveal truth as it lies beyond language. At the same time, Heidegger is taken to task for re-affirming the identity of truth and language, this time beyond the domain of the philosophy of mind, in the various regions of Being. "The test of the power of language," according to Adorno's contrary historical formulation "is that the expression and the thing will separate in reflection. Language becomes a measure of truth only when we are conscious of the non-identity of an expression with that which we mean. Heidegger refuses to engage in that reflection."[104] Which is to say that Heidegger's language philosophy is vitiated by blind conviction (by the return of a priorism), that the ontic (the referent) and the ontological (the concept) are equivalent throughout a discursive universe.

Secondly, in his consideration of Heidegger's philosophy of language, Adorno remarks that uncritical acceptance of language as truthful obscures the manner in which the means of communication mediate social power: establishing interpretative horizons, predisposing perception and signification to follow customary channels, ensuring the recurrence of a privileged set of presuppositions. "The sign system of language," Adorno writes, "by its mere existence, takes everything, to begin with, into something that is held in readiness by society; and defends this society in its own form prior to all content."[105] Ultimately, so Adorno contends, to advocate submission to the prevailing forms of representation is to urge collusion in the extended reproduction of social injustice. At which point ideology critique makes the connection that it aims to advertise; as Adorno impugns Heidegger's language philosophy on the grounds that no matter how abstract and aloof it believes itself to be, it is inextricably enmeshed in a politics of signification, vital for social reproduction.

In a particularly compact pronouncement on the ill-considered sociological implications of Heidegger's philosophy of language, Adorno says: "Once one extrapolates from the words of empirical language what authenticity is, as those words' authentic meaning, one sees that the merely existing world determines what on any specific occasion applies to those words; that world becomes the highest

court of judgment over what should and should not be. Today, nevertheless, a thing is essentially what it is in the midst of the dominant evil; essence is something negative."[106] Which taken more slowly, says approximately: firstly, if we leave aside what Heidegger is privileged to know as authentic meaning, that which is not compromised by the connotations that have accrued to it in the mundane sphere of circulation, what is left is obviously language in use; secondly, that language in use, plainly has as its social essence, the undiluted energy of the will to power; thirdly, what passes as legal tender in the domain of social commerce in language which Heidegger evacuates, is, in fact, irrationality and brutality. Effectively, Heidegger insists on the public nature of language and never suggests that the linguistic forms originate in the consciousness of the thinking subject; additionally, he acknowledges that meaning seeks to embrace something extra-conceptual. He never entertains the delusion that meaning springs fully formed from the structure of individual or of collective human intentionality (his thought is not fatuously teleological); but, and herein lies the gist of Adorno's criticism to the effect that the ontological strangles the historical, Heidegger chooses not to examine the sociological significance (the effect on the unacknowledged sociological premisses of transcendental philosophy) of his resolute evacuation of the philosophy of mind. Undoubtedly, he widened the purview of transcendental enquiry to include the public world of

discourse; but exactly at the moment of transition, he conferred upon the forms of language the structural invariance and unimpeachable probity, formerly claimed for the categories of consciousness. Methodologically, Heidegger's linguistic a priorism established new boundaries within which empirical observation and analytic logic could once again suffice to deliver the phenomenal truth.

Neither methodologically nor substantively, however, do rehabilitation of the concept of Being and reconstruction of the ontology of Dasein, achieve a successful resolution of fundamental issues. The suspicion returns, more insistently, that Heidegger's existentialism is an essentialism. Methodologically, Heidegger's radicalism had two aspects. Firstly, there was his pursuit of a criterion of disinterested truth. In this respect, though, his naive philosophy of disclosure collapsed into a convoluted obscurantism. Secondly, Heidegger shook off the philosophy of mind and rescued phenomenology from the problem of nominalism; but he did this by re-establishing indissoluble parameters for thought and experience in a concrete discursive universe. The philosophy of language he elaborated was sufficiently realistic to emphasize the irreducibly public nature of communicative networks and to stress the irrationality of prevalent forms through which experience is actually articulated; but Heidegger absolutely refused to contemplate the plasticity of

linguistic forms and their possible transfiguration.

Substantively, Heidegger proposed to counter the problems of reification (the disenchantment of the world accomplished by technical rationalization) and alienation (the estrangement of Dasein and Being). Here, too, and most noticeably, Heidegger's existentialism seemed ineffectual. His response to reification was retreatist. It consisted in refusal to traffic in debased forms. His reaction to alienation was acquiescent. It amounted to renunciation of the praxis that had allegedly distanced humanity from its true vocation: which is Care of Being. For Adorno, Heidegger's existentialism is, consequentially, no more than a rhetorical echo of the philosophy of practice: which on one side dissipates rather that articulates criticism; and which on the other, with its posture of submission, is predisposed to do nothing to alleviate distressful conditions. In relation to those negative experiences that provoke criticism, existentialism, says Adorno, is: "a habit of thought which sublimates them into a metaphysicial pain and splits them off from the real pain which gave rise to them."[107] Withdrawal into the possibility of authenticity, Adorno further remarks, means that "reconciliation between the inner and outer worlds, which Hegelian philosophy still hoped for, has been postponed ad infinitum."[108] All in all, the philosophy of Care, as the antithesis of a self-conscious political philosophy, takes on the

appearance of an apologia for political irresponsibility.

Adorno's immanent, methodological critique sifts assiduously through the consequences of Heidegger's abandonment of the epistemological framework. Of cardinal importance, Adorno suggests, is the fact that apophansis (which ostensibly restores to linguistic experience an undistorted access to Truth) actually envisages a situation in which the ontic, the non-conceptual, is fully represented in the ontological, in the conceptual. It sketches a scenario in which the ontological will stand aside, as it were, and let the ontic speak for itself. In effect, apophansis ascribes to materiality the desire and capacity to transsubstantiate itself as conceptuality; and it characterizes conceptuality in terms of a debilitating diffidence about its function of representation. It transpires that the putative equivalence of the ontic and the ontological is founded upon semantic confusion. Whereas the heuristic significance of epistemology had been precisely to problematize the relation of form and content and to put the problem of mediation on the agenda; Heidegger begins by (conveniently) misplacing the analytic distinction upon which critical philosophy is founded.

Subsequently, evasion of the problem of mediation, which proves to be the fundamental limitation of Heidegger's philosophy, is shown, with equal inevitability, to authorize a derogation of the empirical subject. The

rational subject is incapacitated. The constitutive subject of rationalism, that is, is required to surrender the power to cognize contradiction between personal estimates of the value of experience and prejudicial representations inscribed in and promulgated by the predominant, categorial forms of representation. More precisely, with Heidegger, the possibility of knowledge is emphatically not grounded in judgment. In Heidegger's formula for apophantic truth, the relationship between pre-established experiential structures (existentialia) and representational structures (language) is apprehended intuitively by a sentient being, not critically by a rational being. The individual with no cognitive work to do, with no constitutive function to perform, submissively acknowledges the harmony of the existing configuration. The origin of forms does not concern the empirical subject (the man-in-the-street).

For Adorno's ideological critique, the descent into irrationalism contains the historical truth of Heidegger's position. In general, when Heidegger chooses ontology over history, Adorno accuses his adversary of mystification: of naturalizing ephemeral social forms. But, here above all, in his irrationalism, Adorno recognizes Heidegger as spokesman for modern society which systematically militates against the possibility of rational subjectivity. In the familiar Frankfurt School thesis, post-liberal capitalism is the society of the weak ego. It submits Ego, on the one

hand, to the intimidating forces of the Superego, which as those primary institutional apparatuses that overdetermine psychological mechanisms, arrogate the functions of representation and immobilize thought. Simultaneously, this society subverts the formation of rational subjectivity by subtle management of instinctual energy: by organizing dissipation of the forces of the Id, without addressing (in fact while perpetuating) the pervasive sources of frustration. In the context of Adorno's critique, Heidegger's phenomenology registers the reification of the forms of experience (the management of instinctual energy, administration of the Id) and of the forms of representation (technical-rationalization of the means of communication, social control of the Superego); but is predisposed, methodologically, to deny the historicity of these circumstances.

In substantive terms, too, Adorno draws attention to an 'absent' sociology: i.e. to the way in which Heidegger deprecates the existential predicament (condemns it as the realm of inauthenticity), but maintains a principled opposition to the notion of practical transformation. In other words, the critical heart of the matter is Adorno's perception that Heidegger accedes to the prevailing institutional structure which ensures that politics, custody of policy (the power to decide), that impinges directly upon social reproduction, remains a matter of indifference for the generality of people. An avowedly

impenetrable concatenation of circumstances (the inscrutable government of an unaccountable, anonymous conglomerate, perhaps) coheres as the social premiss of Heidegger's existentialism: to which 'inauthentic' life-force, Heidegger's existentialism accommodates itself in detail. This irrational force, moreover, exercises the power of life and death in society. And so, Adorno insists ,when Heidegger submits to the violence (to the will to power) that animates Being, he inevitably, but haphazardly, makes death his highest principle.

Death, the absolute negation, that which signals the liquidation of the individual, becomes the animating principle of Heidegger's philosophy, as it is for a violent and irrational (for a militaristic, aggressively competitive) society. Heidegger acknowledges the prevalence or high incidence of anxiety (nervous depression, mental ill-health), he articulates a widespread obsession with the threat of imminent personal and collective extinction; but, with equal resolution, Adorno complains, Heidegger denies that what is at issue is fundamentally the logic of social reproduction and the structure of the social relations of production. For Adorno, the 'jargon of authenticity' is an ideology that denies the social origins of alienation. And whereas emancipation from the prevailing anxiety, whereas preservation or provision of anything resembling genuine personal disposal over life and death, would require

dissolution of the colossal apparatus of extermination, criminalization of government based on torture, and democratization of the structure of political decision (with all that this entails, including especially the reconstitution of rational subjectivity as a social programme); Heidegger, for his part, recommends an ineffectual retreatism, absorption in private life.

"In so far as death is absolutely alien to the subject," says Adorno, it is the model of all reification."[109] And this thought dominates his critique of Heidegger's existentialism. So, when Heidegger offers to the isolated and profoundly (emotionally, psychologically, economically, socially) insecure individual, the blandishment of his inalienable Self; Adorno accuses him of advertising and glamorizing a husk that has been stripped of almost all productive significance. Heidegger is said to speak for a society where automation has made the worker, at least the skilled worker, increasingly, an anachronism; and which has reduced the body to a fetish: (the residual, sub-rational location of the self, which increasingly defines the person as object (or not) of sexual desire. Which principle of individuation replaces the rationalist one that located subjectivity in the unity of consciousness). So, similarly, when Heidegger assures the individual of freedom (or authenticity) in language, yet cannot define subjectivity as essentially rational, Adorno detects an accommodation to reification of the means of communication.

Heidegger appears as spokesman for a society in which representation or signification like production has been automated, centralized and bureaucratized.

Finally, it is appropriate to underscore the point at which the limit of Heidegger's existentialism was located. It is important, in this respect, to re-emphasize that Heidegger's existentialism conferred an a priori validity upon currently ascertainable socio-existential horizons: which makes Heidegger's the very antithesis of a practical critical philosophy. Sustained analysis, however, revealed a methodological predisposition to establish, rather than a capacity to discover, experimentally, as it were, the essential invariance of things. In this sense, the paramount factor is the effect of the silent theory of society which functions as a Transcendental Aesthetic, that: firstly extrudes the rational individual (the possibility of criticism) from the phenomenological terrain; before, and as the sine qua non of, an affirmation of the unproblematic identity of the forms of representation and the forms of experience. Lurking behind that silent theoretical figure, or more realistically, through the gap where the philosophy of practice requires thought to exhibit some sociological mettle, so Adorno's critique concludes, a preconceptual social premiss ('the will to power,' 'the social relations of production,' 'fascism,') exerts its irrational authority, unopposed. It happens that in Heidegger's existentialism, the actual

circumstances which conspire to extrude a rational subject and to consolidate alienated forms of experience and representation, remain anonymous and escape censure.

Notes

1. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, Oxford, Basil Blackwell 1978, p 46.
2. Ibid., p 46.
3. Ibid., p 46.
4. Ibid., p 71.
5. See Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, D.F. Krell (ed), London, R.K.P., 1978, p 279.
6. Ibid., p 278.
7. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, pps. 246-47.
8. Ibid., p 226.
9. Ibid., p 72.
10. Heidegger, Martin: Basic Writings, p 207.
11. Ibid., p 235.
12. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p 50.
13. Ibid., p 24.
14. Ibid., p 24.
15. Ibid., p 27.
16. Ibid., p 254.
17. Heidegger, Martin: Basic Writings, p 279.
18. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p 84.
19. Ibid., p 152.
20. Ibid., p 89.
21. Ibid., p 226.
22. Ibid., p 70.
23. Ibid., p 67.
24. Ibid., p 207.
25. Ibid., p 143.

26. Ibid., p 144.

27. Ibid., p 146.

28. Ibid., p 164.

29. Ibid., p 164.

30. Ibid., p 175.

31. Ibid., p 177.

32. Ibid., pps. 188-89.

33. Ibid., pps. 190-91.

34. Ibid., p 90.

35. Ibid., p 193.

36. Ibid., p 208.

37. Ibid., pps. 208-09.

38. Ibid., p 201.

39. Ibid., pps. 222-23.

40. Ibid., p 165.

41. Ibid., p 164.

42. Ibid., p 239.

43. Ibid., p 222.

44. Ibid., p 68.

45. Ibid., p 227.

46. Ibid., p 236.

47. Ibid., p 227.

48. Ibid., p 284.

49. Ibid., p 294.

50. Ibid., p 379.

51. Ibid., p 420.

52. Ibid., pps. 303-04.

53. Ibid., pps 304-05.

54. Ibid., p 303.

55. Ibid., p 378.

56. Ibid., p 343.

57. Ibid., p 311.

58. Ibid., p 168.

59. Ibid., p 359.

60. Ibid., p 385.

61. Ibid., p 386.

62. Ibid., p 229.

63. Ibid., p 229.

64. Ibid., p 229.

65. Ibid., p 228.

66. Ibid., p 231.

67. Ibid., pps 203-04.

68. Ibid., p 204.

69. Ibid., p 205.

70. Ibid., p 212.

71. Ibid., p 213.

72. Ibid., p 212.

73. Ibid., p 217.

74. Ibid., pps 253-54.

75. Ibid., p 269.

76. Ibid., p 275.

77. Ibid., p 50.

78. Ibid., p 56.

79. Heidegger, Martin: Basic Writings, p 228.

80. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p 57, p 269.

81. Heidegger, Martin, Basic Writings, p 206.

82. Ibid., p 239.

83. Ibid., p 185.

84. Ibid., p 324.

85. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p 58.

86. Heidegger, Martin: Basic Writings, p 239.

87. Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, p 486.

88. Adorno, Theodor, W., Negative Dialectics, London, R.K.P., 1973, p 70.

89. Ibid., pps 101-02.

90. Ibid., p 85.

91. Ibid., pps 98-9.

92. Adorno, Theodor, W., The Jargon of Authenticity, London, R.K.P., 1973, p 66.

93. Ibid., p 68.

94. Ibid., p 112.

95. Ibid., p 115.

96. Ibid., pps. 114-15.

97. Ibid., p 115.

98. Ibid., p 122.

99. Ibid., p 125.

100. Ibid., p 128.

101. Ibid., pps. 136-37.

102. Ibid., p 65.

103. Adorno, Theodor, W., Negative Dialectics, p 112.

104. Ibid., p 111.

105. Adorno, Theodor, W., The Jargon of Authenticity, p 41.

106. Ibid., pps. 129-30.

107. Ibid., p 38.

108. Ibid., p 72.

109. Ibid., p 152.

CHAPTER TWO

FOUCAULT'S PHENOMENOLOGY TO END ALL PHENOMENOLOGIES ?

Alan Sheridan's book is probably the best available introduction to Foucault's thought. Its success in exposition may, as is claimed by Sheridan himself, be due to resolute and consistent refusal to indulge in gratuitous interpretation.[1] Sheridan may have been enabled as a result to give closer attention than otherwise to the arguments, themes, conclusions and implications of each of Foucault's studies. The obvious difficulty with Sheridan's minimalist posture, however, is that quotation involves abstraction, commentary necessitates interpretation, and selection and emphasis of significant details is made possible only by methodical reading based upon the operation of definite criteria. In the end, Sheridan's promise not to bury Foucault in commentary is no insurance against misrepresentation and distortion, nor more importantly can Sheridan's reading delve further into the mysteries of Foucault's premisses and antecedents than his own criteria and method of analysis allow.

So, while his diffidence may permit Sheridan to do justice to the substance of Foucault's studies, without the intrusion of extraneous interpretative materials, yet his adulation becomes an obstacle to his comprehension of his subject matter. Ultimately, we are expected merely to marvel at Foucault's philosophical virtuosity. At last, where Sheridan must declare himself and present his

methodological credentials he descends almost into philistinism. Thus, he writes: "It would ill behove an analyst of Foucault's thought to impose on the succession of his books any such notions as causal development, underlying unity, common origin..... The coherence of Foucault's work does not extend to a Foucault 'system.' This is why, if one is to write about his work at all, one can only do so chronologically, taking each book in turn. In a sense, each book arrives as a fresh start in a new world...."[2]

Inevitably, Sheriden raises the key questions: Foucault's relation to rationalism, to existentialism, to structuralism to Marxism. His answers are glib and superficial, however, as accords with his biographical and bibliophile approach to literary criticism. He proclaims the irreducible individuality of the author-genius: an approach not endorsed by Foucault, incidentally. He eulogizes the man and regards the book as the proper object of aesthetic production and criticism. Sheridan refuses to speculate on the nature of the principle that unifies the books, because the 'real' answer is to be found in the enigmatic figure of the author and because the book, the text, more loosely, is the only place where literary perfection can be realized.

Nevertheless, in spite of Sheridan's strictures, something other than the man himself must be offered as the principle of intelligibility underlying Foucault's intellectual

efforts. It behoves criticism to supply a theoretical answer.

The outstanding deficiency of Dreyfus and Rabinow's interpretation, by comparison, is its recurrent invocation of Thomas S. Kuhn. They constantly prod, cajole and belabour the idea that Foucault is primarily concerned to render intelligible what Kuhn had already called a 'paradigm.' Throughout, they substitute for the notion of the 'episteme', the admittedly not altogether dissimilar Kuhnian term. It would be unfair to suggest that their comparative approach is never successful; but they afford themselves only the latitude permitted by the 'paradigmatic' perspective on scientific activity. On top of which, their excessive recourse to Kuhn makes their presentation somewhat elliptical.

As is widely known, Kuhn argued that, typically, in the natural sciences, research effort is directed, constrained and legitimated by means of a tacit consensus upheld by the scientific community. What Kuhn called 'normal science' was supposed to require collective suspension of criticism, a moratorium on speculation, a common compliance with and submission to a more or less explicit set of background assumptions. In Kuhn's estimation, 'normal science' implies the universality in epistemological, methodological and sociological, terms of a 'paradigm'; a framework that

contains scientific activity.

Among the corollaries of that engaging notion is one that assumes decisive importance in Dreyfus and Rabinow's encounter with Foucault. Specifically, it seems to follow that social science, by virtue of its inveterate scepticism, can never qualify as 'normal science.' And for Dreyfus and Rabinow, Foucault without being fully aware of the fact, is struggling with the ultimate methodological question: believed to be that which demands clarification of the difference between the natural and social sciences. Or to put it even more crudely, the sixty-four million dollar question, the mega-question for American empiricism has always been: How can the social sciences become like the natural sciences ? Representing what they take to be Foucault's standpoint, they remark: "Since natural science, too, according to Foucault had its birth in the practices of specific social institutions, one would like to know whether the human sciences might likewise free themselves from their involvement with power."[3]

Predictable, too, is the Dreyfus, Rabinow conclusion, which turns on a precise definition of the difference that divides the natural and social sciences. They suggest that, with due regard for the implications of that difference, Foucault's genealogy of the human sciences could have been relieved of unfortunate irrationalist and nihilistic deviations, similar, they observe, to those evident in

Frankfurt School social theory.[4] The Dreyfus, Rabinow perspective is encapsulated in their statement that: "the really important difference between the two (kinds of science) is political. Whereas normal science has turned out to be an effective means of accumulating knowledge about the natural world (where knowledge means accuracy of prediction, number of different problems solved and so on, not truth about how things are in themselves) normalizing society has turned out to be a powerful and insidious form of domination."[5]

What we may safely infer from the foregoing asseveration is this: (1) the presumed unimpeachability of the epistemological/methodological premisses of natural science; (2) the operation of a dualistic ontology that creates the theoretical possibility of a science of nature that can in no way impinge upon the freedoms constitutive of human nature; (3) advocacy of a romantic social science (albeit, to be fair to them, advocacy of a critical social science; e.g. they write - "it would seem incumbent on Foucault to use his work to locate the endangered species of resistant practices."[6] However, it is unmitigated romanticism to reject a technological, 'normalizing' society (to protest at technification, reification, rationalization of social relations) while, at the same time, glorifying the achievement and method of the 'natural sciences.' If ideology consists in the merely imaginary or theoretical resolution of real contradiction, then Dreyfus

and Rabinow fall into ideology where they conceive of a critical social theory that exonerates the natural sciences before rounding upon itself as the villainous agent of domination.

The intrinsic difficulty with Dreyfus' and Rabinow's position is that it employs a simplistic, convenient version of Kuhnian 'phenomenology.' Their analysis neglects this consideration, for instance: namely, the circumstance that Kuhn's history of science discovered that normal science did not advance on the basis of a radical scepticism, through the kind of dialectic of conjecture and refutation envisaged by Popper; but that, on the contrary, 'normal science' proscribed unrestrained intellectual curiosity; that, in fact, the growth of knowledge was not cumulative and continuous but progressed spasmodically, through a series of epistemologically inexplicable 'paradigm switches' In short, Kuhn found that the vaunted sceptical rationalism of the natural sciences to be something of a myth. Dreyfus and Rabinow's naive 'naturalism,' however, notwithstanding their Kuhnian sympathies, survives Kuhn's critique.

Not infrequently, Dreyfus and Rabinow threaten to penetrate the central methodological mysteries surrounding Foucault's work. For example, they repeatedly allude to the importance of a connection between Foucault and the thought of Husserl and Heidegger. They describe Foucault's

researches, collectively, as the "phenomenology to end all phenomenologies."[7] With the same perspicacity they refer to Foucault's archeology as a" radicalization of Husserl's phenomenology."[8] At another point, they remark that Foucault's peculiar concept of power may have originated in Heidegger's conception of truth as the preparation of a 'clearing' that the intellect can inhabit.[9] They are also alive to the influence of structuralism in Foucault's thought; they quite justifiably look upon The Order of Things as an archeology of structuralism.[10]

As often as they promise to make headway, however, Dreyfus and Rabinow curtail their investigations with an abrupt evocation of some familiar precept of American empiricism. For example, as soon as they begin to consider the niceties of Foucault's linguistic philosophy, they introduce a 'simpler' American formula to advance their exposition. Thus they write, in typical fashion: "At the time he is writing The Archeology of Knowledge..... Foucault is exclusively interested in types of serious speech acts, the regularities constituted by their relations with other speech acts of the same and other types."[11] They move obliquely from Foucault to Searle, into a language philosophy burdened with psychologism and atomistic or monadic individualism. They adopt the position of American empiricism which reduces the philosophy of language to the philosophy of mind.

The principal example of their American ethnocentrism, of course, is their prior commitment to Kuhn. Dreyfus and Rabinow are never in danger, as they probe Foucault's texts, of succumbing to the allure of an alien culture. They are equipped for a safe passage through the labyrinths of European philosophy by analytic systems made in the U.S.A. The result is that while their discussion of Foucault is competent and accessible, with everything in sharp focus, still they are condemned to superficiality and digression, because they never, not even experimentally and temporarily, relinquish their own preconceptions so that they might give priority to Foucault's. Their book does not progress. Instead, it applies a Kuhnian grid to several aspects in turn of Foucault's work.

For his part, Barry Smart considers only one area of methodological controversy: the relation between Foucault and Marx. But Smart's approach is anything but investigative. In fact, his book is little better than a diatribe against certain forms (not, incidentally, against any intelligent forms) of Marxism. It is devoid of effective methodological analysis and can be quite adequately described as an extrapolation from a couple of pages of Alan Sheridan's study. At least, Smart not only echoes Sheridan's strident anti-Marxism and shares his conviction that Foucault and Marx are utterly irreconcilable, but he differentiates them on the basis of the same criterion. On the only occasion when Smart's

inquiry appears to over-reach Sheridan's, he invokes another of Foucault's English translators to make an unanswerable adjudication.

Sheridan, who makes the point more forcefully, as well as earlier, provides what he believes are ample grounds for rejecting the theory and practice of Marxism. So, on one side, he says: "Marx, for all his research into historical and economic facts, remained a philosopher. Marx could only think history and economics from within metaphysics. All philosophy belonging to that tradition is ultimately 'idealist;' 'materialism' is a philosopher's attempt, doomed in advance, to escape idealism and reach the real world."[12] In its political practice, Sheridan continues, Marxism was predisposed to ride rough-shod over material circumstances: "The Marxist tradition has maintained its contempt for facts, especially the facts of its own history. As ever, Soviet Communism has produced the most grotesque version of this contempt. Facts are weapons: they can get into the wrong hands."[13]

Foucault, Sheridan contends, has reformulated the relation of theory and practice in a way that avoids the metaphysical dogmatism and the political authoritarianism of Marxism. In explanation, Sheridan begins: "To become a true materialist, the philosopher must cease to be a philosopher. Nietzsche, the classical philologist, never became a philosopher; he also prevented Foucault from

becoming one."[14] This is four parts poetic gibberish, of course, but anyone familiar with the rhetoric of the Theses on Feuerbach where philosophers are also relieved of their duties, should be able to make something of it. Obviously, the claim is made for Foucault that, disencumbered of philosophical presuppositions, he was able to go straight to the facts, or to let the facts speak for themselves. The practical significance of this presuppositionless political theory, Sheridan contends, is that: "The Foucauldian genealogy is an unmasking of power for the use of those who suffer it. It is also directed against those who would seize power in their name."[15] In effect, we encounter the author of a political theory free of metaphysics and of a political practice without the Party.

Barry Smart's analysis follows the same pattern. Firstly, he sets out his general reservations about Marxist theory. "It is difficult," he remarks, "not to reach the conclusion that particular theoretical problems, which have been a consistent feature of the Marxist tradition, have defied resolution. At best, they may have been clarified, yet their very persistence is indicative of a possible insolubility within the existing terms of reference. For example, the epistemological status of Marxist analysis seems to have become a persistent problem, a perennial source of controversy among Marxists...."[16] Smart is less scathing in his criticism of Marxism than Sheridan; but for that reason he has less justification for pronouncing it

dead. When did "possible insolubility' become grounds for the foreclosure of epistemological debate ? Could there be any sociology or political theory at all, if perspectives without stable and adequate epistemological criteria were suppressed ? All that Smart can offer against Marxist theory is a faint silhouette of Sheridan's caricature: Marxism is dismissed as a sterile scholasticism.

The distinction between 'materialism' and materialism introduced by Sheridan also reappears in Smart's study. Thus, he says: "This Nietzschean conception of the body as inscribed by history and invested with relations of power and domination is the antithesis of conceptions in which the body is the alienated locus of an essential human potential."[17] It is alleged that whereas Marxism relies upon a metaphysical notion of man, Foucault's Nietzschean conception does not. This construction elicits two responses. Firstly, it prompts the thought that where Foucault purports to document the experience of man as a being who suffers, surely he extemporizes a philosophy of alienation, with a practical intention, not entirely dissimilar to Marx's endeavours to articulate, theoretically, the experience of the victims of primitive accumulation and of the wages system ? Secondly, Smart's judgment deserves the rejoinder that the notion which conceives the body as an object of subjection is quite consonant with, not in the least antithetical to, a notion that regards men as estranged from an 'essential'

potential: these constructions can be said, perhaps, to coalesce in opposition to a theory of society which proclaims the inalienable rights of man as invulnerable and inviolable, quite irrespective of the disposition of social forces and the structure of existential conditions. Both viewpoints can be said to be materialistic in the sense that they oppose an a prioristic, 'idealistic' humanism, and acknowledge the determinacy, for the structure of individual and collective experience, of social conditions. It is these considerations which have led critics like Dominique Lecourt and Edith Kurtzweil to glimpse an affinity between Foucault and Marx, somewhere above the differences between their substantive political theories.[18]

In due course, Barry Smart proceeds to lodge his doubts about Marxist political philosophy, more minutely. Again, however, his submissions lack the unwarranted assurance of Sheridan's. Which has the advantage that the basis of this conception of the diametrical opposition of Marx and Foucault becomes visible. Above all, Smart points to the reprehensible effect of 'statism': the Marxist fallacy that recognizes power as the prerogative of the state apparatus. "Politically" says Smart, "it has led revolutionary movements to constitute themselves in the image of the state; to seek to accumulate comparable politico-military forces and to adopt hierarchical and bureaucratic forms of organization....."[19] More pointedly,

elsewhere, he writes: "At worst it may be argued that a Marxist programme guarantees only that one form of state power may be displaced by another, more powerful form which has appropriated the authority of science."[20] At which point, it becomes apparent, even if the argument is more thoughtful than Sheridan's, that Smart is really declaring that the spectre of communist terror cannot be exorcised from the principles of Marxist political philosophy: totalitarianism, we are meant to understand, is the evil deus ex machina that awaits the hour of revolution. What is objectionable here, is this: firstly, that proverbial wisdom, advocacy of the lesser of two evils, masquerades as sociological and political analysis; secondly, the fact that this whole exercise in simplification is based upon moral revulsion against a political violence for which Marxist theory is allegedly the seedbed; thirdly, the idealist/empiricist fallacy that postulates a simple causal relation between theory and practice and which makes it possible to focus moral revulsion upon a discrete constellation of ideas as the cosmological centre for the production of political violence; fourthly, that his interpretation enforces a reduction of Marxism to Stalinism (and manufactures for itself the easiest of polemical targets); fifthly, that it confuses Marx and Marxism and it holds Marx morally responsible for totalitarian communism.

All this is necessary to sustain the Marx-Foucault polarity. Any attempt at a theoretical explanation of the

methodological connections between Foucault and Marx, however, immediately throws that rigid polarity into question. For example, Smart actually gives a nice account of the logic of Foucault's critical phenomenology when he says: "The crux of the matter concerns Foucault's account of the discrepancy between discourses - for example, on punishment and the prison or on the organization of the domain of sexuality - and the actual functioning of institutions, which it is evident do not embody a fulfilment of the appropriate rational schemas."[21] At this juncture, however, Smart feels obliged to explain away the resemblance between this formula and the logic of Frankfurt School Marxism. To this end, Smart reiterates Colin Gordon's opinion that there is an indissoluble antithesis between 'critical theory's' tendency to construe all power as repressive and Foucault's insistence that power is also a positive formative influence.[22] Quite apart from the fact that there is a switch in Smart's argument from the methodological to the substantive level in order to sustain the Marx-Foucault dichotomy, it should be appreciated that Foucault's genealogy invariably records the proliferation of pathological forms of social, psychological and physical experience which consolidate domination. Which means that by stressing the primacy of the category of domination or reification over that of repression, by a mere inflection, in other words, the similarity between the concepts of negativity central to Foucault's genealogy and to Frankfurt School critique, again becomes quite impossible to ignore.

In the final analysis, Smart must be said to have penned a polemic that, methodologically, leads nowhere, He postulates the existence of an antithesis which turns out only to be a difference whose true character is never clarified. It is suggested that Marxism condones political violence, while Foucault's political philosophy does not. This is Smart's central contention. Foucault is supposed to have renounced all the contaminated conceptual baggage of Marxism, which makes possible a more humane and morally justifiable politics. But this seems particularly unsatisfactory as an appraisal of Foucault. To expect morality from the self-proclaimed apostle of Nietzsche is, surely, absurd. In fact it seems more accurate to say that Foucault professes the politics of an incendiary. His structural analysis depicts the reified social world as so much dry tinder. His hermeneutics, his effort to enunciate the unutterable, his commitment to expose degenerate forms of socio-political existence, threaten to inflame, at least to politicize what administrative techniques have dessicated and petrified. The link between theory and practice is by no means abrogated, nor does Foucault seem inhibited by moral qualms about possibly violent repercussions of his profoundly practical, political philosophy. Barry Smart, like Alan Sheridan, seems to hanker after a moral philosophy, which neither Nietzsche nor Foucault, any more than Marx, can be expected to supply. Since Hegel,

who still felt compelled finally and reluctantly to confront the most urgent socio-political issues of the day against a background of eternal moral truths about the human condition, social philosophy in its search for truth has moved irrevocably beyond good and evil and habitually regards moral justifications with even deeper suspicion than the facts of material evidence. 'Critique' has become a sustained interrogation of the pretensions of moral prejudices; and as such it cannot be expected to concede the morality of the present order, in advance. (See Foucault's comment: "For modern thought, no morality is possible.") [23]

Finally, perhaps, it is worth alluding to the way in which Foucault perceived his political anatomy of the body constituted by and administered by modern disciplinary techniques and systems of surveillance, as dovetailing with and complementing Marx's critique of political economy. Foucault's estimation of the importance of this connection provides the most cogent refutation of the idea that, substantively, Marx and Foucault pursue radically different interests. In this regard, Foucault wrote: "If the economic take-off of the West began with the techniques that made possible the accumulation of capital, it might perhaps be said that the methods for administering the accumulation of men made possible a political take-off in relation to the traditional, ritual, costly, violent forms of power; which soon fell into disuse and were superseded

by a subtle, calculated technology of subjection. In fact, the two processes - the accumulation of men and the accumulation of capital - cannot be separated; it would not have been possible to solve the problem of the accumulation of men without the growth of an apparatus of production capable of both sustaining them and using them; conversely, the techniques that made the cumulative multiplicity of men useful accelerated the accumulation of capital. At a less general level, the technological mutations of the apparatus of production, the division of labour and the elaboration of disciplinary techniques sustained an ensemble of very close relations..... The growth of a capitalist economy gave rise to the specific modality of disciplinary power, whose general formulas, techniques of submitting forces and bodies, in short, 'political anatomy,' could be operated in the most diverse political regimes, apparatuses or institutions."[24] There is nothing here to suggest that the critique of political economy is redundant or that Foucault challenges the fundamental purpose and content of Marx's substantive social theory.

The Central Work: The Order of Things

In the present interpretation, Foucault's work is discussed as a critique of phenomenology. At least, methodologically, the principle of intelligibility that unifies his diverse investigations is discovered in a protracted altercation with and gradual process of emancipation from the premisses of a phenomenological social theory; and, substantively,

from the time of Madness and Civilization to Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, his intellectual labour is construed as a spirited effort to contrast and bring into visibility, the unbridgeable gulf between the theoretical pretensions of 'positive' social sciences and satellite discourses, on the one side, and the disastrous effect on the quality of human experience that has accompanied the ascent of those human sciences. Progressively, it will be argued that Foucault's critique of phenomenology attacks a philosophy of social science beholden especially to the philosophy of language and existentialism propounded by Heidegger. Simultaneously, it will be alleged that Foucault's critical phenomenology, systematically, exposes the philosophic bankruptcy of 'positive' social science and associated, ancillary anthropological discourses; and documents their historical role as pitiless instruments of social domination. With these thoughts in mind, with Foucault's attitude to phenomenology properly understood, it becomes possible to explain what elsewhere remains obscure, namely, Foucault's relation to existentialism, to structuralism and to Marxism. It is also possible to go farther and to say what supports the notions of archeology and genealogy, and to discover what, theoretically, unifies his work.

Two circumstances, above all, impede comprehension of Foucault's methodological premisses. Firstly, there is the fact that he is by temper and conviction an out-and-out

critical philosopher. Contingent upon his impatience with contemplative metaphysics is a measure of methodological obscurity: which manifests itself in pronouncements that are variously provocative, speculative, preposterous or just wilfully enigmatic. The second source of difficulty for methodological enquiry is the undoubted importance of Foucault's "positivist" period: whose concrete representative is the concept of archeology. These two factors are evident in The Archeology of Knowledge which, as the positivist period draws to a close, attempts a sustained exercise in self-criticism. In that text, which proposes to crystallize some 'positive' conclusions from the diffuse, extensive and inconclusive rumination undertaken in The Order of Things, Foucault oscillates between the temptation to claim an a priori validity for his archeological researches and an inclination to concede the transparency of such an imposture. In the event, The Archeology of Knowledge ends in an embarassed 'epistemological relativism' (as 'positivism', where it consists in a quest for an a priori universal, must) and with a mischievous, disingenious chuckle. Equally, significantly, the notion of archeology does not survive the intense interrogation to which it is submitted. The real thematic centre of gravity of The Archeology of Knowledge is a new critical notion, that of "discursive practice," while the concept of archeology is designated in terms of what it does not signify or presume, without fulfilling its compulsion to become a 'positive' formula.

Where Foucault's method is in question, no doubt, The Order of Things is the fundamental work. Not in its own terms, however. Not in the superficial sense that it propounds an archeology of the human sciences which finally resolves the problem of scientific method, by delineating the necessary structure of the modern episteme and by ascertaining the limit of human reason, in general. The book does have that kind of positivistic overtone, imported, in all likelihood, from Structuralism. It exhibits a longing to surpass phenomenology in epistemological and methodological rigour. In fact, however, The Order of Things is the key text in any search for the fundamentals of Foucault's thought in the almost opposite sense that it may be read as the theoretical expression of a profound methodological crisis in which his earlier work erupts and from which, as it were, his subsequent work recovers.

All Foucault's studies assail the principles of phenomenology, which stand behind and provide the rationale or legitimation of positive discourses like psychology, psychiatry, medical science or criminology. Foucault does not undertake a meticulous inventory and clinical analysis of the elementary concepts which project the self-understanding of these sciences, however. Instead he by-passes the theory and philosophy of these discourses, and aims to re-assess the practical and historical evidence of their effects. He attempts an unprecedentedly radical

phenomenology. The Order of Things is in this respect entirely representative, in the sense that it proceeds through a philosophical quagmire (the question of the origin and objectivity of the social sciences) not by scrutinizing claims to scientificity and epistemological rectitude, but by way of a phenomenological reconstruction of the emergence of specific empirical disciplines such as biology, economics and philology. The Order of Things is, quite characteristically, more phenomenological than hermeneutical. The, admittedly, fairly detailed and obviously fundamental readings and transcriptions of Ricardo, Cuvier and Bopp, among others and in particular, are in due course spectacularly overburdened by speculation about the changing structure of those conventions which govern theoretical representation. The Order of Things is properly understood as a counter-phenomenology, because it consists in a web of speculation about the logic of scientific discovery erected upon exactly the same evidential base as academically accredited interpretations.

What establishes The Order of Things as a singularly important book in Foucault's intellectual development is the fact that it becomes increasingly embroiled, self-consciously, with the most indispensable presuppositions of phenomenology. So, on one level of significance, Foucault's residual dependence upon these enabling principles is encountered as the hitherto unacknowledged

brake upon his own capacity to articulate social criticism. So, on another level of significance, the two main postulations formulated and substantiated throughout that text (one which alleges that the relation between language and the task of theoretical representation has undergone successive, astonishing transformations; and one that declares that Man has entered the field of knowledge only in the last two hundred years) turn out to be with respect to the most sacred principles of phenomenology, counter-theses. The Order of Things attempts to replace the ontological conception of language embrac ed and promulgated by phenomenology with a more practical conception: the concrete result of his investigation and deliberation in this regard is the transformation of the "historical a priori" from the fairly rigid form of "the episteme" which dominates The Order of Things, into the fluid notion of "discursive practice" that emerges in The Archeology of Knowledge and which is successfully operationalized thereafter.

Just as assuredly, The Order of Things finds Foucault still, but increasingly uncomfortably, in the existentialist fold. Existentialism still supplies the pathos in that text, as earlier. Above all, death retains its strategic position as the ultimate restriction on human experience. "Is death not that upon the basis of which knowledge in general is possible ?"[25] However, as the notion of death is progressively transposed, epistemologically, in the

"analytic of finitude," the urgency of the problem of personal extinction and the tragedy of the natural limit of human resourcefulness, give way to anxiety concerning the forms of alienation that dominate and determine experience; which degenerate forms are administered as regional ontologies by those quasi-scientific disciplines which collectively define the 'positive' anthropological knowledge of the modern period. The Utopian vision that Foucault entertains towards the end of The Order of Things, requires the explosion of the forms of alienation. Admittedly, in that text, Foucault remains almost melancholic: his protest at the reification of social existence and the lost possibility of transcendence that entails, takes the form of an encomium on the power of literature to transport linguistic experience beyond the grip of repetition in established forms of expression. His later works, in comparison, get beyond existentialist pathos.

In effect, The Order of Things represents the climax of Foucault's disputation with phenomenology. The book has two themes; more properly, perhaps, it contains two projects. Firstly, it attempts to shatter a pervasive ontological conception of language and to authenticate an alternative historical conception. Secondly, it introduces and explores the idea that, far from being an invariant component of knowledge throughout historical time, as an existentialist philosophy might suggest, Man is actually a

recent invention of the human sciences. What soon becomes apparent, however, is that within the pages of The Order of Things, neither project is satisfactorily concluded, which perhaps explains the undiminished tension and exhorbitant commentary with which the book closes. Also, it becomes apparent that the two projects are less than perfectly integrated and harmonized. As a result, Foucault's characterization of the modern episteme contains an unresolved contradiction which is responsible for some much-discussed anomalies in his position, notably in his relation to Marx and to existentialism.

But in order to pursue these observations it is necessary to turn to the text.

Postulation I:
In Language we Encounter an Historical Reality

The Order of Things documents unsuspected, previously unlooked-for temporal dislocations in the a priori principles of science: "archeological enquiry has revealed two great discontinuities in the episteme of Western culture".[26] To survey the common stock of knowledge, the unexplicated presuppositions, the axiological and categorial armature of scholarship in the Renaissance, in the Classical period (1650-1800 approximately) and in the modern age that begins in the nineteenth century and persists today, so Foucault means to persuade us, is to encounter three quite distinct, three relatively inflexible

epistemological fields.[27] To grasp the distinctiveness of each epistemological system, each episteme, Foucault continues, it is necessary to conceptualize three different modalities of the relation of language and the world. Or, more precisely still, to appreciate three ways in which on the one hand, language has been expected to represent reality, and, on the other hand, three ways in which language has entered into space and time.

In the Renaissance, theoretical representation of the world was an inexhaustible hermeneutic exercise. Knowledge was synonymous with Interpretation. The world was uncritically experienced as the repository of Divinely ordained meaning which language could render intelligible to men. The Classical period sought knowledge in a more chaotic world. Knowledge brought Order. This was the age of mechanism, of the urge to encompass the world mathematically. The Classical age was also, however, the age of nominalism: it had lost the conviction that language could duplicate or reproduce the object of its reflection; instead it sought to be rigorous in the attribution of names to the objects of experience. Finally, in Foucault's scheme, the modern period is the Age of Judgment, and Science, of Positive Knowledge. Which is to say, also, that in the modern age Man enters the field of knowledge.[28] On the one side, in the new configuration, knowledge was expected to disclose the truth of extraneous real systems; through language being was expected to give an account of itself to Man. On the

other side, knowledge was expected to provide an account of Man: consequentially, there arose a network of anthropological discourses whose role was, increasingly, to constitute Man as the protege of positive knowledge. Language retained its instrumental function but this became complicated by an awareness that language simultaneously exercised an impalpable determinacy: as the element in which man cognizes the world, as the pre-established horizon of intelligibility which constrains his thought and action; as the a priori limit imposed upon his relation to his material circumstances. By degrees, the modern episteme understands language as the means of diffusion and inculcation of those fundamental codes that are ultimately responsible for the organization of social space and time. So, increasingly, we understand Man as the invention and effect of "positive knowledge."

The Renaissance

The foremost category of the Renaissance, Foucault explains, was resemblance. Among four subsidiary principles were: juxtaposition or propinquity or contiguity, which all recognized a spatial affinity; emulation or reflection, which both registered similarities that defy spatial boundaries; analogy, which acknowledged the power of imagination to link all the entities of the world; and sympathy which discerned tendencies in things rather than focussing upon their properties. "It is a principle of mobility,"[29] says Foucault. Together with its

antonym, in the sympathy-antipathy pair, we are told, it incorporated all the simpler notions of resemblance and is the archetypal figure.

The Renaissance world of resemblances presupposed a common origin. Everything bore the mark of a common authorship. "There are no resemblances without signatures"[30] as Foucault puts it. The challenge facing the scholarship of the Renaissance was to decipher the signatures or to transcribe those signatures as resemblances. On one side, the possibility of knowledge subsisted in a system of linguistic signs which could duplicate patterns of resemblance. On the other side, was a pattern of resemblances which endured as the material inscriptions of a Divine Signature. "Let us call the totality of the learning and skills that enable one to make the signs speak and to discover their meaning, hermeneutics; let us call the totality of the learning and skills that enable one to distinguish the location of signs, to define what constitutes them as signs, and to know how and by what laws they are linked, semiology."[31] That done, says Foucault, the main preoccupations of the sixteenth century scholar are made known. Besides which, the argument runs, the non-correspondence of these intellectual endeavours determined the character of the problem of knowledge. As Foucault explains: "Everything would be manifest and immediately knowable if the hermeneutics of resemblance and the semiology of signatures coincided without the slightest

parallax. But because the similitudes that form the graphics of the world are as one 'cog' out of alignment with those of discourse, knowledge and the infinite labour it involves find here the place that is proper to them: It is their task to weave their way across this distance, pursuing an endless zig zag course from resemblance to what resembles it."[32]

Ascending to the archeological level, to ponder those conditions of knowledge that were not open to conjecture in the sixteenth century, Foucault inevitably, routinely, maps the relation of language to theory, on one side, and to being, on the other. Half the answer, that which sketches the Renaissance conception of the relation of language to the world, is presented thus: "In its original form, when it was given to men by God himself language was an absolutely certain and transparent sign for things, because it resembled them..... This transparency was destroyed at Babel as a punishment for men.... But though language no longer bears an immediate resemblance to the things it names, this does not mean that it is separate from the world; it still continues, in another form, to be the locus of revelations and to be included in the area where truth is both manifested and expressed. True it is no longer nature in its primal visibility, but neither is it a mysterious instrument with powers known only to a few privileged persons. It is rather the figuration of the world redeeming itself, lending its ear to the true

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word..... Language possesses a symbolic function; but since the disaster at Babel we must no longer seek for it - with rare exceptions - in the words themselves, but rather in the very existence of language, in its total relation to the totality of the world, in the intersecting of its space with the loci and forms of the cosmos."[33]

The other half of the answer, that which supplies the corresponding conception of the relation of language and thought, of the relation between language and the possibility of theoretical exegesis, consists in Foucault's observation that, in those days, there existed "an absolute privilege on the part of writing."[34] In other words, between the material conditions of knowledge and the possibility of understanding, scholarship brought truth into existence in written form. The written word activated and substantiated as theoretical truth the essential bond between language and Being. "This privilege" Foucault submits, "dominated the entire Renaissance, and was no doubt one of the great events in Western culture. Printing, the arrival in Europe of Oriental manuscripts, the appearance of literature no longer created for the voice or performance and therefore not governed by them, the precedence given to the interpretation of religious texts over the tradition and magisterium of the Church - all these bear witness - to the fundmental place accorded in the West to Writing."[35] Knowledge took the form, Foucault maintains, of an

epistemological fields.[27] To grasp the distinctiveness of each epistemological system, each episteme, Foucault continues, it is necessary to conceptualize three different modalities of the relation of language and the world. Or, more precisely still, to appreciate three ways in which on the one hand, language has been expected to represent reality, and, on the other hand, three ways in which language has entered into space and time.

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interminable, prodigious commentary on a world of resemblances. The pursuit of knowledge was conducted within the circumference of a scheme of relevances which connected written commentary, firstly, to the profusion of signs inscribed across the surface of the material world and, secondly, to a text whose truth lay buried below the level of appearances. The intimacy of words and things, throughout, made possible an interpretative knowledge whose truth eventually appeared in writing.

The Classical Age

Just as the Renaissance organized knowledge around the category of resemblance, the Classical Age equated knowledge with what Foucault calls representation. The first of the two great discontinuities in the history of thought whose existence is announced in The Order of Things, is signalled by the ascendancy of representation and the derogation of resemblance: which becomes the simplest form of knowledge. Peculiar to the emergence of the new episteme, essential to the supremacy of representation, is the dissolution of the unity of resemblances and their signs. The new problem of knowledge originates in a profound scepticism about the capacity of the sign simply and without distortion to duplicate its referential object. It is as if, in the Classical Age, learning accepts a more onerous burden of proof in order to produce an improved knowledge. At a minimum, the Classical Age appears as the negative of

the Renaissance, insofar as it refuses the suggestion that a sign merely reproduces some aspect of a substantial system of resemblances. In its full-blown form, representation in the Classical Age is alive to the fact that the sign cannot merely represent its object but that, in addition, it contains, necessarily, and unavoidably, an idea or judgment, that does not originate with any object. The Classical Episteme is, accordingly, graspable as a general theory of representation that hinges upon a "binary theory of the sign".[36]

In the Classical Age, Foucault maintains: "The profound kinship of language and the world was thus dissolved."[37] Now signs exist exclusively on the side of the knowing subject, while that which was known as the world of resemblances exists as a natural order where signs have no place. In Foucault's judgment: "signs are now set free from that teeming world throughout which the Renaissance had distributed them. They are lodged henceforth within the confines of representation, in the intestices of ideas, in that narrow space in which they interact with themselves in a perpetual state of decomposition and recomposition."[38] Knowledge is thus possible, on one side, because of the intrinsic, indubitable meaningfulness of the signs which coalesce in systems of representation. Knowledge proceeds from its presumption of the meaningfulness of the sign. At the same time, however, the general theory of representation continues to demand maximum deference to the objects

of representation. So Foucault writes: "The table of signs will be the image of things. Though meaning itself is entirely on the side of the sign, its functioning is entirely on the side of that which is signified."[39] The general relevance of this bifurcation in emphasis is demonstrated by Foucault in the following terms: "This is why," he says, "the analysis of language, from Lancelot to Destutt de Tracy, is conducted on the basis of an abstract theory of verbal signs and in the form of a general grammar: but it always takes the meaning of words as a guiding thread; it is also why natural history manifests itself as an analysis of the characters of living beings, and why, nevertheless, the taxonomies used, artificial though they may be, are always intended to unite with the natural order, or at least to dissociate it as little as possible; it is also why the analysis of wealth is conducted on the basis of money and exchange, but value is always based upon need."[40] The perilous arbitrariness of the sign is held in check in every case by a conventional anchorage in a specific region of the natural world.

Thought in the Classical Age was founded on a binary theory of the sign, which in turn rested upon an ontological divide that separated mind and matter, words and things. Scholarship was condemned to pursue enlightenment along two divergent trajectories and constantly obliged to adjust and re-evaluate each project in the light of advances in the other. In general, at that time, Foucault alleges,

knowledge elaborated an analytic of imagination and an analysis of nature. The analytic of imagination explored that aspect of representation which involves transposition of a complex of impressions that are originally dispersed in space and time. The analytic of imagination constructed an abstract framework that would accommodate the urge of reason to protect its discoveries from the corrosive effects of history.[41] The analyis of nature, meanwhile, assiduously developed its capacity for systematic observation of that vibrant and chaotic environment that confounded cognition, contradicted every effort of representation and ultimately surpassed comprehension.

The knowledge of the period advanced, we are told, as a function of the tension between the analytic of imagination, which protected and continuously expanded its conceptual constellations above the empirical domain; and the analysis of nature where the inexhaustible labour of observation was in perpetual progress. Between these poles of theoretical endeavour, Foucault explains, thought shuttled, more primitively still, between Nature and Human Nature. These two extremities and the epistemological division of labour to which their projected reconciliation gave rise, Foucault further announces, "are united in the idea of a genesis":[42] which idea consists in deployment of the power to perceive difference, disorder, contradiction, and the associated capacity to fabricate an orderly representation of disorderly impressions. Classical

thinkers, we are told, considered that human nature, by virtue of its ambiguous position between the divine and the demonic, because it was thus conceived in contradiction, enjoyed the privilege of imagination. "The power of imagination is only the inverse, the other side, of its defect. It exists, within man, at the suture of body and soul."[43] Enlarging his explanation, Foucault adds: "It is true that imagination is apparently only one of the properties of human nature, and resemblance one of the effects of nature; but if we follow the archeological network that provides Classical thought with its laws, we see quite clearly that human nature resides in that narrow overlap of representation which permits it to represent itself to itself (all human nature is there....)"[44] In the general theory of representation with its divided perception of the sign, there is a conviction that there is a chaotic order of things that can be comprehended; and there is a conviction that human nature can produce order out of disorder.

In the Renaissance, so Foucault's analysis claimed to show, knowledge took the form of written commentary that brought into alignment a system of resemblances and a system of signatures. Behind this particular epistemic form, we were led to understand, were determinate presumptions about the relation of language to theory and of language to being. In exactly the same way, Foucault's analysis of the historical specificity of the <u>episteme</u> of the Classical

age, moves inexorably towards a subliminal perception of the nature of language as the determinate influence. En route, what were previously referred to as the analytic of imagination and the analysis of nature are redefined, like this: "at the two extremities of the Classical episteme," Foucault says, "we have a mathesis as the science of calculable order and a genesis as the analysis of the constitution of orders on the basis of empirical series."[45] On one side, language avails theory of a matrix of signs, whose value is purely notional. These can be deployed by the science of mathesis to elaborate an idealized order. On the other side, on the side of nature, language is considered to be absent. As Foucault puts it: "one might say that language in the Classical era does not exist. But that it functions: its whole existence is located in its representative role, is limited precisely to that role and finally exhausts it. Language has no other locus, no other value, than its representations."[46] Investigation of the genesis of empirical orders, establishes resemblances and differences which must be ascribed a symbolic value before its endeavour can count as knowledge. The Classical age, in this sense, is the age of nominalism. Knowledge comprises the results of enquiry that appear in abstract systems of representations. "Hedged in by calculus and genesis," Foucault observes, designating the form of knowledge characteristic of the Classical age, "we have the area of the table"[47] which enables him to announce: "It is in this area that we encounter natural history - the science

of the characters that articulate the continuity and the tangle of nature. It is also in this area that we encounter the theory of value - the science of the signs that authorize exchange and permit the establishment of equivalences between men's needs or desires. Lastly, it is also in this region that we find general grammar - the science of the signs by means of which men group together their individual perceptions and pattern the continuous flow of their thoughts. Despite their differences, these three domains existed in the Classical age only insofar as the fundamental area of the ordered table was established between the calculation of equalities and the genesis of representations."[48]

Where, in the Renaissance, one set of ascertainable presuppositions about the nature of language gave rise to knowledge in the form of written commentary, so, in the Classical age another set of unconscious constraints gave rise to knowledge in the form of the taxonomic table. In the Classical age knowledge appeared in catalogues, inventories, indexes, libraries. Always, impressions of the empirical world were registered in the safe-keeping of an abstract space. At which point it should be emphasized that the Classical age was unable to generate the kind of 'positive' knowledge characteristic of modern times: it was compelled to fill out and preserve abstract spatio-temporal regions and sub-regions.

Foucault's closer inspection of the activities of individual disciplines (general grammar, analysis of wealth and natural history) is intended to provide confirmation of his general proposition that the pursuit of knowledge in diverse areas of concern in any age will, necessarily, probably quite unwittingly, obey one overriding system of constraints.[49]

General Grammar

In his review of the priorities which organized the study of language in the Classical age, Foucault aims to situate the science of general grammar between the Renaissance and the modern period by arguing that general grammar alone subscribed to the binary theory of the sign, and that for it alone 'language did not exist.' It is in these terms that Foucault proceeds to reinforce his fundamental postulation that in the structure of knowledge in the Classical age we encounter a unique historical formation. At length, he discloses the authoritative influence exercised by the categories of mathesis, genesis and taxonomia over the accumulation of substantive knowledge.

The linguistic researches of the Classical period are said to have clustered around the pre-theoretical object, discourse. When Foucault announces that language did not exist in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he means to persuade us that language was understood as discourse, whose distinguishing characteristic was its status as a

primordial idealization of the world of things. The written commentaries of the Renaissance transcribed a language that was already interwoven with the fabric of the material world; which it sought to unwind. For general grammar, in comparison, language was already restricted, as discourse, to its representative function, and could accomplish no more than a "play of substitutions."[50] In the Classical age, Foucault remarks: "Commentary has yielded to criticism."[51] By which he means that mimesis, the laborious accumulation of instances of resemblance and difference is, in every sphere of knowledge, bound, subserviently, to a rigorous, analytic semiology that supervises the allocation and distribution of signs. Discourse exists as a naive and spontaneous form of representation, as an insufficiently critical, commentary on things, which stands in need of a more systematic criticism, the responsibility of the meta-discourse, general grammar.

General grammar is the analysis of "discourse, understood as a sequence of verbal signs."[52] It would be, Foucault cautions, "nonsensical to attempt to interpret it as a sort of prefiguration of linguistics."[53] For the reason, which should be clear, that in Foucault's estimation, general grammar addressed its own distinct object, discourse, with its own conceptual baggage. To be more precise, general grammar was constructed upon, made possible by, a concerted effort to transpose the diffuse and ephemeral events of a naturally occurring discursive order, in the controlled

space of a two-dimensional representational system. Thereafter, in one direction, general grammar felt compelled to account for the arbitrariness of the words and meanings by whose means the original discursive order functioned (etymology). In another direction, it felt obliged to provide an exhaustive detailed exegesis of the rules governing the interrelation of words-signs (syntax). "General grammar," Foucault concludes, "does not attempt to define the laws of all languages, but to examine each particular language, in turn, as a mode of articulation of thought upon itself.... It must establish the taxonomy of each language."[54]

By way of mathesis, general grammar develops theories of the proposition, the elementary unit of representation, and of the verb "the indispensable condition for all discourse."[55] "The proposition is to language what representation is to thought, at once its most general and elementary form, since as soon as it is broken down we no longer encounter the discourse but only its elements...."[56] And, inevitably, reflection on the nature of the proposition discovers the supreme importance of the verb. In the reckoning of the Classical grammarians, it seems: "The threshold of language lies at the point where the verb first appears. A proposition exists - and discourse too - when we affirm the existence of an attributive link between two things, when we say that this is that."[57] More emphatically, still, we are advised that: "The entire

species of the verb may be reduced to the single verb that signifies to be.[58] All others secretly make use of this function...." The verb affirms the reality of a conjunction of properties. Besides which it affirms the power of language to make such representations, in general. On this more abstract level says Foucault: "What the verb designates.... is the representative character of language, the fact that it has its place in Thought, and that the only word capable of crossing the frontier of signs and providing them with a foundation in truth never attains to anything other than representation itself."[59] With which interjection Foucault stresses that even in its recognition of the pivotal position of the theory of the verb, general grammar remained profoundly nominalist and located the verb unambiguously on the side of thought.

Besides which, the analysis continues, the verb remains, notwithstanding its unequalled importance, only one component of the propositional unit. In every particular, general grammar understood, the proposition is made up of "words that name."[60] "The word designates, that is, in its very nature it is a noun or name."[61] "So that all words, of whatever kind are dormant names: verbs have joined adjectival names to the verb to be; conjunctions and prepositions are the names of gestures now frozen into immobility; declensions and conjugations are no more than names that have been absorbed."[62] By way of mathesis, that is, general grammar elaborated a general theory of

nomination.

Not unexpectedly, not coincidentally, according to Foucault, the science of language of the Classical age, delivered more than an analysis of the propositional form. Quite predictably, it sought to supply, additionally, a genealogy of discourse. The necessity to develop a separate genealogy arose, says Foucault, out of the following considerations: namely, that in its extreme form the theory of nomination extinguished the dual character of the sign, and reduced the function of representation to that of mere nomination or ostension; which simplification, if entertained on the level of a reflection on the genesis of language would precipitate a decline into naturalism.[63]

The genealogy of discourse, then, encountered and prepared to combat, in another of its manifestations, the tendency for the two aspects of the sign, the ascriptive and the merely nominative, to coalesce. Beginning again, as it were, from the conclusions of the general theory of nomination, the genealogy of the Classical age sought to prise apart the essential aspects of the sign, suspended in everyday traffic in linguistic forms. That genealogy, says Foucault, proceeded on the presumption that: "Throughout its density, even down to the most archaic of those sounds that first rescued it from its state as pure cry, language preserves its representative function; in each one of its articulations, from the depths of time, it has always

named. It is nothing in itself but an immense rustling of denominations that are overlying one another, contracting into one another, hiding one another...."[64] But, with equal assurance it reaffirms the view that language/discourse is never the mirror of nature, it reiterates the heterogeneity of words and things. "The cry does not resemble fear, nor the outstretched hand the sensation of hunger."[65] Ultimately, the Classical age resolves its difficulties by locating the genesis of discourse in a language of action; thereby, Foucault writes. "it entirely avoids the alternatives of natural limitation and arbitrary convention."[66] In this felicitous resolution the ascription of meaning, semantic value, to words is governed by convention, though the fundamental repertoire of available sounds is naturally circumscribed. Entirely consonant with the priority given to the language of action, we are next told, is the importance attributed to semantic roots. Says Foucault: "Roots are those rudimentary words that are to be found, always identical, in a great number of languages - perhaps in all; they have been imposed upon language by nature in the form of involuntary cries spontaneously employed by the language of action. It was there that men sought them out in order to give them a place in their conventional languages."[67]

Characteristically, too, Foucault writes, general grammar offered no firm pronouncement on the nature of the transformation rules affecting the modification of roots.

For an explanation of the obvious variability of semantic elements and of the diversity of historical languages, so it appears, the Classical genealogy of discourse looked not to the inner constitution of language, but to all manner of extrinsic forces. Without any conception of intrinsic linguistic structure, it could do no more than speculate on the possible significance, for example, of psychological, cultural or meteorological effects upon the transmission of the content of the common representational system. For this reason, because it construed the question in this way, general grammar also gave a prominent place to an understanding of conventions governing the written word; writing being recognized as a privileged, influential medium of transmission for signs.

By dividing both mathesis and genesis to produce theories of proposition (and verb), articulation, designation and derivation and by describing the relation between these four projections of the general theory of nomination as orthogonal, Foucault is finally able to announce that Classical scholarship on language or on discourse plotted a quadrilateral, an abstract space within which knowledge was confined.

Before reaching its formal conclusion, however, Foucault's exposition of the science of discourse, pinpoints the inherent limitation of that general perspective and indicates a possible source of disruption for the Classical

episteme related to that limitation. He says, pointing to the blind-spot in a viewpoint acutely sensitive to the subtleties of the connection between thought and language: "In the Classical period, language in its raw state - that mass of signs impressed upon the world in order to exercise our powers of interrogation - vanished from sight, but language itself entered into new relations with being, ones more difficult to grasp...." [68] Presumably, a multitude of imperceptible ripples, in the order of things, undetected by Classical thought, eventually gathered a momentum sufficient to shake epistemological conventions to their foundation and to precipitate a second great rupture in the history of thought.

Natural History

With regard to the manner in which empirical observation of nature was organized in the Classical age, Foucault is, for a second time, concerned to amplify his archeological discovery that knowledge, at that date, was circumscribed by the notions of mathesis, genesis and taxonomia. Even more deliberately, in this case, Foucault takes it upon himself to confront the gradualist consensus among historians of science. Looking over his shoulder, as it were, he contends that natural history arose amid the ruins of Renaissance thought, whose principles it found utterly fatuous. Looking forward, he declares that biology did not exist even embryonically, not even as a possibility, before the modern era. Pressing his point, he dissociates natural

history from Renaissance thought by virtue of its introduction of an entirely new concept of history; arguing, at the same time, that: "Natural history is nothing more than the nomination of the visible;"[69] and, therefore, that it remains irredeemably pre-modern.

What was unprecedented in the organization of perception enjoined by natural history, Foucault writes, was the fact that it made history natural. Previously, he explains, there had been nothing but histories: detailed commentaries recording the subliminal murmur emanating from things themselves. Natural history, we are told, involved an adjustment at the epistemological level to a loss of confidence in the equivalence of words and things, so that: "the old word 'history' changes its value, and perhaps rediscovers one of its archaic significations.... Until the mid-seventeenth century, the historian's task was to establish the great compilation of documents and signs.... It was the historian's responsibility to restore to language all the words that had been buried. His existence was defined not so much by what he saw as by what he retold, by a secondary speech which pronounced afresh so many words that had been muffled. The Classical age gives history a quite different meaning: that of undertaking a meticulous examination of things themselves for the first time, and then transcribing what it has gathered in smooth, neutralized, and faithful words.... The documents of this new history are not other words, texts or records, but

unencumbered spaces in which things are juxtaposed: herbariums, collections, gardens..."[70]

With which asseveration, that the Classical age deposited knowledge in an abstract space which it maintained at one remove from the domain of empirical observation, Foucault means to demonstrate that natural history was incapable of producing 'positive' knowledge of the kind produced in the modern era by, for example, biology. Instead, natural history accomplished the fullest elaboration of a nominalist concept of nature. According to Foucault: "the locus of this history is a non-temporal rectangle in which, stripped of all commentary, of all enveloping language, creatures present themselves one beside another, their surfaces visible, grouped according to their common features, and thus already virtually analyzed, and bearers of their own individual names."[71] And he continues: "It is often said that the establishment of botanical gardens and zoological collections expressed a new curiosity about exotic plants and animals. In fact, these had already claimed men's interest for a long while. What had changed was the space in which it was possible to see them and from which it was possible to describe them."[72]

No less than general grammar, Foucault's argument runs, natural history presupposed the heterogeneity of words and things. No less than general grammar, natural history was constrained by its perception of the divarication essential

to the task of representation. The limit of Classical knowledge of nature was similarly defined by the way in which the fundamental criteria of verisimilitude and universal intelligibility held one another in check. Thus on one side, in its classification of the structure of the natural order, where it set out its mathesis, natural history attempted a stringent observation, a minimal conceptualism, as a means to verisimilitude. The result however was the specification of a universally intelligible 'common noun' which represented unambiguously the structure of observed reality. Natural science, Foucault, explains, was a science of nature rooted in the notion of pure observation. That discourse on nature, says Foucault, scanned the world on the basis of "a visibility freed from all other sensory burdens and restricted, moreover, to black and white."[73] With aphoristic precision he encapsulates the dream of reason in the Classical age, as cherished by its naturalists, when he remarks: "The use of the microscope was based upon a non-instrumental relation between things and the human eye - a relation that defines natural history."[74] In methodological terms, the cardinal requirement was controlled and systematic observation, which permitted "the visibility of the animal or plant to pass over in its entirety into the discourse that receives it."[75] Ultimately, the logic of natural history culminates at the point where: "The book becomes the herbarium of living structures."[76] The most scrupulous attention to detail, resulted in the most fastidious ascription of names to

natural entities. As the search for verisimilitude was subordinated to the notion of representation (as pure nomination, as the ascription of universally intelligble names) natural history produced an inventory of structures.

On the genealogical side, meanwhile, natural history sought to provide an exhaustive differentiation of all natural entities: it endeavoured to ascertain the character of every living individual. In this case, however, in the context of this effort to satisfy the criterion of verisimilitude, analysis initially conceded an absolute authority to the structure previously established through observation. Says Foucault: "The system is arbitrary in its basis, since it deliberately ignores all differences and all identities not related to the selected structure."[77] And although Foucault observes that the study of character proceeded on two fronts, by means of the System and the Method, they have this in common: that prior fabrication of a taxonomic framework and specification of a privileged nomenclature, was the absolute precondition of the furtherance of the genealogical question.

The limit of the knowledge accumulated and tabulated by natural history, of "the effort to establish an order in nature and to discover general categories within it,"[78] was reached when it was admitted that no necessary correlation existed between the extension and subdivision of the major taxonomic systems and the advance of truth. What

proliferated were the privileged categories of the regional theories of nomination. Eventually, Foucault records, the inflexibility of the science of pure observation, provoked the explosive destruction of the most exalted prejudices of an era. The redundance of an out-moded world-view was signalled, violently, we are told, when: "One day, towards the end of the eighteenth century, Cuvier was to topple the glass jars of the Museum, smash them open and dissect all the forms of original visibility that the Classical age had preserved in them."[79]

The Analysis of Wealth

The parallel account of Classical economics contained in The Order of Things announces that until the nineteenth century there existed no 'positive' science of economics, no political economy. Where elsewhere the notions of life and language were unavailable, here, in the context of economic theory, the crucial notion of production was absent. Consequently, the analyses of wealth conducted in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries acknowledged another, quite different, schedule of priorities. "The analysis of wealth," Foucault suggests, "is to political economy what general grammar is to philology and what natural history is to biology."[80] Which means that, as before, an assault is being made on the gradualist conception that would discern the rudiments of political economy in the logic of Classical economic theory. Principally, of course, the exposition proceeds by adducing

yet another example of the ubiquity of the problem of representation; perhaps that should be: the problematic of representation.

The sixteenth century, it seems, already knew money both as common measure of value and as substitute in the process of exchange. Its economic theory rested upon a total identification of these functions in the material reality of precious metal. Asked how or why money is able to perform such prodigious economic tasks, it pointed unhesitatingly to the real value of the metallic element upon which the currency was based. What is archeologically significant in this says Foucault is that: "Whereas the Renaissance based the two functions of coinage (measure and substitution) on the double nature of its intrinsic character (the fact that it was precious), the seventeenth century turns the analysis upside down."[81] For the Classical age, what was fundamental, epistemologically, was the exchange function; what became profoundly uncertain was the real value of money: "money (and even the metal of which it is made) receives its value from its pure function as sign!"[82]

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries money is a universally acknowledged and generally accredited sign of wealth. Moreover, the representative function of money rather than the actual worth of silver or gold becomes the principle of wealth. The criterion of economic well-being becomes vigorous circulation and exchange. Money is

regarded as the life-blood of the community.[83] The economy designates a transcendent, abstract space, where signs bearing various denominations operate infallibly to articulate and unify an enormous diversity of commodities. Foucault puts it like this: "Through the mercantilist experience, the domain of wealth was constituted in the same mode as that of representations. We have seen that these latter had the power to represent themselves with themselves as the basis of that representation: to open within themselves a space in which they could analyze themselves, and to form substitutes for themselves out of their own elements, thus making it possible to establish both a system of signs and a table of identities and differences. Similarly, wealth has the power to be exchanged, to analyse itself into elements that authorize relations of equality or inequality; to signify itself by means of those completely comparable elements of wealth called precious metals."[84] The gist of the matter is that this economic thought is typically nominalist in that it locates the possibility of secure knowledge in the complete transparency of the sign as concept or bearer of universality.

The analysis of wealth inscribes fundamental economic relations, the anatomy of wealth, in a taxonomic frame. Subsequently, along one axis, where it addresses the problem of mathesis, the concept of equilibrium assumes a key role. The overriding issue is the regulation of the

economy at a level of exchange and velocity of circulation that ensures the maintenance of a stable, even marginally expanding, population in prosperity and health.[85] At the same time, however, with a familiar sensitivity about the arbitrariness of its primary representative systems, Classical economics broached the question of the origin of value. In this direction, Foucault's archeology purports to show that whereas the Classical genealogy of wealth is normally construed and recounted as an inconclusive controversy involving the Physiocrats and Utilitarians; in fact, the decisive effect of the ruling episteme constrained both camps to choose one of two possible solutions.

The Physiocrats, Foucault reports, attributed the phenomenon of value to the original fecundity of the soil. The Utilitarians explained the appearance of value over and above that needed to maintain the producer as the result of a more equitable, increasingly optimal, distribution of utilities (commodities capable of satisfying need) than that organized by nature. These superficially antagonistic theses on value, though, share a hard core of unshakeable premisses: that wealth occurs naturally, even that exchange is the basis of value, where it is understood that the Physiocrats reduce all exchanges to the primary exchange between nature and human nature; that the fundamental economic problem is the regulation of wealth and that its solution is to be found in a mildly inflationary currency

and a fixed wage-structure. Both schools of thought also conceive the economy as an abstract spatio-temporal order, not as a social order, and both are compelled to elaborate a genealogy of value without the notion of production. Their separate theories of value are more properly comprehended as chains of inference that move in opposite directions within the limit imposed by the classical equivocation about the basis of representation. Thus the utilitarians convinced of the nominal value of the money system and of the truthfulness of that representative order, perceive the possibility of enhanced value exclusively in that domain. The Physiocrats meanwhile, look through the sign system to the material and natural substratum of the system of wealth, where they discerned the possibility of value in the fecundity of land. Obviously, both camps endorsed a view of economics as a science that conceives of a systematic redistribution of wealth which originates in nature.

As elsewhere, in the realm of economic theory, Classical thought agonized over the total estrangement of words and things. Epistemologically, its every effort was undertaken to minimize the distance between the names it could provide for things (and their relations) and the actual structure of reality. Classical thought, says Foucault, attempted, in every separate case, to "discover a nomenclature that would be a taxonomy."[86] In time, however, with the unheralded intrusion of a new set of priorities for

knowledge, the finesse, plausibility and seriousness of Classical scholarship counted for nothing, as a second great rupture in the history of thought occurred towards the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, Foucault explains, the elegance of the Classical theories of money and value counted for nothing as soon as the quantum upon which the wealth of society was based, namely the natural level of production, the fecundity of the earth, was reappraised as an impediment to the accumulation of wealth. At that point, the economics of production, political economy, took off. If this seems unnecessarily and abruptly reductionist, economically or sociologically, it should be borne in mind that The Order of Things is a charter for such reductionism. It maintains all along that documented changes in the structure of epistemic predispositions cannot be explained epistemologically; that these are historical events not intrinsic to the movement of ideas, or in other words, he writes and prepares the ground for attempts to legitimate the kind of critique undertaken in his earlier historical studies. The Order of Things only puts the question of phenomenological determination in parenthesis; better still, in abeyance.

The Modern Period

Towards the close of the eighteenth century, according to Foucault's archeology of the human sciences, a second momentous displacement of knowledge occurred. As before, the crux of his analysis is an exposition of the

prevailing but theoretically subliminal presuppositions about the relations of language and theory and of language and being, peculiar to the modern period. On the basis of his acquaintance with the structure of the modern episteme, Foucault proposes to explain, for example, among other events: "in the case of grammar.... the eclipse of the major role hitherto accorded to the name, and the new importance of the systems of inflection.... the subordination of character to function in living beings.... the substitution of languages for discourse."[87] More broadly, across the disciplinary divides, he explains that the systems of representation which were once hermetically sealed against the corrosive effects of time, are now, permanently, open systems, that probe the historicity of things and exert, by re-deploying empirically-derived knowledge, a positive influence on the reproduction of objective conditions. In short, Foucault relates how the problem of Order was supplanted by the problem of History.[88]

Political Economy

In this period, we are told, the analysis of wealth gave way to the economics of production. The decisive event was not, according to Foucault, however, the commonly adduced one: Adam Smith's recourse to the concept of labour in a domain previously obsessed with circulation and exchange. For Smith, labour was, as it also was for his unastonished contemporaries, exclusively a measure of exchange value. Essentially, labour was regarded as a measure of the total

effort needed to assuage need and sustain physical existence. As such it could be used microscopically or macroscopically to totalize what was exchangeable. What Foucault is willing to concede to Smith is an additional shift in his analysis of wealth, which construed wealth as command over labour, rather than, as was customary, as command over the object of need. With which digression, Smith is held to have posed the question which served as a pretext for Ricardo's crucial intervention. Smith's economics, as it were, straddled the epistemic chasm that separates the Classical and modern eras: the category of wealth retained its paramount position but, at the same time, The Wealth of Nations enquired into the causes of a general submission to labour. And in this respect, where it situates men in the context of the necessity of labour, Foucault intones, Smith's enquiry: "is already pointing in the direction of an anthropology that will call into question man's very essence (his finitude, his relation with time, the imminence of death...."[89] "From Smith onward," Foucault writes, "the time of economics was no longer to be the cyclical time of alternating impoverishment and wealth; nor the linear increase achieved by astute policies, constantly introducing slight increases in the amount of circulating specie so that they accelerated production at a faster rate than they raised prices; it was to be the interior time of an organic structure which grows in accordance with its own necessity and develops in accordance with autochthonous laws in the time of capital

and production."[90]

Ricardo's unequalled importance, for Foucault, consists in his actual theorization of labour as an historical force. In comparison, Adam Smith continued to regard labour as the supreme representational category: as the principle underlying everything exchangeable. For Ricardo, labour is, straightforwardly, the constitutive force that sustains commodity production: it manifests itself as wage-labour, whose command connotes wealth; it appears also as the power that produces those commodities that subsequently enter the system of exchange. "Value has ceased to be a sign, it has become a product.... after Ricardo, the possibility of exchange is based upon labour; and henceforth the theory of production must always precede that of circulation."[91] This change inaugurated by Ricardo is adjudged to be characteristically modern in the sense that it signals the advance of an economics bent upon penetrating, subduing and reconstructing natural forces. In Foucault's words: "From Ricardo on, labour, having been displaced in its relation to representation, and installed in a region where representation has no power is organized in accordance with a causality peculiar to itself..... All labour gives a result, which, in one form or other is applied to a further labour whose cost it defines; and this new labour participates in turn in the creation of a value, etc."[92] What animates this modern knowledge is the aim of establishing its dominion over the historicity internal

to things. Inseparable from the new historical perspective in economics, Foucault submits, is its insight into the scarcity and insufficiency of available resources. The 'superimposition of history on economics,' situates man in a state of want where he perpetually confronts the dilemma: work or perish. "In fact, labour - that is, economic activity - did not make its appearance in world history until men became too numerous to be able to subsist on the spontaneous fruits of the land."[93] The new 'positive' form of knowledge with its compulsion to command and exploit the productivity of labour represented, in Foucault's estimation, a profound epistemic reaction to the historic discovery of man's parlous condition where production reached saturation point without necessarily making provision for the maintenance of the population. The new 'positive' knowledge began, in Foucault's archeological account, with a determined effort to thoroughly penetrate and render intelligible man's incontrovertible natural limit, his "anthropological finitude."

Biology

In the transition from natural history to biology, the principal categorial innovation is that which establishes organic structure as the emblem of biology, the new science of life. What is entailed by this categorial revolution is essentially this: "that character is no longer drawn directly from the visible structure, and without any criterion other than its presence or absence; it is based

upon the existence of functions essential to the living being, and upon relations of importance that are no longer merely a matter of description."[94] Out go visible characteristics; out goes observation (as a non-instrumental relation between the eye and the entities of nature): in comes clinical anatomy to probe pitilessly beneath the artifices of apparent reality. Organic life is comprehended not in the context of encyclopaedic tables of representation, but in terms of its own historicity, of its own reproductive propensities and intrinsic operations which, as is equally true with regard to the new economics, implies that the absolute difference between words and things recognized by the Classical age has been dissolved. At least, theory is now presumed to be capable of infiltrating the essence of things and delivering into language, as it were, from the inside, the fullest account of the structure of being, in its multiple forms.

Natural history had trusted implicitly in the visible world and had transcribed its observation of that world by means of a fastidious restriction of the power of the sign, in the abstract space of its various taxonomia. Biology, by comparison, suspected all superficial display and required the forms of representation, words, to record the progress of its perpetually revisable, constantly expanding knowledge. Biology, unlike natural history, confidently invaded the secret interior of Life, in order to eliminate every superficial supposition, in order to correct its

first impressions, so that it could arrive at a practicable knowledge. Says Foucault: "From Cuvier onward, it is life in its purely functional aspect that provides the basis for the exterior possibility of classification. The classification of living beings is no longer to be found in the great expanse of order, the possibility of classification now arises from the depths of life, from those elements most hidden from view."[95] Most characteristically biology describes life not in terms of visible characteristics, but in terms of a hierarchy of functions to which it owes its continued existence. Towards this end, biology relies principally upon comparative anatomy. That anatomy subsequently becomes the basis of a new system of classification whose aim is to map relations between visible characteristics and invisible vital functions.

Comparative anatomy, we are told, constructed two hierarchical chains. According to Foucault, comparative anatomy made it possible to "establish two quite distinct forms of continuity in the living world. The first concerns the great functions to be found in the majority of species (respiration, digestion, circulation, reproduction, locomotion.....): it establishes in the whole living world a vast resemblance which can be arranged in a scale of decreasing complexity, from man down to the zoophyte; in the higher species all these functions appear; but as we move down the scale so we see them disappear one after

another.... The other continuity.... deals with the greater or lesser perfection of organs."[96] Which said, we arrive at Foucault's main point; at the point where he inscribes biology in the field of the modern episteme; where he says: "Historicity, then, has now been introduced into nature - or rather into the realm of living beings."[97] And if this is, in any sense, obscure, he provides an exact definition of his concept of historicity when he contrasts the axis of perception in the Classical and Modern periods. He writes: "The plant held sway on the frontiers of movement and immobility, of the sentient and the non-sentient; whereas the animal maintains its existence on the frontiers of life and death. Death besieges it on all sides; furthermore, it threatens it also from within, for only the organism can die, and it is from the depths of their lives that death overtakes living beings."[98] Patently, this 'positive' knowledge too is generated by an obsessive concern with the structure of existence and the limit that structure defines for man.

Philology

Until the end of the eighteenth century, Foucault argues, language was apprehended as discourse: as an elementary and spontaneous commentary upon the order of things. General grammar, the Classical science of language originated in discourse, in relation to which it operated as a critical meta-discourse. In the nineteenth century, the proper object of study became language and the rules intrinsic to

it. The key change in focus was one that led analysis to abandon the theory of nomination and which scrutinized instead the systematic role of inflection, a pure grammatical influence, upon the functionality and scope of linguistic communication. With the discovery of the inflectional rules governing language use, Foucault explains: "an element has been introduced into the analysis of language that is not reducible to it (as labour was introduced into the analysis of exchange, or organic structure into that of characters.)"[99]

In the Modern period, for the first time, languages are classified on the basis of intrinsic laws that underlie the level of explicit meaning: the essence of language is discovered in its 'deep structure,' in an "internal architecture."[100] Whereas, in the Classical age, general grammar was constructed upon a representation or transcription of a more fundamental, natural discourse that existed independently of knowledge, whose existence, therefore, remained ultimately an enigma; in the nineteenth century, philology attempted to explicate the invisible inner nature of language and the configuration of determinations it contained and relayed. Since Bopp, Foucault announces, whose role is analogous to those of Cuvier and Ricardo: "To know language is no longer to come as close as possible to knowledge itself; it is merely to apply the methods of understanding in general to a particular domain of objectivity."[101]

Among the corollaries of what amounted to a demotion of language-as-discourse from its position as representation per se, so Foucault observes, was a new and generally enforced methodological rigour. The sciences were required, in effect, to justify their dependence upon language, where before they employed language with impunity, of necessity. Not accidentally, there arose in the modern period what Foucault refers to as the "positivist dream" (an image of language as "the unmisted mirror" of a non-verbal knowledge)[102], whose practical consequence was a self-conscious effort to reduce scientific dependence upon language to a minimal number of neutral signs; withdrawn from the bustle of every day usage, relieved of all superfluous connotation. In these terms, more or less, positivism sought to elaborate its observation languages. Another expression of this heightened methodological rigour, Foucault remarks, were contemporaneous attempts to contruct a symbolic, algebraic, emphatically non-verbal logic, which aspired to extricate thought from effects of distortion and refraction of meaning inevitable in everyday language use.

A second result of the demythification of language, Foucault further suggests, was that a remarkable upsurge in scholarly interest ensued. Investigation of the convoluted chains of determination which described the structure of an "anthropological finitude," inevitably brought science to a realization of the power of language. In this regard,

modern thought shed a long-standing naivety and sought to illuminate the grim disillusioning truth of language's complicity in the most sordid details of material existence. "This is how," Foucault writes, "we must understand the revival, so marked in the nineteenth century, of all the techniques of exegesis. This reappearance is due to the fact that language has resumed the enigmatic density it possessed at the time of the Renaissance. But now it is not a matter of rediscovering some primary word that has been buried in it, but of disturbing the words we speak, of denouncing the grammatical habits of our thinking, of dissipating the myths that animate our words, of rendering once more noisy and audible the element of silence that all discourse carries with it as it is spoken. The first book of Das Kapital is an exegesis of 'value;' all Nietzsche is an exegesis of a few Greek words; Freud, the exegesis of all those unspoken phrases that support and at the same time undermine our apparent discourse, our fantasies, our dreams, our bodies. Philology, as the analysis of what is said in the depths of discourse, has become the modern form of criticism."[103]

The third corollary of the demotion of language to the status of objectivity, adduced by Foucault, is the appearance of literature. Essentially, its arrival signifies the emancipation of the ludic, semiotic aspect of the representational capability of language from the

obligation of mimetic duplication. To a considerable extent, Foucault's linguistically-based philosophy, at least until The Order of Things, equates freedom, itself, with the promise of release from repetition and reiteration proffered by the evolution of an autonomous literature.

Postulation I
Recapitulation and Reflection

Thus, sketched synoptically, with regard to the comportment and motivation of the fundamental disciplines of biology, political economy and philology, the substructure of the modern episteme is delineated. As before, from an archeological vantage point, the decisive influence among all the theoretically undeveloped premisses of modern thought and action, is exerted by an ascertainable and reconstructable notion of language and its necessary connection with theory and with being. Against the background of his accounts of the prejudices of earlier periods, Foucault purportedly unveiled the double emphasis that underlies Historical knowledge.

In the Renaissance and in the Classical age, Foucault maintains, determinate axiological and categorial preconceptions induced specific modes of scholarly activity, and predisposed knowledge to manifest itself in a standard form. In the Renaisssance, studious interpretation based upon expertise in recognised hermeneutic and semiological skills constantly enhanced the stock of

knowledge chronicled in written commentary. In the Classical age, the literati were constrained by a logic that required co-ordination of meticulous classification (ascription of universal semantic values, what Foucault discusses as mathesis) and precise observation of finite particulars and the regularities they exhibited (genealogy). The scientific community was entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining and gradually expanding the scope of those tables and catalogues in which the logic in question registered its knowledge.

In the Renaissance and in the Classical age, so we are told, the relation of thought and language was conceived successively, in what may usefully be called the nomenclature of interpretation and representation: which is to say that in one case language was employed as a means of generating written commentary; while in the other what could be done with language and what was done, was that it was deployed in the construction of taxonomic systems. In pursuit of a correspondingly succinct terminology to apply to the modern episteme, Foucault invokes Nietzsche's genealogy of morality: "For Nietzsche," he explains, in his critique of moral prejudice, "it was not a matter of knowing what good and evil were in themselves, but of who was being designated, or rather who was speaking....."[104] With which allusion, Foucault provides corroboration of his anticipatory distinction between "the past which believed in meaning, and the present (the future) which has

discovered the significant." And both his reference to Nietzsche's proto-typical formulation and in his distinction between meaning and significance, Foucault discriminates the peculiarity of the Historical, in epistemological terms: he emphasizes the critical inclination to attribute any structured phenomenon (archetypically, linguistic or symbolic patterns) or the discrete traces of any structuration to the intervention of a by-no-means disinterested, Active Subject; he also differentiates the intrinsically and perpetually meaningful, symbolically valuable, from the locally and temporarily significant. In another manifestation of this Historical variant of the connection between language and thought, Foucault suggests, literature emerges with the extravagant aspiration of conferring signifance on everything.

Underlying, operating in conjunction with and inseparable from, the ascertainable epistemological premisses (and the implicit relation of theory and language) embraced by the Renaissance and the Classical age, the argument continues, there were compelling pre-theoretical notions about the relation of language and being. Thus the Renaissance produced knowledge in its compendious commentaries, by means of painstaking interpretation, which purportedly revealed an essential affinity between words and things. The Classical age, which accumulated abstract representations of concrete entities and systems, regarded

words and things as utterly heterogeneous. The fact that Classical knowledge was grounded in a "binary theory of the sign" and divided practically in its effort to satisfy quite independent criteria of internal consistency/ universal communicability and verisimilitude/objective credibility; these circumstances are explicable, in Foucault's account, as effects of a fundamental ontological factor which located language and thought, securely, on the side of the Subject of Knowledge; and which distributed things throughout a world beyond subjectivity. In the Classical age, language did not enter into space and time: "language did not exist." This, epistemologically, was the decisive factor. What Foucault calls discourse, a primordial commentary on things, though believed to be irredeemably dispersed in time and space, was already, originally, with regard to things, a superordinate phenomenon. Discourse did not commingle with things and, most pertinently, what could become knowledge had to be transposed beyond that uncertain, twilight zone.

Turning to the modern period, Foucault announces that it is here, for the first time, that language enters and establishes itself throughout space and times as 'positive' knowledge. With the result that where, formerly, scientific activity had maintained written documents and abstract tables, now in the modern period, scientific discourses actually controlled regions of experience, natural processes, patterns of behaviour and regional

ontologies of various kinds. The emergence of 'positive' knowledge, Foucault suggests, reflects a transformed perception of what language can mediate theoretically; a transformed expectation about the manner in which words and things may be organized. In his consideration of the fundamental sciences of the modern age, biology, political economy and philology, Foucault discerns two essential shifts in the structure of the episteme. Firstly, he remarks, that on an epistemological plane, with the arrival of 'positive' knowledge: "It is no longer their identity that beings manifest in representation, but the eternal relation they establish with the human being." [106] Which is tantamount to a declaration that representation has been swallowed up by signification. It would also be possible to say that only Man is absolute in the new epistemological configuration, and that everything else becomes known in its relation to man, not in its own intrinsic value. The truth of representations no longer consists in their capacity to render, without violence to the entity in question, its distinguishing characteristics; but their truth lies in their ability to elicit, with the utmost rigour, what has significance for Man. Secondly, says Foucault, looking more closely at the individual sciences: "Cuvier and his contemporaries had required of life that it should itself define, in the depths of its being, the conditions of possibility of the living being; in the same way, Ricardo had required labour to provide the conditions of possibility of exchange, profit and production; the

first philologists, too, had searched in the historical depths of language for the possibility of discourse and grammar. This meant that representation ceased, ipso facto, to have validity as the locus of origin of living beings, needs, and words, or as the primitive seat of their truth."[107] Secondly, in effect, the criterion of truth is no longer one of exact transposition and simulation, but of the efficacy of practical control over the disposition of elemental powers. So, together the fundamental pre-theoretical and incompletely formulated theoretical premisses of 'positive' knowledge are said to describe a dialectic that requires thought, in one direction, to invade and discover the secret motivation of things, and to put this into language which necessarily, automatically almost, designates what is significant or indicates all those points at which objective forces impinge upon the existential possibilities available to Man. So, in the other direction, 'positive' knowledge describes a dialectic that through the substantiation of fields of discourse, reorganizes existence in general to bring it into alignment with human purposes.

At this point, it is perhaps appropriate to observe that the difficulties inherent in Foucault's attempt to communicate a sense of the boundaries and peculiarity of pre-modern conceptions of language, are not unrelated to the fact that it was not until very recently, indeed perhaps not until the advent of structuralism, that social

philosophy felt the need to produce a topography of the discursive order. That may plausibly explain why an idea and project which has enormous value in the present conjuncture, struggles to illumine more distant epistemic conditions. (The difficulties revolve not around a failure to produce distinct criteria with which to characterize the Renaissance and the Classical age. Foucault does not fail in this respect, but what is unwieldy, not positively adducible except retrospectively, as a conclusion, is Foucault's conviction concerning the impossibility of producing a topography of the discursive universe, prior to the modern age. This absence only becomes communicable in a discussion of the peculiar properties of positive knowledge. As always, the proper perspective from which to view the book is the retrospective one; and when the archeology in question is understood to originate in a skein of speculation about 'positive' knowledge, the intelligibility factor of The Order of Things is enhanced dramatically.) In any case, it is in his discussion of the modern period that Foucault introduces a fundamental precept of his critical phenomenology, namely: that it is in the modern period alone that language enters into and establishes itself throughout social space and time in the form of 'positive knowledge'. It is, subsequently, by means of his understanding of the logic of 'positive' knowledge that he produces a topography of the discursive order: which is the kind of social theory that Foucault successfully elaborates and deploys in his later researches.

Finally, at this juncture, there is this to say: In what has been discussed so far, an attempt has been made to show that The Order of Things makes out a case for the historicity of language. It has been argued that Foucault undertakes, among other things ,to demonstrate that the history of science provides ample corroboration of his supposition that language has played no uniform role, exhibited no stable purpose, either theoretically or practically, in the progress of knowledge. Most deliberately, an effort has been made to substantiate the claim that The Order of Things may quite reasonably be construed as a refutation of a philosophic prejudice, associated in its most sophisticated and articulate form with the phenomenology of Heidegger (but which is obviously an important unexplicated resource among philosophers and historians of science); which prejudice conceives of language, on a number of grounds: its epistemological transparency, its ontological immutability, its anthropological universality, for example, to be the last refuge of a priori truth. Against this whole preponderant trend, Foucault contends that the 'positive' knowledge characteristic of the modern period evinces a peculiar, historically specific relation to language: its perception of the power of language. Its expectation of what it can achieve theoretically and practically, and consequently its deployment of language, we are persuaded, reflect and relay the insistent pressure exerted upon thought (especially in its institutionalized forms) by an unprecedented, urgent,

and engrossing matrix of practical difficulties.

To have come this far is to have discovered one of Foucault's principal theoretical objectives; to pursue this line of enquiry further, at this point, however is to run the risk of confusing this firm objective with his second principal purpose.

Postulation II: Man is an Invention of Modern Knowledge

In the context of Foucault's presentation, it becomes apparent that the defining characteristic of the modern period, epistemically, is the entry of Man into the field of knowledge. His extensive archeological excavation into the pre-history of language issues with effortless logicality in the discovery that Man is the emblematic figure in the modern episteme. In both theory and practice, the ruling perception of language peculiar to the 'positive' knowledge of modern science, is held to be an effect of the circumstance that for contemporary thought nothing is more problematic than Man. Nevertheless, and in spite of the tendency for one theme to merge with the other, it is important not to conflate them; and to treat the historicity of language and the modernity of Man separately. Any doubts about the advisability of, or justification for , this exegetic procedure should be dispelled in due course. Meantime, the matter-at-hand must be the debut of Man under the auspices of the emerging human sciences and their 'positive' discourses.

"Before the end of the eighteenth century," Foucault writes, "man did not exist any more than the potency of life, the fecundity of labour, or the historical density of language. He is a quite recent creature, which the demiurge of knowledge fabricated with its own hands less than two hundred years ago."[108] In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by comparison, Foucault argues, "the very concept of human nature, and the way in which it functioned, excluded any possibility of a Classical science of man."[109] In other words, Foucault contends that, in epistemological terms, modern science originates in the arresting thought that individual men are finite, transient entities who live work and speak in a space-time continuum where they are subject to the laws of biology, economics and linguistics.[110] The biology instituted by Cuvier, for its part, situated man at the apex of a pyramid of living beings, all of which are victims of predatory powers which only man can comprehend as Anxiety and Death. Ricardo's economics, in turn, are said to have inaugurated research into economic determination and to have required knowledge to explicate the necessary relation between production and extinction. Finally, philology is understood to have marked the beginning of an effort to fix, conceptually, the place of language in the total context of man's existential predicament. In explanation of the breakthrough that occurred in this surpassingly important and less well understood field, Foucault says: "Bopp's analyses were to be of major importance, not only in breaking down the

internal composition of a language, but also in defining what language may be in its essence. It is no longer a system of representation which has the power to pattern and recompose other representations; it designates in its roots the most constant of actions, states and wishes; what it is trying to say, originally, is not so much what one sees as what one does or what one undergoes; and though it does eventually indicate things as though by pointing at them, it does only in so far as they are the result, or the object, or the instrument of that action; nouns do not so much pattern the complex table of a representation as pattern and arrest and fix the process of action. Language is 'rooted' not in the things perceived but in the active subject. And, perhaps, in that case, it is a product of will and energy, rather than of memory that duplicates representation."[111] It seems crass to condense this lucid ratiocination but the general point is that language is discovered to be utterly compromised by its total absorption in and complete subservience to a politics of signification that has strategic importance for social reproduction in the modern age.

All of which, in any case, is intended to communicate the idea that the transition from Order to History; or that the postulated entry of man into the epistemic frame, which is the same idea, consists in a consuming confrontation with the full implications of material existence. Proto-

typically, the fundamental sciences of biology, political economy and philology are said to have begun a transcription and transposition of these implications as an epistemological issue and as a series of manageable technical problems. More succinctly, 'positive' knowledge is introduced as the science of man's existential horizons. In Foucault's words: "Man's finitude is heralded - and imperiously so - in the positivity of knowledge; we know that man is finite as we know the anatomy of the brain, the mechanics of production costs or the system of Indo-European conjugation."[112]

Throughout the modern period, to express the matter alternatively, the forms of positive knowledge have assumed responsibility for the constitution and administration of spatio-temporal regions which afford a controlled environment for Man. The human sciences by taking up the existential problem first addressed by biology, political economy and philology, have accommodated individuals and populations to the structure of an "anthropological finitude." As the problem has grown more urgent a proliferation of authoritative, scientific and quasi-scientific discourses has occurred. And so, Foucault maintains, with the multiplication of those human sciences and anthropological discourses that have met their obligation to care for man, it becomes possible to say in an archeological overview that: "Man, in the analysis of finitude is a strange empirico - transcendental doublet."[113] In an identical formulation, he suggests that: "the

threshold of our modernity is situated not by an attempt to apply objective methods to the study of man, but rather by the constitution of an empirico- transcendental doublet which is called man."[114]

What Foucault's archeology of the human sciences finds epistemologically significant is the tension between transcendental and empirical dimensions of the new historical form of knowledge. In its historicity, Foucault argues, positive knowledge, the sciences of man, are condemned to fluctuate between commitment to freedom in principle (as a universal truth) and to freedom as spontaneous action (as a practical reality). Such knowledge is caught in an interminable process of disillusionment and re-awakened faith in new syntheses; it is compelled to traffic in ideology and utopia. "Modern thought," says Foucault, "has been unable to avoid..... searching for the locus of a discourse that would be neither of the order of reduction nor of the order of promise: a discourse whose tension would keep separate the empirical and the transcendental."[115]

The constant process of conciliation, involving transcendental and empirical orders, which is from an archeological standpoint, the motion that, like a pulse, signals the existence of the human sciences; this process is said to take two principal forms. Firstly, it describes an unstable relation between what Foucault refers to as the

'cogito' and the 'unthought'. For us, so the argument goes, the Cartesian "I think" offers no secure foundation for knowledge. The truth of "I am" consists negatively in a chain of imponderables: "For can I in fact say, "Foucault demands "that I am this language that I speak, into which my thought insinuates itself to the point of finding in it the system of all its own possibilities, yet which exists only in the weight of sedimentations my thought will never be capable of actualizing altogether ? Can I say that I am this labour I perform with my own hands, yet which eludes me not only when I have finished it, but even before I have begun it ? Can I say that I am this life that I sense deep within me, but which envelops me both in the irresistable time that grows side by side with it and poses me for a moment on its crest, and in the immanent time that prescribes my death ?"[116] Modern knowledge takes the form of a continuous dialogue between the 'cogito' and the 'unthought', in this sense: that the 'cogito' provides a permanently deficient and profoundly unreliable inventory of significant determinations of the structure of existence. As a result, scientific activity is pushed in one direction to ensure the conjunctural efficacy (functional readiness, operational capability) of positive knowledge; to protect the 'cutting edge' of those transcendental discourses which may macroscopically or sociologically, be said to comprise the 'cogito,' by mobilizing a phenomenology that monitors the concourse of empirical experience. In this fashion, more or less,

Foucault explains, in a way that anticipates his later more substantive studies, that: "the whole of modern thought is imbued with the necessity of thinking the unthought."[117]

Secondly, in Foucault's scheme, the empirico-transcendental doublet finds expression in the epistemological effect that sends "positive" knowledge floundering across its temporal axis with the same obsessive curiosity that it exhibits in relation to the surveillance of spatial relations. On this temporal axis, Foucault explains, "positive" knowledge shows itself constantly prepared to revise its presuppositions about the elementary determinants of present circumstances; it also becomes engaged in a countervailing effort to modify, ameliorate and seize control of the complex encumbrance of objective determinations which operate with the force of an original causation upon man in society. The way the philosophy of history, or the genealogical impulse is currently organized, so we are meant to understand, means that the unified theme of 'positive' knowledge in this area is what Foucault calls: "the retreat and return of the origin"[118]; which theme represents an adjustment to the discovery that there is no chronology that accounts for the present order of things, nor any evolutionary process that has installed Man in the present as the culminating act in a continuously progressive movement. In the age of History, the genealogy of the human spirit is self consciously conducted on the shifting basis of existential

conditions that are increasingly negotiable, transformable, or just insecure. History is rewritten as the balance of power changes in the present. Every significant determination of present conditions is exerted here and now. In which peculiar circumstances, the essence of genealogical knowedge resides in its capacity to unravel and recompose the configuration of forces that operates now.

For 'positive' knowledge, the all-embracing problem is the material existence of man. Its overriding purpose is to constitute man as an unproblematic, serviceable and comfortable being, between the transcendental principles advertized and promoted by the discourses and authoritative institutional apparatuses of science, on the one side, and the uncertainties of empirical reality, on the other side; from where energy and purpose ultimately arise. In this light, 'positive' knowledge, intent on superimposing the transcendental upon the empirical, has developed an acute sensitivity to the organization of space and time, which it must constantly supervise. Moreover, says Foucault, with the arrival of science dedicated to the purpose of constituting and maintaining man: "Two kinds of analysis then came into being. There are those that operate within the space of the body, and - by studying perception, sensorial mechanisms, neuro-motor diagrams, and the articulation common to things and to the organism - function as a sort of transcendental aesthetic ..... There were also analyses that - by studying humanity's more or

less ancient, more or less easily vanquished illusions - functioned as a sort of transcendental dialectic; by this means it was shown that knowledge had historical, social or economic conditions, that it was formed within the relations that are woven between men, and that it was not independent of the particular form they might take here or there; in short, that there was a history of human knowledge which could both be given to empirical knowledge and prescribe its forms."[119] In other words, 'positive' knowledge has developed modes of analysis which have enabled its discourses to colonize and dominate the relation of knowledge to physical experience, on the one hand, and the relation of knowledge to practice and so to social reproduction, on the other hand.

In Foucault's brutal characterization, the human sciences have systematically developed analytic methods that have made it possible with increasing thoroughness to exercise comprehensive control over the fundamental dimensions of individual existence, namely over the individual's relation to his body; and over the individual's disposal of a capacity to think in the medium of a complex of discursive practices. The enormously successful studies, Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, take up these themes. They almost reflect a division of labour between a critique of the transcendental aesthetic of the human sciences in Discipline and Punish, and a critique of the transcendental dialectic of modern discourse in The History

of Sexuality.

In general, however, the second major postulation advanced by The Order of Things condenses one essential purpose underlying all Foucault's work, as critical phenomenology: which has been his determination to confound and refute the existentialist notion of Man. Thus he has invariably endeavoured to show not only that Man can be regarded neither as an epistemological nor as an ontological Absolute. Foucault has always pointed to ruptures, discontinuities and incommensurable constructions in the organisation of human experience and knowledge. Thus he has, also, against the existentialist trend, sought to substantiate his suspicion that the creature who owes his existence to the human sciences, Man in the modern world, is no fortunate beneficiary of the most altruistic philosophy, but the hapless victim of coordinated and equally pitiless policies of subjection.

CONCLUSION

Against Phenomenology and Anthropology

In his Foreword to the English edition of The Order of Things, Foucault remarks: "If there is one approach that I do reject..... one might call it, broadly speaking, the phenomenological approach...."[120] Early in The Archeology of Knowledge he declares: "My aim is to define a method of historical analysis freed from the

anthropological theme."[121] The interpretation advanced, here, begins and ends as an attempt to construe Foucault in the light of these statements. At least, the hermeneutic exercise centred upon The Order of Things endeavoured, consistently, to draw attention to the preponderance of these themes. And ultimately, with the ramifying implications of these themes considerably clarified, the argument is resumed; which insists that it is in the intensity and in the success of his critique of the philosophical orthodoxy, whose foremost representative is Heidegger, that Foucault emerges as an important social philosopher. To put it in terms more reminiscent of his own thought: Foucault may be said to have made his mark in a discursive field previously dominated by Heidegger.

What then, to make a beginning, does Foucault have in mind when he repudiates phenomenology and anthropology ? In his own terms, initially, he explains that his renunciation of phenomenology involves, crucially, a suspicion of that prejudice "which gives priority to the observing subject."[122] More correctly, however, Foucault actually rejects with this prejudice a network of delusions: most particularly, he protests at an a priori formula that affirms the integrity and autonomy of the rational individual by jumping to conclusions: about the essential priority of mind over matter, so that man is conceived as innately rational; and about the essential priority of mind over language, so that the thinking subject is held to be

in complete control of language. In both respects, quite obviously, this phenomenology propounds a definite anthropology. These anthropological delusions, moreover, are intrinsic to and indispensable to the notion that the "observing subject" is uniquely positioned and impeccably equipped to generate synthetic knowledge and so to arrive at the truth.

Against this monumental presumption, Foucault offers the reproof: "It seems to me that the historical analysis of scientific discourse should, in the last resort, be subject, not to a theory of the knowing subject, but rather to a theory of discursive practice."[123] In the context of the theoretical objectives followed through in The Order of Things, Foucault restricts his criticism to the obvious deficiency of that naive (phenomenological) anthropology, as a means of understanding the true character of scientific discourse; but, in general, Foucault locates the empirical subject, not in an autonomous, constitutive consciousness, but as a physical being whose aspiration to thought and self-understanding is subordinated to the forms of representation. In the light of developments in the fields of psychoanalysis, linguistics and ethnology, Foucault contends: "it became clear that man himself, questioned as to what he was, could not account for his sexuality and his unconscious, the systematic forms of his language or the regularities of his functions."[124] Accordingly, the archeological method is obliged to by-pass the

individual and to investigate the orders of discourse and the forms of representation they provide, as well as the objective structure of the forms of experience, what Foucault calls the regions of discursive practices. Given the consummate fallibility of the ego, whose reason is over-burdened by unconscious motivation, whose means of expression are pre-fabricated and uncontrollably elliptical and whose life experience, is predisposed to reinforce and support an indifferent and transcendent structuration; given all this, Foucault proposes that social philosophy should relinquish its inclination to interrogate the individual and try instead, firstly, to elaborate a topography of the discursive universe, and secondly, to explicate the dynamics of the conglomerate of practices that sustains and reproduces the discursive order.

It is apparent, however, that Foucault's critique of phenomenological principle runs much deeper than is suggested by his censorious response to empiricist epistemology and to the philosophy of consciousness. Already in Madness and Civilization, for instance, there is a much more robust attack theoretically, upon the epistemological absolutism, and practically, upon the projected humanist ethic of psychiatric medicine. There, intent on nullifying that epistemological premise he makes the case that, historically, reason and unreason obey no unitary principle or that there can be no absolute scientific knowledge of madness. He argues that it is possible to recall a world

that refracted madness through the prism of moral-theological values and which recognized the impenetrable mystery of sin and punishment at work not only in the phenomenon of madness but also in disease generally. He further argues that that vanished world can be distinguished from one that employed more economic - utilitarian criteria to define madness. The earlier period, says Foucault, subscribed to a policy of exclusion: it sought to prevent the contagion of evil. The later period, by comparison, was concerned through the offices of a developing medical science to inculcate a code of conduct and to establish a sense of social responsibility in the individual sufferer. So says Foucault, in the bourgeois world: "The asylum is a religious domain without religion, a domain of pure morality, of ethical uniformity. Everything that might retain the signs of the old differences was eliminated. The last vestiges of rite were extinguished. Formerly, the house of confinement had inherited, in the social sphere, the almost absolute limits of the leper house, it was a foreign country. Now the asylum must represent the great continuity of social morality. The values of family and work, all the acknowledged virtues, now reign in the asylum."[125]

Even more vehemently, Foucault tramples upon the humanist credentials of the human sciences. Thus, concerning the emergence of a scientific perception of madness he declares: "It did not evolve in the context of a

humanitarian movement that gradually related it more closely to the madman's human reality, to his most affecting and most intimate aspect; nor did it evolve under the pressure of a scientific need that made it more attentive, more faithful to what madness might have to say for itself.... No medical advance, no humanitarian approach was responsible for the fact that the mad were gradually isolated, that the monotony of insanity was divided into rudimentary types."[126] The beginnings of an understanding of psychiatric medicine and associated disciplines, we are informed, are to be found in comprehension of: "A political more than a philanthropic awareness."[127]

In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault intensifies his assault on medical science in its representative role as the prototypical human science. He deprecates its threadbare metaphysics. He takes the opportunity, firstly, to refute the grandiose metaphysical notion that language is somehow the incorruptible intercourse of human beings, that it is the quintessential element of freedom, or the "home of man." The Birth of the Clinic discovers medical discourse as a variety of 'positive' knowledge exercising an almost totalitarian authority over the physical existence of individuals in society. Foucault describes how medical discourse insinuates itself into the consciousness of the patient-subject where it is able to arrest, impale and colonise elementary life-impulses.

Giving the name, the Gaze, to this invasive power of medical discourse, Foucault discusses the predilection of medical knowledge like this: "To discover" he says, employing the new method, "will no longer be to read an essential coherence beneath a state of disorder, but to push a little further back the foamy line of language, to make it encroach upon that sandy region that is still open to the clarity of perception but is already no longer so to everyday speech - to introduce language into that penumbra where the gaze is bereft of words."[128] Co-ordinated with this re-evaluation of the role of language in the service of public health, there is an even more uncompromising attack upon the existentialist notion that death constitutes what is most secret, inviolable and personal, so that a person can be defined in terms of his or her comportment (dignified or not) towards the unavoidable trauma of an intimate encounter with death. Rounding on this anthropological conceit Foucault's analysis reveals Death instead as the ultimate a priori category of medical science: he discovers in it the transcendent and indifferent principle of an alien, "political rather than philanthropic", philosophy and technology of care. In Foucault's exalted terminology: "To know life is given only to that derisory, reductive and already infernal knowledge that only wishes it dead. The Gaze that envelops, caresses, details, atomizes the most individual flesh and enumerates its secret bits is that fixed, attentive, rather dilated gaze which, from the height of death has already condemned

life."[129] In other words, in Foucault's bitter re-appraisal, the ontological fundament of the new medical knowledge, of the exemplary human science, is the unresistant, immobile and infinitely dissectable corpse. Epistemologically, its favoured technique is the anaesthetic which reduces the anatomical specimen to the status of a docile replica of the cadaverous Ideal.

On a more sociological level, too, Foucault responds with mockery to the humanitarian humbug of medical science. He observes how it is absorbed in and totally committed to the promulgation of the ideology of pathological individuality.[130] Which means that medical perception constantly turns a blind eye to socially superannuated disease and distress. At the same time, Foucault implicates the medical profession in a strategically important police function which they had originally refused.[131] Inevitably, with the emergence of a 'positive' medical knowledge, however, so Foucault contends: "One began to conceive of a generalized presence of doctors whose intersecting gazes form a network and exercise at every point in space, and at every moment in time, a constant mobile, differentiated supervision."[132] Finally, in this regard, Foucault highlights the pedagogic authority of the medics. So he writes: "the question of the settling of doctors was not enough, the consciousness of each individual must be altered; every citizen must be informed of what medical knowledge is necessary and possible. And each practitioner must supplement his

supervisory activity with teaching, for the best way of avoiding the propogation of disease is to spread medical knowledge."[133] Quite clearly, the advance of medical science presupposed and progressively institutionalized the abrogation of that privacy, that intimacy between a person and his thoughts and between a person and his experience of sickness and death, so venerated by existentialism.[134]

Apophansis and Instrumental Reason

As a means of illustrating still more graphically the proposition that Foucault has produced a critical phenomenology, it is expedient to change course at this point. It is worthwhile to digress momentarily to suggest that Foucault's work coheres, more or less self-consciously, as a sustained effort to overturn a phenomenology (and accompanying anthropology) rooted in Heidegger's apophantic concept of truth. Such digression as is necessary, only has to provide a reminder that the concept of apophansis envisaged a non-instrumental relation of thought and Being as the fundamental possibility of linguistic experience; it conceived of truth without judgment, but it did so importantly in terms of doubly indispensable premisses that postulated the a priori structure of language and of Man's existential predicament. Embroidering the proposition that Foucault confronts Heidegger in the manner described, it is possible to maintain that it is in this sense that The Order of Things

assumes its strategic methodological importance, Firstly, because it is in that text that Foucault deliberately focusses his energy on a destructive analysis of the premisses of that jejune, apophantic notion of truth. Secondly, because it is in attacking and demolishing that concept (which cannot survive the loss of its theoretical preconceptions) which has operated as a formidable theoretical impediment to the advance of sociology, that Foucault has been able to produce a vigorous critical social theory.

In The Order of Things, Foucault systematically refuses and subverts the twin notions that the forms of representation and the forms of experience are fixed, transhistorical configurations. He rejects the ontological view of language (to leave the structure of experience to one side, for the moment) which supposes of words themselves that they are the debris of Eternal Ideas, the miscellaneous traces of an adamantine categorical structure that constrains human thought; and which supposes with regard to the relation of words and things that they are interchangeable and equivalent, two by two, across the whole expanse of creation. De-bunking this romanticism, by no means uncommon among the preconceptions of scientific activity, Foucault argues extensively that the interconnection of theory and language and the relation between words and things, have undergone a remarkable series of transformations. Most emphatically, he contends that the

connections established by 'positive' science are peculiar to the modern world: where words were once the ciphers of a hermeneutic, interpretative enterprise; where once they supplied the elementary concepts of encyclopaedic classificatory systems; now, Foucault maintains, in the modern era, discourse is the medium of a politics of signification.

With commensurate vigour, The Order of Things attempts to devastate the complementary notion that the forms of experience (what Heidegger calls the existentialia and which he fastens to the ultimate existential horizon of death) are immutable. Dismissing this ontological conception of Man, a common substructural feature of phenomenological social science, Foucault introduces the counter-argument that man is but a recent invention of the human sciences. In brief he suggests that man is the "empirico-transcendental doublet" posited by a conglomerate of anthropological discourses. In fact, he further speculates that these sciences have converted the metaphysical imponderables surrounding the questions of individual existence and social reproduction into the practical-technical problems entailed in administering a concrete, spatio-temporally realized, "anthropological finitude." Finally, in this respect, Foucault discusses two methodological priorities that circumscribe the purpose of 'positive' knowledge: loosely, he imagines a Transcendental Aesthetic that develops technical control of the

forms of experience, and he alludes to the necessity of a Transcendental Dialectic that supervises and controls the forms of representation.

Is it generally understood that in his deconstruction of the ontology of phenomenological social science, Foucault created for himself the possibility of an unprecedented critique of society ? In any case, that is what The Order of Things accomplished. That possibility of a critique of society is created in two predictable directions. To begin with, when Foucault pulls down that invisible and fabulous metaphysical structure that contains the delusions peculiar to phenomenological social science; the complacent assumptions of the "history of ideas" school get pulverized. This creates the possibility of a sociological account of the history of science: a possibility that is inconceivable where the forms of representation, words, theoretical formulae, the perceptual grids and interpretative frameworks employed by science are held to obey their own imminent developmental laws and believed to advance teleologically. Additionally, much more radically, when Foucault explodes the ontology of Man, when he discredits the pretence that when all other epistemological Absolutes have evaporated, there is still the fundamental truth of Human Nature; at this point, Foucault is released from an obligation to produce separate sociological critiques of individual social sciences and he can begin to construct a generalized practical/historical account of existential

conditions.

After The Order of Things, Foucault's social theory becomes much more obviously a nullification of the concept of apophansis. In fact, it is possible to point to three changes in emphasis beyond The Order of Things; and it is possible to attribute these to the success of the transcendental enquiry that investigates the limit of the interlocking premisses of phenomenological social science and which prompted the conclusion that logically the concept of apophansis was insupportable. That transcendental enquiry left Foucault in a positiion to reveal the human sciences as institutional representations of the most pitiless instrumentalism or as a ruse of the will to power. After The Order of Things, and after the resolution of some outstanding logical difficulties in The Archeology of Knowledge, Foucault turns from methodological clarification to substantive sociology.

So, firstly, in the wake of The Order of Things, in the theoretical space he has prepared for himself, Foucault turns onto the offensive and, openly and confidently, attributes those epistemic ruptures and discontinuities in the history of science that confound the 'history of ideas' mentality to the prior determinacy of practical crises in the affairs of men. In a discussion of the emergence of social science that occurred in the period in question, he said, characteristically: "Countless people have sought the

origins of sociology in Montesquieu and Comte. That is a very ignorant enterprise. Sociological knowledge (savoir) is formed rather in practices like those of the doctors...."[135] And he adds: "In fact, if the intervention of the doctors was of capital importance at this period, this was because it was demanded by a whole new range of political and economic problems, high-lighting the importance of the facts of population."[136] The exemplary pronouncement is made in Discipline and Punish, however, where the existential precondition of the emergence of 'positive' sociological disciplines is explained. "Generally speaking," Foucault submits, "it might be said that the disciplines are techniques for assuring the ordering of human multiplicities.... the peculiarities of the disciplines is that they try to define in relation to the multiplicities a tactics of power that fulfils three criteria.... This triple objective of the disciplines corresponds to a well-known historical conjuncture. One aspect of this conjuncture was the large demographic thrust of the eighteenth century.... The other aspect of the conjuncture was the growth in the apparatus of production.... These are techniques that make it possible to adjust the multiplicity of men and the multiplication of the apparatuses of production (and this means not only 'production' in the strict sense, but also the production of knowledge and skills in the school, the production of health in the hospitals, the production of destructive force in the army)."[137]

Inseparable from this re-orientation is the introduction of a specific conceptual innovation. The Order of Things, as was explained above, demolished established perceptions of the connection of theory and language. More importantly, however, in terms of his subsequent research: between The Order of Things and The Archeology of Knowledge, the 'episteme' became the 'historical a priori,' and with that slight inflection a profoundly sceptical attitude to the notion of "pure theory" and to "objective frameworks of knowledge" gave way to a construction in which the forms of representation were seen to be submerged in and irrevocably implicated in varieties of discursive practice. Most importantly, as a direct effect of the dissolution of the distinctions between words and things, between theory and practice, between the history and philosophy of science and the theory and history of society, Foucault discovered the need for a new sociological project: the need for a topography of the discursive universe or for a theorization of the way discourse is distributed and organized throughout social space and time.

The second qualitative change that occurs after The Order of Things is a renewed and much more sociologically relevant attack on the fundamental principles of existentialism. Where before he had scornfully examined the philanthropic rationalizations of medical and psychiatric sciences, now Foucault turns to consider the sociological veracity of the existentialist conviction that

the body may be regarded as an inalienable personal property, and he reassesses the view that in language men find the incorruptible means of communication and exchange with each other and with Being. So in Discipline and Punish Foucault endeavours to provide phenomenological or merely substantive corroboration of the counter-thesis put together theoretically in The Order of Things. In Discipline and Punish he makes the point that the universal individual known to existentialism was ushered into the world as an epistemological and historical entity (as that unprecedented 'doublet') by the primitive and by the increasingly sophisticated human sciences. "For a long time" Foucault writes, "ordinary individuality - the everyday individuality of everybody - remained below the threshold of description. To be looked at, observed, described in detail, followed from day to day by an uninterrupted writing was a privilege. The chronicle of a man, the account of his life, his historiography, written as he lived out his life, formed part of the rituals of his power. The disciplinary methods reversed this relation, lowered the threshold of describable individuality and made this description a means of control and a method of domination.... the child, the patient, the madman, the prisoner were to become.... the object of individual descriptions and biographical accounts. This turning of real lives into writing is no longer a procedure of historization; it functions as a procedure of objectification and subjection."[138] Where there is something

epistemologically peculiar about the contemporary structure of individuality, Foucault further explains, there is also a substantial difference to be taken into consideration. Thus he writes: "The disciplines mark the moment when the reversal of the political axis of individualization - as one might call it - takes place. In certain societies, of which the feudal regime is only one example, it may be said that individualization is greatest where sovereignty is exercised and in the higher echelons of power. The more one possesses power or privilege, the more one is marked as an individual, by rituals, written accounts or visual reproductions. .....In a disciplinary regime, on the other hand, individualization is 'descending'.... In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the normal and the non-delinquent."[139]

The third conspicuous change that originates in the tortuous process of self-clarification undertaken in The Order of Things is the inauguration of Foucault's prestigious and widely-discussed theory of power. Properly interpreted, the much-esteemed theoretical capability contained in that theory of power should be seen as an effect, a logical precipitate, explicable only in terms of the two facts previously discussed. That theory of power presupposes not only that discourse is inextricably implicated in a global politics of signification, but also

that the anthropological discourses collectively known as the social sciences, exercise a strategic influence over basic social processes of production and reproduction. This theory of power (which thus negates the interlocking premisses of a more innocent phenomenology) which supposes that language is incurably contaminated by squalid material interests and that men can be fabricated in the image prescribed by an unmitigated will to power, enables Foucault to produce a theory of society that combines a topography of the discursive universe (to describe the society of total surveillance) with a genealogy of the orders of discourse that explains how individuals and populations are conformed and regulated in that space-time continuum.

For Foucault, the society of the universal individual is the society of total surveillance. "Our society" he says, comparing it with a feudal order "is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supports of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces

and bodies."[140]

The universal individual (both in particular and in general in the form of the population) controlled by the "power/knowledge," by the instrumental knowledge rather than by the "pure theory" of the human sciences, substantiates and perpetuates the principles and dimensions of a definite "anthropological finitude." In the context of Foucault's genealogy, the epistemologically diverse social sciences exist as strands of an integrated strategy built up around "a technique for constituting individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge."[141] Foucault also puts the matter like this: "The individual," he writes, "is no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society; but he is also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power that I have called 'discipline.'"[142] Generalized, transparent individuality becomes the means to a disciplinary society. The ostensible autonomy of the individual signifies the increased cogency of disciplinary techniques rather than a realization of the ideals of liberal-democratic political philosophies." There are two images, then, of discipline. At one extreme, "we are told the discipline-blockade, the enclosed institution, established on the edges of society, turned inwards towards negative functions: arresting evil, breaking communications, suspending time. At the other extreme, with panopticism, is the discipline-mechanism: a functional mechanism that must improve the exercise of

power by making it lighter, more rapid, more effective, a design of subtle coercion for a society to come. The movement from one project to the other, from a schema of exceptional discipline to one of a generalized surveillance, rests on a historical transformation: the gradual extension of the mechanisms of discipline throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, later spread throughout the whole social body, the formation of what might be called in general the disciplinary society."[143]

In The Order of Things, the controlled development of an "anthropological finitude" was postulated in terms of a Transcendental Aesthetic and a Transcendental Dialectic: modes of analysis and techniques of supervision that related to the forms of experience and to the forms of representation respectively, with a view to superimposing these transcendental frameworks upon an empirical, anatomical and social base. Subsequently, these methodological priorities appear in more familiar, operational contexts with recognizable functional designations. Controlling the development of the universal individual along the physical coordinate, operating upon the body and its relation to processes of production and reproduction, there are the techniques of a "political anatomy." With the emergence of rudimentary human sciences, Foucault alleges: "What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behaviour. The human

body was entering a machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A 'political anatomy' that was also a 'mechanics of power' was being born; it defined how one may have a hold over other's bodies.... Thus discipline produces subjected and practised bodies, 'docile' bodies. ....In short, it dissociates power from the body ....If economic exploitation separates the force and the produce of labour, let us say that disciplinary cercion establishes in the body the constricting link between an increased aptitude and an increased domination."[144]

Controlling the intellectual-linguistic coordinate, supervising and effecting the individual's induction into the realms of discourse in the disciplinary society, there are an endless series of "normalizing judgments' whose institutionalized form is the examination. "The examination," Foucault explains, "combines the techniques of an observing hierarchy and those of a normalizing judgment. It is a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible to qualify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility through which one differentiates them and judges them. That is why, in all the mechanisms of discipline the examination is highly ritualized. In it are combined the ceremony of power and the form of experiment, the deployment of force and the establishment of truth."[145]

In their inception, Foucault means to demonstrate, in response to ascertainable practical crises with economic and demographic origins, the social sciences, at least those anthropological disciplines that do not know whether they are sciences or not; in their inception, these discourses were concerned to constitute useful and docile individuals and to construct society as a hierarchical network of observatories.[146] The regional observatories familiar in contemporary society once took as their common model we are told, the military camp: "For a long time this model of the camp or at least its underlying principle was found in urban development, in the construction of working-class housing estates, hospitals, asylums, prisons, schools."[147] Quite clearly, however, the underlying principle which each institutional structure substantiates is the production of the universally transparent individual as the means of reproducing the society of total surveillance.

The History of Sexuality is a supplementary work. Though it is presented as volume one of a long series of studies, there are at least three respects in which it can be read as an appendix to Discipline and Punish. Firstly, it relates the proliferation of discourse on sexuality in the modern world to the same economic-demographic crisis that provoked the emergence of the rudimentary human sciences discussed in Discipline and Punish. "The discipline of the body and the regulation of the population constituted the two poles around which the organization of the power over

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life was deployed." Secondly, it carries the attack on existentialism still farther: contesting the idea that in sexuality at least there is a fundamental private realm, by arguing that it is a product of the kind of disciplinary technique encountered previously. Most importantly, perhaps, The History of Sexuality, in a third supplementary aspect, gives closer attention to, and provides a more convincing theorization of the weaker component of the genealogy of universal individualism elaborated in Discipline and Punish. It amplifies the techniques implied by a Transcendental Dialectic: it illuminates the process of induction into the discursive order and the tactics of surveillance proper to centralized control of the forms of representation and the means of communication by discussing the censorship function of confessional rites. In fact, the most provocative theme of the later book is this, that : "The confession has spread its effects far and wide. It plays a part in law, medicine, education, family relationships and sexual relations, in ordinary, everyday matters and in the most solemn rites; one confesses one's crimes, one confesses one's sins, one confesses one's thoughts and desires, one confesses to one's past and to one's dreams, one confesses to one's childhood, one confesses one's illnesses and troubles.... Western man has

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become a confessing animal." Promised deliverance is at every point the spool that gathers up an invisible thread of confidences and binds the unsuspecting individual to authoritative discourses bearing on sexuality and on other

matters of moment. The doubts funnel upwards, the truth is communicated from above in a "normalizing judgment" and established in a behavioural adjustment.

Existentialism, Structuralism, Marxism

Three problematic philosophical connections have probably received special attention in discussions of Foucault. In the present interpretation, his relation to existentialism, structuralism and Marxism has been left out of account in the expectation that clarification of the importance of his opposition to Heidegger's philosophical legacy would provide a more penetrative insight, and eventually throw some light on these subsidiary questions. Now it is possible to justify that presupposition and exegetic strategy.

With regard to the simplest of these connections: it may be said quite summarily that structuralism in general emerged in the shadow of a phenomenology (philosophy of social science) heavily dependent upon Heidegger. Structuralism admitted the collapse of rationalism and submerged the philosophy of mind in a philosophy of discourse. At the same time, it renounced the existentialist, a priori humanism which still postulated for man an inalienable supra-historical essence: a non-transferable physicality whose absolute inviolability was supposedly borne in upon the individual by intimations of mortality. Though these two defining characteristics were not present in equal

degrees in every example of structuralism, it is still reasonable to suggest that structuralism consisted in that theoretical effort that sought to pinpoint the contradiction in the phenomenological position between an acknowledgement of the inevitability of 'de-centred' subjectivity in language and a refusal to recognize de-centred subjectivity as an historical phenomenon.

The suspicion that Foucault was a structuralist was no doubt justified on these grounds. However, the decisive factor is that structuralism's encounter with phenomenology remained inconclusive. Levi Strauss was constrained by a residual psychologism. Althusser committed himself dogmatically to an anti-humanism. Barthes, like all structuralists, was to some extent captivated by Saussurean nominalism - so that the constitutional weakness of structuralism is the 'problem of reference.' The comparative success of Foucault's encounter with Heidegger has, hopefully, been demonstrated satisfactorily.

The Foucault-Marx relation has drawn a considerable amount of speculation. What can be offered besides more speculation on the distance that separates them is an account of Foucault's ambivalence to Marx: the posture which enables antithetical formulations to coexist. If the real difficulty is taken to be Foucault's ambivalence then the problem can be dealt with by drawing attention to a slight but crucial dislocation between the two projects

undertaken in The Order of Things. In fact, in each phase of his investigation - in that which aims to establish the historicity of language and that which aims to demonstrate the historicity of Man - Foucault defines the modern period differently. As a result he may in The Order of Things have overlooked a rupture in the modern episteme. Moreover, to resort to speculation, this undetected rupture may be one whose appreciation is indispensable to a proper evaluation of Marx; and it may also be one that actually plays an important, if unacknowledged, role in Foucault's own theory.

One version of the character of "positive" theory (and of the "anthropological finitude" it documents) is given where Foucault is intent on discriminating the distinction between Classical and modern notions of language. At that phase of his argument, Foucault discerns the epistemological unity of the researches of Cuvier, Ricardo and Bopp, the progenitors of modern knowledge, in their efforts to map the most elementary existential dimensions imposed by Life, Labour and Language. They are understood to have declined the Classical imperative to produce formal representations of things in favour of an analytic invasion of the inner mechanism of living systems.

Looking at the modern episteme for the first time, Foucault discovers a pyramid of sciences based on Biology: the paradigmatic science of living systems. The central

assumptions of a fundamental, vitalist philosophy are recorded like this: "In relation to life" Foucault explains, "beings are no more than transitory figures, and the being that they maintain, during the brief period of their existence, is no more than their presumption, their will to survive. And so, for knowledge, the being of things is an illusion, a veil that must be torn aside to reveal the mute and invisible violence that is devouring them in the darkness."[150] More succinctly, Foucault maintains that each of the prototypical 'positive' sciences constructs an "ontology of the annihilation of beings"[151] which in relation to the Classical period operates as an inevitable critique of knowledge.

Biology addresses the generic question: it grapples with the antinomy of Life and Death. Economics and Philology are specialisms developed within the same frame of reference on the basis of the same vitalist presumption. The "anthropological finitude" they explicate progressively extends our understanding of: "the human being who speaks, wears out and wastes his life in evading the immanence of death."[152] Where Biology explores the relation of Life and Death, Political Economy addresses the relation of Production and Extinction, and Philology originates in the antinomy of Communication and Silence. Perhaps, to understand how language and philology can be accommodated in this framework, it is necessary to suppose that Foucault is in accord with Lacan, for whose psychoanaly tic theory

social life occurs exclusively in the realms of discourse; so that exclusion from language, and the possibilities it proffers, is the elementary experience of sickness unto death.

In any event, it is in the context of this description of the structure of the modern episteme that Foucault wrote an obituary for Marxism. It was here that he announced: "Marxism exists in nineteenth century thought like a fish in water, it is unable to breathe anywhere else."[153] But it is apparent that this judgment depends upon a contentious definition of political economy as a positive science that tackles a fundamental existential problem; which became what it was bound to become and what it would remain with the intervention of Ricardo. In this contentious formulation, political economy: "designates in labour, and in the very hardship of that labour, the only means of overcoming the fundamental insufficiency of nature and of triumphing for an instant over death." "The positivity of economics" Foucault suggests, "is situated in that anthropological hollow."[154] Which makes it apparent that a naturalistic residuum, intrinsic to existentialism, constitutes an important resource for Foucault at this juncture. Firstly, where the pathos of the existentialist problem, the poignancy of personal finitude, seems to put larger questions surrounding the structure of the social relations of prduction in perspective. Secondly, in the sense that a naturalistic residuum, intrinsic to

existentialism enables Foucault to equate economics and philology epistemologically with biology, as natural sciences: as quite unproblematically representative sciences, as bearers of a universally valid knowledge engaged in the production of "pure theory."

After all, it may be that only in The Order of Things, where for the last time he adopts an existentialist stance, however residually, that Foucault could have declared that Marx laboured in the shadow of Ricardo.[155] Surely, at the "deepest level of Western knowledge" Marx's critique of political economy erupts as a violent repudiation of naturalistic presumption of economic theory concerned with capitalist relations of production ? In the face of the naturalistic consensus Marx's discourse levels the accusation that production organized, in accordance with the most esteemed thought of the day, to maximize the productivity of labour, did not operate straightforwardly to alleviate need; but actually perpetuated want and exacerbated the precarious predicament of wage-labour.

To explain Foucault's ambivalence to Marx, however, it is also appropriate to consider a second account of the structure of modern knowledge given in The Order of Things. In this second construction, concerned principally to introduce the explosive idea that man is a recent invention of 'positive' anthropological discourses, it is impossible to overlook the fact that the pyramid of fundamental

sciences has been inverted and that the paradigmatic 'positive' science is now philology. In consequence, the epistemological common factor that unites the economics of Marx, the psychoanalysis of Freud and the philology of Nietzsche is the systematic disclosure of significance.[156] Equally consequential is the fact that scientific discourses are no longer understood to be involved practically in the elaboration of an ontology of the annihilation of beings or in penetrating the objective dimensions of an indisputable, anthropological finitude. Instead, they are located in a strategic position in the context of a global politics of signification where they posit man as an "empirico-transcendental doublet" and administer the society of total surveillance. Quite clearly, it is in this phase that parallels with Marx are discernible; and it is when the theoretical discoveries of this second phase of The Order of Things are operationalized that Foucault comes to emphasize the complementarity of his "political anatomy" and Marx's critique of political economy.

In a final comment on the Marx-Foucault connection it is perhaps not totally irrelevant to recall how Hegel abandoned the subjective dialectic, epistemology and Kantian nominalism and put his philosophical trust in a knowledge of the Objective Dialectic of History. Most precisely it should be remembered that Hegel radicalized the epistemological question and took the problem out of

the confines of an individualistic or solipsistic philosophy of mind. Marx, of course, re-constructed the Objective Dialectic. Heidegger, however, in his relation to Hegel and Marx is a reactionary figure precisely in the sense that he reinstates the subjective dialectic. His concept of apophansis involves a disparagement and a capitulation to the problems of historical determination. Apophansis enforces a foreclosure of the epistemological problem. Foucault's affinity with Marx (and with Hegel) may, accordingly, be said to lie in his embroilment in the philosophy of language: where he insists once again on radicalizing the epistemological question and on re-constructing the Objective Dialectic.

The Return of the Philosophy of Practice

Heidegger's concept of truth presides over a network of mystification. Faced with the reification of the forms of experience and representation, it naturalizes those circumstances. In response to the derogation of rational subjectivity entailed by petrifaction of the institutional fabric of social existence, that concept of truth alleges that man's arrogation of a constitutive role in the production of knowledge has been the historical basis of falsehood. At the same time, the apophantic formula for non-instrumental truth, holds out to the disenfranchised empirical subject the consolation of an intuitive knowledge. This redeployment, however, only puts the powerless empirical subject in a position to confirm a

pre-established formal correspondence between the order of discourse and the order of things.

At another point in this thesis the concept of apophansis was said to describe a Transcendental Aesthetic.[157] This was to suggest that in that configuration the knowledge and experience of the empirical individual do not equip him to register contradiction between the transcendental and the empirical; but that, on the contrary, truth is established when and where the empirical subject is subsumed by transcendental structures, representative systems and institutionalized practices. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault demonstrates in the context of his discussion of the structure of medical knowledge how the operation of a Transcendental Aesthetic, how institutional surveillance of the relation of knowledge and physical experience, has been accompanied empirically by the introduction and expanded use of general anaesthetics that reduce the body to the status of a perfectly preserved corpse.[158]

On a more methodological plane, the reduction of knowledge to the form of a Transcendental Aesthetic has two retrogressive features. Firstly, it enforces a surreptitious foreclosure of the problem of mediation (of transcendental and empirical systems, of knowledge and experience) which since Kant has been the principal epistemological question. In this frame, the empirical subject can only experience immediate identities. Secondly, this construction

re-affirms the integrity of the empirical individual on a priori grounds. Effectively, it is the individual who maintains an 'authentic' comportment towards Being and towards language, who chooses resolutely to denounce inauthentic (historical) forms, whose existence becomes the proper ground of truth.

For his part, Foucault recognizes that the sovereignty of the rational subject postulated by the philosophy of mind is, as the doctrine of apophansis implies, theoretically and practically, a dead letter. But Foucault does not endeavour to reconstitute the possibility of absolute truth. Like Heidegger, too, Foucault condemns instrumentalism (the conjunction of power and knowledge, the will to power) as a degenerate form of truth. But Foucault neither regards instrumentalism primarily as an affront to Being, as a violence meted out to the fundamental possibilities of language and of experience; nor does he propose an unassailable truth based upon the integrity of individual existence. To explain the difference another way: Foucault neither requires the individual to assent to his assimilation within the orders of discourse or within the established constellation of disciplinary systems; nor does he define the individual in terms of the quality of his preparedness for death. Again, at the risk of overstating the case, Foucault neither expects the individual to accede to the configuration of objective determinations nor to find his own truth in a

resolute inwardness that preserves the fundamental existential possibility: an authentic relation to Being.

Fortunately, perhaps, so much circumlocution boils down to this: that Foucault consistently promotes a practical alternative from within Heidegger's unprecedentedly realistic philosophy of language. Which means ultimately that Foucault offers no more secure foundations for his critique of phenomenology and for his social philosophy than his desire to escape oblivion in language and his determination to communicate his under-represented and contradictory experience, by invading essentially over-loaded and insensitive media. Thus Foucault declares his intention to evade or alleviate "the profound distress of those whose language has been destroyed."[159] He is pledged to combat alienation in language: "loss of what is 'common' to place and name. Atopia, aphasia."[160] If truth is not a matter of synthetic apperception as Kant imagined, but if as Heidegger maintained, knowledge emerges as a fundamental possibility of linguistic experience; still, Foucault seems to say, existence in a discursive universe does not involve subordination to timeless laws, but it implicates the de-centred subject in a practical world where things are not as they might be.

Noticeably, beyond his 'positivist' period, when the vestiges of epistemological absolutism latent in the archeological knowledge have evaporated; and when the

genealogical formulation is in the ascendency, Foucault is increasingly inclined to convey his philosophic reservations in terms of a compulsion to disrupt and destabilize established discursive fields and to explode the prejudices and preconceptions on which these frameworks rotate. In a statement characteristic of his later period, Foucault defines the genealogical approach like this: "What it really does," he says "is to entertain the claims to attention of local, discontinuous, disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the claims of a unitary body of theory which would filter, hierarchise and order them in the name of some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of what constitutes a science and its objects. Genealogies are therefore not positivistic returns to a more careful or exact form of science. They are precisely anti-sciences. Not that they indicate a lyrical right to ignorance or non-knowledge: it is not that they are concerned to deny knowledge or that they esteem the virtues of direct cognition and base their practice upon an immediate experience that escapes encapsulation in knowledge. It is not that with which we are concerned. We are concerned rather, with the insurrection of knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the contents, methods or concepts of science, but to the effects of the centralizing powers which are linked to the institution and functioning of an organized scientific discourse within a society such as ours. ....it is really against the effects of the power of a discourse that is considered to be scientific that

the genealogy must wage its struggle."[161] Which statement makes it clear that, in epistemological-methodological terms, Foucault eventually admits that he has nothing convincing to say. Equally, it is apparent that what he serves up is a negative judgment on the prevailing transcendentalist logic and the essential and representative truths it establishes discursively and institutionally. The motivating factor in his alternative, practical philosophy of language is an aesthetic criticism that deplores the structure of existential conditions and the systematic misrepresentation of those conditions which are both attributable to the hegemonic power of the 'positive' knowledge exercised by a conglomerate of anthropological discourse in contemporary society.

Notes

1. Sheridan, Alan, Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth, London, Tavistock, 1980. "I come not to bury beneath commentary, but to praise..." Ibid., p 1.

2. Ibid., p 205.

3. Dreyfus, Hubert, L. and Rabinow, Paul, Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics, Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1982, p 116.

4. Ibid., p 88, p 133, p 167.

5. Ibid., p 198.

6. Ibid., p 201.

7. Ibid., p 94.

8. Ibid., p 94.

9. Ibid., p 79.

10. Ibid., p 155.

11. Ibid., p 49.

12. Sheridan, A., op. cit.,

13. Ibid., p 218.

14. Ibid., p 218.

15. Ibid., p 221.

16. Smart, Barry, Foucault, Marxism and Critique, London, R.K.P., 1983, p 29.

17. Ibid., p 86.

18. See: Lecourt, Dominique, Marxism and Epistemology, London, NLB, 1975, pps. 187 ff, and Wuthnow, Robert, Hunter, J.D., Bergeson, Albert and Kurtzweil, Edith, Cultural Analysis, London, R.K.P., 1984, pps. 133-78.

19. Smart, Barry, op. cit., p 108.

20. Ibid., pps. 12-13.

21. Ibid., p 127.

22. Ibid., p 109.

23. Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things, London, Tavistock, 1970, p 328.

24. Foucault, Michel, Discipline and Punish, Harmondsworth Penguin, 1979, pps. 220-21.

25. Foucault, Michel, The Order of Things, London, Tavistock, 1970, p 375.

26. Ibid., p xxii.

27. Ibid., p xxii.

28. Ibid., p xxiii.

29. Ibid., p 23.

30. Ibid., p 26.

31. Ibid., p 29.

32. Ibid., p 30.

33. Ibid., pps. 36-37.

34. Ibid., p 38.

35. Ibid., p 38.

36. Ibid., p 67.

37. Ibid., p 43.

38. Ibid., p 67.

39. Ibid., p 66.

40. Ibid., p 67.

41. Ibid., p 69.

42. Ibid., p 70.

43. Ibid., p 70.

44. Ibid., p 71.

45. Ibid., p 73.

46. Ibid., p 79.

47. Ibid., p 73.

48. Ibid., p 157.

49. Ibid., p 80.

50. Ibid., p 80.

51. Ibid., p 80.

52. Ibid., p 83.

53. Ibid., p 83.

54. Ibid., p 91.

55. Ibid., p 93.

56. Ibid., p 92.

57. Ibid., p 94.

58. Ibid., p 94.

59. Ibid., p 95.

60. Ibid., p 96.

61. Ibid., p 97.

62. Ibid., p 102.

63. Ibid., p 104.

64. Ibid., p 103.

65. Ibid., p 106.

66. Ibid., p 107.

67. Ibid., p 107.

68. Ibid., p 94.

69. Ibid., p 132.

70. Ibid., p 131.

71. Ibid., p 132.

72. Ibid., p 131.

73. Ibid., p 133.

74. Ibid., p 133.

75. Ibid., p 135.

76. Ibid., p 135.

77. Ibid., p 140.

78. Ibid., p 147.

79. Ibid., p 138.

80. Ibid., p 168.

81. Ibid., p 174.

82. Ibid., p 176.

83. Ibid., p 179.

84. Ibid., p 179.

85. Ibid., p 188.

86. Ibid., p 208.

87. Ibid., p 218.

88. Ibid., p 220.

89. Ibid., p 225.

90. Ibid., p 226.

91. Ibid., p 254.

92. Ibid., p 255.

93. Ibid., p 256.

94. Ibid., pps. 227-8.

95. Ibid., p 268.

96. Ibid., p 271.

97. Ibid., p 276.

98. Ibid., p 277.

99. Ibid., p 235.

100. Ibid., p 237.

101. Ibid., p 296.

102. Ibid., p 296.

103. Ibid., p 298.

104. Ibid., p 305.

105. Ibid., p 209.

106. Ibid., p 313.

107. Ibid., pps. 312-13.

108. Ibid., p 308.

109. Ibid., p 309.

110. Ibid., p 310.

111. Ibid., pps. 289-90.

112. Ibid., pps. 313-14.

113. Ibid., p 318.

114. Ibid., p 319.

115. Ibid., p 320.

116. Ibid., p 324.

117. Ibid., p 327.

118. Ibid., pps. 328-35.

119. Ibid., p 319.

120. Ibid., p XIV.

121. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, London, Tavistock, 1972, p 12.

122. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, p XIV.

123. Ibid., p XIV.

124. Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, p 13.

125. Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization, London, Tavistock, 1967, p 257.

126. Ibid., pps. 223-24.

127. Ibid., p 224.

128. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, London, Tavistock, 1973, p 169.

129. Ibid., p 171.

130. Ibid., p 169.

131. Ibid., p 27.

132. Ibid., p 31.

133. Ibid., p 31.

134. Significantly influenced by and continuous with Foucault's critique of the pervasive technology of care is Ivan Illich's book, Limits to Medicine, Medical Nemesis: The Expropriation of Health, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977. See, for example, Illich's characteristic pronouncement: "The medicalization of society has brought the epoch of natural death to an end. Western man has lost the right to preside at his act of dying. Health, or the autonomous power to cope, has been expropriated down to the last breath. Technical death has won its victory over dying. Mechanical death has conquered and destroyed all other deaths. Op. cit., p 210.

135. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, Brighton, Harvester Press, 1980, p 151.

136. Ibid., p 151, pps. 166 ff.

137. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1979, pps. 218-19.

138. Ibid., pps. 191-92.

139. Ibid., pps. 192-93.

140. Ibid., p 217.

141. Ibid., p 194.

142. Ibid., p 194.

143. Ibid., p 209.

144. Ibid., p 138.

145. Ibid., p 184.

146. This aspect is given special emphasis in Bryan S. Turner's reading of Foucault, who says, succinctly, reviewing the latter's career: "Historically speaking, the growth of scientific psychiatry corresponded with the growth of the asylum (Foucault, 1967), the growth of penology with the prison (Foucault, 1977), the development of clinical medicine with the hospital (Foucault, 1973) and the discourse of sex with the confessional (Foucault, 1979). See: Religion and Social Theory, Bryan S. Turner, London, Heinemann, 1983.

147. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, p 171.

148. Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. I, Harmondsworth, Allen Lane, 1979, p 139.

149. Ibid., p 59.

150. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, p 278.

151. Ibid., p 278.

152. Ibid., p 257.

153. Ibid., p 262.

154. Ibid., p 257.

155. Ibid., p 261.

156. Ibid., p 298.

157. See: Part IV, Chapter One, Heidegger's Existentialism and Philosophy of Language.

158. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic, pps. 126-27 and passim.

159. Michel Foucault, The Order of Things, pps. XVIII-XIX.

160. Ibid., p XIX.

161. Michel Foucault, Power/Knowledge, pps. 83-84.

CONCLUSION

The Prejudices of Transcendentalist Logic

On reflection, what unifies the string of critical successes brought together in this study is their concern to explicate the presuppositional structure and the objective ramifications of transcendentalist logic. The several critical perspectives on philosophy and society that have been discussed and analyzed amount to so many skirmishes with the preponderant sorts of reductionism. Accordingly, in spite of a significant level of overlapping and cross-fertilization, in spite of the unobjectionable suitability of comprehensive, thematic notions like estrangement and practice, it is nevertheless correct to conclude that no conceptual formula has been encountered which can be regarded as a common methodological fundament, definitive of critique. Instead, in logical terms, it has proven necessary to define critique in its negativism; in its generalized opposition to authoritative discourses and institutionalized practices. Critique, so it has transpired, has assumed several counter-logical forms in reaction to variations in the same prevailing authoritarianism in thought and action that has sought to foreclose the problem of knowledge and to expropriate and systematize the conditions of individual and collective experience. In consequence, the logical regularities that become apparent in a retrospective appraisal of the achievement of critical social theory, actually reflect

the resilience of the outstanding delusions of an historical period. So, too, the impression of progress derived from a review of the consecutive victories of critique, owes more, ultimately, to a relentless exacerbation of the enveloping existential crisis than to any developmental process intrinsic to critical thought.

Invariably (to isolate one constant source of provocation), critical analysis of the structure of transcendentalist logic has revealed and designated an epistemological prejudice. Criticism has disclosed a predisposition to prioritize the problem of knowledge that includes two equally important though only superficially reconciled components. Formally, transcendentalism has been found to involve an epistemological absolutism: a compulsion to construct and to settle for nothing less than a notion of "pure theory." In fact, the same urge to prescribe, a priori, an invariant structure to the preconditions of knowledge (to the categories of consciousness, to the concepts of scientific theory and to the authentic forms of symbolic representation and communication) was encountered successively in the environs of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of labour and the philosophy of language. Substantively, meanwhile, the epistemological prejudice, the predisposition to prioritize the problem of knowledge, has been discerned in a preoccupation with the question of "objective knowledge" or "positive knowledge." Which is to say that, substantively, the dominant tradition has given

precedence to the general problem of the sciences: the question of validity as it has arisen in the context of their concerted effort to establish the rule of knowledge in specific regions of existence.

Formally, following Kant's prototypical formulation, the a priori universality of scientific knowledge (its predetermined validity for all) is repeatedly attributed to the circumstance that a privileged kind of thought does not arise in the inconclusive dialectic of knowledge and experience (i.e. inductively) but emerges as a possibility constrained by quite unmodifiable cognitive capabilities and intellectual resources: from which indubitable sources it proceeds deductively. Substantively, meantime, with regard to the actual programmatic advance of science, transcendental logic sanctions and validates the purposes of an extensive technical and administrative apparatus by stressing its adherence to a scrupulously principled (disinterested, impersonal) approach to the preservation and transformation of the conditions of knowledge. So that, while the possibility of "pure theory" is linked inseparably to the postulation of a fixed categorical framework, at the same time, the progress of "objective knowledge" is attached firmly to that celebrated sceptical empiricism for which every abstract proposition remains, in perpetuity, a dubious hypothesis.

Invariably, too, disquietude about transcendentalist logic

has focussed not only upon an epistemological prejudice but also upon an anthropological prejudice. Briefly, this consists in the tendency to ascribe a necessitarian structure to individual and collective experience. In the instances that have received some consideration above (in the main part of the text), criticism exposed attempts to naturalize the conditions of experience, either: by submerging social relations in a moral ontology, or by subordinating productive potential and social wealth to the inflexible laws of capitalist production, or by situating opportunity for cultural development in the suffocating space provided by non-negotiable, pre-fabricated forms of representation, peculiar to reified communicative channels. In a variety of ways, the anthropological prejudice denies the historicity of the conditions of experience. It embodies an intransigent resistance to the notion that what is theoretically comprehensible and practically revisable in our contemporary predicament is the complex result of a massive expenditure of effort that has gone toward the historical project of establishing society as a moral order, an economic commonwealth and as a discurive universe.

At each of the points of intervention that have been discussed, the critique of transcendental logic has exposed the orthodox consensus as a conspiracy of silence. At each point the presence of the same basic and ineradicable contradictions has been brought to light. Once again,

as on the epistemological plane, criticism encounters among the anthropological premisses of transcendentalism a significant discrepancy between the formal absolutist criteria it propounds and the pragmatic activity it actually legitimates. On the one side, so it has been demonstrated, this is a knowledge whose formal validity derives from the fact that it transcends experience: from the fact that it is uncontaminated by base material interests and unaffected by immediate tactical considerations. On the other side, this is patently a knowledge whose practical value lies, and to an ever greater extent, in its capacity not merely or even principally to conceptualize, but in its ability to control and reorganize, the conditions of experience. Summarily: while, epistemologically, the critique of transcendentalist logic has drawn attention to an insurmountable contradiction between conceptualism and sceptical empiricism (deductive and inductive logic); anthropologically, it has advertised the antagonism between a reflexive naturalism (a presupposition that the relation of Man and Nature persists unchanged throughout historical time) and a practical instrumentalism (a resolve to dominate the dialectic of Man and Nature).

It is also apparent that the ineradicable contradictions intrinsic to the dominant tradition have, historically, become increasingly troublesome. In the Kantian framework the inconsistencies were barely discernible. Again,

prototypically, that framework combined nominalism (a purely notional estimate of the absolute value of scientific systems) with sceptical empiricism (a utilitarian estimate of the practical value of scientific activity). It also combined, anthropologically, a view of the unalterable moral foundation of human existence with a minimal perception of the dialectical structure of history; where it made Man pivotal and envisaged the construction of a community as the ultimate question. In Foucault's criticism, by comparison, the same logical gaps have become unbridgeable chasms. Between, on one side, an ontological philosophy of language, in whose terms truth is contingent upon renunciation of profane historical forms of expression; and on the other side, the aggressive instrumentalism of anthropological discourses whose imperatives insinuate themselves insidiously within, and establish their unchallengeable dominion in, the minds of subjected individuals. Between the practitioners' humanitarian evaluation of the ethical purpose of social science and the strategic deployment of forces that sustains the society of total surveillance.

By degrees, it has become indisputable that, epistemologically, transcendentalism resolutely refuses to admit the part played by speculative judgments in the formation of truth. Thereby, it strives to transcend contradiction on an a priori basis. This aspect is understood by Pierre Macherey when he alleges: "there is no such thing as an

ideological contradiction - the inexact character of an ideology excludes contradiction..... An ideology can be put into contradiction - it is futile to denounce the presence of a contradiction in ideology."[1] In such terms, Macherey expresses his conviction that transcendental logic involves systematic erasure of all traces of concrete contradiction from the inner sanctuary of privileged knowledge. At the most abstract level of epistemological significance this means denial of the speculative nature of knowledge: elimination of the possibility that the abstract and the concrete can be out of joint.

At the same time, it has become apparent that, anthropologically, the unacceptable, unutterable principle is that of work or production: which is smothered below the threshold of criticism in a non-contradictory concept of Nature. This characteristic lacuna, in the ruling transcendentalist logic was divulged initially by Marx, but it has since been recognized as having a general validity. Roland Barthes, for example, in discussing the conventions governing the art of story-telling, remarks: "our society takes the greatest pains to conjure away the coding of the narrative situation: there is no counting the number of narrational devices which seek to naturalize the subsequent narrative by feigning to make it the outcome of some natural circumstance and thus as it were 'distinguishing it': epistolatory novels, supposedly rediscovered manuscripts, author who met the narrator, films which

begin before the credits. The reluctance to declare its codes characterizes bourgeois society and the mass culture issuing from it."[2]

Re-opening the Theory of Subjectivity

Critique, the critique of transcendentalist logic or the critique of ideology, originates theoretically in energetic opposition to the recurrent attempt to contain enquiry into the conditions of knowledge and experience within stipulated limits. It denounces the preference for ontological constructions and the associated tendency to solve fundamental questions by diktat. In general, for critical social theory, ontological constructions represent a refusal to admit the historical. The ontological systematically conceals by understatement or omission the decisive importance of a practical postulate · e.g., it presents a formal nominalist evaluation of the value of scientific knowledge in which the dynamic, inductive movement of sceptical empiricism is eclipsed; or it projects an existentialist ethic that obfuscates the authoritarian police-function performed by modern medical science. Again and again, criticism explodes an ontological construction by characterizing it logically in terms of its practical significance, in terms of its phenomenological effect, rather than by reference to its theoretical pretension.

The primary consideration for critique, it becomes possible

to suggest, has always been to re-open what transcendental logic has declared closed and suppressed, namely: the theory of subjectivity. This determination to return to the question of subjectivity, monotonously evaded, deferred and conjured out of existence by the objectivist tendency, materializes in two theoretical counter-emphases. Firstly, in the shadow of the ontological habit of thought, there is resistance to the characteristic epistemological reduction that divorces the theory of knowledge from the theory of judgment and declares from first principles that an epistemological question is never simultaneously an aesthetic question. Secondly, there is an argumentative thrust that impugns the anthropological reduction that divorces the theory of society from the realities of power and production and which refuses to regard social relations as political phenomena: which reductionism begins naturalistically from the presupposition that society is in equilibrium morally, economically or culturally. In one direction, transcendentalism is accused of conveniently overlooking abundant evidence which suggests that truth does indeed originate in something as arbitrary and constitutionally tendentious as judgment. In the other direction, transcendental logic is repeatedly found to involve abhorrence of the possibility that in moral, economic and linguistic terms social relations may best be comprehended as expressions of a fundamental deployment of forces, which reproduces moral, economic and linguistic patterns and codes.

With every critical success, moreover, a formidable configuration of allegedly unassailable principles has turned out to be a conglomerate of more or less sound, though undoubtedly authoritative, judgments. So Marx's critique of political economy, in the first instance, constructed the complex notion of capital as a hierarchical arrangement of propositions that set definite limits to economic controversy - giving priority to the problem of exchange and naturalizing the relations of production. With every critical success, too, the problem of "objective knowledge" or "positive knowledge" has been shown, on the model of Hegel's phenomenology, to hinge upon the translation of an abstract framework into a concrete reality through the mediation of social practice. So, for Marx, capital is not essentially a theoretical construct but is, principally, a network of practices that substantiates and sustains a specific mode of production. In fact, Marx's exposition is exemplary in several respects. To begin with, in the sense that it challenges the universal validity of a propositional system, which it insists on redefining as historical, or as a severely limited constellation of judgments that operates to circumscribe thought and to prescribe horizons for consciousness. In addition, Marx's critique is paradigmatic insofar as it provides an extended and documented reflection upon the objective, phenomenal effects of the substantiation of an economic theory whose ultimate principle is the perpetual expansion of value, or profit. In this respect, Marx

penetrates behind the naturalistic facade of an institutional structure that presents itself as the necessary productive apparatus to discover the political reality of a carefully maintained, constantly refined, prefabricated framework for thought and action.

Above all, however, to be as precise as possible, the momentous importance of the critique of political economy as a critical model revolves round its nomination of the Transcendental Subject, Capital, as the totemic epicentre and as the supreme socio-historical power in the modern world. The crux of Marx's social criticism is a resounding condemnation of social conditions in which the complex and remote abstraction, Capital, has been installed as the real arbiter in questions impinging upon the politics of social reproduction and as the principal beneficiary of the collective efforts of generations. Every endeavour to produce an economic commonwealth, Marx complains, has been harnessed to processes that perpetuate the generalized alienation of empirical subjects. In his own words, Marx describes the withering effect of the rule of Capital when he says: "within the capitalist system all methods for raising the social productivity of labour are put into effect at the cost of the individual worker."[3]

The enduring epistemological-methodological significance of Marx's contribution has in this connection been elicited by Adorno in this discussion of the historical truth of the

doctrine of the transcendental subject, which runs: "In a sense (although idealism would be the last to admit this) the transcendental subject is more real - that is to say, more determinate for the real conduct of men and for the resulting society - than those psychological individuals from which the transcendental one was abstracted. They have little to say in the world, having on their part turned into appendages of the social apparatus and ultimately into ideology..... What shows up faithfully in the doctrine of the transcendental subject is the priority of the relations - abstractly rational ones, detached from the human individuals and their relationships - that have their model in exchange. If the exchange form is the standard social structure, its rationality constitutes people; what they are for themselves, what they seem to be to themselves, is secondary. They are deformed beforehand by the mechanism that has been philosophically transfigured as transcendental. The supposedly most evident of things, the empirical subject, would have to be viewed as not yet in existence; in this perspective, the transcendental subject is 'constitutive.'"[4] In Adorno's contrary interpretation, subjectivity, the power to initiate transformative action or to sanction the continuation of existing arrangements, the power of improvisation and judgment, remains entirely with the Transcendental Subject. Subsequently, analogously, for structuralism, the power of discourse is said to be lodged in a de-centred Subject.

In any case, in this formulation, it is apparent that investigation of the ramifications of transcendental logic gravitates towards specification of an objectively compelling system of rational and practical constraints that overshadows and subsumes the generality of empirical individuals. The pretext for criticism turns out to be the asphyxiating pressure exerted by a spurious universality that bears down everywhere as gravity does. With Foucault, alienation is discussed in terms of the interlocking grip of a Transcendental Dialectic and a Transcendental Aesthetic. It becomes clearer, perhaps, than before, that the Transcendental Dialectic, the unknowable truth about ourselves, the unaccountable, inaccessible limit imposed upon the relation of question and answer, is no impenetrable transhistorical enigma; but that it exists as an authoritarian epistemic structure and its institutional concretion: which persists as secret government, as censorship exercised by centralized means of communication and as the sprawling examination system that propagates and inculcates, selectively. It is also possible, employing Foucault's terminology to characterize the other major preoccupation of critical social theory, its critique of mass culture, as a determined resistance to the sclerotic effects of institutionalized practices that constitute society in the form of a Transcendental Aesthetic. But before proceeding down that avenue, before leaving aside epistemological considerations ,it is worth recapitulating.

The position so far may be summarized thus: In critique we are confronted with an intellectual response to those social processes that have organized the automation of the objective dialectic of theory and practice and which have arranged by exactly that means for the stultification of the subjective dialectic of knowledge and experience. The problem is enforced leisure or voluntary redundancy depending on your point of view. Which serves as a prelude to the suggestion that, in the present conjuncture, critique originates in stultifying forms of experience: in stupefaction and a sense of exclusion and futility. In which light, it seems reasonable to argue that critique proposes to escape oblivion by rendering social proceses visible; that it is, in effect, a new, urgent kind of educational initiative; that it is sociology. In these terms, critique is an educational project that intends to re-locate the power of judgment, normally arrogated by anonymous institutional structures. It fosters the possibility of re-evaluation. It aims to establish, firstly, that present circumstances are in no absolute sense, natural; but that they are the general social product: the outcome of laboriously implemented policies and decisions. It aims, secondly, to make room for under-represented estimates of the quality of the resulting social experience. Which means, of course, that as critique, sociology is from its inception embroiled in an earnest politics of signification, rather than committed to

a search for the possibility of "pure theory" or "objective knowledge."

But it should come as no surprise to learn that the critique of ideology does not idealise the shibboleths of transcendental logic. What has gone before should have prepared the ground for the conclusion that the philosophical ideal, the Utopian mirage that exists negatively in present conditions, is, for critical social theory, articulated with difficulty, tentatively. The ideal is glimpsed only vaguely in fragmentary attempts to devise an alternative, materialist aesthetic. On this dimension, critical philosophy has three main characteristics. It begins in an attack on the orthodox, essentially Kantian, aesthetic theory; which it finds narrow and uncritical.[5] It proceeds to depict the prevalent forms of aesthetic experience as means of domination. Lastly, it ascribes the poverty of aesthetic experience to the general structure of production. These tendencies appear, fairly unsystematically, throughout the literature, which itself resists categorization. An attempt is made, at this point, quite briefly, to convey the importance of these themes to a critical perspective, by drawing on a variety of sources.

At the outset, it is worth noting that on considering Kant's definition of the aesthetic ideal as that which affords a "disinterested pleasure," Nietzsche remarked: "all

I wish to point out is that Kant, like all philosophers, instead of viewing the aesthetic issue from the side of the artist, envisaged art and beauty solely from the "spectator's" point of view....."[6] With which observation, no doubt, Nietzsche pinpointed the undeniable limitation of the orthodoxy propounded by Kant. Since Nietzsche, however, this reservation has been worked up into a sociological criticism.[7] Raymond Williams gave the classical formulation to the sociological position when he wrote: "What seems to me very striking is that nearly all forms of contemporary cultural theory are theories of consumption. That is to say, they are concerned with understanding an object in such a way that it can profitably or correctly be consumed."[8] More accurately still, Williams makes the transition from an artistic- aesthetic standpoint (Nietzsche remember stood with the artist and professed a more rarified aesthetic sensibility) to a sociological-aesthetic standpoint when he declared, in condemnation of consumerist literary criticism: "It was not only that the practices of production were then over-looked, though this fused with the notion that most important literature anyway was from the past. The real social conditions of production were in any case neglected because they were believed to be at best secondary."[9] The same exasperated response is made by Stephen Heath to conventional and popular cinema criticism: "Cinema then is perpetual consumption. It is in these terms that cinema is occupying the place of the novel: it is received as <u>natural</u>, as <u>life</u>,

as beauty, unfolding, as it were, outside any concrete process of the production of meaning, and thus unavailable to any theoretical reflection (which has nothing to do with what is commonly known as 'criticism,' mere repetition of the forms of ideological consensus)"[10] The attack on consumerist myopia amounts to so many elucidations of the general suppression of the realities of the processes of production that determine the structure of social experience.

The aesthetic criteria enunciated by Kant, which are still current, still in the ascendancy, envisage an absolute distinction between art and science: which presupposes the absolute heterogeneity of aesthetic/noumenal and economic/phenomenal modes of existence. Lurking behind the consumerist fog - ultimately responsible for it in theoretical terms - there is the familiar ontological dualism. Not always directly, but from all quarters, so it seems, that ontological presupposition has been buffeted and bombarded. For his part, Walter Benjamin has argued, for example, that the progress of art and science were always inextricably bound together. No more so in modern photography than was the case with Renaissance painting, with regard to which he says: "The incomparable development of this art and its significance rested not least on the integration of a number of new sciences, or at least of new scientific data. Renaissance painting made use of anatomy and perspective of mathematics, meteorology and chromatology."[11] From which we are left to infer that art has

always employed scientific criteria. Conversely, too, it should be appreciated that, in spite of its embarrassment, scientific theory has never been able, in its attempts to represent reality in language and in plastic models, to dispense with aesthetic criteria.

In a converging line of argument, the point has been urged that aesthetic criteria have never operated independently of less exalted, more pragmatic rules-of-thumb. John Barrell, for instance, maintains that conventional standards of decency, bearing particularly upon perception of what was exhibitable in prosperous drawing-rooms, exerted a considerable influence upon how or whether the poor could appear in eighteenth-century landscapes.[12] John Berger, somewhat similarly, contends that pictorial art flourished with the general development of commodity production. It was, we are told, an aesthetic form impregnated by the exigencies of universal exchange. Basically, this is held to be true: firstly, in the sense that, immediately, for their producer, the value of these artistic products was realized in exchange; and secondly, in the sense that they, however naively, advertized the fecundity and versatility of the forces of capitalist production. Berger, however, puts it more elegantly in his statement: "Works of art in earlier traditions celebrated wealth. But wealth was then a symbol of a fixed social or divine order. Oil painting celebrated a new kind of wealth - which was dynamic and which had its only sanction in the

supreme buying power of money. Thus painting itself had to be able to demonstrate the desirability of what money could buy. And the visual desirability of what can be bought lies in its tangibility, in how it will reward the touch, the hand, of the owner."[13] Thus Berger explains the meticulous realism of that aesthetic phenomenon.

Still more contentiously, in another affront to the dualistic, ontological construction, Lukacs advances his almost disreputable thesis: that the social origins of the artist are never irrelevant for the study of aesthetic forms. In his account of the deterioration of the historical novel, Lukacs emphasizes the importance of the changed social predicament of the novelist. By the deterioration of the historical novel, of course, he means the diminished power to present a panoramic view of social conditions, which is almost totally lost with the ascendancy of the psychological style of narration. In this process of decline, Lukacs maintains, the decisive factor is not political or ideological allegiance; since while Sir Walter Scott's conservatism proved no obstacle to his complete mastery of the genre, the modern radicals, by comparison,are compelled to modify the classical frame. In short, the explanation for the degeneration of the classical form is given by Lukacs in these terms: "Writers like Flaubert and Conrad Ferdinand Meyer create a 'new' form of the historical novel for profound and necessary reasons: the development of society produces an ideological

decline in their class, they are no longer in a position to see the real problems of popular life in their extended richness, their picture of history is socially and historically impoverished, inadequate; accordingly they fashion it into a 'new' form."[14] And Lukacs continues: "Scott was much more lovingly bound up with, much more intimate with, the life of the people than the outstanding writer of the imperialist period, who has had to struggle both against the isolation from popular life imposed upon the writer by the social division of labour of advanced capitalism and the growth of an ever more reactionary liberal ideology under imperialism."[15]

"This link with popular life", Lukacs concludes, contrasting the classical novelist with his modern counterpart, "was still a natural, socially given state of affairs for the writers of the classical period of the historical novel..... The humanists of our time start in their writing from a protest against the dehumanizing influences of capitalism. An extremely important part is played by the writer's tragic estrangement from popular life, his isolation, his complete dependence upon himself. However, it is also part of the situation that his protest can advance only gradually, unevenly and contradictorily from abstractness to concreteness."[16] Increasing abstractness of form in the literary representation of social conditions, in other words, is attributed by Lukacs to the relative meagreness of the modern individual's

opportunity for varied social experience and to the disintegrative processes that have ensured the increasing abstractness of social relations, in general.

Critical opposition to the almost customary obfuscation of productive relations has one other noteworthy expression. Looking askance, once again, at the ontological dualism that authorizes such prejudices, sociological critique denounces the popular fiction that art, in its authentic, disinterested, 'art for art's sake' mode of existence, is the antithesis of and indispensable corrective to, political activity. In his advocacy of the counter-position, Walter Benjamin makes the following estimate of the political significance of art in contemporary society. With the complacent, orthodox standpoint in mind, he says: "But now let us follow the subsequent development of photography. What do we see ? It has become more and more subtle, more and more modern, and the result is that it is now incapable of photographing a tenement or a rubbish heap without transforming it. Not to mention a river dam or an electric cable factory: in front of these photography can now only say, 'How beautiful'..... It has succeeded in turning abject poverty itself, by handling it in a modish, technically perfect way, into an object of enjoyment."[17] The argument is updated, its pungency rediscovered by John Walker, whose reminder reads: "In a media-saturated environment the same image is encountered in a variety of sizes, display

contexts and media. This has two consequences: first, the shock-value of the image is progressively diminished, and second, the image acquires the character of a stereotype. However violent the event depicted by a press photograph - a car crash, a murder or torture victim; a military atrocity, a starving child - our capacity to respond to it emotionally is reduced the more we are exposed to it. This is one of the inevitable by-products of the ability of the mass media to multiply and disseminate an image. Those paintings by Warhol which repeat a violent image across the canvas make this process of dehumanization visible - they literally demonstrate the way in which a repetition reduces the most horrible images to formal patterns in which all sense of content is lost."[18] The affirmative character of mass culture, the manner in which it insistently re-imposes a complex of meanings and a rigid value system; the sense in which it routinely pronounces in favour of the established order of things, is nicely illustrated by Paul Coates discussion of the Western (among the most popular of popular genres) which, he says, effectively schools its audience in a heroic loneliness[19] and provides a model of psychological adjustment to the society of universal individuation. The same contention that characteristically modern art forms are inextricably implicated in a politics of signification, or that they are signifying practices, is captured most aphoristically by Stephen Heath, however, in his pronouncement that: "Cinema is truth twenty-four times a second."[20]

Most of the last mentioned emphases also figure prominently in the thought of Bertolt Brecht: from his disparagement of 'culinary' forms of drama designed for mass consumption by an uncritical audience to his repudiation of aesthetics in favour of sociology.[21] The importance of Brecht's intervention inheres, however, not in his contribution to the subversion of sacrosanct aesthetic principles but in his attempt, as a working playwright, to transform operative aesthetic conventions which signalled for him the need to forge new dramatic forms. Brecht's theoretical reflection grappled not with nebulous metaphysical themes but with the practicalities of extricating the possibility of dramatic representation from a rigid institutionalized inhibition. In his theoretical reflection, nevertheless, Brecht made visible, with unrivalled simplicity, a whole range of hitherto undetected obstructions. He mapped a subliminal composition of prerogatives that threatened to thwart his ambition to compel the theatre to cultivate an historical sensibility. Brecht protested at the impossibility of employing coagulated materials to express live issues and contemporary modes of experience.

The collective restraints on aesthetic production in the theatre Brecht renounced as the representative conventions of Naturalism. Loosely, he opposed the fact that: "The bourgeois theatre emphasized the timelessness of its objects. Its representation of people is bound by the alleged 'eternally human'. Its story is arranged in such a

way as to create 'universal' situations that allow Man with a capital 'M' to express himself; man of every period and every colour. All incidents are just one enormous cue, and this is followed by the 'eternal' response."[22] The Epic Theatre that Brecht championed, constructed and projected the diametrically opposed, historical perspective on the human condition. "The concern of the epic theatre is thus eminently practical. Human behaviour is shown as alterable; man himself as dependent on certain political and economic factors and at the same time as capable of altering them."[23]

Manifestly, Brecht understood the dominant aesthetic conventions as exercising a pernicious influence upon, as inducing a kind of intellectual paralysis in, the audience at whom naturalistic drama was directed, He sought accordingly to revolutionize the relation between the theatre and its audience. And so he says of epic theatre: "This makes nothing like such a free use as does the aristotelian of the passive empathy of the spectator; it also relates differently to certain psychological effects such as catharsis. Just as it refrains from handing its hero over to the world as if it were his inescapable fate, so it would not dream of handing the spectator over to an inspiring theatrical experience. Anxious to teach the spectator a quite definite practical attitude, directed towards changing the world, it must begin by making him adopt in the theatre a quite different attitude from what

he is used to."[24] The transition from the predominant aristotelian forms to the imperatives of the epic theatre, for Brecht, consisted essentially in an abandonment of diverting entertainment which silently acceded to, even venerated, tragic conditions; and encouragement of responsible, educative theatre that situated the audience in an historical world. The gist of Brecht's educational objective may be said to be this: "Briefly, the aristotelian play is esentially static, its task is to show the world as it is. The learning play is essentially dynamic; its task is to show the world as it changes (and also how it may be changed). It is a common truism among the producers and writers of the former type of play that the audience, once it is in the theatre, is not a number of individuals but a collective individual, a mob, which must be and can be reached only through its emotions; that it has the mental immaturity and the high emotional suggestibility of a mob. We have often seen this pointed out in treatises on the writing and production of plays. The latter theatre holds that the audience is a collection of individuals, capable of thinking and reasoning, of making judgments when in the theatre...."[25] And, as is well known, in order to stimulate a critical response Brecht was inclined to punctuate the narrative tempo with interruptions; which severed the spectacle and the spectator, to create an "alienation effect," and so supplied an opportunity for reflection and judgment.

Eventually, as though to prove that there has been no unnecessary digression, it must be pointed out that the general sociological validity of Brecht's struggle with dramatic conventions turns on the clarity of his perception: the lissomeness with which he articulated his dread of the total victory of authoritative forms over the need to express and communicate experience. That the propinquity, the possibility , of such a totalitarian situation was a matter of some concern to Brecht is particularly evident where he says: "Great apparati like the opera, the stage, the press, etc., impose their views, as it were, incognito. For a long time now they have taken the handiwork (music, writing, criticism, etc.) of intellectuals who share in their profits - that is, of men who are economically committed to the prevailing system but are socially near-proletarian - and processed it to make fodder for their public entertainment machine, judging it by their own standards and guiding it into their own channels; meanwhile the intellectuals themselves have gone on supposing that the whole business is concerned only with the preservation of their work..... by imagining that they have got hold of an apparatus which in fact has got hold of them, they are supporting an apparatus which is out of their control, which is no longer (as they believe) a means of furthering output but has become an obstacle to output, and specifically to their own output as soon as it follows a new and original course which the apparatus finds awkward and opposed to its own aims. Their output then

becomes a matter of delivering the goods. Values evolve which are based on the fodder principle. And this leads to a general habit of judging works of art by their suitability for the apparatus without ever judging the apparatus by its suitability for the work."[26]

Brecht's concern to transform the theatre, in short, deserves an eminent position in a wider oppositional perspective for which contemporary culture exists as an apparatus of containment. Because, in fact, there is a wider movement of resistance: a rather uncoordinated undercurrent that deplores prevalent cultural forms, which are held to extinguish spontaneity and to arrange for the assimilation of individual and collective experience within pre-determined structures, through the medium of selected genres, styles and stereotypes, in specific regions of space and time, at cost-efficient rates of expansion, by means of centrally controlled institutional frameworks. Criticism of this kind of cultural imperialism is carried on at several, sociologically significant, levels. It is possible to point to a parallel between Brecht's characterization of aristotelian drama and Adorno's treatment of jazz.[27] Brecht's attitude squares, too, with Marcuse's more abstract contention that mass culture supplies desublimated aesthetic forms: from which the opportunity to extrapolate from immediately negative experience to a critical re-appraisal of that experience in a sublimated, conceptualized form, has been expropriated;

from which, in other words, the most elementary pre-requisite of transcendence and transformation is absent.[28]

Nor is this critique of cultural domination peculiar to the Frankfurt School. A substantial contribution has been made at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies.[29] And behind them there is the exemplary work of Raymond Williams, whose basic approach resembles Brecht's at many points. For example, when he suggests that advertizing techniques are "simply a pre-democratic form of manipulation of a public regarded as 'masses';"[30] or, when he maintains in connection with the modern "psychological" novel, with its "first-person" narrative, that it is incapable of expressing "some prevalent aspects of contemporary experience";[31] or when he complains that post-war working-class housing estates were not built by the people who live in them.[32] This fundamental affinity between Brecht's and Williams' sociology is never more obvious than in this statement of principle in which the latter says: "The danger now, as has been widely if obscurely recognized, is of fitting human beings to a system, rather than a system to human beings."[33]

The same acute perception of the reality of culture-based tyranny also appears in the structuralist camp. It appears, for instance, in Roland Barthes' sparse commentary on the Dominici trial, where he fulminates against

circumstances in which a Provencal, peasant farmer was accused of murder and condemned to death in an alien, official language, whose logic and psychology of guilt and punishment were incomprehensible to him. Summarizing his position, Barthes says of this matter: "We are all potential Dominicis, not as murderers but as accused, deprived of language, or worse, rigged out in that of our accusers, humiliated and condemned by it. To rob a man of his language in the very name of language: this is the first step in all legal murders."[34] So, similarly, the theme of cultural domination is integral to Foucault's social philosophy. In his genealogies of medical and psychiatric discourse and in his study of confessional regimes, he toys with the notion that language may be the ultimate weapon of totalitarian government.

In a final turn of the screw, as it were, critique, in its re-evaluation of the aesthetic parameters of contemporary existence, straightforwardly attributes the demonstrable poverty of these available forms of experience to the inexorable logic that systematically reproduces both intimidating institutional frameworks and isolated, insecure individuals. So, Marx, as he delineates the logic of capitalist production, constantly reflects upon the progressive dissolution of communal forms of existence that is necessitated by the obsessive pursuit of wealth in its commodity form: "the relation of domination is the only thing which is reproduced on this basis."[35] So, repeatedly,

thereafter. Lukacs and Goldmann, for example, ask: are the freedoms of an extreme subjective individualism, are the rights of the consumer in an aggressively competitive and monadic society, really worth the price of subscription to a tyrannical apparatus ? So, in his turn, Adorno calculates the aesthetic value of existence under the rule of capital and its auxiliary powers in these terms: "The world is systematized horror," he writes, "but therefore it is to do the world too much honour to think of it entirely as a system; for its unifying principle is division....." [36] So, for Foucault, the world of universal individuation represents the triumph of instrumental reason: of meticulous and subtle disciplinary systems and of exhaustive administrative techniques. Invariably, transcendentalist logic is compelled to consider the social costs of its moral, economic and cultural hegemony.

So, briefly, this time without embellishment, what is sociology when it is critique ? It is an indefatigable enquiry into the immanent structure of transcendentalist logic. It assesses the plausibility of the postulated forms of pure knowledge. It is also a refutation of transcendentalist logic, its methodological frameworks and their claims to operate with universal and necessary truths. In this respect, critique carries out an historical subversion of established epistemological and aesthetic criteria; which means that because practical considerations are always primary, it approaches the

categories of consciousness, the paradigms of science, the forms of representation, on one side, and the modes of production and forms of experience generally, on the other side, as genealogical issues. Critique opposes criteria which foreclose the possibility of enquiry into the structure of those constitutive processes that reproduce specific forms of representation and experience.[37]

Next, critique, because the absolutist delusions have had to be destroyed in order to make it possible, is an ideology rather than a science. It is embroiled in the politics of signification that oscillates between enlightenment and mystification. In this respect, sociological critique is a new, urgent kind of educational initiative, which aims to situate the empirical subject in an historical world: one that is brought continuously into existence and taken constantly to the edge of total extinction by the actions of men. Lastly, sociology as critique, is a utopian enterprise which envisages the dissolution of canonical epistemological and aesthetic principles, the re-location of the power of judgment and the re-allocation of custody of strategically important knowledge. It endeavours to equip people for participation in the construction of a less irresponsible political order. Derogation and denigration of the 'transcendental subject' on a theoretical-pedagogical plane, where it is identified in moral, economic and cultural apparatus es, is tied tortuously to a practical commitment to promote a

democratic dispersion of fundamental epistemological and anthropological questions. In this political theory, every individual, every empirical subject, is posited as the, initially unconscious and more or less unwilling, bearer of elementary and generally significant contradictions which can be repressed or exacerbated towards rational resolution. Every individual assumes the dignity of being a potential centre of political crisis. On this basis, the emergence of new forms of social experience is imaginable.

But to end on a lower, more realistic note: the knowledge, the 'positive' knowledge, that sociology can impart advises us that things are presently organised to prevent anything but expanded reproduction of the Same.

Notes

1. Macherey, Pierre, A Theory of Literary Production, London. R.K.P., 1978, pps. 193-94.

2. Barthes, Roland, Image-Music-Text, Glasgow, Fontana, 1977, p 116.

3. Marx, Karl, Capital, Vol. I, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1976. p 799.

4. Adorno, Theodor, W., 'Subject and Object,' in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, A. Arato and E. Gebhart, (eds), Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1978, pps 500-501.

5. The analytic limit of the Kantian aesthetic theory is accurately demarcated by Eva Schaper when she remarks "The problem of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is to provide a justification for the claim to universal validity that yet preserves this essential distinction between judgments of taste and objective knowledge claims." See: Eva Schaper, Studies in Kant's Aesthetics, Edinburgh, E.U.P., 1979, p 20. She comes even closer to articulating the ideological significance of that aesthetic theory, when she writes: "To mention first a quintessentially Kantian problem: it is not even clear that Kant's philosophy has room for subjectively valid judgments. The validity of judgments seems so often simply to be the same as their objectivity." Op. Cit., p 29.

6. Nietzsche, Friederich, The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, translated by Francis Golffing, New York, Doubleday, 1956, p 238.

7. Nietzsche himself recognized that a critique of the Kantian aesthetic contained and implied a critique of capitalist society, when he wrote: "Today one can see coming into existence the culture of a society of which commerce is as much the soul as personal contest was with the ancient Greeks and as war, victory and justice were for the Romans. The man engaged in commerce understands how to appraise everything without having made it, and to appraise it according to the needs of the consumer, not according to his own needs; 'who and how many will consume this?' is his question of questions. This type of appraisal he then applies instinctively and all the time: he applies it to everything, and thus also to the productions of the arts and sciences, of thinkers, scholars, artists, statesmen, peoples and parties, of the entire age: in regard to everything that is made he enquires after supply and demand in order to determine the value of the thing in his own eyes."

See: Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1982, p 106.

8. Williams, Raymond, 'Base and Superstructure in Marxist Cultural Theory,' in New Left Review, No 82, Nov-Dec, 1976, 0 14.

9. Ibid., p 14.

10. Heath, Stephen, 'Film/Cinetext/Text,' in Screen Reader 2, Introduced by Mick Eaton and Steve Neale, London, The Society for Education in Film and Television, 1981, pps 100-101.

11. Benjamin, Walter, Illuminations, Bungay, Suffolk, Fontana, 1973, p 251, Note 16.

12. Barrell, John, The Dark Side of the Landscape, Cambridge, C.U.P., 1980, p 17.

13. Berger, John, Ways of Seeing, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p 90.

14. Lukacs, Georg, The Historical Novel, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1982, p 403.

15. Ibid., p 404.

16. Ibid., p 404.

17. Benjamin, Walter, Understanding Brecht, London, New Left Books, 1973, pps 94-95.

18. Walker, John, A. Art in the Age of Mass Media, London, Pluto Press, 1983, p 39.

19. Coates, Paul, 'The Story of the Lost Reflection, New Left Review, No 143, Jan-Feb, '84, pps 126-7. For a feminist slant on the politics of cinema see, e.g. Sandy Flitterman, 'Woman, desire and the look: feminism and the enunciative apparatus in the cinema,' in Theories of Authorship, John Caughie , (ed), London, R.K.P., 1981, pps 242-50. That article protests at the way mainstream, commercial cinema, whose practice (modes of production) are overdetermined by dominant patriarchal values, reifies the male 'gaze ': which posits woman as the object of desire and so institutionalizes, relays and reinforces the identity of woman, stereotypically, in various postures of subjection; and which especially defines female sexuality in terms of male fantasy.

20. Heath, Stephen, Op. Cit., p 99.

21. For an introduction to Brecht, see: Graham Bartram and Anthony Waine (eds), Brecht in Perspective, Longman, London, 1982. See especially, Erich Speidel, "The Individual and Society," where, for example, it is written: "Brecht suggests that the old dramatic form will be destroyed as soon as a new approach which is oriented towards sociology has taken over the stage and opened theatre to a new public." Op. Cit., pps 49-50. Also of special interest is: Arrigo Subiotto, 'Epic Theatre: A Theatre for the Scientific Age,' which includes the comment: "He (Brecht) called this (bourgeois) theatre 'culinary' as it was no more mentally stimulating than was the eating of food." Op. Cit., p 32.

22. Brecht on Theatre, John Willett, (ed), London, Eyre Methuen, 1974, pps 96-97.

23. Ibid., p 86.

24. Ibid., p 57.

25. Ibid., p 79.

26. Ibid., p 34.

27. Adorno, Theodor, W., 'Perennial Fashion - Jazz' in Prisms, Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1982, pps 119-132.

28. Marcuse, Herbert, One Dimensional Man, London, R.K.P., 1964, pps. 56.

29. Two articles by Stuart Hall can be read as providing something like a manifesto for the contributors to the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies. Firstly: "Culture, the Media and the 'Ideological Effect'," in Mass Communications and Society, James Curran et al , (eds), London, Edward Arnold, 1977, pps 315-48. Secondly: 'Cultural Studies: two pradigms' in Culture ,Ideology and Social Process, Tony Bennet et al., (eds) Batsford, London.

30. Williams, Raymond, The Long Revolution, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971, p 375.

31. Ibid., pps 303-316.

32. Ibid., p 359.

33. Ibid., p 326.

34. Barthes, Roland, Mythologies, St. Albans, Paladin, 1973, p 46.

35. Marx, Karl, Grundrisse, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1973, p 326.

36. Adorno, Theodor, W., Minima Moralia, London, Verso, 1979, p 113.

37. Because it is so implacably opposed to the prevalent epistemological prejudices, because it is grounded self-consciously in the counter knowledge that its very existence depends upon the erosion of those prejudices, for that reason the quite representative criticism made by David Held of the Frankfurt School's 'critical theory' is entirely misguided and mischievous. Held's criticism is that although they have successfully punctured the epistemological - methodological pretensions of others, their own epistemological principles remain opaque. See Held, David, Introduction to Critical Theory, London, Hutchinson, 1980, p 399. However, this approach requires a recantation and enforces the preponderant epistemological absolutism. Held's criticism is an act of obeisance in the direction of the philosophical powers that be. It is also a well-poisoning exercise that invalidates (or seeks to invalidate) the critical knowledge produced by, in the first instance, the Frankfurt School theorists (by implication the critical knowledge proffered by others) and which ultimately denies the possibility of criticism (except as a censorious reiteration of authoritative positions) to others.

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