

PhD in Politics

The Decentralization Game.

Leaders' speeches and what characteristics determine their position on decentralization.

Alberto de León Concepción

School of Government and Public Policy

University of Strathclyde

Glasgow

January, 2023

Abstract

How do party leaders manage their position over sub-national identity? Thus, how do party leaders manage the number of MPs from the party in government from territories with high sub-national identity, intra-party, the number of MPs from the ethno-regionalist parties, inter-party, the audience where the speech is done, the Parliament and the party conference, and the influence of an independence referendum in their speeches position about decentralization? In countries with multilevel institutions, intra-party groups and ethno-regionalist parties with different sub-national identities coexist, and these differences likely hold importance for parties and leaders. Also, the different audiences and venues, influence the leaders' speech position when referring to decentralization. In this thesis, I study how leaders change their speech when they speak in front of other MPs in front of their party members and supporters. Furthermore, I examine how independence referendums affect leaders' positions on the same topic. How the referendum changes the leaders' perception and position on decentralization? In this dissertation, I argue that MPs elected from high sub-national identity territories, the state-wide parties branches MPs from the same territories, the different audiences, and the independence referendums influence the position leaders take over the issue of decentralization. I use an original dataset of speeches from the Spanish and UK parliaments, investiture and Queen's speeches, specifically, and from the party conferences in Spain and the United Kingdom to position leaders' speeches on decentralization. I developed a decentralization scale to predict the leaders' positions using automated text analysis method Wordscores. The results demonstrate that the number of MPs, the audience, and having an independence referendum do influence and position the national party leader's speeches on decentralization. These implications have different connotations in the United Kingdom and Spain. These results impact the studies on decentralization, intra-party discussion, and independence referendums. Moreover, I contribute to the study of speeches and quantitative text analysis using manifestos mentions on decentralization, analyzing the different speeches venues, and stating that a relevant political event, such as the independence referendum, modifies national leaders' positions on decentralization.

Table of contents

Introduction.....	5
Chapter 1: Organization of political parties.....	10
Political parties and their internal organization.....	14
Issue entrepreneurship, ownership, and competition.....	17
Chapter 2: Case selection and political parties.....	20
Centralization, decentralization, and secessionist process.....	28
Spanish decentralization and Independence context.....	30
United Kingdom Devolution and Independence Context.....	34
Chapter 3: Research Design.....	39
Methods.....	39
Data.....	44
Chapter 4: Party leaders beyond left-right ideology: How the decentralization dimension affects party leaders' positions in countries with multilevel institutions.....	52
Introduction.....	52
Intra-party structures and decentralization relationship.....	54
Decentralization and territorialism issues.....	58
Data and methods.....	61
Analysis and results.....	65
Discussion.....	78
Chapter 5: The audience effect: Leaders' speeches over decentralization in different contexts...	82
Introduction.....	82
Different audience, different position.....	83
Why decentralization?.....	85
National Party Congresses vs. Investiture and Queen's speeches.....	87
Methods and Data.....	91
Results.....	93
Discussion and Conclusion.....	98

Chapter 6: Referendums as Mobilization Shocks: Party Leaders and Political Parties position over Decentralization	101
Introduction	101
Issue selection, parliament, and party conference	103
Independence referendums and the political context.....	105
Research Design	109
Results	111
Discussion	117
Chapter 7: Conclusion.....	121
Bibliography.....	127

Introduction

The study of political parties is a prominent topic in political science because of their influence on the voters' identification with different policy positions. Furthermore, voters use political parties as a shortcut to demonstrate their preferences over diverse issues. Therefore, how political parties were formed, their linkages with the citizens and how voters use them as an instrument to organize their demands are important research points in the field. This thesis examines and finds its motivations in the study of the influence of the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, the different audiences where the speech is done, and an independence referendum on leaders' speeches position on one dimension, the issue of decentralization.

Issues such as decentralization challenge national party leaders' positions. Although the leaders' positions on different issues follow the party lines, there are issues where the national leader has to position in different circumstances. For example, taking a position on decentralization when there is a large number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties and you need their support is different than when you hold a large majority and ethno-regionalist parties have no relevant presence in parliament. At the same time, the national leaders speaking at the party conference, where they find support from the party members, differ from speaking on decentralization in the parliament in front of ethno-regionalist and sub-national party branches MPs. In this line, the negotiation or political debate on having an independence referendum, and the matters of having the referendum, challenge the leaders' position on decentralization.

Indeed, the challenges of taking positions on divisive issues such as decentralization are not limited to this case. Political scientists have sought to understand how parties adapt to internal conflicts and external events in multilevel countries (Ceron, 2012; Bäck et al., 2014; Greene & O'Brien, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019).

First, I focus on the political parties' organization by examining their relationship with partisanship, party organization, and cleavages. As part of this study is based on state-wide parties' intra-party relations, the parties' organization is a significant characteristic to take into account. Political parties and party leaders represent voters' preferences. In this case, I address the question of decentralization in multilevel countries, the United Kingdom and Spain, where existing high sub-national identity territories make decentralization a central issue in the political debate. So then, the political parties, and consequently, the leaders' positions in decentralization, symbolize the citizens' preferences.

This thesis aims to analyze how a certain number of Members of Parliament, the different types of audiences and the referendum of independence implementation contribute to the positions leaders take in speeches over the issue of decentralization. Focused on two illustrative cases, Spain and the UK, I select party leaders' speeches as a representation of their political parties and, for extension, their ideological position. Then I analyze this linkage with members of Parliament from ethno-regionalist territories, ethno-regionalist parties, different venues and audiences, and even with political events like independence referendums.

Being more precise in the concepts that influence these changes in the leaders' speeches, I suggest that MPs from ethno-regionalist parties (inter-party) and MPs from state-wide parties but high sub-national identity territories (intra-party) such as Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia in Spain and Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom influence in leader's speeches position on decentralization. Party leaders take different positions on decentralization when the number of MPs changes in needs according to internal coalition building and external negotiations. Also, there is a strategic targeting when a large number of MPs are elected from high sub-national identity territories, from ethno-regionalist parties or parties in the government's sub-national branch.

Building on previous findings (Bäck et al., 2011; Greene & Haber, 2016), I argue that the context and, consequently, the intended audience influence the incentives party leaders have to take positions over decentralization. I expect the different audiences and venues to affect the leader's speech position on decentralization. On the one hand, there are parliamentary or investiture speeches, and on the other hand, references to party conference speeches. The two audiences or venues are different in terms of which people receive the message directly. In parliament, leaders speak in front of MPs from other parties with other policy priorities whose support they need to form coalitions, get invested, approve the budget, and pass the bills, among others. I focus on the role of MPs from sub-national territories with historically high levels of sub-national identity in this research.

In the third part, I maintain the main interest in how the leaders' speeches on decentralization change in different circumstances. In this case, I focus on the influence of the speeches when there is an independence referendum. Of course, there are different types of referenda, but in the cases of this study, there are two referendums of independence in a short period related to the decentralization process. As decentralization is the main topic of interest, how do these referendums, the Scottish Referendum in 2014 and the Catalanian Referendum in 2017, affect the speeches' position on decentralization? I argue that the referendum influences

the leaders' position. Leaders take a more centralized role after the referendum because of the difficulties, such as state-wide party position against territorial independence within countries and institutional weakness, of supporting decentralization positions when the referendum is under debate and hard media coverage.

Intra-party division tends to be covered by the media agenda, and different studies analyze how these differences are based on different countries and data, as Bernauer and Brauning (2009), Müller (2013) and Greene and Haber (2016), among others. However, there is still substantial room for further analysis of intra-party divisions and leaders' positioning on divisive issues. There is a limitation development in these studies because of the difficulties for politicians to take a critical position within the political parties if they are looking for support for being elected or re-elected and how the media and voters could analyze this divergent position.

In addition, studies of intra-party division require internal information about members, internal voting and surveys or discursive disagreements. As Greene and Haber (2016) argue, citizens are more likely to feel close to and choose to vote for unified parties. Citizens and political parties do not have a good relationship with intra-party divisions, and studies show these internal discrepancies. The first is because they want to be part of support political parties wholly unified. Political parties, in their vision, because these disagreement studies could affect their voters appearing divide organizations (Shomer, 2017). As time goes by, despite these citizen preferences, political parties are more open to being transparent with media and citizens, and they are improving the idea that these internal differences have nothing to do with party weakness and it is just that "doors are opened" for their voters and members. Thus, Close et al. (2017) state that disaffected citizens are more likely to support open candidate selection methods, and critical citizens prefer a close selectorate.

During the financial crisis, some new political parties tried to channel the growing political disaffection. These political parties were able to focus on the absence of transparency as one of the main problems in the "old" political parties (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2009). In the words of Juan Linz (2002, p. 291), "public opinion in most democratic systems is characterized by pervasive dissatisfaction with and distrust of political parties, and there is much debate in academic circles about the obsolescence or decline of parties". Facing that situation, citizens started to talk about being involved in the decision-making process and how this lack of influence and transparency questioned the quality of democracy.

Because of the different roles that political parties have nowadays, losing influence with citizens and voters, and the rise of diverse topics and the difficulty of taking a position on them,

it is necessary to note the development and increase of interest groups worried about a single issue. Political parties have lost, and they are already losing, their predominant position as an institution that connects citizens with institutions in favour of these groups and mass media's rise, although Kölln (2015) shows how the declining of membership size has mixed effects, such as higher staff and spending, but at the same time, lower salaries and reductions in the local sphere.

Academics find these elements an essential explanation of dealignment (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2009). The Dealignment thesis has been defined as the decline of political parties because of social and political modernization. In addition, dealignment has developed due to individual and structural factors. Based on these arguments, it is possible to say that the increasing dissatisfaction with democracy has an essential link with dealignment and with the actual minor role of political parties (Lawson & Merkl, 1988; Zelle, 1995; Dalton & Wattenberg, 2009).

Other authors discuss an existent "confidence gap" in this space between public opinion and institutions. Most of the time, public expectations and media debates are more aimed at other democratic institutions such as governments or legislature. Still, political parties have to play as an intermediary institution and be capable of assimilating some dissatisfaction.

This situation produces the general idea of a "crisis of parties" when sometimes the crisis has more general objectives. Although this "confidence gap" is a reality, scholars who have studied it have a different analysis. There is one group based on an 'organic' point of view; structural references of political parties, their functions and increase or decline membership, and how they behave inside the institutions. Second, it has been focused on a 'pragmatic' side, analyzing factors directly related to citizens' attitudes and variables directed towards electoral benefits as the evolution of party identification or electoral participation (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2009; Torcal, Gunther, & Montero, 2002).

Overall, I will analyze different aspects that affect leaders' speeches on decentralization. In particular, I will focus on the role of MPs, the different audiences and venues, the referendum on independence, and the territorial debate. First, I examine the political parties' organization development. Then, I analyze their internal changes, the existence of intra-party groups and how parties address their internal differences. Also, I study theories of party strategy to deal with new issues in the public debate and how issue entrepreneurship and ownership interfere with the decentralization process. After that, in the second chapter, I discuss the main ideas on new topics and how they become predominant in political discussion. I use decentralization as one of

these topics that go beyond the classical left-right dichotomy, so I also expose the relevance of decentralization as the main topic to address when parties and leaders have to position themselves in the debate.

The third chapter refers to the research design of the dissertation. There I explain the methodological specifications and compare the method selected to address the research with similar approaches used in other studies for diverse scholars. Also, I present the case selection, why they are relevant to the study, and their similarities and differences.

In the fourth chapter, I focus on the differences in leaders' speeches on decentralization when there are a specific number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties or state-wide parties based on high sub-national identity territories. In the fifth section, I analyze the different audiences where national leaders make their speeches. Parliament and Party Conferences are the main venues with different characteristics, and how these differences explain leaders' speeches' positions on decentralization. Finally, the sixth part relates to the influence of referendums in leaders' speeches on decentralization. This case is relevant because of the two referendums of independence carried out in the United Kingdom and Spain in 2014 and 2017, respectively.

In the end, I suggest the discussion of these empirical chapters, their influence on the academic debate, and how they address several policy discussions. Altogether, the literature and the empirical research help to explain the leaders' speeches' variation on decentralization processes through MP's analysis, the different audiences, and the referendums of independence.

Chapter 1: Organization of political parties

Party organizations play a prominent role in studies of party politics. Also, it links with my thesis because of the changes in party preferences over diverse and divisive issues at the time. In addition, the internal structure and intra-party organization of the parties is also a characteristic that has been developing over time, and I consider them relevant in this study. Starting with seminal research by Duverger (1959), scholars find that the rules regulating internal decisions lead to Katz & Mair (1995) with the ‘Cartel Party’ and going to new types of political parties nowadays. This literature describes broad types of party organizations as well as changes to the specific rules for the selection of party candidates and leaders. I will foremost describe a number of ideal types of organizations before focusing on the specifics of my research. This review of the classic theories on party organization helps to understand the relationship between the party and the State, as well as the existing intra-party regulations and disagreements. This is a crucial part of this study.

The first definition of what we understand as parties’ differences, structures or divisions was well defined by Maurice Duverger (1959), who mentioned heterogeneity as one of the key characteristics when talking about party structure. This idea determines the course of the party organization’s research. Political parties can be seen as adaptive organizations; as Katz & Mair (1995) state, they have changed their composition and relationship with the citizens and the state. This development has been a process where each new type of political party generates reactions and stimulates changes in series. After this development, the responses and changes implied a new political party type, and the process started again.

One crucial thing that involves party changes is whether the factors are external or internal (Harmel & Janda, 1994). In Panebianco (1988), the external and internal factors or “stimulus” can work together in the change of party organization. He presents external factors such as environmental or technological, which, joining internal characteristics, affect the power structure.

Cadre party

The first political parties were mainly what we now describe as cadre parties or caucuses. Thus, political parties had influenced dignitaries from diverse disciplines and techniques. Thanks to their social position, excellent standing, and economic power, they had the ability to run in the

elections. However, political party and electoral campaigns' finances were entirely personal, and membership and partisanship support were not registered. Duverger (1959) said that "the cadre party achieves by selection" their political representation and strength. Furthermore, in this type of party, the ideology was not an incentive, and they used to focus on specific political questions, such as taxes or labour conditions. In addition, extra-parliamentary organizations with political party links were non-existent, and the regulation between its members, small men groups from the upper and well-positioned classes, was unstructured (Katz & Crotty, 2006).

Similarly, different authors describe this type of party as an individual representation, that it is working in the system because they were supported with a limited degree of participation, restricted political influence and focused on election competition, rejecting any membership organization or participation (Neumann, 1956). Following this theory about membership in cadre parties, if we want to talk about someone completely inside the party, following their principles and underlining their arguments with their names, the cadre party had no members. Since then, political parties have changed substantially in terms of their internal structure, organization and operation and, in other ways, their relationship with the voters, society and substantial, with the State.

The development of different laws and the fight to earn our social and personal rights were not as salient when political parties were created as social organizations. When this type of organization structured politics, the possibility to be a political representative or passive suffrage—the right to stand for elections— and the capacity to choose your representative was not equal for every citizen. What we know as passive and active suffrage was limited. The existence of societies with suffrage limited to a small privileged class propertied male population, the majority in the nineteenth century, made the existence and power of this type of parties habitual given that they had not the whole society demand except social groups with voting capacity (Duverger, 1959).

Mass party

Along with societal progress regarding suffrage, political parties developed a new relationship between the State and citizenship. The increased support of mass parties was predominantly due to the division into different social groups, defined previously by their 'class' (working class, middle-class, etc.). Political parties organized their policies and were involved

with their social groups because they had specific interests and goals articulated and defended in their political party manifesto (Katz & Mair, 1995).

This explains why the distinction between cadre and mass parties also corresponds with the difference between right and left, middle-class and workers' parties (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). The right and middle-class had no need, financial or political, to seek the organized support of the masses: it already had its elites, its personages, and its financial backers. In addition, the feeling of the middle-class and working-class against or for collective action and public mobilization is historically different. The middle-class feels an "instinctive repugnance" toward this type of behaviour, and this is completely opposed to the working class and mass organization (Duverger, 1959).

Some scholars argue that the main difference between cadre and mass party is the number of their members (Duverger, 1959), but this is only one of the points under the party structure, which is the main difference between them. Following the difference between these two types of parties, it is relevant to say that the composition of the party and their organization are entirely different: cadre parties' composition is decentralized and weaker than the mass parties' composition formed by branches and more centralized strength.

This could be related to the difference in membership and enrolment. Each position is clear where the cadre party is restricted to elite interests, and the mass party is open to all workers. This is clearly explained in the way to be a member. Cadre party admission has no official procedure. Duverger (1959) explains that the mass party was a "formal machinery of enrolment". This idea is wholly opposed to the cadre party individualist system. Cadre party was machinery with occasional donations and no subscription, in front of an annual payment in the mass party.

Catch-All Party

Following parties' development, Kirchheimer (1966) discuss the mass party conception of pre-defined membership and the supporters' articulation around a party manifesto. In this sense, his theory implies the weakness of collective identities and social groups that made it easy to identify groups in society. Also, this identification separates the electorate in social sectors in the long term.

The thesis developed by Kirchheimer (1966) exposes the changes that the mass parties have been suffering from for an extended period. He started analyzing the causes and

consequences that ended in a weak alignment between the party and the voter. As a result, the parties became more focused on votes and electoral success rather than following an ideological orientation representing social groups. Also, their internal structure changed to a more fragile organization, being more focused on capitalizing on a more comprehensive range of citizens.

Despite these changes, the catch-all party maintained the large structure created by the mass party, and they are the big mainstream parties today. But, on the contrary, this large machine is not focused on getting better living conditions for a determined social group but on obtaining electoral support. This idea made a relevant transformation in what was known as mass politics in Western Europe in the 1960s.

Cartel Party

After the party conceptions explained before, Katz and Mair (1995) address a new party style. The new parties appear to solve social civil necessities and generate societal developments. However, as societies are developing their behaviour constantly, this is a no-end history. Therefore, Katz and Mair (1995, p. 5) based their theory on a new type of party where the parties “become agents of the state and employ the resources of the state (the party-state) to ensure their own collective survival”. This new type of party is “the cartel party”.

During the period (from 1950s to 1990s) that covers these different types of party organization, there are discussions about the importance of membership, the alignment or dealignment of citizens, and if the party emphasizes an ideological approach or is more willing to look for electoral success widening its policy positions. Yet, despite that, the party maintains its position as a primary linkage with civil society.

The assumption of the State being neutral and a party-free arena is a key debate in the Katz and Mair (1995) theory. The party has an intermediary role. It presents the demands and suggestions from civil society to the State while also acting as the state’s public face to support and defend specific policies in front of public opinion. The party must be able to convince the electorate simultaneously as it can negotiate with the state.

The state became a relevant actor for the parties. It is the state who has the capacity to maintain parties through official funding and limits on private funding. Usually, the state subventions’ depends on electoral performance or parliamentary representation. Although it seems democratically distributed, it also maintains the force on the parties that already have a position in the electoral circle and increase the difficulties for new parties. Katz and Mair (1995)

add the media as political communication to the debate. The state regulates the media at the same time. The parties are the actors that form the State and make the decisions about the resources. The state, which is under party control, helps to ensure party survival and, at the same time, “enhance their capacity to resist challenges from newly mobilized alternatives” (Katz & Mair, 1995, p. 16).

After that, the study of political parties develops in a different way. I examined the major party organization theories, which try to find the perfect party organization that represents their political times. Of course, the authors found characteristics in the emergence of new and diverse parties to theorize, about new types. Nonetheless, more recent work raises questions about the necessity of one type of party representing the whole political spectrum. As Koole (1996, p. 520) states, “next to, or maybe instead of, trying to prove the existence of such a ‘one best’ party type that is typical for a certain period of time, party research should concentrate on the question why, and under what circumstances, a certain category of parties develop in one direction and another category in another”.

Political parties and their internal organization

The development of internal structures and organizational changes in political parties has made changes in how people understand internal divisions. At this point, when I refer to internal divisions in this research, I place the relationship between the national party and sub-national branches as a relevant case. Previous studies (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019) have attempted to explain that intra-party preferences take an important position in numerous political processes, from issue selection (Schumacher et al., 2013; Bäck et al., 2014) and agenda setting to coalition bargaining (Ceron, 2012; 2014).

I argue that to develop an effective electoral strategy, national parties’ leadership seek to maintain control over sub-national policy positions and try to influence them to move closer to the positions of the national party, mostly in countries with a high level of territorialism, with the idea of winning the significant number of votes possible. Alternatively, they try to minimize the deviation between the sub-national and national positions as much as possible. Sub-national political parties have much power in multilevel countries, mainly because they can provide extensive opportunities to win control of the national party leader. It is difficult to ignore the link between both, considering that the sub-national party branches and the candidates who can win these votes simultaneously depend financially and administratively on the national party (Debus

& Navarrete, 2018). Thus, the party has to balance the distribution of power between the national position and the sub-national branches to maximize votes at both levels.

Political parties have internal problems when they have to decide which party level has the power (Bille, 2001; Lundell, 2004). It is possible to see this when parties have support geographically distributed because political parties are not fully worried about local issues if they have differences between sub-national branches and national politics. Sub-national party branches argue to the national party that they will lose votes if they are not focused on their sub-national constituency. Nevertheless, when the party has to choose, the national interests are always stronger for the party than sub-national ones. Because of that, it is important for sub-national politicians to build important local bases of support and avoid confrontation with the national party (Heller, 2002).

Here is where sub-national parties have their primary interest. They have the principal goal to represent the sub-national interest and, using Heller's (2002, p. 658) words, "representing regional interests is through regional parties". However, sub-national parties, at some point, have to negotiate with national parties at the national level. The sub-national parties' appearance is mainly focused on territories where people feel they have to be treated differently from the rest of the country. Suppose these territories have a large number of potential voters. In that case, national parties have to be careful and try to respect sub-national demands because sub-national party branches address the preferences of the voters in these territories better than the national party.

Here is where the cases I treat in this research are relevant. Spain and the United Kingdom have territories that distinguish themselves from other territories within the same country. These territories present language, traditions, folklore, and culture differences. I name these territories as high sub-national identity territories, and I refer to Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia in the case of Spain. In the case of the United Kingdom, I selected Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland.

In the literature, concepts like intra-party divisions have been studied by authors using, in most cases, theoretical approaches based on single case studies (Harmel & Janda, 1994). The principal problem in the intra-party field is the limited data (Polk & Kölln, 2017), although authors such as Schumacher and Giger (2017) have merged diverse datasets from previous studies. The challenges of intra-party democracy also depend on what to compare between parties. As parties contain internal organizations, the measurement of internal democracy or the statement of one party being more democratic than another depends on what to measure

(Poguntke & Scarrow, 2020). Also, the study of political parties and the argument of having a key role in democracy drive the discussion to ask if intra-party democracy is needed to have a full democracy (Cross & Katz, 2013). Despite that, some authors, such as Aldrich (2015) and Kitschelt (2019), state that parties should oppose to intra-party divisions or concepts like intra-party democracy because they are supposed to be solutions to collective action problems and not introducing new issues in the agenda.

In other cases, scholars have paid more attention to internal factions of political parties, which are one type of this internal division. Factions are present in many different contexts, and it is possible to find this word in the media related to civil wars, Congress discussions or in non-political aspects such as business corporations, labour unions, and even families (Belloni & Beller, 1978). In political science studies, the definition of factions in political parties has been used as a synonym of tendency as an informal internal organization working on particular issues (Rose, 1964), clientelism meaning the distribution of benefits to individuals or groups in exchange for political advantages (Hopkin, 2006), or internal collision. This type of internal friction is one of the most critical issues on some countries' agendas. Recent studies address this issue of voters' perceptions and party strength, stating that when unified parties shift their positions, voters update their positions too. Nevertheless, if the party is perceived divided, the outcome from the voters is negative (Greene & Haber, 2016; Lehrer & Lin, 2020; Lin & Lehrer, 2021; Jung & Somer-Topcu, 2022).

The candidate selection processes, recruitment, and decision-making used to be studied as internal division issues because of the confrontation between party members for a position within the party or for positioning the party in a divisive issue. In these groups of intra-party movements that have been analyzed as possible consequences of internal disputes, it is necessary to add parliamentary and mobilization strategies and financial distribution and control (Puhle, 2002). These are different from the classic factions or tendencies, but they still live inside the political parties. With this idea of internal party competition, it is crucial how political parties try to attend to these differences before a formal party strategy because voters can see them as a cohesive group (Cox & McCubbins, 1994; Bowler et al., 1999; McGann, 2002; Ceron, 2017).

The party leader selection methods (Kenig, 2009; Budge et al., 2010; Pilet & Cross, 2014) have, to a great extent, influence on intra-party politics. Although political personalization has increased, political parties remain their prominent role in politics (Rahat & Kenig, 2018). Relevant literature on intra-party politics focuses on party leaders. As party leaders are the main part of this research, the selection procedure is also a relevant part to analyze in future research.

In that sense, Kenig (2008) examines leadership selection procedures when parties decide to expand their selectorates. This selectorate expansion helps to increase the number of candidates, but it comes with a less competitive procedure. Also, in party selectorate expansion, Cross and Blais (2012) demonstrate that parties in government refuse to make internal changes. It is only when they find themselves in the opposition that they are open to changes. Also, parties are more willing to changes in the selection methods when other parties have made changes before.

Also, it is possible to find the party unity shifting with the importance of the moment. For example, Stecker (2015) demonstrates, using roll-call votes, a stronger party unity in government than in opposition, but also, this particular strength is higher in legislative than in non-legislative votes. After that point, if political parties have not achieved internal unity, it is when the leader leading figure appears and depends on their internal support to make a decision about this internal disagreement. In addition, leaders' reactions to this type of internal movement against their power "purges are usually the outcome of leaders' reactions to the mobilization of internal dissent" (Boucek, 2009, p. 464).

Addressing women's representation, Kenny & Verge (2013) examine the linkage between political decentralization, political parties, and gender. In this case, the decentralization process by itself does not determine women's representation in the political parties, and the internal party structures play a relevant role in the successful representation. Also, the decentralization process involves where the politics are conducted. In this sense, the sphere where the political competition performs is not only the national sphere, and it has to share importance with a more "denationalized" area (Hopkin, 2003).

After addressing diverse questions on intra-party issues, since intra-party democracy, candidate and leader selection, factions and internal disagreements, I explore party competition and the party strategies to address different issues in the next section. Intra-party politics and preferences mentioned in this section have relevance and implication for party strategies. In that sense, I develop the relevance of intra-party politics in the next section when referring to a new issue, such as decentralization.

Issue entrepreneurship, ownership, and competition

In addition, to know how internal disputes between political parties happen nowadays, this research seeks to explain if these differences are increasing under the decentralization

process. I analyze decentralization as an issue involved in political parties' divisions following Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) centre-periphery cleavage. The disagreements or tensions over decentralization positions exist in two scopes of action: the intra-party and the inter-party debates. Before knowing how decentralization could be measured and studied by political scientists, it is important to clarify how different issues, the different topics in the political debate, such as decentralization, economy, healthcare, etc., more generally appear in the discussion and are framed in the political agenda.

To put these concepts into context, scholars in the field consider relevant the idea explained by Schattschneider (1960), who said that politics is essentially about which political conflicts come to dominate the political agenda. In addition, Zaller (1992) argues the importance of solid messages to make them more likely to receive by the voters. The relevance of the policies in terms of the number of people that receive your communications helps to develop the perception of the party. Nowadays decentralization issue is one of these political conflicts which play an essential part in understanding the political agenda. It is worthy to remind other existing strategies, such as the "riding the wave" theory (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994) and the "issue expansion" theory (Spoon & Williams, 2020), attempting to talk about issues that are salient and new in voters' minds. Of course, this theory has the ability to give an answer to citizens' concerns and is closer to voters' preferences. Even more, parties add these preferences to their manifestos (Spoon & Klüver, 2014) and press releases (Klüver & Sagarzazu, 2016), increasing the feeling of the people that their demands are being heard by the party.

This could have a linkage with the concept explored by Carmines & Stimson (1989) and then developed by De Vries and Hobolt (2012; 2015) entitled *issue entrepreneurship*, which it is possible to link with the appearance of decentralization discussion as the main topic in the agenda-setting –the mass media set the agenda, influencing the attitudes towards the political issues– (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). The issue entrepreneurship is the movements of one or different political parties trying to put in the centre of the debate a previous non-salient issue dimension in order to attract new voters and be positioned as a central political party option to win the elections. The authors explain that when parties lose their options and feel that they are not dominant in the political debate, they usually have the incentives and try to find a way to change the political debate and make essential issues where they are comfortable and have a strong position.

As usual in multiparty competition, the mainstream political parties, usually the state-wide parties are closer to maintain the status quo than new political parties (De Vries & Hobolt,

2012). This is based only on the idea that mainstream political parties have their voters under the existent political competition. In the same way, in the appearance of new issue dimensions, the challenger political parties prefer to modify the agenda-setting and establish new issues in the discussion than the government political parties. It is relevant how this mobilization strategy tends to be motivated in order to change the “rules of the game”, referencing these “rules” as the general topics of discussion in the political environment and finding changes in voters’ political choices (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012).

Another important point related to issue position and development is *issue ownership* (Carmines & Stimson, 1989), meaning that a candidate or political party has to introduce into political debates one issue that is considered better or more robust than the other candidates and political parties to handle. It differs from the *issue entrepreneurship* were leaders or parties introduce new issues to the discussion (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012). This is based on Petrocik’s (1996, p. 826) theory of managing as “the ability to resolve a problem of concern to voters”. Furthermore, the discussion about issue ownership is an open debate in terms of its capacity to affect electoral campaigns and elections (Petrocik et al., 2003; Egan, 2013; Stubager & Slothuus, 2013).

I explain the diverse theories on party positioning, such as issue ownership (Petrocik J. , 1996) and issue entrepreneurship (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012), but the crucial part is how the party behaves in this situation (Adams, 2012). The party strategy for a salient issue, in this case, decentralization, has three options (Meguid, 2005; 2008). The first option is that the party follows the saliency theory of competition and ignores the topic in order to reduce the relevance and raise other issues more beneficial to the party (Budge et al., 1987). Then, in second there is the proximity theory of competition, where the shifts towards the median voter position and minimizes the party ownership advantage (Downs, 1957). And in third place, there is the directional theory of competition, in which the party choose between being adversarial or favourable to the party issue owner (Rabinowitz & MacDonald, 1989).

The diverse party strategies have been analyzed and compared before (Markus & Meyer, 2014). But, the decentralization policies as a new issue in the political agenda and linked with intra-party divisions have not been studied together. However, considering that ideology, leadership and political strategies used to be the main issue affecting internal divisions, This research addresses a new vision in the field of intra-party division.

Chapter 2: Case selection and political parties

The analysis of different leaders' positions on decentralization establishes a relevant discussion about intra-party disagreements. Although the leaders have their own true preferences with respect to different topics, I argue that they respond to the party members, the voters, and the public opinion preferences. I assume that state-wide parties position themselves in the high sub-national identity territories differ from the rest of the country. This creates intra-party tension when the topic became salient such as during an electoral campaign or following bad electoral results. In this section, I study how the different party branches and the party leaders face the issue of decentralization in each high sub-national identity territory at the same time that they try to resolve these tensions. Thus, the discussion of each case supports the relevance of this issue and how it became relevant in the public debate.

In this part, I examine the diverse circumstances that drive the relationship between the national party and the party branches. Each party has their own circumstances and characteristics that influence how they address this issue. I am not only referring to the issue of decentralization but the issue of intra-party debates in relevant topics, such as decentralization, environment or sub-national taxes. In some cases, there are party "in-groups", in this case from different territories, which handle the topics under discussion differently than the national party. As Budge, Ezrow and McDonald (2010) said, the parties work on their own policies developed by their ideology, but at the same time, they are fractionalized with the existence of intra-party disagreements, and all this in times of uncertainty. I describe the context of each country case below.

- a. Catalonia and the PSC (La Vanguardia, 2012) (El Periódico, 2012) (Ríos, 2012) (20minutos, 2014)

The Partit dels Socialistes de Catalunya (PSC) is the PSOE sub-national branch in Catalonia. It has a federal and autonomous position from the national party. Also, the PSC has been the larger state-wide party branch since democracy, winning several sub-national elections even more. Therefore, the PSC is defined as a catalanist and socialist party. In addition, the PSC is more decentralised than the state-wide party (PSOE) and has a more leftist position (Orriols, 2010). However, despite this assumption of being more "catalanist" than the national party, the PSC has historically followed the national instructions in terms of decentralization votes.

Some PSC leaders have positioned the branch in a more decentralized position and have started a more in-depth discussion on the topic (El País, 2010). Although they have called themselves “catalanists”, they have been in front, electorally, of the ethno-regionalist parties in Catalonia. Some coalitions exist between the PSC and ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), but all of them have been proposed as post-electoral and only looking to build a government (Company, 2003).

The PSC electoral power in Catalonia has been shared with the two major ethno-regionalist parties, *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC). It does not affect the agreement capacity between them like the called “tripartito” or “*Pacto del Tinell*” in the 2003 and 2006 sub-national elections (Company, 2003) (A., 2006). The 2006 statute of autonomy referendum in Catalonia broke the balance of power between the PSC and the ERC. At this point begin the difficult relationship between the PSC and the state-wide PSOE with the ethno-regionalist parties in Catalonia. Four years after this referendum, the Constitutional Court declared “unconstitutional” diverse articles where Catalonia was referred to as a nation, prioritizing their language and some degree of self-government.

Then the political leaders’ reactions were clear in their positions: while PSC (Noguer, 2010) and ethno-regionalist leaders (Piñol, 2010), having their differences in the degree of decentralization, were opposed to the “unconstitutional” declaration, the People’s Party (PP) stated their satisfaction (Cué, 2010). After that, the PSC was immersed in statements exchange where ethno-regionalist supporters called them “unionists” or “Spanish nationalists”, and the state-wide supporters called them “pro-independentists” or “separatists”. Two terms in between, 2012 and 2015, with the setbacks led by CiU and JxSí, a coalition formed by independentist parties and social organizations, and the Spanish nationalist right-wing party *Citizens* (C’s) with no advances in any way, have returned the PSC being the most voted party in the 2021 sub-national elections. Despite that, the government was formed by an independentist parties’ coalition led by ERC.

The PSC’s history in Catalonia and Spain has been determinant in the political debates on decentralization because of their position in handling decentralized voters’ preferences and the national party. In addition, when the decentralization discussion appears, it is more pointed. The PSC and PSOE leaders have talked about decentralization, and its MPs from high sub-national identity territories have been present in several investiture speeches, budget discussions, and bill processes. All this makes them relevant in this study, where MPs from these territories, the intra-party discussions and the independence referendum play a crucial role. As a

consequence, I plan to analyze parliamentary and party conference speeches and how national leaders change their position on decentralization in different circumstances, such as the number of ethno-regionalist or party branches MPs in parliament, the audience, and the independence referendum.

b. The Basque Country and the PSE-EE

The decentralization process in Spain has been built under different circumstances depending on the territory. In the case of the Basque Country, it covers since ethno-regionalist supporting more fiscal and political autonomy to parties having links with military groups whose objective was the independence of the territory. However, this problematic relationship is not what drives this research. Instead, this research analyzes the context of the principal mainstream party, PSOE, and its connection with the sub-national party branch.

I state that party branches have diverse and difficult positions when discussing about decentralization. Their intermediate position between the national party and the ethno-regionalist parties' positions faces them as a "radical autonomist" for some national spheres and a "national unionist" when the accusation comes from the sub-nationalist side. In this middle step, they call themselves the *Partido Socialista de Euskadi*, which takes a classical nationalist denomination of the territory "Euskadi" and not using the majoritarian Spanish denomination "Basque Country".

In this case, the Socialist Party branch in the Basque Country fought against the terrorist group ETA being part of different autonomous government coalitions with the ethno-regionalist party PNV and also being head of the government. At the same time, the party members struggled with declarations against this relationship with ethno-regionalist parties from the right-wing state-wide parties such as PP and Vox. The party branch leaders' have talked about the importance of non-nationalist people in any discussion about independence and how it is impossible while the Socialist Party remains his strength (Europa Press, 2014).

In 2009 the party branch leader Patxi López obtained the victory in the elections, and he was head of the government without support from ethno-regionalist parties. It was the first and only time that this had happened in the Basque Country since the country's transition to democracy. This situation gave a strong position to the Socialist party in the Basque Country, and they proposed an alternative plan to a more decentralized autonomy than previously shown by the leaders of the PNV. The references to a Basque nationality from the Basque Socialist

party leader and his intentions to negotiate with the ethno-regionalist parties was fundamental and critical point during his term (Malaina, 2008).

In this sense, the Basque party branch is in support of decentralization and defends the Basque Country's territorial singularities, such as sub-national and traditional clothing, different language and folklore. Despite their position supporting for decentralization, they always talked about the Basque Country as part of Spain, so the independence referendum has never been central to the Socialist party branch positions. This position relates to the party branches in the other high sub-national identity territories in Spain, supporting sub-national autonomy and fighting to maintain their singularities. All these characteristics make relevant the Basque Country as territory, the shared power between the state-wide party branch and ethno-regionalist party, being head of government at some point, and its defence of the Basque Country differences. The party members have supportive positions in sub-national singularities and, at the same time, participate in the making-decision process at the national level. So, I expect that they influence the speeches' position on decentralization when the leaders speak in front of them in the Parliament and, on the other hand, when the party leader exposes his position at the party conference.

c. The PP in Galicia

The case of Galicia demonstrates that the decentralization issue is a current topic on both sides of the ideology scale, independently. The right-wing party People's Party (PP) also has to face a debate when the discussion turns to decentralization characteristics such as folklore, identity, or language. Here, I intend to explain how party branches from the state-wide parties do influence and differ from the national party. Thus, these differences play a relevant role in changing leaders' positions on decentralization.

Although the People's Party has been the main pillar of national support against ethno-regionalism, the statements from other right-wing unionist parties against their position in Galicia have been convincing. Political parties such as Vox, Unionism Progression and Democracy (UPyD), and Citizens (Cs) have used the PP license with the Galician language to debilitate their adversary (Brion Insua, 2022). The People's Party manages the situation by being respectful of traditions but facing any possibility of "major decentralization", like debates about independence. Sometimes they are even attacked from both sides: the Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), left-wing and nationalist party supporters of more decentralization, calls them

unionist and Spanish nationalists, while the right-wing parties criticize their gestures with the Galician singularities.

The territorial cleavage in Galicia works differently than in the two previous Spanish cases. Here, the People's Party had governed since 1981 except for one term (and an interrupted half-term in 1985). The People's Party in Galicia has a strong territorial distribution in terms of support from small villages and cities, something that gives them a sense of proximity. In Catalonia or the Basque Country, for their characteristics, they have a stronger Spanish nationalist speech against ethno-regionalism than the Galician People's Party (Barcos, 2020).

In addition, this position on decentralization does not make the People's Party lose votes in their electoral success. This is the main reason why the People's Party remains with this policy position on decentralization: it works electorally. For example, the leader of the Galician People's Party until 2022, when he moves to Madrid to be the leader of the state-wide People's Party, Alberto Núñez Feijóo refers to Galicia as "*our country*" (Núñez Feijóo, 2020).

Then, the Galician case gives a relevant and different example to this study. It plays a role in the relationship between decentralization and territorialism with ideology. It demonstrates the relationship between the two cleavages and how MPs from high sub-national identity territories face the issue of decentralization in a different way than MPs from other territories. It includes the diversity in communication, the speeches change when the scenario change and this is also under debate in this research.

d. Labour party in Scotland

Historically, the Labour party have been the state-wide party most pro-devolution in the United Kingdom. Such is the case that the Scottish Labour party works as an autonomous section of the state-wide Labour party. Nonetheless, despite its autonomous definition, Scottish Labour is not registered as a political party but as an accounting unit meaning that it is a section inside the Labour party (Electoral Commission, 2023).

Labour was the major party in Scotland in the United Kingdom General Elections, the European Parliament election, and the beginning of the Scottish Parliament as a devolved institution until the first decade of 2010 (Government, 2010). Devolution has been a controversial issue for the Labour party. Despite that, taking into account the small electoral support for the Scottish National Party (SNP), the Labour party never felt Scotland electorally in

danger. After the 1997 devolution referendum and the 1999 first devolved elections in Scotland, the Labour party remains the largest party in Scotland.

It was not until the 2007 Scottish Parliament election when the SNP overtook Scottish Labour –although it was only by 1 MSP. Since then, Scottish Labour decreased their electoral support election after election (except in 2010 when retained all their 2005 UK General Election seats). Two consecutive Scottish Parliamentary elections with closed results between the Scottish Labour and the SNP arrived in the electoral dispute to the 2016 Scottish Parliament election. Before that, it happened probably the major political decision in Scotland since the devolution referendum: the agreement to hold an independence referendum for Scotland.

In 2014 a referendum on Scottish independence was held from the United Kingdom agreed by the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government. The position of Labour to front the referendum was under debate during the whole campaign, and they finally decided to support the “Better Together” pro-union campaign with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (Macnab, 2012). The United Kingdom remained together, but the Scottish Labour started to lose seats in the Scottish Parliament in each election after that, not only against the SNP but also against the Conservatives. This dilemma is still in the public debate for Scottish Labour because of the possibility of a second independence referendum in Scotland and their position on it (Hutcheon, 2022).

During the independence referendum campaign and after that, a relevant number of Labour voters and supporters vote against what is typically called “the party’s line” (Pattie & Johnston, 2017). It means that although partisanship matters, the referendum and devolution or decentralization is an issue open to debate.

Therefore, I argue that Scotland plays an important role in the leaders’ speeches on decentralization. There are MPs in the House of Commons from Labour that face the issue of decentralization in their constituencies. The policy position of Scottish Labour on decentralization is crucial for the future of Labour in Westminster. In addition, the 2014 Scottish independence referendum has been an example of an agreement between the Scottish Government and the United Kingdom Government solving a political discussion using political ways.

e. State-wide parties domination in Wales

Wales shares with Scotland and Northern Ireland to be the high sub-national identity territories in the United Kingdom. The devolution process's first step in the latest 1990s became more relevant and well-defined in the Government of Wales Act in 2006.

The Welsh Parliament or the, also known as *Senedd Cymru*, have been dominated by the two major state-wide parties in the United Kingdom: the Labour and the Conservatives. In this case, since the first National Assembly for Wales's election in 1999, they Labour have led and is still leading the government in Wales. However, the case of Conservatives in Wales has changed along the way, sharing the second place in the devolved elections with the ethno-regionalist party *Plaid Cymru*.

Welsh Labour has autonomy in the policies already devolved to the *Senedd*, but it is still part of the Labour Party. Being the leader in the devolved and House of Commons elections drives Welsh Labour to address questions from more decentralized perspectives in the *Senedd* and a more centralized one in Westminster. The saliency of Welsh independence became relevant because of the current debate in Scotland about a second independence referendum. The main ethno-regionalist party, the *Plaid Cymru*, have leveraged to position this question in the public discussion (Paun & Hall, 2021). Despite the increasing debate, there is still not a majority supporting an independence referendum in Wales. The Welsh Labour and the Conservatives do not support independence.

Nonetheless, they do not have the same position in the debate. Welsh Labour supports more devolution and federal reform, while the Conservatives remain in agreement with the current situation. The main issue for Welsh Labour is to be in government and simultaneously in the middle of the Conservatives and the Plaid Cymru. The Welsh Labour leader have been clear in their position, saying that "If a party that stands for that at an election wins a majority of votes in Wales, then of course that referendum should happen", but also remembering that "no political party promising a referendum had won a majority of votes at the ballot box" (Hughes, 2022).

There is an intra-party discussion in the Welsh Labour on this topic with the existent "*Labour for an Independent Wales*" formed by Labour Party members (Labour for an Independent Wales, 2023). The number of supporters has been increasing since 2018. The existence of this internal debate endorses this research argument about the influence of intra-party differences in the leaders' speeches' positions on decentralization.

f. The Northern Ireland representation

The case of state-wide parties in Northern Ireland is, at least, worth mentioning. The two largest parties in the United Kingdom have not been close to winning an election in Northern Ireland since devolution. As in the cases of Scotland and Wales, Northern Ireland had the first devolved election in the latest 1990s, in this case, in 1998. Being one of the three high sub-national identity territories, the country's leadership has changed between unionists, the Democratic Unionist Party and the Ulster Unionist Party, and the Irish nationalists (although I classify them into the ethno-regionalists parties), the Sinn Féin.

The complex geographical and sociological situation in Northern Ireland promotes sharing cultural characteristics with both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. This situation appears in their language, religiosity, and ethnicity, among others. For example, language changes from unionist supporters, who use the word “Ulster” to refer to the territory, to nationalists, who use the term “the North”, and it is also applied in the media coverage (Testa & Specia, 2018). In this situation, the Labour Party in Northern Ireland and the Northern Ireland Conservatives are not winning representation in the territory.

The Northern Ireland Conservatives have a narrow relationship with the Ulster Unionists (Summers, 2008), but they also have tried to relaunch the party (NI Conservatives, 2012). This special situation in Northern Ireland exposes how territories with similarities in terms of decentralization or devolution and being the three high sub-national identity territories also have distinctions in the parties leading the politics. In addition, I study how the strength or weakness of the state-wide and ethno-regionalist parties, measured by the number of MPs, influence the leaders' speeches when they refer to decentralization.

In this chapter, I reviewed how political parties change over time. After that, the diverse theories of issue positioning and how parties address voters' preferences make relevant new issues, such as decentralization. In the next chapter, I describe and analyze the issue of decentralization, secessionism, and its relationship with independence referendums. It relates to the main argument of this dissertation, where I study the issue of decentralization in leaders' speeches and the influence of independence referendums on these speeches.

Centralization, decentralization, and secessionist process

The relevant position of political parties in the decentralization process is important to establish as a starting point in the debate. Political parties are responsible for citizens' interests and must implement policies to satisfy them according to normative theories of democracy (Pitkin, 1967). Decentralization in modern democracies is the outcome of politicians' bargaining, which tends to be supported by political parties' structures. That is, "political parties provide the medium through which such bargaining takes place" (Montero, 2005, p. 64). However, how to behave with decentralization demands is unclear. State-wide parties preserve their position against the transfer of authority to sub-national governments and are vehemently opposed to it. On another point, some parties understand this request for decentralization from sub-national levels. However, they only have one way to control it at this time, supporting it. When the claims for a major degree of decentralization increase and the voters' support for this option also increase, the national leaders have no other chance than address it (Toubeau & Wagner, 2013).

In the literature, this debate about decentralization is addressed in two ways: efficiency and redistribution on the one hand and questions of identity on the other. The research done by Toubeau and Wagner (2013, p. 97) is based on the economic idea of efficiency and redistribution. They argue that different countries through which they confirm that "parties on the economic right are more supportive of decentralization than parties on the economic left, while culturally liberal parties favour decentralization more than culturally conservative parties". Also, Spina (2013) examine political decentralization stating that right-wing parties should be more supportive of decentralization, even adding socially conservative parties to his study, but the results are not conclusive. In the next empirical chapters of this research, I address this theory on the division between economic right parties and, at the same time, parties supporting liberals' positions in the cultural cleavage do not fit different political contexts. In this case, I address how this assumption is difficult to sustain when analyzing the case of Spain and the United Kingdom because of a more supportive position to decentralization from left-wing parties than right-wing parties.

On the side of identity, the main statement is that people who identify more strongly with the sub-national territory are more in favour of more decentralization (Serrano, 2013). This argument does not mean that citizens with higher identification with their territory support independence. Despite this distinction, national identity is a robust individual characteristic, and it makes people feel closer to pro-independence positions (Liñeira & Cetrà, 2015). Also, the

study of Liñeira & Cetrà (2015) states that Scotland, Catalan, and Basque independence demands are salient, and this idea supports the leading cause of this research.

The importance of decentralization can be clearly seen in the case of the United Kingdom and Spain. Furthermore, the cases of Scotland and Catalonia have gone beyond the administrative devolution discussion. After the SNP won the Scottish parliamentary election in 2011, with an impressive rise in the number of MSPs, and the referendum of independence held in the autumn of 2014, despite the unionist victory, the referendum revealed the fundamental division in the society. The disagreements over decentralization have become one of the main issues in the United Kingdom at the moment. With the main difference being the referendum accepted by the national government, Catalonia was in the same process under the management of *Convergència i Unió* (CiU) and *Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya* (ERC) on October 1st 2017. Besides that, they had different procedures to execute the referendum, remember that referendum in Scotland was utterly negotiated, agreed upon, and regulated by the House of Commons (although driven by the United Kingdom Government), and the referendum in Catalonia was declared out of the law by every state institution and the state-wide parties had different behaviour too.

Existing research recognizes the “accommodation thesis” as the principal method to procedure when rigid decentralization or sub-national autonomy process appears. As Massetti and Schakel (2016, p. 61) argue, “once the most characterizing demands of regionalist parties are accommodated, they will lose their *raison d’être*, and their voters will gradually abandon them”, so the electoral power of sub-national parties is controlled when these demands are accommodated.

On the other hand, it is possible to find arguments supporting why this independence process materializes in countries with a certain degree of decentralization and with the existence of ethno-regionalist parties supporting differences between territories. The idea is that state-wide parties are able to accommodate only some territorialist demands but not the secessionist ones, something that differs and supposes a change in the “accommodation thesis”. Moreover, because of mainstream parties’ inability to solve their demands, secessionist parties are more likely to maintain and increase their power (Elias & Tronconi, 2011). Nonetheless, the parties have diverse ways to address decentralization and, in link with the new type of parties, they focus on the political and electoral outcomes (Mazzoleni, 2009).

The research of Cetrà & Harvey (2018) addressing the different scenarios in Catalonia and Scotland for having the independence referendum adds a second explanation. They support the accommodation thesis for the United Kingdom agreement but also show the case of Spain as

a “resistant” position from the national government. They state that each country had different incentives to agree with the referendum, and depending on that, they took different positions.

Amat and Falcó-Gimeno (2014) also support the idea about the existence of decentralization demands, increasing the decentralization reforms. In this case, the authors examine the legislative bargain as the main reason why the parties address political needs, and in this case, political demands for decentralization. If parties supporting decentralization have enough electoral force to negotiate, their requests for decentralization will occur. In the same debate over decentralization reforms, the nationalism and as its representatives, its parties have the capacity to change the agenda or fortify for more decentralization or devolution (Béland & Lecours, 2005).

In the following section, I examine decentralization and devolution are in Spain and the United Kingdom. I explain the situation by analyzing the ethno-regionalists parties with representation in the national sphere. Although over the years and legislative terms, the ethno-regionalists parties, as well as the state-wide parties, have had decreasing support or reaching a high number of votes, they have always been involved in the relationship between the sub-national level and national politics. So then, they are a key piece in the ethno-regionalist and sub-national scheme. I argue that this relevant position and the MPs from these parties representing the high sub-national identity territories at the national level have a strong influence on the leaders’ when they talk about decentralization. At the same time, these parties are the major supporters of independence in these territories, to a greater or lesser strength, being the referendum another determinant in the leaders’ position on decentralization.

Spanish decentralization and Independence context

In the previous chapter, I presented the state-wide party branches in high sub-national identity territories and how they relate to decentralization in these territories. Here, I explain the others parties in this territories political scene, the ethno-regionalist parties. When I present Spain as a case study, I examine the country as a whole and the three “historical autonomous communities” Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia. These territories have a special acknowledgement because of their position as autonomy community before the civil war and the subsequent dictatorship until 1976.

Apart from this special process to constitute their status as autonomous communities, Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia are the territories where the debate about nationality

and nation has been and still is a relevant discussion looking at the ethno-regionalist representation in the national and sub-national levels.

Going further in the discussion, the three high identity territories are the three where decentralization, even without the debate about the “nation” concept, has been in day-to-day politics since the country transitioned to democracy institutions. Therefore, the three territories also systematically have ethno-regionalist elected representatives in the national Parliament. Also, these ethno-regionalist parties have had a relevant part in major political agreements like investiture processes, budget approval, and government coalition-making.

Following the same structure as the previous discussion about mainstream parties and party branches, I analyze the context of the different ethno-regionalist parties in each high sub-national identity territory. Also, I remark that the ethno-regionalist parties are not all the same. Although I examine them as one type of party that has strong electoral and popular support in these territories, there are differences between them depending on their demands (Dandoy R. , 2010).

g. CiU, ERC, and CUP

The Catalan ethno-regionalist parties have been the most active supporters of decentralization, even independence, since the Spanish returned to democracy in 1976. Although nowadays they stated indispensable the referendum of independence, they have been involved in Spanish politics supporting both mainstream national parties. They have been working together with PP and PSOE and are always under the opposition's suspicion of more decentralized political transfers.

Currently, there are three ethno-regionalist parties in the national Parliament. Two major parties, CiU and ERC, have been representing the Catalan ethno-regionalism since democracy, and one minor and relatively new party with a more radical position in terms of negotiation and demands to the state-wide parties, CUP. The first two parties have been involved in state-wide leaders' investitures as required supporters to obtain the majority. The CiU supported the People's Party, PP, investiture in 1996 through the so-called “Pacto del Majestic”. A few terms later, in the 2019 investiture procedure, the ERC approved the state-wide leader from PSOE, Pedro Sánchez, as the new Spanish Prime Minister. Although they have ideological discrepancies, they share the mission to obtain a recognized referendum for Catalonia.

The relationship between them has also been complex. As both parties compete for the leadership in Catalonia, sharing with the PSOE party branch, the accusations from one to the other remain. When one party makes an agreement with a national-wide party, the other calls them supporters of unionism or similar words to attack the political opponent. Nonetheless, after the 2017 Catalan referendum, without national agreement, they ran a unified platform to win the sub-national elections against the other unionist parties.

What is evident in the Catalan ethno-regionalist parties is that, despite their desire for independence, their primary aim is to make an agreement with the state-wide party in government to accomplish the independence referendum in the law. While the negotiation with the PSOE exists, and they admit Catalonia as a territory with distinctions and singularities, there are much more difficulties to advance with the PP. The 2017 referendum attempt was carried out when the PP was leading the national government. The roughness and criminalization of this process have deteriorated and toughened the relationship between the ethno-regionalist parties and the People's Party (Minder & Kingsley, 2017).

This relation is relevant because, as explained, they have been determinant in previous terms. They also play an essential role in budget acceptance or the legislative process. So then, I argue that the presence of MPs from these ethno-regionalist parties does influence the national leaders' speeches on decentralization. As decentralization is the main topic of these parties, and they have enough relevance to be necessary, the national leaders have to maintain a close relationship with them and keep them close for legislature voting.

h. EAJ-PNV and EH Bildu

On account of the Basque Country political confrontation, even with the terrorism issue in the discussion, with the Spanish nationalism or unionism, the Basque ethno-regionalist parties had been the parties with more references to independence in Spain since democracy until the so-called "Catalan process". In this part, I differentiate between the EAJ-PNV and the EH Bildu. The experts in the Chapel Hill, in 2019, position these parties in the six (6), and one (1.2) in the traditional left-right ideology scale (0-10), respectively. This means that political experts state a leftist position for EH-Bildu and a centre-right position for EAJ-PNV. The ideological or left-right and the decentralization scales place parties between zero (0) and ten (10), zero (0) being the more decentralized and leftist position and ten (10) the more right-wing and centralized position. However, despite this difference in the ideological space, when referring to

political decentralization to territories using the same source, both parties are positioned between zero (0) and one (1) on the scale. So, their pursuit for more decentralization is evident to the Chapel Hill experts.

The situation in the Basque Country has been changing over the years. Although the Basque ethno-regionalist parties demonstrate their anti-unionism position historically, they both, the PNV and the EH Bildu, had supported diverse national governments indirectly. Their consensus position links with the public opinion in the latest years, asking for more decentralization and self-government but leaving the hard opposition if no independence referendum is made (Ordaz, 2021). Also, the EAJ-PNV party leader states that they want to address the independence but need more work on the idea of independence to build more extensive social support (Urkullu, 2012). Public opinion approves of an independence referendum, although the majority position themselves as the “No” (Público, 2017). It shows how the citizens want to build democratic processes by being part of the making-decision debate.

All this demonstrates the argument of this research. The ethno-regionalist parties are a fundamental part of the legislature and the legislative process and with the ability to being relevant in the executive investiture. They influence public opinion in high-identity territories where the state-wide parties have difficulties having a structured speech, avoiding taking a clear position on decentralization. The good relationship between the ethno-regionalist parties with national representation and the major state-wide parties that compete for the government is a key part of day-to-day politics. As a consequence, I argue that the MPs from the ethno-regionalist parties from high sub-national identity territories do influence the leaders’ speeches when talking about decentralization.

i. BNG

The Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG) plays an entirely different role in Spanish politics. Galicia, a high sub-national identity territory with its singularities and distinctions like Catalonia and the Basque Country, has a different political behaviour. The territorial distribution and the relevance of rural areas make Galicia a more conservative region than its peers. Such is the case that the People’s Party (PP) is the dominant party in the sub-national and the national elections in Galicia. Despite that, there is no state-wide party, except the far-right Vox, that has

doubts about the unique Galician circumstances, the existence of his folklore and the respect for this language.

In defence of these linguistic and cultural singularities, appear the BNG. The Chapel Hill expert survey position the BNG closer to the most decentralized position possible in their scale on “supporting political decentralization”. Although their relevance in national politics is lower than the Catalan and Basque Country ethno-regionalist parties, it is the third territory with national representation in the national legislature. The experts position the BNG on the left (3 to 10) in the classic ideological scale. The clear conservative Galician citizen and the support from the main state-wide right-wing party, the PP, to the Galician singularities and traditions make it more difficult to find their electorate.

So then, the BNG is the ethno-regionalist party that faces the state-wide party branches in this territory. The claims for an independence referendum existent in their manifestos and speeches remain despite the minor electoral force. Therefore, the BNG is also the central part of the argument of this research. Thus, I argue that the MPs number from these territories, the place where the speech is done, and the existence of an independence referendum influence the national leaders’ positions on decentralization.

United Kingdom Devolution and Independence Context

The devolution process for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland has been on the political agenda and the public debate in the United Kingdom for a long time. Nonetheless, it has become prominent and salient in the political sphere since the devolved agreements in the late 1990s. This is because even with the domination of the state-wide party branches, except for Northern Ireland, these territories have maintained ethno-regionalist parties in the party competition for winning sub-national elections. Also, they have not been relevant only in the devolved legislature but have had representation in Westminster. This representation shows how ethno-regionalist parties influence politics at different levels.

When people refer to the three high sub-national identity territories in the United Kingdom, they call them “nations”. This concept arrives with a secondary debate about the existence of nations without a state. In this case, Scotland has opened the public opinion discussion on the independence referendum, even asking for a second independence referendum, increasing the demonstrations about it in Wales. The case of Northern Ireland is different because of their previous armed conflict, and the society is concerned about it.

Nonetheless, there is no doubt in the existence of what Michael Keating (Keating, 1996; 2001) named a “stateless nation”.

In this research, I formulate the influence of MPs from the ethno-regionalist parties in the leaders’ speeches on decentralization. The MPs from the different territories have diverse relevance in national politics, but the state-wide parties have to deal with their position on topics, such the devolution, in territories where it is salient in the debate. The number of MPs from these territories can manage their expectations in Westminster. Also, the state-wide leaders have to know how to deal with the party branches’ MPs because they need their support to win the elections in these territories and the ethno-regionalist MPs to make agreements or counteract their positions. Thus, this idea links with the importance of the scenario where the speech is done. The leaders have different incentives to speak about decentralization or independence in the parliament, in front of other MPs from high sub-national identity territories, which play an important role in the public debate, or if they give a speech in the party conference with the party members supporting his statements and a reduce disagreement in his positions on decentralization. Also, the three ethno-regionalist parties represent the idea of independence in these territories. They support independence by making an agreement to reach a referendum and, after that, become an independent territory. Scotland is the territory that held this referendum in 2014, and scholars (Dekavalla, 2016) state that framing the independence referendum as another policy helps to understand the event (Greene, Spoon, & Williams, 2018; Greene & McMillan, 2020).

j. SNP

The Scottish National Party has become the most relevant party in the last decade when speaking about independence. The capacity to make an agreement with the national party and even more complicated, with a Government which supports unionism, has been an example for other parties and countries. It is also an example for state-wide parties to make a consensus in that sense, or not, to solve the issue of devolution, decentralization or independence. Despite that, this position for the SNP is relatively new. Since the first devolved elections in 1999, it was not until 2007 that SNP won their first Scottish election. Before that, they were the opposition to Labour and Liberal Democrats coalition.

The SNP became the more robust political force in the Scottish Parliament, but they were not the most voted party for the UK General Elections in Scotland. However, this changed

significantly after the 2014 Independence Referendum. In the subsequent 2015 House of Commons elections, the SNP took the first place in Scotland and became the third party in the United Kingdom. This relevance in the United Kingdom politics maintains the debate about decentralization, devolution, and independence still in public opinion.

Despite the defeat of the SNP position supporting independence in the 2014 Independence Referendum, the closer results (44.7% - 55.3%) have made the discussion continue. The SNP accepted the first independence referendum results, but the message about an independent Scotland has never disappeared. Also, the results of the latest circumstances with the United Kingdom European Union membership referendum, also called the Brexit Referendum, have increased the debate about a second independence referendum. The SNP campaign during the Brexit referendum states that there is an existent right to hold another referendum “if there is a ‘significant and material’ change in circumstances, such as Scotland being taken out of the EU against its will” (SNP, 2021). The Brexit referendum results in Scotland support the SNP theory of a different Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom, with 62% to 38% in favour of remaining in the European Union (BBC, 2016).

For all that, Scotland and the SNP party are the most visible example of what other ethno-regionalist parties want to achieve: support and dominance in the sub-national elections, to be the first party opposed to the state-wide parties, and to hold an independence referendum. So naturally, the SNP, with its MPs in the House of Commons, influence the leaders’ speeches on decentralization. In addition, it is the main driving force for an independence referendum in Scotland, so its importance in the influence of referendums in leaders’ speeches on decentralization is remarkable.

k. Plaid Cymru

Plaid Cymru is the mirror of the SNP in Wales. It is the main ethno-regionalist party and a clear supporter of independence for Wales. Nevertheless, they do not have the same political or electoral strength. Plaid Cymru has long been relevant in Welsh politics but never won a devolved election. They were in coalition with the Labour in 2007, but since then, they have been fighting with the Conservatives to remain the leader of the opposition. In addition, when analyzing the United Kingdom General Elections in Wales, Labour maintains its dominance and Plaid Cymru have been placed after the two state-wide parties.

Despite that situation, Plaid Cymru represents an important part of Welsh society. The party represents the citizens that support a higher devolution and an independence referendum. This claim for an independence referendum in Wales has followed the agenda for the second referendum in Scotland. Other parties, such as the Wales Green Party, support the idea of having a referendum, but the main statement on this comes from Plaid Cymru leader. Plaid Cymru, in its party conference, agreed to offer a referendum on independence for Wales if they win the Senedd, Welsh National Assembly, elections (Hayward, 2020). Before that, previous leaders tried to debate independence in the Senedd, but their motions were rejected by the state-wide parties (Craig, 2017). The call for independence arises, and despite the public demonstrations, the Senedd members remain against negotiating an independence referendum (BBC, 2020).

Although the context is still far away from an independence referendum in Wales, there is no doubt about the Plaid Cymru determination as the party most representing this issue. At the same time, as the representative of ethno-regionalism, they are a significant figure in Welsh politics. Maybe, in terms of numbers, the Plaid Cymru is not decisive in Westminster politics, but the presence of its MPs, together with other ethno-regionalist representatives, remind the national leaders of the existence of these high sub-national identity territories. It is worth reminding that national leaders support their electoral chances in these territories because of their party branches, usually with a more decentralized position than the national party. The ethno-regionalist demands and how to face them is an ongoing political debate (Cetrà & Harvey, 2018).

1. Sinn Féin

Sinn Féin has the peculiarity, in comparison with the other ethno-regionalist parties in this research, that it has representation in two different countries: Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Sinn Féin shares with the Basque Country ethno-regionalist party EH-Bildu the accusation of being related to military/paramilitary organizations. The scope of this study only focuses on Sinn Féin in the Northern Ireland Assembly and its results at the sub-national and national levels.

Sinn Féin plays a crucial role in Northern Ireland politics. It is the largest party sharing power with the Democratic Unionist Party. One characteristic of Northern Ireland politics is that elected politicians have to position themselves as unionists, nationalists or neither. All this can be understood after the ethnic conflict between protestant unionists supporting being part of

the United Kingdom and the Catholics closer to the Republic of Ireland. Nonetheless, the religious element is in decline.

So then, Sinn Féin has relevant public opinion support in Northern Ireland to promote independence from the United Kingdom, although in this case, they want to unify the island of Ireland. The difference with other cases is the existent right to leave the United Kingdom through the Good Friday Agreement Article 1. Nonetheless, the electoral support for this option is not enough. After the Brexit results, the Sinn Féin leader claimed a referendum to solve the problems at the border with the Republic of Ireland (Fenton, 2016).

The Sinn Féin situation in the Westminster elections is also singular. Despite being elected and maintaining tight competition with the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Sinn Féinn MPs have a policy of abstentionism in Westminster. So, it is difficult to measure its influence on national politics. Nonetheless, the influence of the party in public opinion and Northern Ireland politics is easily measured. Because of that, its influence in leaders' speeches on decentralization exists because of the party's capacity to mobilize people, but it is less relevant in the political decision process in the national sphere.

In this chapter, I have presented the saliency and the diverse theories to address decentralization and independence in Spain and the United Kingdom. At the same time, I examined the major ethno-regionalist parties with national representation and sub-national strength. This relates to the interest in addressing decentralization as a major issue in national leaders' speeches. Thus, in the next chapter, I show how I study decentralization in the leaders' parliamentary and party conference speeches.

Chapter 3: Research Design

The main argument of this study is to demonstrate the influence of ethno-regionalist and parties in government branch MPs in leaders' speeches on decentralization. Also, after that, I argue the influence of different audiences, such as parliament and party conferences, in the leaders' speeches on decentralization as well. Finally, the third question to address analyzes independence referendums' influence on the parliamentary and party conference speeches on decentralization.

In previous chapters, I argue the saliency of decentralization and independence referendums in the different territories. I showed as high sub-national identity territories Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia in Spain. I stated Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. Thus, they are the territories where decentralization and independence referendums are more salient.

In consequence, I select parliamentary and party conference speeches to find references on decentralization. Thus, in this chapter, I discuss the research design and, specifically, the data and methods. Furthermore, the case selection helps to make internal and external validation of the results following the most similar research design (Gerring, 2004; 2008). Thus, focusing on the leaders' speeches, the analysis of textual data has been increasing in the political science field (Ceron, 2014) (Greene & Haber, 2016).

Documents such as bills, press releases, and party manifestos are the most common type of documents referring to parties' and MPs' preferences. However, having access to leaders' and MPs' speeches have helped to analyze their personal references to diverse topics. In this research, I address the question of decentralization and the different hypotheses using parliamentary and party conference speeches. In order to be more specific, I explain two main aspects of the research design below: the method and the data.

Methods

Classical approaches to methods in political science are closer to survey methodologies and aggregate statistics rather than the use of textual data. Therefore, in this research, I use textual data to analyze the leaders' speeches on decentralization in a quantitative way. The quantitative text analysis (*QTA*) field has developed different approaches to document

management. We can divide them into three big trends for scaling political documents: the supervised methods, the semi-supervised methods, and the unsupervised methods.

These three modes of working with *QTA* differ from the others in the quantity of human influence in the data treatment. First, the supervised method refers to the commonly named “hand-coding”, but then predicts un-coded data. Although there have been historical opinion against humans as an objective subject to analyze political documents, it helps to understand some sentences that are difficult to categorize for computational-based methods. The Comparative Manifesto Project (Klingemann, Volkens, Bara, Budge, & Macdonald, 2006; Lehmann, et al., 2022) made a relevant advance in the comparative research of party manifestos, creating different political issues and positioning them in categories. In this case, the quasi-sentences are coded under the issues scheme and then controlled by the number of quasi-sentences that the political manifesto has. Finally, we get the percentage of total references, which are the quasisentences, referring to an issue in the party manifesto. Also, the Comparative Agenda Project allows scholars to investigate trends in policy-making, including debates, speeches, and bills, among others. Following the same structure as *CMP* it follows a structured coding scheme to examine between countries and across time. In this case, the researcher decides whether the sentences support one topic or another. After that, it is possible to analyze the political documents in terms of issue saliency and prevalence.

The computer-based methods extract the human intervention trying to minimize human error. In second, there are semi-supervised methods. Then, the textual documents are treated by the researcher at the same time, and it will use a non-supervised method to analyze the outputs (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003). This common approach made an advance using other texts as references rather than human-coded dictionaries. The researcher selects documents as references to scale other documents named “virgin” texts. Following this structure, the reference texts are identified and have a value assigned by the researcher, usually extracted from previously known positions from expert surveys (Castles & Mair, 1984; Benoit & Laver, 2006). Then, it compares the number of times each word appears in the reference texts and analyzes the virgin texts in reference to the word coincidence. The documents or text are positioned in a one-dimensional continuum with reference texts. Nonetheless, there are diverse issues with this technique, called *Wordscores*, that will be examined later. There are other scaling methods to solve the problem of different languages using a semi-supervised technique developed by Watanabe (2021) available for placing documents on different dimensions.

In third, there are unsupervised methods. These types of analysis are based on the performance done entirely from the computational method without any human influence beyond document selection (Lowe, 2008; Slapin & Proksch, 2008; Lowe et al., 2011). Following the same idea as previous methods, this unsupervised scaling approach to party positions assumes that the parties show their position on relevant topics depending on the word usage in their party manifesto. By the same token, the political leaders provide their position in their speeches, the government in their bills or laws, and so on with the diverse political actors. As I am examining different scaling methods, the most used in the unsupervised category is *Wordfish* (Slapin & Proksch, 2008). *Wordfish* allows the researcher to position the political documents in a single dimension. Its dimension usually converges with the classic left-right positions because of the analysis of full party manifestos or political texts that refer to a large number of policies. Also, taking advantage of its unsupervised function, it helps to manage a large amount of documents providing a better usage of the text scaling method for time-series estimates.

In this sense, there are different types of results when using computational quantitative text analysis, from sentiment analysis (Proksch et al., 2019) to party position scaling (Laver et al., 2003; Slapin & Proksch, 2008). These studies present different findings to political texts. For example, as I analyze leaders' speeches on decentralization, these other scholars look at sentiment in the documents, positive or negative, or positioning political text on multiple policy positions. Thus, although relevant for text analysis theory, they do not fit with the major argument of this thesis.

In this case, I am focused on scaling party leaders' speeches. I use party leaders' speeches because they present their significant contributions to the following term in this type of speech. Also, I do not use other political documents, such as manifestos, press releases or bills, because the leaders' speeches give a more exact position directly from the leader. The party mostly agrees upon the other documents. As mentioned before, the different scaling methods give me solutions to analyze these political documents. I will support my methodological approach using a semi-supervised scaling method called *Wordscores* (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003) by answering the diverse criticisms received compared with other scaling methods and explaining how it performs in my research perfectly. There are four major questions about semi-supervised scaling methods and about *Wordscores* specifically:

- a. The reference text selection. As I explained before, the researcher performing *Wordscores* has to select previously known text or documents and give them a score on the scale under analysis. The selection of these documents is a primary and major characteristic of this

method. However, this reference text identification is under debate because of the difficulty of positioning them on the scale and the possible disagreement about it from diverse researchers. In this study, I solve this issue by creating the reference text myself using references to the sides of the dimension in parties' manifestos. Then, as I am studying decentralization, the extremes of the political debate are evident: centralization and decentralization. Furthermore, I created an original reference text for each side of the centralization-decentralization scale. I developed the reference text using the Comparative Manifesto Project mentions to each topic. Then, I use the best of hand-coding and human selection to create the reference text when the manifesto quasi-sentence is scored (301) as "Federalism" or (302) "Centralisation".

On the one hand, the (301) code "*federalism*" is assigned to mentions supporting federalism or decentralization of political and/or economic power. This includes references to the territorial subsidiary principle, more autonomy for the sub-national level, the importance of local and sub-national customs and symbols, and favourable mentions for sub-national places. On the other hand, the (302) called "*centralisation*" refers to all general opposition to political decision-making at lower political levels. In addition, it supports unitary government and a more centralized political and administrative process.

Finally, I built two different reference texts with a clear position in the decentralization scale using party manifesto references to the topic. I create these texts using references from the same period as the speeches, 1979-2019. At the same time, the use of these documents and the building of these reference texts help the internal validation of the analysis along with building a frame for external validation, as I use Spain and the United Kingdom as cases of study.

b. The policy dimension. This issue arises from the desire for multidimensional analysis. Although, as in this case, I am working on a single issue debate, there is no problem in terms of the necessity of diverse reference texts to position the virgin text in different dimensions. I analyze the national-sub-national discussion using a decentralization-centralization scale to place the party leaders' speeches between the two more extreme positions created from party manifesto references to the same topic. This reveals an improvement over unsupervised approaches for single-issue analysis.

c. The word weight and the scaling. I address this issue in two steps. First, the main concern about the word weight, the quantity of words, in the text analysis comes from the articles and conjunctions treatment. They do not have political content in any sense, so they could minimize the political output in the leaders' speeches' position on the scale. So, I have deleted the so-called "stop words" because of their non-political sense and their possibility to

change the results. The second part is based on scaling, the positioning of the political text on a previously determined scale. Because of these possible changes in the scaling due to the articles and conjunctions, the authors Laver, Benoit and Garry (2003) developed the variance of virgin documents to make an equivalence score with the reference text. Then, as I deal with the word issue, I use the rescaling technique used by Martin and Vanberg (2008). This new metric allows us to compare the reference and virgin text on the same scale, positioning the reference text in the appropriate place of the scale.

d. Time series, the amount of time under analysis and lexicon, the words that refer to a determined topic. These two characteristics are complementary to each other. The difficulty in examining time series with *Wordsfish* comes from the continuous change of the lexicon. As the lexicon is changing over time and the leaders and political parties change their reference to the same topic if they speak about decentralization in 1980 or 2019, it is complex to use only one reference text to analyze speeches or documents with a long period of time between them. In short, there are three main assumptions to determine a reliable use of this method in time-series analysis: first, the lexicon remains consistent over time, second, the reference texts encompass all relevant words and expressions over the time in analysis, and third, the extreme positions in the scale are represented in the reference texts.

There are scholars that solved this issue by concatenating manifestos (Budge & Pennings, 2006), using two sets of reference texts (Hug & Schulz, 2007), or assuming that their selection is the extremes during the period (McGuire & Vanberg, 2005). I dealt with this limitation when I created the two reference texts, one on decentralization and the other on centralization, using mentions to them respectively from party manifestos during the whole period of time in analysis (1979-2019). According to that, the reference texts have mentioned decentralization and centralization over the time studied, using the different references to the topic from more centralized to more decentralized and from the state-wide parties examined.

In summary, I argue that *Wordscores* scaling method is the best way to analyze the leaders' speeches' position on decentralization in this study. This is because I am able to position the speeches over the decentralization dimension, using hand-coded references to decentralization and centralization to create the reference texts as scale anchors, and I cover an extensive timeframe and the two state-wide parties that have been in government during the whole period. Other methods, such as roll-call votes, when a representative or senator votes "yea" or "nay" so that the names of members voting on each side are recorded, expert surveys, where political experts answer multiple political questions in a survey, and other scaling techniques explained

before, such as *Wordfish* among others, would not answer the full range of characteristics needed in this research.

Data

I follow the most similar system research design. The countries examined in the study provide an outstanding comparison between the cases, the United Kingdom and Spain, which are similar in terms of having high sub-national identity territories alongside ethno-regionalist parties, among other characteristics such as parliamentary systems and two main state-wide parties. Nonetheless, I study leaders' speeches on decentralization, and each leader-year speech is different, the speeches are held in different scenarios, and the independence referendum arrives at a different level of agreement in each country. Thus, this is relevant in the further analysis of this research for increasing the internal and external validity of the study.

The main data used as the dependent variable in this study are the leaders' speeches. Although nowadays it is possible to find speech databases such as ParlSpeech (Rauh & Schwalbach, 2020) or ParlEE (Sylvester, Greene, & Ebing, 2022), among others I collect the leaders' speeches individually. I could not use others' work because of the specifics of the speeches, parliamentary and party conference speeches, and the time-lapse. Furthermore, the speeches are publically shown on institutional websites including the United Kingdom government and the Congreso de los Diputados. I focus on three types of speeches in this research, apart from the reference texts explained before: first, the Queen's speeches in the United Kingdom, in second, the Spanish investiture speeches, and third, the party conference speeches for both countries.

I select the Queen's and the investiture speeches because of one crucial reason: there is the first speech done or written by the head of the government after winning the elections and where they expose the main political and policy positions to achieve during the next term (Jennings, Bevan, & John, 2011). Although there are differences between the Queen's speeches and the investiture speeches, they both share characteristics in terms of speech composition and having the parliament, House of Commons or Congreso de los Diputados, as the scenario. As an example, the Queen's speeches in 2019 said: *"The integrity and prosperity of the union that binds the four nations of the United Kingdom is of the utmost importance to my Government"*. At the same time, in the 2019 Spanish investiture the PSOE leader Pedro Sánchez in his speech said: *"En el 75 éramos un país completamente centralista, sin autonomías, sin respeto a las lenguas vasca, gallega y catalana y hoy somos el*

Segundo país más descentralizado del mundo”. These are just two examples showing how important decentralization and ethno-regionalism are in the United Kingdom and Spain and how the topic appears in the leaders’ speeches. This holds relevance because it shows the saliency of the topic and enables the possibility to analyze leaders’ speeches on decentralization.

I also add party conference speeches to the analysis. These speeches allow me to compare how the leaders’ speeches change when they speak in the Parliament, in front of the other MPs and, being more specific, in front of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, and when they give the speech supported by their party members, affiliates, and people in accordance with their policy positions (Ceron A. , 2015; Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019; Schumacher G. H., 2019). In this case, party conference speeches are not in the public domain if the political parties do not make them public themselves. In this sense, the United Kingdom has the British Political Speech (British Political Speech) where there are collected most of the speeches. Apart from that, I compiled the party conference speeches from the state-wide parties’ webpages, institutions close to them, and news transcriptions if needed.

For example, Cameron, in the Conservative party conference at Birmingham in 2010, said that “when I say I am prime minister of the United Kingdom, I really mean it. England, Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland – we’re weaker apart, stronger together, so together is the way we must always stay”. There is a clear implication of the pro-centralization position when speaking about being “together”. In the same way, Blair in 2005 refers to devolution in his speech, saying, “we’ve given the people of Scotland and Wales the devolution referendums we promised, and they have voted: yes, yes, and yes again”. These are examples of how leaders speak about the issue of decentralization in party conferences.

Also, although there are no political documents from parties or leaders, I built the reference texts from policy mentions in parties’ manifestos. The decentralization and centralization reference texts are composed of *CMP* references to *federalism* (per301) and *centralisation* (per302). To hold the usage of these mentions to develop the reference texts, I show diverse quasisentences examples from state-wide parties across time: on the centralization side, “*En ese modelo no tiene cabida un referéndum de autodeterminación, que el Tribunal Constitucional (TC) ha considerado contrario a la Constitución y que, desde una perspectiva política, provoca la quiebra de la sociedad*” (PSOE, 2019), “*Nuestro siglo exige un proyecto compartido entorno a una nación unida y cohesionada*” (PP, 2008), “*A strong and stable Union, with no divisive Scottish referendum at this time*” (Conservatives, 2017), and “*Scotland needs the transformative investment coming from a Labour government, not another referendum and not independence*” (Labour, 2019). On the side of decentralization references, the reference text

is formed by party manifesto mentions such as “*Devolution has strengthened the UK*” (Labour, 2001), “*honour in full our commitments to Scotland to devolve extensive new powers*” (Conservatives, 2015), “*reconocerá las singularidades de las Isla Baleares, Canarias y Melilla*” (PP, 1996), and “*pleno respeto a los principios constitucionales de autonomía*” (PSOE, 2008). These types of references help to predict positions in speeches because they use similar language between domains, manifestos and speeches. This is called domain transfer by Natural Language Processing (NLP) (Ruder, Peters, Swayamdipta, & Wolf, 2019).

The leaders’ speeches constitute the main dependent variable in this research. I construct the dataset with the different investiture and Queen’s speeches and the party conference speeches. The analysis timeframe is similar in the United Kingdom and Spain, despite the election years are not exactly the same. I selected the investiture and Queen’s speeches after every election between 1982 and 2020 in Spain and during the period 1979-2019 in the United Kingdom. In the United Kingdom, elections are held around each five years, and the Queen’s speeches follow this rule. In the Spanish case, I find some differences. Despite the fact that elections are every four years, there are exceptions with early call elections or investiture process failures. The sentences overall from the parliamentary speeches are up to 5,811. Also, the number of unique words comes to 39,799 words. This data supports the idea of using a text analysis approach rather than the hand-coding scheme. The investiture and Queen’s speeches are as follow:

Table 1. Parliamentary speeches by leader

Spain		United Kingdom	
Felipe González	1982, 1986, 1989, 1993	M. Thatcher	1979, 1983, 1987
J. M. Aznar	1996, 2000	J. Major	1992
J. R. Zapatero	2004, 2008	T. Blair	1997, 2001, 2005
M. Rajoy	2011, 2016, 2016	D. Cameron	2010, 2015
Pedro Sánchez	2016, 2019, 2020	T. May	2017
		B. Johnson	2019


In the first empirical analysis, I use this dataset of speeches to position the leaders on decentralization. Then, I examine the intra-party and inter-party influence on the leaders’ positions. On the one hand, to analyze intra-party relevance, I compile the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, like Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, and Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia in Spain, from the party in

government, Conservatives or Labour in the United Kingdom, and People’s Party or Spanish Socialist and Worker’s Party in Spain. On the other hand, the inter-party relation is studied using the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties, such as SNP, Plaid Cymru, and Sinn Féin in the United Kingdom, and CiU, ERC, CUP, PNV, EH Bildu, and BNG in Spain.

As the ethno-regionalist seats in each Country build the main hypothesis, I show in Figure 1 and Figure 2 the distribution of ethno-regionalist seats. It helps to understand the differences in the distribution and the diverse electoral success of this type of party when the party in government changes between the principal two state-wide parties.


Ethno-regionalist seats by-election

Figure 1. Ethno-regionalist seats by party and year. The Spanish case.



On the one hand, this figure (Fig. 1) illustrates how the ethno-regionalist parties have distributed their seats over the election years in Spain. The main expects to find differences in the decentralization-centralization scale and the number of MPs. This is the principal problem in the Spanish case. The current situation is allowed to explain why this is happening. The last two General Elections present an increase in ethno-regionalist seats. Nevertheless, previous elections have lower differences between the number of seats won by the ethno-regionalist parties.

Figure 2. Ethno-regionalist seats by party and year. The UK case.



On the other hand, I examine a general context about ethno-regionalist seats over the time that involves this research in the United Kingdom and which party was in government.

This gives relevant information about how the electorate responds to various governments and the possibilities of understanding between different parties. In the UK case, where the Conservatives hold the majority of the governments, there was a certain degree of stability in the number of ethno-regionalist MPs. It should be noted that it was higher during the Labour governments. However, under a renewed and exponential debate about the degree of devolution and independence, the last three elections created an entirely different context, with the Conservatives being the party in government.

Apart from these two main independent variables, I add control variables to account for alternative arguments in the analysis. The control variables are the mean turnout in high sub-national identity territories, the party ideology, the existence of minority or majority government, and the polarization. All these variables are deeply explained in the subsequent empirical section.

The second empirical analysis is focused on parliamentary speeches, as well as party conference speeches. The use of different types of text, and the analysis of speeches done in front of different audiences, moves the analysis close to political communication. I think the diverse scenarios where the speeches are done influence the leaders' positions on

decentralization. As I have the investiture and Queen’s speeches as Parliament speeches, I look to compare them with speeches in another stage. In this case, the sentences overall from the party conference speeches are up to 7,117. Moreover, the number of unique words in the case of party conferences amounts to 35,487 words. Then, I collect the following party conference speeches:

Table 2. Party conference speeches by leader

Spain		United Kingdom	
Felipe González	1984, 1988, 1990, 1993	M. Thatcher	1979, 1983, 1987
J. M. Aznar	1999, 2002	J. Major	1992
J. R. Zapatero	2004, 2008	T. Blair	1997, 2001, 2005
M. Rajoy	2012, 2017	D. Cameron	2010, 2015
		T. May	2017
		B. Johnson	2019

The party conference speeches have different public exposure in each country. For example, the United Kingdom has an organized party conference season. All political parties, every year, have a week where the party analyzes its strategies, debates its documents, and proposes the party line for the next political year (Pettitt, 2012). Also, it is used to support or open the discussion on the party leader, usually. In that sense, Spain behaves in an arbitrary order, completely. Although the parties try to seek to do the party conference after the elections, there is no annual season. Most of the Spanish parties, in this case, I study the two main state-wide parties, PP and PSOE, accomplish their party conference in two ways: in order to support a newly elected leader and to determine the party line, and when a leader is under debate and the party conference helps to give support or raise a new leader option. Other than that, party conferences are developed internally. This characteristic is what makes interesting and relevant the comparison between investiture and Queen’s speeches and party conferences speeches. I expect differences when the leaders speak about decentralization in the parliament and the party conferences because of the audience in each scenario.

In this part, it gains importance on the effect of data limitation. Although the political parties have increased their public presence, the available data to collect from party conferences has been an obstacle in this research. As in party conferences there are debates and internal disagreements (Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019), and parties try to maintain their traditional public reputation as unitary actors (Sieberer, 2006).

The main part is to analyze how leaders' speeches on decentralization change when they speak in front of the parliament or at the party conference. In the first case, there are MPs from high sub-national identity territories who would need their support for the investiture, passing bills, and law-making, among other legislative agreements. In the second case, when leaders' speeches on decentralization are held in party conferences, they have the support of the party members, there is an ideological concordance despite minor disagreements, and the publicity of the event is not at the same level. So, I employ the audience, being in parliament or at the party conference, as a main independent variable. Also, based on the previous literature, I consider relevant the country of origin, the United Kingdom or Spain, and the party family, the left-wing or right-wing party, as factors to determine the leaders' speeches change on decentralization.

In the third empirical chapter, I run an analysis more focused on a current discussion in countries with high sub-national identity territories, such as Spain and the United Kingdom, and the independence referendum. I argue that executing an independence referendum influences the leaders' speeches' position on decentralization. The development of an independence referendum is a major topic under debate in multilevel countries. Although I examine the cases of Spain and the United Kingdom, there are other territories historically claiming their "*right to decide*", such as Quebec (1980, 1995) in Canada, Corsica in France, Flanders in Belgium, Bavaria in Germany, and even the South Tyrol in Italy (Henley, Sheehy, Swann, & Fenn, 2017).

First of all, the dependent variable remains the same. I use the combination of leaders' speeches positions on decentralization, including investiture and Queen's speeches, and party conference speeches. Then, I selected a range of independent variables to draw conclusions on the influence of independence referendums in leaders' speeches' position on decentralization. The main independent variable is the referendum itself. The referendum is a dummy variable where the leader's speech would be positioned before (0) or after (1) the referendum. After that, I add variables such as party family, the country of origin, and the audience. I expect these variables have a significant relevance to the leaders' speeches' changes on the topic of decentralization.

In this chapter, I have presented the primary data and methods to develop the thesis, along with its difficulties and controversies. Nonetheless, I address the diverse questions around the issue and case selection. The main argument is still to understand how leaders manage internal and external shocks, such as the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, the audience, and the independence referendum in their positioning on decentralization. After addressing the different topics, in the next chapter, I will examine the first

empirical chapter of this dissertation, focused on the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories.

Chapter 4: Party leaders beyond left-right ideology: How the decentralization dimension affects party leaders' positions in countries with multilevel institutions

Introduction

Diverse preferences for national and sub-national powers across countries challenge political parties' ability to govern. In addition, the intra-party debate in state-wide parties in high sub-national identity territories is more relevant when the topic of decentralization is salient. The sub-national party branches have to coexist with ethno-regionalist parties, and also with the restrictions from the national branch. Intra-party behaviour is still being investigated as a subfield of political parties' organization because of its influence on partisanship and voters' preferences (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Houten, 2009; Müller, 2013; Greene & Haber, 2016; Wolkenstein, 2018). This internal relationship could be vertical, from elites to members, or horizontal, between members. However, these scholars have yet to fully consider the pathways through which distinct sub-national preferences impact the party leaders' position take on sub-national powers reforms. The aim of this study is, using the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, to understand how the territorial issue affects national party leaders' speeches positions on decentralization. It is relevant because of the topic saliency in countries as the focus of research, the United Kingdom and Spain, due to their multilevel system and the relevance of high sub-national identity territories. The question to confront is how does the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories affect parliamentary speeches over decentralization?

Despite actual societal disaffection with political parties (Linz J. , 2002), politicians included, political parties are still the central institutional organization and mechanism through which the citizens' goals and demands can be translated into *realpolitik*. Political parties' disaffection and distance from voters, in terms of not addressing their preferences, are one of the consequences of new issues' appearance on the agenda. The parties introduce new issues as entrepreneurs (Carmines & Stimson, 1989) and call it entrepreneurship (Hobolt & De Vries, 2010). Citizens and political parties are changing, adding new issues to the agenda, so their claims are changing, too, and asking for different solutions to address their problems. Citizens' goals are remaining in their objectives, but they are adding new issues to the discussion. Although debates about healthcare, education, unemployment, and pensions are still the main issues, how the country relates to its population and how state power is distributed between territories are increasingly important. The territorial issue is a contentious topic for citizens and politicians.

Building on past insights related to intra-party politics and territorial reform, I propose that diverse intra-party preferences over sub-national powers challenge parties' ability to function as unitary actors. The state-wide parties have preferences to perform unified over the national territory. Nonetheless, there are existing high sub-national identity territories where the differences between the national party and the party branch from these territories arise. Political preferences on decentralization or devolution are not the same when the MPs represent a determined territory with specific singularities. In this paper, I argue that there is a link between the national party leaders' speeches positions on decentralization or devolution processes and the number of government's party MPs from high sub-national identity territories and the number of ethno-regionalist MPs representing these territories in the national legislatures. The reason behind this assumption is that in both cases, the national party leader needs support from other MPs to come into the office due to the parliamentary process to get the investiture or law approval. In the first case, they need the support from the sub-national MPs from their party, even if they have different positions on decentralization. In the second case, the MPs from ethno-regionalist parties with representation in the national parliament can be determinant in the negotiation process.

How these differences influence the left-right position has been studied, but much uncertainty still exists about the relationship between sub-national MPs and national parties over devolution or decentralization processes. Authors have to deal with the data collection as the main inconvenience when they are conducting a study on intra-party disagreements. Political parties try to maintain secrecy about their internal controversies (Polk & Kölln, 2017). There are inter-party and intra-party discussions in this research. When I refer to how the number of high sub-national identity ethno-regionalist MPs affects national party leader speech, I define the inter-party influence because there are MPs from different political parties. However, I also examine about the impact of the government party MPs from high sub-national identity territories and how this conditions national party leader speech as an intra-party analysis.

To analyze the parliamentary speeches, I use a quantitative text analysis method called Wordscores (Laver et al., 2003). Through this method, it is possible to measure the difference between national party leader speeches in investiture processes over one dimension. Previous studies have used this method (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Müller, 2013) to measure the distance between intra-party groups, although they have been based on the left-right scale. In this research, I use anchoring documents targeted at decentralization issues to evaluate whether the number of high sub-national identity MPs predicts the positions that the party leaders take on decentralization. Also, I create a new dataset on investiture speeches for the Spanish case and

Queen Speeches for the United Kingdom case. These speeches are from 1979 to 2020 after General Elections. Furthermore, I use a novel approach for analyzing these speeches over the territorial dimension

The theory and evidence in this chapter provide implications for theories of intra-party decisions and how MPs from high sub-national identity territories impact leaders' positions. The findings support a certain degree of influence from the high sub-national identity territories MPs in the party leaders' speeches on decentralization, which link with the main argument of this research. As the MPs influence party leaders' speeches on decentralization, further analysis would be focused on the influence on other issues, such as gender or environment, among others.

After this introduction, I present literature on the relationship between how intra-party and inter-party relationships are over decentralization. Also, I examine previous literature about decentralization, territorialism, and new issues. Next, the section on methodology describes the quantitative text analysis approach and its characteristics and similarities and differences with previous research. Finally, the results and the discussion address the influence of MPs from high-identity territories over decentralization.

Intra-party structures and decentralization relationship

In this section, I address the question of intra-party along with the issue of decentralization. After reviewing the literature on intra-party politics, such as disagreements or unity, I stated that there is a special relationship between the national party and the sub-national party branches. Thus, in this chapter, I argue that the MPs from the party in government from high sub-national identity territories do influence the party leaders' speeches on decentralization being in a more decentralized position.

Most of the studies about intra-party differences base their focus on left-right position (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Ceron, 2012; Greene & Haber, 2014; Kölln & Polk, 2017) or internal processes disagreements (Debus & Navarrete, 2018; Wolkenstein, 2018). Also, all contributions are single-country or single-party studies (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Ceron A., 2012).

In the field of political parties, the term "cohesion" shows an important picture of political parties. As McGann (2002) states, this party unity in voters' eyes may improve electoral

success. Despite this, there have been open new lines of internal research changes in political parties. For example, the developed strategies for data compilation like roll calls (Bowler et al., 1999; Sieberer, 2006), national congress speeches analysis (Greene & Haber, 2016), surveyed party members (Kölln & Polk, 2017), or using a new source of information as social media content (Ceron, 2017).

Authors analyze internal differences as ideological disagreements. This research's main idea is to see how these internal and external disagreements happen in another political behaviour cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967): the territorial issue. This represents the conflict between the national and sub-national territories with ethnic, linguistic or religious groups' characteristics.

Nonetheless, there are various works based on intra-party relationships. Authors, as I do in this article, are finding different ways to analyze internal deviations. Kolln and Polk (2017) used survey data from party members in Sweden, and they were looking for disagreement between party members and party leadership. Somer-Topcu (2017) analyzes intra-party politics from party leader selection and how this can affect voter perceptions. Before that, Greene and Haber (2016) examined intra-party politics in pre-electoral coalitions using a new database of party congress speeches (Germany and France). These studies give more importance to the field and demonstrate how important is the study of intra-party politics and how to party disagreement is frequent in political parties. Beyond that, it is essential to know that it is possible to find different terminology for the same finish: an internal disagreement or intra-party differences under a specific issue. Koll and Polk (2017) have compiled such different terms as "intra-party heterogeneity" (Greene & Haber, 2016), "cohesion" (Bowler et al., 1999), "unity" (Panebianco, 1988), "ideological misfit" (van Haute & Carty, 2012) or "internal division" (van de Wardt et al., 2014).

Political parties are divided horizontally and vertically, meaning that various parties' branches impact party position-taking and decision-making. This internal division, in several ways, transfers a different amount of power from the national party to the sub-national party depending on their level of inclusiveness or exclusiveness (Rahat & Hazan, 2001). Political parties can be involved in problems when they have to decide which party level has the power. It is possible to see this when parties with support are geographically distributed because political parties are not sufficiently worried about local issues if they have differences between sub-national branches and national politics. Sub-national party branches argue to the national party that if they are not focused on their sub-national constituency, they will lose votes. Nevertheless,

national interest is always more substantial for the party than sub-national ones. Thus, sub-national politicians need to build critical local bases of support and avoid confrontation with the national party (Heller, 2002).

I argue that to develop an effective electoral strategy, national parties' leadership seeks to maintain control over sub-national policy positions. Also, they try to influence them to move closer towards the national party's positions, primarily in countries with a high level of territorialism, with the idea of winning the majority of votes possible. Alternatively, they look to minimize the deviation between the sub-national and national positions as much as possible. Sub-national political parties have much power in multilevel countries, such as in the sub-national candidate selection (Bille, 2001), mainly because they can provide significant opportunities to win control of the national party leader. Nonetheless, there are always differences between countries (Lundell, 2004). It is difficult to ignore the link between sub-national party branches and the candidates. The national leader depends on winning votes in these territories, and the sub-national party depends on the national party in terms of finance, media coverage and administratively (Debus & Navarrete, 2018).

Nevertheless, the goals of sub-national and local branches differ from the national party. The relationship between national political parties and their sub-national party branches or sub-national parties has not been historically easy because they limit the position to each other (Roller & Van Houten, 2003). Still, in most cases, they know the importance of the other one, and they try to take advantage of them. Political parties have to have the ability to arrange new issues such as devolution, decentralization, and multilevel governance, even changes in the internal relationship between and within parties.

The linkage between parties and electoral arenas becomes complicated ideologically. Sometimes and depending on the issue, the national and sub-national or party branches have more significant differences between them. For example, sub-national party leaders must hold a similar position as national party leaders because of the more critical role of national party leaders, facing General Elections, than the sub-national branch (Roller & Van Houten, 2003). It does not mean they have to state the same position, but even supporting different arguments, the party branch leader knows the relevance of a General Election winning or defeat for their sub-national election. This tension can produce estrangement between leaders, political parties, and voters who probably could vote for them. This type of internal conflict happens regularly. In the words of Roller and Van Houten (2003, p. 5), "in federal or strongly regionalized systems, the regional level plays, by definition, a larger political role and will feature more prominently in

party considerations and strategies". Also, distinct cultural, social, or economic characteristics are important where party branches support their positions. Following important political actors involved in this process, we cannot forget that the presence, most of the time with the significant force of territorialist or secessionist parties, used to cause national parties concern, and they have to pay more attention than in other territories (Keating, 1998).

Political parties try to address how to handle their internal disagreements in highly identity territories. The relationship between members of the Parliament at different levels has increased intra-party pressure. Baker (2004) supports the existence of new multilevel politics and how political parties' structures change to a sort of confederalized party, political parties where the sub-national branches make their decisions. Political parties have changed under this process because of these internal relationships between members, which has provoked the tire of centralized party organisations. Also, the parties' position over devolution or decentralisation could split the party into factions. This is the example of the Labour party when, in 1974, part of the party recognized the Scottish people's desire to make their decisions in their affairs and the necessity of an Assembly with defined and relevant powers. There are mechanisms to appear unified such as promoting a separate manifesto for these territories, while your argument about country unity is still strong. (Keating & Bleiman, 1979).

Looking at the intra-party level, I analyze the influence of the party in government MPs in sub-national territories with high sub-national identity levels over the national leader's speeches about decentralization. As I use parliamentary speeches, there are different studies on legislative behaviour. There are studies based on the first legislative analysis and structures (Gamm & Shepsle, 1989; Cox & McCubbins, 1994), legislative procedures (Huber, 1992), the vote of confidence (Huber, 1996), and the agenda-setting in the legislatures (Döring, 2001).

The leaders respond to the number of sub-national MPs from their party because they need support in the form of investiture votes or legislative debates and voting. The elections are before the investiture and Queen's speeches. In this sense, national party leaders will mention the relevant issues for the next term in this speech. As a consequence, I state that the number of MPs is what influences the speech position over decentralization. I test the following hypothesis:

H1: The higher the number of MPs from the party in government with high levels of sub-national identity, the more decentralized the position the national leader takes over decentralization.

Decentralization and territorialism issues

This section examines the centralization-decentralization issue at the centre of the discussion. As I previously discussed, there are differences between the national and sub-national or territorial, used equally in this article, party branches or parties. Nevertheless, they need each other for their electoral success.

The sub-national parties' appearance mainly focuses on territories where people feel that they have to be treated differently from the rest of the country. If these territories have a large number of potential voters, national parties have to be careful and try to respect sub-national demands. At the same time, politicians have to respond to citizens, and more specifically voters, preferences. The appearance of differences within countries has followed social changes in some European countries (Fabre & Swenden, 2013). In some cases, these emergent differences have developed contemporary nationalism because of the previous culture's oppression. Different cultures, languages, or sub-national's symbols create a sub-national identity that can be followed by the desire for 'home rule'. Although it is usually confusing, nationalism competes with other powerful territorial positions such as unionism and devolution (Fabre & Swenden, 2013; Keating & McEwen, 2017).

Although historically, the concept 'periphery' refers to dependent territories or under a specific misleading position, this is not as the concept is studied nowadays. Scholars use the term 'periphery' to refer to territories with distinction within the State. This term refers to territories where there are cultural characteristics, different languages or where there is a distinct sense of belonging within their country (Gilbert, 1988; Paasi, 2004; Alonso et al., 2013). Those ideas come from increasing decentralization or devolution in their areas, respecting and encouraging their traditions to speak their language, self-government, and autonomy (Rokkan & Urwin, 1983).

A historical overview of the European devolution or decentralization process emphasizes Spain and the United Kingdom. Although the devolution supporters' existence was before this date, these processes took place in the 1970s. These are processes with diverse backgrounds and different party structures but the same political issue. The relevance of Catalonia and Scotland, in this case, comes from how they distribute power within the country. Nobody can doubt the cultural difference between these territories and other parts of the country. The assumption that resumes this process is "not every country has become regionalised, but where we see reform over time, it is in the direction of greater, not less, regional authority" (Marks et al., 2008, p. 167). This has created several difficulties for political parties in terms of treatment and the law's interpretation.

In some cases, the decentralization preferences in determined territories are not addressed only with devolved policies. These high sub-national identity territories present specific characteristics in terms of linguistics, culture, and traditions. When the citizens' preferences for decentralization are not enough, the idea of an independence referendum appears. In that sense, two events focus on the highest point of this discussion over different state levels of power distribution, the 2014 September 18th, where Scotland had a state-wide party accepted referendum asking, "Should Scotland be an independent country?" In Spain, the 2017 October 1st, an unaccepted referendum in Catalonia, states, "¿Quiere que Cataluña sea un Estado Independiente en forma de República?" ("Do you want that Catalonia will be an independent State as a Republic?"). These moments with their similarities and differences, start the current political parties' position in the United Kingdom and Spain.

The Spanish case represents the idea of the "indissoluble unity of the Spanish nation" but, at the same time, "recognizes and guarantees the right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions integrated into it" (Spanish Constitution, 1978). In the United Kingdom case, Keating and Bleiman (1979) exhibit the idea that there is a fundamental necessity to support that decisions affecting Scotland have to be taken in Scotland. However, as in the Spanish example, this has to be developed within the political and economic context unity of the United Kingdom. Also, this discussion involves various degrees of devolution or decentralization over territories. Pro-devolution supporters could utilize this to maintain their difference with other territories with less sub-national identity.

Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain derive cultural separatism from the oppression suffered under the dictatorship. During these years, the suppression of autonomous political institutions, the prohibition of sub-national symbols, sub-national flags and anthems, and the complete persecution of Catalan and Euskera languages build this feeling of difference with other territories within the same territory. Also, Galician people suffered these restrictions, although they have been less politically decisive historically. This is observable in the United Kingdom with the different devolution levels over Scotland and Wales and how the national identity is increasing in these territories (Guibernau, 2000). Authors such as Agnew (2018) support the same idea in the Scottish case. He exposes the existence of Scottish national identity and a "distinctive political community" out of the United Kingdom even though this identity is their own religious, educational, and legal institutions, including national teams in relevant sports competitions (Keating & McEwen, 2017).

I refer to ‘high sub-national identity territories’ as Catalonia, Basque Country, and Galicia from Spain, and Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom. I select these territories because they have relevant ethno-regionalist parties in the sub-national legislature and have this representation in the national parliaments. I refer to “ethno-regionalist” parties as parties that establish the State's reorganization as the central issue in their ideology. The cleavage centre-periphery (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) is not only another policy in the manifesto; it is the “framework of demands” (De Winter, 1998; Dandoy, 2010).

Concerning decentralization, authors such as Gibernau (2010) ask how this affects central governments. The process of devolution, whenever they occur, has been an essential part of the development of sub-national identities under various cultural and artistic expositions. The closer access to these activities and open decision-making processes at sub-national levels contribute to the idea of political decentralization as an element to increase democracy. However, inside this process, there is not only a closer decision-making process. The necessity to expect the power and capacity to implement solutions at this level require facilities in terms of executive, legislative, and budget or economic distribution.

Apart from the cultural characteristics mentioned before, some people sustain decentralization and devolution for economic reasons. The capacity of a decision at devolution and decentralized level in public services such as education, healthcare, culture, housing, transport, or agriculture give an essential role in sub-national territories. Also, the recent Brexit referendum applies in these economic terms. Usually, sub-national parties hold positions that are complementary to the other party level. The national party develops strategies for the sub-national party to maximize its electoral results (Roller & Van Houten, 2003).

I summarize this logic in the national leader’s necessity for support from MPs to get invested or pass legislative initiatives. These MPs from ethno-regionalist parties represent a relevant interlocutor from high sub-national identity territories, and both can offer benefits to the other. The ethno-regionalist MPs benefit by being able to introduce some of their policies, and the national leader gets the votes in the legislature. My second hypothesis states:

H2: The higher the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties from territories with high levels of sub-national identity, the more decentralized the position the national leader takes over decentralization.

In this section, I addressed the literature relevant to intra-party politics and the issue of decentralization. Also, I demonstrate the importance of party branches, as well as ethno-

regionalist parties, in national leaders' legislative negotiations. Then, because of this influence, I stated the two hypotheses, one focused on the number of MPs from the party in government in the high sub-national identity territories, and the second on the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties from each territory. After that, in the next chapter, I present the case selection together with the national leaders' speeches selection in each country. Finally, I also show the method by which I analyze the diverse parliamentary speeches.

Data and methods

The main argument of this chapter analyzes the number of MPs' influence on national leaders' speeches on decentralization. The two groups of MPs are: on the one hand, the number of MPs from the party in government sub-national branches. On the other hand, the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in the national legislature. Thus, I select national leaders' speeches in the parliamentary sphere. In this section, I test the hypotheses using data on party leaders' positions based on their speeches. I focus on Spain and the United Kingdom cases as they present a common situation over decentralization, as Lijphart (1975, p. 159) stated "cases that are similar in a large number of important characteristics" that supports the test of this theory. For example, the current institutions' relationship between the national government and the territories with high sub-national identity and the referendum curriculum reveal how these territories are linked. Furthermore, speeches presented in their parliaments are reasonable for testing the theory as they show what policies and laws the national leaders intend to introduce. Therefore, I focus my research on the national party leaders' speeches from Spain and the United Kingdom between 1979 and 2020 in the Congreso de los Diputados and House of Commons, respectively.

I operationalize the dependent variable, party leaders' positions on decentralization, using first national leaders' speeches in parliament. I use these speeches because they are the first speech that they deliver after winning the elections. Despite winning the elections, the national leader needs other MP's support to pass the bills, approve new legislation, and get parliamentary confidence. Therefore, I take the investiture speeches from political parties' webpage (Congreso de los Diputados). In the United Kingdom case, I use the Queen's Speech that represents the former cabinet and Prime Minister following action (United Kingdom Government). In the Spanish case, I used state-wide party leader speeches from the parliamentary confidence session because, in this speech, the national leader has to present his policies in order to convince other

MPs. Simultaneously, as this procedure does not exist in the United Kingdom and the election winner is generally the head of government, I choose the Queen's Speech, the first speech after the election, where the government informs through the speech about their central policies in the legislature through this speech.

Speeches have been selected from 1979 to 2020 in both cases. In the same way, there are speeches from the two major state-wide political parties in both countries, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, PSOE in their Spanish acronym, and People's Party, PP in the Spanish case, and Conservative Party and Labour Party in the United Kingdom. These speeches explain the national leader and their cabinet position across dimensions. In the Spanish case, the direct audience is other MPs because they are who give confidence to the Prime Minister (called "President" in Spain). The Queen's Speech does not look for support directly. However, it also points to the primary position (the legislation to be introduced to Parliament as the key politics) to adopt across topics during the following term in office. Also, seat information comes from institutional websites because of seat changes across territories over this period.

I analyze the data, the investiture and Queen's speeches using a quantitative text analysis approach. I use the Wordscores method (Laver et al., 2003) to extract policy positions over decentralization. This method, which is run in an R package called *quanteda* (Benoit, 2018), uses the relative frequency of words used in each speech to estimate document positions. This frequency of words comes from two different sets of documents called reference and virgin texts. These reference texts have to be 'previously known' policy positions well defined a priori in the policy dimension. The reference texts are used to estimate word weights or scores based on their relative usage, which are then applied to the 'virgin' text. After that, Wordscores estimate the virgin text position based on the reference text.

Although there are different positions on the importance of words in political messages, political parties choose specific terms to send ideological indications. These indications have the mission to mobilize and influence their supporters and their target audience. Following this idea, the relative word frequency shows a programmatic position over various issues (Brunner & Debus, 2008).

Some scholars assume that computer analysis is unable to understand the meaning of sentences/texts (Alonso et al., 2013). In this case, Alonso et al. (2013) prefer to use manual content analysis. Here, I use hand-coded manifestos from the Manifesto Project database (Klingemann et al., 2006) as 'reference' documents for the Wordscores method. An important issue is to have good reference text to ensure internal validity. Therefore, I select certain parts

from the manifestos to focus on the reference text to identify a specific dimension. This dimension may not be the most salient if I use the whole document as the reference.

Based on the position of these texts, the computer assisted content analysis finds the relation between virgin texts, national leaders' speeches, and the reference text, manifestos. In this way, I am placing the speeches on a scale where their own political parties' manifestos are positioned. The method of using one type of coding to code another document is a *domain transfer* from which limitations in terms of time-lapse and the number of words were addressed before. I can use some ex-ante position estimates from CMP and Wordscores, which are more beneficial than other content analysis methods (Hjorth et al., 2015). Reliability and validity are the two main methodological issues of manual and computerized techniques (Krippendorff, 2004).

There is not a pre-existent scale of measurement centre-periphery cleavage. Previous works in text analysis have shown how to measure the left-right dimension over different methods (Laver & Garry, 2000; Laver et al., 2003; Klingemann et al., 2006; Slapin & Proksch, 2008). Beyond these studies about how to measure various policy positions, there are essential contributions in the field of intra-party politics using party members surveys (Kölln & Polk, 2017), roll call votes, different types of speeches, to computational scaling methods (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Ceron, 2012; Greene & Haber, 2015). The method works by finding the different speeches and scaling (in this case, positioning the speeches on a predefined scale) the documents (Martin & Vanberg, 2008; Benoit & Laver, 2008). The data is cleaned from punctuation, numbers and different words that do not reveal ideological content (Slapin & Proksch, 2008).

The centre-periphery scale categorization or conceptualization has been complex in previous research. For that reason, concepts such as 'centralization/decentralization' or 'nationalism' are used for the same purpose (Swenden & Maddens, 2009). These conceptualization difficulties note how hard it is to work with this 'territorial issue'. This implies the necessity to identify suitable reference texts that, according to Slapin & Proksch (2008), have to "include all relevant words over time". I solve this challenge by connecting all manifestos over the entire period to produce a long reference text (Budge & Pennings, 2006). Reference texts are composed of parts of political parties' manifestos, from the Comparative Manifesto Project, where they talk about federalization (issue 301) and centralization (302). I follow the requirements of removing stop words, punctuation, and numbers.

Following the preliminary Wordscores analysis, I use the political speeches' coefficients over the estimated decentralization-centralization cleavage as the dependent variable (DV). I create four models with a different set of independent variables (IV) to analyze the hypotheses. The principal independent variable (IV) to complete the analysis in Model 1 is the percentage of MPs in sub-national territories from the party in government. In addition to the main variable, I use control variables in Model 2 to give more consistency to the analysis. The control variables refer to different aspects that could influence the main variable. These variables are the mean turnout in the territories in each election, the party ideology following theories on left-right influence on decentralization (Toubeau & Wagner, 2016) from public opinion surveys, the existence of minority government (where 0=minority government and 1=majority government), and the polarization (measured from differences between state-wide party speech position in CMP federalism issue and ethno-regionalist parties position from 0 to 100). It is essential that there are changes in the number of seats won in each election and the number of seats to distribute in each region.

Furthermore, I select voters' perceptions of parties' ideologies information from public opinion surveys. I collect this data for the Spanish case from the Sociological Research Centre¹ during the same General Election year. The United Kingdom data comes from the British Election Studies² and the European Election Studies³. At this point, the study selection is the closest to General Election timing. The people mention the position of each political party on the traditional left-right scale from 0 to 10.

Model 3 focuses on the second hypothesis. Also, the dependent variable (DV) comes from the speech scaling position over decentralization. Otherwise, the main independent variable (IV) in these models is the percentage of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties. Finally, as in the previous model, I created Model 4 to compare this relationship with the control variables explained before.

¹ Studies year: 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993, 1996, 2000, 2004, 2008, 2011, 2016, 2019, and 2020

² Studies year: 1983, 1997, 2001, 2005, 2015, and 2017.

³ Studies year: 1979, 1989, 1994, 2009, and 2019.


Analysis and results

The Spanish case

At this stage, I examine and compare the Spanish and United Kingdom cases. I select variables detailed before to find the relationship between the national party leaders and other members of the parliament with high sub-national identity, from the same political party and other political parties.

Scaling speeches and words used in speeches

Figure 3. Speeches position over decentralization.



In Figure 3, I scale document positions for each confidence speech in Spain. Wordscores predicts the position of each speech on a predetermined scale. I refer to this scale as the “decentralization – centralization” dimension. Speakers’ positions are shown as black dots and include the confidence interval at 95%. Although I expected that different positions over decentralization across national leaders would be higher because of their party identification, most speakers are close to the most decentralized position on the scale. This proximity to more decentralized positions supports the idea that the decentralization issue is relevant in these countries. Also, these results fit with previous literature on the People’s Party leaders being more

focused on centralization than Socialist Party leaders, more supporters of decentralization. In addition, Rajoy's leadership faced an increasing wave of decentralization public debate, taking more centralized positions.


Considering the Spanish general importance of decentralization, it is not surprising that political parties' leaders were positioned close to public opinion. For example, in Spain, 43% of survey respondents prefer to maintain the current territorial distribution, according to a study from the Sociological Research Centre in 2019⁴. This position has similarities with the median voter theorem (Downs A. , 1957) because the new parties are interested in raising new topics. However, the mainstream parties, such as the state-wide parties in this research, do prefer to maintain the status quo. Political parties and politicians specifically choose the position where there are most of the voters. In Spain, the so-called "Estado de las Autonomías" or State of Autonomies, had been supported by the two main state-wide parties since the beginning of democracy in 1977.

Nonetheless, other state-wide parties now support alternatives to the State of Autonomies. These parties are not in the analysis because only these two, PSOE and PP, have formed a government. Further research would be possible to study if these two main parties show their close position to "more centralized power" in the PP case and a "more federal state" for the PSOE option. This would occur if the speeches were performed in other political-institutional settings, such as internal party debates or during electoral campaigns.

Beyond the coefficients estimated for these speeches positions, the graph reveals distinctions across speakers. I find that, on average, speakers are far closer to the decentralization end of the spectrum than the centralization one. I establish the length of the anchors with the reference documents. Although there are speeches from PSOE leaders between PP leaders, the most decentralized speeches come from PSOE leaders. At the same time, the top of centralization in the scale belongs to the PP leader Mariano Rajoy. These positions support the idea that PSOE prefers a more federal State and PP a more centralized State.

⁴CIS. Survey 3240, Feb. 2019 – Question: Territorial power distribution.

Figure 4. Word usage in speeches in Spain⁵



In figure 4, I visualize the words more used by the national leaders in their speeches. Some words have a significant influence on policy positions. Although España/Spain and españoles/Spaniard are two of the most mentioned words in the speeches, they are words used by the two state-wide parties looking to refer to the whole country. Other political parties exclude this reference to the country name, trying to maintain more sub-national proximity, but this is not the case for PSOE and PP. Otherwise, the references to Comunidades/Territories it is probably the cause because the speeches are in a most decentralized position. This refers to sub-national divisions and their importance in the Spanish administration. The number of times for most relevant words (top 20) in the investiture speeches in Spain is shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Word usage in speeches in Spain (specific number of times)

Gobierno	724	Espanoles	306	Años	260	Cámara	219
España	641	Comunidades	302	Ciudadanos	259	Ello	219
Señorías	529	Sistema	289	Empleo	256	Debe	215
Política	413	País	281	Ser	254	Ley	210
social	317	Sociedad	274	acuerdo	222	desarrollo	209


⁵ Most used words in Spain translated to English: gobierno=government, españa=spain, señorías=Your Honour, política=politics, social=social, españoles=Spaniard, comunidades=territories, sistema=system, país=country, sociedad=society, años=years, ciudadanos=citizens, empleo=employment, ser=to be, acuerdo=agreement, ello=it/this, cámara=house/chamber, debe=must, ley=law, desarrollo=development, sí=yes, reforma=reform, hoy=today, todas=all/every, hacer=to do.

The United Kingdom case

The second case in this research refers to the United Kingdom and the three territories that have strong positions over devolution for, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. As in the analysis before, I use the first speech after the elections to expose their primary policies. In this case, I selected the called “Queen’s Speech”. Although the Queen does it, this speech contains the elected executive’s fundamental policies.

Scaling speeches and words used in speeches

Fig. 5. UK speeches “decentralization – centralization” position



This figure (Fig. 5) shows party leaders’ speeches in the United Kingdom regarding the decentralization-centralization dimension. On average, the United Kingdom documents’ position over decentralization states that national leader positions are closer to decentralization than centralization. Nevertheless, the position across political parties responds to higher levels supporting decentralization from the Labour Party than from the Conservative Party.


With some exceptions, as Thatcher 1987, Major 1992, and Cameron 2010, Labour speeches are more decentralized than Conservatives ones. Also, the speeches closer in time to

the Scottish referendum are the most centralized. Although the speeches are more relative to decentralization positions, they are appropriately positioned in the UK political context.

Vote for Labour as a devolution process advocate is a rule across the UK territories (Mitchell, 1996). In the Scottish case the SNP appears as the leading actor in the early 1990s as an alternative, and the Conservatives only beat Labour in the last Scottish devolved elections under the Brexit environment and with SNP support of over 40%⁶. So, the devolution processes in these territories are highly supported. Scottish, Welsh, and Northern Ireland seats meant the difference between a Labour Party electoral majority and a Labour Party in opposition (Meguid, 2008).

Beyond the document’s position in the scale, some keywords clearly show the speeches’ primary goals. Figure 6 below represents the 25 most mentioned words in the speeches:

Figure 6. Word usage in speeches in the UK



It is relevant to the point that within the most usage, 25 words are “local”, “Wales”, “Scotland”, “Northern Ireland”, or “powers”. All these references give explicit support to decentralization processes in the speeches. Nonetheless, on the other side of the dimension, there are keywords such as “united”, “reform”, and “national”. The words are shared between “both sides”, allowing us to validate the dictionaries and the document selection. There is no

⁶<https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/devolution-at-20/elections-and-parties>

complete support for any scale side. The number of times for most relevant words (top 20) in the Queen’s speeches in the United Kingdom is shown in Table 4 below.

Table 4. Word usage in speeches in United Kingdom (specific number of times)

Government	289	Introduced	92	Continue	68	Measures	58
Legislation	111	United	85	New	67	Ireland	57
Local	104	People	78	Scotland	65	Kingdom	56
Forward	95	Bill	75	Public	59	House	56
work	93	Wales	72	Northern	59	support	56

After this descriptive analysis, I will test the relationship between these positions over decentralization and the number of MPs from each region.

Positions over decentralization and the number of MPs

The first hypothesis in this article mentions the MPs’ influence in representing the government’s party in high sub-national identity territories in the national leader speech. The main argument is that the national leader needs support from his sub-national party members, and this necessity moves the speech position closer to their interests. The second hypothesis refers to MPs from ethno-regionalist parties. As these sub-national members come from parties representing high sub-national identity territories, they are positioned in a more decentralized position. I refer to parties that support policies only to their territories, such as SNP from Scotland, Plaid Cymru from Wales, and Sinn Féin from Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. In the Spanish case, the parties that prioritize territorial policies are Convergència I Unió (CiU) and Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (ERC) from Catalonia, Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), Herri Batasuna (HB), and EH-Bildu from the Basque Country, and Bloque Nacionalista Gallego (BNG) from Galicia.

Models 1 and 3 in the table (Table 5) refer to variables that address the hypotheses. Model 2 and model 4 illustrate the results from the test of the two hypotheses with a number of control variables, looking for their influence on the results. Finally, the second table (Table 6) analyzes MPs from the party in government and ethno-regionalist MPs’ influence by country and sub-national level.

Table 5. Regression models


	(1) <i>Position</i>	(2) <i>Position</i>	(3) <i>Position</i>	(4) <i>Position</i>
% MPs in sub-national territories within incumbent	-0.00212 (-1.96)	-0.00249 (-1.58)		
Mean Turnout territories		0.000145 (0.03)		0.00558 (1.12)
Party Ideology		0.0193 (1.37)		0.0257* (2.53)
Minority Government		0.00804 (0.16)		0.0176 (-0.37)
Polarization		-0.00000407 (-1.25)		-0.00000116 (-0.37)
% MPs ethno-regionalist			0.00340* (2.40)	0.00431* (2.57)
Constant	-0.570*** (-12.49)	-1.142* (-2.95)	-0.570*** (-12.49)	-1.142* (-2.95)
Observations	25	20	25	20

t statistics in parentheses

Source: Own source

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Figure 7. Regression models



To be more detailed, I ran six different models about the different variables. The first table (Table 5) addresses the Spanish and United Kingdom cases together. It examines the percentage of MPs from the party in government and the rate of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties and its relationship with the national leader's speech. Also, I add control variables including mean turnout in the territories in each election, the party ideology, the presence of minority government, and the polarization.

Models 1 and 2 address the first hypothesis, the influence of the percentage of MPs in sub-national territories from the party in government. In both cases, with and without the control variables, I find that the coefficients are not statistically different from zero. The results indicate that the variable does not influence the position of the speeches from the national leader.

Otherwise, in Model 3, I analyze the influence of the speeches' position over decentralization from the percentage of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties. I do not add the variable to the first model because I expect to have results about the influence of the number of MPs without influence from other variables in each case. As shown in table 5, the rate of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties has a positive and statistically significant relationship with the national leader speech's position. In this case, I can state that when the percentage of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties' increases, the more centralized is the speech position.

Also, in Model 4, I study the relationship between these two variables with the control variables. Foremost, the party ideology appears as an influential and significant variable for the position of the national leader's speeches over decentralization. The influence of the party ideology supports previous research findings (Toubeau & Wagner, 2016). However, here, I state that the influence exists from the left wing to decentralization and the right wing to centralization in opposite to previous research. In this instance, the results demonstrate that the more rightist the position on the ideological scale, the more centralized the national leader's speech position.

More substantively, although the MPs from the party in government from high sub-national identity territories have no consistent influence in the position of the speeches from the leaders, territories stand in their relevant functions. In this case, ethno-regionalist parties facing central government power have a more consistent effect. For this influence and the type of parties, the main idea of moving the speeches from the national leaders to more decentralized positions does not work. Nevertheless, it is possible to state that they influence a more robust reaction from the national leader trying to oppose these ethno-regionalist parties. Also, it is

remarkable the different positions of parties on the left and parties on the right in the ideological scale. The parties on the left face decentralization being closer to moving towards more decentralization positions than the parties on the right wing. The findings demonstrate the influence of MPs and the topic saliency. Also, the confrontation between parties on different sides of the scale rather than agreements is relevant in these results.

Table 6. Regression table by territories

	(1) <i>Position</i>	(2) <i>Position</i>
% Ethno Scotland seats	0.00363* (3.55)	
% Gov Scotland seats	0.00597 (1.69)	
% Ethno Wales seats	-0.0315 (-2.20)	
% Gov Wales seats	-0.00580 (-1.74)	
% Ethno Northern Ireland seats	-0.00433 (-0.49)	
% Ethno Catalonia seats		-0.00916 (-1.66)
% Gov Catalonia seats		0.000667 (0.16)
% Ethno Galician seats		0.0191 (2.14)
% Gov Galician seats		-0.00697 (-1.86)
% Ethno Basque seats		0.00119 (0.37)
% Gov Basque seats		-0.00921 (-1.55)
Constant	0.198 (0.23)	0.270 (0.93)
Observations	11	14

t statistics in parentheses

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

The second table (Table 6) above shows the influence of the percentage of MPs from the party in government and ethno-regionalist parties but at the sub-national level.

Model 1, Table 6, illustrates the United Kingdom case, and it is divided by the models by high sub-national identity territories. In this model, I look for the link between the speeches' position on decentralization and the percentage of MPs from the party in government and the rate of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties. Although the outcome in the cases of Wales and Northern Ireland are not determinants, the results show how the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in Scotland has a positive and statistically significant linkage to the speeches' position over decentralization. In this case, the result supports the argument for the second hypothesis that when the percentage of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in Scotland increase, it leads to a more centralized speech position.

Additionally, Model 2 in Table 6 shows the results for Spain. I select the percentage of MPs from the party in government in Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia to analyze their influence. In addition, I look for the link between the speeches' position on decentralization and the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in the same territories. The results are the same in these two scenarios; no statistically significant relationships exist with the speech position.

This separated analysis of the relationship between the number of MPs and the national leaders' speeches on decentralization adds more specific findings to this study in terms of going to the sub-national level. As there are different results across models and territories, I delve into studying the MPs' influence on the national leader's speech analyzing trends beyond the significant results exposed before. In this secondary analysis, I find that some of the null results show a tendency. These results are shown and examined in the following figures.

Figure 8. OLS: Position + N° MPs from Government Party





Figure 8 shows how the tendency follows the relationship between leaders' speeches' position on decentralization and the number of MPs from the party in government in the high sub-national identity territories. Thus, when the number of MPs increases, the speech position is more decentralized. Therefore, there is a possibility that increasing the number of speeches and/or adding different national levels (such as sub-national speeches) or other countries would give more consistency in the results.

The pictures that refer to the total amount of MPs from the party's government and MPs from Catalonia and Basque Country territories present a tendency to a more decentralized position in the speeches when the numbers of MPs increase. On the other hand, the Galician example exhibits a different relationship, no tendency, with the speeches' position over decentralization. These results in each territory follow the literature on decentralization, and party branches in Spain exposed in previous chapters. The state-wide party branches face a more decentralized position in Catalonia and the Basque Country than in Galicia.

Figure 9. OLS: Position + N° MPs from ethno-regionalist parties



Furthermore, in the Spanish case, I analyze the speeches' behaviour when the number of MPs from the ethno-regionalist parties changes. In this case, I expected to find that these MPs increase to move the speeches position to the decentralization side. However, as in the previous analysis, the results are not statistically different from zero. More conclusive results await tests on a more prolonged and extensive scale.

This figure (Fig. 9) shows the seat distribution won by political parties from these territories (ethno-regionalist parties) and the decentralization-centralization scales' speeches. Although there are changes in the decentralization-centralization scale across time, there are minor changes in the number of MPs from these territories. The Catalonia case variation is the most prominent, as the speeches have a clear tendency to be more decentralized when the number of MPs increases. In the Basque Country, there is practically no variation.

Otherwise, the Galician zone is a particular place in Spanish politics. Even though there is strong support from their own cultures, such as different languages or ethno-regionalist representation at all institutional levels, it is a right-wing region. This is apparent in figure 9; although it is not significant when the number of MPs from this region increases, the speeches are more centralized.

Figure 10. OLS: Position + N° MPs from Government Party




Figure 10 shows the MPs from the government in the United Kingdom overall, and the three high sub-national identity territories under study. Although there are no significant results in the statistical analysis, there is a trend in the total and high identity territories representing the government's party. I exclude Northern Ireland in this analysis because there are no elected MPs from the party in government.

Beyond that, there appears to be a trend in the Scotland and Wales cases where the more MPs' number, the more decentralized the speech. These results follow the argument of this research. I stated in the previous section that the party in government MPs from these territories do influence leaders' speeches on decentralization. In this case, these MPs show their influence to a more decentralized position from the leaders' speeches position on this issue.

Position over decentralization and MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in the UK by sub-national territories

Figure 11. OLS: Position + N° MPs from Ethno-regionalist parties




Figure 11 appears as the point that guides the discussion in the next section. The prior assumptions in this article stand up for the idea that the speeches move after the number of MPs from these territories increase trying to convince them to support the government. MPs from the government party, as many as MPs from ethno-regionalist parties, are essential in the leaders' stability in government, so the leaders will move their position to persuade them.

Nevertheless, this representation shows how the increase of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties, specifically in Scotland, led the speeches to a more centralized position in the territorial dimension. I attend more at this dilemma further in the discussion section.

In this section, I presented the different results of this analysis. These findings support the theories exposed in the theoretical chapter and address the hypotheses. The key finding is the significant influence of ethno-regionalist MPs in the position of leaders' speeches on decentralization. In the next part, I focus on a broader discussion along with reviewing the characteristics and findings for every high sub-national identity territory under study.

Discussion

In previous sections, I argue that the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories, such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia in Spain, and Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom, do influence the leaders' speeches on decentralization. More specifically, I state that increasing the number of MPs from the party in government in

these territories and the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties with national representation; will also increase the leaders' position on decentralization.

I test these arguments with data from parliamentary speeches from Spain and the United Kingdom. I use investiture speeches for Spain and Queen's speeches for the United Kingdom as they are the first speech written by the national leaders. After that, I find that the number of MPs does influence the leaders' speeches' position on decentralization. There are significant results analyzing the influence of the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties, as well as the specific case of Scotland.

Based on the theory and argument, I conclude that MPs' influence on national leader's speeches is still an open topic and under debate. Future analyses that include more cases can improve this research and make it more conclusive. Nevertheless, despite I did not find strong results supporting my first hypothesis, there is a relationship between speeches and MPs.

Case selection is an important step in this article. Spain and the United Kingdom share the importance of high-identity territories in their national politics. At the same time, these important territories have a political battle with the state-wide parties to position their issues as priorities. The ethno-regionalist parties increase their presence in the sub-national and national institutions in the last two or three elections to support this position. This means that these territories' importance will play an important role in Spanish and United Kingdom politics in the following years.

I select these cases following the most similar case research design, and I have found the results in their differences. Although I explained the cases before, the analysis has a vision altogether. The current political context positions political parties on two sides about decentralization or devolution: the politics of agreements and the politics of conflict. The politics of agreements are when the party in government, the state-wide party, has the ability to negotiate with the ethno-regionalist parties. Nonetheless, the politics of conflict show the confrontation between the state-wide party in government and the ethno-regionalist parties. Beyond that, there is a clear and significant link between the percentage of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties and the speeches' position on decentralization.

The use of polarizing debates to face political issues, such as sub-national disparities, increases ethno-regionalist MPs from these territories because they are transformed into one of the options for voters. The Scottish case show how the front battle to the more devolution claims from the Conservative governments has positioned the Scottish National Party as the

sub-national territory's reference party (Greene & McMillan, 2020). As the elections are before the speeches, the national leaders demonstrate their reaction to the number of seats being harder than ever in the devolution issue.

Why should the state-wide parties care about ethno-regionalist parties if they already have power? Because the question is not only about how the SNP influences the Conservatives, which may sound unreal or even impossible. It is about the demands arriving from these territories, asking for more devolution or even independence after years of confrontation. Leaders have in mind the importance of party branches winning their territories, facing the ethno-regionalist parties, building social networks and working for the national party interest. Even when party branches have more decentralized positions than the national party. Although the results in the case of Scotland become a more pro-centralization national leader speech when there are more ethno-regionalist MPs, this is a case of polarized debate from a centralized right-wing national leader. It is worth considering that voters and public opinion in these territories are also different than in the rest of the country, and they expect a national leader that attends to their demands.

The Spanish case follows other lines. The PSOE has played a significant role in territorial politics from the beginning of the democratic period. Also, it is the party that has governed eight of twelve legislatures. There is a historical position over a higher decentralization process to become a federalist state.

Analyzing the different reactions in each case is central to the point that left-wing parties on one side try to be closer to decentralization positions. On the other side, a right-wing political party such as the Conservatives in the United Kingdom has supported a clear opposition to a higher devolution level (nonetheless, it has passed 2 acts in 2012 and 2016 extending it in Scotland). The significant results extracted from the party ideology positions support this idea of face-to-face politics being the Conservatives the winner in the last elections when the decentralization topic increased, and the party leader was a supporter of unity against devolution. Thus, I am able to conclude that these are positions to the right facing left-wing parties' position on decentralization.

Therefore, it is not easy to support the idea of Toubeau and Wagner (2013), who state that the economic right is more supportive of decentralization than the economic left. Considering that there are "economic right speakers" in a decentralized position in both cases, it is not the most frequent situation. However, the more liberal parties culturally are the more supportive towards decentralization. Following (Toubeau & Wagner, 2013), the results indicate

that the cultural cleavage is more determinant of positions over decentralization than the economic cleavage in both countries.

Despite similarities between Spain and the United Kingdom, I find differences in the results due to political and electoral contexts. The main test of my theory is to discover how the number of MPs from high sub-national identity territories influences the speeches over decentralization. Under this assumption, I state that it is necessary to increase the sample to reject an over-influence from the political context. In addition, the electoral results are dispersed by sub-national division in General Elections, so it is important to note that the existence of strategic voting behaviour (Cox, 1997), such as ‘dual vote’ (Riera, 2013) in Spain and ‘split-ticket voting’ (Campbell & Miller, 1957) in the United Kingdom may influence in the final seat distribution.

In the next chapter, I will consider a new type of speech, the party conference speech. I argue that the audience, if the speech is done in the parliament or at the party conference, does influence the party leaders’ speeches on decentralization. In parliament, the party leader asks for the MPs’ support to get invested, pass the bills, and approve the budget, among other legislative procedures. In the party conference, the party leaders ask for the support of the party members and voters. Therefore, I support the idea that the leaders’ speeches’ position on decentralization changes depending on the audience.

Chapter 5: The audience effect: Leaders' speeches over decentralization in different contexts

Introduction

Party leaders' speeches and communication have changed and developed during the last decades. Scholars of party leader positioning focus on party conferences or parliamentary speeches. Also, they find differences between national leaders' policy positions on the ideological scale. However, they have yet to consider how their focus on positions below the level of broad left-right disagreements differs according to their political needs and audiences. Multilevel countries present a particular challenge as leaders must somehow build support from those from territories with differing priorities, specifically over decentralization.

I provide an answer to this question by arguing that party leaders change their positions over these issues dependent on the demands of their political context. In particular, in parliament, the PM requires support for legislation and government confidence with both intra-party and inter-party groups, whereas, in other contexts, such as intra-party deliberations, their priority is to build party unity.

The question I analyze and answer here focuses on the differences in speeches delivered to different audiences. In particular, are political party leaders' speeches more decentralized when they talk in parliament rather than in national party congresses? I argue that political party leaders have a more decentralized speech when they speak in a parliamentary audience. We can approach the parliamentary audience as an open audience where the leaders need support from other political parties' MPs. In opposition, the party conference is a close environment where the party leaders speak in front of party members and voters that are close to their positions. They need to be more flexible about those parties' main issues at this stage.

To test hypotheses from this perspective, I measure these speeches' positions over the centralization-decentralization scale using an approach of Quantitative Text Analysis. I collect the speeches from the national party congresses and parliamentary speeches, such as the investiture speeches and the Queen's speeches. I make this selection to analyze how different they refer to territorialism issues. I focus this research on two reference cases in the topic: the United Kingdom and Spain. These two countries have similarities in terms of territorial distribution and decentralization or devolution processes. Nonetheless, they differ in aspects like the electoral system and political parties' representativeness capacity.

In this chapter, I link the speech analysis with institutionalization theories. As I am looking for differences when they talk in a different context, it is essential to point out that the institutions have a prominent influence. The parliament as an institution and the respect and prevalence of negotiation between elected members can substantially weigh on the topic. Also, on the side of national party congresses, I find the importance of these congresses for the unity of political parties. The political parties are still the means by which citizens are represented and involved in decision-making.

This chapter has several implications. First of all, the political party leaders' speeches analysis finds that they speak over topics beyond the left-right ideological scale. Second, I analyze speeches from different audiences. There is an influence in two different scenarios: parliamentary, investiture and Queen's speeches, and intra-party studies using party conference speeches. Finally, it is important the additional implication of using the Quantitative Text Analysis approach and the speeches analysis to measure speeches' position on decentralization. In the next sections, I analyze and review the literature referring to the different audiences; the parliament through investiture and Queen's speeches, and the party conference speeches. Also, I add an explanation of the relevance of decentralization as a determinant issue.

Different audience, different position

Although numerous scholars examine speeches, there is limited evidence on how the audience influences the content of speeches. However, the research is split between audiences; the intra-party researchers study the content of messages (Ceron, 2015), internal disagreements (Greene & Haber, 2016), or even be more specific, the ideological differences within the parties (Kölln & Polk, 2017). Otherwise, the analysis of parliamentary speeches is also a topic studied to analyze party heterogeneity (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009), leaders' relationship with other institutions (Salvati, 2020), and a complete vision of policy positions (Bevan et al., 2011) with Queen's Speeches in the UK (Kelso, 2017).

It is important to mark that from this point forward, the *audience* and *scenario* build the same framework; the national party leaders' speeches face different people with diverse interests. In terms of clarifying future concepts, I refer to investiture speeches and Queen's speeches as parliamentary speeches because they are written by the President in the case of Spain and the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom case, and both refer to the main government positions for the next term across several topics (John & Jennings, 2010); otherwise, national party

congress speeches would be called Party Conference speeches, which are held in front of party members and states the main party political lines. In political debates, I argue that a direct relationship exists between the speaker and the audience. In the terms that I analyze in this research, one of the differences between the audiences, the Parliament and the Party Conferences, is the different group responses that the speakers face and the audience members' roles. Therefore, the speeches' contexts have a distinction in terms of the discussion and the audiences (Choi et al., 2016).

On the one hand, political parties' conference speeches are delivered to the political party members at their internal, but public, meetings. Here, political party speakers discuss different political issues and policy positions. These speeches are delivered primarily for party supporters and leader supporters mostly. Although there are debates on addressing the different political debates, the ideological differences and the difficulties in convincing others are reduced at the minimum. On the other hand, the investiture speeches are in front of the Parliament. These speeches state the speaker's position and the central policies to face during office after the electoral success. The ideological differences with the audience and the necessity to attract support from other MPs make these speeches more controversial than those from the party conferences. As these speeches come from the party leader who presents his candidature to be the President in Spain and the Prime Minister in the United Kingdom but presented by the Queen, there is no more significant event in political discourse. I think that this is key in the corpus selection because these speeches express the leaders' positions.

Although there are studies analyzing speeches, primarily based on communication issues or left-right political cleavage (Schoonvelde et al., 2019), I add the importance of decentralization in politics and the different scenarios as a critical variable. Therefore, this research aims to address the differences in speeches about decentralization in a different context. The main idea of this research focuses on the difference in discourses across different audiences. Mentions of centralization or decentralization do not refer to emotions or rhetoric but to direct expressions on the subject.

Before attending the speech selection, I examine the issue of parties' shifting positions. Although I am working on speeches from different speakers over the years, they represent the two state-wide parties in Spain and the United Kingdom. In addition, there are no more critical changes and intra-party disagreement possibilities than the leadership change. Although it might be seen as a symbol of weakness, the leadership changes and shifting the party's policy position helps parties minimize voter disagreement or the possibility of not looking strong (Somers-

Topcu, 2017). Nonetheless, there is no agreement on whether voters respond to policy changes during elections (Adams et al., 2011; Fernandez-Vazquez, 2014).

In order to analyze and find the distinctions in the leaders' speeches' positions over decentralization according to the different scenarios, I select political speeches from Spain and the United Kingdom in two different contexts. The first group of speeches are investiture speeches in Spain from 1982 to 2020 and the Queen's Speeches in the United Kingdom from 1979 to 2019. Secondly, national party leaders' speeches at the national party conferences between the same periods. The different audiences and their influence on speeches' position is the primary purpose of this research.

In summary, I examine the different speeches' contexts in the analysis. The main differences lie in the speech's final aim and the audience in front of which the speech is displayed. Party national conferences are from member to member, and the audience is mainly in the same political position over topics. They look for solid partisan identity and in-group identification to pursue a collective goal. Nevertheless, investiture and Queen's speeches have different venues, audiences, and purposes. These speeches are delivered to the other MPs and the nation. The leaders position themselves as heads of the government and guide for the following years. The main point of this chapter is the difference between the parliaments as a broader audience versus party conferences which are more focused on intra-party politics. In the next section, I discuss the issue of decentralization in relation to the speeches and audiences.

Why decentralization?

When discussing text analysis more in-depth about party leaders' speeches, studies refer to positions on the ideological dimension or issue salience (Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019) and even the position that national parties take on European integration (Proksch & Slapin, 2009). The ideological dimension –usually known as the left-right scale– works as a sort of shortcut for scholars and public opinion to position others, parties, voters, and themselves across different topics, times, and contexts (Mair, 2007).

Although the left-right position may be helpful to have an idea of party positions, the class cleavage shares importance with other agenda-setting topics (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). When leaders and parties strategically position the issues on the agenda, they try to maintain distance to topics difficult for them (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2014) and be relevant to the

problems more promising for electoral success (Carmines & Stimson, 1989; Petrocik, 1996; Hobolt & de Vries, 2015).

Over the last decade, the topic of decentralization has increased in the public debate (Jolly, et al., 2022). Although it exists from the classic centre-periphery cleavage (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967), it takes a more relevant position in multilevel countries such as the United Kingdom and Spain. The decentralization process is addressed for the majority as a confrontation between the national and the ethno-regionalist party where one of the two loses. Usually, if the decentralization process increases, the ethno-regionalist party wins. If the national party maintains the strength of the union and centralized powers, it wins the debate. Meguid (2015) develops the idea that both have something to win. The party in government increases its support in the national election, while this does not happen in sub-national ones when giving power to sub-national governments. On the other way around, ethno-regionalist parties increase their support in the sub-national sphere, but they have less support in the national elections.

In Spain, it starts with the Constitutional Court banning some parts of the sub-national reference law, despite this law being approved by the democratically elected sub-national parliament, the sub-national government, and a popular referendum (Guinjoan & Rodon, 2016; Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017). This also combines with the consecutive victories of the ethno-regionalist and pro-independence parties. On the other side, the Scottish case had its goal in 2014, when they held the independence referendum. Despite the negative results for the pro-independence parties and voters, it was closer than expected, so it remains an open debate in public and legislative chambers (Renwick, 2014).

The relevance of decentralization in the debate and the difficulties for state-wide parties to deal with this topic are still open questions. Also, the study of decentralization presents its problems due to the diverse explanations and meanings of the concepts. It is a major issue to understand what is measured as decentralization avoiding over-specification and under-specification (Schneider, 2003). Then, I answer how leaders' speeches are positioned on decentralization in different periods from different parties and countries. So, I focus on a multiparty and two-country analysis. In addition, I examine where these speeches are done. I state that leaders' speeches on decentralization are different when they speak in front of other MPs and, even more, when there are MPs from ethno-regionalist parties in the parliament than when they make the debate in the party conference in front of other party members and party supporters.

Nonetheless, they need the support of other MPs to pass the bills and laws or be invested. I think this creates a different environment that moves the leaders' speeches to a more decentralized position in parliament than in the party conference, where they may also need support, but all members are closer in terms of policy positions than in the parliament. Therefore, it is relevant to examine how the speeches are in the legislative debate to analyze more in-depth the different venues and stages where party leaders expose their positions (Proksch & Slapin, 2015) and the intra-party discussion (Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019).

National Party Congresses vs. Investiture and Queen's speeches

The Party National Congress, also called Party Conference, is the event where the political parties establish their positions across different policy agendas. Studies in intra-party politics also have been capable of extracting divergences within the parties. In some contexts, the Party National Congresses are useful for display where the different party leaders are positioned on various topics. Although there are differences between candidates, the political parties always try to maintain certain internal strengths. Based on public opinion studies, the voters feel close to parties that show internal stability and homogeneity (Sieberer, 2006).

Factions and groups within the party have been regular since the existence of political parties in the decision-making process. Nevertheless, the presence of intra-party groups in political parties has been used as a sort of strength rather than a weakness. These factions increase the concept that the parties want to show as they work as a democratic organization. After these differences, most parties expose a strong position in the leading policy position they have agreed to during the national congress. Following this concept of party unity or cohesion, academics like Bäck et al. (2011) analyze these singularities from parliamentary speeches.

References to party cohesion in the literature are explicit. However, this cohesion does not imply that leaders do not have a degree of "movement" on the scale to adapt their speeches on specific relevant issues. Moreover, this variation is not analysed with respect to other leaders or party members in the same year but rather in previous or subsequent years. The idea is not that PP or Conservative leaders support the concept of independence in sub-national territories with high territorial identification, but rather that with their mentions of decentralization, they are more flexible or can make more concessions in a negotiation. This also shows the

importance of different audiences since, in front of your party colleagues, you do not have to offer that “flexibility” that you can deliver in parliament.

Another point in the characteristics of national party congresses is the audience. The audience, by definition, is a group of people listening to or viewing a public event. Even agreeing with the definition, the audience also responds to a regular group of people showing their interest in something. These two definitions give clear support to the speaker in the national party congresses. Most of the listeners would agree with the speech, and the speaker does not need to convince others in terms of gaining votes. If you are a party member, you are closer to it than to the other political parties, even with differences or factions. Also, Heritage and Greatbatch (1986) describe the speeches at Party Conferences as “a series of political messages or points for which the speaker seeks the attention, understanding, and support of the audience”.

Political leaders influence political parties during their term in power. The declining partisanship in terms of the number of people registered as party supporters (Dalton & Wattenberg, 2002) strengthens the personalization of politics, although Kölln (2015) findings support an increase in the party organization members. However, there are differences in the influence of the leader within the electorate. The leader has not the same importance as mass-party supporters, who used to be more influenced by ideology than the catch-all party supporters where the ideology constraints are weak (Costa Lobo, 2008). Of course, there are differences across countries. Party leadership concentration of power has not been under discussion since decades ago, not only during the election campaign but also in day-to-day politics. The idea follows that this increase in personalization in politics depends on the party system (Raunio, 2002).

In this research, I present two cases. First, national party congresses, conferences in the UK, have a yearly period. There is a *party conference season* where the main state-wide parties have their conferences. This period of three weeks takes place in the fall when the House of Commons is in recess. Devolved party branches for Scottish and Welsh territories have their conferences in March. The Scottish National Party and Scottish Green Party have been doing two conferences per year. Otherwise, the Spanish case follows a more unstructured agenda because there is no yearly conference season. As a decentralized state, party branches have their sub-national congresses. Despite this, the national party congress is where the main political lines agree on the most relevant topics.

The national party congress utility starts within the party but finishes in public. There is no closed itinerary to follow in the congress, but there are common characteristics to most of

them. First, the leader selection or reinforcement takes place during the congress. The party members choose, each party has its methods, the candidate for the national party leader or Prime Minister, called President in Spain. Second, political parties have internal documents that mark their line of action, the guiding principles, and the limits. These documents are discussed and approved in the national party congresses (Ceron & Greene, 2019). Also, when the internal party structures change, this new internal power distribution is approved and notified to the party members during the event (Schumacher et al., 2013). Finally, the most influential part of the conference is the public opinion: the agenda-setting aspect (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). After the internal debate and making-decision process, the parties involve the public opinion in the changes or the stability of the same leadership/internal committee (Hernandez et al., 2017).

The context for the national party leaders' speeches at the national party conferences is clear. The audience is party members and, to a lesser extent, party supporters and media coverage. National leaders' speeches share this moment with other party leaders' speeches, sometimes previous leaders or important party members. The function of the speeches in this context is to encourage support for the party from the inside. The speeches mostly show the best part of something. In this case, the party itself is the best that could happen to the political context. The national party leader recaps the most relevant policies and moments in this period and the following steps to follow. Even though there are disagreements in the internal structures of the party, the general context gives confidence to the speaker, and they will receive support from the party members.

Otherwise, investiture speeches and Queen Speech both differ from the previous context. First of all, these speeches are done after the election results. So, the leader who has won the election and it has the more extensive support in the Congreso de los Diputados and the House of Commons present their candidature as Presidente or Prime Minister. Although there is a difference between these cases, in Spain, it is the candidate who speaks in front of the Parliament, and in the United Kingdom case, it is the Queen who reads the speech previously presented by the leader, in both cases, they exhibit the key points and central policies to accomplish during the next term. The characteristic of the Queen's speeches being held by the monarch outlining the incoming Government's priorities in the following term may incline to relax the tone and avoid explicit political confrontation and partisan references.

In the investiture speeches, the leaders need parliamentary confidence. At this stage, they need the vote in favour of MPs from other territories and other political parties. Sometimes, these political parties come from high sub-national identity territories, which could increase the

talk intensity in terms of territorial issues. Also, these MPs from different territories or parties have to take a position on a number of policy issues in front of other MPs and the whole parliamentary audience.

At the same time, there are studies focused on parliamentary behaviour. I use investiture speeches in Spain, and the Queen's speeches in the United Kingdom. In this sense, there works on how parliamentary parties form governments (Laver & Shepsle, 1996), the diverse parliamentary procedures (Huber, 1992), such as the vote of confidence (Huber, 1996), and the influence of veto players (Tsebelis, 2000; 2002) and the agenda-setting (Döring, 2001).

Despite the obvious similarities given that both types are speeches, Ceron et al. (2019) remark on the characteristics of investiture speeches. The necessity to obtain approval from other MPs is a key difference from electoral manifestos or speeches in Party Conferences. Also, authors argue that investiture speeches, in the same case as Queen's speeches, intend to summarize policy issue positions in a range of topics and the possibility of agreements between parties.

Although previous research finds characteristics in parliamentary speeches (Bäck et al., 2014) and party conference speeches, I address at least two major gaps. The first gap refers to the inexistent comparative articles based on the research of these two scenarios, Parliaments and Party Conferences. Other academics explain the speeches' implication in one of these two, such as intra-party homogeneity or heterogeneity in Party Conferences. On the other hand, the research on parliamentary speeches focuses on the ideology or left-right policy position dimension. This focus on classical ideology cleavage opens the second gap in this study. These days, the decentralization issue has come across countries, showing a critical moment for different governments. Thus, I analyze position speeches over decentralization to fill the gap in this cleavage.

So, I state that national party leaders have more incentives to take more decentralized positions when they speak in the Parliament, in front of other MPs than in the Party Conferences. Following the explanation, national party leaders can take a more moderate position over decentralization when speaking in front of other party members who position themselves closer to the leader and party ideology. I study the comparison between audiences and how these different positions affect national leaders' speeches position over decentralization through the following hypothesis:

H: The positions that party leaders take in investiture (Parliament) speeches are more decentralized than national party congresses (Party Conference) speeches with respect to position on decentralization.

Methods and Data

Data in this research comes from the national leaders' speeches over decentralization in two scenarios: first, in the Parliament by investiture speeches and Queen's speeches. Second, in the Party Conferences from the different party leaders. The first step with the data is scaling the different speech documents in one dimension. The dimension selected in this article concern decentralization. The specifications of the method approach are explained in chapter three (3).

Once the speeches are positioned on the scale, I analyze the influence of the different audiences in their position over decentralization. To build consistency and answer the research question in this study, I use a multiple linear regression analysis. Using this method, I can determine whether there is a significant relationship between the dependent variable and the different independent variables. In short, I examine if the speeches' position over decentralization changes in different scenarios, Parliament vs. Party Conferences. First, the dependent variable (DP) *Position* exposes the scale placement explained before. Otherwise, the independent variable (IV) *Audience* explores where the speeches take place, 0 when in Parliament or 1 at Party Conferences. Also, I add two control variables that I consider more relevant to give more robustness to the analysis. The control variables refer to different aspects that could influence the main variable. These variables are the *Country* (0=Spain and 1=United Kingdom) and the *Party* (0=PSOE/Labour and 1=PP/Conservatives).

The list of speeches, see table 7 and table 8, is determined by the speeches' accessibility. For example, the investiture and Queen's speeches coincide with the elections. Also, the speeches are conducted after the electoral results when the leaders have to ask for support from other MPs and present the critical points for the next term in office. Moreover, the party's national congresses/conference speeches are presented at an intra-party event. This internal exposure makes the situation more difficult for the speeches to access (Polk & Kölln, 2017), at least in the Spanish case. In order to create an accurate list of speeches (Greene & Sajuria, 2018) (British Political Speech) (Congreso de los Diputados) (United Kingdom Government), I choose the following structure; I select the party national conferences speeches from the same year as the election event and from the leader who won the election. The Spanish case has some

different times in terms of the election year and party conferences. In this case, I select the conference meeting closer to the election date.

I present the MARPOR (Lehmann, et al., 2022) index in the appendix for the different manifestos added to validate the dictionaries. This helps to understand the importance and relevance of decentralization due to the changes between leaders/parties and countries along the selected timeline. To demonstrate this, I select manifestos references to centralization and decentralization from both countries, from the different leaders/parties and in each general election. Also, Figure 5 in the appendix helps to understand the party positions on decentralization using data from Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Jolly, et al., 2022). Again, the Chapel Hill positions are aligned with the speech positions regarding the left-wing parties having a more decentralized position than the right-wing parties.

Table 7. List of investiture/Queen’s speeches

SPAIN		UNITED KINGDOM	
Speaker	Year	Speaker	Year
Felipe González	1982	M. Thatcher	1979
Felipe González	1986	M. Thatcher	1983
Felipe González	1989	M. Thatcher	1987
Felipe González	1993	J. Major	1992
J. M. Aznar	1996	T. Blair	1997
J. M. Aznar	2000	T. Blair	2001
J. L. R. Zapatero	2004	T. Blair	2005
J. L. R. Zapatero	2008	D. Cameron	2010
M. Rajoy	2011	D. Cameron	2015
M. Rajoy	2016	T. May	2017
M. Rajoy	2016	B. Johnson	2019
Pedro Sánchez	2016		
Pedro Sánchez	2019		
Pedro Sánchez	2020		

Table 8. List of Party National Congresses/Conferences speeches

SPAIN		UNITED KINGDOM	
Speaker	Year	Speaker	Year
Felipe González	1984	M. Thatcher	1979
Felipe González	1988	M. Thatcher	1983
Felipe González	1990	M. Thatcher	1987
Felipe González	1993	J. Major	1992
J. M. Aznar	1999	T. Blair	1997
J. M. Aznar	2002	T. Blair	2001
J. L. R. Zapatero	2004	T. Blair	2005
J. L. R. Zapatero	2008	D. Cameron	2010
M. Rajoy	2012	D. Cameron	2015
M. Rajoy	2017	T. May	2017
		B. Johnson	2019

Results

In this section, I show the speeches' positions on decentralization in different scenarios. In the first part of this analysis, I broadly study the comparison in the two audiences, Parliament and Party Conferences. Second, I add the variable political party to the results, so it is possible to see how the different audiences affect each party's position over decentralization. Third, Figure 14 illustrates the different positions over decentralization in the different audiences divided by country, so it is possible to analyze how different political contexts influence these speeches' positions. Finally, the y-axes in the figures always represent the speeches' position on decentralization, where positions closer to the value 1 are more relative to centralization positions, and speeches near -1 are the most decentralized positions.

After the figures, I present the results showing the influence of the independent variable *Audience* and the control variables, *Country* and *Party*, in the dependent variable, *Position*. Table 9 shows the coefficients and significance level regarding the speeches' position over decentralization.

Figure 12. Comparison between Party Conference speeches and Parliament speeches





Figure 12 outlines a broader scenario than figures 13 and 14, based on the country and party level. Here, I analyze the whole list of documents presented in Table 7 and Table 8. The Parliamentary speeches, also mentioned as investiture speeches, position over decentralization from the United Kingdom and Spain together and from the four different parties: the Conservatives and Labour in the United Kingdom, and PP and PSOE in Spain. I use the same process to analyze the Party Conference speeches over decentralization.

The graph makes it possible to analyze the average position in the different audiences. The positions over decentralization address the principal research statement: On average, parliament speeches' positions over decentralization are more decentralized than Party Conference speeches. These results will be explained in more detail below. First, I show the differences between political parties. Second, I split the results by country, so it will be possible to observe the characteristics of each territory. After that, Table 9 demonstrates the significant results supporting this research's argument.

Figure 13. Party Conference and Parliamentary speeches by political parties




Political parties have different positions over decentralization in their speeches. It is possible to validate this argument by reading the different parties' manifestos (Mazzoleni, 2009). Also, articles related to decentralization and left-right scale that position the speeches depend on economic or cultural cleavages (Toubeau & Wagner, 2013; Toubeau & Wagner, 2016). Apart from the ideological differences, I find that they follow the same similarities and differences across countries. The speeches have different levels of decentralization, but the investiture speeches have a more decentralized position than party national conferences speeches in all cases. So, the differences between parties regarding position over decentralization have no changes when the analysis focuses on the audience's influence.

Following Figure 13, the parties in the United Kingdom, Conservatives and Labour, expose more differences between speeches in Parliament and speeches in national Party Conferences than in the Spanish case, PP and PSOE. The more decentralized position from speeches in Parliament than in Party Conferences significantly affects both parties. In the Spanish case, there are also differences between the parties. Beyond the more decentralized position from PSOE leader speeches, I find that both PP and PSOE have more decentralized speeches when the leader speaks in front of the Parliament. In summary, I find that the speeches

in Parliament take more decentralized positions than the speeches in Party National Congresses, which relates to the main argument of this chapter.

Figure 14. Comparison between Party Conference speeches and Parliament speeches by country



Attending to figure 14, the difference between audiences in the case of Spain and the United Kingdom shows mixed results. First, the case of Spain illustrates disparities in the means, as is possible to see in the graph before. However, the means in the national leaders' speeches on decentralization are within the error margins, so the results must be taken carefully.

Nevertheless, it is relevant to mark that the tendency supports the research question and hypothesis outlined before; the speeches' position on decentralization exposes a more decentralized position in the Parliament than in the Party Conferences.

Second, the United Kingdom case shows different results when analyzing the speeches' position on decentralization. The difference in the means of speeches' over decentralization split by audiences demonstrates a clear and significant variation between the speeches done in the Party Conferences and the speeches in the Parliament. Despite some outliers in parliamentary speeches, the mean makes visible the more decentralized position in the speeches when the national leader speaks in the Parliament.

Analyzing the cases as a whole, it is possible to state that the speeches in Parliament have a more decentralized position than the speeches from the Party Conferences. Although there are differences by country, the overview shows how their position over decentralisation increases when the national leaders have to speak in front of MP's from other parties, some of them from high sub-national identity territories. Otherwise, the support from their party colleagues and the “no necessity” to convince MPs from other parties make their position more conservative in this cleavage. Although there is a trade-off between national and sub-national MPs from the same party, there is a smaller difference between them than when they speak in the parliamentary sphere. Therefore, I find a more centralized position as conservative for the national leader because there are representing state-wide parties.

Table 9. Multiple Linear Regressions explaining Position over Decentralization

	Dependent Variable Position (1)
Parliamentary	0.158*** (5.84)
Spain	0.129*** (4.46)
Left-wing	0.0794** (2.75)
Constant	-0.567*** (-23.45)
Observations	46
R ²	0.6622
Adjusted R ²	0.6380
F Statistic	27.44 df=(3, 42)

*Note: t statistics in parentheses * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001*

Table 9 provides evidence consistent with the argument. The statistical output presents significant results from the primary independent variable and the control variables. At this point, the influence of the type of audience, Parliament or Party Conference, is positive and statistically significant. This strong positive coefficient supports the main argument of this chapter, which considers parliamentary speeches more decentralized than party conference speeches. These

results validate the theoretical framework presented in this research about the different speeches position taken from the national leaders over decentralization.

In addition, the country and party of the national leader influence this speech position over decentralization. The positive significant values in these two variables confirm the figures presented before where there are noticeable differences between parties, PP vs. PSOE and Conservatives vs. Labour, and between countries, Spain vs. the United Kingdom. In the first case, there is a strong positive effect when referring to the country. It demonstrates a more decentralized position in the leaders' speeches on decentralization in Spain than in the United Kingdom. In addition, analyzing the parties, there is also a significant positive finding supporting the argument about the left-wing parties being more supporters of decentralized positions than right-wing parties.

To be more precise, statistically, the R-squared from the model demonstrates that the independent variables, *Audience*, *Country*, and *Party*, explain 66.22% of the variability of our dependent variable, *Position*. Also, all three variables added statistically significantly to the prediction, $p < .05$. Beyond that, I state that when the leaders' speeches take more centralized positions (closer to 1 than -1), there are higher probabilities of being in a Party Conference than in Parliament, in the United Kingdom than in Spain, and from a Conservative/PP leader than Labour/PSOE leader. These results are consistent with this study's argument.

Discussion and Conclusion

Previous literature has yet to explain the association between leaders' speeches, different audiences, and the decentralization issue. Therefore, this study set out to assess the importance of where the speeches are done, the scenario, the different circumstances and characteristics where the leaders speak about their position and policies in the knowledge of political discourse. I argue that leaders' speeches' positions on decentralization are in more decentralized positions than leaders' speeches' positions on decentralization in party conferences. I examine this argument with evidence from parliamentary speeches, investiture and Queen's speeches, and party conference speeches. The results support the main argument and present a more decentralized position on decentralization when the leaders speak in the parliamentary sphere.

The most prominent finding to emerge from the analysis is that the position over decentralization derived from national leaders' speeches depends on the context. This data must be interpreted with caution because there are differences across countries and parties, and it

could be argued that the positive results were despite these differences. Nonetheless, I also present results on the differences between countries and parties to analyze these changes. For example, national leaders' speeches position over decentralization have a more decentralized position during investiture and Queen's speeches in Parliament, where the leaders refer to other MPs after elections, than in Party National Congresses, where the national leaders require support from the party members.

Another aspect under debate in the field involves ideology. In this case, the references to the two state-wide parties in each country, two on the right and two on the left, state that it influences the leaders' speeches' positions over decentralization. References in the literature to the relationship between decentralization and ideology issues (Toubeau & Wagner, 2013; 2016) lead to difference between economic and social/cultural ideology positions to position parties in the spectrum. Here, I handle the parties as institutions historically positioned in the left, Labour and PSOE, and right, Conservatives and PP, scale. Its influence in the national leaders' speeches positions over decentralization opens new aspects to investigate in the field of political parties and decentralization, providing helpful evidence to understand coalition governments, office-seeking debates, and other issues such as gender (Greene & O'Brien, 2016) or career background (Alexiadou, 2022), and independence referendums in multilevel countries.

The country context also makes a difference in the national leaders' speeches' position on decentralization. The United Kingdom and Spain involve relevant media coverage because decentralization is the main issue in agenda-setting (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). Therefore, it is pertinent to analyze how there is a big difference between scenarios in the United Kingdom case. This shows how speeches given in the Parliament are significantly more decentralized than those in Party Conferences. Otherwise, the Spanish case reveals more similar positions in the speeches of both audiences. Nonetheless, the national leaders' positions over decentralization in Spain are also significantly different, being more decentralized when the speeches are given in Parliament than at Party Conferences.

Despite these promising results, questions remain. For example, further work is required to establish the viability of using speeches from diverse audiences to analyze positions over different policies, such as gender or environment, and even classic issues, such as economy or ideology, and analyze if there are changes in the leaders' positions. Also, this research will increase the comparative analysis by adding countries with high sub-national identity territories, such as Belgium or Canada, among others and political parties, from different spectrums' positions and with national or sub-national focus on their policies.

In this chapter, I established that parliament requires to take more decentralized positions because of the influence of the number of MPs from parties with strong sub-national identities and that these positions are stronger than in intra-party contexts, such as party conferences. After that, in the next part of this thesis, I focus on the impact of one type of political shock, the independence referendum.

Chapter 6: Referendums as Mobilization Shocks: Party Leaders and Political Parties position over Decentralization

Introduction

Leaders' and parties' positions over political divisions are part of the central political discussion in public opinion. However, the most relevant cleavage in politics continues to be the ideology left-right dimension because of his use as a 'shorthand' (Mair, 2007) to place political parties on different topics, although authors such as Inglehart (1977) and Kriesi et al. (2012) have discussed the development of new cleavages. Despite these theories, the classic cleavages, such as those based on religiosity, class, and territory, help to explain voting behaviour and major citizenship divisions (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) (Pattie et al., 1991). In this chapter, I demonstrate the importance of the centre-periphery dimension through the issue of centralization and how the referendums of independence influence the national leader's speeches.

Departing from the existing literature (Harguindéguy, 2022), I examine the relationship between external shocks such as independence referendums based on the centre-periphery cleavage and the leaders' speeches' position on decentralization. I conceptualize a referendum as an external shock because state-wide government parties have to deal with them despite the fact that they do not have them on the agenda for the next term. I argue that these events, the referendums, affect party leader speeches' positions on decentralization because of their relevance setting the topic of decentralization salient and their polarized answer options and results. In addition, the recent debates around independence referendums in Spain and the United Kingdom motivate this research. I close the existent gap in the literature using independence referendums as a primary variable to change leaders' speeches on decentralization.

Building on the results from the previous chapter, I consider explanations about other characteristics that influence party leaders' speeches on decentralization. For example, the impact and how influence the different spheres and audiences where the speeches occur, in the Parliament or Party Conferences, on party leaders' speeches. The party leaders confront diverse scenarios when speaking in front of MPs from other parties than when speaking in front of party members. I expect that party leaders' speeches are more decentralized when speaking in Parliament because of the different needs, agenda control or passing legislation, and goals of the leaders at the venue in which the speech is given (Huber, 1992; Döring & Hallerberg, 2004). I state differences in how the various political parties' historical positions –on the left-right scale– also influence their relationship with the speeches on this issue. As a consequence, after the

relevance of the audiences, I consider independence referendums as another variable, such as the number of MPs in the first empirical chapter and the audience in the second empirical chapter, that changes the national leaders' position on decentralization.

I compare two study cases with similarities and differences using referendums of independence, including Spain and the United Kingdom. To test the argument, I use a novel, large-period dataset consisting of three different types of documents. The speech dataset and the process to create the reference texts to scale the speeches in the centralization-decentralization scale are explained in detail in previous chapters (chapters three for methodologies specifications and five for the different types of documents).

I present the independence referendums as an external shock because they were not a principal purpose of the party in government when the term started. In addition, the party in government in Spain and the United Kingdom when the independence referendums occurred were supporters of non-independence. Although it is arguable that the House of Commons approved the independence referendum in Scotland, the Prime Minister and, by extension, the party in government were positioned against independence (Faulconbridge & Osborn, 2014). In the Spanish case, the President and the party in government even challenged the independence referendum legally and used state force (Domínguez, 2017). Thus, in both cases, the independence referendum was a political shock external to the government's prevision when the legislature started.

After testing the different hypotheses, I find that external shocks like referendums have a moderate effect on national leaders' speeches talking about decentralization (Matsusaka, 2018) (Greene & McMillan, 2020). Nonetheless, other variables such as the national leader's political affiliation, the country, and the audience are key characteristics and have relevant importance over the national leaders' speeches over decentralization.

This research has implications in the study of the independence referendums and the issue of decentralization, along with the national leaders' speeches in different audiences addressing this topic. First, when I examine the referendums and how they impact political behaviour. Second and being narrower in the explanation, it influences decentralization when leaders speak about it in different stages. Furthermore, the third implication arrives in the use of quantitative text analysis scaling to position leaders' speeches on decentralization. Finally, there is an existent gap in the study of major political reforms related to decentralization and the different characteristics that condition the position of party leaders' speeches over this issue,

such as the existence of a referendum, the different audiences, the belonging to a particular political party, or even the country political path.

The chapter follows the following structure: first, I present literature on decentralization, devolution and territorialism politics. Also, I explain the importance and influence of this issue in contemporary politics. Second, I show the similarities and differences in the cases with respect to independence referendums. Also, I describe the three hypotheses that constitute this research. Third, I expose the research design, the statistical methods, and how I answer the hypotheses shown before. The fourth and fifth sections answer the hypotheses and build a discussion or debate about these results and how they influence the field of party politics and comparative politics using text analysis approaches.

Issue selection, parliament, and party conference

Political parties address an immense number of issues in political debates (Mortensen, et al., 2011; Greene Z., 2016). Parliament and party conferences are two classic spheres where political leaders and political parties debate different topics. Usually, the study of speeches and political parties is based on ideological cleavage (Greene & Haber, 2016) or single-party studies (Ceron & Greene, 2019). Historically, the left-right scale summarises the different party positions on several topics; however, the saliency of the centre-periphery cleavage is a challenge, as Galais & Serrano (2020) state.

The issue of decentralization is a major topic of debate in the two countries in this research's scope. Therefore, I focus this research on the influence of independence referendums on party leaders' speeches over decentralization. Following this statement, the cases of the United Kingdom and Spain have been the most recent cases. Also, both countries have relevant ethno-regionalist territories with their corresponding ethno-regionalist parties in the national legislatures. To show that not only state-wide parties have disagreements on ideology, the SNP has a long tradition of intra-party debates about its position on independence (Stewart Leith & Steven, 2010). Beyond that, the United Kingdom made and agreed on a Scottish Independence Referendum in September 2014. On the other hand, in the case of Spain, the October 2017 Catalanian Independence Referendum was made unilaterally by the Catalanian sub-national government without the support, control or even the results recognition from the Spanish national government. Therefore, the two different approaches have a link with the

accommodation thesis and resistant thesis, based on the government incentives to make an agreement for the independence referendum (Cetrà & Harvey, 2018).

Nevertheless, it is an issue in development and used in the public, parliamentary, and party debate to a greater extent by ethno-regionalist parties. Here it stands the idea that political parties employ the issue of decentralization as their issue ownership (Petrocik, 1996) on one side or as an issue entrepreneurship (De Vries & Hobolt, 2012) on the other. Although state-wide parties have more to lose than win when speaking about devolution or territorialism, sometimes they cannot select the topic under debate in parliament, party conferences, or the media (McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2014). According to the issue ownership theory, the influence of issue ownership can be moderate depending on how much salience perception there is about the topic in question (Bélanger & Meguid, 2008).

In addition, there are two other relevant aspects: the agenda-setting, the parties expose their preferences and try to position them in the public debate (McCombs & Shaw, 1972); and the different party characteristics in terms of ideology, both making a relevant strength positioning or evading uncomfortable topics for the political parties and leaders. For example, it is well-known that parties and leaders emphasise specific issues more than others they intend to ignore (Green-Pedersen & Mortensen, 2014). Also, during the debates and discussions, political party actors try to set the agenda, shifting others' policy positions and attention to a specific topic to support their preferences (Rossiter, 2021).

The issues related to territories and devolution constitutes an important topic in Spain and the United Kingdom because of their citizens' emotional and political attachment to the territory. Going further in that idea and not without discussion, the devolved territories in both countries are called *nations*. These national identities identify these territories as collective, sharing social, cultural, and political attributes beyond the classical ideology cleavage (Calhoun, 1993; Galais & Serrano, 2020).

I embrace the argument that ethno-regionalist parties push the territorial dimension into the political agenda, including the legislative debate. This political audience exposes the leaders and parties to their goals in order to position themselves in a more supportive or opposite way. Also, Meguid (2005) argue that, mainstream political parties' behaviour influences niche party success. Martin & Vanberg (2008) support a there is a communicational strategy positioning these debates in the parliament in a central role where "they target audiences" about the parties' position over particular issues or bills (Cox, 2006; Martin & Vanberg, 2008; Giannetti &

Pedrazzani, 2016). In addition to that, the independence referendum is a topic that the party in government cannot dismiss, although they are in a “risk-averse” position (van de Wardt, 2015).

I find a theoretical gap in the study of decentralization as the main topic in political science to position parties and leaders. The current number of contributions is mostly based on expert surveys and with the influence of ideology as the main factor (Toubeau & Wagner, 2013; Toubeau & Wagner, 2016). Therefore, I state a different argument using referendums as a key factor in leaders’ speeches’ positions on decentralization. I consider referendums as political events that influence party leaders’ speeches, and in this case, independence referendums when the salient topic is the issue of decentralization. There are theoretical studies about decentralization to address each study case present in this research (Dandoy, 2010; Fabre & Swenden, 2013). However, no comparative study answers the question about the influence of independence referendums on leaders’ positions using the leaders’ speeches.

Independence referendums and the political context

After the independence referendum in Spain and the United Kingdom, decentralization and independence referendums became salient on the political agenda. Consequently, the research on independence referendums has increased, and with that, the analysis of referendum typologies, the logic under the debate of the referendum, and results (Harguindéguy et al., 2022). In these cases, ethno-regionalist and state-wide parties confront a significant discussion over decentralization, devolution, or independence from opposed perspectives. Nonetheless, political parties such as Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Junts per Catalunya, EH-Bildu, Bloque Nacionalista Galego, or the Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru take a stance of supporting decentralization, devolution and even independence referendums on this debate. Also, state-wide parties are mainly positioned in opposition, not only about independence but to perform a referendum.

The debate about independence starts differently in Scotland and Catalonia. In Scotland, the devolution process was introduced by Labour on the basis that devolution would finish with nationalism. In 1995, George Robertson (Labour Party member) stated, “Devolution will kill Nationalism stone dead”. However, as Greene & McMillan (2020) state, it was the opposite effect. SNP voters increased over the devolved elections until they won the majority of seats dominating Scottish politics. The SNP supported independence from the beginning, although the topic remained ‘frozen’ until their elections victories. Despite the referendum results predictions –where they had small chances of success– the SNP campaign positioned the

independence referendum issue at the centre of the debate (McCrone, 2019). Although the Scottish citizens voted in the independence referendum, the road to this agreement with the UK national government has been long. They started with unionism in the nineteenth century, going through the devolved years, getting more self-government, and finishing in the independentist period with the emergence of ethno-regionalist parties such as the SNP seeking to be an independent country (Keating, 2015).

Nevertheless, the case of the Catalanian referendum starts another way. The debate became public and central in Catalan, and by extension Spanish, politics following two events. First, the explanation from the authors Guinjoan & Rodon (2016) is based on the Constitutional Court declaration about the Catalan Statute of Autonomy (2010), which the Catalan citizens supported by a legal and mandatory referendum and it was announced as unconstitutional. Also, there were territorialist political actors majority supporting independence in 2012 (Barrio & Rodríguez-Teruel, 2017).

Studies about referendums have increased since the Scottish independence referendum in 2014. Also, the case of Scotland (Greene & McMillan, 2020) and Catalonia (López & Sanjaume-Calvet, 2020) are two of the three most analyzed, the other referendum at the top three is the Brexit referendum (Hobolt, 2016; Hobolt et al., 2021). This reveals the topic's relevance in the political debate and confirms being part of the agenda-setting. Nonetheless, I find the gap when reviewing those studies, the small number of quantitative research on this topic, even analyzing small or large samples, (Harguindéguy et al., 2022). Therefore, in addition to quantitative research, I am adding this type of design to the analysis of speeches using quantitative text analysis (QTA). Previously, the analyses were based on a more theoretical approach and Quebec as a single case (Dion, 1996).

From the perspective developed by Downs (1957), the most effective way for parties and their candidates to maximize their vote share is by adopting a programmatic stance that comes close to the median voter's position. In this situation, ethno-regionalist parties aim to scrutinise and double-check the mainstream parties. Using the referendum, in this case, it is effective for them to pursue this goal, although in the minority because their vote share depends on it to a large extent. In addition, Stokes' (1963) valance theory stands by the importance of voters' perception about parties or leaders' competence in the topic under debate. In addition, the study of party policy shifting supports the idea that what they call "niche parties" shifts their positions responding to the shifts in the mean position of their supporters rather than the general electorate (Ezrow et al., 2011).

These perspectives are relevant to explain the importance of the year of the referendum in this research. The cases explained had their respective referendums, under different conditions, in 2014 and 2017 in the United Kingdom and Spain, respectively. As with any other General Election, the referendum process coexists with support and opposition campaigning from the relevant political institutions. Supporting the argument before, I argue that party leaders also emphasize their positions before and after external shocks like referendums. At this point, I expect that leaders try to get closer to more or fewer decentralization references depending on their party and voters' position on the issue.

The main difference between the United Kingdom case, being more precise, the Scottish 2014 Independence Referendum, and the Spanish case, referring to the no-agreed Catalonia 2017 Independence Referendum, is the agreement with the government. In the first case, after years of holding its position about an independence referendum, the Scottish government announced its intentions after the SNP achieved a parliamentary majority victory in the 2011 Scottish Parliament elections. After that, the UK coalition government in Westminster formally agreed to one in the 2012 Edinburgh agreement. On the other hand, the case of Catalonia has not been recognized by the government at any time. State-wide parties in Spain have no intention of having a legally supported referendum about the independence of Catalonia from the rest of the territory. Nonetheless, different social organizations supported by independence parties and the devolved sub-national Catalanian government organized a referendum that ended with arrest warrants and riots. After a trial, some political leaders went to prison.

In both cases, there was a hard-fought campaign between parties and organizations supporting and opposing independence. The event entirely influenced the media coverage of the months before and after the referendums. This helped to engage citizens, not only those already positioned in the issue. Of course, this campaigning during the period before the referendum raises other issues that potentially crosscut the subject of the referendum. For instance, ideological or centre-periphery cleavages are outstanding in this debate. In that sense, national leaders' have to address a difficult context, where they have to oppose what they consider "debilitate" their country in any sense. As they can have, at some point, an understanding position on the issue of decentralization, after the referendum, they have to state the strength of the State and the country together. This entire situation before and after the referendum and the national leaders' difficulties in positioning over decentralization supports the idea of national leaders' supporting more centralized positions in their speeches, as presented in the first hypothesis in this research, which states:

(H1: speeches – referendum) National leaders' speeches over decentralization are more supportive of centralization after referendums.

Political parties take diverse positions in public debates. Also, there are relevant differences in the policy-issue process between countries. While in the United Kingdom case, the referendum was an agreement from the Conservative government, it is appropriate to state that in Spain, the left-right cleavage is closely related to the territorial dimension. At this point, sub-national/peripheral identities tend to be associated with the left (Dinas, 2012), and opposition to independence referendums tend to correlate with the right-wing parties. Also, in the United Kingdom case, the Conservatives campaigned harder in favour of centralization than the Labour party, which is criticized because of its vague position in some referendum and devolution debates. Being supportive of decentralization and devolution in the past has made it difficult for the Labour party to have a clear party position when speaking about referendum and independence.

The two dimensions, ideology and territorial distribution of power, are not independent because historical reasons make them related. Also, using the left-right scale to place parties and political actors is applicable even when their policies may change. This dimension shows “a more abstract standard which can be applied more or less uniformly in different settings and periods” (Mair, 2007, p. 207). The opposition to the Franco dictatorship was led by left-wing and periphery ethno-regionalist parties. For instance, the two cleavages tend to go together in the debate. While right-wing parties are pro-centralization policies, the ethno-regionalist and left-wing parties are more supportive of territorialism, peripheral nationalism and, generally, pro-decentralization policies (Sánchez-Cuenca & Dinas, 2016; Simón, 2020). Despite the argument developed by Toubeau & Wagner (2013) based on the right-wing support for decentralization because of their economically liberal grounds, this is not the case in the United Kingdom and Spain, as explained in the previous chapter. On the same line, I follow the position exposed by Convery & Lundberg (2017) when they say, “both the PP and the Conservative Party have used economic justifications for a strong central state at different times. The PP continues to hold a conservative view of decentralization, and the Conservatives have only recently started to link their market liberalism to a justification for decentralization”.

Thus, I consider the party itself and its ideology to be an indicator of political decentralization and, in this case, for a more supportive position to decentralization after the referendum. The second hypothesis investigates the influence of these differences and affirms:

(H2: speeches – party) Left-wing parties state a more decentralized position than right-wing parties after the referendum.

Finally, I find another critical characteristic influencing the leaders' speeches over decentralization: the country itself. In this case, I refer to the existing distinctions between the countries. The political culture, the number of parties in the parliament, and the political system indicate relevant differences. Also, the increasing debate about polarization is involved in the discussion. The referendum and multiple General Elections in a few years have increased the doubt about the unified United Kingdom. In general, the evidence with respect to long-term ideological positions is mixed. Perrett (2021) states that the increasing polarization and partisan sorting do not exceed levels experienced 25 years ago. Moreover, in the case of Spain, the debate about decentralization and multiple identities within the state can influence parties' and voters' positions. This influence helps to increase polarization; as Simón (2020) states that the polarization has increased with fractionalization and more electoral volatility in Spain.

The polarization is not the variable that differentiates one country from the other. The General Election results, which party or leader wins the elections, or how many investiture procedures or conferences have been held before and after the referendum also influence the country's distinction. Also, the leaders "want to hold only referendums that they are going to win" (Renwick, 2014, p. 79). In both cases, the Conservative party was in government before the referendum day in the national government, and in the Scottish referendum, the support to maintain the status quo won but with a closer result than expected. This creates another difference from the Catalan case, where the results are completely irrelevant because of the non-legal procedure. Still, the pro-independence parties maintain the sub-national government despite the failed process. A key point and difference between the cases is the change of national government in Spain after the referendum, supporting the social-democratic party (PSOE), which is more open to negotiating with the pro-independence parties. These political differences between the countries support that:

(H3: speeches – country) Due to differences in political party government after the referendum, the speeches' position on decentralization is more decentralized in Spain than in the United Kingdom.

Research Design

In this section, I explain how I test the hypotheses and predictions about the speeches' position over decentralization and the influence of referendums. First, I explain how I analyse

the speeches and run the scaling process. Then, I present the predictors and their operationalization.

I based the analysis on the study of political texts. I analyse investiture speeches and Queen's speeches as parliamentary speeches as well as party conference speeches. The details about how the speeches are scaled, the dataset and case of studies, and the specification of the method are in the research design chapter (chapter three).

As a reference, some articles use textual data to validate the method (Bruinsma & Gemenis, 2019). Along with that, there are scholars interested in measuring other dimensions, such as EU positions (Proksch & Slapin, 2009) and how different approaches like manifestos, expert surveys, and elite party surveys deal with these topics (Ecker et al., 2021). Although differing in the level of power, studies are using plenary speeches from different stable democracies at the UN General Assembly, where the issue of national sovereignty is involved (Finke, 2022). This reinforces the argument about the importance of decentralization, devolution, and referendums of independence topic. However, there is an existing gap in the analysis of documents' positions over other issues such as decentralization. The main statement from the analysis of the *wordscores* is the importance of recognising the policy dimension under study and the ability in the selection of text to represent the extremes in the same dimension (Bruinsma & Gemenis, 2019).

First, the Wordscores scaling method returns the documents' positions over the predetermined scale based on the content of the two reference texts. This returns our dependent variable (*DV*).

Second, I find the relationship between this dependent variable with the following predictors or independent variables (*IV*). The independent variables in this research are *dummy* (0/1) variables to differentiate between two different groups or characteristics. The first independent variable is *the referendum*. This variable is coded as follows: 0 when the speech was done *before* the independence referendum in the country, and 1 when the speech was given *after* the independence referendum. Second, it is the variable *audience*. Also, the place where the speech is done plays a relevant role as a predictor variable. It is presented as 0 when the speech occurs in the parliament and with code 1 when it occurs in the party conference. The third predictor reflects the different political parties. The variable *party* states the parties considered left-wing parties in both countries, Labour Party and Spanish Socialist and Workers' Party, coded as 0, and on the opposite side at the right side of the scale, Conservatives and

People’s Party, as code 1. Finally, to complete the group of independent variables, I use the variable *country* differencing from Spain (0) and the United Kingdom (1).

Several methods currently exist for the measurement of the relationship between variables. So, I estimate three different models: the first model demonstrates the relationship between the dependent variable and the different independent variables. After that, Models 2 and 3 refer to the linear estimation between the dependent and independent variables but are divided by country. Thus, Model 2 refers to the Spanish sample, and model three shows the United Kingdom sample coefficients. All these references to estimators and coefficients are presented in Table 1.

Results

I estimate three regression models to evaluate the different hypotheses. In Table 10, I start with Model 1, which includes the speeches’ position over decentralization and the predictors’ variables. Also, Models 2 and 3 represent the relationship between the primary dependent variable and the predictors’ variables but show the differences between the two cases of study. In this case, Model 2 refers to Spain, and Model 3 shows the results in the United Kingdom case.

Table 10. Multiple regression models

	Model (1) Position	Model (2) Spain Position	Model (3) UK Position
After	0.049 (0.033)	-0.024 (0.039)	0.109*** (0.037)
Right-Wing	0.074** (0.029)	0.091*** (0.030)	0.027 (0.037)
United Kingdom	0.125*** (0.028)		
Party Conference	0.161*** (0.027)	-0.059* (0.029)	0.259*** (0.030)
Constant	-0.574*** (0.024)	-0.526*** (0.024)	-0.480** (0.033)

Observations	46	24	22
R-Squared	0.680	0.433	0.825
Adjusted R2	0.649	0.348	0.796
F Statistic	21.756*** (df = 4;41)	5.085*** (df = 3;20)	28.322*** (df = 3;18)

Note* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01

The results shown above allow us to answer the research questions in this research and test the hypotheses from the previous section. The results are based on the first hypothesis, which states that the influence of independence referendums on the leaders' speeches' position over decentralization show differences across models, meaning that there are differences between the two countries under study.

When discussing Model 1 and Model 2, they refer to the model combining the United Kingdom and Spain and the Spanish model, respectively. When looking at the referendum variable, I do not find significant results in these cases. Nonetheless, Model 3 shows how the referendum significantly relates to the leaders' speeches' position on decentralization in the United Kingdom case. The variation suggests a strong positive effect significant at 99%, meaning that the leaders took the more centralized positions in the speeches over decentralization after the 2014 Scottish referendum.


In a broader analysis, Table 10 shows the variables fitting the models to a reasonable extent in Model 1 and Model 3. These models refer to the combined model and the United Kingdom case, and it is possible to conclude that the independent variables (the referendum timing, the party ideology, the country, and the speech audience) explain the dependent variable (the speeches position on decentralization) with solid accuracy following the Adj-R2 levels (64,9% and 79,6%, respectively). However, Model 2 has a low level of explanatory (34,8%) power using the independent variables mentioned in the analysis.

Figure 15 and Figure 16 below present the differences between Spain and the United Kingdom. Although the statistical results do not support the idea of referendum influencing leaders' speeches over decentralization in Spain, it is possible to note the differences before and after the 2017 Catalanian referendum represented by the vertical line. Despite that, the variation moves closer to the most decentralized positions on the scale in the Spanish case.

Because of the relevance of the results, the influence of the audience is remarkable, as found in the previous chapter. Clearly, the context where the speech is done influences the


position over decentralization. The significant results across the three models show this importance. It is possible to visualize more about this result in the Appendix.

Figure 15. Speeches position over decentralization before/after the referendum in Spain



On the other hand, in Figure 16 below, the United Kingdom demonstrates a different situation over devolution or decentralization before and after the referendum than Spain. More precisely, the significant results show the closer to more centralized positions in the devolution/decentralization scale after the 2014 Scottish referendum, also represented by the vertical line. In the same vein, although the changes in the government evidence minor variation in general between Conservatives and Labour positions over decentralization, it is necessary to remind the inexistent left-wing governments in the United Kingdom since Tony Blair in 2005. This political context influences the citizens' political mindset engaging better with more centralized positions, if the party in power states a more centralized position and remains in power for this long period, it is arguably its effects on the public debate. Helping to understand the differences in the results between Spain and the United Kingdom, it is essential to clarify that after the referendum in each case, the salient governments have different policy positions in terms of decentralization. Nonetheless, the Socialist party in Spain is also positioned to oppose the independence referendum and any secessionism debate but has supportive speeches with more decentralization or devolution.


Figure 16. Speeches position over decentralization before/after the referendum in the United Kingdom



The results in Table 10 expose how they significantly influence the position over decentralization adopted by the leaders in their speeches. At this point, and going more in-depth, it affects Model 1, so there are significant results in the combined model, which states that when speeches move forward with more centralization positions, then the speeches come from right-wing parties. Model 2 also has significant results in this variable, referring directly to speeches from the People’s Party, Partido Popular (PP) in the Spanish translation.

Also, Figure 17 below, provides a clear picture of both cases. While Spain clearly distinguishes between parties’ positions by analyzing leaders’ speeches over decentralization, the United Kingdom case has more mixed positions over decentralization across the Conservatives and Labour parties. Another statement to explain this difference is how citizens position the parties over scales. To a significant extent, people from Spain position the parties and leaders in more radical or extreme values on the scales, mostly on every topic, than the United Kingdom, where people position them closer to the median values. This increases the parties’ ability to have a close position where their voters want them to be in the discussion to maximize votes.


Figure 17. Speeches position over decentralization by Political Party



Accounting for context presents a challenge in automated text analysis, due to multilingual contexts' difficulties in the comparative approach. These differences between countries are well shown in Figure 18. Beyond differences between audiences or political parties, the countries expose relevant variations in the speeches' positions on decentralization in Spain and the United Kingdom. Table 10 explains in Model 1 how relevant and significant the variable country is. This significant result presents more centralized positions closer to the United Kingdom than Spain. It is supported visually by Figure 18, where beyond a few speeches; most leaders' speeches over decentralization in Spain have more decentralized positions than in the United Kingdom. These results relate to the hypotheses exposed in the previous section, where I stated that parties from the right wing and the case of the United Kingdom would be closer to centralization positions than left-wing parties and the case of Spain.

To explain more in detail why the United Kingdom takes more centralized positions over decentralization speeches than Spain, it is necessary to analyze the other variables. In each one, the significant results, or even the null results but with tendency, demonstrate more centralized positions from the United Kingdom leaders and parties. Thus, Figure 18 helps to clarify these previous results and aligns with the public opinion beliefs.

Figure 18. Speeches position over decentralization by Country



In general, the results have shown relevant information for this research and future investigations about decentralization and speeches. From the three hypotheses presented, the influence of referendum, the party in government, and the country, I find results partially consistent with two hypotheses that partially demonstrated it depends on the country for the referendum and the party in government, and an entirely consistent with the third, referring to the country. When referring to “partially” in these cases, I individually indicate significant results in, at least, one of the three models presented in Table 1 concerning two of them to Spain or the United Kingdom. On the other hand, the coefficient testing the third hypothesis was significant in Model 1, which refers to both study cases together.

The mechanisms that drive these results in the speeches’ positions on decentralization are the independence referendum and the party in government. The independence referendum demonstrates its influence on the leaders’ speech changes on decentralization because, in both cases, the speeches present more extreme positions on the centralization-decentralization scale. Nonetheless, I state the importance of the party in government after the referendum. While right-wing parties like the Conservative party take a more centralized position to confront the

situation, the Socialist party in Spain, a left-wing party, position itself closer to decentralized positions on the scale.

Discussion

The debate over the issue of decentralization covers cultural, social, and political distinctions between territories. At some point, in the political sphere, it is shown as an attempt to break something that already exists. Conservatives or parties positioned on the right-wing support maintaining the status quo, while left-wing parties, most of them from the social-democratic family, are open to delegating powers to sub-national governments. The idea developed by Tobeau & Wagner (2013) seems not to work under the Spain and United Kingdom cases. It is closer to the notion that Conservatives were open to holding the Scottish referendum in 2014 because of their confidence with the results. Because of the no-confidence, the Spanish national government were not open to debate (Cetrà & Harvey, 2018). Also, even being pro-free market parties, the Conservatives and Partido Popular are two centralized parties (Convery & Lundberg, 2017). However, other studies more focused on nationalism or secessionism go further than this research on the necessity or right to decide using the referendum as an instrument to transform the society.

In this study, the scope is focused on two comparable cases with a big difference: the agreement to do the referendum. In fact, it is necessary for this agreement to have a referendum accepted and approved legally, not only by the Government but for supranational institutions too. Nevertheless, beyond that, do these external shocks influence the leaders?

The study of political speeches and, even more, their relationship with external shocks such as referendums is a gap in the field this dissertation has covered. In this case, and starting with the country's influence, the results are precise: Spain has leaders with more decentralized statements than the United Kingdom despite not having an agreed referendum. This does not mean that the United Kingdom is not a decentralized or devolved country or the inexistence of an independent movement; moreover, the 2014 Scottish referendum had a close result. The point here is that the debate about giving more devolution or decentralization to specific territories in Spain is an issue nowadays, and it has been an issue from the beginning of democracy in 1976. The issue has risen with time, but the strength of the more pro-decentralization and pro-independence territories financially take a crucial position in maintaining the debate.

The evidence sustains to affirm that referendums influence leaders' speeches over decentralization. Although the results are not as strong as expected, the tendency is clear whether, after the referendums, the speeches have more extreme positions in the devolution/decentralization scale. Furthermore, this is the main finding of this study; that external shock influences leaders' statements, which is something to explore in future investigations. Unfortunately, I deal with data limitations and limited resource possibilities. Still, the possibility of analyzing these speech variations involving leaders from a more extensive range of countries would increase and develop the field of comparative politics and text analysis.

Following and supporting leaders' positions are the political parties as a whole. It exists a similar output than in the country case. In Spain, the positions over decentralization are more radicalized in terms of differences between the two main parties. Although it follows valence theories on party positioning over topics to look competent to the electorate, it makes the agreement complex. In such a scenario, the United Kingdom parties share closer positions over decentralization and, if possible, hold the explanation over an agreed referendum in one case and the disagreement in the other. Finally, the audience appears as a relevant issue to mention. The parliamentary speeches have more decentralized positions than the speeches at the party conferences. This can be explained by the presence of ethno-regionalist parties and MPs in the first case, which plays a crucial role in the political system in both cases. The differences between scenarios and the speeches only taking place at the parliamentary level can be found in the appendix (Figures 19, 20, and 21).

To sum up, I maintain the importance of shock as the referendum in political positions beyond the ideology. In this case, the decentralization issue. Of course, further research adding new cases with potential similarities in different contexts will help to make stronger assumptions, but this is an appropriate first step in studying referendums and leaders' relationships referring to territorialism.

After this chapter focusing on the independence referendum's relevance to national party leaders' speeches on decentralization, I will analyze how the different empirical analyses affect leaders' positions. In this sense, in the next chapter, I explain my research influence and contribution to the field, along with the specific knowledge from each section addressing the influence of MPs from sub-national territories, the different audiences, and the independence referendum.

Appendix

Figure 19. Speeches position over decentralization by the Audience




Figure 20. Parliamentary speeches position over decentralization in Spain





Figure 21. Parliamentary speeches position over decentralization in the United Kingdom



Chapter 7: Conclusion

After the three empirical chapters, I address the questions outlined at the beginning of this research. Then, I examine how different factors like the number of MPs, the different audiences, and the referendum on independence affect the leaders' speeches on decentralization. Finally, I face the topic of decentralization as a significant discussion in the political context. The saliency of decentralization in the political debate in the United Kingdom and Spain was also demonstrated during this thesis through manifesto references to it and expert surveys.

In the overall analysis, I argue that leaders' speeches on decentralization vary when these characteristics about power distribution appear. This assumption is essential in the level of policies because the decentralization issue is still a debate in both countries. Although the states have similarities in terms of territories with high sub-national identity, the way that the national government deals with the sub-national suggestions and the claim for a referendum of independence have been entirely different. Further analysis would be relevant to analyze if this rising polarization debates around decentralization have increased the parties' difficulties in making arrangements between national and sub-national parties. Nevertheless, despite singularities in the different cases, the current political situation remains broadly similar with the relevance of decentralization issue in the political debate and the public opinion and the existence and increasing representation of people from high sub-national identity territories through the ethno-regionalist parties.

The first empirical analysis addresses the variation in the position of the leaders' speeches on decentralization when the number of MPs increases. There are two types of MPs relevant in this examination: the MPs from ethno-regionalist parties, the relevant parties in both cases because of their force at the sub-national level and their representation in the national chambers, and the state-wide party in government MPs from high sub-national identity territories, also called party branches. Historically, the MPs from state-wide parties elected in sub-national territories such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia on one side, and Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland on the other have a more supportive position on decentralization than their party peers from different territories and from the national party.

I predicted that when the number of MPs from ethno-regionalist parties increases, the leaders' speeches on decentralization would be more supportive of decentralization. Instead, the significant results show what I called "the politics of confrontation" in the fourth chapter. The results show that leaders' speeches go more to centralized positions when the number of MPs

from ethno-regionalist parties increases. In addition, when analyzing the sub-national level, the case of Scotland shows significant outputs in the same sense.

Although it would look contradictory, the significance of party ideology, which I place as a control variable, gives us an explanation. The results show that the parties on the right wing are more supportive of centralization, and the left-wing parties are more supportive of decentralization. In the case of Scotland, the party in government is the Conservative party, so the leader's speeches try to position himself in front of the increasing number of MPs from the SNP in Scotland. This explanation brings closer the results of this research to the policies and *realpolitik*. Nonetheless, the outputs from the other sub-national territories or even from the state-wide parties MPs from high sub-national identity territories follow the trend despite adding more cases to give significance to the results.

The devolution and sub-national demands also respond to state-wide party branches in high sub-national identity territories. Historically, the branches in these territories are more pro-devolution than the national party, and so are their voters. Because of that, state-wide parties and national leaders care about sub-national suggestions from these territories even when ethno-regionalist parties claim them because their supporters and party members would be closer to the same positions on the decentralization issue.

After that, I look at the political communication question. I examine the relevance of the different audiences and venues in the leaders' speeches on decentralization. Here, I analyze the investiture and Queen's speeches as parliamentary speeches and party conference speeches. Each type of audience has its characteristics. Not only the venue where the speech is done like the Parliament versus the party conference venue, but also the people and the goals of the speech.

In parliamentary speeches, the leader speaks in front of other MPs from different parties and territories. In the other case, at the party conference, the leader speaks in a more comfortable venue with party members and supporters as the primary audience. Also, while in Parliament, the leader's speech looks to position the government and the party on diverse issues and, sometimes, looks for support from other MPs to pass different laws, bills or the investiture procedure, in the party conference, the leader refers to a more party internal discussions and trying to maintain the party line.

I address the question of audience influence and answer the hypothesis of leaders' speeches being more supportive of decentralization in Parliament than in party conferences. I state this hypothesis because of the necessity of negotiating different term legislative procedures

with other MPs from different parties or the party in government but from high sub-national identity territories. However, the leaders did not have these constrictions at the party conference. They place themselves in the same line as the party, and like in the previous section, there are differences between right-wing and left-wing parties. In summary, leaders' speeches on decentralization are more supportive of it in parliament than in party conferences.

Finally, I use the referendum of independence as an explanatory variable. I expect leaders' speeches on decentralization are more supportive of centralization after the independence referendums. The point here remains in the difficulties for national leaders to position in the independence debate in a decentralized position that would be analyzed closer to independence. For a definition, state-wide parties are in opposition to independence procedures. Nonetheless, I find a difference between right-wing and left-wing parties in their position after the referendum. In this case, the political context and electoral results after the referendums take a relevant role.

The independence referendum in the United Kingdom case refers to the Scottish Independence referendum in 2014. Despite winning the "*No Independence*" option, the close result gives a solid position for the "*Yes*" in Scottish public opinion. It has maintained the public and political debate about independence until now. In the case of Spain, I select the Catalonia 2017 referendum as a key point. It is necessary to point out the "*illegal*" vision of this referendum because of the no-agreement between the national and the sub-national level to carry it out. Despite that, it gives me a strong and relevant demonstration supporting independence to analyze the speeches before and after this moment.

The limitations in the number of elections after the referendums give us a small sample to analyze the results. Beyond that, I present significant results in the case of the United Kingdom, where leaders' speeches are more centralized after the referendum. Nevertheless, I find more supportive positions for decentralization after the referendum in Spain. In this case, the explication is also linked to the parties in government and their historical positions in the decentralization debate. After the Scottish Independence referendum in 2014, the Conservative party has been the only party in government (although it was in coalition until 2015), being the first line against the sub-national power and sub-national autonomy in the United Kingdom. In Spain, however, the party in government after the referendum has been the Socialist party. The Socialist party has been, historically and together with the Communist party, the state-wide party more supportive of decentralization and devolution of powers since democracy, and even before

that. It is remarkable in this debate that, despite this supportive position, the Socialist party has a strong position against the independence of any Spanish territory.

Also, the recent territorial polarization (Garmendia Madariaga & Riera, 2022) gives a strong argument for these results. In this sense, polarization makes the right-wing parties more centralized while it moves more to decentralization positions for left-wing parties. So, the differences continue increasing while the polarization also increases.

Methodologically, I also develop a new approach. I started using two countries as the scope of the research, which is not usual in quantitative text analysis because of the multilingual diversity. A few novel research works have developed how to deal with this limitation (Reber, 2019). Regarding the type of speeches, I use party conferences (Greene & Haber, 2016; Ceron & Greene, 2019), but also investiture speeches and the Queen's speeches to analyze parliamentary communication. These speeches give a new approximation to parliamentary speech because of the characteristic of being the first speech in front of other MPs after the election written by the Prime Minister. Also, it shows the main topics to address by the government during the next term. Otherwise, I created a new original set of documents in classifying the speeches and the reference texts to scale documents in the decentralization-centralization cleavage. Along with that, I developed a new measure of decentralization preferences, using Wordscores and creating reference texts from mentions to the topic of decentralization and centralization to analyze this dimension. Previous documents by other scholars positioned the documents in the classical left-right scale (Laver, Benoit, & Garry, 2003).

This research also has relevance in the policy position field. Although the study of decentralization as a policy is not new, the increasing saliency of the topic due to political events has positioned decentralization, devolution, and independence in the public opinion debate in many states. Party competition through issues such as decentralization is challenging to deal with for political parties. Usually, they feel more comfortable when the political discussion is limited to the classic left-right scale because of the more straightforward meaning and voters' perception. In addition, I base my research on the analysis of Spain and the United Kingdom. The two cases have distinctions when party competition and parties' policy positions move to the decentralization debate. Clearly, the Socialist left-wing party (PSOE) has more decentralized speech than the People's Party (PP). In the United Kingdom case, the results between the two state-wide parties remain similar. But, the differences appear when the comparison is between countries. Probably, more information would be needed to extract conclusions because of the vocabulary differences. And also, the political context in each country is different. But in short,

the left-wing party in Spain hold a more decentralized position than its homonymous in the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, this difference has not translated yet in practice to more support for ethno-regionalism, at least, the only country that held an independence referendum agreed between the sub-national government led by an ethno-regionalist party and the national government led by a state-wide party is still the United Kingdom.

The conclusions stated in this dissertation have potential similarities with events in other countries where decentralization or independence processes arise, such as Canada or Belgium, among others. These cases are relevant in the literature of independence referendums (Béland & Lecours, 2005; 2007). On the one hand, the case of Canada (Nadeau et al., 1999; Lecours, 2017) highlights because of the two independence referendums and the short margins in the last 1995 independence referendum, winning by the “remain” option 50,58%-49,42%. On the other hand, the case of Belgium developed differently. Although there are suggestions and preferences for a referendum, the ethno-regionalist parties have focused on “policy winnings” (Newman, 1995; Dodeigne & Niessen, 2019) rather than fighting for a referendum. Although each case has its singularities in terms of the number of parties, political system and context, and voters’ preferences, among others, this literature and examples give a possibility for external validation to this thesis’s results. Nonetheless, the interest in multilingual text analysis is increasing and would help to develop this research further.

Scholars of intra-party politics must consider the diverse policy issues where political parties could have disagreements. However, voters and parties use the ideological scale as a shortcut. The raising of new issues will develop the references to these topics. The voters’ representation and the policy congruence within the parties is also a topic in this research. We have seen how different party branches handle the issue of decentralization in different ways. These differences between branches are also relevant in their relationship with the national party.

Nonetheless, as seen when the leaders speak on decentralization, there is a two-forces battle, the position of the voters on a specific topic and the leaders’ and parties’ interest in raising a topic where they would be “the ownership”. Moreover, after analyzing the independence referendums as an external shock for the leaders’ speeches on decentralization, the leaders’ positions always have to address discrepancies. Nonetheless, the idea after this study supports leaders’ positions on decentralization, addressing their voters’ preferences in divisive issues, such as decentralization. Also, new studies on gender, environment or immigration are divisive issues with a strong saliency now. Therefore, how to address these issues and how leaders refer to them

would be a further step in the investigation of intra-party and inter-party studies using speeches and text analysis.

In consequence, I state that this thesis adds new relevant answers in the methodological and substantive spheres. By collecting and analyzing relevant political texts using novel methods to measure new cleavages pertinent to the current political debate like decentralization, devolution, and independence, but also explore the question: how do the different characteristics specified at the beginning of this thesis, the number of MPs from sub-national territories, the different audiences, and the independence referendum, affect leaders' speeches on decentralization? In short, I demonstrate that these factors explain a large part of the leaders' speeches on decentralization variation.

Bibliography

20minutos. (16 de January de 2014). El PSC se rompe por la votación de la petición para celebrar el referéndum en Cataluña. *20minutos* .

A., R. (6 de November de 2006). *Nuevo tripartito catalán, presidido por Montilla y quizá con Carod de vice*. Obtenido de 20 Minutos: <https://www.20minutos.es/noticia/169250/0/tripartito/catalan/Montilla/>

Adams, J. (2012). evidence, Causes and electoral consequences of party policy shifts in multiparty elections: Theoretical results and empirical. *Annual Review of Political Science* , 401-419.

Alcaide, S. (24 de May de 2011). *El País*. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/politica/2011/05/24/actualidad/1306248688_742769.html

Aldrich, A. S. (2015). National parties and European legislators. *University of Pittsburgh ProQuest Dissertations Publishing* .

Alexiadou, D. (2022). Cabinet ministers and inequality. *European Journal of Political Research* , 326-350.

Alonso, S., Gómez, B., & Cabeza, L. (2013). MEasuring Centre-Periphery Preferences: The Regional MANifestos Project. *Regional and Federal Studies* , 1-23.

Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1994). Riding the Wave and Claiming Ownership over Issues: The Joint Effects of Advertising and News Coverage in Campaigns. *Public Opinion Quarterly* , 335–57.

Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Müller, J. (2014). Who Takes the Parliamentary Floor? The Roles of Gender in Speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag. *Political Research Quaterly* , 504-518.

Bäck, H., Debus, M., & Müller, W. (2011). The Ideological Cohesion of Political Parties. An Evaluation of the Method of Deriving MPs' Policy Positions from Parliamentary Speeches. *Oxford University* .

Barcos, J. (6 de July de 2020). *Noticias de Navarra*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.noticiasdenavarra.com/actualidad/2020/07/06/pp-galicia-parece-resto-partido-2267771.html>

Barrio, A., & Rodríguez-Teruel, J. (2017). Reducing the gap between leaders and voters? Elite polarization, outbidding competition, and the rise of secessionism in Catalonia. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* , 1776–94.

Baumann, M., Debus, M., & Gross, M. (2021). Strategic issue emphasis in parties' election campaign statements. *Party Politics* , 515-527.

BBC. (15 de July de 2020). *www.bbc.com*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-wales-politics-53410205>

- Béland, D., & Lecours, A. (2007). Federalism, Nationalism and Social Policy Decentralization in Canada and Belgium. *Regional & Federal Studies* , 405-419.
- Béland, D., & Lecours, A. (2005). The Politics of Territorial Solidarity: Nationalism and Social Policy Reform in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. *Comparative Political Studies* , 676–703.
- Bélanger, É., & Meguid, B. M. (2008). Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. *Electoral Studies* , 477-491.
- Belloni, F., & Beller, D. (1978). *Faction politics: Political parties and factionalism in comparative perspective*. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-Clio.
- Benoit, K. W. (2018). quanteda: An R package for the quantitative analysis of textual data . *Journal of Open Source Software* , 774.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2008). Compared to What? A Comment on "A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text" by Martin and Vanberg. *Political Analysis* , 101-111.
- Benoit, K., & Laver, M. (2006). *Party Policy in Modern Democracies*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Bernauer, J., & Bräuninger, T. (2009). Intra-Party Preference Heterogeneity and Faction Membership in the 15th German Bundestag: A Computational Text Analysis of Parliamentary Speeches. *German Politics* , 385-402.
- Bevan, S., John, P., & Jennings, W. (2011). Keeping party programmes on track: The transmission of the policy agendas of executive speeches to legislative outputs in the United Kingdom. *European Political Science Review* , 395-417.
- Bille, L. (2001). Democratizing a Democratic Procedure. Myth or Reality? Candidate Selection in Western European Parties. *Party Politics* , 363-380.
- Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M., & Katz, R. S. (1999). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government*. Ohio State University Press.
- Brión Insua, R. (3 de May de 2022). Vox tacha a Feijóo de "nacionalista" por emplear el gallego, pero el líder popular no los llamará "ultraderecha" si les molesta. *Galicia Press* .
- British Political Speech*. (s.f.). Recuperado el 2022, de <http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/>
- Bruinsma, B., & Gemenis, K. (2019). Validating Wordscores: the promises and pitfalls of computational text scaling. *Communication Methods and Measures* , 212-227.
- Brunner, M., & Debus, M. (2008). Between Programmatic Interests and Party Politics: The German Bundesrat in the Legislative Process. *German Politics* , 232-251.
- Budge, I., & Farlie, D. (1983). *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies*. London: Allen & Unwin.

- Budge, I., & Pennings, P. (2006). Do They Work? Validating Computerised Word Frequency Estimates Against Policy Series. *Electoral Studies* , 121-29.
- Budge, I., Klingemann, H.-D., Volkens, A., Bara, J., & Tanenbau, E. (2001). *Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Budge, I., Robertson, D., & Hearl, D. (1987). *Ideology, Strategy and Party Change in 19 Democracies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Buttolph Johnson, J., Reynolds, H. T., & Mycoff, J. D. (2020). *Political Science Research Methods*. Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE Publications.
- Calhoun, C. (1993). Nationalism and ethnicity. *Annual Review of Sociology* , 211-239.
- Campbell, A., & Miller, W. (1957). The motivational basis of straight and split ticket voting. *American Political Science Review* , 293-312.
- Carmines, E., & Stimson, J. (1989). *Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics*. Ithaca, NY: Princeton University Press.
- Castles, F. G., & Mair, P. (1984). Left-Right Political Scales: Some Expert Judgements. *European Journal of Political Research* , 73– 88.
- Ceron, A. (2012). Bounded oligarchy: How and when factions constrain leaders in party position-taking. *Electoral Studies* , 689-701.
- Ceron, A. (2015). Changing politics, changing language. The effect of institutional and communicative changes on political language measured through content analysis of Italian intra-party debates. *Journal of Language and Politics* , 528-551.
- Ceron, A. (2014). Inter-factional conflicts and government formation Do party leaders sort out ideological heterogeneity? *Party Politics* .
- Ceron, A. (2017). Intra-party politics in 140 characters. *Party Politics* , 7-17.
- Ceron, A., & Greene, Z. (2019). Verba volant, scripta manent? Intra-party politics, party conferences, and issue salience in France. *Party Politics* , 701-711.
- Ceron, A., Curini, L., & Negri, F. (2019). Intra-party politics and interest groups: missing links in explaining government effectiveness. *Public Choice* , 407-427.
- Cetrà, D., & Harvey, M. (2018). Explaining accommodation and resistance to demands for independence referendums in the UK and Spain. *Nations and Nationalism* , 607–629.
- Choi, H., Bull, P., & Reed, D. (2016). Audience Responses and the Context of Political Speeches. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology* , 601-622.

Close, C., Kelbel, C., & van Haute, E. (2017). What Citizens Want in Terms of Intra-Party Democracy: Popular Attitudes towards Alternative Candidate Selection Procedures. *Political Studies* , 646–664.

Company, E. (15 de December de 2003). *Maragall proclama que el programa pactado para el nuevo Gobierno "será el de todos"*. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/diario/2003/12/15/espana/1071442802_850215.html

Competition Between Unequals. the Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success 2005 *American Political Science Review* 347–360

Congreso de los Diputados. (s.f.). Recuperado el 6 de May de 2020, de <http://www.congreso.es/>

Convery, A., & Lundberg, T. C. (2017). Decentralization and the centre right in the UK and Spain: central power and regional responsibility. *Territory, Politics, Governance* , 388–405.

Costa Lobo, M. (2008). Parties and LEader Effects: Impact of LEaders in the Vote for Different Types of Parties. *Party Politics* , 281-298.

Cox, G. (1997). *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cox, G. W. (2006). The Organization of Democratic Legislatures. En B. G. Weingast, & D. A. Wittman, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy* (págs. 141-161). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral Politics as a Redistributive Game. *The Journal of Politics* , 370-389.

Cox, G. W., & McCubbins, M. D. (1994). Bonding, structure, and the stability of political parties: party government in the House. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 215-231.

Craig, I. (13 de March de 2017). *South Wales Argus*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.southwalesargus.co.uk/news/15152790.wales-needs-to-debate-independence-says-plaid-cymru-leader-leanne-wood-after-scotland-referendum-call/>

Cué, C. E. (29 de June de 2010). *El País*. Obtenido de El PP se alegra de que haya fallo y pide calma a los partidos catalanes: https://elpais.com/diario/2010/06/29/espana/1277762411_850215.html

Daalder, H. (2002). Parties: Denied, Dismissed, or Redundant? A Critique. En R. Gunther, J. Montero, & J. J. Linz, *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges* (págs. 39-57). New York: Oxford University Press.

Dalton, R., & Wattenberg, M. (2009). *Parties without Partisans. Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Dandoy, R. (2010). Ethno-regionalist parties in Europe: a typology. *Perspectives on Federalism* , 2 (2), 194-220.

- De Vries, C. E., & Hobolt, S. B. (2012). When dimensions collide: The electoral success of issue entrepreneurs. *European Union Politics* , 246-268.
- De Winter, L. (1998). Conclusion. A comparative analysis of the electoral, office and policy success of ethnoregionalist parties. En L. De Winter, & H. Tursan, *Regionalist parties in Western Europe* (págs. 204-247). London and New York: Routledge.
- Debus, M., & Navarrete, R. (2018). Do regional party primaries affect the ideological cohesion of political parties in multilevel systems? Evidence from Spain. *Party Politics* , 1-13.
- Dekavalla, M. (2016). Framing referendum campaigns: the 2014 Scottish independence referendum in the press. *Media, Culture & Society* , 793–810.
- Díez, A. (15 de Mayo de 1999). *El País*. Obtenido de El País: https://elpais.com/diario/1999/05/15/espana/926719201_850215.html
- Dinas, E. (2012). Left and right in the Basque Country and Catalonia: the meaning of ideology in a nationalist context. *South European Society and Politics* , 467-485.
- Dion, S. (1996). Why is Secession Difficult in Well-Established Democracies? Lessons from Quebec. *British Journal of Political Science* , 269-283.
- Do parties respond? How electoral context influences party responsiveness2014*Electoral Studies* 48-60
- Dodeigne, J., & Niessen, C. (2019). The Flemish Negative Case: Explaining the Prevalence of Regionalist Demands without Request for an Independence Referendum. *Fédéralisme Régionalisme* .
- Domínguez, I. (2017, October 27). *El País*. Retrieved December 2022, from https://elpais.com/politica/2017/10/27/actualidad/1509091082_211811.html
- Döring, H. (2001). Parliamentary Agenda Control and Legislative Outcomes in Western Europe. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 145-165.
- Döring, H., & Hallerberg, M. (2004). *Patterns of Parliamentary Behavior*. London: Routledge.
- Downs, A. (1957). *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper.
- Downs, A. (1957). An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Economy* , 135-150.
- Duverger, M. (1959). *Political Parties, their organization and activity in the modern state*. New York: Wiley.
- Ecker, A., Jenny, M., & Muller, W. C. (2021). How and why party position estimates from manifestos, expert, and party elite surveys diverge: A comparative analysis of the 'left-right' and the 'European integration' dimensions. *Party Politics* , 528-540.

Egan, P. J. (2013). *Partisan Priorities. How Issue Ownership Drives and Distorts American Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

El País. (2 de October de 2010). Montilla refuerza el perfil catalanista del PSC y niega que CiU sea "el cambio". *El País* .

El Periódico. (11 de September de 2012). El ala catalanista del PSC se desmarca de la dirección y va a la manifestación. *El Periódico* .

Elias, A., & Tronconi, F. (2011). From protest to power: Autonomist parties in government. *Party Politics* , 505–524.

Europa Press. (06 de April de 2014). Eguiguren (PSE) cree que Euskadi será independiente "cuando decidan los no nacionalistas" por "desengañarse" de España. *20 minutos* .

Fabre, E., & Swenden, W. (2013). Territorial Politics and the Statewide Party. *Regional Studies* , 342-355.

Faulconbridge, G., & Osborn, A. (2014, September 16). *Reuters*. Retrieved December 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-scotland-independence-cameron-idUKKBN0HA0JT20140916>

Fenno, R. F. (1978). *Home style: house members in their districts*. Little, brown.

Fernandez-Vazquez, P. (2014). And Yet It Moves: The Effect of Election Platforms on Party Policy Images. *Comparative Political Studies* , 1919–1944.

Fieldhouse, E., Green, J., Evans, G., Mellon, J., Prosser, C., Schmitt, H., y otros. (2021). *Electoral shocks: The volatile voter in a turbulent world*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Finke, D. (2022). Party ideologies and UN debates. *Party Politics* .

Galais, C., & Serrano, I. (2020). The effects of regional attachment on ideological self-placement: a comparative approach. *Comparative European Politics* , 487-509.

Gamm, G., & Shepsle, K. (1989). Emergence of Legislative Institutions: Standing Committees in the House and Senate, 1810-1825. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 39-66.

Garmendia Madariaga, A., & Riera, P. (2022). Territorial Polarisation after Radical Parties' Breakthrough in Spain. *South European Society and Politics* .

Gerring, J. (2008). Case Selection for Case-Study Analysis: Qualitative and Quantitative Techniques. In J. M. Box-Steffensmeier, H. E. Brady, & D. Collier, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (pp. 645–684). Oxford University Press.

Gerring, J. (2004). What Is a Case Study and What Is It Good for? *American Political Science Review* , 341 - 354.

Giannetti, D., & Pedrazzani, A. (2016). Rules and Speeches: How Parliamentary Rules Affect Legislators' Speech-Making Behavior. *Legislative Studies Quaterly* , 771-800.

- Gibernau, M. (2010). Devolution and Independence in the United Kingdom: the case of Scotland. *Revista d'estudis autonòmics i federals* , 56-82.
- Gilbert, A. (1988). The New Regional Geography in English and French-speaking Countries. *Progress in Human Geography* , 208-28.
- Greene, Z. (2016). Competing on the issues: How experience in government and economic conditions influence the scope of parties' policy messages. *Party Politics* , 809-822.
- Greene, Z., & Haber, M. (2016). Leadership Competition and Disagreement at Party National Congresses. *Cambridge University Press* , 611-632.
- Greene, Z., & McMillan, F. (2020). 'Party competition and dual accountability in multi-level systems' the independence echo: the rise of the constitutional question in Scottish election manifestos and voter behaviour. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* , 317-338.
- Greene, Z., & O'Brien, D. (2016). Diverse parties, diverse agendas? Female politicians and the parliamentary party's role in platform formation. *European Journal of Political Research* , 435-453.
- Greene, Z., & Sajuria, J. (2018). Agenda Setting and Intra-Party Deliberation: Who gets represented at party national meetings? *SocArXiv* .
- Greene, Z., Spoon, J.-J., & Williams, C. J. (2018). Reading between the lines: party cues and SNP support for Scottish independence and Brexit. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* , 307-329.
- Green-Pedersen, C., & Mortensen, P. B. (2014). Avoidance and Engagement: Issue Competition in Multiparty Systems. *Political Studies* , 747-764.
- Grimmer, J., & Stewart, B. (2013). Text as data: the promise and pitfalls of automatic content analysis methods for political texts. *Political Analysis* , 267-297.
- Guibernau, M. (2000). Spain: Catalonia and the Basque Country. *Parliamentary Affairs* , 55-68.
- Guinjoan, M., & Rodon, T. (2016). Catalonia at the Crossroads: Analysis of the Increasing support for secession. En X. Cuadras-Morató, *Catalonia: New independent state in Europe?* New York, Milton Park: Routledge.
- Harguindéguy, J.-B., Sánchez Sánchez, E., Sánchez Sánchez, A., & Cole, A. (2022). The rise of research on independence referendums. *International Political Science Review* .
- Harmel, R., & Janda, K. (1994). An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* , 259-287.
- Hayward, W. (11 de December de 2020). *Wales Online*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/politics/welsh-independence-price-senedd-referendum-19438732>
- Heller, W. (2002). Regional Parties and National Politics in Europe. Spain's estado de las autonomías, 1993 to 2000. *Comparative Political Studies* , 657-685.

- Heritage, J., & Greatbatch, D. (1986). Generating Applause: A Study of Rethoric and Response at Party Political Conferences. *American Journal of Sociology* , 110-157.
- Hernandez, M., Sanz, L. A., Carvajal, A., & Piña, R. (30 de 01 de 2017). ¿Para qué celebran congresos los partidos? *El Mundo* .
- Hjorth, F., Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S., & al., e. (2015). Computers, coders, and voters: comparing automated methods for estimating party positions. *Research & Politics* .
- Hjorth, F., Klemmensen, R., Hobolt, S., Hansen, M., & Kurrild-Klitgaard, P. (2015). Computers, coders, and voters: Comparing automated methods for estimating party positions. *Research and Politics* , 1-9.
- Hobolt, S. B. (2016). The Brexit vote: a divided nation, a divided continent. *Journal of European Public Policy* , 1259-1277.
- Hobolt, S., & de Vries, C. (2015). Issue Entrepreneurship and Multiparty Competition. *Comparative Political Studies* , 1159-1185.
- Hobolt, S., Leeper, T., & Tilley, J. (2021). Divided by the Vote: Affective Polarization in the Wake of the Brexit Referendum. *British Journal of Political Science* , 1476-1493.
- Hopkin, J. (2006). Clientelism and Party Politics. En R. S. Katz, & W. Crotty, *Handbook of Party Politics* (págs. 406-412). London: SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Houten, v. (2009). Multi-Level Relations in Political Parties. A Delegation Approach. *Party Politics* , 137-156.
- Huber, J. D. (1992). Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States. *The American Political Science Review* , 675-687.
- Huber, J. D. (1996). The Vote of Confidence in Parliamentary Democracies. *The American Political Science Review* , 269-282.
- Huber, J. (1992). Restrictive Legislative Procedures in France and the United States. *American Political Science Review* , 675-687.
- Hug, S., & Schulz, T. (2007). Left-Right Positions of Political Parties in Switzerland. *Party Politics* , 305– 30.
- Hughes, G. (30 de June de 2022). *North Wales Live*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.dailypost.co.uk/news/should-vote-welsh-independence-your-24361316>
- Ideology, Party Factionalism and Policy Change: An integrated dynamic theory2010*The British Journal of Political Science* 781–804
- Inglehart, R. (1977). *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Jennings, W., Bevan, S., & John, P. (2011). The Agenda of British Government: The Speech from the Throne, 1911–2008. *Political Studies* , 74-98.
- John, P., & Jennings, W. (2010). Punctuations and Turning Points in British Politics: The Policy Agenda of the Queen's Speech, 1940–2005. *British Journal of Political Science* , 561-586.
- Jolly, S., Bakker, R., Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Polk, J., Rovny, J., et al. (2022). Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File, 1999-2019. *Electoral Studies* .
- Katz, R. S., & Crotty, W. (2006). *Handbook of Party Politics*. SAGE Publications Ltd.
- Katz, R. S., & Mair, P. (1995). Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy. The Emergence of the Cartel Party. *Party Politics* , 5-28.
- Keating, M. (1996). *Nations Against the State: The New Politics of Nationalism in Quebec, Catalonia and Scotland*. Palgrave Macmillan.
- Keating, M. (2001). *Plurinational Democracy: Stateless Nations in a Post-Sovereignty Era*. Oxford University Press.
- Keating, M. (1998). *The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Keating, M. (2015). The Scottish Independence Referendum and After. *Revista d'estudis autonòmics i federals* , 73-98.
- Keating, M., & Bleiman, D. (1979). *Labour and Scottish nationalism* . London: Macmillan.
- Keating, M., & McEwen, N. (2017). The Scottish Independence debate. En M. Keating, *Debating Scotland: Issues of independence and union in the 2014 referendum* (págs. 1-26). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kelso, A. (2017). The politics of parliamentary procedure: An analysis of Queen's Speech debates in the House of Commons. *British Politics* , 267-288.
- Kenny, M., & Verge, T. (2013). Decentralization, Political Parties, and Women's Representation: Evidence from Spain and Britain. *Publius: The Journal of Federalism* , 109–128.
- Kirchheimer, O. (1966). The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems. En J. La Palombara, & M. Weiner, *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kitschelt, H. (2019). *The logics of party formation: Ecological politics in Belgium and West Germany*. Cornell University Press.
- Klingemann, H., Volkens, A., Bara, J., Budge, I., & Macdonald, M. (2006). *Mapping Policy Preferences II: Estimates for Parties, Electors and Governments in Eastern Europe, the European Union and the OECD, 1990-2003*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

- Klüver, H., & Sagarzazu, I. (2016). Setting the Agenda or Responding to Voters? Political Parties, Voters and Issue Attention. *West European Politics* , 380-398.
- Kölln, A., & Polk, J. (2017). Emancipated party members: Examining ideological incongruence within political parties. *Party Politics* , 18-29.
- Kölln, A.-K. (2015). The effects of membership decline on party organisations in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research* .
- Koole, R. (1996). Cadre, Catch-All or Cartel? A Comment on the Notion of the Cartel Party. *Party Politics* , 507-523.
- Kriesi, H., Grande, E., Dolezal, M., Helbling, M., Höglinger, D., Hutter, S., y otros. (2012). *Political Conflict in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge UP.
- Krippendorff, L. (2004). *Content Analysis. An Introduction to its Methodology*. London: Sage.
- Krouwel, A. (2012). *Party Transformations in European Democracies*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- La Vanguardia. (23 de September de 2012). El ala catalanista de PSC pide el derecho a decidir. *La Vanguardia* .
- LaPalombara, J. (2007). Reflections on Political Parties and Political Development, Four Decades Later. *Party Politics* , 141-154.
- Laver, M., & Garry, J. (2000). Estimating Policy Positions from Political Texts. *American Journal of Political Science* , 619-634.
- Laver, M., & Shepsle, K. A. (1996). *Making and breaking governments: Cabinets and legislatures in parliamentary democracies*. Cambridge Univ Pr.
- Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting Policy Positions from Political Texts Using Words as Data. *American Political Science Review* , 311-331.
- Lawson, K., & Merkl, P. (1988). *When Parties Fail: Emerging Alternative Organizations*. Princeton N.J: Yale University Press.
- Lecours, A. (2017). THE TWO QUEBEC INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUMS: POLITICAL STRATEGIES AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. *Colección Monografías CIDOB* , 63-68.
- Lehmann, P., Burst, T., Matthieß, T., Regel, S., Volkens, A., Weßels, B., et al. (2022). The Manifesto Data Collection. *Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR)*. Version 2022a.
- Lehrer, R., & Lin, N. (2020). Everything to everyone? Not when you are internally divided. *Party Politics* , 783-794.
- Lijphart, A. (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. *The American Political Science Review* , 682-693.

- Lijphart, A. (1975). The Comparable-Cases Strategy in Comparative Research. *Comparative Political Studies* , 158-177.
- Lin, N., & Lehrer, R. (2021). Everything to everyone and the conditioning effect of intraparty cohesion: A replication in a cross-national context. *Party Politics* , 909-916.
- Linz, J. (2002). Parties in Contemporary Democracies: Problems and Paradoxes. In R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, & J. Linz, *Political Parties: Old Concepts and New Challenges* (pp. 291-317). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Liñeira, R., & Cetrà, D. (2015). The Independence Case in Comparative Perspective. *The Political Quarterly* , 257-264.
- Lipset, S., & Rokkan, S. (1967). *Party systems and voter alignments: cross-national perspectives*. New York: Free Press.
- López, J., & Sanjaume-Calvet, M. (2020). The Political Use of de facto Referendums of Independence. The Case of Catalonia. *Representation* , 501-519.
- Lowe, W. (2008). Understanding Wordscores. *Political Analysis* , 356-371.
- Lowe, W., Benoit, K., Mikhaylov, S., & Laver, M. (2011). Scaling policy preferences from coded political texts. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 123-155.
- Lundell, K. (2004). Determinants of Candidate Selection. The Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective. *Party Politics* , 25-47.
- Macnab, S. (30 de July de 2012). *The Scotsman*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.scotsman.com/news/scottish-independence-labour-dismisses-rebellion-1615992>
- Mair, P. (2007). Left-Right Orientations. In R. J. Dalton, & H.-D. Klingemann, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Marks, G., Hooghe, L., & Schakel, A. (2008). Patterns of Regional Authority. *Regional and Federal Studies* , 167-181.
- Markus, W., & Meyer, T. M. (2014). Which Issues do Parties Emphasise? Salience Strategies and Party Organisation in Multiparty Systems. *West European Politics* , 1019–1045.
- Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2008). A Robust Transformation Procedure for Interpreting Political Text. *Political Analysis* , 93-100.
- Martin, L. W., & Vanberg, G. (2008). Coalition Government and Political Communication. *Political Research Quarterly* , 502-516.
- Massetti, E., & Schakel, A. H. (2016). Between autonomy and secession: Decentralization and regionalist party ideological radicalism. *Party Politics* , 59–79.
- Matsusaka, J. G. (2018). Public policy and the initiative and referendum: a survey with some new evidence. *Public Choice* , 107–143.

- Mazzoleni, M. (2009). The saliency of regionalization in Party Systems. A Comparative Analysis of Regional Decentralization in Party Manifestos. *Party Politics* , 199–218.
- McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The Agenda-Setting function of Mass Media. *Public Opinion Quarterly* , 176-187.
- McCrone, D. (2019). Pebble them wi' stanes: Twenty Years of the Scottish Parliament. *Scottish Affairs* , 125–151.
- McGann, A. (2002). The advantages of ideological cohesion: a model of constituency representation and electoral competition in multiparty democracies. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* , 37-70.
- McGuire, K. T., & Vanberg, G. (2005). Mapping the Policies of the U.S. Supreme Court: Data, Opinions, and Constitutional Law. *Prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association* , Washington , DC.
- Meguid, B. (2008). Institutional Change as Strategy: The Role of Decentralization in Party.
- Meguid, B. M. (2005). Competition Between Unequals: The Role of Mainstream Party Strategy in Niche Party Success. *American Political Science Review* , 347-359.
- Meguid, B. M. (2015). Multi-Level Elections and Party Fortunes. The Electoral Impact of Decentralization in Western Europe. *Comparative Politics* , 379-398.
- Meguid, B. (2008). *Party Competition Between Unequals. Strategies and Electoral Fortunes in Western Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Minder, R., & Kingsley, P. (2017, October 27). *The New York Times*. Retrieved December 2022, from <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2017/10/27/espanol/parlament-cataluna-puigdemont-rajoy-espana.html>
- Mitchell, J. (1996). From unitary state to union state: Labour's changing view of the United Kingdom and its implications. *Regional Studies* , 607-611.
- Montero, A. P. (2005). The Politics of Decentralization in a Centralized Party System: The Case of Democratic Spain. *Comparative Politics* , 63-82.
- Mortensen, P. B., Green-Pedersen, C., Breeman, G., Chaqués-Bonafont, L., Jennings, W., John, P., et al. (2011). Comparing Government Agendas: Executive Speeches in the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and Denmark. *Comparative Political Studies* , 973–1000.
- Müller, J. (2013). On a Short Leash? Sub-National Party Positions between Regional Context and National Party Unity. *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties* , 177-199.
- Nadeau, R., Martin, P., & Blais, A. (1999). Attitude Towards Risk-Taking and Individual Choice in the Quebec Referendum on Sovereignty. *British Journal of Political Science* , 523-539.
- Neumann, S. (1956). *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics* . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Newman, S. (1995). Losing the electoral battles and winning the policy wars: Ethnoregional conflict in Belgium. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* , 44-72.

NI Conservatives. (14 de June de 2012). *NI Conservatives launch as fresh, centre-right party, in Belfast*. Obtenido de <https://www.niconservatives.com/news/ni-conservatives-launch-fresh-centre-right-party-belfast>

Noguer, M. (29 de June de 2010). *El País*. Obtenido de Montilla, "indignado", pide a Zapatero que rehaga el pacto estatutario: https://elpais.com/diario/2010/06/29/espana/1277762408_850215.html

Núñez Feijóo, A. (25 de July de 2020). *El Plural*. Recuperado el 2022, de https://www.elplural.com/autonomias/hogar-gallegos_244723102

Ordaz, P. (18 de July de 2021). *La paradoja de Euskadi: menos independentismo, más nacionalismo*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://elpais.com/espana/2021-07-18/la-paradoja-de-euskadi-menos-independentismo-mas-nacionalismo.html>

Orriols, L. (3 de December de 2010). ¿Por qué el PSC es "catalanista"? *El País* .

Paasi, A. (2004). Region and Place: Looking through the Prism of Scale. *Progress in Human Geography* , 536-46.

Party over Policy? Scottish Nationalism and the Politics of Independence 2010 *The Political Quarterly* 263 - 269

Pattie, C., & Johnston, R. (2017). Sticking to the Union? Nationalism, inequality and political disaffection and the geography of Scotland's 2014 independence referendum. *Regional and Federal Studies* , 83-96.

Pattie, C., Fieldhouse, E., Johnston, R., & Russell, A. (1991). A widening regional cleavage in British voting behaviour, 1964–87: Preliminary explorations. *British Elections and Parties Yearbook* , 121-144.

Paun, A., & Hall, D. (22 de April de 2021). *Institute for Government*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/explainers/welsh-independence>

Perrett, S. (2021). A divided kingdom? Variation in polarization, sorting, and dimensional alignment among the British public, 1986-2018. *The British Journal of Sociology* , 992-1014.

Peterkin, T. (31 de January de 2006). *The Telegraph*. Recuperado el 2022, de <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1509280/IRA-fuel-smuggling-drove-oil-giants-to-abandon-Ulster.html>

Petrocik, J. (1996). Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 Case Study. *American Journal of Political Science* , 825-850.

Petrocik, J. R., Benoit, W. L., & Hansen, G. (2003). Issue ownership and presidential campaigning, 1952–2000. *Political Science Quarterly* , 599–626.

- Pettitt, R. T. (2012). Me, myself and I: 'Self-referencing' in Labour Party conference leaders' speeches. *British Politics* , 111-134.
- Piñol, À. (29 de June de 2010). *El País*. Obtenido de CiU califica la situación de "gravísima" y ERC augura un auge del independentismo: https://elpais.com/diario/2010/06/29/espana/1277762407_850215.html
- Pitkin, H. F. (1967). *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press.
- Poguntke, T., & Scarrow, S. E. (2020). Intra-Party Democracy and Representation: Necessity, Complement, or Challenge? In R. Rohrschneider, & J. Thomassen, *The Oxford Handbook of Political Representation in Liberal Democracies* (pp. 323–339). Oxford Handbooks.
- Polk, J., & Kölln, A.-K. (2017). The lives of the party: Contemporary approaches to the study of intraparty politics in Europe. *Party Politics* , 3-6.
- Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2009). Position Taking in European Parliament Speeches. *British Journal of Political Science* , 587-611.
- Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2015). *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate. Parties, Rebels, and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Proksch, S.-O., Lowe, W., Wäckerle, J., & Soroka, S. (2019). Multilingual Sentiment Analysis: A New Approach to Measuring Conflict in Legislative Speeches. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 97-131.
- Público. (23 de March de 2017). *La mayoría de los vascos apoya una consulta sobre la independencia de Euskadi*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.publico.es/politica/mayoria-vascos-apoya-consulta-independencia.html>
- Puhle, H.-J. (2002). Still the Age of Catch-allism? En R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, Linz, & J. J., *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges* (págs. 58-83). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Rabinowitz, G., & MacDonald, S. E. (1989). A Directional Theory of Issue Voting. *American Political Science Review* , 93–121.
- Rahat, G., & Hazan, R. Y. (2001). CANDIDATE SELECTION METHODS An Analytical Framework. *Party Politics* , 297-322.
- Rahat, G., & Kenig, O. (2018). *From Party Politics to Personalized Politics? Party Change and Political Personalization in Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Rauh, C., & Schwalbach, J. (2020). *The ParlSpeech V2 data set: Full-text corpora of 6.3 million parliamentary speeches in the key legislative chambers of nine representative democracies*. Recuperado el 2022, de Harvard Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/L4OAKN>
- Raunio, T. (2002). Why European integration increases leadership autonomy within political parties. *Party Politics* , 405-422.

- Reber, U. (2019). Overcoming Language Barriers: Assessing the Potential of Machine Translation and Topic Modeling for the Comparative Analysis of Multilingual Text Corpora. *Communication Methods and Measures* , 102-125.
- Renwick, A. (2014). Don't trust your poll lead: how public opinion changes during referendum campaigns. In P. Cowley, R. A. Ford, & D. Finkelstein, *Sex, Lies and the Ballot Box : 50 Things You Need To Know About British Elections*. Biteback Publishing.
- Riera, P. (2013). Voting differently across electoral arenas: Empirical implications from a decentralized democracy. *International Political Science Review* , 561-581.
- Ríos, P. (4 de July de 2012). El sector catalanista del PSC reaparece y critica el dirigismo del partido. *El País* .
- Rokkan, S., & Urwin, D. (1983). *Economy, Territory, Identity*. London: Sage.
- Roller, E., & Van Houten, P. (2003). A National Party in a Regional Party System: The PSC-PSOE in Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies* , 1-22.
- Rose, R. (1964). Parties, Factions and Tendencies in Britain. *Political Studies* , 33-46.
- Rossiter, E. L. (2021). Measuring Agenda Setting in Interactive Political Communication. *American Journal of Political Science* , 337-351.
- Ruder, S., Peters, M. E., Swayamdipta, S., & Wolf, T. (2019). Transfer Learning in Natural Language Processing. *Proceedings of the 2019 Conference of the North American Chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics: Tutorials* (pp. 15–18). Minneapolis, Minnesota: Association for Computational Linguistics.
- Salvati, E. (2020). Politicization and conflict in the relationship with the European Union: an analysis of Italian Prime Ministers' parliamentary speeches. *Rivista italiana di scienza politica* , 1-24.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I., & Dinas, E. (2012). Introduction: voters and parties in the Spanish political space. *South European Society and Politics* , 365-374.
- Sánchez-Cuenca, I., & Dinas, E. (2016). *Voters and Parties in the Spanish Political Space*. London: Routledge.
- Scarrow, S., & Gezgor, B. (2010). Declining memberships, changing members? European political party members in a new era. *Party Politics* , 823-843.
- Scarrow, S., Webb, P., & Farrel, D. (2000). From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation: The Changing Distribution of Power within Political Parties. En D. Russel, & W. Martin, *Parties without Partisans: Political Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (págs. 129-153). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schattschneider, E. (1960). *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*. Hinsdale: The Dryden Press.

- Schneider, A. (2003). Decentralization: Conceptualization and Measurement. *Studies in Comparative International Development* , 32-56.
- Schoonvelde, M., Brosius, A., Schumacher, G., & Bakker, B. N. (2019). Liberals lecture, conservatives communicate: Analyzing complexity and ideology in 381,609 political speeches. *PLOS ONE* .
- Schumacher, G. H. (2019). A new dataset of Dutch and Danish party congress speeches. *Research & Politics* .
- Schumacher, G., & Giger, N. (2017). Who Leads the Party? On Membership Size, Selectorates and Party Oligarchy. *Political Studies* , 162 –181.
- Schumacher, G., de Vries, C., & Vis, B. (2013). Why Do PARTies Change Position? Party Organization and Environmental Incentives. *The Journal of Politics* , 464-477.
- Schwarz, D., Traber, D., & Benoit, K. (2015). Estimating Intra-Party Preferences: Comparing Speeches to Votes. *Political Sciences Research and Methods* , 379-396.
- Seeberg, H. B. (2020). First avoidance, then engagement: Political parties' issue competition in the electoral cycle. *Party Politics* , 284-293.
- Serrano, I. (2013). Just a matter of identity? Support for independence in Catalonia. *Regional & Federal Studies* , 523–545.
- Shomer, Y. (2017). The Conditional Effect of Electoral Systems and Intraparty Candidate Selection Processes on Parties' Behavior. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* , 63-96.
- Shomer, Y., Put, G.-J., & Geldaya-Lavy, E. (2016). Intra-Party Politics and Public Opinion: How Candidate Selection Processes Affect Citizens' Satisfaction with Democracy. *Political Behaviour* , 509-534.
- Sieberer, U. (2006). Party unity in parliamentary democracies: A comparative analysis. *The Journal of Legislative Studies* , 150-178.
- Simón, P. (2020). Two-bloc Logic, Polarisation and Coalition Government: The November 2019 General Election in Spain. *South European Society and Politics* , 533-563.
- Slapin, J., & Proksch, S. (2008). A Scaling Model for Estimating Time-Series Party Positions from Texts. *American Journal of Political Science* , 705-722.
- SNP. (21 de April de 2021). *The Scottish National Party*. Recuperado el 2022, de www.snp.org: <https://www.snp.org/manifesto/>
- Somer-Topcu, Z. (2017). Agree or disagree: How do party leader changes affect the distribution of voters' perceptions. *Party Politics* , 66–75.
- Spina, N. (2013). Explaining political decentralization in parliamentary democracies. *Comparative European Politics* , 428–457.

- Spoon, J.-J., & Williams, C. J. (2020). 'It's the economy, stupid': when new politics parties take on old politics issues. *West European Politics* , 802-824.
- Stokes, D. E. (1963). Spatial models of party competition. *American Political Science Review* , 368-377.
- Stubager, R., & Slothuus, R. (2013). What Are the Sources of Political Parties' Issue Ownership? Testing Four Explanations at the Individual Level. *Political Behavior* , 567–588.
- Summers, D. (24 de July de 2008). *Cameron plans partnership with Ulster Unionists*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2008/jul/24/davidcameron.conservatives>
- Swenden, W., & Maddens, B. (2009). *Territorial Party Politics in Western Europe*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Sylvester, C., Greene, Z., & Ebing, B. (2022). *ParIEE plenary speeches data set: Annotated full-text of 21.6 million sentence-level plenary speeches of eight EU states*. Recuperado el 2022, de Harvard Dataverse: <https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/ZY3RV7>
- Testa, A., & Specia, M. (15 de October de 2018). *The New York Times*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/world/europe/northern-ireland-brexit-border.html>
- Torcal, M., & Montero, J. R. (2006). *Political Disaffection and Democratization History in New Democracies*. Routledge.
- Torcal, M., Gunther, R., & Montero, J. R. (2002). Anti-Party Sentiments in Southern Europe. En R. Gunther, J. R. Montero, & J. J. Linz, *Political Parties. Old Concepts and New Challenges* (págs. 257-290). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Toubeau, S., & Wagner, M. (2013). Explaining Party Positions on Decentralization. *British Journal of Political Science* , 97-119.
- Toubeau, S., & Wagner, M. (2016). Party competition over decentralisation: The influence of ideology and electoral incentives on issue emphasis. *European Journal of Political Research* , 340-357.
- Tsebelis, G. (2000). Veto Players and Institutional Analysis. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration* , 441 - 474.
- Tsebelis, G. (2002). *Veto Players. How Political Institutions Work*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- United Kingdom Government*. (s.f.). Recuperado el 6 de May de 2020, de United Kingdom Government: <https://www.gov.uk/>
- Urkullu, I. (14 de September de 2012). *EAJ-PNV*. Recuperado el 2022, de <https://www.eaj-pnv.eus/es/noticias/31514/urkullu-el-concepto-de-independencia-hay-que-traba>
- van Biezen, I. (2003). *Political Parties in New Democracies. Party Organization in Southern and East-Central Europe*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

- van de Wardt, M. (2015). Desperate Needs, Desperate Deeds: Why Mainstream Parties Respond to the Issues of Niche Parties. *West European Politics* , 93-122.
- van de Wardt, M., De Vries, C. E., & Hobolt, S. B. (2014). Exploiting the Cracks: Wedge Issues in Multiparty Competition. *The Journal of Politics* , 986–999.
- van Haute, E., & Carty, R. K. (2012). Ideological misfits: A distinctive class of party members. *Party Politics* , 1-11.
- Verge, T. (2013). Party Strategies on Territorial Reform: State-wide Parties and the State of Autonomies in Spain. *West European Politics* , 317-337.
- Volgens, A., Krause, W., Lehmann, P., & al., e. (2019b). *The Manifesto Data Collection*. Obtenido de Manifesto Project (MRG/CMP/MARPOR): <https://manifesto-project.wzb.eu/>
- Watanabe, K. (2021). Latent Semantic Scaling: A Semisupervised Text Analysis Technique for New Domains and Languages. *Communication Methods and Measures* , 81-102.
- Webb, P. (2009). The Failing of Political Parties: Reality or perception? *Representation* , 265-275.
- Wolkenstein, F. (2018). Membership ballots and the value of intra-party democracy. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy* , 433-455.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Zelle, C. (1995). Social Dealignment vs. Political Frustration: Contrasting Explanations of the Floating Vote in Germany. *European Journal of Political Research* , 319-45.