Thesis

The political determinants of public infrastructure investment in Middle Income Countries : the visibility and targetability of white elephants

Creator
Rights statement
Awarding institution
  • University of Strathclyde
Date of award
  • 2025
Thesis identifier
  • T17313
Person Identifier (Local)
  • 202069617
Qualification Level
Qualification Name
Department, School or Faculty
Abstract
  • Middle Income Countries are often stuck in a trap, due to the political distortions thatdrive their allocation of investment. This dissertation explores these politicaldeterminants of public infrastructure investment in Middle-Income Countries [MICs],focusing on how political competition drives the allocation of investment. I argue thatinsecure incumbents in MICs, prioritize investments in economic infrastructure oversocial infrastructure due to their higher visibility and targetability, which make thempolitically valuable. Theoretically, when accountability is low, this misallocation can leadto inefficient, wasteful investments and "White Elephants" that hinder development. Byadopting a political economy approach, the dissertation disaggregates investmentcategories by function to examine the visibility and targetability mechanisms and theirdistortionary effects on resource allocation. Using empirical analysis of MICs and adetailed case study, this dissertation shows how low horizontal and verticalaccountability mean that politics can distort the allocation of investment, resulting inoverinvestment in potentially wasteful-albeit politically valuable- economic infrastructureat the expense of -often-more necessary social investments. The findings contribute tounderstanding, not only why MICs overinvest in economic infrastructure, but also whyinvestment in MICs often fails to translate into growth, providing critical insights into thepolitical dynamics behind resource misallocation and its implications for escaping theMIT.
Advisor / supervisor
  • Dellepiane Avellaneda, Sebastian
  • Alexiadou, Despina
Resource Type
DOI
Date Created
  • 2025

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