Thesis

The political economy of competition policy : varieties of competition policy approaches

Creator
Rights statement
Awarding institution
  • University of Strathclyde
Date of award
  • 2023
Thesis identifier
  • T16598
Person Identifier (Local)
  • 201675474
Qualification Level
Qualification Name
Department, School or Faculty
Abstract
  • This thesis investigates and analyses the economic, political, and institutional factors driving the development and enforcement of competition policy. According to the ‘convergence thesis’, most competition policies converge towards the economic-based assessment of anti-competitive practices and the separation of competition policy enforcement from broader political and social objectives. Generally, there is broad agreement that cartels and monopolistic practices intended to increase prices and limit market access are detrimental to the public interest and should be prohibited. Furthermore, the delegation of enforcement powers to independent competition authorities and supranational authorities such as the European Commission contributes to the further professionalisation and harmonisation of competition policies across countries. However, this convergence or globalisation view bears the risk of ignoring important cross-country differences that continue to play an important role and, therefore, put limits on the future convergence of competition policies. By making use of the Competition Law Index, which provides annual data on the strictness and scope of formal competition laws for up to 197 countries from 1890 to 2010, and an original data collection effort of the enforcement activities of the British and German competition authorities over the post-war period, this thesis explains temporal and cross country variations in competition policy. For that purpose, different time series cross sectional regression models are employed. The thesis finds that the existence of varieties of competition policies may be explained by levels of privatisation, democracy, the political ideology of the government, legal origin, and types of capitalism. Therefore, common functional pressures for the adoption and expansion of formal competition laws are shaped by domestic-institutional and political factors. Furthermore, on the level of enforcement activities, besides a functional welfare-enhancing role of competition policy, the thesis finds supporting evidence for the Stigler-Peltzman model of regulation and a continued responsiveness of competition authorities to political factors and business cycles.
Advisor / supervisor
  • De Francesco, Fabrizio
Resource Type
DOI

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