Thesis

Delegation to European executive agencies : frameworks for analysis and the 'delegation of delegation'

Creator
Awarding institution
  • University of Strathclyde
Date of award
  • 2012
Thesis identifier
  • T13156
Qualification Level
Qualification Name
Department, School or Faculty
Abstract
  • This thesis tests six models of delegation on six European executive agencies, which have been set up at the request of the European Commission since 2003. Executive agencies are a new form of agency and the first example of bodies which have been delegated powers directly by the European Commission and given full legal status. Three of the models tested stem from rational-choice approaches to delegation, while the other three are constructivist models. The thesis tests these models to determine which approaches best explain this form of delegation. The thesis also provides an empirical account of the agencies and an assessment of the implications for the wider delegation and agency literature of the Commission delegating its own delegated responsibilities to new organisations. A mixed-methods approach is adopted, including primary document analysis and qualitative interviews with management level staff at the agencies and the European institutions. The conclusion is that multiprincipal, rational-choice approaches to delegation, in which competition between the European institutions is a key explanatory variable, provides the best framework for analysing delegation to European executive agencies. The thesis also concludes that the 'delegation of delegation', in which powers originally assigned to the Commission have been delegated by the Commission to new agencies, is an important new development in the EU's institutional structure and has implications for how delegation processes are studied in the EU context.
Resource Type
DOI
Date Created
  • 2012
Former identifier
  • 947372

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